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IDENTITY: A CONCEPTUAL, EMPIRICAL,
AND METHODOLOGICAL STUDY

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Norman, Oklahoma
1963

IDENTITY: A CONCEPTUAL, EMPIRICAL,
AND METHODOLOGICAL STUDY

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Interest in the use of identity as a psychological concept has increased rapidly in recent years. Although the term appeared earlier with approximately its present connotations in the psychological literature (Bhattacharyya, 1931; Amen, 1926), its present use stems primarily from its re-introduction by Erikson (1950, 1956).

The current widespread use of the term in several disciplines¹ may be indicative of more than just popularization of the concept. The immediate and general acceptance of

¹To suggest the scope of the use of the concept of identity across disciplines in the social sciences, the following examples are illustrative:

In psychiatry: Szasz (1961); Erikson (1959); Ruesch (1961).

In conversion (brainwashing) processes: Lifton (1961); Schein (1961).

In education: Brown (1962).

In social work: Wolstad (1961).

In human development: Church (1961); Blos (1962).

In sociology: Stein, Vidich, and White (1960); Lynd (1961); Josephson and Josephson (1962).

the term may be more indicative of a relatively independent confluence of thought across disciplines in attempting to reach more powerful and integrative concepts (Becker, 1962). The immediate accession of the concept by the several areas of inquiry into human behavior may therefore be taken as evidence of the integrative conceptual-theoretical significance of the concept at our present level of understanding in the behavioral sciences.

A term of such manifest importance in the current literature provides thereby an intrinsic justification for empirical study: "It is almost enough to demonstrate the significance of the concept 'identity' by referring to the rapidity with which it has caught on in the social sciences" (Rose, 1962, p. 93). Since the re-legitimation of the study of self and self-processes by Hilgard (1949) and Cottrell (1950), there must certainly remain little need to justify the undertaking of self-concept related studies in psychology. However, the present study had as its primary impetus the ultimate objective of evaluating the potential integrative power of the concept identity, particularly for its conceptual-theoretical use in social psychology and its pathologies, such as psychiatry (Feibleman, 1962).

In political science: Pye (1962).
 In psychology: Jourard (1958); Allport (1961).
 In anthropology: Lee (1959); Cohen (1961).
 In social psychology: Strauss (1959); Shibutani (1961).

The specific objectives of the study reported here were, therefore, the following:

1. To examine the conceptual dimensions of the concept identity that have arisen from the proliferation of its use, with a view toward some proposed theoretical clarification. As Rose (1962) has said:

...the impetus to discovery afforded by the term has been so great that its meaning threatens to spill over the bounds of analytic utility. Before its meaning becomes totally lost by awakening every conceivable response in every conceivable investigator (like the term 'personality'), the concept must be salvaged (p. 93).

While no attempt was made to refine a definition of the term and thus restrict its explanatory power (Popper, 1950), some understanding of the different orders of phenomena referred to by the term seemed necessary to the theoretical usefulness of the concept. A careful study of the kinds of phenomena various writers have referred to in their use of the term was thus expected to lead to some empirical (rather than merely theoretical-descriptive) utility for the concept.

2. To investigate empirically the usefulness of the concept in the assessment and interpretation of human behavior. The approach followed here is particularly apropos a prototheoretical position such as that of Levy (1963). A number of empirical studies of limited scope were carried out to test the usefulness of the concept in assessing psychological structuring and experience, and the possibilities

for relating inferences about identity to certain behavioral performances and psychological experiencing (Gendlin, 1962). The empirical studies reported here were also carried out to explore the possibility of utilizing a test battery as an assessment device, and of providing an empirical basis for resolving some apparent contradictions in the various theoretical formulations of identity.

3. To examine procedurally several methodologies for the empirical and clinical investigation of subjective identity. The cross-validation of several assessment instruments, and an evaluation of those developed specifically for this study, were intended to provide a basis for further research and the refinement of techniques for apprehending various structural and qualitative aspects of psychological identity.

The results of the conceptual-analytic survey undertaken to satisfy the first basic objective are reported in Chapters 2 and 3, and serve as a theoretical basis for the balance of the study. In Chapters 4 and 5, the research undertaken to satisfy the second basic objective of this study is described and discussed. That phase of the empirical work concerned with the evaluation of assessment instruments devised especially for this study is described in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides a summary and conclusions, an evaluation of the various methodologies utilized in the study, and a brief discussion of some implications of the results of this study for further

research. The several test instruments and scales, and other relevant procedural detail, are presented in the indicated appendixes.

Chapter 2

The Concept of Identity: I

As Popper (1950) has suggested, the explanatory power of our language may be a function of the imprecision of our terms. If this be true, then the ambiguity and surplus meaning associated with the term identity provide it with considerable explanatory power (Strauss, 1959, p. 9). Thus, no attempt will be made here to refine or pontificate a composite definition or to reconcile apparent inconsistencies; rather, the objective is to explore the connotations that various writers have given the term in order to dimensionalize the concept in the form of derived propositions.

The present widespread use of the term identity reflects a confluence of theoretical formulations in several areas of inquiry into human behavior. Hence, the plan of this and the following chapter is:

1. To present a brief overview of the conceptual-theoretical backgrounds from which the present uses of the concept identity have emerged;
2. To review the uses of the term by some of its

leading proponents in order to establish a firmer conceptual foundation for its empirical use;

3. To derive a set of "propositions" from the analysis of the theoretical positions examined;

4. To relate the concept to a number of other concepts in psychology in order to provide a broad theoretical context for its empirical use; and

5. To articulate a tentative theoretical formulation on which to base the empirical studies undertaken and reported in the following chapters.

The problem of identity, in some form, has been a matter of concern in physical and psychological inquiry since the days of Parmenides. While this chapter will be devoted primarily to an assessment of the state of the concept as it is currently employed in psychology, and not to histories of identity and related terms which are adequately reported elsewhere, a cursory indication of some conceptually-related backgrounds may be a useful introduction to the reviews of specific theoretical positions which follow.

Antecedent and Correlative Concepts

If a conceptually composite theory of identity were to be articulated today, it would reflect a heritage from philosophy, from self theory, and from ego theory.

In philosophy, concern about identity has been directed

toward three different but related problems: toward the problem of the identity of objects to a perceiver (Myerson, 1962); toward the complementary problem of the identity of the perceiver vis-à-vis those objects of the real world (Parker, 1917; Price-Williams, 1957); and toward the problem of accounting for the "mental" (or neurophysiological) dynamics of the perceiver's transactions with the "external" world, that is, of the nature of the correspondence between external and internal realities, as in the so-called "identity theory."² Such concerns as these, while only indirectly related to the concept of identity as it is presently being used in psychology, are of considerable metatheoretical interest. For example, the notion that a person's identity and his perceptions of his world are intimately interrelated emerges from these philosophical questions as a distinct prototheoretical position in the psychological use of the concept today (van den Berg, 1955; Levy, 1956).

Current use of the concept identity is obviously also related both explicitly and implicitly to self and self-theory concepts in a number of direct and tangential ways. These relationships can be dealt with most appropriately as a part of the assessment of contemporary identity formulations

²The identity theory is obviously an attempt to render monistic the dualism or interactionism implied by the existence of the first two problems. Cf. Campbell (1957); Bertocci (1962). For a psychological treatment, cf. Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961, p. 11 ff., p. 62 ff.).

which comprises the major part of this chapter. Of special interest in the way of an overview has been the movement from apprehending identity as a function of consciousness (Locke), or memory (Hume), to its conception as an interpersonal phenomenon (Baldwin, 1895; Cooley, 1902; Sullivan, 1953). A similar movement is from the philosophical dilemma of self as knower (self-as-process or "ego") vs. self as known (self-as-object or "self-concept"), to a concept of self which attempts to incorporate these logically antithetical functions (Wylie, 1961; English and English, 1958; Bertocci, 1962; Dewey and Bentley, 1949).

Historically, the development of self-theories up to 1930 is adequately handled by Bittner (1932).³ The research literature on the self and self-concept, which dates from about 1949, is reported by Wylie (1961). An interesting review of studies on the formation of the self or ego is presented by Sherif and Cantril (1947, Ch. 7); a brief recapitulation is available in Sherif (1963, pp. 58-63). A very useful review of representative views of the self and the ego is that of Hall and Lindzey (1957, p. 469 ff.). This apparent overlapping of the concepts of self, ego, and identity will be dealt with later in this and the following chapter.

³An earlier classic statement is Laird (1917). Cf. Curtis (1915).

A third conceptual-terminological development related to identity is that of ego in the psychoanalytic (psychic apparatus) sense. This concept of ego stems primarily from the notion of an autonomous ego which appeared only very tentatively in Freud's later work (1950), and found refinement in the work of Hartmann (1958) and Rapaport (1951). The development of the concept of the autonomous ego is reviewed by Wiemers (1957). An evaluative study of the status of the concept of ego is offered by Allport (1943).

As may be seen from this brief overview, an apparent source of the conceptual confusion attendant upon self and ego theories, and earlier conceptions of personal identity, has been the characteristic inclination to place behavioral determination in the situation (e. g., role), in the individual, or in some formulation which dichotomizes or otherwise implies a dialectic between organism/environment. The concept of identity, as it becomes refined empirically, may eventually provide a means of accomodating these disparate kinds and levels of determination within one theoretical perspective.

Specific relationships between the current use of the concept identity and these three broad conceptual antecedents will be dealt with as they arise in the analysis which follows.

Some Representative Theoretical Formulations

In this section, a brief analysis is presented of the

unique aspects of the meaning attached to the concept of identity by representative users of that term in the current literature.

Erikson. Since it was Erikson (1950; 1959) who re-introduced the term identity, the precursory usage is his.

Erikson's formulation of the concept of identity (deriving as it did from psychoanalytic ego psychology) is multiform. At different times, he has given the concept at least four basic meanings:

1. A conscious sense of individual identity;
2. An unconscious striving for a continuity of character;
3. A criterion for the silent doings of ego synthesis;
and
4. Maintenance of an inner solidarity with a group's
ideals and identity.

In so endowing the term with multiform meaning, Erikson includes within his concept the self as subject and the self as object. This surplus meaning with which he has endowed the term leads both to a richer conceptualization and to some ambiguity and theoretical difficulty.

A distinctive consistency of Erikson's formulation is the manner in which he implicates some correspondence between the inner and outer worlds as both the impetus for and the objective of a sense of reality. For example, "The sense of ego identity...is the accrued confidence that the inner sameness and continuity are matched by the sameness and continuity

of one's meaning for others..." (1950, p. 228). Yet ego identity seems not clearly to serve social functions for Erikson: "Psychologically speaking, a gradually accruing ego identity is the only safeguard against the anarchy of drives as well as the autocracy of conscience" (1959, p. 93).

At times, Erikson's use of the term is much like the notion of ego synthesis in psychoanalytic theory: integration in youth, he suggests,

is more than the sum of the childhood identifications. It is the inner capital accrued from all these experiences of each successive stage, when successful identification led to successful alignment of the individual's basic drives with his endowment and his opportunities (1959, p. 89).

Perhaps as a matter of structural necessity, from a psychoanalytic point of view, this same notion of synthesis or integration appears frequently in his formulations: "Ego identity...develops out of a gradual integration of all identification..." (1959, p. 90).

The assertion just quoted also reflects an additional theme which recurs in Erikson's writing: that the development of ego identity, while a particular characteristic of one stage of development, is a continuing process, and one crucial to the achievement of maturity. A further quotation will reflect the process character of identity in one of Erikson's non-structural formulations:

An increasing sense of identity...is experienced pre-consciously as a sense of psychosocial well-being. Its most obviously concomitants are a feeling of being at home in one's body, a sense of 'knowing where one is going,' and an inner assuredness of anticipated recognition from those who count. Such a sense of identity, however, is never gained or maintained once and for all (1959, p. 118).

For Erikson, the term identity "covers much of what has been called the self by a variety of workers"--Mead's "self-concept," Sullivan's "self-system," the "fluctuating self-experiences" of Schilder and Federn, Hartmann's "cathected self" and "self-representation" (at least the genetic continuity of that function)--and is not unrelated to what Freud referred to as "attitudes toward the self" (1959, pp. 147-48). Throughout, however, Erikson seems to have been concerned with a psychosocial equilibrium that involves both self-definition and social recognition (each as a function of the other). Achieving identity is thus an attainment of a sense of the reality of the self within social reality. Yet he did not neglect the cognitive aspects of identity: "...identity and ideology are two aspects of the same process" (1959, p. 157). Thus, for all the richness of Erikson's formulations, he implies considerably more than he expressed for the psychological use of the concept. He implies a fundamental relationship between identity and the capacity for "fully-functioning," and of the achievement of identity as a basis for "self-actualizing." He observed that "everything that makes for a strong ego contributes to its identity" (1959, p. 39). With the achievement of a well-defined identity, he postulated a coincidence of functional pleasure and actual performance, of ego ideal and social role.

At one point or another, Erikson characterizes identity as an affective state or condition, a process, a function,

a quality of structure, a goal and simultaneously the drive toward that goal, and as an agent. Such diverse formulations are not conducive to systematic conceptualizations at an empirical level. But the ambiguity and surplus meaning with which he endowed the concept served well the concept's rapid and widespread adoption by other workers.

Wheelis. For Wheelis (1958), personal identity is a stable vantage point from which to view experience, a vantage point which contemporary man, through his extended awareness, has lost. Wheelis writes from a theme which recurs in twentieth-century literature, and in the tracts of cultural analysts such as Fromm, Riesman, and Whyte. A single quotation may best characterize Wheelis's formulation:

Identity is a coherent sense of self. It depends upon awareness that one's endeavors and one's life make sense, that they are meaningful in the context in which life is lived. It depends also upon stable values, and upon the conviction that one's actions and values are harmoniously related. It is a sense of wholeness, of integration, of knowing what is right and what is wrong and of being able to choose (p. 19).

As evidenced by the preceding quotation, an essential aspect of Wheelis's formulation is the place of value:

"Identity is founded on value...the beliefs, faiths, and ideals which integrate and determine subordinate values.... Values determine goals, and goals define identity" (p. 200, p. 174). Wheelis also reaffirms Erikson's emphasis on the crucial role of ideology in identity achievement. And,

following White (1961), Wheelis asserts that indeterminate life goals lead to indeterminate identity.

Strauss. Anselm Strauss begins his "essay" with the following comment: "Identity as a concept is fully as elusive as is everyone's sense of his own personal identity. But whatever else it may be, identity is connected with the fateful appraisals made of oneself--by oneself and by others" (1959, p. 9). Although he does not definitively go beyond this brief characterization, Strauss utilizes the freedom provided by the ambiguity, vagueness, and diffuseness of Erikson's term to discuss the role of language and interaction in identity, the various transformations of identity, and the function of group identity: e. g., "...personal identity is meshed with group identity..." (p. 173). Of particular relevance for the present study is Strauss's reminder that one's own behavior must be interpreted in the same way that others' behavior is interpreted, for the meaning of neither is self-evident. The legitimacy of this point raises a concern which will be dealt with later: that a sense of continuity is a function of an individual's ascriptions and not of his behavior. The continuity which provides the basis for Erikson's primary formulation of identity is not in one's behavior, but in his assessment of his behavior.

Lynd. Lynd's formulation is more social-psychological in nature, and emphasizes social aspects in individual orientations. In Lynd, as in Wheelis, one finds the stress on "Who am I?": "The search for identity...is a social as well as an individual problem. The kind of answer one gives to the question Who am I? depends in part upon how one answers the question What is this society--and this world--in which I live?" (1961, pp. 14-15). Lynd's focus is, as the title of her book implies, upon the relatively uncodifiable, pervasive experiences of life which she sees to have "a peculiarly close relation to the sense of identity." She concentrates particularly on one such experience--that of shame. Her basic hypothesis is that "experiences of shame if confronted full in the face may throw an unexpected light on who one is and point the way toward who one may become" (1961, p. 20). The self-conscious experiences of shame, which involve the whole self, may thus provide substantial clues for the understanding of the sense of identity. The sudden awareness that shame affords, of a discrepancy between what one appears to be and what one thought one to be, between the world one thought one knew and what it appears to be in the experience of shame, may provide both a sense of one's past identity and a powerful precursor of his future identity.

The feeling of shame--which may also be seen as a falling short of one's own ideal--is a consequence of the failure to achieve expectations of others or of a situation.

When one's assumptions of who he is and what the world is like are negated or disconfirmed, he experiences the shame and anxiety of being unable to trust his answers to the question: Who am I? In such "confrontations," in which one finds his anchorages undependable, he questions who he is and thus becomes what his self-ideal in dialectic with his experiences enable him to become. Becoming oneself is thus more than finding one's role or roles. The adoption of a socially approved role, when that role does not coincide with the deepest desires of the individual, is, according to Lynd, a form of depersonalization.

Also of importance in Lynd's formulations, as in Strauss's, is the manner in which a person names and connotes the persons, objects, and institutions of his world. Just as the constraints of one's language may preclude one's ability to communicate his sense of identity, the same constraints hold for the investigator. One's ability to encounter life and others with full awareness, however, may be a prerequisite to one's full confrontation of himself--whether verbal or preverbal.

Finally, one's identity is not something to be discovered--as Horney, Fromm, and Sullivan seem sometimes to assume--but something to be created in discovery as a lifelong endeavor. Experiences of identity are experiences of the viability of one's personal idiom in full awareness of the style of life (norms, standards, values) offered or

imposed by one's groups and one's society. One's identity is therefore, for Lynd, more than a composite of one's identifications and/or roles. It is an experience of transcending these in encountering life at a higher level of awareness and mutuality. Thus the achievement of a firm sense of identity--while never fully realized--implies the courage of risking incongruity and inappropriateness in personal relations:

Openness to relatedness with other persons and the search for self-identity are not two problems but one dialectical process; as one finds more relatedness to other persons one discovers more of oneself; as the sense of one's own identity becomes clearer and more firmly rooted one can completely go out to others (1961, p. 241).

This point appears also in Wheelis (1958): "...the sense of identity comes from being meaningfully related to others in an organic community" (p. 51), and in Tournier (1962).

Ruesch. Ruesch's formulation, if no more immediately operational, is somewhat more definitive:

In psychiatric terms, identity refers to a person's awareness of what he is, a feeling of being a self-contained unit regardless of situation, group, or activity. To have an identity means to possess an absolute core that defines what is good for self.... To have an identity implies commitment to long-term goals, enabling the individual to minimize activities undertaken for reasons of expediency or boredom. Identity also means responsibility, above all, towards self, compelling an individual to look after his own welfare and growth and to avoid all those things that are detrimental to body and soul (1961, pp. 282-83).

And further: "...the sense of identity at any one moment is

almost synonymous with the sense of integrity, independence, and usefulness that an individual possesses" (1961, p. 284). Ruesch emphasizes also that what goes into the sense of identity is codified within the organism in the analogic mode, and that logical, analytical, deductive (and verbal) approaches are digital and cannot therefore deal fully with human experiences of the analogic mode (1961, p. 283, p. 290).

Consistent with Erikson's multidimensional formulation, Ruesch believes that identity can be defined in terms of one's name, age, sex, past experiences, status, roles, and many other factors. He is particularly concerned with the communication pathologies attendant an ill-defined identity. Thus, for Ruesch, identity "subsumes all those processes which clarify an individual's awareness of his functions vis-à-vis others and of what he has to expect of himself" (1957, p. 93).

Fromm. Fromm postulates that a sense of identity is a universal need (1955, p. 69). The simplest formulation of identity that Fromm offers is the individual's experience that he is the subject and the agent of his powers. A sense of identity based upon that particular experience is, for Fromm, a prerequisite to mental health. It is the kind of experience which may mean, simply, that "I am what I do" (1947, p. 72).

Fromm's "marketing orientation," in which one is as others desire him, may be a necessary substitute (since one cannot live doubting his identity) for a genuine feeling of identity. As does Ruesch, Fromm postulates a basic core which is the reality behind the word "I" (conceptually similar to Mead's "I"); it is upon this "core" that one bases his conviction of his own identity. Failure to have faith in oneself means becoming dependent upon others' approval for a feeling of identity within oneself.

May. Contrary to the Lynd, Fromm, and other formulations, May suggests that absorption in the group is tantamount to giving up one's existence as an identity in its own right (1953, p. 29). And in direct contrast to Goffman (1962) and Becker (1962), May believes that as performers in life, we cease to be persons who live and act as selves. For May, then, one's identity is more than just one's self--more than the sum of the roles one plays. It is the capacity for being aware that one plays roles.

Additionally, May proposes that a valid sense of identity implies a sense of worth. The person with a firm sense of identity will be aware of, and experience fully, his feelings, and he will know what he wants in contradistinction to what he thinks he should want. The person with a strong sense of identity will integrate his life around self-chosen goals. Consistent with the position taken by Strauss and Lynd on tradition and history, May writes, "One of the distinguishing

marks of strength as a self is the capacity to immerse oneself in tradition and at the same time be one's own unique self" (1953, p. 208). Thus, a firm sense of personal identity seems for May to be a function of one's achievements and faith in one's unique self.

Bettelheim. Bettelheim (1960) equates identity with the subjective conviction of one's uniqueness arrived at through choices and decisions made out of inner conviction. One's identity derives from and is consonant with a respect for one's work and a pleasure in one's competence to carry it out. Man achieves a sense of identity through his achievement of an autonomous existence. Conformity to the reasonable demands of society is thus a creative experience for the person with a heightened sense of personal identity. The ability to "be oneself" is a matter of personal integration and is not entirely dependent on the structure of society (1960, p. 88). One achieves integration and a sense of being oneself through the exercise of choice.

Schachtel. Schachtel's primary emphasis (1961) is on paper-identity as a substitute for authentic identity. He equates self-aberration with doubt about and search for identity, and sees both as a concomitant of aberration from others and from the world around us. Such aberration, which precludes a sense of identity, leads one to substitute a

fixed, reified personality for ongoing psychological processes of growth. Looking upon oneself as a thing, and basing one's existence on the support of some reified attribute of that thing, precludes the achievement of an authentic identity. Consequently, Schachtel stresses the importance (after Goethe) of self-knowledge through awareness of one's relations to other people and to the world.

Lifton. The inseparability of belief and identity is Lifton's (1961) unique focus.⁴ Implicitly, what one seeks is an ideological self-definition that facilitates self respect. Thus, ego-strength is not equivalent to strength of identity for Lifton. One may exhibit high ego-strength but remain ideologically ill-defined. Lifton equates identity with a personal thesis or creed.

Laing. Laing's formulations (1960; 1962) are similar to those of Sullivan, Fromm-Reichmann, and Arieti: the absence of a sense of identity is equivalent to a precarious ontological security. A person who has such a low threshold of security is thus preoccupied with preserving rather than gratifying himself. Adequate interpersonal relationships therefore are contingent upon a firm sense of one's own

⁴Cf. Wm Sargent's (1957) point that one's political and religious beliefs are the essence of his identity.

autonomous identity. In psychoanalytic terms, a lack of a firm sense of one's autonomous identity is concomitant with the amorphousness or loss of ego boundaries. Laing suggests that an authentic identity is two-dimensional and is established by a conjunction of identity-for-others and identity-for-oneseif, the former being "objective," the latter "subjective." Following Erikson, Laing postulates the necessity of a conjunction of self-other recognition for a sense of identity; this he refers to as "complementarity." A purely "subjective" identity cannot be "real" (1962, p. 101). One's uncertainty of identity in time leads to a reliance upon spatial (physical) identity. In all cases, an ongoing dialectical relationship is a prerequisite; one's identity is a complement to another's. One's own identity can therefore never be abstracted from his identity for others: One's "identity for himself depends to some extent on the identity others ascribe to him, but also on the identities he attributes to others, and hence on the identity or identities he attributes to the other(s) as attributing to him" (1962, p. 75).

A person's identity is therefore the complex of all those aspects of his being whereby he and others identify him. Laing also suggests that there may be a qualitative difference between knowing who one is and what one is.

While one's identity, whatever its subsequent vicissitudes may be, is originally conferred on one, one's identity may be self-defined by a re-definition of others (1962, p. 85). The

drive to significance may thus be achieved in phantasy, clearly suggesting that there may be a distinct difference between what one presumes himself to be (subjective report) and what or who he is for others.

Szasz. For Szasz (1961), identification is the underlying psychological mechanism of identity.⁵ Szasz's primary focus, however, and the one of most interest to this study, is upon the distinction between a conscious, responsible assumption of life-role (authentic existence and identity), and passive acceptance of one's life-role as imposed upon oneself (in-authentic existence and identity). Thus Szasz stresses the similarity between identity studies, existential interest in authenticity, and semiotical and game-analytic inquiries into human behavior (1961, p. 250).

Goffman. Goffman (1959; 1961), like Foote (1951), equates identity with role--or, more precisely, with the concatenation of roles which one actually performs. A person may thus have many selves or many identities--as many as the different roles he plays or personages he exhibits. An individual carrying out a role is performing; in his performance, he will attempt to express the identity imputed to him by others. Identities are thus game-generated. Such a formulation is not inconsistent

⁵Cf. Foote (1951); and Winch (1962). For an interesting study of identification pathology, see Baumberger (1961).

with Szasz's notion of game-regulated behavior, but Szasz's conception is distinguished by his emphasis on the inauthenticity of only playing the roles imposed upon one by society.

Allport. Beginning with the notion of self-continuity through memory, Allport (1961) points out that a sense of identity is a function of one's awareness of the "I" as the continuing factor in intermittent relationships with the world. For Allport, everything that an individual has and does is in the way of enhancing his sense of identity--as long as those objects and actions serve to differentiate self from non-self. Of all the confirming props, a person's name remains his most important anchorage. One's identity, for Allport, is ultimately his answer to the question, "Who am I?" The answer depends upon one's "directedness" or "intentionality."

Allport subrogates identity to one aspect of selfhood or the proprium, the others being bodily sense, self-esteem, self-image, self-extension, and propiarte striving. The individual attempts to establish his identity by trying to discover his peculiar place in the world.

Becker. For Becker (1961), one's identity is symbolic and is formed through others. One nourishes that identity by submitting it for public approval and aggrandizement. Identity can only be validated in the social encounter. Not unlike the Peters (1958) and Szasz and Goffman formulations, and based upon Mead's and Sullivan's theoretical positions, Becker sees

the self-system as a locus composed of internalized social rules for behavior (1961, p. 168), but based upon a firm feeling of identity. Becker agrees essentially with Fromm that identity is the individual's subjective experiencing that he is the agent of his powers. He emphasizes that the only standard of veridity for identity is the socially-agreed one. Thus, "by performing according to the standards of which others approve...one earns an identity" (1961, p. 187). Yet one also builds an identity by achieving a sense of mastery.

One measure of a person's sense of identity, suggests Becker, is his power to sustain interaction--to conjoin in staging a joint cultural self-enhancing ceremony. Like Goffman and Foote, Becker sees identity as inseparable from role. Yet the self of which one is aware is largely a style of performance. Throughout, Becker emphasizes the symbolic, as contrasted with the behavioral, determination of identity.

Other Formulations. Stein and Vidich (1960) equate identity with personal style. Achieving a personal style requires, in their view, a high degree of self-insight, particularly into the limiting effects of one's habitual responses.

By implication, the "ego" of Sherif and Cantril's treatment (1947, Ch. 12) is similar to what several writers refer to as identity. Their descriptions of the consequences of the loss of identity and identity breakdowns are particularly

apropos. For these authors, identity is roughly equated with identification with groups. Fromm, and Klein (1961), both offer some support for this position.

Jourard (1958) suggests two "definitions" of identity: as the subjective experience of "being one's real self," and as a person's beliefs concerning the ways in which other people think about him. A person thus reinforces those beliefs by behaving consistently in order to maintain that identity.

One's body image and his clothes--in fact, all aspects of his appearance to others--may be significant factors in his identity (Schilder, 1935; Stone, 1962). The implication here is that one's identity may be characteristically anchored in some apparent aspect of himself (including the objects he owns, the part of town in which he lives, etc.), but that such external anchorages may at the same time bode ill for his ultimate realization of himself. Such external means of being identified by others, when taken as the sum-total of one's personal identity, are thematically implied in such appraisals as Jung's (1933), whose "Modern Man in Search of a Soul" may be thought of as a man in search of something more than the sum of others' definitions of him.

Foote and Cottrell (1955) believe the pursuit of identity to be a positive value "without limit." They also suggest that the growth of competence is not separable from the elaboration of identity.

The fact that an individual's identity was defined from

birth in past ages, but that in contemporary western society man must find his own unique identity, is a central point in Church's (1961) formulation; one thus forges his identity as he forges the other aspects of his less-structured social world.

For Dorsey and Seegers, a firm sense of identity is a function of one's awareness of his essential subjectivity. Denial of this ultimate and omnipresent subjectivity vis-à-vis the world implies for these writers some degree of self-amnesia: "The illusion of self-detachment is the one sign of immaturity and of illness" (1959, p. 80).

Some Derived Propositions

To partly "operationalize" the concept of identity, and to establish an empirical base for its apprehension and assessment, a number of propositions have been derived from the theoretical literature on identity. The derivations were made on the basis of their commonality and centrality to the various writers cited, and on the basis of their relevance to the theoretical formulation employed in the research reported in the following chapters.

The present set of propositions has been "factored" by inspection from an original list of 127 items. It is immediately apparent that different orders and levels of phenomena are implicit in the statement of the various

propositions offered. No attempt was made to systematize the propositions according to the order or level of phenomena involved, other than to remain cognizant of the three basic levels of reference--the cognitive-evaluative, the experiential, and the behavioral. It is also immediately apparent that these propositions are not independent of each other, a condition which, when dealing with a conceptually-integrative notion such as identity, is to be expected.

Propositions Relative to a "High," "Stable," "Well-Integrated," "Strong," "Authentic," or "Firm" Sense of Identity.⁶

Individuals who may, in keeping with the preceding theoretical formulations, be said to manifest a positive, viable sense of subjective identity may present the following potentially assessable characteristics:

1. An articulated or articulative feeling that life is being lived by self initiation rather than simply happening to the individual (Erikson), and of knowing who one is and where he is going (Wheelis). Such an individual would both feel and exhibit evidence of being the agent of his own powers (Fromm), and will have achieved or be achieving a

⁶Most of these and the following propositions have been derived from the work of the writers dealt with in the preceding section; hence specific references are not repeated. Where previously uncited writers are drawn upon, specific references are provided.

conscious and responsible assumption of a life-role--of an authentic existence (Szasz).

2. Feelings of, and external or behavioral evidence of, autonomy, as contrasted to heteronomy (Bettelheim).

3. Purposiveness, and the possession of definite goals toward which the individual is actively working (Wenkart, 1961).

4. Mastery of some culturally worthwhile endeavor (Erikson); feelings of, and behavioral evidence of, competency (Foote and Cottrell) and productivity (Fromm); a sense of active achieving in life (Becker).

5. Feelings and expressions of confidence, and anxiety-free expectations of recognition by those who count (Erikson and Becker).

6. Evidence of true engagement with others, which is both the result and the test of firm identity (Erikson); openness to relatedness with other persons (Laing); the ability or capacity, as demonstrated by one's behavior, to love (in the Frommian or Maslovian sense). These conditions imply a clear commitment to oneself as a certain kind of person, and the ability to reveal oneself to others (Lynd, 1961; Jourard, 1963).

7. Full participation and involvement in the now (Ruesch); spontaneity (Erikson), and freedom from debilitating self-consciousness (Lynd and Becker).

8. A sense of inner continuity and sameness (Erikson, Allport, etc.). A feeling of being a self-contained unit regardless of situation, group, or activity (Ruesch).

9. A clear recognition of one's ultimate subjectivity

(Dorsey and Seegers), and a self-knowledge or self-awareness which enables an internal locus of evaluation (Rogers) that provides the basis for the ability to choose between right and wrong (Ruesch) with the contingent recognition that there is no recourse from making one's choices ultimately alone (May). Acceptance of the fact that one's life is one's own responsibility (Lynd). Expressions of knowing what one wants rather than wanting what one thinks he should want (May)--e.g., the ability to express desires and wishes without moral sanction.

10. A conviction that one's life and endeavors make sense (Wheelis), with a concomitant sense of pleasure in living, of usefulness, and of general well-being (Wheelis).

11. Congruency between one's actions and one's values (Wheelis, May, Rogers). A high degree of coincidence between ego ideal and social role (Erikson), and a conjunctiveness between subjective identity and public identity (Laing).

12. A personal style or idiom (Bettelheim; Stein and Vidich). This characteristic implies an awareness and transcendence of role-demand and other social imperatives, an awareness of interpersonal relations (Sullivan, 1953), and a high degree of insight into the limiting effects of habitual or stereotypical responses (Becker).

13. High self-evaluation, self-respect, and self-esteem (Becker, Allport, and others).

14. An ability to cope with life metaphorically (Ruesch); high tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. A keen sense

and appreciation of the tragic and the comic in life (Ruesch, May).

15. An awareness of, and ability fully to experience, one's feelings (May; Gendlin, 1962).

Propositions Relative to a "Low," "Unstable," "Diffuse," "Weak," "Inauthentic," or "Infirm" Sense of Identity.

Individuals who may be said to manifest a negative, impoverished sense of subjective identity may present the following potentially assessable characteristics:

1. A distantiative orientation to reality (Laing, Erikson), and a lack of problem-centering (Maslow, 1954).

2. A disintegration of the sense of continuity, and a heightened sense of isolation (Erikson). Such uncertainty about one's temporal identity may lead to a reliance on spatial identity (Laing).

3. An inability to derive a sense of accomplishment from one's activities, an inability to concentrate, and an excessive awareness and abhorrence of competitive activities (Erikson).

4. A basic mistrust (Erikson).

5. An ability to enter only stereotyped and formalized relationships, or seeking intimacy with unlikely partners. Little or no capacity for mutual relationships (Erikson). Extreme dependence and reliance on paper identity and visible

roles or sociological classifications (Schachtel).

6. Overemphasis of differences from others (Ruesch).
Expressions of belief that only others have power (Becker).

7. Inability to assume some kind of immortality (Ruesch).
Attempts to live anonymously or remotely by being "only a little man," and by committing oneself to the wisdom of society's managers; anxious retreat or depressive helplessness (Bettelheim), with obviously artificial facades for different people and different circumstances (Schachtel).
Fear of individuality (Erikson and others).

8. Pervasive indifference (Fromm; Eckhardt, 1961).

9. A "marketing-orientation" to others (Fromm); an inability to transcend others' approval and identifications.

10. Seeking identity with non-human objects, ideas, or with Nature (May).

11. A loss of sense of tragedy (May).

12. Self-condemnation in order to achieve a substitute sense of worth (May, Szasz).

13. Intellectual-affective dichotomization (Maslow, Fromm, Gendlin), and other similar either-or orientations (Becker).

14. A putting-off of the beginning of "real life": "Things will be better when..."; and a fatalistic attitude toward time: "Why start anything when..." (May).

15. Too easy internalization of handy ideologies and values (Brown, 1962; Symonds, 1951).

Chapter 3

The Concept of Identity: II

Like any fundamental or integrative concept, identity bears some conceptual relationship, or has some theoretical implications, for many other concepts and theories. A brief indication of some closely related concepts and implications for psychological theory may serve to provide an additional increment to the present empirical foundations of the concept of identity.

Related Concepts and Implications

First, the concept of identity is obviously closely related to the concept of self (and self-concept) and to the concept of ego, as the latter term is used both in psychology and psychoanalysis. It is possible that the further development of the concept of identity will clarify the similarities and differences in the references of these terms. At the present time, some authors subsume identity under the

concept of self or proprium, as Allport (1961) structures those terms. Others subsume the notion of self under that of identity (Smith, 1950). It does seem clear at the present state of theoretical development that "self" and "ego" are connotatively more likely to refer to internal structures or qualities--whether static or dynamic. As Snygg and Combs (1949) point out, the function of one's self is to define one's relation to the world. From that perspective, one's identity would be the consequence of that function. Identity would seem to be more than the function of relating oneself, however; it is construed more as the experience of being related to the world in a number of different ways simultaneously. Thus identity is a concept connotatively closer to the relation between organism and environment than to psychic apparatus per se (Perls, Hefferline, and Goodman, 1951; Angyal, 1941).

Identity seems to be conceptually related also to Mead's "I" and to Freud's original "ich." The internalization of society, on the other hand, which becomes for many writers the self or self-system or even the ego, is more nearly related to Mead's "me." There are also definite conceptual similarities between the use of identity by some writers and what Horney refers to as the "real self" or Fromm as the "true self" (Munroe, 1955). In its "affective" or experiential dimension, identity is related to Federn's "ego-feeling," and, in other respects, to Cattell's integrative "self-sentiment" or McDougall's "sentiment of self-regard." There are also conceptual similarities between identity and the concept of "sentiments" in Leighton (1959, Ch.7).

In its structural connotations, the concept of identity is related to Sullivan's "self-system." A weakness in, or disintegration of, the self-system is in turn conceptually related to the notion of depersonalization or ego breakdown, which many neo-Freudians, such as Federn, Schilder, and Symonds (1951) consider to be a factor in every neurosis.⁷ Loss of identity may thus be related both to the concept of depersonalization and to that of "fugue" (Fisher and Joseph, 1949).

It would appear that the structural connotations of identity overlap the concepts of self and ego. Clarification will await the results of the increased theoretical attention being given the concept of identity. What is apparent at this point is that self is used more to refer to the agent of one's powers or to what is apprehended "internally" by those powers; ego, on the other hand, refers more often to a set of processes and to the structure which houses those processes. Identity, as most frequently employed, refers to the experience of the certitude (and satisfactoriness) of one's definition vis-à-vis himself and his world, and secondarily to the nature or dynamics of that definition.

Second, the concept of identity is obviously related to theories of cognitive structure and functioning (Festinger,

⁷ An interesting explication is evident in the work of Bartlett (1932): if memory is a function of self-oriented references, depersonalization may be viewed as a breakdown of schemata through a dissolution of their personal attributes.

1957; Rapaport, 1957; Peak, 1958). The nature of this relationship is not immediately evident. But it appears probable that the experiences one has of "being himself" and of "being whole," etc., are some function of the consonance or dissonance of one's psychological structures vis-à-vis his behaviors and his cognitive inputs and processes. Gestalt and Lewinian behavioral systems are also conceptual relatives. Sarbin (1952) is more explicit when he suggests that one's self is in essence a cognitive structure consisting of one's ideas about various aspects of his being. Such a position opens up a fruitful manner of understanding and explaining ego-involvement, level of aspiration, and related phenomena (Sherif and Cantril, 1947).

Some approaches to psychological structuring which seem particularly likely to relate and clarify the structural aspects of the concept of identity are those of Hebb (1949), Deutsch (1960), and of Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960). Structures of (or for) behavior are implicitly self-environment relational (or transactional) possibilities, whether verbal or physical. As these behavioral structures may be affectively facilitated or impeded by self-referent structures, one experiences himself consciously in relation to the world. It may therefore be these "self-consciousnesses" which provide the experiential component of identity.

Third, the concept of identity is also related to the concepts of role and status. As indicated previously, some writers, such as Goffman and Becker, equate identity with role

and/or status. Role and status are, however, sociological designations--he is so-and-so a person because he is fulfilling such-and-such role--rather than psychological ones relating to one's experience of himself in or out of roles. Ruesch's (1957) distinction is typical: "Identity is felt as a permanent, somewhat unalterable part of the self; role is felt as a temporary function which is assumed" (p. 94). One's role or status may provide one's identity for others; but that level of analysis is sociological and should not be confused with the psychological level of analysis. (The bridge between the two levels in this instance lies in the fact that others' perceptions do have a distinct impact on one's own perceptions of himself.) The distinction made by several writers between conventional and interpersonal roles (Shibutani, 1961) is helpful, but one's transcendence of roles through his awareness of them and the creativity or personal idiom with which they are carried out (cf. Bettelheim and May) may be more a product of than a prerequisite to a firm sense of identity.

The distinction Tournier (1957) makes between person and personage is helpful. Tournier theorizes that a person is first of all his personages or roles or masks (his persona), but that his person is something created out of that concatenation of personages--a point utilized in the present empirical formulation. Additionally, one is not bound to an acceptance of others' definitions of him; he may make real his phantasies of his identity, if he can find (sometimes only in love or in

psychotherapy) complementarity for his imagined identity (Laing, 1962). Just as roles are created as well as discovered, identities are created as well as discovered.

Status is likewise a sociological designation, implying one's visible "identity" for others. While such complementarities as statuses may provide one a basis for knowing who he is vis-à-vis others, perhaps only a discrepancy between ascribed and achieved status will provide him with a consciousness of who he is vis-à-vis himself.

Fourth, identity is conceptually and occasionally theoretically related to identification and to definition (in the broadest sense of that term). For Szasz (1961) and for Foote (1951) and for Winch (1962), identity is more or less a summation of one's identifications. It is possible, within this view, that a sense of identity would be tantamount to bringing unconscious identifications into conscious awareness (cf. Lynd, 1961). Yet consciousness of one's identifications (which conceptually--if paradoxically--remove them from the function of identifications), may theoretically either heighten or reduce one's sense of identity. In any event, the selectivity involved in identifications remains to be explained, and one's sense of his own identity must be presumed to be a factor in that selectivity. As Lynd (1961) concludes,

Relations with other persons are something different from selective identifications with aspects of one's immediate social situation or with wider values. Both are involved, but neither comprehends all of person-to-person relations....The realization of identity is something more than, and different from identifications with parents and with social roles...(pp. 235, 263, 234).

Thus one's identifications, like one's roles, which together form his personage, are at least the basis for one's identity--but, as Ruesch (1961) has warned, in an analogic mode.

Fifth, the concept of identity is conceptually related to the notion of alienation, a long-standing theme in social analysis. Stemming from Hegel and Marx, the notion of alienation, which implies a kind of socially-imposed depersonalization, has been popularized in modern literature since Dostoyevsky's Notes from the Underground (1864). Conceptually related also to the psychological rendering of Durkheim's anomie and to Fromm's "marketing-orientation," alienation is behaviorally manifested, as in Beckett's Waiting for Godot, in passivity, paralysis, isolation, indecisiveness, and inertia. Other correlates are suggested by Dean (1961), by Seeman (1959), and by Davids (1955). However, it should be noted that self-actualizers (Maslow, 1954) may demonstrate some aspects of alienation when the determining criterion is cultural "normalcy." Alienation may also refer to the difficulty of basing one's identity on complementary relationships and on broader values determined from birth. In this view, alienation is more a failure to forge one's personal idiom in a community of minimum status and role formalization. To be "alienated" is thus not to be without identity in that sense; to be "alienated" is to be unable to accept one's (and another's) person under conditions of minimum imperatives regarding personage. An "alienated"

person may have a firm sense of identity (even if not negative), whereas a person with a weak or diffuse sense of identity may be not at all "alienated."

Sixth, whatever "theory" of identity may ultimately be formulated, it will be intimately related at many points to the many ramifications of existentialism in psychology. Notions such as "authenticity," "encounter," "involvement," "commitment," "being," and "becoming" overlap several of the propositions derived from the theoretical treatments of the concept of identity reviewed in the previous chapter (May, 1961; Maslow, 1962). Many have followed Kierkegaard's lead that the aim of life is "to be that self one truly is" (Nixon, 1962), and the implications of Tillich's The Courage to Be (1959). An interesting attempt to bridge the sociological-existential gap is offered by Tiryakian (1962).

The notion of existence is obviously closely related conceptually to the notion of subjective identity, but in a way or ways that have not as yet been defined. It would seem to be most likely that one's subjective identity derives from those aspects of his existence by which he may define himself in relation to all other aspects of his existence.

Seventh, the concept of identity is also obviously related to the increasing ramifications of self-actualization, self-realization, and individuation theories (Maslow, 1954 and 1962; Allport, 1955; Munroe, 1955; Murphy, 1958; Rogers, 1961).

The implicit underlying question of the ontological vs.

the epistemological self (Sarbin and Rosenberg, 1955; Hook, 1963) is one which has been dealt with earlier and will be clarified in the theoretical formulation which follows. It is a choice which need not be made. One's epistemological self is in itself unique. One's sense of his identity most likely emerges from his cognizance, not of the epistemological selves which he evidences, or of an ontological self or "core," but of a unique configuration of epistemological selves.

The concept of identity has implications for mental health: "The healthy individual knows who he is and does not feel basic doubts about his inner identity" (Jahoda, 1950; cf. Erikson, 1959; Sullivan, 1940), for creativity (Foote and Cottrell, 1955; MacKinnon, 1962), for conceptions of autonomy and conformity (Foote and Cottrell, 1955; Laing, 1962; Jahoda, 1958; Berg and Bass, 1961), and for the syndrome of "authoritarianism" or prejudice (Rokeach, 1960).

The theoretical formulation of identity which follows also has apparent implications for the field of motivation, for personality dynamics and structure theories, for value psychologies, interpersonal relations, approaches to attitude and attitude change, and for many other social psychological topics and problems.

A Tentative Formulation of Identity
(for Research and Assessment Purposes)

While little is to be gained by legislating a composite or eclectic formulation for a theoretical concept, some conceptual definition is necessary at the point of assessment or experimentation. Thus, on the basis of the preceding analysis, a tentative or working formulation has been established for the purpose of providing a means of assessing and researching identity. The difficulty and the tenuousness of such an attempt cannot be disregarded. As James wrote more than a half century ago:

The principle of personal identity...has been justly regarded as the most puzzling puzzle with which psychology has to deal; and whatever view one may espouse, one has to hold his position against heavy odds....Whatever solution be adopted...we may as well make up our minds in advance that it will fail to satisfy the majority of those to whom it is addressed (1890, p. 330)

Neither can the possibility of defining a conceptual "straw man" be disregarded. Laing (1962) has suggested, for example, that what we see in current literature and tracts on cultural analysis regarding the "quest" for identity may be nothing more than a shibboleth of our age.⁸ But the number of writers in

⁸E.g., "Saul Bellow's portrait, in The Adventures of Augie March, of a Jewish boy leaving the Chicago slums and wandering over three continents, not to make a fortune, but to find the answer to a simple question: Who am I? The question echoes through many recent novels, and it is a good question, too, one that helps to convey the puzzled spirit of this time..." (Cowley, 1962, p. 7).

various behavioral disciplines who are coming to suggest that one's quest for identity is "the very essence of human nature" (Allport, 1961) is increasing exponentially. The significance of the problem for social psychology and psychotherapy, as expressed by Rogers, among others, attests to the potential integrative power of the concept in psychology:

Below the level of the problem situation about which the individual is complaining--behind the trouble with studies, or wife, or employer, or with his own uncontrollable or bizarre behavior, or with his frightening feelings, lies one central search. It seems to me that at bottom each person is asking, 'Who am I, really? How can I get in touch with this real self, underlying all my surface behavior? How can I become myself?' (1961, p. 108).

Certainly there can be little doubt, as evidenced by the dominant trends in the psychologies of human behavior, that an individual's behavior is in some aspect a function of his self-definition apposite that behavior within the context of the situation as he views it. The theoretical notion of identity is central to this approach to the study of human behavior.

In the empirical sciences, a theory or concept is to be judged in great part by its usefulness. One objective of the following theoretical formulation and the research reported in the next two chapters was to test and evaluate the usefulness of this concept as an interpretive and research tool. Thus the present theoretical formulation was considered a necessary prerequisite to that evaluation (Hanson, 1961).

1. Identity is a construct which refers to the mode of one's orientations to his world. The construct also refers to one's experiences of those orientations in their behavioral manifestations or anticipations. Suzanne Langer refers to "man's ceaseless quest" for conception and orientation, Dewey to his observation that "the characteristic human need is for possession and appreciation of the meanings of things." One establishes the meaningfulness of his world, and his meaning within it, by relating himself to it psychologically. Identity refers to the kinds and qualities of those orientations.

In this manner, subjective identity refers to certain aspects of one's psychological "environment," analogous to what is referred to as the "internal milieu" at the physiological level (Shands, 1960). As such, identity may be no more easily quantified or formalized than that "internal milieu." Wiess (1958), for example, suggests that it is logically impossible to conceptualize these supralogical orders of human functioning.

2. Thus, identity, as a construct (i.e., not in its manifestations but in its conceptualization) has both an evaluative and a noetic dimension, both of which function analogically. For example, in terms of the evaluative dimension, all of one's values may be related to his self-valuation (Lecky, 1945) in some way. Since a person must interpret and evaluate his own behavior (or intentions) just as he must interpret and evaluate others' behavior (or their intentions),

he is able to say, "I am bad," "That was a good move on my part," and so on. To say, on the other hand, "I am John Jones," "an executive," etc., is a function of the noetic dimension. The two dimensions together comprise one's total psychological structure, and serve to distinguish the unique qualitative nature of the relationships which comprise that structure-- i.e., the manner in which it is differentiated (Witkin et al., 1962). It is out of the transactions between these two dimensions of identity that emerge one's experiences of his own identity. Thus, functioning with a high degree of congruity between the evaluative and the noetic dimensions (including one's expectations of others' reactions) gives rise to a qualitatively different experience of self-awareness (Harvey et al., 1961, p. 71 ff.) than functioning at a low level of congruity.⁹

3. One has an "identity" only at the sociological level. The behavioral manifestations of one's experiences (or anticipations of his experiences) of his subjective identity are to be inferred from his expectations about his transactions with the world implicit in the style of his behavior (i.e., in the systematic aspects of his behavior--verbal or nonverbal-- cf. Pascal and Jenkins, 1961). One's style of behavior implies,

⁹Cf. Osgood's "discontinuities," Festinger's "dissonances," and Rogers' "incongruities." Since these cognitive conditions may be viewed as a primary basis of self-consciousness, it is possible that perfect consonance within the psychological system or structure would be tantamount to total unself-consciousness.

in a functional way, his expectations regarding his behavior vis-à-vis other persons, society, reality, etc. (Szasz, 1961). Adler has suggested that there would be no need for an ego psychology if an adequate psychology of life-style could be developed (Munroe, 1955). Personal style at the cognitive level as discussed by Cohen (1960) is also apropos this position.

4. One's subjective identity, as one's self-system, is an emergent social phenomenon. What is sometimes referred to as one's ontological self (as contrasted with his epistemological self--Sarbin and Rosenberg, 1955; Hook, 1963) can perhaps better be construed as one's experiences of the total concatenation of his epistemological selves--i.e., as a function of one's psychological structure and its unique qualities.¹⁰ One creates his identity in much the same way as he creates his image or model of the "external" world; his experiences of his world vary with his orientations toward it (van den Berg, 1955) and the kind of responsibility he is willing to assume for these orientations (Dorsey and Seegers, 1959). Thus a subjective identity refers in part to one's power to determine himself vis-à-vis his world.

5. An essential aspect of one's subjective identity

¹⁰A useful concept here is that of the biologist Thompson, who proposes that each separate structure has its unique function, and that functions are thus a function of the form or structure from which they emanate (Thompson, 1952).

thus the effectance he experiences or anticipates vis-à-vis his psychological movement through his life and his world. This part of the present formulation is not unlike that of self-regard or self-valuation,¹¹ but effectance, which is White's (1959) term, seems much better equipped connotatively to facilitate empirical inquiry in the relational or transactional mode.

This effectance aspect is obviously (and necessarily) inferrable from one's actions and behaviors. In the same way that we might question the psychological integrity of an individual who in spite of his apparent achievements feels incompetent, we might also question the efficacy for psychological health of an individual's feelings of competence and effectance in the absence of any apparent achievements. The behavioral component would thus seem to have, as its concomitants, active as opposed to passive orientations, and achievement as opposed to discursive orientations. Fromm's point that one is what he does has considerable relevance here (1947, p. 72).

6. One's subjective identity may be "pathologically" anchored in a social identity which provides that person a freedom of movement beyond the acknowledged efficacy of that subjective identity. A lack of incongruity in one's functioning may serve also as a kind of self-anesthesia which precludes the

¹¹Cf. Becker (1961): "The basic predicate for human action is a qualitative feeling of self-value" (p. 163). The observation by Sullivan (1962) that there is some disaster to self-esteem in the etiology of every case of schizophrenia is additional evidence for the stress on this aspect.

self-awareness necessary for the shame experiences (Lynd, 1961) that would lead to the forging--through multiple confrontations and disconfirmations--of a "sound" or achieved (as contrasted with an ascribed) subjective identity. Thus a famous bohemian artist may "ride in" on his sociological identity and never ask, "Who am I?" If one's dominant mode of identity is prescriptive, normative, or culturally-valued idiosyncratic,¹² the emergent experiences of his subjective identity will likely be denied or repressed. As Fromm (1941) has pointed out, many normal, adequately functioning individuals do not know (or care) who they are, what they want, or what their goals are. A person without the possibility of a socially-ascribed dominant mode of subjective identity thus must forge one. Marginality would therefore be subjective identity-impairing only for those persons who define themselves (evaluatively and noetically) in terms of sociological categories or conventional roles.

On the other hand, one's strivings for identity may be determined by his idealized image (Horney, 1950). To take this ideal self as one's identity goal may be as self-destructive as taking one's social identifications as an identity goal (Lynd, 1961). While we may not as yet have conceptual logic for apprehending systemic interdependencies, it would seem likely that the conjunction of personal-public identity--given

¹²Sex-identities, socio-economic identities, beauty, status, clothes, role, race, prestigious occupations, possessions, or notorious performances, are representative of the range of possibilities.

congruities at both levels--is maximally conducive to a viable subjective identity.

7. One's awareness of himself thus functionally relates to the multiplicity and multidimensionality of his self-definitions; since the efficacy of one's subjective identity depends first upon his apprehension of how he is determined, such awareness is a prerequisite to a viable subjective identity. (I.e., it is only to the extent that one is aware of how he is determined that he can transcend the self-consciousness that emerges from discontinuities in his psychological structure-functioning.) One can thus take his subjective identity from any psychological source (identification, internalized roles and validation in them, negative or dominant modes of identification by others, physical or virtuoso characteristics, etc.). But the viability of that subjective identity depends upon the ubiquitousness of one's self-determinations. This point is well-put by Schrader: "A necessary condition for my awareness of an object is the multiple determination of myself in relation to the object. Similarly, my self-consciousness requires and is constituted by the various ways in which I determine myself" (1960, p. 47). Thus, the multiple determination of oneself in relation to social roles, for example, would increase and enhance one's possibilities for self-awareness and hence for the viability of his subjective identity (through what might be termed "role virtuosity").

8. To the extent, then, that one's sources of subjective

identity confirmations are "external" to him (i.e., are other persons), his subjective identity is neither functional (to its underlying structures),¹³ proteiform, nor multivalent, all characteristics of a viable sense of subjective identity. Disconfirmation is a term that seems to be inapplicable to a person whose behavior stems from an inner congruity. Thus temporary or chronic conditions of disorientation or subjective identity "loss" are most likely to occur following conditions of sensory deprivation ("disconfirmation" of psychological structures) or of evaluative deprivation (either personal or social--but subjective). A "low" sense of identity would thus be, contrarily, a qualitative experiencing of incongruity between or within the evaluative and noetic dimensions of one's psychological structure vis-à-vis the expectations with which he endows his behavior (the "function" of his behavior).

9. It is clear from this and the preceding discussion that subjective identity is not a unidimensional concept--at least in terms of conventional psychological dimensions. Neither the source nor the structure nor the experience nor the behavioral manifestation of subjective identity are specific differentia for prediction; as Witkin and his co-workers (1962) have reported, for example, emotionally cold, isolated, over-intellectual children were found to have as developed a sense

¹³Erikson's (1959) "negative identity" might be thus characterized.

of separate identity as emotionally warm, empathic children. Identity "problems," of the sort referred to by Rogers (1961), and of the sort popularized in modern literature, may refer to cognitive-evaluative dissonances rather than to alienation or disorientation or personal anomie. An individual who has always "known" who he is, regardless of the basis of that identity and regardless of the justifiability of that identity (Nixon, 1962), may present a "healthier" clinical assessment than an individual who is presently concerned with the problem of "who" he is. The latter individual may reach a more or less functional (for him) conclusion than the individual who has never wondered about his identity. As with status, then, we might fruitfully discriminate between achieved and ascribed identity. Either the process of achievement or the loss of ascription may set the conditions for identity pathologies. "Becoming" (Maslow, 1962) is thus a phenomenon of identity achievement, "being" of identity ascription. While both refer to relations between self and world, or to orientations or behavioral intentions, there may be significant qualitative differences at the cognitive-evaluative, experiential, and the behavioral levels which are not presently distinguishable.

Certainly, this tentative formulation of so complex an integrative concept as identity cannot be taken as an attempt to formalize a theory of identity. It can be seen as little more, at this stage of our understanding, than an attempt at a conceptual formulation to be explored and assayed empirically.

Chapter IV

Research Description and Procedures

The ultimate point of departure for any empirical study of identity may be the caveats sounded by Ruesch and Lynd: "What goes into the sense of identity is codified within the organism in the analogic mode. It cannot be appraised logically and has no quantitative or numerical value; it cannot be tested; it can only be experienced" (Ruesch, 1961, p. 283; underline added).

Elaboration of research methods in psychology and social science has kept pace with the proliferation of labeling. Observations, categories, techniques for the study of human nature were never so abundant.... If understanding of identity and of ways of realizing it could be discovered by such means, this strategic problem of today would seem assured of solution.

But since every way of seeing is also a way of not seeing, it is possible that the very multiplication of categories and the very precision of techniques may sometimes act as barriers instead of as means of access to understanding. Reliance on accepted categories and methods may mean that certain phenomena essential for understanding identity escape attention (Lynd, 1961, p. 16).

Yet a concept as potentially integrative as identity needs to be empirically explored in such a way that its usefulness in research and assessment, as well as its theoretical development, might be enhanced.

Previous Research

Bronson (1957) studied Erikson's notions of identity diffusion from a structural point of view. Using judgments from personal interviews and measures based on semantic differential techniques, Bronson found significant inter-correlations among his four measures, and that college students who are considered high on identity diffusion also exhibited some internal conflict or anxiety.

Howard (1960) and later Woldstad (1961) at Smith College studied identity conflicts in normal and disturbed adolescent girls by means of a questionnaire developed by Howard and refined by Woldstad. The disturbed adolescents were found to reveal more anxiety over identity than the normal adolescents. The focus in these studies was upon the revelation of conscious concern over identity.

Miller (1963) reviewed a number of studies which are more characteristic of self-description than of identity studies. However, the work of Miller and his colleagues would seem to attest to the efficacy of self-ratings, projective tests, and recorded interviews as measuring techniques in identity studies. Witkin and his colleagues (Witkin et al., 1962) offer what is perhaps the most definitive research to the present time on the structural aspects of identity. Anticipating that if the self is experienced as distinct and structurally differentiated, and self-defining internal frames of reference are available, the Witkin group expected a sense of separate identity to be

manifested in three ways:

1. As "a limited need for guidance and support from others";
2. As an ability to establish and maintain attitudes, judgments, and sentiments without external confirmation or reference; and
3. As a stable self-view regardless of context (p. 155). Individuals with an analytical approach--as contrasted with those evidencing a global approach--were found to show greater self-differentiation and hence a greater sense of separate identity as measured by the above criteria.

Research Objectives

The specific research objectives of the present study were:

1. To explore the concept of identity as an empirical tool through a set of propositions derived from major identity theories. The approach followed was analogous to the construct validation procedure discussed by Selltiz, Jahoda, Deutsch, and Cook (1959).
2. To compare and examine various existing test instruments for measuring and assessing subjective identity; and
3. To evaluate and partially to validate some assessment procedures designed specifically for this study.

As Hanson (1961) has indicated, the most notable research

may begin with the data and not with hypotheses. Thus this study, both because of its exploratory nature and its validation objectives, does not proceed from specific experimental hypotheses. However, the general expectations "tested" by the empirical studies reported in this chapter were:

1. That subjective identity is a measurable psychological construct;
2. That a number of existing test instruments (specified in the following section) that might be expected to test one or more dimensions of identity are singly inadequate to assess subjective identity but cumulatively support the validity of the identity construct; and
3. That "high" and "low" identity individuals present discriminably different performance styles on assessment instruments such as story completions, sentence completions, and other methods evaluated in this study.

Procedure

Subjects and Setting. The choice of subjects and study setting was based upon a twofold rationale:

1. That a "normal" population would be most efficacious in terms of the wider range of the latent characteristic to be explored and validated; and
2. That a "normal" or field setting which would preclude the subjects' awareness of being observed and assessed would

be a desirable condition for certain longitudinal, validity, and reliability requirements of the study.

Thus the choice of college students in a required, year-long course in the College of Business Administration at the University of Wichita seemed to assure a fairly random sample of students enrolled in that particular College, the advantage of repeated observation and testing, and the distinct advantage of conducting the study within the framework of routine course requirements and activities. The course was an experimental course in the behavioral sciences for business students, and was being offered for the first time during the year of the study.

The students ranged in age from 19 to 42; most were in the 20-24 age group. While most of the students were sophomores and juniors, there were a few seniors and 4 first-year graduate students. Six of the initial 108 students in the class were women.

An especially advantageous aspect of these study conditions was that the course was handled in such a manner as to prohibit the students' avoidance of their responsibility for their own learning in the course. Thus certain additional observations of task-orientation and reaction to adversity could be made.

Test Instruments and Methods. A. A number of "hypotheses" regarding the capacity of existing test instruments to tap

identity comprised one major phase of the empirical assessment procedures. All test instruments and measures were administered during the regular class meetings of the course, ostensibly as an aspect of the course's guidance and development objectives. It was expected that, due to the multidimensionality and heterogeneity of the concept of identity as theoretically formulated, no single measure would reliably discriminate differential identity, but that a battery of such measures might be found to discriminate "high" from "low" identity subjects, as validated by independent measures and determined by an ex post facto analysis (Greenwood, 1945). The most expedient way to describe these expectations may be to discuss them individually.

1. It would be expected, on the basis of theoretical formulations of identity, that positive identity individuals would evidence less maladjustment than negative or weak identity individuals. The measure selected for this aspect was the Grigg and Kelley "Scale for Self Description" (1960). Subjects were asked to complete three sentence stems each with three adjectives self-selected from a 12-adjective pool previously scaled for adjustment value by clinical and counseling psychologists. The scale purportedly taps adjustment in the areas of feelings, study habits, and social relations.

2. Particularly on the basis of Erikson's formulations, ego-strength might be expected to be a factor in assessing differential identity. The measure utilized in this study

was Barron's (1953) Ego-Strength Scale.

3. Bronson (1957), Woldstad (1961), and Witkin et al. (1962) have specifically suggested that anxiety is a salient factor in assessing identity. Taylor's (1953) Manifest Anxiety Scale was selected as a measure of anxiety for this study. An additional measure of anxiety--Gleser, Gottschalk, and Springer (1961)--was to be derived from the taped interviews conducted near the end of the study, but, for a number of reasons, this measure was not utilized in the study.

4. Implicit in some of the theoretical formulations of identity, and explicit in the work of Witkin et al. (1962), is the expectation that integrated identity individuals would indicate more preference for complexity in life than would diffuse identity individuals. An attempt was made to test this expectation with Barron's Complexity-Simplicity Scale (1953). An additional or substitute measure might be derived from the Welsh Figure Preference Test (1954), but the difficulties of administering and interpreting that test with such a large group made it unfeasible for this study.

5. A measure of satisfaction and affect was expected, on the basis of several of the theoretical formulations, to reflect a latent factor in "high" vs. "low" identity. A general Satisfaction Scale developed by Harris and described in Brim, Glass, Lavin, and Goodman (1962) was administered to test this expectation. The scale purports to measure satisfaction and degree of affect on the basis of responses to the same 40 items.

6. As intimated by Erikson, Lifton, and others, an individual's identity is closely linked to his basic beliefs. To explore this possibility, a Test of Basic Beliefs (Erim et al., 1962) was administered. Only the four scales relating to one's beliefs regarding causation, of the total of 16 scales in the test, were utilized in this study. These were belief in animism, belief in fate, belief in the supernatural, and belief in multiple causation.

7. On the basis of several of the theoretical formulations discussed earlier, strength of identity might be expected to co-vary with degree of independence. This expectation was explored by Barron's (1953) test of independence of judgment.

8. For a number of reasons implied or expressed in the various theoretical formulations, the researcher might expect to find a relationship between conditions of identity and self-insight. This possibility was tested by a modification of Gross's Self-Insight Scale (1947) in conjunction with some methodological leads furnished by Goodman (1953). Eighteen of Gross's original items were used with minor alterations. The scale actually administered is reproduced in Appendix I. Chapin's Social Insight Scale might also have been used for this purpose, but the revised edition of that test was not available at the time this study was made.

9. The "Need for Certainty" test (Brim, 1954) was utilized in this study with the expectation that differential identity would co-vary with the degree of need-for-certainty

as a basic orientation to life.

10. In order to evaluate the role of intelligence in subjective identity, the Otis Group Form Mental Maturity Test was administered. The expectation, inferred from the emphasis on competence and mastery in some of the theoretical formulations, was that identity and intelligence scores would vary concomitantly.

11. The "Who-Are-You?" technique (Bugental and Zelen, 1950; Kuhn and McPartland, 1954) was employed. It was expected that the number and kind of consensual statements offered by Ss might bear some relationship to identity measures and to other measures of adjustment and emotional stability utilized in this study.

12. Following Erikson's emphasis on time diffusion, and some implications of a study by Kastenbaum (1961), it was hypothesized that there would be a direct relationship between identity scores and the number of categories employed by individuals to describe their activities. To test this expectation, Ss were asked to list, by time segments, all of their activities of the previous day. The number of categories they used for their lists was then correlated with their identity scores.

13.¹⁴ The MMPI was administered to provide a check against

¹⁴This and the following measures were obtained during the second semester of the course.

the "normality" of the group studied; the SI (Social IE Scale) and SC (Schizophrenia) scales, which might logically be expected to provide a means of validating the identity measures, were the two scales of particular interest in this study.

14. Three scales from the DF Opinion Survey were utilized: the AS (adventure vs. security) scale, the SR (self-reliance vs. dependence) scale, and the RT (realistic thinking) scale. On the basis of previous research and the theoretical formulations of identity reviewed previously, scores on these scales might be expected to co-vary with identity scale scores and with adjustment and other similar scores.

15. A semantic differential (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957) was administered in the following manner: the members of each task group in the course (5-11 members) were asked first to rate other members on a 20-item, 7-point scale reproduced as Appendix II. Then they were asked to rate "Myself as Others See Me." Later they were asked to rate "Myself as I Usually Am." Finally, they were asked to rate "Myself as I Would Really Like to Be." The items comprising the scale were taken from Osgood and Luria (1954), Stagner and Osgood (1946), and from Cattell (1946); a few of the items (Nos. 15-20) were based upon expectations from theoretical formulations of identity. The concepts employed were those that would theoretically (Osgood and Luria, 1954) be expected to provide a basis for the three discrepancy scores sought by this measure:

- a. The discrepancy between others' ranking of self and self-judgments of others' rankings of self (O-SO);
- b. The discrepancy between others' rankings of self and self-ranking (Myself as I Usually Am)--(O-S); and
- c. The discrepancy between self-rankings of Myself as I Usually Am and self-rankings of Myself as I Would Really Like to Be (S-SI).

From an item analysis (inspection of plots) and on the basis of post-testing discussions with Ss, a number of the items were eliminated from the scoring of this measure. Only the items underscored (see Appendix II) were retained for scoring purposes. It was expected that the O-SO and the O-S discrepancy scores would vary directly with identity scores, and that the S-SI discrepancy scores would vary inversely with identity scores.

B. The second major phase of the empirical assessment procedures involved the development and partial validation of 5 identity scales. Three of the scales were constructed, pre-tested, and redesigned as operational scales based upon the propositions derived from the theoretical formulations of identity surveyed in the previous chapters. This procedure follows that suggested by Cronbach and Meehl (1955) for construct validation.

The basic scale, the behavioral scale (B-Scale), was composed of twenty heterogeneous, multidimensional items

(Appendix III) derived from the theoretical propositions presented in Chapter 2. The five-point scale for each item (-2 to +2) was carefully explained in training sessions with two judges, who were graduate assistants in the course and who, at the time of the ratings, had had close contact with the Ss for at least 7 months, both in and out of class, and had evaluated at least 12 assignments prepared by each of the Ss. Judges' ratings were made independently. Interjudge reliability (ρ) for the B-scale was .89.

The second identity measure was a self-report scale (SR-scale, Appendix IV). As a part of his regular course requirements, each S wrote nine "self-explorations," for which he was encouraged to write a minimum of three pages during successive weeks of the first semester in the way of exploring his own behavior, ideas, beliefs, values, etc. On the basis of a preliminary content analysis, a six-item rating scale was developed from the set of theoretical propositions derived in Chapter 2. Two different judges (one graduate and one upper-division psychology student), after training, rated the self-reports of a sample of 16 Ss selected as a representative cross-section of performance¹⁵ on the objective measures administered during the first semester. Interjudge reliability (ρ) for the SR-scale was .74. The mean ratings of the two

¹⁵The specific procedure involved selecting the high positive variance, the high negative variance, and the zero variance Ss based upon the number of standard deviations each S's score varied from the population mean on each test (tests 1-10 supra), and sampling randomly from these three categories of Ss.

judges were used in the further analysis of this measure.

The third rating scale of identity developed for this study was a 13-item interview scale (I-scale, Appendix V), based upon the same set of propositions, but differently organized and stated. Each of the three "identity" scales thus had both similar and unique items.

Two judges (the writer and an upper-division psychology student), after several orientation sessions, rated each of the same 16 Ss rated on the SR-scale from their taped interviews. (The interview schedule is presented as Appendix VI.) Inter-judge reliability (ρ) for this measure was .79. Mean ratings were used in further analysis.

A fourth measure of identity utilized in this study was the "task-reaction" scale created by Witkin et al. (1962) for assessing task attitudes and similar stylistic variations in the performance of story-telling in the laboratory. This measure is a 4-item, 5-point scale (referred to later as the W-scale); it is presented as Appendix VII in the form utilized in this study. Independent ratings by two judges (the writer and a graduate assistant) of the same sample of 16 Ss plus an additional 13 Ss selected on the basis of their high, middle, or low rankings on the B-scale produced an interjudge reliability (ρ) of .86. The judges utilized both their longitudinal observations of course tasks, and Ss's written responses to one specific question from the first-semester performance summary: "Discuss, as frankly as you wish, your reactions to this course."

It was expected that such task-orientations, revealed behaviorally and in writing, would be analogous to those observed by Witkin and his colleagues.

The fifth measure of differential identity was also taken from Witkin et al. (1962). All Ss completed Draw-a-Person tests, both male and female figures (Machover, 1948). The drawings were rated independently according to the Marlens scheme (Witkin et al., 1962, p. 118 ff.) by two judges (the writer and a graduate psychology student). This procedure purports to measure sophistication-of-body-concept, which in turn is taken to reflect identity integration vs. diffusion. Interjudge reliability (ρ) for this scale (referred to later as the Body-Concept or M-Scale) was .92. Mean scores were used in further analysis.

C. The third major phase of the empirical assessment and validation procedures was concerned with the attempt to qualify and partially to validate four additional measures devised for this study, and expected, on the basis of the theoretical formulations and derived propositions, to provide somewhat more efficient and projective means of assessing identity. Since clinical and research protocols do not usually permit longitudinal observation of behavior, or the possibility of repeated self-reports in writing, or reliable observations of task orientations and reactions to adversity, the following methods were assayed by multiple analysis of the performances of 29 Ss who were

classified as high, neutral, or low identity Ss on the basis of their scores on the five scales described in the preceding section:

1. A sentence completion test. On the basis of the methodological guides provided by Rotter and Willerman (1947) and Rohde (1957), 12 sentence stems were devised which were expected to tap one or more of the dimensions of identity characterized by the theoretical formulations of identity surveyed in Chapter 2 and the propositions derived from them. The sentence completion test finally administered to all Ss is reproduced as Appendix VIII. It was expected that differential scorers on the 5 identity scales would complete the stems in discriminably different ways both in terms of content and style.

2. Story completions. In the spirit of the early Wolff studies (1943, Ch. 15), and the very recent Arnold research (Arnold, 1962), 8 story "stems" (Appendix IX) were developed to tap one or more of the identity dimensions characterized by the derived propositions. All Ss continued or completed these stories according to the instructions for each. While Arnold has warned of the difficulty in interpreting from conversation produced by Ss using the TAT, it was expected that stylistic variations in all-written material would thereby be minimized; thus both conversation and narrative completions were called for in this set of story completions. In general, it was expected that high and low identity scorers (on the 5 identity scales) would produce discriminably different styles

and contents in their story treatments. To the extent that they might do so, the story completion technique might serve as a clinical substitute for the less efficient behavioral and self-report scales.

3. Projected biography (or autobiography). A procedure expected to be particularly fruitful as an assessment instrument was the projected biography (or autobiography). All Ss wrote a biography (or autobiography) of themselves from the point of view of some time after their deaths, in a narrative form, and covering the significant events of their lives from the day of the assignment to the end of their lives. Written in class, these narratives varied in length from three to seven handwritten pages. It was expected that certain differential elements of content and style might be identified in the performances of Ss who fell at each end of the continuum on the 5 identity scales described previously.

4. The fourth major methodology explored was the possibility of identifying "high" vs. "low" identity individuals on the basis of their rhetorical or expository styles. Each of the Ss produced from 6,000-10,000 words in a wide range of forms having an equally broad range of objectives; this material provided a rich source for an analysis of this sort. For this part of the study, the leads of Baldwin (1942), Sanford (1942), and Hale (1920) were especially useful. These analyses were conducted both independently and cooperatively by the writer, an upper-division English student, an upper-division psychology

student, and the two graduate assistants for the course. A number of background and procedural discussions were held prior to the initiation of the analyses. None of the analysts, at the time these analyses were made, was aware of the classification of the Ss on the basis of the 5 identity scales.

The postulated relationship between speech and personality has a long and venerable history in psychology, a history given particular impetus by Dewey (1922) and Sapir (1927), without producing an integrated body of empirical data consistent with the supposed basic level of the phenomenon being investigated. While no attempt was made in this study to suggest such an integration of existing data, it was expected that, given the integrative level of the theoretical concept of identity, this type of analysis might be especially fruitful.

As with the three preceding methods of studying or assessing identity explored and evaluated in this study, no specific hypotheses were set forth. It was reasoned that any factors which discriminated "high" from "low" identity individuals would be legitimate discriminanda. However, a wide range of possible factors ¹⁶ was derived from the empirical literature

¹⁶ E.g., type-token ratios, action quotients, semantic orientations and styles, verb-adjective ratios, imports, quantity of material produced, objectivity (absence of an "I"), economy and effectiveness of expression, vagueness and obnubilation, stereotypy and rigidity of expression, grammatical structures, evaluative assertion analysis, Discomfort-Relief Word Quotient, lack of diversity, over-reliance on characteristic modes of expression, and so forth.

for educing both common and uncommon factors through repeated analyses of the writing performances of the Ss.

Chapter 5

Research Results and Discussion

Because the objectives of the research conducted for this study were basically eductive or exploratory and not definitive in nature, the results cannot be summarily presented. However, the objectives of the research phase of this study were achieved, and basic expectations fulfilled. The heuristic value of the results of a study such as this may more than compensate for the lack of precision required at this stage of our theoretical development of the concept of identity (Lynd, 1961).

The Measurability of The Construct "Identity"

The multiple discrimination of the same ordering of the population tested by various forms of assessment instruments for measuring identity may be taken as suggesting both their reliability and the validity of the construct (Selltiz,

Jahoda, Deutsch, and Cook, 1960, p. 158 ff.).¹⁶ Table 1 presents the obtained product-moment correlations between the anchoring behavioral scale and the other four identity scales employed in this study. These results would seem clearly to suggest that identity is a measurable characteristic of

Table 1
Product-Moment Correlations
of the Behavioral with
the other Identity Scales

Scale	r	d.f.	Probability
Behavioral Scale (B-scale)			
Self-Report Scale (SR-scale)	.89	15	< .01
Interview Scale (I-scale)	.76	15	< .01
Task-Reaction Scale (W-scale)	.89	28	< .01
Body-Concept Scale (M-scale)	.68	28	< .01

individuals, that identity is a valid empirical construct, and that identity may reliably be assessed by these scales.

The somewhat lower relationship between the B- and M-Scales is most likely attributable to the fact that the M-Scale was

¹⁶The original study design anticipated the possibility of factoring a 26x26 intercorrelation matrix based on scores derived from a number of existing tests that might be expected to assess one or more of the theoretical propositions. But the consistently high interjudge reliabilities for each of the 5 identity scales (see Table 1) with the anchoring behavioral scale, obviated this procedure. Some of the relevant results of the intercorrelations are referred to later in this chapter, however, for the further research interest they may offer.

the only undimensional scale employed in this phase of the study.

The Efficacy of the Indirect Measures

The several test instruments which were evaluated in this study on the expectation that they might tap one or more of the dimensions of identity were found to be singly inadequate to assess subjective identity. In Table 2 are presented the product-moment correlations of scores on all other measures with scores on the B-scale.¹⁷

Table 2
Product-Moment Correlations
between the B-scale and other Tests
Administered

Test	r (between B-scale and...)	d.f.	Probabil- ity
Adjustment (Grigg and Kelley, 1960)	.18	15	> .05
Ego-Strength (Barron, 1953)	.23	15	> .05
Anxiety (Taylor, 1953)	-.29	15	> .05
(Table continued on next page)			

¹⁷It was assumed that the highly significant correlations of the other identity scales with the B-scale obviated the necessity of obtaining intercorrelations, and that the B-scale was the most reliable for the present purpose.

Table 2--Continued

Test	r (between B-scale and...)	d.f.	Probabil- ity
Preference for Complexity (Barron, 1953)	-.03	15	> .05
Satisfaction (Brim et al., 1962)	-.06	15	> .05
Affect (Brim et al., 1962)	.05	15	> .05
Basic Beliefs (Brim et al., 1962)			
Animism	-.03	15	> .05
Supernatural	-.16	15	> .05
Fate	-.39	15	> .05
Multiple Causation	.34	15	> .05
Self-Insight (Gross, 1947)	.38	15	> .05
Need-for-Certainty (Brim et al., 1962)	-.31	15	> .05
Otis Mental Maturity	.44	15	> .05
"Who-Are-You?" (Noncon- sensual responses) (Bugental and Zelen, 1950)	-.18	15	> .05
MMPI			
Social Index Scale	-.42	15	> .05
Schizophrenia Scale	-.02	15	> .05
DF Opinion Survey			
Adventure vs. Security	.41	15	> .05
Self-Reliance	.11	15	> .05
Realistic Thinking	.04	15	> .05
Semantic Differential			
O-SO Discrepancy	.07	15	> .05
O-S Discrepancy	.07	15	> .05
S-SI Discrepancy	.34	15	> .05
Time Categories	.75	13	< .01

It can readily be seen from an inspection of Table 2 that only one of the indirect assessment techniques appears to have reliably ordered the intensive research sub-population in the same way as did the 5 identity scales; that was the Time Categories Technique. The significance of that apparent

relationship may be interpreted in the following manner: individuals scoring higher on one or more of the identity scales described in this study tend also to utilize more categories in describing their activities, and conversely.

While none of the other correlations is significant at the .05 level, the cumulative effect of a number of relationships in the expected direction provides an additional increment of validity for the construct of identity and the derived theoretical propositions (Selltitz et al., 1960, p. 160 ff.). Mutual validation is apparent particularly in the following measures: ego-strength, freedom from anxiety, absence of belief in fate, belief in multiple causation, independence of judgment, self-insight, absence of a need-for-certainty, intelligence (Otis), social participation, adventurousness, and self-ideal discrepancy. Most of these directional relationships would be expected on the basis of their relevance to one or more theories of identity. The measures which were particularly non-discriminating in this context--adjustment, preference for complexity, degree of satisfaction and degree of affect, belief in animism and the supernatural, the number of consensual responses on the W-A-Y test, the Sc scale of the MMPI, the self-reliance and realistic thinking scales of the DF Opinion Survey, and the O-SO and O-S discrepancy scores, are generally less relevant to most of the theories of identity considered in this study.

With the exception of the three semantic differential discrepancy scores and the Time Categories measure, none of

these tests was designed specifically with the construct of identity as a conceptual framework. Thus, while their usefulness as indirect techniques in the assessment of subjective identity may be questionable on the basis of this study, the consistency of scores in the expected direction, given additional verification of these tendencies in other studies of identity, might be taken as tentative evidence for discriminating "high" from "low" identity individuals. It is possible, in other words, that an individual's profile of scores on the more clearly related group of tests (ego-strength, etc.), would be indicative of his ordering on one or more of the identity scales used in this study. Analysis of the profiles completed for all Ss would seem to support this conjecture. "High-identity" scorers (B-scale) presented significantly more variance from mean scores ($2\frac{1}{2}$ times as much) on this set of tests than did "low-identity" scorers.

However, it should be noted that one informal expectation-- that the magnitude of variation on all test instruments (exclusive of the identity scales) would discriminate among Ss consistent with their ordering on the identity scales-- was unsupported. The product-moment correlation between the scores of the groups thus distinguished was $-.06$. Elimination of the 12 less discriminating measures had the effect of increasing this index of relationship to an r of $-.21$. Inspection of individual scores revealed that some low scorers on the 5 identity scales evidenced little or no variability from

the average scores on the indirect tests. One would expect, on the basis of previous studies, that such inconsistencies from a theoretical point of view might be attributable either to anxiety connected with self-revelation (McClelland et al., 1953) or some witting or unwitting attempt to give socially desirable scores (Edwards, 1957).

The apparent lack of correspondence between the adjustment and identity scores is both defensible and perplexing. As Maslow has indicated (1954), self-actualizers frequently show relatively high "alienation" scores. Hence, if this adjustment instrument measures social "adjustment," as it clearly appears to, then the absence of a relationship with identity scores is understandable. However, the adjustment scores for all Ss correlated significantly with such other measures as ego-strength and adventurousness, which, in turn, were more clearly related in direction and magnitude to the identity measures. Given the fact that this adjustment measure also correlated significantly with other measures which seemed to bear no discriminable relationship to the identity scales, one might conclude that common elements of the adjustment measure and other measures with which it did correlate were not fundamental elements in the identity scales.

Another noteworthy failure of expectation was the apparent non-discriminability of the Preference for Complexity Scale. While the scores on this measure did intercorrelate significantly with the Independence and Need-for-Certainty scores, there was no apparent relationship

between these scores and the scores of other measures which were more clearly related to the identity scores. Thus one might conclude that complexity-simplicity are relative to the individual's own frame of reference, and that the continuum of possibilities for performance on this test is more restricted than that provided by the multidimensional identity scale employed.

The failure of the scores based upon the number of nonconsensual responses in the W-A-Y technique to vary more directly with other measures of adjustment and integration (e.g., Independence) is interesting. The notion, as proposed by Bugental and Zelen (1950) and some later researchers, is that the fewer the consensual responses the more likelihood of some psychological disturbance. While the intercorrelation of the W-A-Y scores with the MAS scores was significant at the .05 level ($-.25$, $N=108$), most of the other intercorrelations approached zero. Since the strength and dominant mode or source of identity may certainly be expected to vary independently, a reasonable conclusion would seem to be that the present use of the W-A-Y technique is not a reliable one for assessing subjective identity.

Although there are many other intriguing possibilities for discussion with such a heterogeneous mass of data, a single additional observation seems most pertinent.

It was expected, on the basis of the conceptual

orientation provided by the several theories of identity, that "high" identity individuals would better predict others' evaluations of them (the first semantic differential discrepancy score), and also that their own characterizations of themselves would be more consistent with others' characterizations of them. This expectation was clearly not borne out. While no empirical data to interpret this reversal was specifically sought in the study, it might be tentatively concluded that an unmeasured interaction between the imposed conditions of the course, and the implications of this assessment task performed by the Ss, might account for the absence of any apparent relationship between these scores. Different subjects under different testing conditions might well produce results in the expected direction. Also, it is possible that the source of the reversal lies in the inability of "low" and "intermediate" identity Ss to perceive "high" identity Ss accurately. The complexity of person perception research is well attested to by the several essays in Tagiuri and Petrullo (1958). The covariance between identity scores (B-Scale) and the self--self/ideal discrepancy scores is perhaps attributable to the non-defensive insight of "high-identity" scorers and their willingness to work toward greater achievements.

Validation of Other Indirect
Methods of Assessment

Sentence Completion Test. As indicated previously, 12 sentence stems (Appendix VIII) were constructed to tap one or more of the factors underlying the theoretical propositions derived in Chapter 2. All Ss completed the sentences during the first semester of the course. On the basis of their scores on the B-scale, two sub-groups were identified: those whose scores were more than one standard deviation above the mean, and those whose scores were more than one standard deviation below the mean. Then a random sample (exclusive of the 16-subject intensive study sub-population utilized on the interview and other scales) of 4 Ss was drawn from each of these sub-groups for intensive analysis of their sentence completions. This analysis failed to reveal any consistent differences between sub-groups in their completions of stems 5, 7, 8, 10, and 12; consequently those stems were dropped from the test. The homogeneity of the completions of the remaining seven stems by the respective sub-groups was the basis for the crude rating scale presented below as Table 3.

Table 3
Sentence Completion Rating Scale

Sentence Stem	Scale Value	Scale Value
	1	3
1. One's work is	Completions that reflect indifference, burdensomeness, undesirability, inevitability, "never finished," "just beginning"	Completions that suggest enjoyment, means of fulfillment, "one's life," etc.
2. Being alone	Completions that suggest utility for undesirable activities, fear, loneliness, etc.	Completions reflecting personal desirability: "valuable," "reflective," "rewarding," etc.
3. The most difficult decisions in life	Completions reflect inconsequential decisions, imposed tasks or immediate problems, etc.	Refers to long-range self-chosen goals, future consequences, life decisions, or a playing down of their importance: "may affect you least"
4. When a person is a failure	Refers to giving up, external causes, blaming, or excusing, feelings of uselessness	Refers to self-responsibility for failure, learning from mistakes, creating new opportunities
5. I frequently worry that	Refers to not doing well at undesirable activities or immediate problems, retaliation or bad luck, inability to achieve short-range goals	Refers to failure to live up to potential, lack of positive accomplishment toward goals

(Table continued on next page)

Table 3--Continued

Sentence Stem	Scale Value	-2-	Scale Value
	1		3
6. I usually feel that	Refers to being better than others, of having the biggest problems, of not having enough time to achieve, of certainty of success		Refers to satisfaction with present life and activities, of not doing something as well as possible, of being an average person
7. I would like life better	Refers to inability to understand life objectively, the need for something to make life worthwhile, the need to stop present undesirable activities, etc.		Refers to the desirability of sharing life with others, of achieving goals or higher levels of understanding, etc.

The sentence completions of the 16 intensive-analysis Ss were then subjected to this scale. Two judges, neither psychological sophisticates, rated the Ss's completions of these seven stems. Interjudge reliability (ρ) was .83. The mean ratings of the two judges on each item were then correlated with the scores of the same 16 Ss on the B-Scale (product-moment correlation). The resultant r was .59 ($P < .05$), which may be taken as a partial validation of this crude scale as an indirect method of assessing subjective identity. However, the sample analyzed was quite small and the point range quite limited. Further validation is required before this scale could reliably be used alone as an assessment procedure.

"Projected Biography." The same analysis sample was utilized as previously. Readily discriminable differentia in content and style (and import) were sought in the intensive analysis of the written biographies (or autobiographies) described earlier.

The most reliable differentia were found to be the following:

A. "Low" identity scorers:

1. Produced more unrealistic records of achievement (both in terms of timing and in terms of level of achievement)
2. Exhibited more anxiety about visibility of achievements
3. Talked about living rather than getting involved with it
4. Extended present problems rather than reporting encounters with new or changing problems and thus reflecting personal growth
5. Reported achievements which seemed to come as matters of fate or sly dealings rather than from well-intentioned commitment to work
6. Tended to write in the third person and in an "objective" style
7. Did not refer to well-defined events but exhibited a vague diffuseness about chains of occurrences
8. Tended to "live" more in first and second generations, of offspring rather than own life

9. Reflected extreme "egocentrism," through superlatives of description ("greatest," "best-liked," "most successful," etc.)

10. Saw love and family as reward for achievement rather than as worthwhile in its own right

11. Exhibited inability to maintain consistent point of view (illogical variations of past and present tenses, use of "I" when writing a biography, etc.)

12. Reflected a hurry to terminate life, with fewer events recounted.

B. "High" Identity scorers:

1.-10. Generally reflected the obvious opposites of these factors.

A "blind" sample of 10 biographies were rated by the above criteria, scoring +1 for each positive criterion, -1 for each negative criterion. The derived scores were correlated with the B-scale scores (product-moment r) for these 10 Ss. The obtained r was .63 ($P < .05$).

As was true of the sentence completion test scale, however, the sample was quite small and the range of scores constricted; thus, this scoring procedure could not be presumed to be a singly reliable identity assessment technique without further validation.

Story Completions. The story completions of the same two sub-populations were analyzed in a search for reliable discriminanda. Of the factors revealed by this analysis, the following

seemed to be the most differentiating:

A. "Low" identity scorers:

1. Tend to talk about, discuss, and evaluate problems rather than get actively engaged in telling story to some end

2. Endow characters with passivity (being "acted-upon" by situations rather than transacting), and a seeming inability to take positive action, to be self-determining, or self-accountable

3. Create "marketing-oriented" and mistrustful interpersonal relations; emphasize structure rather than functions of human relationships

4. Characterize persons as unable to accept the reality of difficult situations, as escaping or denying reality; problems are solved "magically" by simply saying so (i.e., without understanding or effort on the part of the characters involved)

5. Evidence considerable direct and indirect concern with the moral or legal (or other standardized, sociological) consequences of behavior; tend to write in terms of "shoulds" and "oughts"

6. Attempt to be "objective"; little evidence of an "I"

7. Exhibit lack of empathy, absence of sincere attempts to understand or to accept others, and non-involvement and indifference as story-tellers and in their characters

8. Reflect an inclination to save or "straighten" others out; exhibit condescension, superiority, and/or obsequiousness

9. Tend to intellectualize, to rely on words of feeling rather than of behavior

10. Use more subjunctive and conditional expressions, stereotypy (in language and plot), and more generalized statements (rather than specific details or personalized dialogue)

11. Are less likely to complete stories, solve the problem (through concrete action of one or more of the characters), or conclude the behavioral sequence initiated by the stem

B. "High" identity scorers:

1.-11. Tend generally to exhibit the polar opposites of the above factors.

A random sample of 10 sets of story completions was evaluated using these criteria, scoring -1 for the presence of each negative factor, +1 for the presence of each positive factor. These scores were then correlated with the B-Scale scores (product-moment correlation) of the same Ss. The obtained r was .32, which is not a significant index at the .10 level of significance, although it is in the expected direction.

Two of the obvious confounding factors in this attempt to isolate reliable discriminanda in these story completions are the flexibility that derives from experience or interest, and

the extent and kind of exposure to the mass media. Since it was not possible to hold these factors constant, they may be assumed to be interacting with the factors of concern. In spite of this, one might expect, with a larger sample, to obtain an r of the same magnitude. Thus no item analysis was made.

Linguistic Style. Repeated analyses failed to isolate reliable discriminating stylistic factors--other than those incorporated in the previous two scales. "Low" identity scorers evidenced more grammatical and spelling errors, but these could as readily be attributed to factors measured by the Otis test as to identity factors. "High" identity scorers evidenced less constraint; their styles were more idiosyncratic and vigorous. Their word choice was wider, and their constructions more variant. "High" identity scorers also produced more material than "low" identity scorers, thus reflecting more interest and involvement. "Low" identity scorers were less specific and offered less detail or substantiation; they thus seemed to be more willing to stand on their opinions rather than to proceed logically or to document their assertions. "Low" identity scorers also presented more stilted, "academic" styles and constrictions, although this characteristic was not limited to the "low" scoring group.

None of these factors was believed to be reliable as differentia, however. Thus no specific method of measuring writing style was developed from this study.

Chapter 6

Summary and Conclusions

The current and growing interest in identity as an integrating concept in psychology was the impetus for this conceptual, empirical, and methodological study. An analysis of a number of theoretical formulations of identity was the basis for the derivation of a set of propositions to be tested, and for a formulation of subjective identity as a framework for the empirical investigations undertaken to validate the construct of identity. Three identity scales were developed from this theoretical formulation and set of propositions; two additional identity scales from Witkin et al.(1962) were also employed. These five scales reliably ordered the subjects in a homologous way, and hence were relied upon to provide a means of evaluating the discriminatory power of a number of existing tests for measuring subjective identity. Although none was found, as expected, to discriminate "high" from "low" identity individuals (as identified by the 5 identity scales), the consistency of the direction of their relationships with the identity scales served to

validate the construct identity as an assessable and usable empirical concept. Additionally, "low" identity individuals were found to vary considerably less from the mean scores on a number of existing tests, thus suggesting a method of identifying the "highs" from the "lows" on profiles drawn from scores on the following measures: ego-strength, manifest anxiety, belief in fate and belief in multiple causation, independence of judgment, self-insight, need-for-certainty, intelligence, social participation, and adventurousness. "High" identity scorers were also found to indicate more discrepancy between self and self-ideal on the semantic differential instrument, but the difference was not believed to be a reliable one.

One indirect measure found to discriminate reliably between "high" and "low" identity scorers was a technique employed for evaluation in this study: a "time categories" measure. On the theoretical possibility that "low" or diffuse identity individuals might generally utilize fewer categories to describe their daily experiences, subjects were requested to complete a record of their activities "yesterday," using clock times to identify each activity. "High" scorers on the identity scales were found to use significantly more categories in so describing the record of a day's activities.

A third major objective of this study--in addition

to the conceptual analysis and the empirical investigations-- was to educe reliable discriminanda from the protocols of subjects on a sentence completion test, a "projected biography," and a series of story completions, with the object of partially validating the scales based upon these discriminanda against the identity scales developed previously. Both the sentence and the story stems were based upon the set of propositions derived from theoretical formulations of identity. The projected biography represents a more indirect method of assessment.

The scale developed from the sentence completion test (after an item analysis which revealed the inefficacy of 5 of the 12 stems) was found to discriminate at a reliable level the "high" from the "low" identity scorers in a random sample of protocols produced by the subjects.

Similarly, a scale developed from the story completion protocols was found to discriminate the "high" from the "low" identity scorers, but at a less reliable level.

The scale developed for scoring the projected biographies was likewise employed on a blind random sample of these protocols, and was found to identify "high" from "low" identity scorers on the B-Scale (the anchoring identity scale).

None of these three scales, however, was considered to be sufficiently reliable for independent use without

further validation. The objective was to explore the possibility of devising more efficient indirect measures of subjective identity; these three possibilities satisfy that objective.

An attempt to develop a scoring procedure based upon discriminanda educed from stylistic variation evident in a wide range of other written material produced by the subjects during the course was unsuccessful. A number of differences were found, but these were not clearly scalable nor were they expected to be reliable.

The basic objective of this exploratory study was thus satisfactorily achieved.

Some Methodological Considerations. The inefficacy of a number of direct assessment procedures reliably to discriminate the "high" from the "low" scorers on an anchoring identity scale (the B-Scale), constructed on the basis of a set of propositions derived from theoretical formulations of identity, may be taken as further evidence of the multidimensionality and heterogeneity of the identity construct. An analysis of individual scores on the first 15 tests administered (Table 2) revealed a consistently higher variation from mean scores by "high" identity scorers. Such a finding might be interpreted in two ways: that these tests, developed from and standardized on "normal" populations, may not adequately tap that

level of the tested-for continuum at which "high" identity scorers might be discriminated; or that "low" identity scorers may typically present more defenses in performances on tests of this sort, or be more susceptible to socially-desirable responses (Edwards, 1957). In either case, these particular paper-and-pencil tests may be expected to be unreliable methods of assessing subjective identity, at least as that construct has been operationalized in this study. The possibilities of a method of profile analysis (Ch. 5) remain open, however.

The three indirect methods of assessing subjective identity developed and partially validated in this study offer some promise of becoming reliable assessment or research instruments after further refinement and validation. The projected biography technique, because it potentially taps most if not all of the identifiable dimensions of subjective identity, is particularly promising as a method of assessment. Experimentation with different instructions, and perhaps with restrictions on length or other form aspects, would be useful in refining this procedure.

The utilization of a "normal" population for research on identity, and for validation and standardization of assessment procedures, would seem to be particularly efficacious. Comparative studies of clinical, "alienated," and "self-actualizing" samples would contribute increments of validity and a more articulate means of refining the

various procedures and methodologies. Two conditions of the research setting particularly recommend themselves: that the subjects be observed under frustrating or personally challenging task conditions in order to assess their approach and reactions to adversity; and that the function of the research setting be such that some internal change in subjects be expected to occur if they are individually capable of accepting or encouraging such changes (Weigert, 1960).

Some Implications for Further Research. Other than those expressed or implied in the preceding pages, a few implications for further research warrant specification.

First, the factor of achievement appears consistently in the theoretical formulations of identity, and is either explicit or implicit in the 5 identity scales utilized in this study. An evaluation of achievement, as identified either by McClelland et al. (1953) or by Arnold (1962), as that measure relates to identity as conceived and assessed in this study, would provide additional foundation for further studies of identity.

The Witkin et al. (1962) approach would seem to be particularly fruitful by extension into story interpretation and story completion, in an attempt to isolate differentia of field-analytic vs. global approach individuals. The apparent relationship between the Witkin researchers'

instruments and the identity scales developed for this study provides a broader base from which to explore further both the identity construct and methods of assessing it.

An apparent "quality" of "high" identity scorers that emerges from a re-analysis of the items used for scoring seems to be what might be called "multipotentiality"; that is, "high" identity scorers seem to function from more complex and yet more highly integrated cognitive-evaluative structures, and to exhibit less constriction, inhibition, and stereotypy in their performances and responses. An attempt to operationalize Kelly's notion of "man's construction of his alternatives" (Kelly, 1958) might well produce an intrapersonal assessment technique which would order individuals in a manner similar to their ordering on one or more of the identity scales utilized in this study.

An incidental observation from this study was that "high" identity scorers exhibited a generally higher level of activity, awareness, and psychological vitality (Barron, 1963). It would seem to be both possible and desirable to create reliable measures of "vitality" which might in turn discriminate levels of one or more dimensions of subjective identity in various populations.

The interviews conducted for this study also revealed some support for Brown's contention (1956) that "low-identity" students are also "low" in social and peer-group orientation. If such orientation were conceived as active involvement

and commitment, then it would seem to be possible to assay certain dimensions of identity by some procedure which would reliably discriminate levels of social and peer-group orientation.

Although the contribution of "independence" to the over-all measurement of identity in this study was not clear-cut, the possibilities for reliably ordering individuals on subjective identity by some measure of independence remain relatively unqualified. Utilizing a scoring method similar to Arnold's (1962) for assessing "independence" in story protocols might be a particularly effective way of identifying independents (vs. dependents) and of comparing the ordering of scores by this technique with the ordering of scores on one or more of the identity scales employed in this study.

The possibility of "testing" identity through actual or laboratory experiences analogous to marginality might also be an especially efficacious way of assessing identity strength or integration. The difficulty of controlling actual circumstances of marginality suggests the use of a modified role-playing technique similar to that described by Stanton and Litwak (1955). The researcher or his assistant, by invariably disconfirming the subject, or by consistently thwarting the subject's role claims or expectations, creates a relatively unstructured interpersonal situation in which the subject can neither "be" what it

appears he should be nor what he might attempt to "be" as an alternative role. His reactions to such situations might be scored in such a way that this procedure could be validated against the scores of the same subjects on one or more of the identity scales of this study.

Other possibilities for further research may emerge as the results of this exploratory study are replicated or re-examined.

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Appendix I

Self-Insight Scale*

1. I have criticized others for saying things that I might
very well have said myself. T F
2. I am sure of only those things of which I have proof.
T F
3. I have no need to deceive myself on anything concern-
ing my personality. T F
4. Much of my reasoning consists in finding arguments for
going on thinking as I already do. T F
5. I have always appreciated a frank criticism of my
faults. T F
6. I can as easily laugh at myself as at other people.
T F
7. I never try to make anyone believe that I am a different
person from what I know myself to be. T F
8. I have at times acted upon the basis of self interest
knowing that my gains would be another's losses. T F
9. I am always careful to correctly describe what I have
read or seen. T F
10. There is no one who might think of me as a selfish
person. T F
11. I have no feeling of hostility toward anyone.
T F
12. There are times when I have been a source of annoyance
to other people. T F
13. As a friend, some people would find me disappointing.
T F
14. If it were not for the fear of disapproval, I would
probably violate certain social conventions. T F

(Continued on next page)

*Adapted from Gross (1947).

Appendix I (continued)

Self-Insight Scale (continued)

15. I have never insulted anyone. T F
16. I sometimes criticize another's actions because of
the feeling of self-righteousness and superiority it
gives me. T F
17. I sometimes do a good turn because of the praise or
advantage it brings me. T F

Appendix II

Semantic Differential

*AFFECTIONATE : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : INDIFFERENT
 UNPREDICTABLE : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : PREDICTABLE
 INTELLIGENT : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : UNINTELLIGENT
ALOOF : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : SOCIABLE
 GREGARIOUS : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : WITHDRAWN
 HOT : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : COLD
 HAPPY : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : UNHAPPY
WEAK : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : STRONG
 LARGE : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : SMALL
 SLOW : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : QUICK
VALUABLE : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : WORTHLESS
SHALLOW : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : DEEP
ACTIVE : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : PASSIVE
IMMATURE : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : MATURE
DEPENDENT : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : INDEPENDENT
ASSERTIVE : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : SUBMISSIVE
 IMPULSIVE : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : RESERVED
INADEQUATE : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ADEQUATE
SELF-DETERMINING : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : CONFORMING
TYPICAL : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : UNIQUE

*Underlining indicates items that were retained for scoring and correlations.

Appendix III

Behavioral Scale

In his behavior and performances,
and in his talk about himself, this
person exhibits:

+2	+1	0	-1	-2
1. Purposiveness; a sense of usefulness				Lack of purposiveness; expressions of uselessness
2. Autonomy (internal values and drives; not needing others to "get going," to make decisions, etc.); self-governing; self-determining				Heteronomy
3. Active achieving in present life; productive				Passive, apathetic, non-achieving orientations; non-productive
4. Confidence; unself-consciousness; self-assurance				Fear or anxiety about possible failure; self-deprecation; self-consciousness that interferes with commitment to work and others; lack of self-confidence and self-assurance
5. True engagement or encounter with others; openness to full relatedness (mutual or complementary) with others; relating to self and others as unique persons				Inability to engage others authentically; clinging to stereotyped or formal relationships, to paper identity; treatment of self and others as things; inability to transcend others' approval
6. Spontaneity; high degree of insight into the limiting effects of habitual responses; transcendence of and creativity in role-playing				Determination primarily by automatisms and social sanctions or role imperatives; low insight into social influence on own behavior; rigid adherence to stereotypy in role-playing

(Continued on next page)

Appendix III (continued)

Behavioral Scale (continued)

+2 _____ +1 _____ 0 _____ -1 _____ -2 _____

- | | |
|---|---|
| 7. Acceptance of ultimate subjectivity and the fact that one's life is one's own responsibility; openness to own experiences and values; direct reference to own experiences as basic aspect of reality | Assumption of "objectivity" and presumptions of getting at the "real" world directly; dispersion of responsibility for own life and values; considerable self-amnesia in some aspects of own life; inability to accept own experiences as aspect of reality |
| 8. Ability to deal with the world in terms of own wants and needs and desires (without moral or other sanction) and not in terms of what he thinks he <u>should</u> want and desire | Need to have a moral or other sanction for own wants and desires (and beliefs); thinking in terms of what he <u>should</u> want and <u>should</u> do and <u>should</u> believe or value |
| 9. A real sense of pleasure in living the life he is living--of general well-being | No clear or real sense of pleasure in living; complaining, fault-finding, "disadvantaged" orientations; sense of wrongness (or being wronged), of incompleteness, or of misgiving, however vague; living by phantasies rather than by well-intentioned work |
| 10. A personal style or idiom; some kind of personal creed or philosophy arrived at through effort | No personal style or idiom; exaggerated stereotype of style of behavior and values; no personal creed, or the easy assumption of handy, ready-made ones |
| 11. Ability to cope with life metaphorically; high tolerance for ambiguity, unstructuredness, and complexity | Inability to cope with life metaphorically; low or no tolerance for ambiguity or uncertainty; preference for simple, imposed, or repetitive activities |

(Continued on next page)

Appendix III (continued)

Behavioral Scale (continued)

+2 _____ +1 _____ 0 _____ -1 _____ -2 _____

- | | |
|---|---|
| 12. An open accepting orientation toward reality; problem-centering, with derivation of pleasure from challenging tasks and adversity | Distantiative orientation toward reality; talks <u>about</u> problems rather than committing oneself to achievement in spite of them |
| 13. No exaggerated reliance on spatial identity; no apparent compulsive need to be seen, heard, etc. | Exaggerated reliance on spatial identity; apparent compulsive need to be physically confirmed by others |
| 14. Distinct willingness (and courage) to live (and to fulfill) own individuality and uniqueness; belief that society's managers are persons like oneself; immersion in life without cynicism or anxiety over outcome; absence of hiding behind facades | Attempts to live "anonymously" by being "only a little man"; belief in the wisdom of society's managers as superior to one's own; anxious retreat or depressive resignation to helplessness; fear or individuality; hiding behind facades |
| 15. Interest in and concern about most aspects of own life; transcending goals and values | Pervasive indifference; inactive or passive value orientations; values and goals are situational |
| 16. No dichotomization of intellectual-affective (experiential) life; reluctance to rubricize; empathy and sensitivity in classifying or categorizing | Dichotomization of intellectual-affective life; other either-or orientations pervade thinking and behavior |
| 17. A full immersion and involvement in the now | A putting-off of the beginning of "real" life ("things will be better when..."); a fatalistic attitude toward time ("why start anything now when...") |

(Continued on next page)

Appendix III (continued)

Behavioral Scale (continued)

+2 _____ +1 _____ 0 _____ -1 _____ -2 _____

- | | |
|--|--|
| 18. High self-valuation; high self-esteem | Low self-valuation; low self-esteem |
| 19. Basic trust of others and of the world; realistic optimism | Basic mistrust; suspiciousness of others' motives and intentions, and of the general trustworthiness of the world; unrealistic pessimism |
| 20. Competitiveness; belief that success in any endeavor (even the required ones) is a consequence primarily of hard work, and of creative well-intentioned commitment | Abhorrence of competition; belief that success is unlikely, but that if it does come, it will be primarily as a result of fate or chance (or luck, or of one's slyness in "doing others in") |

Appendix IV

Self-Report Scale

4-----3-----2-----1-----0

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. An articulated feeling that life is being lived by self-initiation rather than simply happening to the individual; evidence of being and feeling the agent of one's powers; having definite goals and being able to work now at achieving them | Feelings or expressions that life is happening to the individual rather than being self-initiated; expressions of not being or feeling the agent of one's powers; absence of definite goals or distinct inability to work now in order to achieve them |
| 2. Evidence of competency (effectance) and feelings of competency; productivity in some culturally worthwhile endeavor; over-all active (achieving) vs. passive (talks about problems and difficulties, etc.) orientations | Evidence or expressions of incompetency; distinct lack of productivity in any culturally worthwhile endeavor; over-all passive orientations |
| 3. Evidence of true engagement with others; openness to relatedness with other people, without dependency upon them for identity or direction; B-love (Maslow, 1962) for others; or, commitment to active perpetuation or achievement of value-goals | Marketing-orientation toward others; lack of true engagement; absence of openness to others, or dependency upon them for identity or direction; D-love; no active commitment to the fulfillment of value-goals |
| 4. Full participation and involvement in the now; spontaneity; absence of defensive constrictions and constraints; full use of one's powers; congruency of actions and values | Lack of involvement and participation in the now; lack of spontaneity; presence of defensive constrictions and constraints; lack of full control of own powers; incongruency of actions and values |

(Continued on next page)

Appendix IV (continued)

Self-Report Scale (continued)

4-----3-----2-----1-----0

- | | |
|--|---|
| 5. Recognition and personal reconciliation with ultimate subjectivity; internal locus of evaluation; acceptance of the fact that one's life is one's own responsibility | Reliance on objectivity and delusions of contact with "real" socio-moral facts; external loci of evaluation; avoidance of acceptance of the fact that one's life is one's own responsibility |
| 6. A personal style or idiom anchored in the cognizance of role-playing and other socio-cultural imperatives; insight into limiting effects of habitual responses; a personal creed, thesis, or philosophy of life | Lack of a personal style or idiom; little or no cognizance of the limitations of role-playing, other socio-cultural imperatives, or habitual responses; no evidence of having a personal creed, thesis, or philosophy of life |

Appendix V

Interview Scale

-2 _____ -1 _____ 0 _____ +1 _____ +2 _____

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Obligatory, marketing-oriented relationships; stereotyped interpersonal relationships or social isolation; inability to engage or approach | True engagement, unconditional relationships; creative interpersonal relationships |
| 2. No real achievement or sense of achievement, but many reasons (external) for not achieving | Active achievement and accomplishment |
| 3. Best of life in the past or in the future | Immersed in the now |
| 4. No concern, or unhealthy concern over identity | Healthy concern about identity |
| 5. Low self-esteem honestly appraised | High self-esteem realistically appraised |
| 6. Basic mistrust | Basic trust |
| 7. Abhors competition, or pretends to value, but no evidence of really competing at anything | Likes to compete, or is actively engaged in doing so |
| 8. Denies embarrassment or shame, or amnesic with regard to such experiences | Openness to experience of shame or embarrassment |
| 9. Passive religious orientations, or none | Active religious orientations, even if atheistic |
| 10. General assumptions of objectivity | Accepts ultimate subjectivity |
| 11. Denies own experiences or amnesic toward them | Ability to have and accept own experiences |

(Continued on next page)

Appendix V (continued)

Interview Scale (continued)

-2 _____ -1 _____ 0 _____ +1 _____ +2 _____

12. Poor insight into self
and social processes

Good insight into self and
social processes

13. Self- or idea-centered

Problem-centered

Appendix VI

Interview Schedule

1. Talk five minutes uninterrupted about any interesting or exciting life experience you may have had.
2. Groups you belong to, or identify with.
3. Describe the person closest to you. Describe the most recent encounter with that person.
4. Occupational or career choice? Pleased by the prospect?
5. Recount your yesterday from the time you got up until you went to bed.
6. Major conflicts or problems today. What concerns you?
7. Do you ever wonder who you are or what kind of a person you are? Do you have a feeling of knowing who you are and where you're going?
8. Do you like yourself? In what way?
9. Do you believe that people are basically good and well-intentioned toward you?
10. Do you like to compete with others? For what kinds of goals or rewards?
11. Describe the most recent situation in which you were embarrassed or ashamed. Why were you? How did you feel afterward and what did you do as a consequence?
12. What do you think is wrong with our world? Right?
13. What gives you the greatest happiness or joy in life?
Example.
14. What activities are most boring or least interesting to you?
15. What do you believe to be your responsibility toward your fellow-man? Example.
16. Do you like to be alone? Recent example.
17. Do you believe in God? In what way? Example.

Appendix VII

W-Scale*

+1

Strong evidence of many or all of these four characteristics: reliance on instructor (or others) for task definition; lack of confidence in own competence; unpleasant, trying, burdensome, anxious task attitudes; absence of "evidence of an I"

+5

Strong evidence of the following: ability to define standards and procedures for performing the task independently of instructor (or others); a positive attitude toward one's own competence; enjoyment of the tasks; "evidence of an I"

*Adapted from Witkin et al. (1962), pp. 139-40.

Appendix VIII

Sentence Completion Test

- 1.* One's work is
2. Being alone
3. The most difficult decisions in life
4. When a person is a failure
5. Other people think I
6. I frequently worry that
7. It is usually hard for me to
8. Most people one meets
9. I usually feel that
10. I could be more productive if
11. I would like life better
12. When people watch me

*Underscored numbers indicate stems that were retained; others were discarded when an item analysis revealed their lack of discriminatory power.

Appendix IX

Story Stems

1. Ralph Andrews, a university sophomore student, felt that he had worked hard and had done a pretty good job on a term paper for one of his courses. But the professor had given him a very low mark on the paper, for a number of reasons which the professor had pointed out on the paper. On his way to discuss with the professor what he felt to be the professor's excessively high standards in grading the paper, Ralph met Tony Pauling, a classmate.

A. Reproduce Ralph's conversation with Tony.

B. Reproduce Ralph's conversation with the professor.

2. Complete this story: Richard Downs, who had been first in his high school class scholastically, was dismayed by his discovery today that his midterm grades for his first semester at the university had been "average" or below in all of his courses but one, in which he had made an "A." He was contemplating what he should do about the problem, and how he was going to explain it to the folks back home.

3. Complete this story: Robert Hayes and Bonnie Rolf had "gone steady" since they were juniors in the same high school. Now, attending the same university, they both planned to graduate at the next commencement--Bonnie with a degree in sociology and Robert in pre-med. They had frequently discussed what they should do about their relationship in view of the fact that Robert would be going on to med school next fall; they both realized that they could probably not arrange the necessary finances to marry before Robert completed his medical training. In recent weeks, Robert had frequently seen Bonnie having coffee with Ed Wilks, another sociology major. Nevertheless, Robert was shocked when Bonnie told him she wanted to break off their relationship.

4. Complete this story: Bill Travers brought Evelyn Weeks, a girl he had met at the university where they were both sophomores, to his family's home during the vacation period. He told his parents of their intention to get married in the spring. As soon as the opportunity arose, his parents took Bill aside and told him how much they disapproved of his choice of mate, and that they would naturally have to withdraw their financial assistance to him if he went ahead with his plans to marry the girl.

(Continued on next page)

Appendix IX (continued)

Story Stems (continued)

5. The infant child of a young couple became choked on a piece of candy shortly after the noon meal. Nothing they could do dislodged the piece of candy. They feared that the infant was unable to breathe and would die if something were not done immediately. They decided to rush the child to the hospital in their car. Enroute, travelling at a high rate of speed, their car struck a second-grade child at a school crossing. Either the impact or the excitement dislodged the piece of candy from the infant's throat, but the child that had been struck by the car was seriously injured and was not expected, by the attending doctors, to live. The four parents were together at the hospital when they heard that news. Reproduce the conversation that might have ensued between the four parents.

6. Harold Adams, a university student, was walking alone along a street in a large city with which he was unfamiliar. It was winter. A shabbily dressed man approached him and asked for money to buy a meal. Complete the story.

7. On his 35th birthday, Carl Tompkins was emotionally struck by the disparity between the dreams of his youth and his present accomplishments. He thought about his dilemma all during the day. Early in the evening, after helping put their three children to bed, he told his wife he was going out for a pack of cigarettes. She was worried about him because he had been acting what seemed to her "strangely" all day. She asked him what was troubling him. He replied that he'd talk to her about it when he got back. Reproduce their conversation.

8. A man pauses before a closed door. Inside is his son, who has been paroled to the father, after being arrested for a crime, with the stipulation that the father establish in his son's mind a firm sense of right and wrong. Reproduce the conversation between father and son that you think might accomplish this objective.