A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF TIME MAGAZINE'S COVERAGE
OF THE HOSTAGE CRISIS IN IRAN NOVEMBER
1979–JANUARY 1981

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PREFACE

This study is concerned with Time magazine's coverage of the hostage crisis in Iran. It sought to determine if the Time magazine's coverage of the crisis was balanced and fair to both parties - the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the American government. The writer is from Iran and was concerned with the coverage received by the Iranian government.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation for the guidance and support given to me by my graduate work adviser and the Director of Graduate studies of the school of Journalism and Broadcasting at Oklahoma State University, Dr. Walter J. Ward. It is because of his assistance and kind advice that this thesis stands completed. He was always available for counsel and encouragement and his directions were of great value.

My appreciation goes to the other members of the committee - Dr. William R. Steng, Jr. and Dr. Ed Paulin - for their interest and assistance. I would like to express my gratitude to them for providing immediate feedback within a short time span.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The American involvement in Iran since the early 1930s, the reign of the Shah, and the growing discontent of the Iranian people have been a focus of attention in the U.S. media. Every instrument of journalism has followed closely the development of issues and increase in friction at every stage. But the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the capture of Embassy officials as hostages brought events to a climax, drawing worldwide attention in its wake.

The writer believes that a study of how one major publication - Time magazine - portrayed the hostage crisis might serve as a springboard for discussing matters more clearly.

Time magazine is chosen for several reasons. It is one of the leading magazines in the nation with more than 50 years of news-gathering experience. Its readership is not limited to the U.S. but extends worldwide. The writer believes that coverage by Time was more extensive than any other national news magazine. For this analysis every article related to Iran and the hostage crisis between the period October 1970 and February 1981 will be utilized.

To those not familiar with Iran or the crisis, it would be helpful if some background information is furnished. Certain pertinent details regarding history, culture, and geography of Iran provide a helpful backdrop for this study.
Figure 1. Map of Iran
Iran is bounded on the north by the Caspian Sea and the Transcaucasian and Turkistan territories of the U.S.S.R.; on the east by Afghanistan and Pakistan. On the south are the Persian Gulf and Arabian Seas; and on the west, Iraq and Turkey.

The period of history of contemporary interest actually started in 1925 when Reza Shah, the father of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, succeeded to the throne of Iran by a vote of the Iranian Parliament and a constitutional amendment, thus becoming the Shah of Iran. He established the Pahlavi dynasty and singlehanded, absolute rule, but retained the Constitution of 1906 and its symbol of expression, and the Parliament as a source of legitimacy for his actions.

His reign was well summarized by Saikal when he wrote:

He ruled his strategically and economically important Islamic Kingdom with absolute authority, and spent its enormous oil income as he saw fit. His publicly avowed goal was to transform Iran into a progressive, pro-Western, self-sustaining industrial and military power.1

Until 1940 Iran had a very small place in the arena of American foreign policy. The United States had neither significant military and economic interests in Iran, nor were there many Iranian voters, compared to those of other ethnic groups, in the United States.

But the American viewpoint of Iran changed drastically, beginning in 1940. In the early 1940s a report was submitted to President Franklin Roosevelt by an American commission of experts, which stated that the center of gravity of the world's petroleum output was shifting to the Persian Gulf.

It gradually dawned on a number of American policy-makers that if

1Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah (New Jersey, 1980), p. 3.
Iran fell to Soviet communism, all Western economic and political interest in the Persian Gulf region would become vulnerable to Soviet penetration.

In the context of reports and the existence of a potential threat of Soviet interference in Iran, the American government began to establish closer relations with Reza Shah.

Washington committed itself to the development of close political, economic, and military ties with Iran, so that America's position would remain strong in the country. It bolstered its military mission in Iran by dispatching additional military experts and advisors to the Iranian government. It sought access to the country's oil resources.²

Reza Shah abdicated in favor of his son in 1941. He went into exile in South Africa, where he died in 1944. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, only 20 years old, became the Shah of Iran.

It took the Shah a few years to return the country to normal. He had to fight the growing social disorder, political disarray, and economic hardship.

The Shah's goals at this time were stated by Avery, thus:

The Shah began his new term of office with the announcement that he would cleanse the existing administrative machinery of the nepotism, inefficiency and corruption with which he found it 'riddled'. The Shah was not prepared to allow a variety of forces to join together and unseat him.³

U.S. Senator, Hubert Humphrey, put it this way in 1960: "Do you know what the head of the Iranian army told one of our people? He said the army was in good shape. Thanks to U.S. aid it was now capable of coping with the civilian population."⁴

²Ibid, p. 31
The U.S.A. acquired an extremely convenient base area along the southern borders of the Soviet Union.

Halliday summed up American involvement thus:

The U.S.A. has been the key external factor in Iranian foreign policy since the second World War. Iran gradually became part of what is called 'the North Tier' -- the line of pro-Western states along the southern borders of the Soviet Union, from Turkey to Pakistan.5

Aid from the U.S.A. was not limited to military supplies and personnel.

Under its various programs and agencies, the United States "provided the regime, from 1953 to 1957 alone, with a total of $366.8 million in economic-financial aid. The inflow of such aid continued at an average of $45 million a year for the next three years.6

This extensive American involvement in Iran brought with it a great increase in Western social and cultural influence, particularly among those educated urban Iranians who found the Shah's regime and its pro-Western stance desirable and beneficial.

At the same time it brought with it crushing force wiping out any form of internal dissension against the Shah. The military and the secret police, (SAVAK) executed, imprisoned, and exiled hundreds, almost indiscriminately.

The brutal intervention of the military in the political sphere became a pervasive characteristic of the Shah's rule. The military and SAVAK were used effectively in crushing and demoralizing opposition of all political coloring, manipulating the behavior of citizens, and controlling and redirecting public opinion for the benefit of the regime's stability and security.7

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5Ibid., p. 75.
6Saikal, p. 51.
7Ibid., p. 62.
Toward the end of 1960, the Shah's regime became unpopular. The regime enforced strict press censorship, and warned the press against any criticism of the royal family, or the military, or the Americans, whose support was crucial for the Shah to continue his political repression.

There were enormous, often violent, mass demonstrations against the regime from 1960, which continued over the next three years and demonstrated the displeasure of a sizeable portion of the Iranian people with regime's behavior and with the discouraging social and economic conditions. Those displeased with the state of affairs comprised nonpartisan students, intellectuals, professionals, craftsmen, small businessmen, landowners, religious leaders, and tribesmen. 8

At this time, there rose to prominence a religious figure - Ayatollah Rohollah Khomeini.

Elson summed up Khomeini's influence over the Iranian public, thus:

The impact of the Ayatollah on world events is far greater than merely the hostage crisis. Khomeini has ignited a messianic fervor to destroy Western influence that may spread throughout the Arab world, and a xenophobic nationalism that could be exported even to non-Islamic Third World nations. 9

Khomeini was chosen as the "Man of the Year" by Time magazine, in its January 7, 1980 issue. He was relatively unknown to the world in 1960. At that time he came into prominence when he began issuing public statements in opposition to the Shah's "oppressive" rule and some of the government reforms. He opposed, for example, the government's program of female emancipation as contrary to Islam.

Khomeini was exiled in 1964 as a part of the Shah's actions to crush the growing uprising against the government. For almost 15 years

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8 Ibid., p. 64.

he lived in Baghdad, Iraq. When the uprisings began in 1978 against the Shah, Khomeini left Iraq and went to Paris. On February 1, 1980 – 14 days after the Shah left Iran – Khomeini returned.

The writer believes that a brief summary of the significant developments between 1964 and 1978 will serve as a backdrop for the Iranian revolution and the role Khomeini played in it.

To regain some of his lost popularity and to subdue those agitating for better social and economic conditions, the Shah launched the "White Revolution" on January 26, 1963.

Saikal describes the need for it, thus:

The Shah declared that 'Iran's internal situation and international position' made him feel 'an empirical need' for a revolution and based on the most advanced principles of justice and human rights that would change the framework of society and make it comparable to that of most developed countries in the world.10

He introduced several land reforms to improve the condition of the peasant.

Lenczowski describes the land reforms:

The primary objects of land reforms were to destroy the power of the large landowners and improve the condition of the villager. Additional reforms dealt with the politically and socially delicate question of the consolidation of parcels of land into economic units.11

In this period the status of women rose steadily. The Shah started the process of emancipation of women by decreeing that girls should receive an education, and by ordering that the "achador" – the traditional dress worn by women – be no longer worn. He also gave them the

10 Saikal, p. 79.

right to vote.

In 1967, legislation was passed to prevent a man from marrying a second wife unless the first agreed. In 1974, the minimum legal age for marriage was raised from 16 to 18. The emancipation of women has meant a great upsurge of concern for social welfare.12

For the pasture lands, the government legislated that "public ownership" be available to sheep and cattlemen, and canceled all the charges that had been collected in the past by private owners. It subsequently nationalized water resources. The nationalization of water, which came into effect in July 1968, supported both agricultural and industrial development. It made water utilization more efficient and increased the water supply, so that there would be enough water available for the expanding agriculture, industry, and electric power.

Concurrently with land reform, the White Revolution's program stressed the rapid industrialization of Iran and improvement in the working and living conditions of the country's industrial labor force. It sought direct investment to establish heavy industries, such as steel and petrochemicals; it promoted, together with private investment, light industries, such as the manufacture of refrigerators, heaters, and assembly factories for motor vehicles, radios, and the like; and it sought to protect and strengthen traditional industries, such as textiles, carpets, and food processing.

The Shah declared "National Reconstruction" to be a necessary follow-up of these reforms, involving the reconstruction of both urban centers and rural areas. By the late 1960s, the government legislated urban renewal and urban reconstruction acts.

12Ibid., p. 116.
Saikal describes the National Reconstruction reform and sums up its objectives:

It was to narrow the gap in the standards of living between the cities and villages; to eliminate discrimination among various areas through greater attention to less developed areas; to accelerate rural development and reconstruction; and to continue with urban renewal; and to introduce all modern amenities for transforming Iran into a prosperous and powerful country in its region.13

The Shah failed to couple these socio-economic reforms with any major reform toward political democracy. He left the political structure and machinery under his supervision almost intact, and continued to centralize politics under his absolute control to strengthen his traditionally central position in Iranian politics. In general, the Iranian people were still denied basic political freedoms and civil liberties. The people were allowed neither to criticize government policies nor to seek redress for their grievances, individually or collectively.

The Shah magnified the scope and accelerated the implementation of his economic and military policies on the understanding that such revenue increases would continue for at least the next decade. He declared that the overriding objective of his policies was to transform Iran into a non-oil, self-generating industrial and military power by the mid-1980s.

But the Shah's over-all policies of accelerated economic industrial and military build-up soon proved to be beyond Iran's capacity to absorb at the rate envisaged by the Shah.

By the end of 1975, after two years of high government spending, heavy importation of advanced industrial and military

13Ibid., p. 89.
capital goods, and increased foreign investment, Iran was confronted with a serious shortage of trained manpower and an abundance of technological, infrastructural, and administrative bottlenecks, as well as a spiralling inflation, a drop in its agricultural production, and social imbalances.14

By 1977, Iran's general economic and social situation appeared grim. A large elite of about 15 to 20 percent of the population, who benefited most from the oil wealth, the Shah's policies and their consequent opportunities, and who formed the upper social strata, led an amazingly lavish and extravagant Western life style. The remainder, who made up the lower social strata, lived largely in impoverished conditions, envious of those with wealth, but struggling to improve their own social conditions and fulfill their rising expectations in whatever way possible.

By 1977, amid growing economic and social difficulties, the political structure became a major source of worry for the Shah. The Shah found it necessary to make some moves in order to 'liberalize' the political system to some extent. He permitted a degree of guarded criticism by the government-controlled press, some members of the Parliament, and certain key officials of the government's execution of his policies. The SAVAK was instructed not to persecute and torture dissidents to the extent it had previously.15

The liberalization measures soon proved to be very limited, too late, and ineffective in easing the situation. The measures opened the way for the various opposition groups that had hitherto been suppressed to rally public support against the Shah's rule. By early 1978, a series of demonstrations were held in the major Iranian cities.

With these demonstrations started a period of aggression against

14Saikal, p. 183.
15Saikal, p. 192.
the Shah. By mid-1978, the demonstrations developed into a nationwide anti-Shah movement. The catch words of the agitators were "down with the Shah and his oppressive and corrupt rule," and "long live Khomeini, Islam, democracy, freedom, and equality."

Khomeini now became the force behind the revolution. From Paris he publicized his views on the revolution through the Western press.

Church describes Khomeini's role thus:

Khomeini was the symbol of the revolution. Arrogant and pious. Stubborn and vengeful. Humorless and inflexible. Ascetic and power hungry. These are some of the adjectives that experts on Iran use to describe Khomeini. When he called for strikes, his followers shut down the banks, the postal service, the oil wells, bringing the country close to paralysis.  

The Shah left Iran for a long vacation with his wife and proceeded to Aswan Egypt. This departure on January 16, 1979, was believed to be permanent. "It was generally agreed in domestic and foreign circles that the Iranian monarch, who had ruled his country for 37 years, had departed for a long and perhaps permanent exile."  

The Shah left the nation's affairs to Premier Shahpur Bakhtair. The Parliament approved on January 16, the civilian cabinet of Bakhtiar. Bakhtiar's authority was immediately challenged by Khomeini. On January 13, 1979, he announced the formation of the Council of the Islamic Revolution, which he contended, would pave the way for a transitional government to replace Bakhtiar. Khomeini urged his followers in Iran to continue their general strikes and demonstrations against the Bakhtiar government.

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Several resignations in Bakhtiar's government followed the protests. Finally, Bakhtiar, in the face of strong protest against his government, left Iran on February 11, 1979.

On April 1, Khomeini proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic Republic. This followed a nationwide referendum held March 30-31. Of 18 million who voted in the referendum, 97 percent of the electorate had endorsed the Islamic Republic.

Mehdi Bazargan, a revolutionary chosen by Khomeini, headed the country till November 5, 1979. He served as prime minister.

Meanwhile, the Shah proceeded from country to country seeking asylum. After spending five days in Egypt, he arrived in Marrakesh, Morocco on January 23, 1979.

On March 30, 1979, the Shah and his family left Morocco and flew to the Bahamas where he stayed till June 9.

On June 10, 1979, the Shah flew to Mexico and landed in Mexico City. He was granted a six-month tourist visa. While in Mexico, the Shah's health worsened. Doctors in Mexico told him his condition required advanced medical care available only in the U.S.

On October 22, the Shah proceeded to New York for medical treatment. He underwent surgery in New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center and was reported to be suffering from cancer of the lymph nodes.

The U.S. Department said entry was granted because of the 'significant deterioration in his health in recent days.' Washington reportedly stressed to the Iranian government that the Shah's entry was temporary and for medical treatment only.18

On December 15, 1979, the Shah left the U.S. for Panama. In Panama

the Shah's health deteriorated and his personal doctors said he was in need of hazardous surgery. But the operation was delayed until his condition stabilized. A dispute arose between the Shah's aides and Panamanian doctors as to where and by whom the operation was to be conducted.

The ailing Shah then left his exile in Panama on March 23, 1980, and arrived in Cairo, Egypt, where the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat granted him permanent asylum.

In Cairo, the Shah's health deteriorated further. On June 27, 1980, he was admitted to an Egyptian military hospital near Cairo. The cancer that had been consuming him for several years finally took its toll.

The Shah of Iran died on July 27, 1980.

On the Shah's death, the late President Sadat said: "Let history judge the reign of the Shah as ruler, but we, in Islamic Egypt, will remain loyal to ethics and faithful to humane values. It was our duty to stand by him during hard times."19

On November 4, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was taken over by a group of Iranian students. The 60 hostages included political officers, Marine code clerks, and secretaries. The take over was preceded by demonstrations outside the embassy the same morning.

On Sunday hundreds of protesters gathered in downtown Tehran outside the U.S. embassy, a 27-acre compound surrounded by ten- and twelve-foot brick walls and secured with metal gates. The students, most of whom were unarmed, chanted anti-American slogans and carried banners: DEATH TO AMERICA IS A BEAUTIFUL THOUGHT and GIVE US THE SHAH.20

A detailed account of the take over was provided by Time magazine in its November 19 issue.

Just before 11 a.m., someone with a pair of powerful shears managed to break the chain that held the gates together. Once inside the compound, some headed for the ambassador's residence. Others tried to take over the chancellery, but found it protected with armor plating and grillwork. Inside the two-story, brick chancellery building, known to Americans as "Fort Apache" for its special security reinforcements, Marine guards donned flak jackets and gas masks and ordered everyone to the top floor. Finally, after stalling as long as possible, a Marine opened the door and students rushed in. Then they blindfolded the embassy staff, bound their hands and made them sit on a corridor floor.21

With this began a long period of negotiations between American and Iranian officials that lasted for more than a year.

At this point, the reasons for the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, by militant students must be clearly stated.

The U.S. failed to meet several demands made by the Iranians led by Khomeini. The chief reason for the takeover was U.S. refusal to return the Shah and his wealth.

The Ayatollah, who gave his blessing to the capture, has made a demand for the hostages' release: that the U.S. return deposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to Iran for trial and no doubt execution.22

The purpose of this study was to examine the content of Time magazine during the events that followed. The 444 days from November 4, 1979, to January 20, 1981, have become history - the hostage crisis.

21 Ibid., p. 19.
22 Church, p. 9.
CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

Message content is an important ingredient in the process of communication. Content represents the "portable world" with which one person or group communicates with another. Content analysis is a scientific method for analyzing various aspects of message content. Content analysis has been used to answer questions such as these:

How can communications suspected of subversion be tested for their 'propaganda' components? What makes writing readable? What are the similarities and differences in the political symbols which come to the attention of people in the major power states? What intelligence data can be secured from analysis of enemy propaganda?¹

Content analysis procedures have developed greatly since 1952, when Bernard Berelson reviewed and codified the procedure in his book on content analysis. Kerlinger defined this method of analysis as follows:

Content analysis, while certainly a method of analysis, is more than that. It is a method of observation. Instead of observing people's behavior directly, or asking them to respond to scales, or interviewing them, the investigator takes the communications that people have produced and asks questions of the communications.²

This study involved analysis of selected messages by Time magazine. Messages about a news event may be handled in different ways by different


communicators or media. Some produce lengthy messages. Others produce short messages, and still others may produce no messages at all. Some may select one part of the event to report and others another part. Some may display the messages prominently; others may place them in locations where they are likely to attract little attention.

This content study involved symbol analysis. In symbol analysis, the investigator seeks to describe some attitude or attitudes. We chose symbols that described the attitudes. Their frequency of occurrence in the content of the message was tabulated.

Coding usually involves directional analysis - that is, noting whether the symbol is given favorable or unfavorable treatment - and the symbols may also be studied over time to determine changes in attention and treatment given a particular symbol.3

Regardless of the specific method of content analysis, the investigator has to question reliability. In simple terms, reliability means repeatability with consistency of results. Another definition of reliability was provided by Janis, Fadner, and Janowitz:

For purposes of content analysis, we define reliability as the degree of correspondence between two sets of frequencies of classified symbol data based on the results of analysis of the same communications by two independent groups of analysts.4

According to Stempel, reliability in content analysis is a problem that the individual researcher must solve to his own satisfaction within the limits of his study design and resources.5

Errors most likely to bear on reliability are random rather than

3Ibid., p. 64.


constant errors.

A method to correct errors was provided by Budd, Thorp, and Donohew:

Stempel suggests computing a correlation coefficient of the results of two coders who coded the same material. To correct for random errors likely in frequency tabulation, a contingency table should be test-run to determine coder reliability.6

Different types of hypotheses can be tested with content analysis. They are:

1) Propositions which state a relationship between (a) communicator's environment, his opposition in the social structure, his personality traits, or his intentions, and (b) the kinds of signs which occur in his communications. 2) Propositions which state a relationship between (a) the kinds of signs which occur in communication, and (b) the reactions of audience (such as changes in attitudes) which result from perceiving those signs. 3) Propositions which state a relationship between one kind of sign in communications and another kind of sign which occurs in the same communications, such as typography.7

This study was concerned only with the relationships between the kind of signs or symbols used by Time magazine in its coverage of the hostage crisis, but not with the reactions of audience, such as changes in attitudes.

While doing the study, the writer did not take typography of symbols into account. It is not important to the study because Time magazine does not use banner headlines or special type faces for emphasis. Time magazine uses the same type for most of the printed matter. Italics were used only briefly for explaining photographs.

At this stage, the writer will describe the methodology adopted in her content analysis. The variables involved will be stated. The

6Budd, Thorp, and Donohew, p. 67.

symbols will be named and the method of classifying them described.

The writer attempted to determine, through content analysis, the relation between several characteristics of symbols used by Time magazine in its coverage of the hostage crisis in Iran.

In symbols analysis, the writer attempted to detect and describe some attitude or attitudes (to be specified later). Symbols that described these attitudes were tabulated. The writer searched for them in the content—articles in Time magazine dealing with the crisis and related to the period.

The content of the articles were classified as "favorable", "unfavorable" or "neutral" assertions. Each of the categories "favorable" or "unfavorable", was further differentiated into the sub-categories of "strength" and "morality", depending upon which of these standards was indicated in the favorable or unfavorable assertion.

The symbols employed were chosen from Lasswell:

There is no cut-and-dried list of political symbols (and objects that will serve the needs of every research on politically significant contents of the press. We can, however, be sure that comprehensive studies will include certain classes of symbols: 1) of persons, 2) of groups, 3) of agencies, 4) of policies, 5) of participants, and 6) of ideas (statements of crimes, future expectations).8

The question posed was: Did Time magazine use some symbols concerning the American government—the Carter administration—in favorable light while the same group of symbols were used concerning the Islamic Republic in unfavorable light? Or vice versa? What kind of attention was given to the hostages themselves? How often did Time magazine refer to the hostages or the issues? And in what direction—

favorable or unfavorable? And what dimension - moral or immoral, strength or weakness?

Operational Definition of Variables

1. The Iranian Government and its leadership: Any reference to the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranians, Khomeini, or representatives of the Iranian government.


3. Favorable: Any reference to the parties in the crisis in positive light. This is in relation to two sub-categories mentioned earlier - strength and morality.

4. Unfavorable: Any reference to the parties in the crisis in negative light. This again is in relation to two classes - strength and morality.

Strength refers to the position of the symbol as a cause of value changes. It includes military, diplomatic, economical, and ideological assets and effectiveness. The morality standard relates to conformity or non-conformity of a symbol to norm. It includes the presentation of symbols in terms of beauty, goodness, consistency and the like.9

Statement of the Problem

The writer was concerned with the objectivity of Time magazine coverage of the hostage crisis.

The following questions were asked during the study of the news stories of the crisis published by Time: Which aspect of the Iranian government did Time emphasize? Successes or failures? In what light did Time portray the two sides? In what dimension was the American government portrayed in Time magazine's coverage of the hostage crisis? To which did Time direct more attention? The issues or the hostages?

Key Symbols

A list of symbols was compiled after carefully reading several articles related to the hostage crisis in Time magazine.

Thirty symbols frequently repeated in the articles were noted. These were tabulated for analysis.

Stewart has emphasized the importance of symbols in content analysis:

Studies content, as a rule, attempt to report the relative attention and the direction given these symbols at some time in some channel. As a gauge of the attention which symbols command, almost universal reliance has been placed on a single dimension of content frequency.10

The list of symbols chosen for analysis is as follows:

1. Khomeini 8. Militant students
2. Shah of Iran 9. Ghotbzadeh

17. American Public 25. Hostages' release
19. Hodding Carter II 27. Bakhtiar
21. Iranian demands 29. Hostage treatment
22. Raja'i 30. Freezing Iranian assets

It must be understood that more than 30 symbols have been frequently repeated in the articles in Time magazine. But for the purpose of this analysis, the writer chose those she believed to be prominent and important.

The writer read carefully through the articles in Time magazine from October, 1979 to February, 1981. Occurrences were recorded as favorable, unfavorable, or neutral to key symbols.

While reading through the articles, the symbols may not have occurred with the same title or name, but unmistakably they comprised the point of reference.

Coding Rules

The following rules were followed for coding symbols: (a) Any city was coded as its country. Example, Tehran was coded Iran; (b) Any public figure (or synonym for him) was coded as his country unless he was in the symbol code; (c) Any synonym for a country was coded as that country. Any synonym for a man was coded as the man.

Certain rules were followed to classify strength and morality:

1. Strength Plus: Gain of, act, indication, promise, hope,
expectation, demands of: economic, military, diplomatic, social strength and/or gain. Diplomatic strength: envoy recall, demands for reparations, verbal attacks and offensives, belligerent stands, pro-war and anti-peace stands, threats.

2. Weakness Minus: Loss of, act, indication, expectancy of weakness or defeat in the military, economic, diplomatic, or social spheres. Economic weakness: lack of items constituting economic strengths described above; need for aid, shortages. Diplomatic weakness: yielding to pressure, conciliatory attitudes, pro-peace, anti-war in face of threats.

3. Morality Plus: Emotional evaluations of the symbol, endowing it with the following qualities: truth, mercy, glory, heroism, virtue, propriety, religiosity, honor, generosity, kindness, affection, sympathy, duty, justice, honesty, patriotism, loyalty, legality.

4. Immorality Minus: Emotional evaluation of the symbol, endowing it with the following: falsity, viciousness, ferocity, uncharitableness, cowardice, impropriety, paganism, dishonor, selfishness, cruelty, hatred, vanity, treachery, treason, subversiveness, unjust, dishonesty, unpatriotism, disloyalty, illegality, aggressions, insanities, abnormalities.

A form schedule for the analysis was prepared and applied for every article (a sample is enclosed).

Articles were read for symbols. When a symbol was found, its predication was determined. For example, if the classification of the predication was "plus", according to strength, the symbol was entered in the +S column under symbol. If the predication was -S, according to strength, code number of symbol was placed in the -S column under the symbol.
The coded sheets were tabulated and the frequencies of each symbol in the schedule was tabulated by a simple counting operation.

It must be noted here that a "plus" presentation of the symbol put it in a favorable light and a "minus" presentation put it in an unfavorable light.
CHAPTER III

FINDINGS

This study centered entirely on relevant stories printed in Time magazine during the hostage crisis: November 1979 to January 1980. The stories were read as closely as possible, first for their contents, and then for the presence or absence of 30 key symbols. For each symbol the writer determined the direction (positive, neutral, or negative) and dimension (strength or morality). A "plus" presentation of the symbol put it in a favorable light, a "minus" presentation put it in an unfavorable setting.

Before going to the actual interpretation of the tables and data, the writer considered it necessary to explain briefly the time phases involved in the analysis. Instead of taking the crisis as one 15-month period, she chose to split the same into four phases. This enabled the identification of any change in the trend of events and their coverage by Time.

Phase I (November 1979 to January 1980)

Seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the Shah's departure from U.S. to Panama, and freezing of Iranian assets in the U.S.

Phase II (February 1980 to April 1980)

Shah leaves Panama for Egypt, U.S. cuts diplomatic ties with Iran,
U.S. airborne force makes unsuccessful attempt to rescue hostages.

Phase III (May 1980 to September 1981)

Shah dies in Egypt of cancer and Majlis form a commission to study the fate of the hostages.

Phase IV (November 1980 to January 1981)

Iran proposes negotiations with U.S. to free hostages on basis of four conditions. Algerian mediators named.

Table I shows the direction and dimension of symbols during each phase of the hostage crisis.

The figures in Table I express, in percentages, the neutral symbols, symbols for positive and negative strength, and positive and negative morality. For example, in Phase I the percentages 8.98 and 14.69 are those for positive strength and morality for the American government. The total of 23.67 is the sum of percentages of positive symbols for the American government in Phase I.

It must be noted that every figure is a percentage of the total number of symbols in that phase and not the entire crisis. For example, 8.98 percent in Phase I for positive strength for the American government means that 8.98 percent of the 205 symbols in that phase were of positive strength.

Table I later is broken into four different tables for clearer discourse.

Time magazine and its correspondents believed that the action of militant students in taking over the U.S. Embassy was totally immoral, improper, unjust, and illegal.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases</th>
<th>AMERICAN GOVERNMENT</th>
<th>ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S +</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>8.98</td>
<td>14.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23.67</td>
<td>8.57</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>12.93</td>
<td>8.57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21.55</td>
<td>14.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>7.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16.36</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>13.75</td>
<td>23.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S = Positive Strength  \( M = \) Positive Morality
O = Neutral \( M = \) Negative Morality
S = Negative Strength \( N = 496 \) Symbol Frequencies
The magazine's opinion can be found in paragraphs such as this: "The situation was most infuriating, because the mightiest power on earth found itself engaged in a test of wills with an unruly gang of Iranian students and an ailing zealot of 79."1 "The trials presumably would be held before an Islamic revolutionary court. But compassion and mercy have scarcely been noticeable in Iran's revolutionary trials."2

In the first phase, Time magazine, in its coverage, portrayed Iran 20.41 percent in terms of negative morality and only 4.89 percent in terms of positive morality, as shown in Table II.

The figure 20.41, it must be remembered, stands for the percentage of negative morality symbols in the total of 205 symbols in the first phase.

As for positive strength, the American government had 8.98 percent and the Islamic Republic of Iran had 15.10 percent. This high percentage on the Iranian side partly is because Iran held the upper hand in the situation. American government employees were being held hostage, the U.S. could make no attempt to rescue them, and no diplomatic negotiations were successful. At one stage, Time magazine even conceded that negotiations with the Iranian government or Khomeini posed great problems.

The Ayatollah Khomeini, old and ailing, does not understand modern statecraft, diplomacy, or administration. Yet this remarkable old man, and he alone, seems to possess the power to preserve his volatile country from total anarchy - and to free the rest of the American hostages in Tehran.3

---

3"Iran: The Test of Wills," p. 20.
TABLE II

DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF TIME MAGAZINE ON THE IRANIAN CRISIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AMERICAN GOVERNMENT</th>
<th>ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN</th>
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<tr>
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<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase I</td>
<td>8.98</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23.67</td>
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</table>
Another reason for the high percentage of strength is Time magazine's portrayal of Khomeini. *Time* surprised the world by choosing Khomeini as the "Man of the Year" for 1979.

Wrote a *Time* correspondent about Khomeini:

Khomeini's carefully cultivated air of mystic detachment cloaks an iron will, an inflexible devotion to the simple idea that he has preached for decades and a finely tuned instinct for articulating the passions and rages of his people. He possesses the most awesome - and ominous of political gifts: the ability to rouse millions to both adulation and fury.4

In the second phase (Table III), while the percentage of negative symbols for American government showed 4.31, the figure for Iran was 14.65.

The American government still felt that Iranian demands were unreasonable and the Iranian action in capturing the embassy was cruel.

A *Time* correspondent wrote in April, 1980: "But this was an unusually somber Easter, and many a church-goer could not forget that half a world away, in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Americans had begun their sixth month of cruel captivity."5

At the same time, the positive strength figure for the American government stood at 12.93 percent compared to 15.51 percent for Iran. A major reason for this was the failure of the rescue mission reflected in the magazine's coverage. "Nonetheless, a worldwide debate was raging over the incident. A Pentagon whose planes had not even been detected while flying into Iran, much less shot at, now was barraged by bombs of


TABLE III
DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF **TIME**
MAGAZINE ON THE IRANIAN CRISIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AMERICAN GOVERNMENT</th>
<th>ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S + M O S - M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II</td>
<td>12.93 8.62 13.79 4.31</td>
<td>15.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21.55 14.65 18.1</td>
<td>16.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
criticism. 6

A look at the figures for positive morality (truth, mercy, glory, heroism, virtue) on either side proved to be interesting. The percentages were 8.62 for the American government and only .86 for Islamic Republic of Iran. The mission was viewed as an heroic attempt by commandoes to bring back their countrymen.

At the same time the Iranian leaders were shown as condemning the attempt but at the same time unhappy for the dead. "This is proof of Carter's crime, ranted the Ayatulla Sadegh Khalkhali, formerly Tehran chief Islamic judge. Then switching hypocritically to mournful tones, he added: 'My heart aches for the families of these victims.'" 7

In the third phase, Time magazine continued to endow Iran with more negative morality, as shown in Table IV. When the new parliament, majlis, was sworn in, the magazine showed members to be radicals and revolutionaries.

One article carried the headline, "Pistol-packin Parliament."

Wrote a Time correspondent: "It was symptomatic of the country's volatile political climate that most of the 213 newly-elected representatives arrived with personal body guards. Some even carried their own weapons." 8

The percentage for morality minus (falsity, impropriety, hatred, unjust aggressions) was 27.27, the highest yet encountered. Writing about the executions of anti-government officers, Time magazine implied

7Ibid.
### TABLE IV
DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF TIME MAGAZINE ON THE IRANIAN CRISIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>AMERICAN GOVERNMENT</th>
<th>ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S + M O S - M</td>
<td>S + M O S - M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>9.09 7.27 16.36 3.64</td>
<td>3.64 7.27 14.54 27.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16.36 3.64 20.0</td>
<td>10.91 7.27 41.81 100</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
the Iranians were violating the rules of their own religion. "Islamic guards fired salvo after salvo, enough to kill the men many times, while prison officials chanted a refrain of Allahu Akbar." 9

The Shah of Iran died in exile in Egypt. With his death Iranians lost one of their major demands - the return of the Shah. In this phase, both sides weakened in terms of positive strength.

Carter stated he did not predict an early resolution of the issue. Secretary of State Edmund Muskie said "It would be a mistake to raise expectations based on any specific statement." 10

The majlis were facing confusion in their midst.

In the final phase, positive strength and morality for the American government rose rapidly as negotiations for the release of the hostages were proving to be successful. Khomeini, himself, seemed ready to solve the dilemma. For Iranians, the war with Iraq had become the overriding issue.

The improvement in negotiations seemed to soften Time magazine's attitude toward Iran. Thus, this phase reflects the lowest percentage of negative morality. The figure for this period was only 13.75, as shown in Table V. The homecoming of the hostages, January 20, 1981, and their welcome by the American public were shown by Time magazine as gains in morality. This writer found that symbols like hostages, American public and hostage release appeared frequently and were endowed with morality plus (truth, mercy, glory, heroism, virtue, kindness, affection, patriotism).


TABLE V

DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF *TIME* MAGAZINE ON THE IRANIAN CRISIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AMERICAN GOVERNMENT</th>
<th>ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S + M 0 S - M</td>
<td>S + M 0 S - M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase IV</td>
<td>13.75 23.75 16.25 6.25</td>
<td>6.25 1.25 6.25 13.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37.5 6.25 22.5</td>
<td>7.5 6.25 20.0 100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Wrote a Time correspondent about the nation's welcome: "So the nation last week welcomed the freed hostages back from their 444 days of captivity with an orgy of emotion. Yellow ribbons were tied to virtually everything that could not or would not resist."\(^{11}\)

At the same time, the figures for positive strength and morality on the Iranian side were 6.25 and 1.25, respectively. Iran no more held the upper hand. It had entered into negotiations and ultimately agreed to release the hostages.

Time magazine did not pay much attention to what were certainly gains by Iran—ending of the U.S. embargo on trade with Iran and return of frozen Iranian assets.

In Table VI, "favorable" figures were compiled from the presentation of the parties in positive light (+); and "unfavorable" from their presentation in negative light (-).

The table shows there is a clear-cut direction in Time's coverage of the parties during the hostage crisis.

This proposition—namely the clear-cut direction—is supported significantly in all the four phases of the crisis.

In Phase I of the crisis, the figures for the Islamic Republic of Iran were 49 favorable and 67 unfavorable. For the American government it was 58 favorable and only 31 unfavorable. With 10.62, the chi square for Phase I in Table VI is .5957, and one can conclude that the differences could occur less than one time in 100 by chance. As indicated in the "C" column in Table VI, the coefficient of contingency of .5957 shows a moderate relationship. Therefore in the first phase of the crisis...

TABLE VI

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF KEY SYMBOLS DURING EACH OF THE FOUR PHASES OF IRANIAN CRISIS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>American Gov.</th>
<th></th>
<th>Islamic Republic of Iran</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Level of Sig.</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fav.</td>
<td>Unfav.</td>
<td>Fav.</td>
<td>Unfav.</td>
<td>$X^2$</td>
<td>df</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>10.62</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7.51</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Favorable and unfavorable presentation of American Government and Islamic Republic of Iran by Time magazine during each of four phases of Iranian Crisis, November 1979 to January 1981.
crisis Time magazine's coverage supports the proposition stated above.

But in the second phase, the chi square of .92, shown in Table VI, indicates that there was no significant difference. Therefore, our proposition is not supported in this phase.

In Phase III, the chi square of 3.31 shows there is no significant difference. Our proposition is not supported just as in the second phase. But in Phase IV, the difference is significant. The observed chi-square of 7.31 could occur by chance less than one time in 100.

Using the figures for favorable and unfavorable symbols in each individual phase, the writer ran one group chi-squares to find out where the differences were. This provided varied results.

In Phase I the chi-square for 58 and 49 - being the favorable symbols for American and Iran - was .76. This is not significant. Therefore, the two countries did not differ in getting favorable symbols.

But a look at the chi-square for unfavorable symbols in the same phase shows a significant difference. For 31 and 67 - being the unfavorable symbols for the American and Iran - the chi-square was 13.22. This means the difference is significant. Therefore, Iran did get more unfavorable coverage in this phase than the U.S.

In Phase II, both the chi-square for favorable and unfavorable showed no significant difference. The figures were .818 for favorable and 0.2 for unfavorable. Therefore, in Phase II there is no significant difference. Neither the U.S. nor Iran received more favorable or unfavorable coverage.

In Phase III, the coverage for favorable symbols showed no difference with a chi-square of .60, but the chi-square of 4.22 means Iran got
more unfavorable coverage than the U.S.

In Phase IV, there was a significant difference in coverage of the two countries. The chi-square of 16 for favorable symbols of the two countries shows the difference. But the chi-square of .1176 for unfavorable symbols shows no significant difference. This means the U.S. got more favorable coverage, while the two countries received an "equal" amount of unfavorable references.

Over-all Direction

The over-all direction, or the general trend, can be inferred from Table VII. Of the total 413 assertions, 202 were favorable and 211 unfavorable. Iran received more unfavorable (130) while the American government received more favorable (122). Therefore, Time magazine's coverage of the hostage crisis did portray the Iranian government in unfavorable light and the American government in favorable light.

| Table VII |
| FREQUENCIES OF USE OF KEY SYMBOLS IN FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE LIGHTS TOWARD TWO GOVERNMENTS: ACROSS ALL FOUR PHASES OF HOSTAGE CRISIS |
|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                                   | American         | Islamic Republic of Iran |
| Favorable                         | 122              | 80                |
| Unfavorable                       | 81               | 130               |
| Totals                            | 203              | 210               |

Totals 413
Most of the references to the country and the people seemed to indicate that Iran, especially Tehran, was full of mobs, demonstrations and confusion. Descriptions such as this by *Time* correspondents were common.

A number of demonstrators wore the Kafan, the Islamic burial shroud, to proclaim their willingness to become martyrs. One group carried a large cardboard effigy of Carter, depicting him as Satan, with fangs, and scythe dripping blood.\(^\text{12}\)

Another example would be this: "The crowds around the U.S. embassy grew larger and uglier. 'Death to the Shah' the demonstrators chanted, 'Death to Carter'."\(^\text{13}\)

At the same time, references to the Carter administration, and Carter, himself, were usually favorable. *Time* magazine showed Carter trying to do his best most of the time.

Two references are shown below: "For eight days the President had remained largely secluded in the White House, trying every weapon and maneuver he could imagine."\(^\text{14}\)

At the annual ceremony to light the Christmas tree on the Ellipse behind the White House, Carter bowed to a request by the hostages' families: except for a bright star of hope at the top, he left the 24-ft. spruce dark as a somber 'vigil of remembrance.'\(^\text{15}\)

A question we have to consider is this: How often did *Time* magazine refer to the hostages? And in what direction? Favorable or unfavorable? And what dimension? Moral or immoral? Strength or weakness?

Though the issue is known as the hostage crisis, very little was mentioned about the hostages. Their treatment and their families in the

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\(^{13}\)"Iran: The Test of Wills," *Time* (Nov. 26, 1979), p. 21

\(^{14}\)Ibid., p. 20.

United States. This writer, while reading through the articles, found only occasional references to the hostages, but any mention made was favorable. The dimension was always positive morality (glory, mercy, heroism, kindness, affection, sympathy).

Wrote a *Time* correspondent at a time when the release of the hostages seemed near:

Most of the families have tried to keep their hopes from rising too high. While the rest of the country concentrated on Election Night coverage on TV, the hostages' families were mainly attending to the ring of phone calls from Washington.16

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CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The writer would like to present some words of caution before proceeding with the summary and conclusions. While reading through the articles, her judgment had to be used in classifying the symbols. Every effort was made – the writer being from Iran – to avoid any individual bias or prejudice. It is possible that if an American were to conduct the same analysis, results could be slightly different.

Also, the writer did not conduct any reliability checks. No other coder apart from the writer was brought in to run any reliability test in coding symbols.

Another caution concerns the credibility of the information and news sources used by Time. One has to remember that Time’s bureau in Tehran lasted only until December 1979. The last two Time correspondents to leave Iran were Bruce Van Voorst and Roland Flamini.

In late December, the Iranian government, accusing Time of "one-sided and biased" coverage, finally ordered the two expelled.¹

After this, all the information received was through other foreign news agencies based in Iran, particularly in Tehran.

From the findings, it is evident that Time's coverage was

¹Meyers, p. 1.
pro-American through much of the crisis. The writer is not surprised at this, since Time magazine is an American magazine. But what makes the writer unhappy is Time's hostile attitude toward Iran and Iranians, condemning acts of religious leaders and portraying the entire country as full of blood-thirsty revolutionaries.

Time magazine ignored whatever happened in Tehran that was not related to the U.S. hostage crisis. Though demonstrations and protests were covered, the "normality" in Tehran was ignored.

Also, while updating the events in the crisis constantly, at no point was any detailed analysis made of what caused the Iranian people to act the way they did.

Time magazine should have offered background information. It is the responsibility of the medium to bring its readers up to the point at which the news story is and how this stage was arrived at. Only this can avoid a story being reported as more than an isolated incident.

The atrocities, the crimes and the dictator-type rule of the Shah, and American interference in Iranian affairs for many years, contributed to the uprising against America - a situation that led to the embassy take over. The militants who took over the Embassy also believed that the embassy officials were spies.

Just as this writer knew from her own experience, the nature of the Shah's rule, there were many people in Iran who could have testified about the Shah's rule. This would have provided another side of the story. Time magazine should be conscious of balance in the presentation of news.

The writer would like to recommend that in reporting any future international conflict such as this, Time magazine should take a
balanced stand. This would, perhaps, increase its credibility as a totally independent magazine committed to objectivity. It should also respect the feelings of entire nations, something which it seemingly failed to do in the case of Iran.
LITERATURE CITED


"Blackmailing the U.S." *Time* (Nov. 19, 1979), pp. 21-30.


APPENDIX
SAMPLE OF CODING SHEET

Date of Article ___________________________ Phase of the Article ___________________________

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Symbols</th>
<th>American Government + American Government -</th>
<th>Key Symbols</th>
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</tbody>
</table>
VITA

Parvin Lalehpavarman
Candidate for the Degree of
Master of Science


Major Field: Mass Communications

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Shiraz, Iran, December 28, 1956, the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Lalehpavarman.

Education: Attended Nazemeih High School in Shiraz, Iran from 1968 to 1974; received Bachelor of Arts degree in Journalism and Sociology from Southeastern Oklahoma State University at Durant in 1980; enrolled in Master of Science program at Oklahoma State University, 1980-1981; completed requirements for the Degree of Master of Science at Oklahoma State University in December 1981.