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JOHN LOCKE'S PHILOSOPHY OF DISCOURSE

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JOHN LOCKE'S PHILOSOPHY OF DISCOURSE

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JOHN LOCKE'S PHILOSOPHY OF DISCOURSE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem of this Study

Many authors have suggested that Locke has been one of the most influential writers and thinkers since the Enlightenment. Hibben, in The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, stated that Locke set the theme for the Age of Reason:

With the principles of Locke widely disseminated and discussed in the cafe and salon and even among the rank and file of the people generally . . . his philosophy exerted a remarkable influence upon the religious, the moral, and the political life of that age.¹

Leslie Stephen regarded Locke's works as the "keynote of English speculation in the eighteenth century."² Locke's formulations of the empirical theory in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding motivated the later development of that school of philosophy. Deism took its lead from The Reasonableness

¹John Grier Hibben, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910), p. 18. See pp. 6-7. Also Crane Brinton, The Shaping of the Modern Mind (New York: The New American Library, 1950), p. 110.

²Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1902), p. 94.

of Christianity. Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and, hence, the American Constitution demonstrated some influence of his theories in political and religious tolerance.³ In the recent American Mind, Stow Persons maintained Locke's influence upon American thought: "Locke was certainly widely read and quoted by American writers. . . ."⁴ Persons wrote of America's "indebtedness to Locke."⁵ Accordingly, Locke's thinking has been influential, to some degree, on modern society.

The thesis of this study is that Locke contributed not only to the political, religious, and philosophical facets of modern society, but to the development of rhetorical theory. This proposition raises three questions: Did Locke's interests lead him to consider discourse and language extensively? Assuming that he did contribute to rhetorical theory, would it be profitable to study his concepts? And third, and most important, what were his contributions? These questions must be answered in order.

There is sufficient historical evidence to suggest that Locke maintained an interest in linguistic communication on both the practical and theoretical levels. At Oxford and Westminster Schools, studies in rhetoric and practice in

³Chapter II presents a discussion of Locke's contributions to modern society in the areas of philosophy, politics and religion.

⁴Stow Persons, American Mind: A History of Ideas (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958), p. 130.

⁵Ibid.

disputations were an essential part of Locke's seventeenth century education. From his detailed expense account while at school we learn that he purchased many of the speeches given in Parliament.⁶ Locke himself wrote and delivered several speeches to the Oxford student body.⁷ The fact that he owned and was familiar with Lamy's influential work, The Art of Speaking, and Aristotle's Rhetoric indicates some interest in theoretical rhetoric.⁸ His library also contained the rhetorical works of Cicero and Seneca.⁹ Locke served as Reader in Rhetoric at Christ Church at Oxford in 1662.¹⁰ In Locke's own words, he suggested that by a more penetrating consideration of both "ideas and words as the great instruments of knowledge" he hoped to "afford us another sort of logic and critic, than what we have been hitherto

⁶John Locke, Essays on the Laws of Nature, ed. by W. von Leyden (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 16.

⁷Ibid., pp. 3, 15, 19. Von Leyden further wrote of two orations written and delivered in Latin by Locke at Westminster before Dr. Busby and other masters of the school. His work reprinted a valedictory speech written and delivered by Locke while he was Censor of Moral Philosophy. See pp. 11, 214-243. One of Locke's orations is referred to by him in a letter to his father as printed in John Locke, An Early Draft of Locke's Essay, ed. by R.I. Aaron and Jocelyn Gibb (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 4.

⁸G. Bonno, Les Relations Intellectuel de Locke avec la France (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1954), p. 125.

⁹Maurice Cranston, John Locke: A Biography (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), pp. 20-21.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 35.

acquainted with."¹¹ There is sufficient historical evidence, therefore, to conclude that Locke was concerned with the methodology of discourse.

Several authors have hinted at the value of a rhetorical study of Locke's works. Both C.W. Edney and Warren Guthrie asserted that George Campbell's rhetorical formulations were strongly influenced by Locke's thinking.¹² Edney further argued that Locke formulated in Book III of the Essay the basic tenets of contemporary "general semantics."¹³ Although this study is centered on Locke's role as a rhetorical theorist, Thonssen's and Baird's view of Locke as a critic of rhetoric is not unimportant.¹⁴

There is, moreover, another view of the value of a study of Locke's rhetorical contributions. Howell, in Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, described the development of a "new" rhetoric around the turn of the eighteenth century.¹⁵ A preliminary analysis of Locke's works revealed

¹¹John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Alexander Fraser Campbell (New York: Dover Publication, 1959), II, 462.

¹²C.W. Edney, "English Sources of Rhetorical Theory in the 19th Century America," p. 82 and Warren Guthrie, "The Development of Rhetorical Theory in America," p. 64, both in A History of Speech Education in America, ed. by Karl Wallace (New York: Appleton Century-Croft, 1954). Also see, Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948), p. 136.

¹³Edney, "English Sources of Rhetorical Theory in the 19th Century America," p. 95.

¹⁴Thonssen and Baird, pp. 181-182.

¹⁵Wilbur Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in

that his rhetorical positions were at many points parallel to those characteristics of the "new" rhetoric. Hence, it becomes of significant value to study Locke with regard to his influence on this important development of rhetorical history.

The Purpose and Method of this Study

This study proposes to abstract and systematize Locke's philosophy¹⁶ of discourse. Locke never proposed any system of prescriptive rules or regulations regarding rhetorical behavior. He did analyze, however, the basic philosophical precepts of the methods of producing discourses. Hence, a study of Locke's complete works, i.e., letters, diaries, journals, notebooks and books, should produce a synthesis of his thinking toward linguistic communication.

This study does not attempt to relate Locke's rhetorical views to the historical development of rhetoric. Inferences of this nature which the work presents are incidental to the main objective. In the concluding chapter, however, I suggest some possible relationships.

Previous Research

Recently there have been several good biographies done on Locke. One of the best and most recent is the Cranston

England, 1500-1700 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 364.

¹⁶This term is used to mean a scrutiny of the basic or primary postulates of a given discipline, in this case, logic and rhetoric.

work, John Locke: A Biography. An older but still reliable biography is Henry R.F. Bourne's two volume The Life of John Locke.¹⁷ Cranston thought highly of the work:

His biography is an excellent one. He showed great enterprise in finding new material, and he examined all he found with the upmost care. His book is reliable, intelligent and systematic and, as far as was possible in the circumstances of time, complete. . . .¹⁸

Lord King, a nephew of Locke, wrote the first biography of Locke in 1829.¹⁹ Unfortunately, the work is not a good one. Cranston said: "He transcribed with no great care or method the more legible of Locke's manuscripts and printed them in random sequence."²⁰ Other works which shed light on Locke's life and rhetorical thinking are Benjamin Rand's The Correspondence of John Locke and Edward Clarke and Aaron's and Gibb's An Early Draft of Locke's Essay.²¹ Each of these works is important to this study because they made available significant primary source material.

There are other works on Locke of a critical, interpretative nature. D.J. O'Connor has done an excellent

¹⁷Henry Richard Fox Bourne, The Life of John Locke (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1876).

¹⁸Cranston, p. x.

¹⁹Lord King, The Life and Letters of John Locke (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1858).

²⁰Cranston, p. x.

²¹Benjamin Rand, (ed.), The Correspondence of John Locke and Edward Clarke (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927).

evaluative interpretation of Locke's epistemology in John Locke.²² The Relation of John Locke to English Deism by Hefelbower analyzed Locke's theory of religious tolerance.²³ One of the best accounts of Locke's political position is "The Politics of a Philosopher" by Maurice Cranston.²⁴ Cragg has written a very thorough study of Locke in relation to his times, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason.²⁵ S.C. Carpenter's Eighteenth Century Church and People is also a good study of Locke's influence on ideas and theories of the eighteenth century.²⁶ Of course, there are many more interpretative studies of Locke; however, this is a representative list of a few of the best.

According to various bibliographical sources, only one study of Locke has been slanted toward the rhetorical point of view. Louis Cockerham wrote an M.A. thesis on Locke's theory of logical proof.²⁷ Cockerham specified the limitations

²²D.J. O'Conner, John Locke (London: Penguin Books, 1952).

²³Samuel Gring Hefelbower, The Relation of John Locke to English Deism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1918).

²⁴Maurice Cranston, "The Politics of a Philosopher," The Listener, LXV (January, 1961), 17-19.

²⁵G.R. Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason: A Study of Changes in Religious Thought within the Church of England, 1660-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).

²⁶S.C. Carpenter, Eighteenth Century Church and People (London: John Murray Press, 1959).

²⁷Louis Cockerham, "John Locke's Theory of Logical

of his own work:

Book IV, "Of Knowledge and Probabilities," embodies all of the basic contributions to Locke's theory of logical proof. Book III, "Of Words," is a comprehensive treatment of language which is an important contribution to the study of Rhetoric but which will not be considered in this particular investigation.²⁸

This present study is much more inclusive than Cockerham's.

Hans C. Aarsleff's dissertation, The Study of Language in England 1780-1860, considered Locke's theory of Language.²⁹

With these exceptions there are no works similar enough to this investigation to be of immediate usefulness.

Other studies not on Locke gave valuable methodological insights. John Cook's work on Bertrand Russell's "conception of an ideal language" is a good example.³⁰ Wayne Brockriede did a rhetorical study of Jeremy Bentham, a "philosopher" not usually associated with linguistic communication.³¹

Availability of Materials

There are no deficiencies in this study caused by

Proof" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Oregon, 1959).

²⁸Ibid., p. 1.

²⁹Hans C. Aarsleff, "The Study of Language in England 1780-1860." (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, The University of Minnesota, 1960).

³⁰John Cook, "An Essay on Russell's Conception of an Idea Language." (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, The University of Nebraska, 1960).

³¹Wayne E. Brockriede, "Bentham's Philosophy of Rhetoric." (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois, 1954).

lack of materials. The accessibility of the collection of Locke's papers, journals, letters and lectures in the Lovelace Collection in the Bodleian Library at Oxford at first posed a serious problem.³² Little of the material is in print or on microfilm and it was possible that some of the material might be relevant to this study. However, W. von Leyden, who has catalogued all of the materials, assured me that none of the materials is relevant to this study.³³

Method of Organization

Since this study consists of systematizing Locke's philosophy of discourse, this work is not restricted to Locke's organizational development. Whenever his organizational pattern was appropriate, it was used. However, in the main, the purpose of this study dictated the approach. Accordingly, this dissertation presents two major sections. Chapters II and III constitute an investigation of the background of Locke's philosophy of discourse. Chapters IV, V, VI and VII

³²In 1948, Lord Lovelace sold to the Bodleian Library, Oxford, John Locke's personal papers which Locke had left when he died in 1704 to his young cousin Peter King. Locke's 1,000 odd manuscripts include detailed financial accounts, library lists, notebooks containing entries on philosophy, politics, literature, science, theology, economics and colonial administration; several more elaborate manuscripts on the same subjects; recipes, inventories, certificates of various kinds, and ten volumes of Locke's journal. See Cranston, pp. ix-xi.

³³In a letter to me, von Leyden stated: "I am sorry to say that to my knowledge none of Locke's lectures on rhetoric have been preserved anywhere. Nor do I recollect that any of his letters or journals in the Lovelace Collection is in any way concerned with speechmaking. . . ."

consist of the discussion of his views on communication and language.

CHAPTER II

JOHN LOCKE AND HIS TIMES

Introduction

Any serious investigation of Locke's philosophy of discourse must include a study of the man and his times. Locke's educational background, his various occupations, and his wide travels influenced and guided his views of rhetoric. Also, underlying all of Locke's writings was a social and cultural milieu which tailored and limited what he postulated. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to investigate and delineate John Locke and his times. This chapter does not constitute a definitive, exhaustive analysis, but it represents only an attempt to familiarize the reader with Locke's background and the intellectual context out of which his philosophy of discourse developed.

The Man

Early Years

On the 15th of July, 1630, John Locke, senior married Agnes (or Anne) Keene at Wrington, her home.¹ John Locke the

¹Benjamin Rand, (ed.), The Correspondence of John

philosopher was born and baptized at Wrington on the 29th of August, 1632.² The Locke family had since made their home in Pensford in Somerset, but at the time of the birth, Locke's mother was visiting relatives in Wrington.³ The only other child from this marriage was Thomas, born at Beluton the 9th of August, 1637.⁴

The story of Locke's childhood is relatively incomplete. His parental background was of Puritan middle class.⁵ The senior Locke was a "fair-to-do" attorney and clerk to the Justices of the Peace in Somerset.⁶ Cranston suggested that in either status "he enjoyed no great . . . distinction."⁷

Locke and Edward Clarke (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927), p. 2.

²Maurice Cranston, John Locke: A Biography (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 1 and Henry Richard Fox Bourne, The Life of John Locke (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1876), I, 12. For other good biographies see: A.C. Fraser, Locke (London: Oxford University Press, 1890); Thomas Fowler, Locke (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1906); S. Alexander, Locke (New York: Dodge Publishing Company, 1908); Robert I. Aaron, John Locke (London: Oxford University Press, 1937); and Lord King, The Life and Letters of John Locke (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1858).

³Rand, p. 2.

⁴Ibid. Thomas Locke married, but died young of consumption, leaving no children.

⁵Cranston, p. 3.

⁶Ibid., p. 5. Locke's father claimed cousinship with a John Locke, major of Bristol in 1642, and descendant of an earlier John Locke, sheriff of London in 1460, and grandfather of Sir William Locke, a great English merchant under Henry VIII. Bourne also identified a long and not very accurate article about early Lockes in Gentleman's Magazine, LXII (1792), 798. Bourne, I, 1-2.

⁷Cranston, p. 5.

Locke's mother died while he was still young and his care and education became the father's responsibility.⁸ Bourne stated that his childhood "was passed mainly at Pensford, with occasional visits to Wrington, where relatives lived."⁹

Cranston elaborated on the early life of Locke by describing the village in which he grew up:

The economic conflict of his village reflected in a complicated way the religious conflict, and both were reflected in the nation's politics. High Churchmen against Puritans, enterprising capitalists against old-fashioned landowners, assertive politicians against an imperious king: each of these divisions in society presaged that great clash of principles, the Civil War; and as the country was divided, so too was Somerset. . . .¹⁰

At times Locke's childhood may have been lonely, but he grew up in a bookish home and, as Cranston indicated, "there was much to absorb or amuse a child in the vicinity of Belluton."¹¹

The Civil War which began within a week of Locke's tenth birthday had several influential consequences on his life. Some years following the War, Locke wrote of the experience in one of his journals: "I no sooner perceived myself in the world but I found myself in a storm which has lasted almost hitherto."¹² Locke's father joined the

⁸Rand, p. 2.

⁹Bourne, I, 13.

¹⁰Cranston, p. 3.

¹¹Ibid., p. 13.

¹²John Locke's journal, 1677, p. 28 in Ibid., p. 3.

Parliamentary army as a captain of a cavalry unit under the command of his friend and employer, Colonel Alexander Popham.¹³ The relationship between Locke senior and Popham was to be highly significant in Locke's education.

Through the influence of Colonel Popham, Locke entered Westminster School in 1647. Popham, who had entered the Parliament as a member for Bath, gained the nomination for Locke's entrance into Westminster.¹⁴ Cranston described Popham's action as a favor to Locke's father:

Colonel Popham found an occasion in 1647 when the Civil War was virtually won, to render Locke's father a small kindness which had important consequences. While Parliament had gained control of many educational institutions, one of which was Westminster School, Colonel Popham had become a Member of Parliament for Bath and thus in a position to nominate boys for that distinguished foundation. Colonel Popham put up John Locke's name and in the autumn of 1647 the boy was admitted to the school.¹⁵

Locke studied at Westminster School for the next six years.¹⁶

Locke's experiences while at Westminster were significant in shaping his adult, mature philosophies. Dr. Richard Busby, a liberal and an ardent opponent of Cromwell, was the headmaster of Westminster at the time of Locke's entrance.¹⁷ He taught his pupils "to beware of persuasion, and never to

¹³Bourne, I, 7.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁵Cranston, p. 17.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 20.

accept without reflection the pretensions of men in power."¹⁸ Indeed, Locke found certain difficulties with the political atmosphere of the school because of his strict Puritan home life.¹⁹ Nevertheless, Dr. Busby and Westminster deserve much of the credit for instructing Locke in the theories of liberalism which played such an important role in his later political and religious works.²⁰ Cranston argued the contributions of Busby and Westminster to Locke's intellectual development: ". . . Westminster did purge Locke of the unquestioning Puritan faith in which he had grown up; and thus . . . Dr. Busby . . . must be given the credit for having first set Locke on the road to Liberalism."²¹ Hence, many of Locke's ideas and concepts which appeared in his later philosophical and political works find their genesis in his educational experiences with Dr. Busby and Westminster.

While at Westminster, Locke devoted much of his time and attention to the practice and study of the rhetorical teaching devices common in his day. Early each morning the students spent two hours in Greek and Latin grammar repetitions, in extemporaneous Latin paraphrases and expositions of passages from Greek and Latin works, and in repetitions of passages that they had learned overnight. The students, next,

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 19.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.,

had one hour in which to prepare other exercises, and between nine and eleven the elder scholars of the school examined them in prose and verse composition, still, of course, in Greek and Latin. Bourne described the students' activities between one and three: they engaged in "construing and other grammatical ways, examining all the rhetorical figures, and translating out of verse into prose, or out of prose into verse, out of Greek into Latin, or out of Latin into Greek."²² On Saturdays the students performed Greek and Latin declamations. Throughout the week, the headmaster required the students to attend numerous sermons.²³ Hence, at Westminster Locke received his initial introduction to the rhetoric of his day.

In 1652, Locke graduated from Westminster and enrolled in Christ Church at Oxford with a junior studentship.²⁴ The routine at Christ Church was busy but varied. During the morning Locke attended the lectures of the University professors or the college readers. After dinner, during which he had to speak Latin, he generally heard a second public lecture.²⁵ He probably used the free time following the lecture

²²Bourne, I, 20. Bourne also referred to an account of studies at Westminster in "The Public Schools," Blackwood's Magazine, 1867).

²³Ibid., pp. 19-20.

²⁴Ibid., p. 19. Locke spent six years at Westminster School, a year longer than the ordinary curriculum. He entered Christ Church on the 27th of November.

²⁵In 1649 the college passed the requirement "to cause either Greek or Latin to be strictly and constantly exercised and spoken in their familiar discourse within the

to attend the University disputations or declamations.²⁶ During Locke's first year at Christ Church he went to lectures on rhetoric every Monday and Thursday. He enrolled in classes on logic during his second year. Regulations required Locke to attend and participate in public disputation during his fourth year at school.²⁷ Fowler, in The History of Corpus Christi College, explained the regulation:

Undergraduates were to be lectured in logic, and assiduously practised in arguments and the solution of sophisms by one or two of the Fellows or probationers assigned for that purpose. Moreover, all undergraduates, who had devoted at least six months and not more than thirty to the study of logic, were to frequent the argumentative contest of the school. . . .²⁸

Locke not only received a thorough theoretical foundation in rhetoric and logic, but was also a frequent participant in disputations and declamations.

Locke found little, if any, challenge or satisfaction in his studies at Oxford. Lady Masham, a very close friend of Locke, described his reaction to his education:

I have often heard him say, in reference to his first years spent in the university, that he had so small satisfaction there from his studies, as finding very

said several colleges and halls respectively, and that no other language be spoken by any fellow-scholar or student whatsoever. . . ." From the Queen's College MSS cited in the appendix to the Fourth Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission (1874), p. 456 as quoted in Ibid., p. 42.

²⁶Bourne, I, 42.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 44, 54-55.

²⁸Thomas Fowler, The History of Corpus Christi College (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1893), p. 41.

little light brought thereby to his understanding, that he became discontented with his manner of life, and wished his father had rather designed him for anything else than what he was destined to, apprehending that his no greater progress in knowledge proceeded from his not being fitted or capacitated to be a scholar.²⁹

Locke considered the time spent in the study of philosophy nearly wasted, "because the only philosophy then known at Oxford was the peripatetic, perplexed with obscure terms and useless questions."³⁰ He disliked the grammatical exercises in which the Oxford students indulged. Locke regarded the Latin and Greek verse-writing, "for the pedantic exhibition of familiarity with the husks and dry bones of classical literature," as a total waste of time.³¹ In disputations, according to his college friend James Tyrell, he spent no more time than he could help, and then resented that time as wasted. Lady Masham indicated Locke's dissatisfaction with disputation: ". . . Locke never loved the trade of disputing in public in the schools, but was always want to declaim against it as being invented for wrangling or ostentation, rather than to discover truth."³² Closely related to his dislike of disputation was Locke's distaste for "Greek and

²⁹Manuscript in the Remonstrants' Library: Lady Masham to Le Clerc, 12 January, 1704 in Bourne, I, 47.

³⁰Le Clerc, "Eloge de M. Locke," Bibliothèque Choisie, p. 347 in Bourne, I, 61.

³¹Bourne, I, 61.

³²Manuscript in the Remonstrants' Library: Lady Masham to Jean le Clerc, 12 January, 1704 in Bourne, I, 42-43.

Latin declamations in fantastic support of Aristotelian and pseudo-Aristotelian dogmas."³³ He considered such activities "destructive of sound intellectual energy."³⁴ Hence, by and large, "Locke spent . . . his first years at the university in reading romances, from his aversion to the disputation then in fashion there."³⁵

Locke finished his bachelor's degree in February, 1655, abridging the usual time period by one term. He shortened his Master's work by two terms, finishing on the 29th of June, 1658. He thus completed his curriculum twelve months before the end of the seven years covered by his junior studentship which expired in 1659.³⁶ His election to a senior studentship made it possible for him to remain at the University.³⁷ Soon afterwards, Locke received appointments as a

³³Bourne, I, 49-50.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Spence, "Anecdotes," p. 107 in Bourne, I, 54. Bourne, p. 44, made a judgment as to the quality of Locke's courses. ". . . If the rhetoric and logic now imparted to him were not altogether stale, there was not much profit in them. The logic was Aristotelian logic, which had been filtered--perhaps we should say vitiated--through the minds of some thousands of Greek, Roman, dark-age and mediaeval commentators. . . ." Chapter III will describe in more detail the rhetorical climate of Locke's times.

³⁶Bourne, I, 36, 52.

³⁷Rand, p. 4. Bourne stated that nearly every capable Westminster student received a senior studentship which was equivalent to a fellowship at any other college. These senior studentships, unless taken away for bad behavior, or for some other special reason, were tenable for life. Locke held one of the studentships until 1684. Bourne, I, 52-53.

Reader in Greek (1661) and a Reader in Rhetoric (1662) at Christ Church. He also held, between 1661 and 1664, the censorship of moral philosophy in the college.³⁸

During his year as Reader in Rhetoric (or Greek and Latin), Locke lectured on many of the Greek and Roman classical authors. On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, he lectured from some portion of the Grammar of Theodorus or some other approved Greek grammarian, together with some of Lucian, Philostratus, or the orations of Isocrates. On Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, he taught Aristophanes, Theocritus, Euripides, Sophocles, Pindar, or Hesiod, or some other ancient Greek poets, in addition to parts of Demosthenes, Thucydides, Aristotle, Theophrastus, or Plutarch. The Reader in Rhetoric, also, taught from Cicero and Quintilian. Moreover, three times a week he gave private instructions in Greek grammar or rhetoric to all members of the college below the degree of Master of Arts.³⁹

Adult Years

The temper of Locke's nature and personality made him a student of human nature all of his life. During his adult

³⁸Bourne, I, 86-87. Clergymen generally occupied these offices. See Rand, p. 5. Bourne, I, 89, maintained: "It is most likely that, without pledging himself to any course of action, he had serious thoughts of entering the church, and that with this prospect, if not on this understanding, he was not only allowed to hold his studentship irregularly, but was appointed . . . [to the Readerships.]"

³⁹Fowler, The History of Corpus Christi College, pp. 38-39.

life, he traveled extensively, engaged in various occupations, studied and taught at Oxford. From each of these experiences he was able to learn; these experiences tended to broaden his scope and his interests.

In 1664 Locke first entered public affairs as secretary to Sir Walter Vane, the King's new envoy to the Elector of Brandenburg.⁴⁰ Locke performed his duties so efficiently that in a letter to a friend, he stated: "I am now offered a fair opportunity of going into Spain with the ambassador. . . ."⁴¹ Nevertheless, Locke decided to return to his studies and teaching at Oxford, where he stayed until the end of March, 1667.⁴²

While at Oxford, Locke's work and scholarship matured and in November, 1668, members of the Royal Society proposed him for membership. On the 23rd of the same month, they elected him into full standing in the order. However, Bourne allowed that although the members of the Society made several efforts to secure his support, Locke appeared to have taken

⁴⁰Bourne, I, 99-100. Rand, p. 5, explained this appointment: "The desire to increase the strength of England through diplomacy during the first Dutch War had led to the appointment of an embassy to the Elector of Brandenburg. . . ." Bourne, I, p. 99, added: "One of the several efforts to increase the strength of England by indirect means was an embassy to the elector of Brandenburg, whose territory was in immediate proximity to Holland, and whom it was therefore desirable to keep neutral if he could not be secured as an active ally."

⁴¹Letter from Locke to Strachey, 22 February, 1665 in Bourne, I, 122.

⁴²Bourne, I, 123, 127.

very little part in their activities.⁴³

One of the most significant and far reaching events in Locke's life occurred in July, 1666, when he met Lord Ashley who later became the Earl of Shaftesbury.⁴⁴ Following the meeting, Ashley invited Locke to London to serve as a physician in his household.⁴⁵ Locke accepted the offer and from the 15th of June, 1667, as Lady Masham indicated, "he was with my Lord Ashley as a man at home, and lived in that family much esteemed . . . by all the friends of the family."⁴⁶ For the next several years, Locke was a family physician, tutor, and private adviser and friend to Lord Ashley.⁴⁷

As Ashley's power developed and unfolded, Locke attained higher public office. In 1668 Ashley secured for Locke

⁴³Ibid., p. 245.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 136. Rand gave a full description of the meeting: "In July Lord Ashley . . . came to Oxford to drink the waters of the neighbouring village of Astrop. Ashley had appealed for advice in regard to his health to Dr. Thomas, with whom he had an acquaintance. . . . Dr. Thomas, being in London, wrote to Locke to advise Ashley in his stead." p. 6.

⁴⁵Rand, p. 6. Bourne argued that it was not until 1666 when Locke decided to be a physician instead of a clergyman. Bourne, I, 91. However, it does seem odd that Dr. Thomas would ask Locke who had not studied medicine to "advise Ashley in his stead." Nevertheless, Rand, p. 5, claimed: "He never . . . received the degree of doctor of medicine, and moreover, never having taken a regular medical course, he had difficulty in obtaining, in 1674, the bachelor's degree in that subject."

⁴⁶Letter from Lady Masham to Le Clerc, 12 January, 1704 in Bourne, I, 143-144.

⁴⁷Bourne, I, 199.

the appointment of chief secretary to the proprietors of the Carolinas.⁴⁸ Lord Ashley received a peerage with the title of Earl of Shaftesbury in April of 1672 and in the following September he became the president of the Council of Trade and Plantations. Two months later, in November, the Earl rose to the position of Lord High Chancellor of England. Again Locke profited from Shaftesbury's rise to power as the new Chancellor made him his Secretary for the Presentation of Benefices and later promoted him to the Secretaryship of the Board of Trade.⁴⁹ However, the King dismissed Shaftesbury as Chancellor in March of 1675 and Locke consequently lost the positions which the Earl had provided for him.⁵⁰

During his sundry occupations, Locke continued to view medicine as his proper vocation.⁵¹ In 1666 and 1670 he made two futile efforts to obtain his doctorship in medicine without complying with the ordinary qualification of residence at Oxford. In 1666 the King would not recommend the degree

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 236.

⁴⁹Rand, p. 7.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 10. The loss of Shaftesbury's position dated back to 1672 when he, a strong supporter of nonconformity, did not support the King's 1672 indulgence. See Harry Grant Plum, Restoration Puritanism: A Study of the Growth of English Liberty (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1943), p. 43.

⁵¹Bourne, I, 235. Bourne further stated: ". . . There seems to have been no abatement of the interest taken by him in medical studies and pursuits. He allowed himself to drift into other occupations, and in each he did so much that posterity has almost forgotten that he was ever a medical man at all."

for him but did excuse him from taking holy orders as a condition of retaining his studentship at Christ Church.⁵² Lord Ashley, in 1670, wrote a letter in Locke's behalf asking that the college assign him the next vacant faculty studentship in medicine.⁵³ Locke received his bachelorship of medicine in February, 1674 and in January of the next year he accepted the appointment to a medical studentship at Christ Church.⁵⁴ Locke soon found that the barriers which had kept him from receiving the doctor's degree in 1666, still prevailed.⁵⁵ Thus, while he spent his life in medicine, he never received his doctorship.

Locke's governmental work and study at Oxford proved to be a severe strain on his already poor health. As a result of his constant battles with chronic consumption and periodic attacks of asthma, he took frequent vacations.⁵⁶ Locke made two trips to France, the first of short duration and the latter much longer.⁵⁷ His first trip began in September, 1672

⁵²Ibid., pp. 330-331.

⁵³Ibid., p. 210.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 330. ". . . It was then expected by his college acquaintances that in the following spring he would become a doctor of medicine."

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 211.

⁵⁶Rand, pp. 6-7.

⁵⁷These trips are described in some detail in John Lough, (ed.), Travels in France, 1675-1679, as Related to His Journals, Correspondence and Other Papers (Cambridge: University Press, 1953).

and lasted only two or three weeks.⁵⁸

Again poor health forced Locke to leave England for his second visit to France in November of 1675.⁵⁹ He lived at Montpellier, a health resort and the seat of a famous medical school for the next fifteen months.⁶⁰ During this time Locke revised and expanded his notes for An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.⁶¹ In March, 1677, Locke left Montpellier for Paris to meet Caleb Banks who he had consented to tutor for five or six months.⁶² Despite the fact that Banks originally intended to spend only a few months, Locke and his pupil stayed in Paris for over a year and then toured France during the remainder of the time which they spent on the Continent. Locke's second trip to France which was originally planned to last only a short time ended after some three and half years.⁶³

⁵⁸Rand, p. 7. See also Lough, p. xv, who stated that " . . . very little is known about [the short trip to France in 1672] . . ."

⁵⁹Lough, p. xvi, indicated that his original plans were to make a relatively short stay in France. See also Bourne, I, 337.

⁶⁰Lough, p. xv. Montpellier was a famous health resort for those who, like Locke, were consumptive.

⁶¹Bourne, I, 355.

⁶²Lough, pp. xvi-xvii. Lough elaborated on Locke's decision to accept the pupil for tutoring: "In March 1677, Locke received a pressing request from Sir John Banks, a wealthy London merchant, to return to Paris and take charge of his son, Caleb, whom he was proposing to send over to spend five or six months in France. Locke accepted this request, which was backed by his patron, Shaftesbury. . . ."

⁶³Ibid., pp. xvii-xviii, xix, xv. Lough stated: "A

Last Years

Locke, on his return to England in 1679, renewed his connections with Shaftesbury. In the spring of 1679, the Earl became president of a reorganized Privy Council and again desired Locke's advice and counsel.⁶⁴ However, Shaftesbury was arrested and sent to the Tower in June, 1680 because of his connection with the "Popish plot." He was acquitted, but lost his political influence and eventually retreated to Holland where he died.⁶⁵

Locke's close connection as friend and adviser to Shaftesbury soon aroused suspicions about his own loyalty to the Crown. Deciding that he was no longer safe in England, Locke fled to Amsterdam in September, 1683 where he remained for the next five years.⁶⁶ These years proved to be the most fruitful of his entire career in educational and philosophical writings.⁶⁷ Soon after Prince William came to England and the

good deal of his time seems to have been spent in showing his pupil the sights of Paris; occasionally they went to the theatre or the opera. He also had a certain number of contacts in learned and scientific circles. During these months he occasionally practised as a physician, numbering among his few patients such illustrious personages as Thomas Herbert, 8th Earl of Pembroke, whom he already encountered at Montpelier, and to whom he was later to dedicate his *Essay on Human Understanding* and the Countess of Northumberland, now the wife of the English Ambassador, Ralph Montagu."

⁶⁴Rand, p. 12.

⁶⁵Cranston, pp. 184-204, 214-231, gave a detailed account of the Popish plot and Shaftesbury's and Locke's relation to the movement. See also Rand, p. 15.

⁶⁶Rand, pp. 15-16.

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 17, 24.

throne, Locke returned in February of 1689.⁶⁸

Locke spent the last five years of his life engaged in various minor governmental positions. For his aid in the "Bloodless" revolution, King William offered him the new Ambassadorship to Brandenburg. He refused the position on the grounds of his ill health but later he accepted the more modest and less demanding appointment of Commissioner of Appeals.⁶⁹ In spite of his poor and failing health, Locke took the office of Commissioner of Trade in 1698 which kept him active during the next four years.⁷⁰

Locke died on the afternoon of October 28, 1704, after a life filled with writing, studying, traveling and serving his government. Hibben briefly summarized Locke's life: he was

. . . a scholar of Christ Church, Oxford, trained in diplomatic service, widely travelled, secretary of the first Earl of Shaftesbury, a profound student of the theory of government, champion of toleration, a man of affairs, and withal a philosopher, whose habit of mind fitted him in an eminent degree to deal with speculative problems from a practical point of view.⁷¹

⁶⁸Ibid., pp. 23-24. Rand described Locke's political activities while in Holland: "Whatever secrecy and avoidance of political activity he may have exercised during the earlier period of his residence abroad, it is very evident that in the later stages of it he was in touch with the movement in Holland for placing William of Orange on the English throne."

⁶⁹Bourne, II, 143-145. See letter of refusal, pp. 144-146. See also Rand, p. 32.

⁷⁰Rand, p. 54.

⁷¹John G. Hibben, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910), p. 6.

His Times

The Enlightenment

Historians generally view the Enlightenment as a development of thought rooted in the eighteenth century. Hibben regarded the period as extending from Locke to Kant: "The period of philosophy which is referred to in a general way as the eighteenth century began with Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1690 and ended with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1781."⁷² Manuel described the Age of Reason or the Enlightenment in political dimension: "The Age of Reason usually characterizes the period from the Peace of Utrecht (1713) to the French Revolution of 1789."⁷³

Various authorities describe the Enlightenment in several different ways. Berlin, in The Age of the Enlightenment, maintained that it was "perhaps the last period in the history of Western Europe when human omniscience was thought to be an attainable goal."⁷⁴ Cragg characterized the period as one which broke away from medieval scholasticism:

Gradually . . . the authority of Aristotle -- the symbol of the scholastic method -- was broken and the discoveries of the later seventeenth century filled in the details of the new world picture whose outlines an earlier period had supplied.⁷⁵

⁷²Ibid., p. 3.

⁷³Frank E. Manuel, The Age of Reason (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951), p. 1.

⁷⁴Isaiah Berlin, The Age of the Enlightenment (New York: The American Library, 1956), pp. 6-7.

⁷⁵G.R. Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason:

Snyder suggested that the Enlightenment was important because of its results: "The Age of Reason was one of the few movements in history that resulted in an important, new outlook upon existence and prepared the way for new and untried ways of future development."⁷⁶ These views of the Enlightenment indicate that the period was in fact a matrix of movements and emphases.

These are various characteristics of the Enlightenment. Snyder identified four distinct ideas:

1. The secularization of learning: Where medieval philosophers and theologians interpreted the universe and man in terms of the Scriptures, the rationalists tended to avoid ecclesiastical authority and turned more and more to the secularization of knowledge.
2. Faith in Reason: The age of Reason was an age of faith in the rational behavior of nature and immutable scientific laws.
3. Utilitarianism: The spirit of the age of Reason was utilitarian and practical.
4. Optimism and Self-Confidence: The rationalists were supremely confident and optimistic men, fully convinced of their ability to discover natural laws and to perfect the world and life in accordance with them.⁷⁷

Jones, in different terminology, summarized three assumptions on which the Enlightenment was based: "(1) there are certain rational 'principles' at work in the universe: (2) the mind is capable of understanding these principles: (3) the will

A Study of Changes in Religious Thought Within the Church of England, 1660-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. 87.

⁷⁶Louis L. Snyder, The Age of Reason (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1955), p. 13.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 7.

is capable of acting on this knowledge."⁷⁸ In substance these two views sensitize the essence of the Enlightenment. Now we need to investigate these characteristics in some detail.

One of the most significant changes of this period was a shift of emphasis from the Christians' supernatural heaven to the rationalists' natural heaven on earth.⁷⁹ Willey stated that this transformation was one in which a "'scientific' explanation replaces a theological" view of the world.⁸⁰ Snyder maintained the same contention:

In contrast both to Renaissance humanism and the motivating ideas of the Reformation, the Age of Reason was an intellectual, rational movement, which substituted for the medieval Age of Faith an Age of Faith in science.⁸¹

Writers and thinkers of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were hostile and antagonistic to the old forms of dogmatic religious authority and certainty. They rejected the unquestioned acceptance of tradition and historical authority and adopted a spirit of critical inquiry which demanded rational justification.⁸²

⁷⁸W.T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952), p. 808.

⁷⁹Crane Brinton, Ideas and Men--The Story of Western Thought (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 376.

⁸⁰Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background (London: Chatto and Windus, 1946), p. 3.

⁸¹Snyder, p. 7.

⁸²Manuel, p. 1. See also Cragg, p. 57. Most historians generally accept the proposition that this was a move

Reason, during the Enlightenment, became the dominating theme in practically all thought. Cassirer described the status of reason as "the unifying and central point of . . . the Enlightenment, expressing all that it longs and strives for, and all that it achieves."⁸³ Reason could lead man to understand and to mold his conduct after the principles of nature. Reason could destroy the restrictions and superstitions inherited from the dark ages and create a new society.

For the men of this age, "reason" had rich emotive-connotative overtones: it stood for "cool" objectivity (as opposed to "passion"), for impartiality (as opposed to prejudice), for intellection (as opposed to revelation). They held it to be . . . the instrument by which they were to fashion for themselves a new and better life.⁸⁴

The philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, therefore, hailed reason as the panacea for the evils created

toward modern thought. However, Carl Becker is an exception. In the Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers (Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), Becker attempted to disclose the fallacy of believing that the eighteenth century was essentially modern in its temper. He sought to demonstrate that the period commonly described as the Age of Reason was, in fact, very far from it; that Voltaire, Hume, Diderote, and Locke were living in a medieval world; and that philosophers "demolished the Heavenly City of St. Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials." He stated: "I shall attempt to show that the underlying preconceptions of the eighteenth-century thought were still . . . essentially the same as those of the thirteenth century." p. 31.

⁸³Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. by Fritz C.A. Koelin and James P. Pettegrove (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 5.

⁸⁴Jones, p. 721.

by the medieval society. "Reason will clear up the mess that superstition, revelation, faith (the devils of the rationalists) have piled up here on earth."⁸⁵

This supreme confidence in human reason inferred that all human beings can progress to a state of perfection. If reason could improve society, and if man could manipulate reason, there was no barrier to the perfectibility of man's environment and, hence, of man. Much of the preparatory work for this development was the result of John Locke's thinking.⁸⁶

Most of Locke's writing dates from the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. His works constitute a summing up of the seventeenth century conclusions and a starting point for eighteenth century investigations.⁸⁷ One author suggested that "the early eighteenth century did not, like the early seventeenth, witness a great intellectual revolution; it merely inherited the results and consolidated the certainties of the previous century."⁸⁸ Locke's works were certainly a major part of that eighteenth century heritage as he synthesized the conclusions of his age with the needs of the coming age.⁸⁹ Locke accordingly did influence the development of thought during the Enlightenment

⁸⁵Brinton, p. 371.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 369.

⁸⁷Cragg, p. 114.

⁸⁸Willey, p. 264.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 266.

in philosophy, politics, and religion.⁹⁰

Locke's Relationship to the Enlightenment

What is the relevancy of Locke's relationship to the Enlightenment to his philosophy of discourse? Locke's thinking on rhetoric did not develop in a vacuum; his reactions to the philosophic, religious, and political climate of his time directly influenced his philosophy of discourse. Any analysis of his thought must include an investigation of his relation to the Enlightenment.

Philosophic Relationship. Locke viewed his efforts in the Essay as a definite break from the Continental Rationalists, such as Descartes, Spinoza, and as a significant contribution to an empirical epistemology. Locke sought a practical, "common sense" philosophy in contrast to the "speculative theories" in vogue on the Continent. Some of Locke's metaphysics was in contradistinction to Spinoza's. Where Spinoza preferred the rational and the ideal, Locke argued the concrete and practical.⁹¹ Locke, however, was unable to accomplish completely either of his avowed purposes. In some respects he founded his approach to reality on a rationalistic metaphysics, and in other aspects, he was thoroughly an empiricalist.

⁹⁰Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1902), p. 94.

⁹¹Jones, p. 720.

One of Locke's philosophic contributions was his epistemology.⁹² He encountered difficulties in establishing validity in the areas of morality and revealed religion. In his philosophical investigations, he read unfounded assertions about "Truth," while in the sciences he discovered cautious generalizations and reliance on empirical evidence.⁹³ Locke compared the confusion and uncertainty in theology and ethics with the precision and accuracy in the natural sciences. Hence, he attempted to bring to ethics and theology, to metaphysics and politics, the same empirical inductive method of investigation which was so valuable in astronomy, optics, physics, and medicine.⁹⁴

On the other hand, however, basic to Locke's philosophy was his faith in the rational foundation and structure of the cosmos. He postulated an objective logical necessity in the processes of the world and nature, even if man could not discover this necessity:

If we could discover the figure, size, texture, and motion of the minute constituent parts of any two bodies, we should know without trial several of their operations one upon another, as we know the properties of a square or a triangle.⁹⁵

Nature is a machine, each part of which is related to each

⁹²Cragg, p. 35.

⁹³John Locke, Locke: Selections, ed. by Sterling P. Lamprecht (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928), pp. xxxv-xxxvi.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. xlv.

other part by a necessary and rational connection.⁹⁶ Man's failure to perceive the "really real" lies with his inability to comprehend the science of nature, not with nature and its logical operations.

Locke's analysis of the human mind and its operation was a significant contribution to his times. It came to be, in the eighteenth century "the normal possession of the educated and enlightened of Europe."⁹⁷ Becker described Locke's contribution: ". . . His Essay . . . became the psychological gospel of the eighteenth century."⁹⁸ The role of Locke's philosophy and epistemology in the Enlightenment was that, while demonstrating that knowledge is founded on experience and tempered by reason, "he literally created a new science of the human mind."⁹⁹

Political Relationship. During the seventeenth century, theology still greatly influenced political thought. ". . . Religious developments were so closely related to political affairs that changes in one area inevitably produced important results in the other."¹⁰⁰ With the Age of Reason, however, governments tended to produce more secularized and politically freer societies. Snyder explained this movement:

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Willey, p. 265.

⁹⁸Becker, p. 64.

⁹⁹Snyder, p. 48.

¹⁰⁰Cragg, p. 13.

governments encourage "the pursuit of individual happiness, the security of individual liberties, constitutionalism, tolerance, cosmopolitanism, the unfettering of thought, and a society of free citizens based on law."¹⁰¹ The new secularized middle class abandoned many of the traditional political, religious concepts and enthusiastically accepted the transformations in the new political and social order.

Locke was instrumental in formulating the doctrine behind this new political order, along with Hobbes and others. Locke based his political philosophy on the concept of the "state of nature." He argued that any state of political society ought to parallel the state of nature. This former state will be bound by a social contract between the governor and the governed. Most of the ideas involved in his theory were current in the seventeenth century, but the manner in which Locke argued them was unique. The Lockian form of this view became a potent political program of action during the following century.¹⁰²

Charles II's ascension to the Crown in 1660 revitalized the ancient doctrine that kings govern by divine right. In 1688, with the fall of James II, however, the divine right of kings lost its strength completely and forever.¹⁰³ The

¹⁰¹Snyder, pp. 14-15.

¹⁰²Sterling P. Lamprecht, The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Locke (New York: Columbia University Press, 1918), pp. 22-23.

¹⁰³Cragg, p. 157.

Bloodless Revolution did in fact achieve the acceptance of political toleration as a characteristic of English government, but the complete triumph of toleration as a theory was due to Locke. Plum suggested that Locke's work, The Two Treatises of Government, served as a justification for the Revolution in 1688. "John Locke, who had retired to Holland when James (II) became King, published the first clear statement of the philosophy of the Revolution before William had crossed the channel."¹⁰⁴ Plum's interpretation regarded Locke's efforts as a rationale of the Revolution. However, in a recent article Cranston argued convincingly that the Treatises should be considered as arguments for action which preceded the Revolution:

The book remains a piece d'occasion . . . only it becomes a piece of a different occasion. It is revealed as something written not to justify a revolution which had already taken place but to set forth arguments for a revolution which was being planned. It does not belong to the settled years of the reign of William and Mary, but to the perilous years of Protestant Plot against Charles II. The Two Treatises of Government, when it was first written, was a seditious and inflammatory document.¹⁰⁵

In either case, Locke argued that the governed have the legitimate and natural right of revolution when a King betrays the social contract. When Locke maintained the rights of the individuals, the sovereignty of the people and the invalid rights of Kings or Bishops, he established a foundation for

¹⁰⁴Plum, p. 71.

¹⁰⁵Maurice Cranston, "The Politics of a Philosopher," The Listener, LXV (January 5, 1961), 18.

much of modern political thought.

Locke's political concept developed into the most widespread political philosophy of the Age of Reason. Willey described Locke's influence by stating that "Locke is the father of nineteenth century as well as eighteenth century 'liberalism.'"¹⁰⁶ Cranston, on the other hand, identified Locke's political influence on modern thought:

The influence of Locke's teaching in these matters has been worldwide and his belief that a denial of the rights of man can justify rebellion has had the explicit approval even of the United Nations. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948, the rights which are specified are more detailed than Locke's "life, liberty and property", but Locke's three rights contain the essence of most of them.¹⁰⁷

Religious Relationship. Locke was immensely interested and involved in the religious controversies of his day. Yolton suggested the results of this involvement:

. . . [An] important factor accounting for Locke's popularity was the way in which he orientated his discussions around the religious and moral questions of great significance to the majority of people of the seventeenth century.¹⁰⁸

One of the most notable religious precepts which Locke questioned was the method for demonstrating the existence of God. The Scholastics, during the seventeenth century,

¹⁰⁶Basil Willey, The Eighteenth Century Background (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), p. 267.

¹⁰⁷Maurice Cranston, "Two Treatises of Civil Government," The Listener, LXII (November 19, 1959), 867.

¹⁰⁸John W. Yolton, John Locke and the Way of Ideas (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 21.

maintained that God had imprinted on the mind of man certain innate truths. The truth of His own existence was one of the clearest and most important of these innate ideas. Hence, men did not question or reason to the existence of God; they simply knew His existence. Locke, however, approached the existence of God by quite a different avenue. Man starts with himself instead of innate ideas; he "knows that he himself is;" but he also knows that "nothing can produce a being, therefore something eternal."¹⁰⁹

Locke explicitly argued the role of reason in discovering the existence of an eternal being:

. . . From the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, that there is an eternal, most powerful and most knowing Being. . . .¹¹⁰

Locke, then, avoided relying on innate ideas for demonstrating the existence of God; he argued that His existence could be proven rationally. We will consider this controversy in some detail in Chapter V.

The significance of Locke's proof of God's existence is not that he exalted reason, although that emphasis is important. But Locke supplied a detailed account of what many

¹⁰⁹John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Alexander Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), II, 308. (Hereafter referred to as An Essay.) See also Herbert McLachlan, The Religious Opinions of Milton, Locke and Newton (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1941).

¹¹⁰Locke, An Essay, II, 309.

people had felt must be the true origin of their idea of God. Cragg summarized Locke's contribution on reason's place in religion:

He did more than affirm the importance of reason in religion: he explained how it worked, and made it seem both necessary and inevitable. He laid bare the workings of the mind, with the result that those who followed him could confidently affirm as fact what had previously been put forward as hypothesis.¹¹¹

In maintaining the theory that religion was "reasonable" Locke necessarily discussed the relationship between reason and revelation. Instead of opposing each against the other, he synthesized the two modes of knowledge:

Reason is natural revelation, whereby . . . God communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he had laid within the reach of their natural faculties. Revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives that they come from God. So that he that takes away reason to make way for revelation puts out the light of both: and does . . . the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope.¹¹²

Locke, thus, explicitly stated that Christianity is a religion of both reason and revelation. The value of his contribution was his analysis of the way in which man receives revelation and its relationship to reason.

Shortly after the publication of The Reasonableness of Christianity, the Deists interpreted Locke's position to mean that traditional Christianity was invalid because much

¹¹¹Cragg, p. 118.

¹¹²Locke, An Essay, II, 431.

of it was "mysterious" and empirically unverifiable. Locke was not, properly speaking, a deist; religiously, he was a unitarian. His theological methods and views, to be sure, led toward deism, but the Deists' view of Locke's statement was a misrepresentation. Carpenter confirmed this contention:

Locke would certainly have been startled and shocked by their teaching, if he had lived to see it. At the same time while fully acknowledging the reality and necessity of a divine revelation, he pursued a common-sense and matter-of-fact approach to Christian theology, which tended to make it, if not, in the language of full-blown Deism, "not mysterious", at least less so.¹¹³

Therefore, to call Locke a Deist is a misnomer. Nevertheless, Deism preached, to a large degree, a biased view of his religious position.

Locke's role in the Toleration Act of 1689 was a significant contribution to religion of his day. The Act proclaimed a new era for religion in England; it provided for the acceptance of religious minorities. Carpenter argued that Locke was instrumental in drawing up the terms of the Toleration Act.¹¹⁴ In writing to a friend on the 6th of June, 1689, Locke described his feelings about the Act:

Toleration has indeed been granted but not with that latitude which you, and men like, true Christians without ambition or envy or desire. But it is something to have got thus far. On these beginnings I hope are

¹¹³S.C. Carpenter, Eighteenth Century Church and People (London: John Murray Press, 1959), p. 39. See also Samuel Gring Hefelbower, The Relation of John Locke to English Deism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1918).

¹¹⁴Carpenter, pp. 21-22.

laid the the foundations of liberty and peace on which the Church of Christ will hereafter be established.¹¹⁵

For this new attitude and outlook Locke provided the intellectual justification with his Letter on Toleration. As Grimm insisted: "It remained for John Locke to formulate the most potent theories for religious toleration and liberty. . . ."116

Several authors have summarized Locke's influence on the religion during the Enlightenment. Willey stated: "In his religious writings . . . he gave his age just what it was ready to receive, a reasoned plea for toleration and a demonstration of the Reasonableness of Christianity."¹¹⁷ Cragg described Locke's relationship to the religion of his times:

'All passion spent' might stand as the epitaph of seventeenth-century theology, and Locke, more than any other man, was responsible for giving religious thought the self-possessioned assurance which it carried into the Age of Reason.¹¹⁸

Mark Pattison, finally, maintained Locke's religious influence during the Enlightenment: "The title of Locke's treatise, The Reasonableness of Christianity, may be said to have been the solitary thesis of Christian theology in England for the

¹¹⁵Fowler, Locke, p. 59.

¹¹⁶Harold J. Grimm, The Reformation Era (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), p. 592. See also, Roland N. Stromberg, Religious Liberalism in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Oxford University Press, 1954) and Wilbur K. Jordan, The Development of Religious Toleration in England (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932).

¹¹⁷Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background, p. 267.

¹¹⁸Cragg, p. 121.

great part of a century."¹¹⁹

This chapter has set the stage for Locke's philosophy of discourse by investigating the man and his times -- both essential items in comprehending his theory of discourse. It has presented several conclusions. Locke was well informed in the rhetorical theories and practices of his day. Because of his wide and varied experiences, he was probably aware of the movements and schools of thought around him. Locke's period was an age of transition between the medieval and modern. Locke made some significant contributions in the philosophic, political, and religious spheres of the Enlightenment, such as, his analysis of the human understanding and its processes, his political concept of the "state of nature," his synthesis of reason and revelation, and his theory of religious toleration.

¹¹⁹Mark Pattison as quoted in Ibid., p. 118.

CHAPTER III

THE RHETORICAL CLIMATE OF LOCKE'S TIMES

Introduction

While reading Locke's works, one is struck by his criticism of the contemporary logical and rhetorical practices. His criticism of the rhetoric and logic of the seventeenth century indicated his awareness of the rhetorical traditions common to his day. Because Locke's appraisal is basic to his philosophy of discourse, a survey of the rhetorical thought and practices with which he was familiar is necessary for an understanding of his thought.

This chapter discusses three stages of rhetorical development to provide the proper perspective. First, because the rhetorical tradition of Locke's age was partly "medieval" in character, the medieval rhetorical tradition is considered. Next the rhetorical characteristics peculiarly common to Locke's age, and, finally, a rhetorical transformation which took place during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are discussed.

The Medieval Rhetorical Tradition

Abelson stated that medieval rhetoric focused on the

communicative arts then needed, including the writing of letters and documents.¹ Valios viewed rhetoric as a liberal art subject until the close of the twelfth century and then as a practical discipline concerned with preaching and prayer.²

Haskins was concise in his description of medieval rhetoric: "Ancient rhetoric was concerned with oratory, mediaeval rhetoric chiefly with letterwriting."³ Finally Howell affirmed a larger view of rhetorical scope:

Between the year 700 and the year 1573, rhetoric flourished continuously in England as that branch of the theory of communication in which directions were set down, and observations made, for the guidance of speakers or writers whose audience was populace and whose purpose was instruction or persuasion by means not primarily connected with the use of fictions.⁴

These four observations of medieval rhetoric identified it as a patchwork of emphases. In Howell's view, rhetoric during the Middle Ages was classical in scope and nature. Abelson, Valios, and Haskins emphasized the lack of any realistic communication outlet and characterized rhetoric as a very limited discipline. The characteristics of medieval rhetoric, then,

¹P. Abelson, The Seven Liberal Arts: A Study in Medieval Culture, pp. 52ff. as quoted in Richard McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," Critics and Criticism: Ancient and Modern, ed. by R.S. Crane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925), p. 262.

²N. Valois, Guillaume d'Auvergne, pp. 224ff, as cited in McKeon, p. 262.

³C.H. Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, p. 138, quoted in McKeon, p. 262.

⁴Wilbur Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 64. (Hereafter referred to as Logic and Rhetoric.)

depend on the vantage point.

One of the most consequential medieval rhetorical movements occurred when logic absorbed much of rhetoric. McKeon suggested that this transition was "accomplished when the increased influence . . . of the New Logic led to the separation of scientific . . . proof from probable proof."⁵ In the classical scheme, Aristotle differentiated science, dialectic, and rhetoric on the bases of two factors, the level of probability obtainable in each division and the logical mode employed by each discipline. Science searches for exact knowledge, or certainty, through the logical mode of demonstration and pure induction. Dialectic seeks conclusions of very high probability by the syllogism and induction. Rhetoric through the enthymene, sign and example seeks probable conclusions also, but it uniquely searches for persuasive materials "contingent in human affairs."⁶ To Scholastic logicians of the Middle Ages, Aristotle's distinction between

⁵McKeon, pp. 277-278. He stated: " [This transition] . . . is a gradual transition, dependent as much on increase of erudition in logic as in rhetoric. In the comprehensive collection of texts in the liberal arts prepared by Thierry of Chartres under the title Heptateuchon about 1141, all of Aristotle's Organon except the Posterior Analytics and the Prior Analytics appears, while under rhetoric are included only Cicero's De partitione oratoria and Julius Severianus' Precepts on the Art of Rhetoric." See also, Richard McKeon, "Aristotelianism in Western Christianity." Environmental Factors in Christian History, ed. by J.T. McNeill (Chicago: University Press, 1939), pp. 215-219.

⁶Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941). See Rhetoric, 1354 a 1, 1355 b 7, and 1357 a 1-5. See Topics, 101 b 1-4 and 104 b 1-3. See also, Posterior Analytics, 71 a 1-5.

dialectic and rhetoric vanished and the logical modes of each division became confused.

The Scholastics characterized logic (the term they used to symbolize Aristotle's dialectic) by the procedures of invention and judgment formerly assigned to rhetoric.⁷ For them invention entailed discovering materials concerning debatable propositions. Judgment or disposition consisted of methods for arranging words into propositions, propositions into syllogisms or inductions, and syllogisms or inductions into whole discourses. Howell described the combination of these two procedures:

Taken together, these two procedures constituted a machinery of analysis and synthesis on the level of language--a machinery for assembling materials to prove the truth of an assertion and for combining those materials into complex discourses.⁸

Scholasticism, thus, viewed the scope of logic as "the process of combining logical propositions so that a fully articulated act of thought, a complete inference or demonstration, is created."⁹

With the absorption of invention and judgment by logic, rhetoric retained only the canons of style and delivery. Because of this emphasis rhetorical theory developed into a sophistic tradition focused on an elaborate style.¹⁰

⁷Howell, pp. 16-17.

⁸Ibid., p. 15.

⁹Ibid., p. 53.

¹⁰J.W.H. Atkins, English Literary Criticism: The Medieval Phase (London: Methuen and Company, 1943), p. 26.

Atkins illustrated this significant medieval movement: it was

. . . that morbid revival of Asiatic tendencies in rhetoric which had marked the opening centuries of the Christian era throughout the Empire, and which had drawn its inspiration . . . from the traditions of Gorgias and the early Greek sophists.¹¹

The movement was limited to occasional oratory; that is, to displays of verbal skill on occasions suitable to panegyrics.¹² The sophists turned their attentions to questions of composition relating to stylistic devices utilized in novel and striking speech. Sophistic theorists gave little attention to methods for discovering valid subject matter (inventio) or for arranging a discourse (dispositio), for these materials were within the province of logic.¹³ Atkins maintained that the essence of the New Sophistic was the concentration on matters of style.

In their places [invention and arrangement] demands were made for more ingenuity of expressions, for the use of fixed patterns for structural purposes; and in this way were neglected not a few of the basic principles of good speaking (or writing) laid down by antiquity, the value of coherent structure, for instance, that organic quality inherent in all good prose, or again, the importance of psychological factors in all matters of expression. In short, rhetoric as a result became little more than a barren study of a fixed and elaborate technique.¹⁴

Accordingly, rhetoric became more and more centered on style.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., pp. 15-16.

¹³Ibid., pp. 26-27.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 27.

The educational use of the declamation paralleled the growth of the sophistic tradition. Declamations were scholastic exercises in which the student elaborated fictitious themes with a flamboyant and ornate style. Since rhetoricians viewed style as mere verbal artistry, students could obtain an "artistic" style simply by the mechanical application of certain specific devices. Atkins identified some of these devices for exaggerating style.

Hence the importance attached to episodic descriptions, prolix amplifications, neat antitheses, pointed epigrams, far-fetched and paradoxical expressions, which now became the main ingredients of an attractive style. It was not that such figurative devices were inherently wrong; but, used mechanically and indiscriminately, they led to sheer absurdity, providing little more than specious ornament and artifice, and a burlesque exaggeration of the "pomp of Roman speech."¹⁵

The declamation, then, was the practice of adding an ornate glamour to student's speech through the use of these stylistic devices.

The rhetorical heritage of Locke's age was the view that rhetoric was little more than style. Clark characterized this view of rhetoric as "personified in picturesque mediaeval allegory, never as being engaged in any useful occupation, but as adding beauty, color, or charm to life."¹⁶

¹⁵Ibid. See also, Donald Lemen Clark, "The Rise and Fall of Progymnasmata in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Grammar Schools," Speech Monographs XIX (1952), 259-263 and Karl Wallace, "Rhetorical Exercises in Tudor Education," Quarterly Journal of Speech XXII (1936), 28-51.

¹⁶Donald L. Clark, Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1922), p. 47.

The Rhetorical Climate

Rhetorical theorists of Locke's age inherited from the Middle Ages a theory of communication divided into three areas: grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic.¹⁷ These three disciplines, or the trivium, assumed the responsibility for the rhetorical training of students.¹⁸ Howell identified grammar as the study of the language of communication, Latin for learned discourse or English for popular speech. Dialectic centered on communication for learned audiences, while rhetoric was the study of the means of making a discourse to a popular audience. Therefore, rhetoric emphasized style and delivery.¹⁹

¹⁷Howell, pp. 2-4.

¹⁸Wilbur Samuel Howell, "Renaissance Rhetoric and Modern Rhetoric: A Study in Change," The Rhetorical Idiom, ed. by Donald C. Bryant (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 55. (Hereafter referred to as "Renaissance and Modern.")

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 54, 58-59. In Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 3-4, Howell enlarged on this distinction between logic and rhetoric: "Rhetoric was then regarded as the theory behind the statements intended for the populace. Since the populace consisted of laymen, or of people not learned in the subject being treated by a speaker or writer, and since the speaker or writer by his very office was to some extent a master of the real technicalities of his subject, rhetoric was regarded as the theory of communication between the learned and the lay world or between the expert and layman. Over and over again in logical and rhetorical treatises of the English Renaissance, logic is compared to the closed fist and rhetoric to the open hand, this metaphor being borrowed from Zeno through Cicero and Quintilian to explain the preoccupation of rhetoric with the more open discourses of orator and popularizer. . . . The conviction of Renaissance learning . . . [was] that logic and rhetoric are the two great arts of communication and that the complete theory of communication is largely identified . . . with both." See Donald Lemen Clark,

This rhetorical tradition survived the Middle Ages mainly because of the prominence of disputation and declamation in the universities.²⁰ The Chancellor of Oxford University maintained the value of the rhetorical activities as a part of the degree requirement:

I did in the time of the last vice chancellor recommend to him and the convocation's consideration whether it might not be of some use to impose some exercise in Rhetorick to be formed by the Bac. of A. before they take the degree of Mr., and whether the enjoying them to make some public declamation in the Schooles might not be an exercise verie sutable to that season of their studies', etc.²¹

Later the delegates of Oxford ordered students to engage in rhetorical exercises: ". . . According to duty and order in the Lent following, vic. 2. that all Bachelaurs of this University who have not determined [disputed] the last yeare do determine this Lent."²² These activities were a significant element in the rhetorical climate of Locke's times: ". . . Rhetoric was of importance . . . because of the public disputations which had to be undertaken by students who had completed their studies in the trivium."²³ The

John Milton at St. Paul's School (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 2-16 for a detailed description of the trivium.

²⁰W. Fraser Mitchell, English Pulpit Oratory From Andrewes to Tillotson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 68.

²¹Andrew Clark, The Life and Times of Anthony Wood (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1891), p. 464.

²²Ibid., p. 149.

²³Mitchell, p. 60.

rhetorical education of the time influenced, to a notable degree, the rhetorical climate of the times.

The emphasis of Locke's age was largely "traditional." This "traditional" rhetoric consisted of three distinct patterns; Ciceronian, formulary and stylistic.²⁴ The Ciceronian and stylistic traditions emphasized different aspects of the five classical canons, (invention, delivery, style, memory and arrangement), while formulary rhetoric focused on teaching discourse by imitation.

The Ciceronian rhetorical tradition concentrated on all five of the rhetorical canons. Alcuin, who wrote a Latin version of Ciceronian rhetoric in the late eighth century, first identified the five canons for the English. McKeon posited that Cicero's rhetorical thinking and writing were significant during the Renaissance: "Cicero's achievement, originality, and consistency, his choices and emphases, fixed the influence and oriented the interpretation of ancient thought, Greek as well as Latin . . . in the Renaissance. . . ."²⁵ In the middle of the sixteenth century, Thomas Wilson provided a thorough discussion of Ciceronian rhetoric for the first time in English.²⁶

Theorists of the formulary tradition also sought to

²⁴Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, p. 6. Howell provided much of the material used to develop and amplify these three patterns.

²⁵McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," p. 263.

²⁶Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, p. 7.

emphasize all five classical canons. However, they implemented their objectives not by the study of rhetorical principles but by the imitation of models. Howell amplified this characteristic of formulary rhetoric:

Rhetorical education has always rested upon the assumption that practice in communication is necessary for the development of proficiency, and that the best possible practice consists in performing exercises like those required in the actual processes of civilized life. Sometimes these exercises [werē] performed by students in conscious imitation of models. . . .²⁷

Formulary rhetoricians posited that to master "effective" public speaking the student must imitate models of "effective" discourse.

Stylistic rhetoric emphasized the canon of style although stylistic theorists were aware of the other four canons. This rhetorical emphasis was the conclusion of a transition which began in the Middle Ages and climaxed during the Renaissance. The study of poetry gradually narrowed to current rhetorical teachings and the whole division of rhetoric became part of poetry. Rhetoric and poetic became almost synonymous terms while both disciplines focused on the single item which they held in common -- diction or style.²⁸

Atkins described the relationship between rhetoric and poetic:

. . . Rhetoric was being limited to a consideration of style, and its treatment was held to embrace the style of poetry as well as that of oratory or prose. Hence,

²⁷Ibid., pp. 7, 138. Richard Rainolde, in 1563, produced the first formulary rhetoric written in English.

²⁸Clark, Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance, p. 55.

poetry came to be regarded as a sort of versified rhetoric; and rhetoric assumed in some sense the function of the earlier poetic.²⁹

Baldwin, in Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice, regarded Renaissance rhetoric as preoccupied with style and poetics.³⁰ Clark stated that "throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries . . . the term rhetoric . . . regularly connoted skill in diction."³¹

This emphasis led to a number of treatises on style by such authors as Sherry, Peacham and others.³² These authors limited rhetoric to style, and style to the art of decoration; they concentrated on those schemes and tropes which

²⁹Atkins, p. 29.

³⁰Charles Sears Baldwin, Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice, ed. by Donald Lemen Clark (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), pp. 44-53.

³¹Clark, Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance, p. 51. Ronsard, 1574, in Abbrege, regarded elocution as ornament or style. Ronsard is cited in Vere L. Rubel, Poetic Diction in the English Renaissance (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 100. Another writer gave perhaps the most potent evidence that rhetoric was equated to poetry when he described the manner in which an orator treated a given subject matter: "Oratours and Philosophers treat Nature after a very different manner; . . . [orators] represent her with all her graces and ornaments, and if there be anything which is not capable of that, they dissemble it, or pass it over slightly." Burnet, Theory of the Earth, p. 109 in Basil Willey, The Eighteenth Century Background (London: Chatto and Windus, 1949), p. 28.

³²Richard Sherry, Treatise of Schemes and Tropes and Treatise of the Figures of Grammer and Rhetorike; Henry Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence Conteyning the Figures of Grammar and Rhetorick. Other works and authors which are notable: John of Salisbury, Metalogicon; Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Poetria Nova; Stephen Hawes, Pastime of Pleasure; and The Court of Sapience. See Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 118-137, for a full description of each of these works.

had been influential in medieval rhetoric.³³ Atkins maintained that "since the earlier confusion between poetic and rhetoric still persisted, these same devices are found occupying a prominent place in exposition of poetry by Puttenham and others."³⁴ Thus these theorists advanced a stylistic concept of rhetoric and proposed a speaking style characteristic of both medieval poetry and prose.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, rhetoricians viewed style almost exclusively as tropes and schemes:

Figurative language was considered rather to be a means of carrying out a literal as well as a figurative intention, and thus the figures of speech were part of the machinery of scientific, of popular, and of poetic discourse, and were assigned formally and with equivocation to rhetoric during the Renaissance.³⁵

Style was differentiated into two types: one for conversation and one for formal writing or speaking. The style appropriate for formal communication was distinctive in the use of figures of speech.³⁶

Englishmen of the Renaissance did not believe the language of ordinary life to be suitable for formal discourse. They believed instead that formal discourse must be deliberately contrived to appear systematically unlike the language of ordinary.³⁷

Howell claimed that the political structure of England during the Renaissance regulated the rhetorical emphasis on style.

³³Atkins, pp. 196-197.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, p. 5.

³⁶Howell, "Renaissance and Modern," p. 67.

³⁷Ibid., p. 56.

In the feudal and monarchical periods the elaborate, grandiose style was predominant but became less influential with the growth of parliamentary government.³⁸

The characteristics of sacred rhetoric during this era were very similar to those of secular rhetoric. This parallelism is logical since nearly all the ordained ministers were graduates of universities in which rhetoric constituted a great part of the education.³⁹ Their rhetorical educations, therefore, determined the temper and style of their preaching:

. . . It is plain that the English sermon . . . bears a direct relation to the rhetorical bias of contemporary English education, in so far as the majority of those who became the preachers of the period had

³⁸Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 17-18. Howell elaborated on his contention: "It is suggestive to speculate upon the cultural implications of a rhetorical theory which equates true eloquence and hence true effectiveness with a system of studied departures from the established pattern of everyday speech. Such a theory appears to be the normal concomitant of a social and political situation in which the holders of power are hereditary aristocrats who must be conciliated by the commoners if the latter are to gain privileges for themselves. In a situation like that, persuasive forms of speech would emerge as agreeable forms and agreeable forms would be those which sound more agreeable to the aristocrat than those which originated in a repudiation of the speech of the lower classes? Would not such forms remind him of the superiority of his own origin and thus be a way of softening his will by the subtle inducements of flattery? Would not the patterns of ordinary speech, if used by a commoner in seeking advantage from a great lord, be a way of showing contempt for the august person addressed? And would not that implication of contempt be enough to secure the prompt denial of the advantage sought?"

³⁹Caroline R. Richardson, English Preachers and Preaching, 1640-1670 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), p. 36.

received the conventional training in theme, declamation, and oration.⁴⁰

The sermon, thus, should indicate the trends of sacred rhetorical theory.

The stylistic extravagances characteristic of secular rhetoric also influenced preaching. Bacon complained that the revival of preaching during the Reformation led to "an affectionate studie of eloquence" which degenerated into "the sweet falling of the clauses," with special emphasis on tropes and schemes.⁴¹ Some years later, Dryden remarked that corruptions in style tended to find "benefit of clergy" and survived among preachers.⁴² Critics praised sermons on a stylistic criterion, not on the soundness of their presentations. The sermon which received the highest praise was the one which consisted of an elaborate style embellished with ornate figures of speech. Richardson mentioned some of the most used figures: ". . . Strained metaphors and startling similies . . . long sentences complicated with clauses and entangled with parentheses. . . ." ⁴³ Mitchell described the transition in preaching from the theological emphasis to the stylistic:

. . . The transition from the old 'metaphysical' preaching to the 'quaint and elegant,' with continually less delight in the quaintness and a continually growing insistence on the elegance, until, with the gradual

⁴⁰Mitchell, p. 90. See also, pp. 9, 129-130.

⁴¹Bacon quoted in Ibid., p. 11.

⁴²Dryden cited in Mitchell, p. 11.

⁴³Richardson, p. 81.

change of view as to what might be considered elegance, even the most conservative of preaching vogues succumbed to the prevailing taste of the Court and of the most highly educated part of society.⁴⁴

The sermon during Locke's time accordingly bore testimony to the contemporary taste in style.

The stylistic tradition was perhaps the most influential and extensive rhetorical movement of Locke's period. Rhetoric was style and style was ornate and exaggerated. Atkins succinctly summarized the stylistic tradition:

What was aimed at was not the enunciation of broad general principles based on human nature, but rather the provision of elaborate systems of devices, with ample divisions and subdivisions, capable of mechanical application.⁴⁵

A Rhetorical Transformation

Coexisting with the rhetorical tradition peculiar to Locke's time were the beginnings of a rhetorical transformation. In fact, roots of this rhetorical change occur long before Locke's period as well as extend beyond his day. Howell suggested that at the end of the seventeenth century, no new rhetoric had appeared in any single work.⁴⁶ However, there were indications of an evolutionary process under way in rhetorical theory. Howell identified the Renaissance as the transition between ancient and modern rhetoric:

. . . The Renaissance is the one point in the history

⁴⁴Mitchell, pp. 310-311.

⁴⁵Atkins, p. 16.

⁴⁶Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, p. 364.

of Western Europe where the communication theory of ancient Greece and Rome and that of modern Europe and America are ranged side by side, the older one still alive but losing ground, the young one still immature but growing.⁴⁷

Mitchell substantiated Howell's thesis when he posited that "the Renaissance gave new life to rhetoric."⁴⁸

A definite and influential revolt occurred between 1574 and 1600 which indirectly affected the development of rhetorical thought. Clark maintained that "the most influential dialectician who . . . robbed rhetoric to pay logic was Petrus Ramus."⁴⁹ The Ramistic reform of rhetoric carried on by Ramus' disciples consisted in limiting rhetoric to style and delivery, while transferring the canons of invention and arrangement to logic as the Scholastics had done earlier. Later traditional theorists realized that much of Ramus' criticism was justified. Howell described the results of this realization:

. . . [Traditional rhetoricians] sought to restore Ciceronian concepts to rhetoric . . . but at the same time they sought to purge those concepts of redundancy and to arrange them methodically, as the

⁴⁷Howell, "Renaissance and Modern," p. 53.

⁴⁸Mitchell, p. 60.

⁴⁹Clark, John Milton at St. Paul's School, p. 12. See also, Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, p. 7. In describing the scope of Ramus' work and influence, Howell stated: " . . . The English Ramists . . . were responsible for most of the logical treatises produced in England during the seventeenth century." p. 343. "Debates in the learned world often had Ramism as an ingredient at the turn of the sixteenth century. . . ." p. 193.

Ramists were effectively advocating.⁵⁰

Although Ramus' works were directed toward reforms of redundancies in the liberal arts, his criticisms originated a limited reformation in rhetorical theory.

In the area of sacred rhetoric, there was also a notable transformation. The English sermon in the seventeenth century represented an evolutionary process. Mitchell declared that "the sermon . . . is a . . . medium in which to study the changing tastes of . . . the seventeenth century."⁵¹ A new era in politics and new leadership in the church, coupled with a revitalized rhetoric, provided the motivation for this transition. Carpenter suggested a "new spirit" in preaching during the eighteenth century:

The English sermon remained throughout the whole of the eighteenth century, even in its most decadent form, a norm of dignified, sustained and beautifully modulated prose . . . till upset by the irruption of a new spirit. . . .⁵²

Even in sacred rhetoric, therefore, there were evidences of change from the old order to the new.

Five basic changes, identified by Howell, occurred during this period of rhetorical development; the change in

⁵⁰Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 146, 318. Significant Ramian treatises were Audomari Talaeus' Rhetorica and Dialection, Abraham Fraunce's Lowiers Logike and Arcadion Rhetoric, and Dudley Fenner's The Artes of Logike and Rhetorike.

⁵¹Mitchell, p. 5.

⁵²S.C. Carpenter, Eighteenth Century Church and People (London: John Murray Press, 1959), p. 32. See also p. 7 and Mitchell, pp. 136, 343.

the relationship between logic and rhetoric, in the scope of rhetoric, in the emphasis on rhetorical invention, in arrangement, and finally in rhetorical style. And, as Howell stated, "these changes help to explain why modern rhetoric is as it is."⁵³

One of the most important departures from the medieval system of communication was the separation of logic from the communicative arts and its identification as a discipline of scientific investigation. Descartes was one of the earliest theorists to advocate this new direction for logic. In Discourse he indicated a need for a logic of inquiry to replace the older logic of communication. He argued for a logic that would accept experiment rather than disputation as the chief instrument in the quest for truth.⁵⁴ In his work, Descartes evolved a new method of inquiry as opposed to the method of communication among scholars. Another evidence of this separation between logic and rhetoric occurred in 1553, when Thomas Wilson wrote the first complete work on rhetoric in English. His exclusion of the apparatus of scientific investigation in the Arte of Rhetorique indicated that he felt that the methods of inquiry should be left to logic and that only modes of communication should be discussed under rhetoric. As a matter of fact, he was the first Englishman to write a

⁵³Howell, "Renaissance and Modern," p. 55. The idea and much of the information on these changes come from Howell.

⁵⁴Descartes, Discours de la Methode, pp. 62-63 cited in Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, p. 346. See also p. 348.

logical treatise in English, indicating once again that he regarded these two disciplines separately.⁵⁵ Hence, contemporary rhetoricians no longer consider logic a means of communication, but they view it as a method of testing the consistency and validity of arguments and conclusions. As Howell summarized: ". . . In the main the two disciplines have parted company. . . ."56

A second significant change in the nature of rhetoric, closely related to the first, was in its scope. Rhetoric evolved into the theory of communication encompassing both popular and learned discourses. The "new" rhetoric was a fuller, a more inclusive and comprehensive discipline than it had been in the classical tradition. Wilson was one of the first to argue the enlarged view of rhetoric when he maintained that rhetoric was concerned with all oral discourse and not merely communication to the populace.⁵⁷ The new, enlarged province of rhetoric in the eighteenth century was speech for both scholarly exposition and popular persuasion.⁵⁸

A third result of this evolutionary process involved

⁵⁵Russell H. Wagner, "Thomas Wilson's Contributions to Rhetoric," Papers in Rhetoric, ed. by Donald C. Bryant (St. Louis: Printed by Subscription, 1940), p. 1. See also p. 5. Howell gives a detailed account and analysis of Wilson's work in Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 12-32.

⁵⁶Howell, "Renaissance and Modern," p. 57.

⁵⁷Wagner, "Thomas Wilson's Contributions to Rhetoric," p. 3.

⁵⁸Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, p. 365.

the canon of invention. Rhetoricians gradually discarded invention which emphasized commonplaces and adopted methods of thorough investigation.⁵⁹ The classical commonplace system during the medieval period had degenerated. Speakers used commonplaces not for discovering arguments or for finding the status of a question but as devices for describing and constructing an ornate style.⁶⁰

The seventeenth century sermons also bore witness to the use of the commonplace book which was nothing more than a collection of tropes and schemes, "appropo quotations for any occasion," and arguments. Sermons of the age were full of catchy and elaborate phrases, indicating the preachers' use of commonplace books. Many clergymen used Erasmus' first work which is an excellent example of a commonplace book.⁶¹ The Book of Homilies, published under the direction of Queen Elizabeth, was very similar to a commonplace book.⁶² Mitchell cited the use of commonplaces in sermons in the seventeenth century:

. . . In a century famous for the citations and allusions in its sermons, the influence of the commonplace book is manifest, and the approval with which these quotations were received is quite plainly connected with the prevailing practice in school and

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 376.

⁶⁰McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," pp. 296, 291-292.

⁶¹Howell, "Renaissance and Modern," p. 61.

⁶²Mitchell, pp. 63, 17-18.

college.⁶³

Thus the invention of rhetorical matter by the use of the commonplace book was widely practiced in both sacred and secular rhetoric.

The commonplace system, as the medieval rhetoricians used it, decreased in use during the Renaissance and Reformation when men became dissatisfied with the ready made arguments, pat answers, and accepted opinions. Speakers realized the need for an exhaustive investigation of the individual case as the most profitable means of finding arguments which would have a persuasive effect upon the audience.⁶⁴ Howell summarized this transition from the commonplace system to the inventive process of investigation and analysis:

Perhaps the best way to describe this change is to say that nowadays rhetoric in the quest for a theory of subject matter emphasizes external realities somewhat more than mental interpretation, whereas in the Renaissance, and for a thousand years before, mental interpretation was emphasized somewhat more, at time considerably more, than external realities.⁶⁵

A fourth transformation in rhetorical theory concerned the arrangement of ideas in speech. The evolution in disposition consisted of moving from the complicated classical speech structures to simpler ones.⁶⁶ Wallace identified the

⁶³Ibid., p. 82.

⁶⁴Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 5-6. See also pp. 10-11.

⁶⁵Howell, "Renaissance and Modern," p. 61.

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 64-65.

transition in a similar manner: "The change in arrangement away from the long tedious classical exordium, narration or exposition, proposition, confirmation, confutation and conclusion was toward a more functional and logical progression."⁶⁷ Erasmus was one of the earliest to discard the usual classical arrangement and to argue that the order of a discourse is contingent upon the nature of the subject.⁶⁸ Wallace also maintained that the Tudor and early Stuart rhetoricians, in addition to the rhetorical theorists during the time from Henry VIII to Charles I maintained a simplified rhetorical arrangement "more adaptable to the purpose of the communication, to the mood and nature of the audience and the surrounding conditions of time, place and occasion."⁶⁹ Bacon, in Advancement of Learning, recognized the fact that there could be no static, fixed pattern of arrangement for all discourses. He argued that the subject, the purpose of the speech and the other variables of the communicative situation must determine the structural form.⁷⁰

This new "psychological, logical" emphasis in speech arrangement also influenced sacred rhetoric. Richardson

⁶⁷Karl Wallace, "Early English Rhetoricians on the Structure of Rhetorical Prose," Papers in Rhetoric, ed. by Donald C. Bryant (St. Louis: Printed by Subscription, 1940), p. 18.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 21.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 18.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 13.

described a typical sermon prior to this transition:

The framework of a technically correct sermon was an elaborate arrangement of main topics, sub-topics, illustrations, authorities, "uses," and applications, the whole held together by formal transition, phrases, even sentences. . . .⁷¹

Soon, however, clergymen realized the necessity for simplicity in the arrangement of their sermons. Sacred rhetoricians, such as Hyperius in Practice of Preaching and William Perkins in Arte of Prophecyng, complained of the long, involved classical divisions and suggested simpler forms of arrangement.⁷² Mitchell mentioned the results of the clergy's realization of the relationship between form and function: "The devices of rhetoric were employed (in sermons), but in such a way as made less for a display of these devices than for the better management of the subject in hand."⁷³ The significant trend, therefore, seemed to be away from the ancient system of organization to the more logical and functional schemes.

The theory of style experienced the fifth transition. Rubel maintained that "about the middle of the sixteenth century, critics of discourse became interested in redefining the medieval view of style."⁷⁴ Chaucer's influence in the treatment of style was significant. He abandoned the "astonishingly

⁷¹Richardson, p. 71.

⁷²Wallace, "Early English Rhetoricians on the Structure of Rhetorical Prose," pp. 23-24.

⁷³Mitchell, p. 126.

⁷⁴Rubel, pp. 10, 2.

artificial" stylistic tradition of the medieval sophistics and employed a style based on a "close observation of life and the exercise of the creative imagination."⁷⁵ Wilson in the sixteenth century illustrated the changing emphasis in style when he insisted on plainness, aptness, and sound composition as essential qualities of good style.⁷⁶

Preaching also experienced the transformation in stylistic emphasis. The clergy discovered that the rhetoric of tropes and schemes was not really persuasive. Hence, preachers began to question this rhetorical approach. Thomas Glanvill, an English theologian, criticized the preoccupation which preaching had with style in the seventeenth century.⁷⁷ Out of this questioning evolved a stylistic emphasis based on perspicuity. Burnet summarized the introduction of perspicuity into preaching style:

Preaching has past through very different Forms among us, since the Reformation. But without flattering the present age, or any Persons now alive, too much, it must be confessed, that it is brought of late to a much greater Perfection than it was ever before in

⁷⁵J.M. Manly, Chaucer and the Rhetoricians (London: The British Academy, 1926), p. 5. Manly further stated: ". . . [Chaucer] began his career, not as a disciple and imitator of a thoroughly artificial school of writing, but as a conscious exploiter of the formal rhetoric taught by the professional rhetoricians, and that it was only gradually and as the result of much thought and experiment that he replaced the conventional methods of rhetoric of imaginative construction which give his best work so high a rank in English literature." pp. 20-21.

⁷⁶Wagner, "Thomas Wilson's Contributions to Rhetoric," pp. 5-6.

⁷⁷Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 10-11.

among us. . . . Our language is much refined and we have returned to the plain Notions of simple and genuine Rhetorick.⁷⁸

In a similar vein, Mitchell declared that during the seventeenth century "the plain sermon, which aimed at perspicuity but at the same time did not neglect grace and flexibility, became an accomplished fact."⁷⁹

The shift in the emphasis on style correlated closely with the evolution of political power from the monarchy to the new middle class. Howell contended that before this shift in power the persuasiveness of a discourse depended upon the appropriate use of the language of the nobility. However, as the Crown lost its power there was no reason to equate persuasion with the style of the upper, ruling class.⁸⁰ Howell stated that "a new political structure made an old theory of popular appeal unworkable."⁸¹ Howell summarized the transition in stylistic emphasis:

We may elaborate this image a bit and say that the great change in the theory of rhetorical style since Wilson's day has been a change from the convention of imperial dress to the convention of the business suit.⁸²

A theory of communication modifies its emphases to handle new communicative needs. The communicative situations

⁷⁸Burnet cited in Mitchell, pp. 128-129.

⁷⁹Mitchell, p. 332.

⁸⁰Howell, "Renaissance and Modern," p. 68.

⁸¹Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 10, 118.

⁸²Howell, "Renaissance and Modern," p. 66.

of both antiquity and the Renaissance were much the same, but the needs and demands were different.

. . . The theory of communication as expressed in . . . rhetoric was throughout the Renaissance a response to the communicative needs of English society of that time, and thus it is not to be considered in a vacuum, but in complex relation to the culture surrounding it. A theory of communication is an organic part of a culture. As the culture changes, so will the theory of communication.⁸³

Accordingly, the five significant changes in the theory of communication identified by Howell were adjustments to the needs of a dynamic, changing society. These changes, however, did not appear full grown and distinct at the turn of the eighteenth century, but they evolved from a slow, gradual, overlapping process. Over a period of time during the last half of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century these different rhetorical emphases coexisted.

Chapter III presented the climate of rhetorical thought and practices out of which Locke's thinking on discourse developed. During his age the most persistent and influential rhetorical emphasis was stylistic. In the next chapter, "Locke's Criticism of Rhetoric," we will study his criticism of this tradition. Another significant rhetorical development during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the evolution of what Howell termed the "new" modern rhetoric. This new direction in communication theory is important in an analysis of Locke's philosophy of discourse because of his contributions to the movement.

⁸³Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 9-10.

CHAPTER IV

LOCKE'S CRITICISM OF RHETORIC

Introduction

Locke, like Plato in the Phaedrus, based his constructive view of rhetoric on his critical appraisal of contemporary rhetorical and logical practices. He was highly dissatisfied with the rhetoric and logic of his day. In a biography of Locke, Fowler maintained: "With . . . logic and rhetoric . . . Locke is almost equally discontented."¹ Locke himself declared that the art of rhetoric "attempts to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby all discourses wherein the aim is truth and knowledge the trickeries of rhetoric should be avoided."² He further declared that criticism of the art of rhetoric was fruitless:

Eloquence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against; and it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving, wherein men find pleasure to be deceived.³

¹Thomas Fowler, Locke (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), p. 6.

²John Locke, The Philosophical Works of John Locke, ed. by J.A. St. John (London: George Bell and Sons, 1908), II, 112. (Hereafter referred to as The Philosophical Works.)

³Ibid.

Thus, the practices and precepts of seventeenth century rhetoric and logic did not please Locke.

Locke's criticism of rhetoric extended to six areas: Scholasticism; rhetorical education; the art of disputation; speeches, sermons, and disputations; invention by commonplace; and finally, stylistic tradition.

Criticism of Scholasticism

During Locke's connection with Oxford, Scholasticism was the predominant philosophical view at the University. Locke described his own reactions to the Scholastic methods and practices:

In which abstract speculations young men have had their head employed a while, they are apt to have mean thoughts either of learning or themselves, to quit their studies, and to throw away their books, as containing nothing but hard words and empty sounds; or else concluding, if there be any real knowledge in them, they themselves have not understanding capable of it. And that this is so, perhaps I could assure you upon my experience.⁴

Regardless of the predominance of the methods of Scholasticism, Locke questioned the validity of the practices. He suggested that

it would perhaps be thought an affection of novelty to suspect the rules that have served the learned world these two or three thousand years, and which . . . the learned have rested in, are not sufficient to guide the understanding.⁵

⁴Letter, Locke to Clarke; 8th February - 15th March, 1686 cited in Benjamin Rand, (ed.), The Correspondence of John Locke and Edward Clarke (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927), p. 137.

⁵Locke, I, 24.

Scholarship based on Scholasticism was limited, according to Locke, because it encompassed only the Scholastic view. Locke offered his epistemology as another metaphysics of reality:

If men are for a long time accustomed only to one sort or method of thoughts, they grow stiff in it, and will not readily turn to another. It is therefore to give this freedom that I think they should be made to look into all sorts of knowledge, and exercise their understanding in so wide a variety and stock of knowledge. But I do propose it as a variety and stock of knowledge. . . .⁶

Locke thus advocated his philosophy of knowledge as an alternative to the Scholastic epistemology.

Locke centered the majority of his criticism of Scholasticism on the syllogism which was the methodological foundation of the Scholastics. He indicated that the syllogism was "at best, the art of fencing with the little knowledge we have."⁷ He specified that the syllogism was "more adapted to catch and entangle the mind, than to instruct and inform the understanding" and was "abundantly liable to fallacies."⁸

He was critical of the concept which affirmed the syllogism as the only form of human reason. If, as the Scholastics argued, the syllogism was the only valid instrument of reason, then it follows that "before Aristotle, there was not

⁶Ibid., pp. 62-63.

⁷John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Alexander Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover Publication, 1959), II, 402. (Hereafter referred to as An Essay.)

⁸Ibid., p. 399.

one man that did or could know anything by reason."⁹ Locke suggested, however, that "God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational. . . ."¹⁰ Locke added that he was not criticizing the person of Aristotle but that he was revolting against the view that the syllogism was the only or best means to knowledge.

If the syllogism were the sole method of knowledge, how could men obtain knowledge who were not aware of this form of reasoning? They could not obtain knowledge. But Locke maintained that many men "are not at all helped by the [syllogistic] forms they are put into; though by them the natural order; wherein the mind could judge of their respective connexion. . . ."¹¹ Syllogistic reasoning followed knowledge since there must be knowledge before there is syllogistic proof of that knowledge.¹² Locke's point was that syllogisms cannot produce knowledge; knowledge is not discovered simply by placing propositions in syllogistic form. He concluded

⁹Ibid., p. 390.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 391. Locke said: "I say not this way to lessen Aristotle, whom I look on as one of the greatest men amongst the ancients; whose large views, acuteness, and penetration of thought and strength of judgment, few have equalled; and who, in this very invention of forms of argumentation, wherein the conclusion may be shown to be rightly inferred, did great service against those who were not ashamed to deny anything."

¹¹Ibid., p. 395.

¹²Ibid., p. 402.

that the syllogism was not the avenue "for the leading of those into truth who are willing to find it, and desire to make the best of their reason, for the attainment of knowledge."¹³

Locke further thought that the syllogism was too limited to include investigation of probabilities. Syllogistic investigation of probable statements is unprofitable because it leads to "running away with one assumed probability, or one topical argument, pursues that till it has led the mind quite out of sight of the thing under consideration. . . ."¹⁴ This form of reasoning, Locke affirmed, tends to analyze only one side of the problem and does not consider on which side the greater probability exists.

. . . [Such reasoning] forcing it upon some remote difficulty, holds it fast there; entangled perhaps, and as it were, manacled, in the chain of syllogisms, without allowing it the liberty, much less affording it the helps, requisite to show on which side, all things considered, is the greater probability.¹⁵

Locke conceded that the syllogism is helpful in that it demonstrates the connection of proofs and premises; however, it "is of no great use, since the mind can perceive such connexion, where it is, as easily, nay, perhaps better, without it."¹⁶ He advocated that other forms of reasoning are more

¹³Ibid., p. 392.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 401.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 389.

capable of perceiving the connection among ideas than the syllogism, although he did not elaborate on any of these forms.

"Reason, by its own penetration, where it is strong and exercised, usually sees quicker and clearer without syllogism."¹⁷

The syllogistic form of reasoning, then, is useful and valuable in only one instance, Locke concluded:

Indeed, syllogism is made use of, on occasion, to discover a fallacy hid in a rhetorical flourish, or cunningly wrapt up in a smooth period; and, stripping an absurdity of the cover of wit and good language, show it in its naked deformity.¹⁸

Locke, hence, credited the syllogism with the ability of discovering fallacious reasoning.

Since Scholasticism and its practices saturated the educational system, Locke was extremely sensitive to contemporary educational practices and especially to rhetorical education.

Criticism of Rhetorical Education

The student, for Locke, was the most important ingredient in the educational process. He characterized the curiosity of the students as "an appetite after knowledge."¹⁹ Moreover, he suggested that this quest for knowledge should be encouraged.²⁰ In some advice to a friend on the education

¹⁷Ibid., p. 400.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 389.

¹⁹Rand, p. 137.

²⁰Ibid.

of his son, Locke recommended that education should start early in life. ". . . If my rules have any advantages in them, [they] . . . are to be put in practice as soon as children begin to speak, and therefore no time is to be lost."²¹

Locke considered the study of rhetoric important in a student's education. In addition to rhetoric, he suggested studies in arithmetic, geography, grammar, chronology, history, geometry, astronomy, natural philosophy, French and Latin.²² For Locke, the value of studying rhetoric was obvious; however, it did not merit first place in the curriculum.

There are so many advantages of speaking one's own language well, and being a master in it, that let a man's calling be what it will, it cannot but be worth our taking some pains in it, but it is by no means to have the first place in our studies; but he that makes good language subservient to a good life and an instrument of virtue, is doubly enabled to do good to others.²³

Locke, accordingly, subordinated rhetoric to other studies, but maintained that rhetoric was of certain importance for everyone regardless of one's planned occupation.

Skill in a practical art, such as rhetoric or logic, cannot come from reading a book of rules and principles, according to Locke. Much as a theorist in the formulary tradition would suggest, he maintained that students of rhetoric

²¹Ibid., pp. 117-121.

²²B.C. Burt, A History of Modern Philosophy (Chicago: A.C. McClurg and Company, 1892), I, 155.

²³Lord King, The Life and Letters of John Locke (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1858), p. 17.

and logic should study examples of effective speaking and reasoning.

. . . I have seldom or never observed any one to get the skill of reasoning well, or speaking handsomely, by studying those rules which pretend to teach it: and therefore I would have a young gentleman take a view of them in the shortest systems could be found, without dwelling long on the contemplation and study of those formalities. Right reasoning is founded on something less than the predicaments and predicables, and does not consist in talking in mode and figures itself.

. . . If you would have your son reason well, let him read Bacon; and if you would have him speak well, let him be conversant in Tully to give him the true idea of eloquence; and let him read those things that are well writ in English, to perfect his style in the purity of our language.²⁴

In addition to studying models and examples, the student learns rhetoric and logic by practice. Locke related practice to the development of man's potentialities. ". . . It is only exercise of these potentialities which gives us ability and skill in anything, and leads us towards perfection."²⁵ Locke was an unreserved advocate of the maxim "Practice makes perfect." Moreover, Locke attempted to synthesize practice with inherent abilities and potentialities:

I do not deny that natural disposition may often give the first rise to it, but that never carries a man far without use and practice, and it is practice alone that brings the powers of the mind, as well as those of the body, to their perfection.²⁶

Practice and exercise constituted an essential role in rhetorical education. They were indispensable, for Locke,

²⁴Rand, p. 155.

²⁵Locke, An Essay, I, 34.

²⁶Ibid., p. 36.

in gaining a high degree of effectiveness in "right reasoning" and oratory.

And he will not have much better success who shall endeavour . . . to make a man reason well, or speak handsomely, who has never been used to it, though you should lay before him a collection of all the best precepts of logic or oratory. . . . Practice must settle the habit of doing without reflecting on the rule; and you may as well hope to make a good painter or musician extempore, by a lecture and instruction in the arts of music and painting, as a coherent thinker or a strict reasoner by a set of rules showing him wherein right reasoning consists.²⁷

Thus, the proper and adequate means of teaching rhetoric and logic, from Locke's view, was through the study of models supplemented with practice. Although Locke's pedagogical techniques seem to correspond closely with the formulary rationale for teaching rhetoric, he did not advocate the imitation of models and examples.

Locke was critical of the contemporary devices used in teaching rhetoric. He viewed the teaching techniques of "long discourses and philosophical reasonings" as a little educational value to the students except to "amaze and confound . . . them."²⁸ Locke was persistent in his stand against using themes, verses, and declamations in rhetorical education. He advised Edward Clarke not to allow Clarke's son to dabble in these practices:

. . . I would be glad we might preserve as much of our education as could be, and at least not perplex him

²⁷Ibid., p. 37.

²⁸Letter, Locke to Clarke: 28th January, 1688 cited in Rand, pp. 285-286.

with grammar, much less with themes, declamations, and making of verses, but only reading and translating prose authors, beginning with those of (easier sort, and) so proceeding to harder.²⁹

So firm was Locke in his views, that in a later letter to Clarke, he again warned of the uselessness of the "making of themes" and further elaborated his rationale against this educational device.

But yet by all means obtain, if you can, that he be not employed in making Latin themes and declamations, and least of all verses of any kind. You may insist upon it to the Learned Dom. (inics) if it will do any good, that you have no desire to make him either a Latin orator and poet, but would barely have him understand perfectly a Latin author.³⁰

Locke was quite explicit in his criticism of contemporary rhetorical teaching devices.

Locke advanced two specific criticisms against making themes. Theme-making failed in its defined purpose to inculcate the principles of effective speech making. This teaching technique required a student to speak on subjects about which he knew nothing, a practice of no benefit to the student:

As to themes, though they have, I confess, the pretence of something useful, which is to teach people to speak handsomely and well on any subject. . . . But this I say, that the making of themes, as is usual in schools, helps not one jot toward it: For 1st. Do but consider what it is in making a theme that a young lad is employed about; it is to make a speech upon some Latin saying as 'Omnia vincit amor' or 'Dulces sunt fructus radix

²⁹Letter, Locke to Clarke: 27th December, 1691 cited in Rand, p. 327. Rand added the material in parenthesis.

³⁰Letter, Locke to Clarke: 8th February - 15 March, 1686 quoted in Rand, p. 148. Rand added the material in parenthesis.

virtutis amara.' And here the poor lad, who wants knowledge of these things he is to speak of, which is to be had only from time and experience, must set his invention on the rack, to say something where he knows nothing which is a sort of Egyptian tyranny to bid them make bricks who had not yet any of the materials.³¹

Before a student can speak on any subject they must know something about it or "else it is as foolish to set him to discourse about it, as to set a blind man to talk of colours, or a deaf man of music."³² Locke struck at the very essence of the sophistic tradition in a query to Clarke: "And would you not think him a little cracked who should require another to make an argument on a moot question, who understood nothing of our laws?"³³ Locke in this first criticism of theme-making inferred that the subject matter of a discourse is of no small concern, that what is to be said must be given prime consideration. "And what, I pray, do school-boys understand concerning those matters, which are used to be proposed to them in their themes, as subjects to discourse on, to whet and exercise their fancies?"³⁴

Locke, next, maintained that making themes was not effective because of the language in which the student delivered them. Students prepared and delivered themes in Latin which Locke described as "a language foreign in their country,

³¹Rand, pp. 148-149.

³²Ibid., p. 149.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid.

and long since dead everywhere" and he suggested that the chances were "an hundred to one" that a student would ever have the occasion to make a speech in Latin.³⁵ Making themes in Latin was not profitable because Latin was a language "wherein the manner of expressing one's self is so far different from ours, that to be perfect in that, would very little improve the purity and facility of his English style."³⁶

The proponents of theme-making argued that this device aided the student in learning and improving their Latin. Locke disagreed strongly with this rationale:

. . . But the making of themes is not the way to it; that perplexes their brains about invention of things to say not about the signification of words to be learnt; and when they are making a theme, it is thoughts they search and sweat for, and not language. But the learning and mastery of a tongue, being uneasy and unpleasant enough in itself, should not be cumbered with any other difficulties, as is done in this way of proceeding. In fine, if boys' invention is to be quickened by such exercise, let them make themes in English, where they have facility and command of words, and will better see what kind of thoughts they have, when put into their own language. And, if the Latin tongue is to be learned, let it be done the easiest way, without toiling and disgusting the mind by so uneasy an employment as that of making speeches joined to it.³⁷

Thus, the combination of two dubious tasks improved neither.

Locke's views on making verses were as critical as his views on theme-making. His major contention was that in making verses students are required to perform tasks for which

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid.

they are not prepared. "For if he has no genius to poetry, it is the most unreasonable thing in the world to torment him and waste his time about that which can never succeed."³⁸

Locke implied that education ought to have some utility and should not exist simply because it is the thing that is done.

Closely associated with Locke's criticism of rhetorical education was his appraisal of the art of disputation which was practiced by the schools.

Criticism of the Art of Disputation

In Locke's attack on disputation, he first related a history of the growth and development of the activity from the "philosophers of old" to his day. According to Locke, the original motivation for the "invention and growth" of disputation was the desire to hide ignorance.

. . . The philosophers of old, (the disputing and wrangling philosophers, I mean, such as Lucian wittily and with reason taxes,) and the Schoolmen since, aiming at glory and esteem, for their great and universal knowledge, easier a great deal to be pretended to than really acquired, found this a good expedient to cover their ignorance, with a curious and inexplicable web of perplexed words, and procure to themselves the admiration of others, by unintelligible terms, the apter to produce wonder because they could not be understood. . . .³⁹

The advent of the disputation produced very little new knowledge "unless the coining of new words . . . or the perplexing or obscuring the signification of old ones, and so bringing

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Locke, An Essay, II, 127.

all things into question and dispute, were a thing profitable to the life of man. . . ."40

The art of disputation, in fact, constitutes a barrier to knowledge and produces some serious deficiencies in language.

. . . This art of keeping even inquisitive men from true knowledge hath been propagated in the world, and hath much perplexed, whilst it pretended to inform the understanding. . . . There were philosophers found who had learning and subtlety enough to prove snow was black; i.e. to prove that white was black. Whereby they had the advantage to destroy the instruments and means of discourse, conversation, instruction, and society; whilst with great art and subtlety, they did no more but perplex and confound the signification of words, and thereby render language less useful than the real defects of it had made it. . . .⁴¹

And, hence, in tracing the history of the art of disputation, Locke concluded that this "artificial ignorance and learned gibberish" which is "the direct opposite to the way of knowledge," has developed "under the laudable and esteemed names of subtlety and acuteness, and has had the applause of the schools, and encouragement of one part of the learned men of the world."⁴²

Locke's main criticism of the art of disputation was that it focused on words and not ideas. Since words are inaccurate signs of ideas, disputers are more concerned with sounds than with ideas. He elaborated his contention by

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 127-128.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 128-129.

⁴²Ibid., p. 127.

describing the typical practice of a disputer:

In arguing, the opponent uses as comprehensive and equivocal terms as he can, to involve his adversary in the doubtfulness of his expressions: this is expected, and therefore the answerer on his sides makes his play to distinguish as much as he can, and thinks he can never do it too much; nor can he indeed in that way wherein victory may be had without truth and without knowing. This seems to me to be the art of disputing. Use your words as captiously as you can in your arguing one side, and apply distinctions as much as you can on other side to every term, to nonplus your opponent, so that in this sort of scholarship there being no bounds set to distinguishing.

. . .⁴³

Locke viewed this "playing with words," this "artifice and fallacy of words, which makes so great a part of the business and skill of the disputers" as contemptible to rational man.⁴⁴ Disputation is nothing more than an art "whose business is only the vain ostentation of sounds."⁴⁵ In closing this line of criticism, Locke compared the disputer with "him that should walk up and down in a thick wood, outgrown with briars and thorns, with a design to take a view and draw a map of the country."⁴⁶ There was little implicit in Locke's outspoken appraisal that the method of disputation gets so involved in the signification of words that as an investigative method it loses sight of knowledge and truth.

Disputation, by the same token, does not inculcate a

⁴³Locke, The Philosophical Works, I, 86.

⁴⁴King, pp. 362-364.

⁴⁵Locke, An Essay, II, 151.

⁴⁶Ibid., I, xxv.

desire for knowledge, but, quite apart, it concentrates solely on victory in verbal skills. Locke was very lucid in this charge:

Truth and knowledge have nothing to do with all this bustle; nobody thinks them concerned, it is all for victory, -- a trial of skill, without any appearance of a true consideration of the matter in question, or troubling their heads to find out where the truth lies. . . . The mischief has been brought in by placing too high a value and credit on the art of disputing, and giving that the reputation and reward of learning and knowledge.⁴⁷

The procedures of disputing indicate that truth and knowledge do not concern disputers whose primary goal is victory.

Nor is it to be wondered, since the way of disputing in the schools leads them quite away from it, by insisting on one topical argument, by the success of which the truth or falsehood of the question is to be determined, and victory adjudged to the opponent or defendant, which is all one as if one should balance an account by one sum, charged and discharged, when there are a hundred others to be taken into consideration.⁴⁸

Locke was convinced that a disputer was an

insignificant wrangler, opiniated in discourse, and priding himself in contradicting others; or, which is worse, questioning everything, and thinking there is no such thing as truth to be sought, but only victory, in disputing.⁴⁹

Therefore, in one of Locke's most outspoken attacks, he disapproved of one of the prominent rhetorical activities of his day. The art of disputation and all it stood for was antagonistic to Locke's way of thinking mainly because

⁴⁷King, p. 362.

⁴⁸Locke, The Philosophical Works, I, 44.

⁴⁹Ibid., II, 189.

because disputation, for him, was a hindrance to knowledge and truth. We will now move from Locke's appraisal of the general art of disputing to his evaluation of specific communicative acts.

Criticism of Speeches, Sermons
and Disputations

Locke sprinkled his journals with evaluations and descriptions of various discourses which he had heard. During his travels in France, he analyzed and criticized several sermons, speeches, and disputations. In describing the "manner of making a doctor in physic," Locke elaborated on the procedures of a speech given by one of the professors:

When they had plaid a litle while, the professor made signs to them to hold that he might have opportunity to enterteine the company, which he did with a speech against innovations as long as an ordinary declamation. When he had don, the musick took their turne, & then the inceptor began his speech . . . it being, I believe, chiefly designed to complement the Chancellor & other professors who were present. In the midle of his speech he made a pause, & then we had an interlude of musick, & soe went on till he came to thank us all for our company & so concluded.⁵⁰

Locke maintained that he "found litle for edification" in the speech.⁵¹ The journal which Locke kept during his exile in Holland contained a description of an oration made by "the young Gronovius:"

His subject was the original of Romulus. The harangue

⁵⁰John Lough, (ed), Travels in France, 1675-1679, as related to His Journals, Correspondence and Other Papers (Cambridge: University Press, 1953), p. 57.

⁵¹Ibid.

itself began with a magnificent and long compliment to the curators; and then something being said to professors and scholars, he came to the main business, which was to show that Romulus was not an Italian born, but came from the east and was of Palestine or therabout. This, as I remember, was the design of his oration, which lasted almost two hours.⁵²

In each of these instances, Locke focused on the content of the discourse with little regard for style or delivery. Such attention infers that Locke placed emphasis on the message of the discourse.

Locke was notably critical of some disputations which he heard at the Medical School in Montpellier. Of the first disputation, Locke declared: "At the Physick Schoole a Scholler answering [disputing] for the first time, a Professor moderating. 6 other professors oppose with great violence of Latin & French, Grimasse & hand."⁵³ He characterized another disputation as "much French, hard Latin, little Logic and little Reason."⁵⁴ In his evaluations of disputations Locke appeared concerned with the presence or absence of logic and reasoning.

Locke criticized several sermons and disputations during his employment as secretary to the elector of Brandenburg. On December 24th, he described a sermon as "a good lusty, rattling High Dutch sermon, the sound whereof would

⁵²Henry Richard Fox Bourne, The Life of John Locke (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1876), II, 15.

⁵³Lough, p. 54. That portion of the quotation which appears in italics was in Locke's shorthand.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 50.

have made one think it had the desire of reproof. . . ."55

Later Locke evaluated another sermon given at a Lutheran church.

His sermon, I think, was in blank verse; for by the modulation of his voice, which was not very pleasant, his periods seemed to be all nearly the same length. But, if his matter were no better than his delivery, those that slept had no great loss, and might have snored as harmoniously.⁵⁶

In this last note Locke hinted at the reason why he failed to comment on the content of the sermons. He explained that he did not speak or understand Dutch when he noted "if the matter were no better than his delivery." Since he could not understand the message he naturally centered his entries on the delivery of the sermons.

In discussing the metaphysical disputations of some Franciscan monks who entertained him while he was in Brandenburg, Locke stated: "Poor materia prima was convassed cruelly, stripped of all the gay dress of her forms, and shown naked to us; though, I must confess, I had not eyes good enough to see her."⁵⁷ Locke elaborated on one disputation at length:

The professor of philosophy and moderator of the disputation was more acute at it than Father Hudibras. He was top-full of distinctions, which he produced with so much gravity, and applied with so good a grace, that ignorant I began to admire logic again, and . . . with the right stroking of his whiskers, the settling of

⁵⁵King, p. 17.

⁵⁶Bourne, I, 109.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 115.

his hood, and with his stately walk, made him seem to himself and me something more than Aristotle and Democritus. But he was so hotly charged by one of the seniors of the fraternity, that I was afraid sometimes what it would produce, and feared there would be no other way to decide the controversy between them but by cuffs; but a subtle distinction divided the matter between them, and so they part good friends. . . . But it behoves the monks to cherish this art of wrangling in its declining age, which they first nursed and send abroad into the world to give it a troublesome, idle employment.⁵⁸

Finally Locke further identified his own reactions to the disputation of the Monks:

I being a brute, that was rode there for another's pleasure profited little by all their reasonings, and was glad when they had done, that I might get home to my ordinary provender, and leave them their sublime speculations, which certainly their spare diet and private cells inspire abundantly, which such gross feeders as I am not capable of.⁵⁹

Even though Locke viewed the Monks' debate much superior to the disputation at Oxford, he found little satisfaction in the activity.⁶⁰

Underlying all of Locke's notes on these speeches, sermons, and disputations are his critical standards for the practice of effective communication. One of Locke's most pronounced criticisms of contemporary speech practices was of the use of commonplaces.

Criticism of Commonplaces

During Locke's day, speakers relied heavily on

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 115-116.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid.

commonplace books for the collection of the materials for their discourses. A typical commonplace book consisted of little more than a collection of clichés, quotations and arguments which were categorized around certain general topics. In lieu of investigating and analyzing the ramifications of a problem, a speaker or writer simply "invented" his "case" from the commonplace book. Locke gave an apt description of the use of commonplaces:

There is another but more innocent way of collecting arguments very familiar among bookish men, which is to furnish themselves with arguments they meet with pro and con in the questions they study. This helps them . . . to talk copiously on either side . . . for such arguments gathered from other men's thoughts, floating only in the memory, are there ready indeed to supply copious talk with some appearance of reason. . . .⁶¹

Locke singled out for criticism another practice closely related to collecting arguments on both sides of a question and that was "hunting after arguments to make good one side of the question, wholly to neglect and refuse those which favour the other side."⁶²

Two objections motivated Locke's criticism of medieval and contemporary uses of "commonplaces." Whereas the defenders of commonplaces maintained that the commonplaces were materials for knowledge, Locke insisted that commonplaces could not produce knowledge.

If their memories retain well, one may say, they have the materials of knowledge, but like those for building

⁶¹Locke, The Philosophical Works, I, 57.

⁶²Ibid., pp. 56-57.

they are of no advantage if there be no other use made of them but to let them lie heaped up together.⁶³

Knowledge does not necessarily follow from the fact that a speaker is a copious talker. Locke again affirmed his position:

The memory may be stored, but the judgment is little better, and the stock of knowledge not increased by being able to repeat what others have said or produce the arguments we have found in them.⁶⁴

The speaker who uses commonplaces, indeed, appears knowledgable and well read on his topic when in reality he has very little "knowledge" of the topic.

This, when it succeeds to the purpose designed . . . sets a man off before the world as a very knowing learned man, but upon trial will not be found to be so; indeed, it may make a man a ready talker and disputant, but not an able man. It teaches a man to be a fencer; but in the irreconcilable war between truth and falsehood, it seldom or never enables him to choose the right side, or to defend it well, being got of it.⁶⁵

When a speaker uses commonplaces, he is "but a retailer of others."⁶⁶ He cannot defend the foundation of his case since commonplaces provide only superficial insight. The essence of Locke's first criticism was that if the mind does not digest commonplaces, "it produces nothing but a heap of crudities."⁶⁷

Locke, next, contended that "truth needs no

⁶³Ibid., pp. 54-55.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 64.

⁶⁵King, p. 104.

⁶⁶Locke, The Philosophical Works, I, 57.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 54.

recommendation, and error is not mended by it."⁶⁸ Hence, he based his second criticism of commonplaces on the proposition that investigation for knowledge must not rely on the opinions of others. He paralleled relying on the conclusions of others with a man traveling on a journey:

. . . In our inquiry after knowledge, it as little concerns us what others have thought, as it does one who is to go from Oxford to London, to know what scholars walk quietly on foot, inquiring the way and surveying the country as they went, who rode past after their guide without minding the way he went, who were carried along muffled up in a coach with their company, or where one doctor lost or went out of his way, or where another stuck in the mire. If a traveller gets a knowledge of the right way, it is not matter whether he knows the infinite windings, by-ways, and the right secures him from the wrong, and that is his business: and so methinks it is our pilgrimage through this world. . . .⁶⁹

Locke implied that materials for discourses must be gleaned from personal experiences without any aid, except in a very general manner, from the experiences of others.

Locke realized that he had overstated his case and he softened his position on the use of other people's knowledge. He admitted that there is some profit and value to be gained from reading and knowing what others have said, if the study is not overdone:

I do not say this to undervalue the light we receive from others, or to think there are not those who assist us mightily in our endeavours after knowledge; perhaps without books we should be as ignorant as the Indians, whose minds are as ill clad as their bodies; but I think it is an idle and useless thing to make

⁶⁸King, p. 94.

⁶⁹Ibid.

it one's business to study what have been other men's sentiments in things where reason is only to be judge, on purpose to be furnished with them, and to be able to cite them on all occasions.⁷⁰

In the end, therefore, Locke gave some credit to the wisdom of others.

Locke concluded that commonplaces are as "empty sounds" and can no more improve the understanding or strengthen the reason than "the noise of a jack will fill our bellies or strengthen our bodies."⁷¹ He compared the skill in using commonplaces to being "dexterous in tying and untying knots in cobwebs."⁷² In addition to the use of commonplaces, he analyzed the stylistic emphasis of contemporary communication practices.

Criticism of Style

At the outset of Locke's short critical analysis of style, he delineated his objective which was "not to decry metaphor, or with design to take away that ornament of speech."⁷³ He stated that he was writing for the philosopher and "lovers of truth" and was not concerned with the rhetorician or orator.⁷⁴ Notwithstanding Locke's exclusion of speech makers, his evaluation of style is relevant to his philosophy

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 94.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 360.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Locke, The Philosophical Works, I, 88.

⁷⁴Ibid.

of discourse.

While not directly opposed to figurative language, Locke suggested that the use of devices such as similes and metaphors should be regulated. There is some justification for utilizing figurative devices but there are, at the same time, some deficiencies in them:

. . . Though it may be a good way and useful in explaining our thoughts to others, it is by no means a right method to settle true notions of anything in ourselves, because similes always fail in some part, and come short of that exactness which our conceptions, should have to things if we would think aright.⁷⁵

Locke praised the "well chosen" similes, metaphors, and allegories as excellent means for conveying new concepts.

These devices relate new information well because

being taken from objects already known and familiar to the understanding, they are conceived as fast as spoken, and the correspondence being concluded, they think they are brought to explain and elucidate is thought to be understood too.⁷⁶

Locke illustrated his view on figurative language,

. . . For those are always most acceptable in discourse who have the way to let their thoughts into other men's minds with the great ease and facility; whether those thoughts are well formed and correspond with things matter not; few men care to be instructed but at an easy rate. They who in their discourse strike at the fancy, and take the hearers' conceptions along with and go for the only men of clear thoughts. Nothing contributes so much to this as similes, whereby men think they themselves better, because they are the better understood.⁷⁷

While equating figurative language with "plausible"

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 87.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 88.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 87.

speech, Locke also warned that a genuine investigation for knowledge must go beyond the use of these devices.

If all our search has yet reached no further than simile and metaphor, we may assure ourselves we rather fancy than know, and have not yet penetrated into the inside and reality of the thing, be it what it will, but content ourselves with what our imaginations, not things themselves, furnish us with.⁷⁸

In different terminology, Locke enlarged on the same idea. He suggested that many students never find truth because of some "rhetorical discourse," that they "are struck with some lively metaphorical representations they neglect to observe . . . what are the true ideas upon which the inference depends."⁷⁹

Locke recognized both virtue and vice in the use of figurative language. He indicated where metaphors, similes, etc. could be used advantageously and where they could not.

In this chapter we have looked at Locke's criticism of both the theoretical and practical aspects of the contemporary rhetorical tradition. The examples, descriptions, and notes of Locke's reactions to this tradition are indicative of his standards of rhetorical effectiveness. Locke's rhetorical standards have significant ramifications in the development of his philosophy of rhetoric.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 88.

⁷⁹Locke, An Essay, II, 397.

CHAPTER V

LOCKE'S EPISTEMOLOGY

Introduction

The genesis of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding dates from about 1670. A discussion among Locke and some of his colleagues late in 1670 centered on "principles of morality and revealed religion."¹ Because they were unable to reach any definite conclusions about this subject, Locke became interested in some fundamental epistemological questions:

After we had a while puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with.²

Locke and his friends agreed to consider the problem of knowledge, and Locke proposed to prepare and read a paper on the subject at the next meeting. This original brief on

¹ John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Alexander Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), I, xvii. (Hereafter referred to as An Essay.)

² Ibid., p. xvi.

the intricacies of knowledge raised an inquiry which ultimately ended in 1690 with the official publication of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.³ Throughout these twenty years Locke pursued the query: What is knowledge and how do we obtain it? As he declared early in the Essay, his purpose was to "inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent. . . ."4

There is a direct relationship between epistemology and rhetorical theory. A given metaphysical position logically determines what is judged as certain or probable, how and why the mind assents to knowledge or probability, what constitutes proof of probability, and other important rhetorical questions. Without a systematic epistemological foundation, a philosophy of rhetoric is little more than an empty shell of style, delivery, and arrangement. Further, a speaker has some significant insight into the rhetorical situation

³Henry Richard Fox Bourne, The Life of John Locke (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1876), II, 94, 100. The Essay grew and matured for sixteen years in Locke's mind and notebooks. He substantially completed the work in 1687. In that year while in Amsterdam, he prepared the abstract of the Essay which appeared in the Bibliothèque Universelle for January, 1687. Locke released the work for official publication in London in 1690 and then revised and enlarged it two or three times within the next decade.

⁴Locke, I, 25-26. See the following works for discussions of Locke's epistemology: George Boas, Dominant Themes of Modern Philosophy: A History (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1957) pp. 184-205; Raymond Gregory, "A Study of Locke's Theory of Knowledge" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1919); and Hugh Miller, An Historical Introduction to Modern Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), pp. 207ff, 277ff.

when he recognizes the processes which an audience follows in accepting or rejecting propositions as valid or invalid.

The subsequent theory of knowledge which Locke produced in his Essay is the ideological foundation for his philosophy of rhetoric. Accordingly, this chapter traces Locke's theory of how the mind comes to have knowledge. This investigation includes his views on four topics: ideas, propositions, faculties of the mind, and the accumulation of the preceeding three elements, knowledge.

Ideas

In the seventeenth century there existed a widespread acceptance of the concept of innate ideas.⁵ Before discussing the sources and types of ideas, Locke felt that it was necessary to refute the theory of innate ideas. The proponents of the theory of innate ideas maintained that there was some knowledge with which a person was born and which he intuitively knew to be true, certain, and real. They supported their position by citing the "universal agreement" of certain ideas such as, the existence of God, and A is not non-A.⁶

⁵James Gibson, Locke's Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations (Cambridge: University Press, 1917), p. 30. Some of the most famous advocates were the Cambridge Platonists and Lord Herbert of Cherbury. Lord Edward Herbert of Cherbury, 1583-1648, was matriculated May, 1596 at University College, Oxford. Published De Veritate in London, 1642. See Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, (ed.), The Dictionary of National Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1917), IX, 624-632.

⁶Gibson, p. 36.

Their argument ran, if people universally admit an idea, the idea is innate; if the idea is innate, it is certain and beyond question.⁷ They further affirmed that syllogistic deductions from these innate first principles produced all other knowledge. These deductions or conclusions were true and valid beyond proof or criticism.⁸

Locke realized that in attacking the theory of innate ideas he was engaged in a conflict with the philosophy of the Scholastics.⁹ He anticipated that his criticisms of innate principles would "seem absurd to the masters of demonstration," that the Scholastics would censure him for departing from the "common road" and for "pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty."¹⁰

Locke's arguments against innate knowledge presented a dilemma to the Scholastics. Either their epistemology signified that certain ideas and principles were explicitly present from the earliest period of consciousness, or the theory asserted the existence of a natural capacity for knowledge. In the former case, the Scholastics admitted that the theory was false. In the latter, the theory could not maintain the

⁷Ibid. See Locke, I, 37-39, for his statement of the argument for innateness.

⁸Gibson, p. 40.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Locke, I, 38-39, 116.

standard of certainty so closely associated with it.¹¹

Locke recognized that the theory of innateness stood in direct conflict with his epistemological position. He concluded, therefore, that there are no innate ideas, that "at its beginnings the mind is an empty surface," and that ideas must come from some source other than innateness.¹²

Ideas originate in what Locke designated "experience."¹³ There are two sorts of experience which produce ideas, sensation and reflection. The experience of sensation produces data of external things, while ideas of the operation of the mind originate in reflection.

Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our mind perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all materials of thinking. These two are the foundations of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.¹⁴

Therefore, the ideas of sensation are data of the nature of material things and ideas of reflection are simply representation of the operations of the mind.¹⁵

¹¹Gibson, p. 20.

¹²Locke, I, 121-122.

¹³John Locke, An Early Draft of Locke's Essay, ed. by R.I. Aaron and Jocelyn Gibb (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 3. (Hereafter referred to as An Early Draft.)

¹⁴Locke, An Essay, I, 122. See also R.I. Aaron, "The Limits of Locke's Rationalism," Seventeenth Century Studies, ed. by Herbert Grierson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938).

¹⁵For an excellent discussion of the sources of ideas, see Gibson, pp. 52ff.

The term "idea" had a dual meaning for Locke. Gibson described these two uses: "The idea is . . . at once the apprehension of a content and the content apprehended; it is both a physical existent and a logical meaning."¹⁶ Locke repeatedly compared the function of the idea with that of the word; both are essentially representative.¹⁷ He used the term "idea" to stand for the object of the understanding.¹⁸ The word "idea" is an all inclusive one, "a term of most comprehensive generality, embracing all that is in any way immediately apprehensival by the mind of man. . . ."¹⁹ Locke summarized his definition of idea: "Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea. . . ."²⁰

Objects, or things in reality, have powers to produce ideas in the mind. Locke designated these powers "qualities." "Thus a snowball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, -- the power to produce in us the idea, as they are in the snowball, I call qualities. . . ."²¹ Primary qualities are those powers which a body or object

¹⁶Gibson, pp. 19-20.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁸Locke, An Essay, I, 32.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 33.

²⁰Ibid., p. 169.

²¹Ibid.

maintains in whatever state it is, "such as are utterly inseparable from the body."²² Locke defined secondary qualities:

. . . . Such qualities which in truth are nothing in the object themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, etc. These I call secondary qualities.²³

Primary qualities of objects produce ideas which are very similar to the object.²⁴ Secondary qualities, however, originate ideas which bear no resemblance to the object; "there is nothing like our ideas, existing in the bodies themselves."²⁵

There are two major types of ideas which the mind utilizes, simple and complex.²⁶ Simple or particular ideas are the unaltered sense data from experience.²⁷ They are not capable of descriptions because experience is the only means to knowledge of them. For instance, one cannot describe color for a blind man; the blind man must experience color to know it. From experience through the senses, the mind receives such simple ideas as pain and pleasure,²⁸ extension, mobility,

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid., p. 140.

²⁴Ibid., p. 143.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid., p. 144.

²⁷Ibid., p. 48.

²⁸Ibid., p. 302.

perceptivity and motivity,²⁹ as well as solidity.³⁰ Such ideas are representations of the power in things (qualities) to produce such sensations in the mind.³¹ The mind acts on these simple ideas in chiefly three ways: (1) combining them into compound ideas: (2) comparing them; (3) separating them from their real existence or abstracting them.³²

The understanding constructs "complex ideas" when it combines several simple ideas into such ideas as beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe.³³ These ideas, as Locke explained, are "complicated of various simple ideas."³⁴ Once the formulation of the complex idea is completed, the mind fixes the combination by means of a name. Locke illustrated his point with an example:

For the several simple modes of numbers being in our minds but so many combinations of units, which have no variety, nor are capable of any other difference but more or less, names or marks for each distinct combination seem more necessary than in any other sort of ideas. For, without such names or marks, we can hardly well make use of numbers in reckoning, especially where the combination is made up of any great multitude of units; which, put together without a name or mark to distinguish that precise collection will hardly be kept from being a heap of confusion.³⁵

²⁹Ibid., p. 373.

³⁰Ibid., p. 151.

³¹Ibid., p. 511.

³²Ibid., pp. 213-214.

³³Ibid., p. 214.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., p. 272.

Locke divided complex ideas, according to the nature of the content apprehended, into ideas of modes (simple and mixed), substance and relations.³⁶ He elaborated on each of these categories, but a detailed analysis of them would be extraneous to the purposes of this chapter.

The understanding also utilizes simple ideas to formulate general ideas.³⁷ General ideas pose the question of how ideas which are particular in their existence come to be universal in representation and meaning. Universality of general ideas is contingent upon a two-fold mental function. In the first place, the mind considers the generalized meaning, by the process of abstraction, apart from its original setting in experience. The understanding further recognizes a general idea as representing all other particulars of the same class or kind.³⁸ Locke maintained that an idea is capable of generality only in its meaning.³⁹ As an existing entity, the idea must retain its particularity, even though that which it represents is universal. Locke repeatedly emphasized this distinction between the particular existence and the universal meaning of a general idea.⁴⁰

³⁶See for a discussion of these types of complex ideas, Ibid., pp. 215-216, 381, 385, 505, 512-513.

³⁷Ibid., p. 49.

³⁸Ibid., p. 214.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

Ideas, in the literal sense of the word, are incapable of confusion with one another. An idea is what it is and it can be nothing more because the act of sensation sufficiently distinguishes it from all other ideas.⁴¹ However, in an apparent contradiction, Locke differentiated "clear" from "confused" ideas:

. . . A clear idea is that whereof the mind has such a full and evident perception, as it does receive from an outward object operating duly on a well-disposed organ, as a distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other; and a confused idea is such an one as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different.⁴²

The solution to this dilemma is in the references to names. Ideas, properly speaking, are not capable of confusion on the mental level. However, confusion among ideas occurs when two names which were intended to stand for different ideas are used for the same idea or when a single name is used for two distinct ideas.⁴³

There are two basic reasons for this confusion of names. This confusion prevails, first, when a complex idea consists of too few particular ideas. In this case, the complex idea is not distinguishable from other complex ideas.⁴⁴ Ambiguity also arises when a complex idea consists of sufficient simple ideas, but they are so confused, "so jumbled

⁴¹Ibid., p. 488.

⁴²Ibid., p. 487.

⁴³Ibid., p. 488.

⁴⁴Ibid.

together," that the complex idea cannot be distinguished from other complex ideas.⁴⁵ Such confusion of simple ideas creates a case in which, as Locke stated, "it is not easily discernible whether it more belongs to the name that is given it than to any other."⁴⁶

Ideas inherently possess three discernible characteristics; they are either real or fantastical, adequate or inadequate, and true or false. An idea is "real" when it conforms to an external real object. By "fantastical" ideas, Locke meant those ideas which have no foundation in reality, "nor have any conformity with that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred, as to their archetypes."⁴⁷ Those ideas are "adequate" which "perfectly represent" that reality, or that object, for which they stand. Locke designated an "inadequate" idea as one which is "but a partial or incomplete representation" of that archetype to which it refers.⁴⁸ Ideas are true or false in three instances. An idea is true or false, in the first place, in its conformity to the ideas of other men. Locke explained this dimension of truth: ". . . When the mind intends or judges its ideas of justice, temperance, religion, to be the same with what other men give

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 489.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 497.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 502.

those names of."⁴⁹ Secondly, ideas are true or false in regard to their conformity to reality.⁵⁰ Finally, Locke maintained that an idea is true "when the mind refers any of its ideas to that real constitution and essence of anything, whereon all its properties depend. . . ."⁵¹

Having completed his survey of ideas, Locke considered himself, as Gibson stated, "in a position to attack the question of the nature . . . of the knowledge of which ideas are but the 'materials' or 'instruments.'"⁵²

Propositions

The second step toward knowledge consists of placing ideas into propositions. Locke consistently made the point that the "mental proposition," as distinguished from mere ideas is the unit of knowledge or judgment.⁵³ Therefore, once the mind has ideas, or materials for knowledge, it formulates them into propositions.

Locke theorized two sorts of propositions: mental and verbal.⁵⁴ In mental propositions, the understanding formulates propositions with ideas only. Locke specified this process as "wherein the ideas in our understanding are without

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 515.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Gibson, p. 120.

⁵³Locke, An Essay, II, 168.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 245.

the use of words put together or separated. . . ."55 Because verbal propositions consist of words which are signs of ideas, they logically follow mental propositions.⁵⁶ Locke elaborated on the verbal proposition:

. . . Verbal propositions . . . are words, the signs of our ideas, put together or separated in affirmation or negative sentences. By which way of affirming or denying, these signs, made by sounds, are, as it were, put together or separated one from another. So that proposition consists in the putting together or separating those signs, according as the things which they stand for agree or disagree.⁵⁷

Locke's distinction between the mental and verbal propositions has some significant ramifications in his philosophy of discourse.

Propositions are not only an essential item in knowledge, but propositions also contain "truth." Locke used the term "truth" to signify "the joining or separating of Signs, as the Things signified by them do agree or disagree one with another."⁵⁸ Truth, then, in Locke's usage of the word, is contingent upon the correspondence of signs relations, either ideas or words, to the relations among things which the signs represent. Locke, in an effort to clarify his position, distinguished truth from falsehood:

Truth is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas as it is. Falsehood is the

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 246.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 245.

marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas otherwise than it is. And so far as these ideas, thus marked by sounds, agree to their archetypes, so far only is the truth real.⁵⁹

Propositions contain real truth as distinguished from verbal truth when the terms are "joined as our ideas agree, and when our ideas are such as we know are capable of having an existence in nature. . . ." ⁶⁰ Verbal truth, then, exists when ideas in a verbal proposition have no correspondence to reality.⁶¹

In addition to the real and verbal truths contained in propositions, Locke specified two other sorts of truth. Moral truth consists in "speaking of things according to the persuasion of our own minds, though the proposition we speak agree not to the reality of things."⁶² The second sort of truth is metaphysical truth. This truth exists when ideas conform to reality.

This, though it seems to consist in the very beings of things, yet, when considered a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit proposition, whereby the mind joins that particular thing to the idea it had before settled with the name to it.⁶³

It is difficult to see any significant distinction between real truth in propositions and metaphysical truth.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 249.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 248.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ibid., p. 249.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 249-250.

In his analysis of propositions, Locke divided propositions into different types, such as general and trifling propositions. General propositions constitute certainty "when the terms used in them stand for such ideas, whose agreement or disagreement, as there expressed, is capable to be discovered by us."⁶⁴ The mind can never base general certainty on ideas because they are particular in nature, but only general propositions afford general knowledge.⁶⁵

Under the heading of trifling propositions Locke included both the purely identical propositions, in which a term is predicated of itself, and analytical propositions. Although both classes of propositions are "certainly" true, they add nothing to the understanding.⁶⁶ Locke explained why identical propositions cannot make a contribution to knowledge.

These obviously and at first blush appear to contain no instruction in them; for when we affirm the said term of itself, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains any clear and real idea, it shows us nothing but what we must certainly know before, whether such a proposition be either made by, or proposed to us.⁶⁷

The second sort of trifling proposition Locke identified as those in which "a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole: a part of the definition of

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 266.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 292.

⁶⁷Ibid.

the word defined."⁶⁸ Such propositions are certain but not instructive. Finally Locke concluded that instruction is something different from the nature of these two sorts of propositions; propositions which are instructive "find out intermediate ideas, and then lay them in such order one by another, that the understanding may see the agreement or disagreement of those in question."⁶⁹

Faculties of the Mind

Once the mind has ideas and has formulated these ideas into mental propositions, two of its faculties, perception and retention, are required in the final step toward knowledge.

Perception is the most general name for all the operations of the mind or the understanding. Locke defined perception as a specific act of thought by which the mind has explicit consciousness of some object or content.⁷⁰ But how is this faculty different from sensation or reflection? Perception is synonymous to thinking; it is an active function of the understanding while sensation and reflection are passive actions. Locke suggested that his readers through introspection were capable of comprehending the process of perception.

What perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he . . . thinks, than by a discourse of mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in his own mind cannot miss it. And if he does

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 296.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 295.

⁷⁰Gibson, p. 21.

not reflect, all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it.⁷¹

According to Locke, perception is of three sorts; the perception of ideas or simple apprehension, the perception of the meaning of words, and the perception of the connection or repugnancy between ideas.⁷² Locke divided the perception of the agreement or disagreement among ideas, which is essential to knowledge, into several separate, but not distinct, actions. One such action consists of discerning and distinguishing between ideas. Of this process, Locke contended: "Unless the mind had a distinct perception of different objects and their qualities, it would be capable of very little knowledge.

. . ."⁷³ Another operation of the understanding is that of comparing ideas "one with another, in respect of extent, degrees, time, place, or any other circumstance."⁷⁴ This act of perception produces, of course, the ideas of relation. There seems to be little difference between comparing and discerning ideas, for the process of discerning or distinguishing ideas one from another would not be possible save for the process of comparison. Finding differences and similarities among ideas is nothing more or less than comparing them. Finally, Locke mentions two other operations of the mind.

⁷¹Locke, An Essay, I, 183.

⁷²Ibid., p. 314.

⁷³Ibid., p. 202.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 204.

Composition is the act which the understanding performs when it combines simple ideas into complex ones.⁷⁵ The action of abstraction consists of giving generality to particular ideas.⁷⁶ These facets of perception are essential to knowledge, to the use of language, and to the process of reasoning.⁷⁷

Locke termed the next major faculty of the mind, retention, or "the keeping of those simple ideas which from sensation or reflection (the mind) hath received."⁷⁸ The process of retention functions in two ways. First, retention consists of contemplation which is retaining an idea in the consciousness of the mind.⁷⁹ The second act of retention is memory, which consists of "the power to revive again in our minds those ideas which, after imprinting, have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of sight. . . ."⁸⁰ The memory is, as it were, the "storehouse of our ideas."⁸¹ Locke was necessarily concerned with the memory's inability to furnish the mind with "dormant" ideas.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 205.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 209.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 193.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Ibid.

. . . Ideas (in the mind) quickly fade, and often vanish quite out of the understanding, leaving no more foot-steps or remaining characters of themselves than shadows do flying over fields of corn, and the mind is as void of them as if they had never been there.⁸²

Locke suggested attention and repetition as two techniques for improving the retentive power of the memory.⁸³ Repetition is accomplished "by a frequent return to the objects or actions that produce [the ideas and] . . . fix themselves best in the memory, and remain clearest and longest there. . . ." ⁸⁴ However, in another instance, Locke maintained that ideas which are accompanied by pleasure or pain make the deepest and most lasting impressions.⁸⁵ Locke was quick to proclaim the value of memory to the progress of knowledge.⁸⁶

Now that Locke had considered the three basic elements in knowledge -- ideas, proposition, and the faculties of the mind, he was ready to inquire into the fundamental objective of the Essay, the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge.

Knowledge

Knowledge is the "perception of the connection and

⁸²Ibid., p. 195.

⁸³Ibid., p. 194.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 197.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 194.

⁸⁶Ibid., pp. 198-199.

agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas [in mental propositions]."⁸⁷ Knowledge consists of an act of thought in which an affirmation or denial is made.⁸⁸

Knowledge exists in four sorts of agreement or disagreement:

To understand a little more . . . wherein this agreement or disagreement consists . . . we may reduce it all to these four sorts: (1) Identity or diversity, (2) Relations, (3) Coexistence, or necessary connection, (4) Real existence.⁸⁹

When Locke wrote of identity or diversity as one of the four types of agreement or disagreement, he was not referring to the identity of an object but to the identity of the content of an idea and its distinction from every other idea. The recognition of an idea in this sense involves the very meaning of an idea.

It is the first act of the mind, when it has any sentiments or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas; and, so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary that without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no imagination, no distinct thoughts at all.⁹⁰

The first act of knowledge, then, is the realization of an idea "for what it is" and of its distinction from other ideas.

Closely related to the first sort of affirmation or

⁸⁷Ibid., II, 167.

⁸⁸Gibson, p. 121.

⁸⁹Locke, An Essay, II, 168.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 169.

negation is the act of perceiving relations.⁹¹ Locke designated this act as "nothing but the perception of the relation between any two ideas, of what kind so ever, whether substances, modes, or any other."⁹² So the mind obtains knowledge when it perceives the relationship of ideas.

. . . Since all distinct ideas must eternally be known not to be the same, and so be universally and constantly denied one of another there could be no room for any positive knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any relation between our ideas, and find out the agreement or disagreement they have one with another, in several ways the mind takes of comparing them.⁹³

The act of affirmation or denial of relations consists of comparing two or more ideas for their similarities and differences.

The third type of agreement or disagreement is the perception of coexistence or non-coexistence. This act amounts to perceiving certain characteristics about ideas. Locke related an instance of the act of coexistence:

Thus when we pronounce concerning gold, that it is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this, that fixedness, or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is an idea that always accompanies and is joined with that particular sort of yellowness, weight, fusibility, malleableness, and solubility in

⁹¹It is difficult for me to see any difference between the action of "identity or diversity" and "relation." When one perceives the relationship of an idea, he at the same time sees its identity or diversity with other ideas. An idea has identity or diversity not within itself but because of its relationship to other ideas, and hence, the two acts, for me, have little distinction.

⁹²Locke, An Essay, II, 170.

⁹³Ibid., pp. 170-171.

aqua regia, which make our complex idea signified by the word gold.⁹⁴

The perception of coexistence consists of an affirmation or denial of the entities of two or more ideas, whether they exist in one body or object, or whether they are separate entities.

Finally, the fourth sort deals with the real existence of the idea. This facet of knowledge comes from deciding whether the mental idea has an actual counterpart in reality. Locke illustrated this type of knowledge with an instance of perceiving the real existence of the idea of "whiteness."

The first and most natural predication or affirmation is of the existence not of the Idea but something without my minde answering that Idea, as haveing in my minde that Idea of white the question is whether any such quality i.e. that whose appearance I can possibly have and to which my facultys can attaine is the testimony of my eys, which are the proper and sole judges of this thing, and whose testimony I rely on as soe certaine, that I can noe more doubt whilst I write this that I see white and black and that they really exist then that I write. . . .⁹⁵

In the knowledge of real existence, the mind judges the relationship of an idea to reality.

The mind sometimes possesses "actual knowledge" which exists in the present perception the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas.⁹⁶ On the other hand, sometimes in the past the mind perceived the agreement or disagreement of a proposition and retained this knowledge in the

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 171.

⁹⁵Locke, An Early Draft, p. 20.

⁹⁶Locke, An Essay, II, 172.

memory. Locke termed this "habitual knowledge."⁹⁷ The perception that "A is not non-A" recognized early in life is an example of habitual knowledge. As this proposition later occurs, the understanding simply affirms the knowledge supported by the earlier perception.

Locke contended that there are two degrees of knowledge. The mind, in some cases, immediately perceives the agreement or disagreement of ideas. In other cases, the understanding recognizes the agreement or disagreement only by the aid of other ideas. In the former instance, when the mind perceives simply on the consideration of the ideas in question, there is intuitive knowledge which is self evident.⁹⁸ The understanding recognizes immediately, without the intervention of any other ideas, that "white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two and equal to one and two."⁹⁹ Such truths the mind realizes by simple intuition. This knowledge is

irresistible, and like bright sunshine forces itself immediately to be perceived . . . and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt or examination, but the mind

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 173. Locke speaks of two degrees of habitual knowledge: "First, the one is of such truths laid up in the memory as, whenever they occur to the mind, it actually perceives the relation is between those ideas. And this is in all those truths whereof we have an intuitive knowledge; where the ideas themselves, by an immediate view, discover their agreement or disagreement one with another. Secondly, the other is of such truths whereof the mind having been convinced, it retains the memory of the conviction, without the proofs."

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 176.

⁹⁹Ibid., pp. 176-177.

is presently filled with the clear light of it. . . .¹⁰⁰ Locke did not equate intuitive knowledge with innateness because the understanding must be directed toward the former knowledge while innate ideas simply exist in the mind from birth.

The second degree of knowledge is demonstrative knowledge. This category of knowledge depends upon proof or intervening ideas, which reveal the agreement or disagreement that the mind cannot directly perceive. Locke elucidated this knowledge in defining demonstration as "the beare shewing of the things or proposing them to our sense or understanding soe as to make us take notice of them as is evident in mathematical demonstration. . . ."¹⁰¹ Demonstrative knowledge consists of a connected series or chain of intuitions, in which the mind immediately perceives the agreement or disagreement of each proposition with the next in order.¹⁰² In this manner, the understanding establishes a connection between the first and last propositions in the series. Such perception would have been beyond the power of the mind to perceive directly. Gibson related the act of "intuition" to demonstrative knowledge:

Demonstration itself, it is clear, is dependent upon our ability to perceive intuitively relations of necessary connection between the contents of our ideas,

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 177.

¹⁰¹Locke, An Early Draft, p. 47.

¹⁰²Locke, An Essay, II, 178.

since we can only mediately perceive an agreement or disagreement between two ideas if each of these is seen to stand in some necessary relation to a third.¹⁰³

Demonstrative knowledge possesses the same objective certainty as intuition, but the former is more difficult to obtain and is less clear than the latter.¹⁰⁴ Locke summarized the basic difference between the two types of knowledge:

Now, in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge, there is an intuitive knowledge of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate idea which it uses as proof; since without the perception of such agreement or disagreement, there is not knowledge produced: if it be perceived by itself, there is need of some intervening idea, as a common measure, to show their agreement or disagreement.¹⁰⁵

To these two former types of knowledge Locke added a third. This type of knowledge he termed sensitive knowledge which expresses an awareness of external objects.¹⁰⁶ Consequently, man has unconditional certainty of knowledge in three degrees of clearness, that is, in simple or self evident perception, complex or demonstrated perception and sense perception.¹⁰⁷

From his discussion of the types and degrees of knowledge, Locke inferred six conclusions.

¹⁰³Gibson, p. 148.

¹⁰⁴Locke, An Essay, II, 178-179.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 180.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 188.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

1. Knowledge is dependent upon ideas; that is, the mind can have no more knowledge than it has ideas.
2. The understanding can have knowledge only so far as it has perception of the agreement or disagreement among ideas.
3. The mind cannot have intuitive knowledge of all of its ideas.
4. The mind cannot have rational or demonstrative knowledge of all its ideas.
5. Sensitive knowledge can reach only to the extent of the mind's sense experience.
6. The extent of one's knowledge necessarily comes short of the reality of things and of one's own ideas.¹⁰⁸

Knowledge must possess three characteristics, the first of which is certainty. For Locke, knowledge and certainty were equivalent terms:

With me to know and to be certain is the same thing: what I know, that I am certain of; and what I am certain of, that I know. What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be called knowledge.¹⁰⁹

Knowledge excludes the possibility of both doubt and error.¹¹⁰

"What we once know, we are certain is so; and we may be secure that there are no latent proofs undiscovered, which may overthrow our knowledge, or bring it in doubt."¹¹¹ This certainty which constitutes knowledge is an objective certainty which Locke distinguished from the highest degree of probability. Even in cases of very high probability, Locke refused the name

¹⁰⁸Ibid., pp. 190-191.

¹⁰⁹Second Letter to Stillingfleet, Works, v. iv, 145 as cited in Gibson, pp. 2-3.

¹¹⁰Locke, An Essay, II, 168.

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 371.

of knowledge.¹¹²

Besides certainty, knowledge must contain two other general features. Knowledge must possess the character of being instructive or synthetic, which Locke distinguished from the merely verbal certainty of the trifling proposition. In addition to being certain, and instructive, knowledge must be real. In real knowledge, the mind must recognize its ideas in their relationship to the reality of things for which they stand. Locke related real knowledge to a conformity to reality.¹¹³ In his consideration of the characteristics of knowledge, Locke concluded that knowledge, as he used the term, is at once absolutely certain, instructive, and real.

The results of Locke's analysis into the nature and possible extent of knowledge are important and far-reaching. Locke described the essential nature of knowledge and, by a survey of the thinking process, the requirements of knowledge. He established strict standards for the use of the term knowledge and demonstrated how other forms of cognition, such as opinion, belief, and probability, are inferior to knowledge. Locke summarized his efforts:

Nobody, that I had met with, had, in their writings, particularly set down wherein the act of knowing precisely consisted. . . . If I have done anything new, it has been to describe to others more particularly than had been done before, what it is they do, when

¹¹²Ibid., p. 409.

¹¹³Ibid., II, 228.

they perform that action which they call knowing.¹¹⁴

Locke's epistemology consists of four essential units. First, ideas are obtained from experience through the sensation of reality and the reflection of the operations of the understanding. The mind then formulates these ideas into propositions. The perceptive faculty of the mind views the agreement or disagreement of the ideas in these mental propositions. The knowledge which results from this perception is either intuitive or demonstrative but in both cases it is certain. The level of probability and judgment which is considered in Chapter VI is of special interest to the rhetorician.

¹¹⁴Works, iv, 143-144 as quoted in Gibson, p. 8.

CHAPTER VI

PROCESS OF INVENTION

Introduction

In the last pages of the Essay, Locke divided science into three categories.

. . . First, the nature of things, as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation: or, Secondly, that which man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, especially happiness: or, Thirdly, the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated. . . .¹

The first category constitutes information about things which Locke identified as physica or natural philosophy and whose end is speculative truth.² Ethics, or practica, the second class, concentrates on "the skill of right applying our own powers and actions, for the attainment of things good and useful."³ The legitimate objective of the second category is regulated human conduct or "the seeking out those rules and measures of human actions, which lead to happiness, and the

¹John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Alexander Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), II, 459. (Hereafter referred to as An Essay.)

²Ibid., p. 460.

³Ibid., pp. 460-461.

means to practise them."⁴ The third branch of science, the doctrine of signs, consists "the business whereof is to consider the nature of signs, the mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others."⁵ Locke made this branch of semiotics inclusive of the other two classes of science. The third category is subjectless until the mind uses signs (ideas and words) for the attainment and communication of information about things and/or rules and measures of human actions.

Explicit in Locke's three categories are two facets of these sciences. In one of his journals, he clarified these two aspects: "The end of study is knowledge, and the end of knowledge . . . is communication."⁶ In the Essay, Locke inferred that each science functions on the levels of ideas and words:

The consideration, then of ideas and words as the great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their contemplation who would take a view of human knowledge in the sole extent of it.⁷

Hence, the three sciences, natural philosophy, ethics and semiotics, function in two dimensions, that is, the attainment

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶John Locke, The Philosophical Works of John Locke, ed. by J.A. St. John (London: George Bell and Sons, 1908), I, 92. (Hereafter referred to as The Philosophical Works.) By "knowledge," as used here, Locke did not mean "certainty," but only information, either certain or probable, about something.

⁷Locke, An Essay, II, 462.

of knowledge on the mental level and the communication of that knowledge on the verbal level.

Locke maintained that the method of discourse consists of both the mental and the verbal levels. The two basic elements of what Locke termed "the art of speaking well" are "right reasoning" and "perspicuity."⁸ Locke related valid reasoning to the mental operations and perspicuity to the verbal functions of the understanding. In writing about "Study" in one of his journals, Locke again referred to the two levels of cognition. "Reading and meditation" connote the mental level of ideas while "discourse" infers the verbal level of words and statement.

Reading, me thinks, is but collecting the rough materials, amongst which a great deal must be laid aside as useless. Meditation is, as it were, choosing and fitting the materials, framing the timbers, and squaring and laying the stones, and raising the building; and discourse with a friend . . . is, as it were, surveying the symmetry and agreement of the parts, taking notice of the solidity or defects of the works, and the best way to find out and correct what is amiss; besides that it helps often to discover truths, and fix them in our minds, as much as either of the other two.⁹

Locke was suggesting that the doctrine of signs deals with both the attainment and communication of knowledge.

Hence, the next two chapters, "Process of Invention" and "Process of Statement" consider the two facets of Locke's sciences.

⁸Locke, The Philosophical Works, II, 499.

⁹Lord King, The Life and Letters of John Locke (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1858), pp. 108-109.

On the mental level of attainment and collection of knowledge Locke maintained that the understanding seeks speculative truth in the category of natural philosophy and rules of conduct in the class of ethics. Later we shall see that speculative truth must come before rules of conduct because knowledge and judgment direct the will. But for now it is sufficient to distinguish between the objectives of these two sciences. Although Locke did not use the terms conviction and persuasion, his description of the ends of natural philosophy and ethics relate very closely to the concepts for which these terms stand. Conviction connotes enlightenment of the understanding, while for Locke the results of natural philosophy is the knowledge of things. Persuasion usually refers to moving the will, and Locke designated the objective of ethics as rules and measures of human action. Hence, the use of these terms would not misrepresent Locke's thinking. Accordingly, this chapter investigates the mental process as related to natural philosophy and ethics.

What occurs in this mental process corresponds closely to the rhetorical concept of invention, though Locke did not use the term. Invention, as used here, signifies a dual process. As Locke admitted in an earlier quotation, invention in its broadest interpretation is "collecting the rough materials", and in its more limited and usual sense it is "choosing and fitting the materials, framing the timbers, squaring and

laying the stones, and raising the building."¹⁰ Invention, therefore, includes the collection of knowledge generally, as well as the specific task of obtaining evidence for a discourse.

Processes Related to Conviction

Consideration of Reason

The process of reasoning, according to Locke, is the investigation and discovery of the agreement or disagreement among ideas.¹¹ Reason consists of four functions. What Locke depicted as "the highest" task of reason is the discovery of truths.¹² Secondly, the understanding utilizes reasoning for the arrangement of ideas in order to perceive their agreement or disagreement.¹³ The next role of reason is the perception of the connection of ideas in mental propositions.¹⁴ The fourth and final function of reason is "making the right conclusion."¹⁵ Underlying these four functions of reason is the

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹John Locke, "First Letter to Stillingfleet," Works, v. iv. p. 62 as cited in James Gibson, Locke's Theory of Knowledge and Its Historical Relations (Cambridge: University Press, 1917), p. 127.

¹²Locke, An Essay, II, 388.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 389.

¹⁵Ibid. Louis Cockerham, "John Locke's Theory of Logical Proof" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Oregon, 1959), p. 60 related these four levels of reason to

basic objective of the understanding which is to obtain knowledge and judgment. The method by which reasoning accomplishes the arrangement of ideas is argument. In First Letter to Stillingfleet, Locke characterized argument as the arranging of intervening proofs in order to suggest probability.¹⁶

Reason operates in two capacities: first, in ascertaining knowledge and secondly in regulating judgment and assent. The former aspect of reason determines intuitive or demonstrative knowledge in certainty and in the latter case, reason infers judgments or opinions in probabilities. Locke designated these two distinct functions of reasoning as "sagacity" and "illation."

By the one, it finds out; and by the other, it so orders the intermediate ideas as to discover what connexion there is in each link of the chain whereby the extremes are held together; and thereby, as it were, to draw into view the truth sought for, which is that which we call illation or inference, and consists in nothing but the perception of the connexion there is between the ideas, in each step of the deduction; whereby the mind comes to see, either the certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, as in demonstration in which it arrives at Knowledge; or their probable connexion, on which it gives or withholds its assent, as in opinion.¹⁷

Locke seemed to make this point: In intuitive knowledge, reason is not used; the understanding immediately perceives the agreement or disagreement; however, in demonstrative

philosophy, rhetoric and logic. Philosophy encompassed the first function; rhetoric the second and logic the final two.

¹⁶Locke, "First Letter to Stillingfleet," cited in Gibson, p. 127.

¹⁷Locke, An Essay, II, 386-387.

knowledge the understanding uses reason to arrange mental propositions so that the mind might recognize the agreement or disagreement.

In probability the understanding also employs reason to arrange probable propositions, but even then the mind cannot perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas and has to presume that a probable connection exists. Reasoning in this case results in opinion or judgment.¹⁸

Judgment is the thinking or taking two ideas to agree or disagree by the intervention of one or more ideas, whose certain agreement or disagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath observed to be frequent and usual.¹⁹

In the area of probability, therefore, the understanding presupposes an agreement or disagreement between ideas which results in a judgment.

Often, however, reason does not reach sound judgment. Locke admitted that there are three "miscarriages" which men make with regard to reasoning. In the first place, men totally disregard reason and base their judgments on the example of others.²⁰ Men, at other times, subordinate their reasons to their passions. In the third instance, men only partially reason because they perceive only in part.²¹

According to Locke the quality of judgment is dependent

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 387-409.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 409.

²⁰Locke, The Philosophical Works, I, 26-27.

²¹Ibid.

upon the quantity and quality of ideas. First, reason fails when the understanding has no ideas. The reasoning process cannot extend further than ideas.²² Moreover, if obscurity or imperfection exists in ideas, the reasoning process will be liable to confusion.²³ Obviously, reasoning cannot attain judgment when it cannot perceive intervening ideas or proofs which would demonstrate the agreement or disagreement among ideas. Further, Locke suggested that if reasoning proceeds from false principles it tends to reach unsound judgments.²⁴ Finally, Locke concluded that just as imperfect ideas confuse the reasoning process, uncertain signs produce invalid judgments.²⁵

In Locke's consideration of reason, he discussed the relationship between reason and propositions. Propositions which can be concluded as true or probable by investigating the ideas involved in them Locke defined as "according to reason."²⁶ Propositions which are "above reason" cannot be judged as true or probable.²⁷ Propositions which are "contrary to reason" are those which are inconsistent with clear

²²Locke, An Essay, II, 405.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., p. 406.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid., p. 412.

²⁷Ibid.

and distinct ideas.²⁸

Locke inferred that the reasoning potential of man is adequate, providing he utilizes it correctly and does not demand "truth" from it. To improve the reasoning powers, Locke suggested reading Chillingworth, and Dr. Tillotson, late Archbishop of Canterbury, both of whom demonstrated effective reasoning in all their works.²⁹

Locke reported that most of the decisions which men must make lie in the area of probability.³⁰ Since man reasons most often about probable propositions, Locke's discussion of probabilities is significant to his philosophy of discourse.

Consideration of Probability

Probability, according to Locke, is the likeliness to be true. The understanding assumes that a probable proposition is true or false on the ground of intervening ideas.

. . . So probability is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Locke, The Philosophical Works, II, 499. William Chillingworth, 1602-1644, was a theologian and Fellow at Trinity College, Cambridge. Some of his works are: "A Discourse Against the Infallibility of the Roman Church," and "Additional Discourses." His major work is The Religion of Protestants A Safe Way to Salvation, 1637. See Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, (ed.), The Dictionary of National Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1917), IV, 252-257. John Tillotson, 1630-1694, was educated at Cambridge. He was one of the most famous and eloquent preachers of Locke's day. One of his famous sermons is "The Wisdom of being Religious," 1664. Rule of Faith is his major work. See Stephen and Lee, XIX, 872-878.

³⁰Locke, An Essay, II, 364.

of proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but it, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary.³¹

Locke was persistent in the point that the mind receives a probable proposition as true only on the bases of intervening proofs.

The one essential difference between judgments of probabilities and knowledge of certainty is the existence of intervening ideas.³²

. . . Probably propositions therefor are only concerned in and capable of proof but certain knowledge or demonstration makes it self clearly appear and be perceived by the things them selves put together in our sight or their clear distance Ideas put together and as it were lying before us in view in our understanding.³³

Hence, the legitimate domain of the rhetorician is the area of probabilities since the understanding can perceive the agreement or disagreement of certain knowledge without proofs.

Another distinct difference between judgment and knowledge is that the likelihood of a probable proposition's being true increases or decreases in proportion to its usualness or unusualness.³⁴ He illustrated this position by indicating that new ideas are usually suspected simply because they are

³¹Ibid., p. 363.

³²John Locke, An Early Draft of Locke's Essay, ed. by R.I. Aaron and Jocelyn Gibb (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 56. (Hereafter referred to as An Early Draft.)

³³Ibid., p. 47.

³⁴Ibid., p. 58.

not common.³⁵ Locke admitted that in certain instances probabilities come very close to knowledge, but he maintained the distinction between them.

Probabilities occur in several different degrees, for Locke, ranging from the "very neighbourhood" of certainty to impossibility.³⁶ The highest degree of probability exists in regard to particular matters of fact.

The first . . . is when the general consent of all men, in all ages, as far as it can be known, concurs with a man's constant and never-failing experience in like cases, to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact attested by fair witnesses. . . .³⁷

Locke encountered some difficulties in distinguishing this instance of probability from certain knowledge: "these probabilities rise so near certainty that they govern our thoughts as absolutely, and influence all our actions as fully, as the most evident demonstration. . . ." ³⁸

The second degree of probability occurs when a proposition is not contradictory to experience and when various credible witnesses attest to the validity of the proposition. The understanding presumes such probable propositions to be true for the most part. Locke alleged that the mind naturally assents to this level of possibility, since it is so probable.³⁹

³⁵Locke, An Essay, I, 4.

³⁶Locke, An Early Draft, p. 55.

³⁷Locke, An Essay, II, 375.

³⁸Ibid., p. 376.

³⁹Ibid.

Locke identified the assent to the highest degree of probability as assurance. Confidence was his term for judgment on the second level of probability.⁴⁰

In an early draft of the Essay, Locke discussed the third and fourth degrees of probabilities. The third degree of possibility occurs when experiences conflict on a particular matter. The judgment then is grounded in the number and credibility of witnesses.⁴¹ The fourth degree of probability exists when, according to general observation, the proposition is contrary to the natural order of things but several witnesses recommend its validity. "The probability of this depends wholly upon the veracity of the witnesses or of the usefulness of such strange events to some end aimed at by him who had power to produce such irregularitys."⁴²

Implicit in Locke's discussion of probability is the inference that probability is not inherent in the content of any message but is contingent upon the audience which the speaker addresses. What appears improbable to one group might seem highly probable to another. Hence, the difficulties in a rhetorician's task would increase or decrease in regard to his audience's view of the probability of his message.

After considering the dimensions of probability, Locke next investigated the means by which the understanding comes

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Locke, An Early Draft, p. 58.

⁴²Ibid., p. 59.

to accept or reject a proposition as probable or improbable, true or false.

Consideration of Assent

The assent to judgment is always grounded on certain features in the reasoning process which act as inducements for the mind to accept the proposition as true or probable. These proofs or inducements do not enable the understanding to perceive intuitively that the proposition is necessarily and certainly true. But the understanding had no other alternative but to accept the proposition as valid and probable because of the warrant of the proofs. Locke elucidated the understanding's lack of freedom: "As knowledge is no more arbitrary than perception, so I think assent is no more in our power than knowledge."⁴³ Locke, thus, implied that judgment is determined by the content and proofs of the proposition.

Locke made an explicit distinction between the proof and the content of a proposition. The inferiority of judgment to knowledge is not the lack of objective determination. The inferiority stems from the fact that the connection which the mind asserts in judgments of probability is not perceived to exist in the essential nature of the propositions, but is presumed to exist.

That which makes me believe is something extraneous to the thing I believe; something not evidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the

⁴³Locke, An Essay, II, 455.

agreement or disagreement of, those ideas that are under consideration.⁴⁴

In probability, therefore, proofs which are not intrinsically part of the content of the proposition determine the understanding.

"Well-weighted reasons" are the inducements which should determine the judgment. Although Locke did not elaborate on "well-weighted reasons," he did explain that they are those which "the mind should be always ready to hearken and submit to, and by their testimony and suffrage entertain or reject any tenet. . . ."⁴⁵ Assent of judgment is always contingent upon the warrant of the proofs. Over estimating and assenting to proofs beyond their strength results in unsound judgments:

How a man may know whether he be so in earnest is worth inquiry; and I think there is one unerring mark of it, namely, the not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon will warrant. For the evidence that any proposition is true . . . lying only in the proof a man has of it, whatsoever degrees of assent he affords it beyond the degrees of that evidence, it is plain that all the surplusage of assurance is due to some other affection. . . . Whatsoever credit or authority we give to any proposition more than it receives from the principles and proofs it supports itself upon is owing to our inclinations that way as it can receive no evidence from our passions or interests. . . .⁴⁶

The rhetorician, accordingly, cannot expect the acceptance of

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 365.

⁴⁵Locke, The Philosophical Works, I, 79.

⁴⁶Henry Richard Fox Bourne, The Life of John Locke (New York: Harper Brothers, 1876), II, 96-97.

a proposition on a higher degree of probability than the evidence warrants.

In considering the relationship of proof to the assent of judgment, Locke specified that the understanding must base its judgment on the proofs of which the proposition is capable. In other words, the understanding cannot expect more evidence than the nature of the proposition can produce:

. . . It would be very convenient . . . to consider what proofs the matter in hand is capable of, and not to expect other kind of evidence than the nature of the thing will bear. Where it hath all the proofs that such a matter is capable of, there we ought to acquiesce, and receive it as an established and demonstrated truth; for that which hath all the evidence it can have, all that belongs to it, in the common state and order of things, and that supposing it to be as true as anything ever was . . . whatsoever is so, though there may be some doubts, some obscurity, yet is clear enough to determine our thoughts and fix our assent.⁴⁷

Locke suggested that expecting more evidence than the nature of the proposition is capable of often leads men to scepticism. A speaker then must build his case on the evidence inherently available in the nature of the proposition.

If the assent of judgment is grounded on proper and appropriate proofs, how is it possible for men to assent to a judgment which is contrary to probability?⁴⁸ In so far as the conditions of such wrong assent are merely negative, they presented no particular difficulty for Locke's point of view. Thus, where there is ignorance of proofs or lack of skill to

⁴⁷King, p. 107.

⁴⁸Locke, An Essay, II, 442. See also, pp. 443ff.

utilize these proofs, the understanding may assent to fallacious judgment.

Generally speaking there are two classes of people who judge in error because they lack proof. Some are incapable of discovering proofs because of the lack of opportunity for conducting experiments, making observations, or collecting testimonies.⁴⁹ Next, some men are ignorant of the proofs for probability simply because they fear that an investigation of the matter "would not suit well with their opinions lives or designs."⁵⁰ In both cases there is a strong tendency that these people will assent to a judgment which is contrary to probability.

People who cannot properly use proofs are liable to judge fallaciously, also.

Those that want skill to use the evidences they have of probabilities, that cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads, nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs and testimonys making every circumstance its due allowance, may be easily misled to assent to doctrines that are not probable and doe not always incline to that side on which the strongest proofs lye and therefor doe not alway follow that which in its self is the more probable opinion.⁵¹

According to Locke, then, the absence or ill use of proofs results in invalid judgments.

Locke, however, recognized the existence of more positive causes of error. He enumerated the influences exerted

⁴⁹Locke, An Early Draft, p. 60.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 62.

⁵¹Ibid.

upon the mind by preconceived opinions and hypotheses, deference to authority, and "predominant passions." The understanding sometimes assents to unsound judgment because it relies on supposedly established, but unproven, principles.⁵² In this category Locke placed "men whose understandings are cast into a mold and fashond just to the size of a received hypothesis."⁵³ Closely associated with this instance of fallacious judgment is the assent based on pseudo-authority of the common opinions of the environment. In such an instance, people judge by "fashion and examples."⁵⁴ Because of the fact that "our understandings [are] no less different than our palates," the understanding, when predominated by passion, is liable to invalid judgment.⁵⁵

Probabilitys too which crosse mens appetites run the same fate, earthy low mindes like muddy walls resist the strongest batterys and though the attempts made against them may make some impression yet they never the lesse keepe out the enemy truth that would captivate or disturbe them. . . .⁵⁶

These three forms of bias check the inquiry into probability and artificially limit the data presented to the understanding for judging.

Locke suggested one other possible reason for

⁵²Ibid., p. 63.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 64-65.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 112.

⁵⁵Locke, An Essay, I, 12.

⁵⁶Locke, An Early Draft, p. 65.

fallacious assent. Men often give their assent to religious propositions without sufficient proof. Such assent is due to "enthusiasm":

A strong and firme perswasion of any proposition relating to religion for which a man hath either noe or not sufficient proofs from reason but receives them as truths wrought in the minde extraordinarily by god him self and influences comeing immediately from him seemes to me to be Enthusiasme.⁵⁷

Judgment assented to on the grounds of a deep religious feeling of enthusiasm is erroneous since all legitimate assent must be regulated by reason.⁵⁸

After investigating the factors behind fallacious assent, Locke was ready to consider the means of acquiring proofs for the valid judgments.

Consideration of Proofs

The foundation for Locke's inventive process is what he termed "bottoming." In Conduct of the Understanding, Locke recommended that in "every question, the nature and manner of the proofs it is capable of should be considered to make our inquiry such as it should be."⁵⁹ He explicitly maintained the value and importance of the "bottoming" process: "this is the fairest way to search after truth, and the surest not to mistake on which side she is. There is scarce any controversy which is not a full instance of this. . . ."⁶⁰ Locke placed

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 119.

⁵⁸King, p. 128. See also Locke, An Essay, II, 438.

⁵⁹Locke, The Philosophical Works, I, 58.

⁶⁰King, p. 105.

so much significance on the investigative process that he affirmed that those arguments which have not been thoroughly examined "to the bottom" are not worth advancing in support of a contention.⁶¹ But what is the nature of this "bottoming" process?

Locke defined this means of finding proofs in probabilities in several different ways. He suggested that it is discovering the intuitive truth on which a proposition rests:

It is necessary in any question proposed to examine and find out upon what it bottoms. Most of the difficulties that come in our way, when well considered and traced lead to some proposition which, known to be true, clears the doubt, and gives an easy solution of the question.
 . . .⁶²

He identified bottoming as searching for the "foundation" on which a proposition is based. Locke enlarged the process to include investigating the probabilities on both sides of a question:

The way to find truth . . . is to pursue the hypothesis that seems to us to carry with it the most light and consistency as far as we can without raising objections, or striking at those principles as far as it will go, and given what light and strength we can to all the parts of it. And when that is done, then to take into our consideration any objections that lie against it, but not so as to pursue them as objections against the system we had formerly erected; but to consider upon what foundation they are bottomed, and examine that in all its parts, and then putting the two whole systems together, see which is liable to most exceptions, and labours under the greatest difficulties. . . .⁶³

⁶¹Bourne, II, 95.

⁶²Locke, An Essay, II, 373.

⁶³King, pp. 323-325.

In still another definition of bottoming, Locke maintained that it is finding a "clear and true notion of things as they are in themselves."⁶⁴

This . . . always naturally suggests arguments upon all occasions, either to defend the truth or confound error. This seems to me to be that which makes some men's discourses to be so clear, evident, and demonstrative, even in a few words; for it is but laying before us the true nature of anything we would discourse of, and our faculty of reasoning is so natural to us that the clear inferences do, as it were, make themselves: we have, as it were, an instinctive knowledge of the truth which is always most acceptable to the mind, and the mind embraces it in native and naked beauty.⁶⁵

Locke compared the investigative procedure of "bottoming" to a mathematical demonstration:

For in all sorts of reasoning every single argument should be managed as a mathematical demonstration, the connexion and dependence of ideas should be followed, till the mind is brought to the source of which it bottoms, and observes the coherence all along, though in proofs of probability one such train is not enough to settle the judgment, as in demonstrative knowledge.⁶⁶

The essence of the process of "bottoming" seems to be that of investigating each proposition or argument to find out on what self-evident principle it is based. It encompasses an analysis of the probabilities on both sides of the question.

In contrast to the commonplace method of finding arguments, bottoming can make a substantial contribution to knowledge and judgment. Commonplaces make little contribution to

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 104-105.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 116.

the judgment but only test the retentive powers of the memory. Bottoming, on the other hand, does not "burden the memory," but provides the materials and proofs for knowledge and judgment.

This way also of knowledge, as it is in less danger to be lost, because it burdens not the memory, but is placed in the judgment; so it makes a man talk always coherently and confidently to himself on which side so ever he is attached, or with whatever arguments: the same truth, by its natural light and contrariety to falsehood, still shows, without much ado, or any great and long deduction of words, the weakness and absurdity of the opposition: whereas the topical man, with his great stock of borrowed and collected arguments, will be found often to contradict himself; for the arguments of divers men being often upon different notions, and deduced from contrary principles, though they may be all directed to the support or confutation of some one opinion, do, notwithstanding, often really clash one with another.⁶⁷

The process of bottoming, accordingly, produces proofs on which the understanding bases its assent.

The assent to probability is grounded in two sorts of experience, both of which are extraneous to probable proposition.⁶⁸ The mind readily accepts as probable that which conforms to its own knowledge, observation, and experience. Assent is based next on the testimonies of others about their observations and experiences. Locke thus made all of man's knowledge and judgment dependent upon experience:

Soe that as all our owne knowledg is noe thing but our owne Experience, the foundation of all our beliefs is ultimately grounded in Experience too. Soe that at last the clearest best and most certain knowledg that

⁶⁷King, p. 105.

⁶⁸Locke, An Early Draft, pp. 56-57.

mankind can possibly have of things existing without him is but Experience, which is noe thing but the Exercise and observation of his senses about particular objects and therfor Knowledg and Faith too at last resolve themselves into and terminate somewhere or other in Experience either our owne or other mens.⁶⁹

In the inventive process, the rhetorician investigates both his own experiences and the experiences of others for inducements of probability.

Locke apparently did not feel the need for any analysis of personal experience as proofs for judgment beyond its place in bottoming because he mentioned and then disregarded it. He did, however, develop in some detail a consideration of testimonies as evidence. He alluded to but did not elaborate six criteria by which testimony ought to be weighed:

1. The number of witnesses.
2. The integrity of the witnesses.
3. The skill of the witnesses.
4. The motive of the witnesses.
5. The consistency of the testimony.
6. Contrary testimonies.⁷⁰

Locke's standards for judging the quality of testimonies sounds very similar to a contemporary treatment of the subject.

In considering testimony as a mode of proof, Locke adhered to a rule "observed in the law of England: That any testimony the further off it is from the original truth, the less force and proof it has."⁷¹ His point was that heresay evidence has less credibility in proportion to the distance

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Locke, An Essay, II, 366.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 376.

from the original experience. Locke illustrated this principle:

A credible man vouching his knowledge of it is a good proof; but if another equally credible do witness it from his report, the testimony is weaker: and third that attests the heresay is yet less considerable. So that in traditional truths, each remove weakens the force of the proof: and the more hands the tradition has successively passed through, the less strength and evidence does it receive from them.⁷²

Thus, a speaker must recognize "how little credit the quotations deserve, where the originals are wanting; and consequently how much less quotations of quotations can be relied on."⁷³ Directly criticizing the commonplace inventive process, Locke maintained: ". . . That what in one age was affirmed upon slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future ages by being often repeated."⁷⁴

Locke categorized testimonies into two classes. In the first category, he placed testimonies about general principles, such as, iron placed in water will not float.⁷⁵ In the other class, Locke specified testimonies related to particular experiences, like a horseshoe placed in water will not float.⁷⁶ Locke did not elaborate as to which category obtained the greater degree of probability, but simply cited an

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid., p. 379.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Locke, An Early Draft, p. 57.

⁷⁶Ibid.

example.

The testimony of an Historian that Caesar at the battle of Munda made this speech being one ground of probability to make one believe he did soe. The testimony of all historians that mention it, that it was a custome for the Roman Generals to make speeches before they joynd battle, being an other ground of probability that Caesar did soe.⁷⁷

Locke's division is an obvious one and it is unfortunate that he did not enlarge on the effectiveness of each type of testimony.

In the account which Locke gave of the extraneous grounds of probability, he assumed in general a natural relationship between the logical validity and potency of proofs and their psychological influence on the mind. As the "natural tendency" of the mind is "toward knowledge," so, in the dimmer areas of probabilities it is "the nature of the understanding constantly to close with the more probable side."⁷⁸

In one concise statement Locke summarized the process of invention as related to conviction:

. . . The mind, if it will proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and see how they make more or less for or against any proposition, before it assents to or dissents from it; and, upon a due balancing the whole, reject, or receive it, with a more or less firm assent, proportionable to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one side or the other.⁷⁹

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Locke, An Essay, II, 390.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 366.

Processes Related to Persuasion

For Locke the human being is more than a judging and reasoning creature; man is a moving and willing being. Because of the close association between the understanding and the volition, Locke considered the process of motivation to action. He attempted to answer the questions: what is the will, what determines the will, why is there variation in wills, and how does man will the wrong action?

Consideration of the Will

Locke defined the will as the power of the understanding to regulate and direct the actions of the body.⁸⁰ The faculty of the mind is the will; the process is willing. In a concise definition, Locke explicitly explained his view of the will:

Soe that the power of determining our facultys of thinking or motion to act or not act, to act this way or that way in all cases where they are capable of obedience is that I thinke which we call the Will.⁸¹

Whenever Locke referred to the will he was identifying the power of the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or rest.

A more basic question to Locke's consideration of the will is that of what determines it. As he has already stated, the mind directs the will. "For that which determines the

⁸⁰Locke, An Early Draft, p. 80.

⁸¹Ibid.

general power of directing, to this or that particular direction, is nothing but the agent itself exercising the power it has that particular way."⁸² Accordingly, the mind, using knowledge or judgment, is the essential element in determining the will. A person is moved to action or rest by the assent which the understanding gives to certainty or probability. As Locke declared: ". . . The will supposes knowledge to guide its choice."⁸³ The mind suspends determination of the will until it has judged and examined knowledge or judgment:

For, during this suspension of any desire, before the will be determined to action, and the action (which follows that determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do; and when upon due examination, we have judged, we have done our duty, all that we can, or ought to do . . . and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will and act according to the last result of a fair examination.⁸⁴

Basic to Locke's view of persuasion is the relationship between the knowledge and judgment of the understanding and the determination of the will.

The actions of the will are regulated by "uneasiness." Locke explained uneasiness as a desire for want of some absent good.⁸⁵ Locke summarized his contention:

⁸²Locke, An Essay, I, 350.

⁸³Ibid., p. 349. Again, Locke did not mean only certain knowledge, but he included judgment of probability as well.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 345.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 332. Locke commented on an opposing view: " It seems so established and settled a maxim, by the general

When a man is perfectly content with the state he is in--which is when he is perfectly without any uneasiness--what industry, what action, what will is there left, but to continue in it?⁸⁶

Within human nature there are natural inclinations to continue in happiness and to avoid misery. These "inclinations of the appetite," as Locke stated, are the motivating and determining influence on all actions of the will.⁸⁷ The human will, then, is determined by those actions which the understanding perceives or judges to cause pain or pleasure. "Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work that pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid [pain] . . . as to pursue [pleasure]" ⁸⁸ The essence of Locke's view of the will was this: The will is the power of the understanding to move the body to action. The will is determined by the mind which in turn is regulated and directed by "uneasiness." Uneasiness of desire is the presence of pain, misery, or the absence of pleasure, happiness. All human actions and passions are grounded in the

consent of all mankind, that good, the greater good, determines the will, that I do not at all wonder that, when I first published my thoughts on this subject I took it for granted; and I imagine that, by a great many, I shall be thought more excusable for having then done so, than that now I have ventured to recede from so received an opinion. But yet, upon a stricter inquiry, I am forced to conclude that good, the greater good, though apprehended and acknowledged to be so, does not determine the will, until our desire, raised proportionable to it, makes us uneasy in the want of it." Ibid., p. 335.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 234.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 67.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 161.

avoidance of misery or pain and the quest for happiness or pleasure.

But all the rest, terminating purely in pain and pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all men. For we love, desire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect of pleasure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in respect of pain ultimately. In fine, all these passions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure or pain, or to have pleasure or pain some way or other annexed to them.⁸⁹

Locke indicated that the will is determined by the uneasiness which seems most pressing and obtainable.⁹⁰ Locke maintained two criteria in considering which uneasiness determines the will. The uneasiness which directs the will must be judged to be pressing and urgent. "The greatest present uneasiness is the spur to action that is constantly most felt, and for the most part determines the will in its choice of the next action."⁹¹ Secondly, the understanding must judge the most pressing uneasiness as avoidable. There must exist some obtainable alternative before the will is determined by the most pressing uneasiness.⁹² For the rhetorician the ramifications of Locke's view of the will are twofold. First the speaker must convince his audience that an uneasiness of

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 307. Locke stated: "I would not be mistaken here, as if I meant this as a Discourse of the Passions; they are many more than those I have here named: and those I have taken notice of would each of them require a much larger and more accurate discourse." Ibid.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 339.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 340.

⁹²Ibid., p. 337.

desire exists and then he must convince them that this present uneasiness is both urgent and avoidable. Hence, the campaigning politician must demonstrate to his audience that they are experiencing "uneasiness" in the form of present misery -- high taxes, government intervention, etc. -- and absent happiness -- his presence in office. He must convince them further that this "uneasiness" is pressing and urgent and that it can be solved by electing him.

On the bases of the preceding analysis, Locke developed an ethical position which we can designate as an "ethic of persuasion." Locke suggested that things are good or evil in reference to pleasure or pain.

That we call good, which is apt to cause or increase pleasure or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good or absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that evil which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us; or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good.⁹³

Locke explicitly differentiated good and evil on the bases of the pleasure or pain which the action will bring. Hence, the ethical dimensions of rhetoric exist in the pleasure or pain brought about by the determination of the will. In this sense, rhetoric is ethically relative. There can be no absolute standard of good and evil for man in Locke's system. Each man's sense of good and evil is determined by his personal perception of his own feelings of uneasiness.

⁹³Ibid., p. 303.

Locke discussed at some length the variations in volitions. Since things and actions are not inherently good or evil they must appear so only as man judges them to be so.

. . . It is easy to give an account of how it comes to pass, that, though all men desire happiness, yet their wills carry them so contrarily; and consequently some of them to what is evil. And to this I say, that the various and contrary choices that men make in the world do not argue that they do not all pursue good; but that the same thing is not good to every man alike.⁹⁴

One person may seek after knowledge, while another enjoys other "hawking and hunting."⁹⁵ One action cannot be said to be better than the other or the one good and the other evil. Man does not seek that which brings him pain or misery. The obvious explanation for this situation is that one person finds happiness and pleasure in knowledge and another thrives on "hawking and hunting." Locke illustrated the point that there is no absolute:

And therefore it was a right answer of the physician to his patient that had sore eyes: -- If you have more pleasure in the taste of wine than in the use of your sight, wine is good for you; but if the pleasure of seeing be greater to you than that of drinking, wine is naught.⁹⁶

As Locke stated before, happiness is that which brings man the greatest pleasure and this condition of happiness is "to different men . . . very different things."⁹⁷

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 350.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 351.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Ibid.

Consideration of Fallacious Willing

Even though men pursue that which makes them happy, there occurs the problem of willing that which brings misery and pain. Locke raised the query in this manner: ". . . How men come often to prefer the worse to the better; and to choose that, which, by their own confession, has made them miserable?"⁹⁸ Locke attributed fallacious determination of the will to wrong judgments. He affirmed:

It is impossible any one should willingly put into his own draught any bitter ingredient, or leave out anything in his power (that would tend to his satisfaction, and the completing of his happiness,) but only by a wrong judgment.⁹⁹

In attempting to investigate the problem of fallacious willing, Locke considered the manner in which actions are judged to be good or evil. The understanding, first, judges the immediate pleasure or pain which will be derived from any action. But the mind also evaluates the future results of that action. Locke specified this second dimension of judgment:

But because not only present pleasure and pain, but that also which is apt by its efficacy or consequences to bring it upon us at a distance, it is a proper object of our desires, and apt to move a creature that has foresight; therefore things also that draw after them pleasure and pain, are considered as good and evil.¹⁰⁰

Good and evil, pleasure and pain, accordingly, have both

⁹⁸Ibid., pp. 353-354.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 357.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

present and future ramifications.

Men can never really misjudge present pleasure or pain; it is what it appears to be; there is no mistaking it.¹⁰¹ However, error occurs when present results are compared with future pleasure or pain. When the mind projects pleasure or pain into the future it is liable to error.

But though present pleasure and pain show their difference and degrees so plainly as not to leave room to mistake; yet, when we compare present pleasure or pain with future, (which is usually the case in most important determinations of the will,) we often make wrong judgments of them; taking our measures of them in different positions of distance.¹⁰²

Locke attributed "judging amiss" on future consequences of any action to "the weak and narrow constitutions of our minds."¹⁰³

In essence, unsound willing caused by misrepresenting future consequences takes two forms. First, the understanding erroneously judges that pain does not exist in the action.¹⁰⁴ Next, the understanding properly evaluates the potency of the consequences but interprets them to be avoidable. Locke elaborated on the second means:

When we judge that, though the consequences be of that moment, yet it is not of that certainty, but that it may otherwise fall out, or else by some means be

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 358.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 360.

avoided, as by industry, address, change, repentance, etc.¹⁰⁵

Locke concluded his analysis of the erroneous determination of the will be describing the deficiencies in judgment which lead to unsound directing of the will. Judgment is liable to error when there is ignorance of the probabilities on both sides of the question. A second cause of invalid judgment exists in what Locke designated "inadvertency:"

When a man overlooks even that which he does know. This is an affected and present ignorance, which misleads our judgments as much as the other. Judging is, as it were, ballancing an account, and determining on which side the odds lie. If therefore either side be huddled upon in haste, and several of the sums that should have gone into the reckoning be overlooked and left out, this precipitancy causes as wrong a judgment as if it were a perfect ignorance.¹⁰⁶

In Locke's analysis of the errors of judgment which in turn cause unsound determination of the will, he was reaffirming his position that knowledge and judgment direct the will.

Chapter VI has presented a discussion of the mental aspects of Locke's philosophy of discourse. In his view, communication is concerned first with the attainment of information about the sciences of natural philosophy (conviction) and ethics (persuasion). There are many explicit and implicit rhetorical ramifications in his analysis of how the mind is enlightened by judgments of probability and how the will is determined. These conclusions will be discussed in the closing chapter.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 361.

CHAPTER VII

PROCESS OF STATEMENT

Introduction

Locke clearly perceived a connection between language and knowledge and judgment. When he began his Essay he was concerned solely with the question: "How do we know?" However, he soon broadened his study to include language:

. . . [As] I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had so near a connexion with words, that, unless their force and manner of signification were first well observed, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge. . . .¹

In fact, Locke postulated "the perception of the signification of signs" as one of the modes of knowledge.²

At the time of the Essay, the verbal facet of understanding, or what Locke termed "logic," had received little attention by other authors. Locke, therefore, defended himself against the charge of giving more importance to language

¹John Locke, The Philosophical Works of John Locke, ed. by J.A. St. John (London: George Bell and Sons, 1908), II, 92. (Hereafter referred to as The Philosophical Works.)

²John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Alexander Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), I, 314. (Hereafter referred to as An Essay.)

than it deserved:

What I have here said concerning words in this third book will be thought by some to be much more than what so slight a subject required. . . . However, I shall imagine I have done some service to truth, peace, and learning, if, by an enlargement on this subject, I can make men reflect on their own language, and give them reason to suspect, that since it is frequent for others, it may also be possible for them, to have sometimes very good and approved words in their works and writings, with very uncertain, little, or no signification.³

Accordingly, Locke attached a great deal of importance to the proper use and analytical treatment of language because words ". . . interpose themselves so much between our understanding and the truth . . . [that] their obscurity and disorder do not seldom cast a mist before our eyes, and impose upon our understanding."⁴

This chapter constitutes an investigation of Locke's treatment of the doctrine of signs in the verbal facet. First it synthesizes his discussion of the general nature of language. A later section presents a consideration of the imperfections and abuses of language and what Locke suggested as solutions for these deficiencies.

Nature of Language

Genesis of Language

Locke adhered not only to a divine but also to a social origin of language. At one point Locke explicitly

³Ibid., II, 54-55.

⁴Ibid., I, 14-15.

stated that God, "having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with language."⁵ In his Two Treatises on Government, Locke expounded the same contention: "God, having made man such a creature that in his own judgment it was not good for him to be alone . . . fitted him with understanding and language. . . ."⁶ Locke thus espoused the divine origin of language.

On the other hand, however, Locke conceived of a social genesis of language. Man, motivated by social needs to share his thoughts with others, articulated sounds as external signs for internal conceptions.

The comfort and advantage of society not being to be had without communication of thoughts, it was necessary that man should find out some external sensible signs, whereof those invisible ideas which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpose nothing was so fit, either for plenty or quickness, as those articulate sounds, which with so much ease and variety he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how Words, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, came to be made use of by men as the signs of their ideas. . . .⁷

In what appears to be a contradiction with his first view, Locke postulated that language evolved as a result of man's social needs.

⁵Ibid., II, 3. See also, John Locke, The Philosophical Works, II, 2-3.

⁶John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. by Thomas I. Cook (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1946), p. 159.

⁷Locke, An Essay, II, 8.

The solution to this apparent conflict is the view that language development was the composite result of both divine and social factors. Locke suggested that God provided man not with language per se, but with the ability to articulate sounds and to comprehend words as representations of internal concepts.⁸ Man, thus inherently equipped for the formulation of language, was motivated by "the comfort and advantage of society" to develop a system of linguistic communication. Locke's only suggestion as to why man devised an oral system as opposed to a system of gestures or written symbols was that the former consisted of "so much ease and variety."

Uses of Language

Locke maintained that words are used for recording and communicating ideas. Words are used to record thoughts "whereby . . . we talk to our own memories."⁹ In this sense, language connects past experiences with the present. Man further uses language to communicate his thoughts to others.¹⁰

Communication occurs on two levels, civil and philosophical. Civil communication constitutes common conversation about everyday affairs, that is, "speech of the market place." The philosophical use of words consists of conveying

⁸Ibid., 3.

⁹Locke, The Philosophical Works, II, 79.

¹⁰Locke, An Essay, II, 105.

precise meaning in the expressing or searching for "truth." Locke differentiated these two levels by the ends and contents of the communication as well as by the degree of exactness necessary for each.¹¹

Communication is based on the premise that the listener must comprehend the signs of the speaker. As Locke stated in one of his journals: "What ever other men have . . . can be communicated to me but by making me alike knowing. . . ." ¹² Communication is ineffective when the speaker and the listener do not recognize the same meaning for the identical word.¹³

Consideration of "Meaning"

Locke discussed meaning in two dimensions: from the speaker's point of view and from the listener's. The signification of words consists in a reference to something. Since words are signs, they "are of no value nor use, but as they are the signs of things."¹⁴ Locke equated the meaning of a sign to the idea in the mind of the speaker.

When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood: and the end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer. That then which words are the marks of the

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Henry Richard Fox Bourne, The Life of John Locke (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1876), I, 364.

¹³Locke, The Philosophical Works, II, 6-7.

¹⁴Lord King, The Life and Letters of John Locke (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1858), pp. 93-94.

ideas of the speaker: nor can any one apply them as marks, immediately, to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath: for this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other ideas: which would be to make them signs and not signs of his ideas at the same time; and so effect to have no signification at all.¹⁵

Accordingly, the idea in the speaker's understanding constitutes the meaning of a sign.

In Locke's second view of meaning, a word, after constant connection to an idea, often elicits a response from the listener very similar to the response produced by a real object.¹⁶ This view of meaning indicates that the word "needle" would elicit a response from the reader or hearer very similar to the reaction he would experience in seeing a "needle." Lock was not clear whether this response to a sign was physical and/or mental, covert and/or overt.

. . . There comes, by constant use, to be such a connexion between certain sounds and the ideas they stand for, that the names heard, almost as readily excite certain ideas as if the objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the senses.¹⁷

Locke was careful not to suggest that the word elicits the same response as the object.

Though words can properly signify nothing but the speaker's ideas, Locke identified two invalid references which men give words. First, speakers assume that the words they

¹⁵Locke, An Essay, II, 9-10.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 11-12.

¹⁷Ibid.

use represent the listeners' ideas. Men, next, suppose words to represent the reality of things. In this case the word would take on the characteristics of the object for which it was supposed to have stood. Locke contended that if the word represents reality, "it is a perverting the use of words, and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification."¹⁸ Locke's position is similar to, but precedes by nearly three centuries, the general semanticists' view that the "word is not the thing."

Linguistic Relativity

Locke constantly maintained the arbitrary nature of words. Words are external to reality and they have no natural connection with ideas.

. . . Every man has so inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases, that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has, when they use the same words that he does.¹⁹

By tacit consent and common usage, however, words are related to certain ideas in order to facilitate intelligible speech.²⁰ Locke maintained that common usage is adequate to regulate the signification of words in civil communication but is not sufficient in philosophical discourse.

In Locke's study of comparative languages, he observed

¹⁸Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁹Locke, The Philosophical Works, II, 8.

²⁰Ibid.

words in some languages which had no parallel in other dialects. He theorized that this phenomenon was the result of the purpose of communication, that is, to communicate thought with the greatest ease and facility:

. . . They usually make such collections of ideas into complex modes, and affix names to them, as they have frequent use of in their way of living and conversation, leaving others, which they have but seldom an occasion to mention, loose and without names that tie them together: they rather choosing to enumerate (when they have need) such ideas as make them up, by the particular names that stand for them than to trouble their memories by multiplying of complex ideas with names to them, which they seldom or never have any occasion to make use of.²¹

Since language is contingent upon ideas, the development of words depends on the mental concepts as well as the cultural needs of men.²²

Although Locke did not use this terminology, his concept sounds similar to contemporary thinking on linguistic relativity:

For whence it is easy to imagine why, as in some countries, they have not so much as the name for a horse; and in others, where they are more careful of the pedigrees of their horses, than of their own, that there they may have not only names for particular horses, but also of their several relations of kindred one to another.²³

Locke cited another example of the relativity of language:

The terms of our law, which are not empty sounds, will hardly find words that answer them in the Spanish or Italian, no scanty language; much less, I think, could

²¹Locke, An Essay, I, 383.

²²Ibid., pp. 296-297.

²³Ibid., p. 472.

any one translate them into the Caribbee or Westoe tongues: and the versura of the Romans, or corban of the Jews, have no words in other languages to answer them; the reason whereof is plain, for what has been said. Nay, if we look a little more nearly into this matter, and exactly compare different languages, we shall find that, though they have words which in translations and dictionaries are supposed to answer one another, yet there is scarce one of ten amongst the names . . . that stands for the same precise idea which the word does that in dictionaries it is rendered by.²⁴

Words, accordingly, are not inherently connected to reality or ideas. However, linguistic concepts influence one's perception of reality.

Consideration of Names

Locke considered at length the relationship between names and the types of ideas for which they stand. He was especially interested in clarity. Names of simple ideas are less doubtful because they represent a simple sense experience.²⁵ A single sensation is more easily retained and affixed to a name.²⁶ The term "red" refers, with little ambiguity, to that visual sensation "red." By the same rationale the names of simple modes are least liable to doubt and uncertainty.²⁷

By reason and necessity, the majority of words (except for proper names) are general terms. Words, to be of

²⁴Ibid., II, 48.

²⁵Locke, The Philosophical Works, II, 28-29.

²⁶Locke, An Essay, II, 117.

²⁷Ibid., p. 118.

maximum use, must comprehend several particular things "for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use, had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by."²⁸ It would be virtually impossible for every particular item to have a particular name. Even if all particular objects had names it would be useless and would not serve the functions of communication. Everyone would have to experience the same particular items in order to maintain communication.²⁹ The solution to this problem was the formulation of general terms.³⁰

In Locke's view of language, general words stand for general ideas. General ideas are produced by separating them from their particular existence. This process of abstraction consists of "leaving out something that is peculiar to each individual, and retaining so much of those particular complex ideas of several existences as they are found to agree in."³¹ Hence, a word which signifies a general idea represents a group of particular ideas each of which has some conformity to the abstract, general idea. General words are founded upon individual similarities which minimize differences. Locke illustrated the process of abstraction with an example of the development of a child's concept of the general term "man:"

²⁸Locke, The Philosophical Works, II, 1.

²⁹Ibid., p. 9.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 9-10.

³¹Ibid., p. 10.

And thus they come to have a general name, and a general idea; where in they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them.³²

General terms are most liable to confusion and ambiguity.

Locke noted that words such as "justice," "democracy," and "love" represent complex ideas which are often meaningless.³³

Following this discussion of the general nature of language, we are ready to consider Locke's analysis of the accurate use of language.

Accurate Use of Language

The thesis underlying Locke's discussion of the accurate use of language was that more controversies are caused by obscurity of meaning than by differences in concepts. Locke considered first the inherent imperfections of language, the abuses of language, and finally the corrections for these deficiencies.

Imperfections of Language

The chief imperfection of words is the doubtfulness of their meaning. Since terms have no natural connection with ideas or reality, their meanings are difficult to establish. When the meaning of a term is settled, it is only through the arbitrary imposition of men.³⁴

³²Ibid., pp. 10-11.

³³Locke, An Essay, II, 31.

³⁴Locke, The Philosophical Works, II, 80.

Another reason for the obscure meaning of words is the complexity of ideas which words represent. When ideas become so complex, "compounded and decompounded," men cannot retain the same precise idea without some variation. This imprecision is caused by the existence of too many particular ideas in the complex idea. "Hence . . . men's names of very compound ideas such as . . . moral words, have seldom in two different men the same precise signification. . . ." ³⁵

A further difficulty with words which signify complex ideas is that neither the idea nor the term has a counterpart in reality. Since complex ideas are inventions of the understanding, the meaning of the general terms cannot be observed in reality.

Names, therefore, that stand for collections of ideas which the mind makes at pleasure must needs be of doubtful signification, when such collections are nowhere to be found constantly united in nature, nor any patterns to be shown whereby men may adjust them. ³⁶

Locke characterized the vagueness of general terms by describing the manner in which children learn such words. Children most often learn first the term "justice," for instance, and then the meaning of the term. ³⁷

Another inherent deficiency in language occurs in terms which signify substances. This obscurity can be traced to the fact that many times the reality for which the term

³⁵Ibid., p. 81.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 81-83.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 83-84.

stands is not known or is imperfectly known.³⁸ The ideas of substance should conform to reality and the signs which represent them should signify that conformity:

In these we must follow Nature, suit our complex ideas to real existences, and regulate the signification of their names by the things themselves, if we will have our names to be signs of them, and stand for them. Here, it is true, we have patterns to follow; but patterns that will make the signification of their names very uncertain. . . .³⁹

Since ideas of substances should reflect the real essences which often are not known, the names of these ideas are vague and uncertain.⁴⁰

Locke inferred four conclusions from his discussion of the inherent imperfections of language. Words are most likely to be obscure and vague when: (1) the ideas they represent are complex and consist of a great number of particular ideas, (2) the ideas they represent have no connection to the reality of things, "and so no settled standard anywhere in nature existing, to rectify and adjust them by," (3) the signification of the term refers to a standard which is not easily known, and finally, (4) the signification of the word and the real essence of the object are not exactly the same.⁴¹

³⁸Ibid., p. 83.

³⁹Locke, An Essay, II, 111.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 111-112.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 106-107.

Abuses of Language

Besides the inherent imperfections, there are several willful abuses of language. Locke designated six abuses of language: using words without clear meanings, using words for an intentional obscurity, using words inconsistently, using words as reality, using words to signify something which they cannot, and using words with inherent significations.

Speakers sometimes use words without clear and distinct meanings. Some words are used which signify no clear or distinct idea at all. Locke called these words "insignificant terms," but did not elaborate on them. Second, words which commonly specify distinct ideas are often used without any distinct meaning. Locke characterized this negligence:

Wisdom, glory, grace, etc., are words frequent enough in every man's mouth; but if a great many of those who use them should be asked what they mean by them, they would be at a stand and not know what to answer: a plain proof, that, though they have learned those sounds and have ready at their tongues ends, yet there are no determined ideas laid up in their minds, which are to be expressed to others by them.⁴²

Words which have no distinct reference in the understanding of the communicator are liable to confusion.

Another abuse of language involves an affected obscurity caused by either applying old words to new and unusual meanings or introducing new and ambiguous terms without defining them.⁴³ Locke suggested that the art of disputation

⁴²Ibid., pp. 123-124.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 126-127.

was to blame for this deficiency.⁴⁴

A speaker abuses language when he uses words inconsistently. This neglect occurs when a speaker uses a word to signify one idea and then later uses the same word to signify a different idea.

. . . It is plain cheat and abuse, when I make [words] stand sometimes for one thing and sometimes for another; the willful doing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great folly, or greater dishonesty.⁴⁵

Locke stated that using words for reality instead of ideas results in erroneous determination of the will. Words which do not signify ideas are nothing more than empty sounds.⁴⁶

A word may be of frequent use and great credit with several authors and by them made use of as if it stood for some real being; but yet, if he that reads cannot frame any distinct idea of that being, it is certainly to him a mere empty sound without meaning, and he learns no more by all that is said of it or attributed to it than if it were affirmed only of that bare empty sound.⁴⁷

The fifth abuse of language, according to Locke, involves using words to represent ideas which they cannot signify. Locke did not suggest that language is incapable of representing such ideas. In essence, he maintained that there are some objects the intrinsic nature of which men cannot

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Locke, The Philosophical Works, II, 96.

⁴⁶Ibid., I, 82.

⁴⁷Ibid.

know, yet they attempt to represent this unknown reality in language.⁴⁸ Locke admitted that this application of language is closely related to using words without meaning.⁴⁹ As in every abuse of language, this unsound use causes obscurity in communication.

Finally, speakers violate the purpose of communication when they assume that words are inherently connected to ideas. Because of constant usage, a speaker often supposes that a word represents only the idea which he uses it to signify.

. . . They are apt to imagine so near and necessary a connexion between the names and the signification they use them in, that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what their meaning is; and therefore one ought to acquiesce in the words delivered, as if it were past doubt that, in the use of those common received sounds, the speaker and hearer had necessarily the same precise ideas.⁵⁰

Locke suggested that this assumption caused little harm in civil communication but was inappropriate for philosophical inquiries.⁵¹

Corrections of Language Deficiencies

Locke suggested several remedies for the abuses and weaknesses of language: using words only with clear meanings, using words to signify only clear and distinct ideas, using words in their common usage, and defining the meaning of

⁴⁸Locke, An Essay, II, 135.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 140.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 141.

⁵¹Ibid.

obscure words.

Speakers must first be careful not to use words without signifying some idea.⁵² However, a word must represent a clear and distinct idea. If the word signifies a single experience, this idea must be distinguished from other simple ideas. If the word represents a complex concept, the idea must be a "determinate," that is, clearly fixed in the understanding. The basis for linguistic clarity consists of the "determinate" or "determined" idea. Locke defined this characteristic of a determined idea:

. . . When such as it is at any time objectively in the mind, and so determined there, it is annexed, and without variation determined, to a name or articulate sound, which is to be steadily the sign of that very same object of the mind, or determinate idea.⁵³

The clear and distinct idea played a significant role in Locke's philosophy of language for, as he contended, "if men had such determined ideas in their inquiries and discourses, they would discern how far their own inquiries and discourses went, and avoid the greatest part of the disputes and wranglings they have with others."⁵⁴

Locke believed that a speaker, if he proposes to be understood, should use words as much as possible in their common usage which "gives our thoughts entrance into other men's

⁵²Ibid., p. 152.

⁵³Ibid., I, 22.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 24.

minds with the greatest ease and advantage."⁵⁵ Finally, a speaker who uses a word whose meaning is unclear should define the meaning he attaches to the term. Locke specified that a definition is necessary in two instances: When the common usage of a term is uncertain and when a term which is significant to an argument is obscure.⁵⁶

A definition, for Locke, is the demonstration of the meaning of a term. The process of definition involves stating the genus or the next highest general term that comprehends the word in question.⁵⁷ Terms signifying simple ideas are incapable of definition except by experiencing the reality which the ideas represent. The mere sounds of the words "light" or "red" cannot define these ideas; these realities must be experienced to be known.⁵⁸ Complex ideas are most effectively defined by enumerating the simple ideas which constitute them.⁵⁹ Locke explicitly insisted that definition is not performed by using synonymous terms.

This is to translate, and not to define, when we change two words of the same signification one for another; which, when one is better understood than the other, may serve to discover what idea the unknown

⁵⁵Ibid., II, 153-154.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 154.

⁵⁷Locke, The Philosophical Works, II, 13.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 22, 26.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 13.

stands for; but is very far from a definition. . . .⁶⁰

Locke was persistent in his belief that definitions ought to be used to avoid obscure language.

Locke's suggestions for the correction of linguistic deficiencies are based on the stylistic emphasis of perspicuity.⁶¹ Above all else Locke argued that communication ought to be clear and intelligible: those who

. . . teach or maintain truth, should have nothing to do with all that tinsel trumpery; should speak plain and clear, and be afraid of a fallacy or equivocation, however prettily it might look, and be fit to cheat the reader; who on his side should, in an author who pretends instruction, abominate all such arts, and him that uses them, as much as he would a common cheat who endeavours to put off brass money for standard silver.⁶²

Locke's thinking was parallel in many ways to the rhetorical transformation in style during the seventeenth century.

There are four essential aspects in Locke's process of statement. In analyzing the general nature of language, Locke investigated the origin and uses of language, meaning, linguistic relativity, and names. Then he delineated the inherent imperfections and the willful abuses of language. Finally, he recommended some practical techniques for correcting these deficiencies of language.

⁶⁰ Locke, An Essay, II, 35.

⁶¹ Locke, The Philosophical Works, II, 499.

⁶² King, p. 97.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

This concluding chapter consists of two parts: a summary and a discussion of the relationships of Locke's philosophy of discourse to the history of rhetoric.

Summary

The basic element of Locke's philosophy of discourse is his division of the sciences into natural philosophy, ethics and semiotics. The third category, the doctrine of signs, involves both a mental facet (the attainment of information) and a verbal facet (the communication of information). Since semiotics is inclusive of the other two classes, its subject matter is, in natural philosophy, the knowledge of things and in ethics, rules of conduct. Locke's method of discourse, accordingly, operates in both conviction (enlightening the understanding) and persuasion (moving the will).

Conviction is the result of knowledge of certainty and/or judgment of probability. The data for all of the operations of the understanding are ideas which come from experience either through sensation or reflection. Knowledge, in Locke's limited sense, constitutes absolute certainty and

originates in intuition and demonstration. The subject matter which is appropriate for discourse however, occurs on the level of probability at which the understanding makes judgments.

The understanding rejects or accepts probable propositions as true on the bases of intervening ideas or proofs. On the level of probability, the mind cannot perceive an agreement or disagreement among ideas, but presumes, on the warrant of proofs, that a connection exists. Locke designated the arrangement of proofs as argument and the process by which they are arranged as reasoning. Locke was notably critical of the Scholastics' syllogism and opposed the view that it was the only form of reasoning which would produce knowledge. According to Locke, proofs of probabilities come from two sources, personal experience and testimony. Proofs which induce the mind's assent to judgment are produced by the investigative process of "bottoming." Locke did not recommend the use of ready made arguments or commonplaces and, in fact, was strongly opposed to the system.

Locke defined the will as that faculty which directs the actions of the body. In persuasion, knowledge and/or judgment regulate the determination of the will. Thus conviction necessarily is prior to persuasion. "An uneasiness of desire," which Locke specified as the presence of pain or the absence of pleasure, determines the will. Locke established an ethical standard by equating "good" and "evil" with

pleasure and pain. Because "good" and "evil" are contingent upon individual preferences, there is no absolute ethical standard.

The verbal aspect of Locke's philosophy of discourse consists of civil and philosophical communication. Locke did not elaborate on these levels of communication apart from indicating the differences in purpose, content, and degree of exactness at each level. He did, nevertheless, accomplish a comprehensive analysis of the nature of language. The meaning of a word is the idea which the speaker uses the term to represent. Language is arbitrary and is not inherently connected to either ideas or reality. This arbitrary nature of language coupled with communicative and cultural needs accounts for the existence of linguistic relativity.

Language contains two deficiencies. First, there are natural imperfections of language, the most important of which is vagueness of meaning. Speakers also often consciously abuse language when, for example, they use words without clear meanings. Clarity in language is not so much related to sign or to "meaning" as it is to distinct ideas. In other words, an idea must be clear and distinct before the meaning of a word can be clear and intelligible. This contention constitutes the foundation of the corrections which Locke offered for the weaknesses of language.

Locke advocated the teaching of discourse through the study, but not imitation, of models. Effective speaking and

reasoning cannot be taught, he held, by rules and principles. Locke was outspoken in his criticism of verse and theme making particularly in Latin which were considered valid teaching devices of his day. He was critical of the art of disputation because it concentrated on words and not reality, on victory and not knowledge.

Relationships

There are certain explicit and implicit relationships between Locke's philosophy of discourse and the history of rhetorical theory.

Locke was explicit in explaining his attitudes toward seventeenth century rhetoric. He indicated rhetoric as embellishment with little concern except for style. He identified rhetoric as immoral when he stated that the art of rhetoric dealt in deceitful practices. It would not misinterpret Locke to say that he viewed the art of rhetoric as the counterpart of the art of disputation. Most of the charges which Locke leveled at disputation are applicable also to his view of rhetoric.

There are some similarities as well as differences between Locke's views on discourse and those of the classicists. Locke's criticism of rhetoric was motivated by much the same situation as that which Plato and Aristotle experienced and discussed in their Gorgias and Rhetoric. Both Aristotle and Plato appraised the rhetoric of their days as shallow and then proceeded to develop what they considered sound approaches to

discourse.¹ Locke also criticized the deficiencies of contemporary rhetoric but praised the value of "speaking well." Even though Locke maintained that "lovers of truth" should avoid the "trickeries of rhetoric," he developed a detailed philosophy of discourse. Locke specified, however, that the communication of information on the verbal level is logic and not rhetoric.

One of the most obvious similarities involves Locke's proofs of probability which are personal experiences and testimonies. These categories relate closely to the classical concept of artistic and non-artistic proofs. Non-artistic proofs consist of those inducements which are external to the speaker and the subject matter. The classics specifically identified testimonies as inartistic proofs. A personal experience could constitute an example of logical, emotional or ethical proof.²

Both Locke and the classical tradition limited rhetoric or discourse to subject matters at the level of probability. Aristotle stated that rhetoric was concerned with matters "contingent in human affairs."³ Much along the same

¹Everett Lee Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," in Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, ed. by Raymond F. Howes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961) pp. 36-41, 56. See also, Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 1354 a 10-1354 a 20.

²Aristotle, 1356 b 35-1357 a 20.

³Ibid., 1357 a 1-35. Aristotle stated: "The subject

lines, Locke inferred that deliberation depends upon an investigation of the evidence on both sides of the question. In probabilities, according to Locke, there is no absolute answer as there is in certainty, but decisions rest on the warrant of the evidence.

Locke's four types of agreement or disagreement could be conceived as a type of classical topic system. Most of the classical writers devised a system by which the speaker was able to discover a line of arguments in a given speech topic.⁴ These predetermined lines of argument were known as a topic system. In Locke's philosophy of discourse, a speaker could search for lines of argument in identity or diversity, relation, coexistence or non-coexistence, and actual real existence. Cockerham in his thesis on Locke's theory of logical proof suggested that these four types of connection were the criteria of logical proof.⁵

Neither Locke nor Aristotle viewed the syllogism as suitable for discourse. In rhetoric, Aristotle recommended the enthymeme and restricted the syllogism to dialectic and science.⁶ Locke conceived of the syllogism as a means, not of

of our deliberation are such as seem to present us with alternative possibilities. . . ."

⁴Ibid., 1358 a 10-35.

⁵Louis Cockerham, "John Locke's Theory of Logical Proof" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Oregon, 1959), pp. 30-31.

⁶Aristotle, 1356 b 5-25.

communication but, of testing for validity and discovering fallacies. They maintained that the syllogism was too complex for reasoning in discourse.

Locke departed from Aristotle and much of the classical tradition in his division of the subject matter of discourse. Whereas Aristotle categorized rhetoric into deliberative, forensic and ceremonial speeches, Locke divided discourse into the subject matters of natural philosophy and ethics.⁷ However, it seems that Locke's class of practica or ethics would include both politics and law. With such an interpretation, Locke appeared to have added another category, that is, natural philosophy.

Harding, in "Quintilian's Witnesses," discussed the similarities between Quintilian's Institutio and Locke's thinking on education:

A reader who has the main doctrine of the Institutio in mind is at once impressed with the humane reasonableness of Locke's theories. Nor can we escape the general similarity of the Thoughts [on Education] and the Institutio on the subject of the early training of children.⁸

Quintilian and Locke suggested that excellency in the art of rhetoric stems from the study of models. However, Quintilian developed his devices of progymnasmata and declamations of

⁷Ibid., 1358 b 5-20.

⁸ Harold F. Harding, "Quintilian's Witnesses," in Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, ed. by Raymond F. Howes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 97.

which Locke was notably critical.⁹

Locke's philosophy of discourse is similar to Wilson's Rhetorique of the sixteenth century in some ways. Locke, like Wilson, visioned his theory of discourse as encompassing both written and oral communication.¹⁰ Locke also agreed with Wilson in insisting on a plain, clear and intelligible style.¹¹

Locke made some important contributions to the new rhetoric of the eighteenth century which Howell identified. As we have just pointed out, Locke suggested plain and clear language in discourses and therefore paralleled the transition in rhetorical style which we considered in Chapter III. One of his most significant contributions to the new attitude toward rhetoric was his emphasis on an investigative process of invention. Even Bacon who supposedly was the first to suggest an investigation of the evidence outside of the set lines of arguments relied on his "Formulae and Lesser Forms."¹² However, Locke completely rejected all forms of commonplaces and topics and argued that the nature of the case must be

⁹Ibid., pp. 90-93.

¹⁰Russell H. Wagner, "Thomas Wilson's Contributions to Rhetoric," in Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, ed. by Raymond F. Howes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 109.

¹¹Ibid., p. 112.

¹²Karl R. Wallace, "Bacon's Conception of Rhetoric," in Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, ed. by Raymond F. Howes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 129-133.

investigated. He devised the process of "bottoming" for the purpose of collecting evidence on a question.

In other areas, however, Locke opposed the new rhetorical movement. He still maintained that the discipline of logic was a communicative art. Notwithstanding, he advanced a very modern view of the syllogism. He held that the syllogistic form of reasoning was not fitted for communication but its prime value was searching for validity and fallacies. Locke also maintained the distinction between "popular" and "learned" communication which he designated as civil and philosophical. Although his method of discourse did not suggest any differences in approach for these levels, he nevertheless affirmed the distinction.

Since Locke never proposed to develop a system of communication, he did not investigate all five of the rhetorical canons. He had nothing to say concerning rhetorical arrangement.

One of the most interesting aspects of Locke's philosophy of discourse, especially in the area of language, is the manner in which it resembles some aspects of modern linguistic thought. For instance, Roger Bowen, in Words and Things, discussed Whorf's theory of linguistic relativity:

A thoroughgoing linguistic relativity has, in recent years, been proposed by Benjamin Lee Whorf in Language, Thought and Reality. It is his belief that each language embodies and perpetuates a particular world view. The speakers of a language are partners to an agreement to perceive and think of the world in a certain way--not the only possible way. The same reality--both physical and social--can be variously

structured and different languages operate with different structures.¹³

However, some two hundred and fifty years earlier Locke delineated at some length a very similar phenomenon.

Locke's theorizing on language also foreshadowed many of the significant concepts of general semantics. A reading of Lee, Johnson, or Korzybski indicates a surprising similarity to Locke's view of language.¹⁴ Locke's treatment of the arbitrary nature of language, the process of abstraction, general words, the means of definition, and language behavior is very similar to that of several contemporary theories of semantics.

There is a striking similarity between Locke's view of meaning and the contemporary theory of "representational meditation." Osgood, in The Measurement of Meaning, espoused the theory that through a process of meditation a person differentiates between a reaction elicited from a word and a reaction caused by an object.¹⁵ Locke also indicated that the response

¹³Roger Brown, Words and Things (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), p. 230. See 229-263. See B.L. Whorf, Language Thought, and Reality, with an introduction by J.B. Carroll (Cambridge: Technology Press, 1956).

¹⁴A. Korzybski, Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics (Lancaster: Science Press, 1933), Wendell Johnson, People in Quandaries (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946) and Irving J. Lee, Language Habits in Human Affairs (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941).

¹⁵Charles E. Osgood, George J. Suci and Percy Tannenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957), pp. 1-10. See Brown, pp. 98-102.

caused by a word is often very similar to that reaction elicited from an object. In so far as Ogden and Richards identified meaning with the reference in the speaker's mind, Locke paralleled their theory of meaning.¹⁶

In brief, then, Locke's significant contributions to the rhetorical tradition are: his opposition to invention solely by commonplaces and topics and his advocacy of the investigative process of invention; his adherence to a plain style; his appraisal of the syllogism as a means of testing validity; his treatment of language as an instrument of knowledge; his division of the ends of communication into conviction and persuasion; his ethical bases for discourse, and finally, his epistemological foundation for discourse. Because of Locke's similarities to both the classical and contemporary rhetorical traditions, further study of his relationship might well identify his philosophy of discourse as "the watershed" in the history of rhetorical theory.

¹⁶C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1923).

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