

THEORIES OF STRONG-WEAK STATE INTERACTION AND  
DEPENDENCE: ISRAELI-AMERICAN AND  
CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

By

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## PREFACE

Philosophers, academicians, theologians, and politicians have, since the origins of man and the creation of their disciplines, proposed insights explaining human interaction. At times, these explanations have themselves become the justification, or excuse, for the ways in which men confront themselves and each other.

This paper is based on the premise that all humans feel the need to fulfill certain basic desires, among them: the security of the individual, the safety of the family, and the establishment of a social environment in which both can develop. These needs transcend political, economic, and religious ideology.

When groups of individuals interact, these desires are magnified to a societal level-- some call them national aspirations. Economic or physical prosperity and national defence know no philosophy or ideology, when it is realized that such beliefs are only the intellectual means to fulfill more personal, eternal goals.

Sincere appreciation is felt for the Oklahoma State University Political Science Department for the time and support it has given to my personal development. Special gratitude is felt for Harold Sare, who much more than lent valuable time for this thesis, has given me special insights into a lifetime pursuit. Raymond Habiby has always been most instructive, and kind: I especially thank him for many hours of stimulating conversation and friendship. And finally, I would like to thank James Lawler for the time and input he gave to this project. I can only

hope that one day I will have the right to call these fine gentlemen,  
"Colleagues."

The greatest appreciation, however, is felt for my family. Dolores and Richard Klausmeyer have given a lifetime of complete, loving support-- the highest tribute I can pay is to attempt to be as good a parent. And my wife, Barbarastephanie Arter, has, and I am sure will always, give me her deepest support. I will do only the same for her.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

In the year 416 B.C., the Athenians sent a naval expedition against the Island of Melos in what is known today as the Aegean Sea. Under the generalship of Alcibiades, a young man hoping that military conquest would bring him fame and fortune, the Athenians arrived at the island prepared to attack. Instead of pressing on with the sacking of Melos, the Athenians entered into negotiations with the islanders; in exchange for tribute to be paid to the Athenians, the Melians were to be left in peace.

These negotiations were recorded, as he imagined they occurred, by the Greek chronicler Thucydides, in what has become known as the "Melian Dialogue."<sup>1</sup> Thucydides portrays the Athenians as declaring "might makes right," and that the Melians should defer to Athenian demands since gods had shown their preference by making the Athenians the stronger of the two. The Melians, besides placing their hope for survival on good fortune in battle against their superior opponent, kept faith in the fact that they were colonists of the Lacedaemonian Empire. As the Melians related to the Athenians, an attack against Melos would lead to a wider war by bringing Lacedaemonia into the fight and also have the repercussion of fostering distrust for Athens on the part of neutrals. Eventually the negotiations failed, and after a seige of several months the Lacedaemonian colony of Melos fell to the Athenians; all Melian adult males were put to death, and all women and children were bound over into slavery.



While the fate of Melos is an interesting tale to ancient historians, Thucydides' "Melian Dialogue" is of particular interest to the diplomatic historian and the political scientist. The Dialogue describes an early example of the interaction between two societal actors possessing political, military, and economic power. The stronger of the two, the Greek city-state of Athens, sought conquest and national interest (with some Athenians seeking personal gain) through the force of arms. The weaker colony, Melos, refused to submit, placing faith in fate and its relationship with a "parent" state.

Of course, Thucydides recorded his History of the Peloponnesian War and the story of Melos very much in the style of Homer; a description of events providing entertainment for the listener or reader and, most importantly, relating some moral lesson for future generations. While an understanding of the sequence of events is necessary to understanding a social relationship, today's scholar seeks facts in a much more methodical manner with the intent, among other things, to draw better generalizations about social interaction. This study will examine the strong state-weak state relationship by employing a more rigorous methodology than merely rendering a chronological survey.

At this point it should be noted that when referring to states of unequal power, the terms strong, stronger, weak, and weaker will be used. Often times the terms large, larger, small, and smaller are employed, with, it must be admitted, a loss in accuracy when a wide variety of factors are taken into consideration. The Peoples Republic of China and the Republic of India are both larger in terms of population than any other countries in the world today, but would it be fair to say that they are stronger than the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Britain, or Japan? In terms of size in land mass, the Commonwealth of

Australia is larger than Japan, West Germany, and Great Britain. But once again, can it be said that Australia is stronger? When referring to such factors as economic, military, or diplomatic power, the terms strong and weak provide great accuracy, while maintaining the relational character (i.e., one state is stronger in relation to another) when considering two or more countries.

As illustrated by the "Melian Dialogue," the topic of imperialism is not a new subject of study. For many years and from many parts of the world, scholars and politicians have tried to explain the strong-weak state relationship by using several different factors. Some have sought to explain strong-weak state interaction in terms of political, ideological, religious, and ethnic factors. All of these are important to the study of dependence, but do not lend themselves to easy comparative analysis. One of the key points of this thesis will be to attempt a systematic study of dependence. In order to do this, measurable phenomena have been selected to be analyzed. For this reason, the economic dimension of dependence will be emphasized.

For many years writers have taken the economic approach to understanding how stronger states interact with the weaker. The works of Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin, of course, become very important when considering the economic interpretations. Far from being the first communists, they did give socialist thought a more precise direction and firm method of analysis. The theories of Marx will provide a starting point to understanding the economic interpretations. Then the views of Lenin and other economic theorists, some having their origins in Marxist thought and some not, will be reviewed. It is important to understand the economic theories of strong-weak state relationships because much of the terminology used by those who emphasize economic factors is used by those

who concentrate on other factors of such interaction. While many of these economic theories have generated considerable controversy because some states have adopted them as the heart of their political dogma, scholarly study demands that they be taken into consideration. The object of this study is to examine social theory, and such theory will not be rejected because of the political sensitivities of any person.

While full explanations of the economic terms will have to wait for the chapter on Methodology, the hypotheses are elaborated below. It must be pointed out that as one studies these hypotheses, different types of economic dependence are sometimes being described. If more than twenty percent of a state's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is in the form of foreign trade, then at least the monetized sector of that state's economy is dependent upon foreign trade.<sup>2</sup> This hypothesis does not seek to explain state-to-state relationships, but is used to describe a type of dependence internal to a state--the health of a country's economy being dependent on its exports, regardless of the importers. Also important to the study of a country's dependence upon its export sector is an examination of those products or services being exported, referred to as the degree of export concentration. Export concentration refers to the diversification of the state's exports. While no formal hypothesis will be elaborated, export concentration should be investigated to provide a fuller analysis of a weak state's export dependence. After all, if a state is dependent upon the export of a scarce mineral, for which importers are plentiful, could it be compared to the situation of a state which is dependent upon the export of a common agricultural product?

After the impact of foreign trade on a state's economy is investigated, the relations between the export dependent state and stronger importing countries must be examined. Proposed will be a test for exclusivity, or

the degree to which a weaker state exports to one stronger country. If more than one-third of a state's total foreign trade is with just one other country, then the weaker state is to be considered dependent upon the stronger.<sup>3</sup> Also important to the examination of exclusivity will be an analysis of which products are exported to the stronger states. This is particularly important to the state lacking diversification.

Of great importance to the study of trade exclusivity is that of trade asymmetry. Trade asymmetry is where trade between two countries is reflected in one receiving a larger portion of its GDP from the exchange of goods and services than the other. The greater the degree of asymmetry, the greater the possibility that one state is dependent upon another.<sup>4</sup>

Of course, foreign aid must also be included in this thesis on economic dependence. No hypothesis is given which explains solely the role of economic aid in dependence. Instead, foreign aid as a percentage of GDP will be added to the percentage of GDP earned from foreign trade. The analysis of dependence then will be made on this basis. This will give a more accurate picture of total economic dependence of one state upon another.

The other major area of thought to be used in this study is centered upon security considerations. The security theorists either ignore the economic explanations of strong-weak state interaction, or else offer counter-arguments denouncing economic theory in an effort to give greater credence to the ideas they are advancing. Some scholars have focused on regional isolation as a factor relating to dependence. It is hypothesized that the more regionally isolated the state, the more it will be dependent upon a stronger state to satisfy security concerns.<sup>5</sup>

After a brief study of the outstanding theoretical works on the subject, it will be necessary to choose case studies demonstrating the

strong-weak state relationship. For this project, two examples will be used to increase the accuracy of the findings and enhance the possibilities of discovering regularities in such relations.. Also, by using at least two case studies, strong-weak state relationships can be examined across ideological lines; in this case, one from the capitalist and the other from the socialist spheres. Once again, this will lend increased confidence in the results of this study. Pure state-to-state interaction, absent of ideological considerations, is the subject to be examined. For these purposes, the relationships of the United States and Israel, and the Soviet Union and Cuba will be employed as the case studies.

This study, then, will contribute to the theoretical literature on the patron-client relationship and dependence in two ways. First, the strong state-weak state relationship will be examined across ideological systems in order to better refine theoretical generalization. The relationship between the United States and Israel will be compared to that of the Soviet Union and Cuba. In particular, the common factors forcing Israel and Cuba, as representative weak states, to seek patrons (thus placing themselves in positions of dependence, a concept to be discussed in depth at a more appropriate time) will be sought. Secondly, this study will attempt to achieve a higher level of systematic inquiry by examining a series of factors relating to a feeling of insecurity and vulnerability on the part of weak states. If common sources of weakness can be proven to exist, not only within weak states themselves but also within states which follow different and, indeed, opposing ideologies, then higher level theoretical generalizations can be made with confidence. At the same time, a set of assumptions will be advanced which will lay the basis for future studies on the question of dependence.

This study will conclude by reviewing the factors leading to dependence as discovered from analyzing the positions of Cuba and Israel. Is it a fair assessment to say that Israel and Cuba are dependent upon other states? What has led to this dependence? Do the Israelis and Cubans feel this dependence? How can the theories already advanced by scholars concerned with strong-weak state interaction be used to explain relationship between Cuba and the U.S.S.R. and Israel and the United States?

It is hoped that the following study will contribute to the literature on strong state-weak state interaction on the contemporary scene, and lead to a greater understanding of international events in general.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER I

1. Botford and Robinson's, Hellenic History, MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc.: New York, pp.220-224.
2. Marshall Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relations, The Free Press: New York, 1972, p.238.
3. Ibid., p.238.
4. Ibid., p.239.
5. Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System, Frank Case and Co., Ltd.: London, 1981, p.71.

## CHAPTER II

### THEORIES OF IMPERIALISM AND DEPENDENCE

#### Economic Theories of Dependence

Many subscribe to the notion that economics plays a key role in, if it is not at the heart of, societal interaction. There are a number of explanations that explain strong-weak state relations, imperialism, and dependence in economic terms. As already mentioned, the ideas of Karl Marx have had a profound influence on socialist thinkers from his time on. The theories of two European communists writing since the death of Marx are fundamental to this study. They are Rosa Luxemburg from Germany and Lenin of Russia. Also of importance to a contemporary discussion of Marxist thought on imperialism and dependence is a group of writers collectively known as the depentistas. Their reasoning is Marxist in origin, but does not use all of the features of Marx's writings. The depentistas make some adjustments to bring Marx's theories up-to-date and explain present reality with greater precision. Finally, the theories of Englishman John Hobson, not considered a Marxist but a liberal, are of interest since he offers an economic interpretation which is not Marxist in nature.

It is common knowledge among students of society that the Marxist critique of economics was designed to explain capitalist relations of production and their affects on society. Marx criticized capitalism because of the constant expansion of surplus value (that product produced



which does not go directly into reproducing the laborer), the alienation of the laborer from the fruits of his own production, and the resultant class conflicts. Marx's theory of imperialism and dependence criticized the capitalist states at that time on the grounds that within the strong-weak state relationship the capitalists exploit the weak countries of the world.

According to Marx, three historical phases have passed which explain the relations between the developed or developing capitalist states and the undeveloped areas of the world. The first two were periods of exploitation in which wealth was directly taken out of these undeveloped regions and transferred to the capitalist centers: the first was that of plunder, and the second of trade and taxes. During the third stage, the capitalist states industrialized the undeveloped lands with capital flowing from the rich areas to the poor.

The colonial system during the plunder stage was attempting to gain the wealth necessary for the take-off of the industrial revolution in Europe. According to Marx:

The treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement, and murder floated back to the mother country and were turned into capital.<sup>1</sup>

During the whole course of the 18th century the treasures transported from India to England were gained much less by comparatively insignificant commerce, than by the direct exploitation of that country, and by the colossal fortunes transmitted to England.<sup>2</sup>

During the second phase, as Marx reconstructs the past, the industrialized nations of the world were expanding their manufacturing output, and the underdeveloped areas provided markets to absorb the products of that increasing output. Using colonial India as an example, Marx said of England:

Until 1813 India had been chiefly an exporting country, while it

now became an importing one.... India, the great workshop of cotton manufacture...became now inundated with English twist and cotton stuffs. After its own produce had been excluded from England, or only admitted on the most crucial terms, British manufactures were poured into it at a small and merely nominal duty, to the ruin of the native cotton fabrics once so celebrated.<sup>3</sup>

Marx argues that it was this second phase of capitalist imperialism that disrupted the domestic economic and social fabric of the dominated countries, such as India. Traditional economic endeavors were ruined because of the flood of European imports, and far greater wealth was transferred to the industrialized states than was put back into the undeveloped areas.

The third phase of exploitation described by Marx was one in which the capitalists of the developed countries transferred capital to the undeveloped, with the goal of creating wealth in the latter to trade for goods in the former. "You cannot continue to inundate a country with your manufactures," Marx wrote, "unless you enable it to give you some produce in return. The industrial interests found that their trade declined instead of increasing (as their industries became more productive)."<sup>4</sup> At this point, Marx said, the undeveloped nations took on the capitalist mode of production due to the influx of capital and capitalist methods from the developed countries of Europe.

Rosa Luxemburg, a leading German Marxist during the early twentieth century, argued that the only way capitalist accumulation could continue in the developed nations was through overseas expansion. Luxemburg saw imperialism as the only way the accumulation of wealth could continue in the developed areas of the world. New markets had to be opened, and new purchasers, previously outside of the relations of exchange already created, had to be introduced. Of particular interest here, however, is what Luxemburg had to say about the role of the state apparatus in

European imperialism.

The part played by the governments of the European capitalist states was one of facilitating the economic expansion of their countries.

Luxumberg believed that the state's role is one of opening new "spheres of interest" in which markets are opened and new capital is transferred, both of which increase the amount of surplus value returning to the industrialized countries of Europe.<sup>5</sup> In particular, she said:

Militarism... is employed to subject the modern colonies, to destroy the social organizations of primitive societies so that their means of production may be appropriated, forcibly to introduce commodity trade in countries where the social structure had been unfavorable to it, and to turn the natives into a proletariat by compelling them to work for wages in the colonies. It is responsible for the creation and expansion of spheres of interest for European capital in non-European regions, for extorting railway concessions in backward countries, and for enforcing the claims of European capital as international lender.<sup>6</sup>

The result of this expansionist policy would be interimperialist wars, with the developed countries of Europe taking a bellicose posture against the undeveloped regions and also against the other capitalist states as they scramble for new and increasingly scarce areas in which to invest accumulated surplus value.

Switching from the Marxist theorists to a non-Marxist, John Hobson believed that the European imperialism of the late nineteenth century could be linked to the trusts and monopolies that were growing at the time. Small capital investors could find plenty of opportunities within their domestic economies, but large investors of capital had to look for new investment possibilities abroad. It was within this framework that Hobson identified certain sectors as benefiting and having the keenest interests in imperialism abroad. Those sectors were manufacturers of armaments and railroad equipment, shipbuilders, large manufacturers primarily producing for export, those engaged in the

shipping trade, the military and civil servants who secure jobs administering the colonies, professionals who identify with imperialism for ideological reasons, and most of all, the financial capitalists who put together and profit most from the trusts and combines. As Hobson wrote, "Aggressive Imperialism... is a great source of gain to the investor who cannot find at home the profitable use he seeks for his capital, and insists that his Government should help him to profitable and secure investments abroad."<sup>7</sup>

V. I. Lenin would come to accept Marx's and Hobson's analysis of the causes of imperialism, and in his work Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, expanded Hobson's study of finance capital as the root source of capitalist expansion and imperialism.<sup>8</sup> Lenin believed that during the early years of the twentieth century, "monopolist associates of capitalists" had developed in all "capitalistically developed countries" and that in a certain "few very rich countries... the accumulation of capital (had) reached gigantic proportions."<sup>9</sup> Lenin, borrowing heavily from Hobson, surmized that the only outlet for the capital of these most advanced states was abroad. Secondly, Lenin believed that imperialist objectives were pursued by the capitalist states so as to secure scarce resources necessary for industrialization.

Lenin described the role played by the state in this economically motivated expansion. Believing that the giant monopolies of Europe required new, non-monopolized areas in which to invest their huge sums of capital (in particular the banking trusts with their finance capital) and in which to extract the minerals needed for industrial production, the state apparatuses and their respective militaries stepped in to

secure new colonies. Lenin outlined several types of areas the European states exploited: formal colonies falling under the direct rule of a colonial master, semicolonies which had "independence" but little true autonomy, commercial colonies with a bourgeoisie dependent upon the financial capital of the European capitalist centers, and independent protectorates which exercise a large amount of independence but have granted favorable economic concessions in their own countries and colonies to the finance capitalists in turn for their patronage and protection. Two main social groups, states and colonies, participated in the imperialist scheme, with a host of other politically independent territories around the world being "enmeshed in the net on financial and political dependence."<sup>10</sup> And finally, answering what is perhaps the key question, Lenin states:

... what is the cardinal, underlying idea of our theses? The distinction between oppressed and oppressor nations.... The characteristic feature of imperialism in the division of the whole world, as we now see, into a large number of oppressed nations by an insignificant number of oppressor nations which, however, command colossal wealth and powerful armed forces."

In sum then, these older economic theorists of imperialism have several beliefs in common, and to a point build on each other. Obviously, all saw imperialism as a manifestation of the capitalist mode of production of Europe, and later the United States. The capitalists required extraterritorial markets to absorb new production and lands to exploit so as to gain the materials necessary to expand surplus value. Following the lead of Marx, Luxemburg and Lenin agree on the idea that the governments of the capitalist states of Europe facilitate the mode of production by acquiring the colonies necessary to absorb that production and supply those materials. While Marx dealt more with what was

happening between the developed and underdeveloped states on a purely economic basis, both Lenin and Luxemburg agree that the respective militaries of the capitalist states also played a part in opening those new markets and regions for exploitation.

As for those with the greatest interest in pursuing a policy of imperialism, Hobson and Lenin have done the most to answer this question. Both agree that the growing monopolies and joint stock companies (one of the most famous examples being the East India Company of Great Britain) spurred on the imperialist policies of Europe. Hobson, of course, listed more sectors of European society and business as the cause of imperialism, with Lenin emphasizing the influence of the European banking community.

Also, as all of these authors seem to agree in various degrees, the undeveloped states become tied to the capitalistically developed states. The former come to rely on the latter for investment and the tools of economic modernization. While the object of the developed states was to use the undeveloped areas as markets and areas to supply needed raw materials, the undeveloped did experience various amounts of development as the European capitalists invested in those new markets. It is this last concept, that the less developed states did make some economic progress under this system of imperialism, which differentiates these classic economic theories from the depentistas.

Latin American in origin and Marxist in much of their thinking, the depentistas attempt to use the same economic framework in searching for answers to the question of imperialism from the point of view of the underdeveloped countries. The overall thrust of the depentista train of thought is that the relations carried on between the capitalists of

Europe and the United States and the undeveloped areas of the world contributed to the underdevelopment of the latter, an idea first advanced by the Communist International in 1928. Following, in order to get a feel for the beliefs of depentista thought, is an outline of the theories of Andre Gunder Frank, James A. Caporaso, and Carlos Johnson.

Andre Gunder Frank is one of the foremost authors of the depentista tradition. He believes in the notion that the capitalist relations between the capitalist centers and the undeveloped periphery lead to the underdevelopment of those already less developed countries. In his book Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, Frank advances several hypotheses that attempt to explain this continuing underdevelopment.<sup>12</sup> The first of these states that "in contrast to the development of the world metropolis which is no one's satellite, the development of the national and other subordinate metropolises is limited by their satellite status."<sup>13</sup> As Frank admits, this is a difficult hypothesis to test, but seems to be proven by an examination of the unsatisfactory and non-autonomous economic development of Latin America. Development in the cities of Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo is described as "a satellite development largely dependent on the outside metropolis, first Britain and then the United States."<sup>14</sup>

The second hypothesis Frank advances states that the greatest economic expansion occurred when satellite status was at its weakest. This is tested by an examination of the period of the Second World War, in which the ties between the capitalist centers and the countries of Latin America were at their weakest. This is, in other words, a refutation of the belief that the greatest advances occur in the underdeveloped world when there is a heavy infusion of capital from an

outside source. Frank argues that his second hypothesis is also proven by an examination of the most isolated regions of the world, which he says showed promising signs of development which were arrested as these regions became integrated into the world capitalist system.

Two other hypotheses put forward by Frank were crucial to the work of almost all depentistas. The first states that the latifundium (large Latin American plantations) were initially created to respond to world demand by expanding land and labor to increase the supply of agricultural products. The second, directly related to the former, states that "latifundia which appear isolated, subsistence based, and semi-feudal today saw the demand for their products or their productive capability decline"<sup>15</sup> and that they are to be found in regions that saw a decline in the demand for their products in general. The important point here, explicitly, is the claim that feudal society in Latin America is actually a consequence of capitalist relations with Europe and the United States. Implicitly, Frank is laying the groundwork for the argument that the prosperity of the latifundia was the consequence of their capitalist relations. In other words, these plantations were dependent upon the maintenance of those relations. When they were broken, these plantations deteriorated.

Frank is thus talking about the dependent development (overall underdevelopment) which occurs because of the integration of the undeveloped regions of the world into the world capitalist system of trade. What spurs on these capitalist relations between the developed and underdeveloped countries is the monopoly position capitalist multinational corporations are able to acquire in the latter. This condition of monopoly penetration, for Frank, has led to a great flow of surplus



value developed in Latin America to the metropolises of the United States and Europe, the complete opposite of what one would expect to find by following the arguments of Marx, Lenin, and Luxemburg. As Frank further points out, monopoly leads to "Close economic, political, social and cultural ties between each metropolis and its satellites, which results in the total integration of the farthest outpost and peasant into the system as a whole..., misuse and misdirection of available resources throughout the whole system and the metropolis-satellite chain," and finally, the "expropriation and appropriation" of the surplus value generated in the undeveloped states.<sup>16</sup> Thus dependence of the peripheral countries on the capitalist metropolises is reinforced, and the capitalist centers prosper. It should be noted that this dependence is further reinforced by the reliance of the underdeveloped countries on the developed for technology transfer.

For purposes of limiting the review of the depentista tradition, Frank's arguments will serve as a base on which the beliefs of his colleagues can be built, allowing ease of comparison and contrast. For example, James A. Caporaso clarifies the depentista argument by reasoning that dependency represents non-autonomous development possibilities, the lack of true independence from foreign or transnational influences, and the presence of a series of related domestic, external, and transnational characteristics.<sup>17</sup> These domestic and transnational features are often referred to as "structural distortions," describing the way a domestic economy is structured to meet the needs of the foreign sector.<sup>18</sup> These structural distortions, according to Caporaso, manifest themselves in a lack of integration in the local economy due to linkages between the domestic and foreign economies, the marginal status of displaced

domestic groups left out of the development process due to the condition of dependency, and a severe gap growing between the elite and the masses of the dependent state. In particular, Caporaso emphasizes the fact that dependency cannot be reduced to a "unidimensional concept," but must be related to a "syndrome of related concepts": external penetration, ties between local and foreign capital, and structural integration or disintegration of segments of the local economy.<sup>19</sup> Caporaso believes that American scholars over-emphasize the external dimension of dependency (reliance on external markets, external sources of raw materials, and external infusions of technology), at the expense of understanding the domestic manifestations of economic dependency. In sum, Caporaso's concept of dependency requires that one view the dependent actor in relation to the entire environment in which it must exist; not just in relation to other states, but classes, other socio-economic groups, as well as political forces.

Carlos Johnson also expands on the belief that Western (capitalist) theorists have taken dependency to be a form of underdevelopment rather than as an inter-relation between capital and labor.<sup>20</sup> This occurs, according to Johnson, not so much at the fault of the Western theorists, but because the depentistas have not examined this capital/labor relationship themselves. In the dependency concept of Johnson's, dominant classes in the underdeveloped countries had appropriated huge sums of surplus value from the laboring classes, but as these nations gained full independence, this upper class could not preserve and expand this capital, and in fact, saw it siphoned off to the European and American metropolises. Thus, any chance for competitive capitalism was lost, and a situation of dependency resulted. In the light of this analysis, the

depentistas have come to argue that no influx of capital into the undeveloped states will result in the development of the nations of those countries. Instead, they argue that Latin America is forever doomed to its dependent position in the capitalist mode of production.

The depentistas have tried to answer several questions that have received increasing concern over the past few years. Why, as the developed nations have become richer, the undeveloped have become poorer? Why has development stagnated in many of the less developed countries? What part have the developed countries played in this stagnation? The answers provided, couched in Marxian terms and beliefs, lead to different conclusions than those provided by Marx, Luxemburg, Hobson, and Lenin.

The depentistas take the overall view that the underdeveloped countries do not progress when they are engaged in relationships with the developed capitalist states. They claim that though the capitalists of Europe and the United States do invest in the underdeveloped countries, the surplus value expropriated and removed from the developing states leaves those countries with a net loss. That surplus value is not reinvested domestically. The labor of these countries, which the capitalists acquire at a much cheaper rate than they could in the United States or Europe, produces value which is not reinvested for their benefit. Hence, according to the depentistas, the underdeveloped countries become poorer as the developed achieve a yet higher standard of living.

In summation, several trends can be identified with respect to the use of the terms imperialism, domination, and dependency in these economic analyses. To generalize, imperialism is a relationship between two national powers of unequal strength, with attributes such as

population, native raw materials, strategic position, and military and economic capabilities determining strength. In this relationship, the stronger seeks to maximize its economic potential and wealth at the expense of the weaker. In order to facilitate this economic endeavor, the formal state apparatus may intervene so as to ease the goal of the capitalists. Thus, in good Marxian terms, the institutions of the superstructure (political, military, and even religious if one considers the areas of the world opened to European infiltration as a result of white man's burden" or "civilizing mission") all serve the mode of production.

Dependency, on the other hand, has two rather related meanings. Classically, dependency refers to the reliance the underdeveloped countries have on the developed for investment, technology, and training. While Marx and Luxemburg saw Europe as seeking to maximize its own economic position, they did feel some development, though for selfish reasons, did occur in the less developed countries. On the other hand, the dependentista's dependency is a drain on the underdeveloped nations, with surplus value being taken from those states at a much faster rate than it is being reinvested. Also, dependency is a domestic structural phenomenon, with the societal patterns being structured to serve the very mode of production which is draining those nations of their wealth and productive power.

#### The Power-Security Theories of Dependence

The other major body of theory seeking to explain strong-weak state relations and imperialism and dependency is the power-security theories. These revolve more around formal state-to-state interaction, and do not see the state apparatus as necessarily serving the economic sector of a

society. Instead, the term national security is commonly used to describe the goals of the stronger and weaker states as they interact with one another. National security, as the review of these theories will make obvious, is the general survival of a people to which a government is responsible (here, responsible need not refer to any democratic concepts) and the territory on which they exist. The United States as well as the Soviet Union are equally responsible for the security and survival of their respective peoples. The notion of democracy plays no part in the fact that one of the chief roles played by government is that of guaranteeing the survival of their citizens. The security of the person is the basic goal offered by the power-security theories.

The theories of several different authors will be examined so as to provide a general background of the power-security theories. E. M. Winslow, writing in 1948, said that explanations of the relations between strong and weak states cannot be restricted to economic variables, and argued that this would be an erroneous point of departure for the student and scholar. Charles Reynolds also rejects economic arguments for explaining imperialism, and then writes about how imperialism is a self-perpetuating phenomenon. Once again, the writings of James Caporaso will be introduced. Originally, he was identified with the depentistas; his work sought to reconcile some of the differences between those advocating an economic explanation, and those theorists advancing the power-security arguments of strong-weak state relations. Finally, a very recent book by the British scholar Michael Handel will be discussed. This new work, which is a comprehensive survey of the power-security theories, offers several points of interest to those interested in the relations between stronger and weaker powers.

Winslow, in his book The Pattern of Imperialism, acknowledged the economic interpretation of imperialism, but argued that it is incomplete and over simplistic.<sup>21</sup> He does note, however, that the logic advanced by the economic interpretations is compelling for several reasons. Modern man, "surrounded as he is with industrialization, money-making and aggressive business practices, all of which seem readily identifiable with capitalism..., (has) reason to be impressed by these forces."<sup>22</sup> The economic argument is easily invoked, deals with understandable factors, and "carries an air of sophistication which can be imparted with great educational faculty."<sup>23</sup> As Winslow points out, the economic theorists provide a view of man "writ large."<sup>24</sup>

Winslow goes on to point out that several other factors have the ability to spark an imperialist foreign policy, a phenomenon he equates with militarism. These other inputs to the decision-making process include the love of adventure, the seeking of prestige (one remembers what drove Alchibiades to sack Melos), an enhancement of strategic position, perhaps a dash of white man's burden, and the further expansion of ideology (both political and religious). All of these, of course, are not restricted to states whose systems are based upon capitalism. As Winslow attempts to show, a state based upon socialism can also practice a policy of imperialism.

Imperialism and militarism are not restricted to any one state or economic system. All states seek prestige and advantage. Imperialism can occur within whatever economic system happens to be present, with that economic system being used to pursue and advance imperialist and militarist policies. Stronger states pursue imperialist policies because of an inherent fear for survival, with the term "stronger"

leaving open numerous possibilities. Imagine three states all of unequal power. There are three possibilities for imperialist policies being pursued, with one state not even practicing imperialism. The point being, not only the most developed or strongest states have the capacity to follow imperialism.

Charles Reynolds also finds the economic theories of imperialism too restrictive.<sup>25</sup> For Reynolds, "imperialism...denotes a relationship of dominion," but not necessarily one of economic domination.<sup>26</sup> What generates an imperialist policy may be elusive to discover, but the drive for security and power may provide some insights. The power-security thesis conceives the world as being composed of sovereign states, each responsible for its own security. This implies that each state must take the responsibility for its own security, that no single state can control all of the factors affecting its security. These uncontrollable inputs generate instability, which force a state to adopt imperialist policies.

Reynolds goes on to suggest that this inherent instability and the imperialist policies adopted are self-perpetuating. As one state seeks to enhance its position among the others, it creates security problems for those other states. Thus, imperialist policies (often taking a militarist approach) are perpetuated, in turn heightening instability and insecurity.

The power-security hypothesis postulates the pursuit of power as the primary objective of the state in its relations with other states. And this is supported by the creation of a war capacity, which in turn generates the reciprocity between states, making the need to provide security even more acute<sup>27</sup>....The only secure guarantee of territorial integrity lies in the exercise of authority beyond the nation-state through diplomacy backed by force.<sup>28</sup>

In light of this analysis, both capitalist and socialist states pursue

policies of imperialism. In fact, it is quite easy to recognize how the competition between these two ideologies (as they have become personified by their advocates and detractors) perpetuate insecurity and imperialism on the part of the stronger countries.

Returning to the writings of James Caporaso, who was earlier identified with depentista thought, clarification between the power-security and the economic theses can be found, but from the point of view of the dominated state. Caporaso concedes that an economic interpretation, with which he was earlier related, may only be one part of a larger whole. Dependency, or the economic analysis of being dependent, is a structural phenomenon largely divorced from conscious decision making. Thus, dependency is a part of dependence, a general term which describes the dominance of one actor over another.

Here, Caporaso emphasizes the costs-benefits of dependence. A full specification of the structural conditions of dependence (termed "asymmetric interdependence") would include two actors A and B:

1. The magnitude of A's interest in obtaining good X.  
How important is X to A?
2. The extent to which X is controlled by B.  
To what extent does B supply X to A?
3. The ability of A to substitute for good X or supplier B.  
What are the costs of substituting X or B?<sup>29</sup>

While in this context dependence is part structural, dependent itself upon the endurance of the asymmetric properties and continuance of these interactions, there is room for decision making; in dependency, choice is removed from the equation.

In his recent theoretical work Weak States in the International System, Michael Handel examines the relationships carried on between states of various power.<sup>30</sup> In examining the relationships between



strong and weak powers, Handel identifies several factors that determine the strength of a state. This strength, in turn, determines a country's proclivity to being dominant or dependent, imperial or the object of imperialism.

First geographic data, which constitutes a "prime constant for survival," must be considered.<sup>31</sup> What sort of natural resources does a state have within its borders? What size of territory does a nation occupy? How many other states share common borders with the state in question, and are there any natural defense barriers along those boundaries? Obviously, a diversity of minerals and natural resources is an advantage, but all states, those traditionally considered to be strong and those thought to be weak, are experiencing increasing vulnerability where natural resources are concerned. Thus, theoretical generalizations centered upon geographic information are increasingly difficult to make.

However, the consideration of the geographic shape and position lends points of departure in the study of dependence. States with little territory are among the more vulnerable to complete invasion, as well as states which lack defensible boundaries or share common borders with several neighboring states (due to the possibility of a belligerent coalition being formed). Such states, according to Handel, are more likely to seek an alliance with a stronger state in the hope of generating a deterrent to potential aggressors.

The military position of weak states is also of paramount importance when studying the question of dependence. Weak states attempting to create (at a minimum, when extra-territorial goals are not a consideration) a credible deterrent force are faced with a number of

particular problems. Weak states often find that their small populations have difficulty in providing the necessary manpower to create a sufficient armed force, or when mobilized in times of emergency, lack reserves to deal with a possible war of attrition.

The costs in national treasure are also a major inhibitor for a weak state attempting to enhance its deterrent posture. The costs of modern weapons have risen, as is commonly known, to a point where many states have great difficulty in outfitting an armed force solely through national means. Domestic production of weapons is a possibility, but because of the costs of research and development and running long production lines is often out of the question. This leads to real advantages for strong states attempting to exert influence over weaker states. "There is little doubt that the selling of weapons to weak states is one of the most important and perhaps one of the most efficient means available to the (strong) powers in their struggle for hegemony."<sup>32</sup>

Finally, the economic position of weak states must be considered. For many of these states, domestic production is limited to a narrow range of goods. In fact, the weaker the state, the greater this concentration will generally be. These states also find themselves extremely vulnerable to external forces for consumer and capital goods.

These factors contribute to Handel's thesis that for the weak states, the largest portion of their strength comes from external sources. Geographic position, military ill-preparedness, and economic vulnerability all force weak states to seek a patron or patrons. But, as Handel points out, no systematic study of these patron-client relationships has ever been made.

This study, then, as mentioned earlier, will attempt such a systematic inquiry of dependence across ideological lines. First, however, a working definition of dependence (subject to refinement throughout) must be advanced.

In arriving at a definition of dependence, several assumptions will be made based upon the work of the theorists already introduced. First conditions of imperialism and dependence emanate from both capitalism and socialism (this, of course, is one point to be tested). Further, in following the beliefs of Winslow, it will be assumed that both a socialist and capitalist system can be used to advance such policies if governments decide to pursue imperialism or allow their state to become dependent upon another. This is an important qualification because pure economic theorists might object to such a statement. As an example, socialists could logically argue that their doctrine dispels imperialism rather than promoting it. However, theoretical doctrine may seem quite different when that cannon is compared to how it is actually implemented by a government or society.

For this study, then, dependence is an asymmetric relationship in which the costs of terminating the relationship are unacceptable to the weaker actor. Implicit are several ideas advanced by the above-mentioned theorists: alternative suppliers of economic goods cannot be found, or the costs of substituting goods or supplier are too high; alternative suppliers of military hardware cannot be found at reasonable costs, either in terms of sophistication or numbers of weapons; and no other state is willing to commit itself in times of emergency when the actual survival of the weaker state is threatened.

Some might object, saying that this definition of dependence is

too broad or overly simplistic. Three points must be kept in mind before leveling such charges. First, this is a working definition, subject to change (perhaps even complete reconsideration) as examples of strong-weak states relationships are studied. Secondly, this definition, as the first assumption stated, is broad enough to embrace relations between both capitalist and socialist states. Finally, it leaves open numerous combinations of states in this area of First, Second, Third, and now the so-called Fourth World countries.

With this definition of dependence in hand, it will be necessary to test its accuracy and completeness. As mentioned, the examples of Cuba and Israel and their respective patrons, the Soviet Union and United States, will be used to test the proposed definition and generate a better understanding of strong-weak state interaction. The following chapter, then, will discuss how the concept of dependence has been tested in the past, and how this study will treat the subject. Once again, a systematic inquiry of dependence is the goal, with several germane factors and means of exploring those inputs being offered.

## CHAPTER II

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18. Caporaso, "Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System," p.18.
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20. Carlos Johnson, "Dependency Theory and the Process of Capitalism and Socialism," in Dependency and Marxism: Towards a Resolution of the Debate, Ronald H. Chilcote, ed., in Latin American Perspectives Series, No. 1, Westview Press: Boulder, Co., 1982, pp. 55-78.
21. E.M. Winslow, The Pattern of Imperialism: A Study in the Theories of Power, Columbia University Press: New York, 1948.
22. Ibid., p.70.
23. Ibid., p.44.
24. Ibid., p.44.
25. Charles Reynolds, Modes of Imperialism, St. Martin's Press: New York, 1981.
26. Ibid., p.1.
27. Ibid., p.24.
28. Ibid., p.25.
29. Caporaso, "Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System," p.30. This method of analysis is elaborated further in the work of John C. Harsanyi (from which Caporaso borrows) "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-person Bargaining Games," in Human Behavior and International Politics, J. David Singer, ed., Rand McNally and Co.: Chicago, 1965, pp.378-384,
30. Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System, Frank Case and Co., Ltd.: London, 1981.
31. Ibid., p.70.
32. Ibid., p.86.

## CHAPTER III

### METHODOLOGY

Before the dependent positions of Israel and Cuba and the resulting theoretical implications can be understood, a brief history of the empirical study of dependence is in order. Michael Handel is not entirely correct in writing that no systematic, empirical studies of dependence had ever been made. Several empirical studies, though perhaps not entirely sufficient in methodology or results, have been made. Neil R. Richardson identifies several stages of development in the study of dependence, with the first being the simple measure of the "magnitude of each country's combined economic and military aid from the United States."<sup>1</sup> While this served as the first step in applying systematic methods to the study of dependence, and has been employed by such eminent scholars as J. David Singer, it is extremely limited and perhaps misleading. First, the study of economic dependence must be differentiated from that of military dependence if both are to be understood; only when each has been separately explored can they be rejoined in examining the dominant-dependent relationship. Secondly, dependence, as argued by the depenistas which will be discussed later, does not always rely upon the transmission of aid from one state to another. Also missing in this method of measuring dependence are two important factors: The exclusivity of the relationship (can the dependent state go elsewhere for aid), and an investigation of the dominate-dependent

relationship.

The question of the exclusivity of the asymmetric relationship, in other words, the notion that a dependent state receives a relatively substantial share of its aid or trade from one dominant state, must be taken into account if greater definitional precision of dependence is to be achieved. If, for example, fifty percent of state A's Gross Domestic Production (GDP) comes from its export sector, then the health of that state's economy could be considered dependent upon its exports (a concept to be elaborated below). However, suppose that five states, B, C, D, E, and F each receive ten percent of A's exports; does an asymmetric, dependent relationship exist? Indeed not. The stable functioning of A's economy is dependent upon its exports, but not upon its relationship with one other state. Suppose, on the other hand, that state B received thirty percent of A's exports, while C, D, E, and F each imported five percent. In this instance, one could argue (though complete empirical validation, as will be explained, is difficult to achieve) that state A is engaged in an asymmetric, dependent relationship with B until it has the ability of domestically absorbing all or part of that thirty percent of its exports, or until it can find alternative importers. Hence, "other empirical investigators (came) to express dyadic economic flows as proportions of total external flows (from) the dependent economy."<sup>2</sup>

A third method used to measure dependence, one which Richardson correctly claims obfuscates rather than clarifies an understanding of the dependent relationship if taken alone, measures the dyadic trade flow as a proportion of the total GDP of the dependent state's total economy.<sup>3</sup> In short:



$$TD_{AB} = T_{AB} / GDP_A$$

where,

$TD_{AB}$  = trade dependence of A on B

$T_{AB}$  = bilateral trade between A and B. More specifically,  
exports of A to B.

$GDP_A$  = Gross Domestic Product of A

What is being measured here is the proportion of A's economy which is bound up in exports to B. While this is useful, it omits the factor of exclusivity, and thus the full impact of dependence of one state upon another. Richardson believes, and this study will employ the approach, that first the exclusivity of the relationship should be measured, and then the impact of the relationship on the economy of the dependent state should be calculated.

A fourth method, one which will also be employed in this study, examines the "net external reliance," or the concept of asymmetry, of one state on another.<sup>4</sup> Here, the dependence (or lack thereof) of State B on A will be measured by determining what portion of B's imports and exports are represented by trade with A. If a true asymmetric relationship exists, then A's ratio ( $T_{AB} / GDP_A$ ) should be larger than B's. It should be noted that a relative equality between the ratios would be more an expression of interdependence than an asymmetric dependence.

At this juncture, it would serve clarification to enumerate those measurements of economic dependence that will be employed in this study.

#### 1. Exclusivity

What portion of Cuba's and Israel's exports come from trade with the Soviet Union and United States, respectively?

2. Impact of Trade

What portion of the GDP's of Cuba and Israel are represented by trade with the Soviet Union and United States, respectively?

3. Asymmetry

What portion of the GDP's of the Soviet Union and United States are represented by trade with Cuba and Israel, respectively?

Marshall Singer has offered several ideas to the understanding of economic dependence, a concept which he believes cannot truly be represented in any one index.<sup>5</sup> If, however, such an index could be devised, it would surely have to include, along with those factors taken from Richardson, several other indices. Those that will be used in this study are the diversity of exports, diversity of customers for the major export (if such an export exists), and, taken from Richardson but used with greater precision, total foreign aid as a percentage of GDP. To extend the list of factors to be used in this study, then:

4. Export Concentration

What portion of Cuba's and Israel's GDP come from their chief export?

5. Exclusivity of Chief Export

What portion of that chief export is received by the Soviet Union and the United States, and thus, what percent of Cuba's and Israel's GDP is represented by exports of that chief export product to the USSR and US?

6. Importance of Economic Aid

What portion of Cuba's and Israel's total foreign aid comes from the Soviet Union and United States and what portion of their total GDPs does that aid represent?

In concluding the economic analysis, the percentage of GDP earned through foreign trade will be added to that of the GDP received through

foreign economic aid. This will provide a more complete picture of the dependence one state has upon another.

At this point one could raise the objection that while several factors have been advanced which can surely demonstrate the extent of an asymmetric trade relationship between two states, to say one country is dependent upon another requires more specificity. This is where an empirical validation of dependence loses some strength. At what point is one country's economy dependent or not dependent upon another? If five percent of a state's GDP comes from exports to another? Or ten percent? Why not twenty percent? No adequate figures can be advanced which can be derived from empirical methods to determine dependence, but Marshall Singer has advanced several benchmark percentages (which Michael Handle, for one has accepted) that serve as points along a dependence-independence continuum. They are as follows:

1. If more than twenty percent of the GDP of a state is in foreign trade, then at least the monetized sector of that state's economy can be considered dependent upon foreign trade.<sup>6</sup>
2. If more than one-third of that country's total trade is with just one Power..., the decisions - public and private - made in the more powerful country that relate to the foreign trade of the weaker could have profound effect on the economic well-being of the weaker; and thus the weaker could legitimately be considered economically dependent upon the stronger.<sup>7</sup>
3. ...any state that derives even ten percent of its GDP from trade with one country is tied to that power.<sup>8</sup>

Further than just an empirical measurement of dependence, which implies a specific time frame to be analyzed, is that dependence has the quality of perpetuating itself. On the import side of dependence, in which the weaker state acquires large amounts of technology from the stronger, the dependent finds that it must rely on the dominant state

for training, spare parts, and expansion technologies.<sup>9</sup> Thus, dependence is a difficult condition to break due to the dislocation and adjustment costs if exports to the dominant state are reduced without alternatives to absorb the production, and also because of the ties that develop from extremely close technological cooperation.

The two other inputs to be used in this study as mentioned in the introduction, regional isolation and military weakness, are included more for completeness in understanding these strong-weak state relationships and may open new avenues for theoretical generalization. Of course, the assumption is that regional isolation and military weakness contribute to a sense of insecurity, and drive a weak state to seek a stronger country to provide a deterrent to potential aggressors and to acquire the materials necessary to secure its own defense.

Regional isolation, then, will be a rather easy factor to determine. A simple list of those that officially recognize Cuba and Israel will provide sufficient information to determine, within reasonable parameters, the condition of relations carried on by Cuba and Israel in their respective regions. Of course, the state of "behind the scenes" relationships, those that are carried on through other means than officially established channels, cannot be taken into account. A valid assessment of such interaction is simply beyond the scope of this paper. An outline of the officiality of state to state relations will suffice for this portion of the study.

With regards to the military dimension of dependence, a summary of the arms imported by Cuba and Israel will provide the information necessary to expand the discussion of the relationships carried on with the Soviet Union and the United States. Included in this analysis will

be such items as the total military expenditures for Cuba and Israel, military expenditures as a percentage of each state's GDP, total military imports, military imports as a percentage of each state's GDP, and a list of each state's chief military suppliers. This brief survey will enable the reader to get a better grasp of the dependent positions of Cuba and Israel.

### NOTES FOR CHAPTER III

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2. Ibid., p.91.
3. Ibid., pp.92-93.
4. Ibid., pp.93-94.
5. Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relations, The Free Press: New York, 1972, p.222.
6. Ibid., p.238.
7. Ibid., p.238.
8. Ibid., p.239.
9. Ibid., p.254. For a further discussion of the effects of technology transfers to the developing countries, one can turn to Michael Handel's Weak States in the International System, Frank Case and Company, Ltd.: London, 1981, pp.86-89.

## CHAPTER IV

### CUBAN-SOVIET AND ISRAELI-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Now that several of the theories attempting to explain strong-weak state interaction and dependence have been reviewed and a number of indices with the capacity of providing information on strong-weak state economic relations have been elaborated for use in this study, it is time to examine Israeli-American and Cuban-Soviet relations to better understand such state-to-state interaction and how it can be measured. As pointed out in the conclusion of Chapter III, regional isolation and transfers of military equipment will also be examined to provide a fuller picture of these relationships. Economic interaction, then, will not be studied first; instead, regional isolation, by listing those states that officially recognize Cuba and Israel in their respective regions, will be studied first. This will provide a basis on which to understand why Israel and Cuba have sought extraregional trading partners and patrons to aid them with their national defence. After regional isolation has been reviewed, the central concern of this paper, economic relations between stronger and weaker states, will be examined in the cases of Israel, Cuba, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Finally, military transfers will be taken into account.

## The Case of Cuba

### Regional Isolation

The Organization of American States (OAS) took significant action at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers last July. Its decision that member nations sever diplomatic or consular relations with Cuba; suspend all direct and indirect trade with Cuba, except foodstuffs and medicines sent for humanitarian purposes; and suspend all sea transport with Cuba, except that of a humanitarian nature, has contributed substantially to the political and economic isolation of the Castro regime. All but one of the American Republics have complied with the OAS decision- Mexico being the only exception.<sup>1</sup>

In our view, the principal reasons that Fidel Castro wants the embargo lifted are psychological and political. The psychological factor has to do with Castro's intense pride: He seems to feel demeaned by the continuation of the embargo; he frequently speaks of the embargo as discriminatory, noting especially that the United States does not maintain an embargo against the two great Communist powers. The humiliating implication is that the US embargo is maintained against Cuba because Cuba is a small, unimportant power.... Politically, it stands to reason that Cuba would like to normalize economic relations with the<sup>2</sup> United States so as to be a bit less dependent on the USSR.

These two quotations summarize the regional position of Cuba in the inter-American system. After the fall of the Batista government in 1959, the American states reacted with the conviction of stopping the further establishment of communist governments in the Western Hemisphere.

Actually, before the coming of Castro to power, the Organization of American States (OAS) had laid the groundwork for attempting to insulate the Western Hemisphere from the "international communist movement."<sup>3</sup> In the "Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against International



Communist Intervention," adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference on March 28, 1954, the OAS stated clearly that any state facilitating:

to this Hemisphere the political system (communist) of an extracontinental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and (very importantly) would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.<sup>4</sup>

In the "Caracas Declaration of Solidarity, 1954," the OAS left open the possibility for a wide range of actions in the event an American state should come under the control of a communist government with ties to an extracontinental communist state. The "Caracas Declaration of Solidarity, 1954," was adopted seventeen in favor, Mexico and Argentina abstaining, and Guatemala voting its dissent.

In 1960, the "Declaration of San Jose" further stated the resolve of the OAS to resist the influence of the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China, or any other communist government in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>5</sup> While the document itself declared that the members of the OAS were pledged to resist extracontinental pressures in the Hemisphere, the concluding statements added to the Declaration by the participating states, reflecting their opinions and reservations, are of particular interest. The Mexican delegation's statement, though reaffirming their country's belief that extracontinental influences and aggressions should be opposed, also declared that it viewed the resolution as "of a general character," and "that in no way is it a condemnation or threat against Cuba...."<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, the statement submitted by the delegation from Guatemala (only two concluding statements were added to the "Declaration of San Jose") related the feeling that

"... the American states would have been justified in assuming a stronger attitude..." towards the government of Cuba for "...adopting a policy inclined toward the Soviet Union and contrary to the inter-American system...."<sup>7</sup>

On January 22-31, 1962, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs met within the OAS framework at Punta del Este, Uruguay. At this meeting, the members of the OAS voted overwhelmingly (twenty to one, with Cuba casting the dissenting vote) for a set of resolutions restricting Cuba from participating in the inter-American system. In this document the members of the OAS explicitly said that the Castro government was "incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system."<sup>8</sup> Cuba was omitted from the Inter-American Defence Board, which was designed to coordinate the collective security arrangements under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Suspended were shipments of all materials capable of being put to military purposes, with the OAS to look into the possibility of suspending shipments of other items.

Finally, on July 21-26, 1964, a much stronger set of resolutions was adopted at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.<sup>9</sup> By this time, the majority of the OAS members were satisfied that the government of Cuba had been actively trying to overthrow the government of Venezuela. The resolutions adopted were mentioned in the opening quotation to this discussion on the regional position of Cuba, but as a reminder, they were that all governments of the Americas sever diplomatic or consular relations with Cuba, all American states were to suspend direct and indirect trade and all sea transportation with Cuba unless intended for humanitarian purposes, and to warn the government of Cuba that the

American states would use their powers, either singularly or collectively, to resist Cuban sponsored subversion; and to urge other states that were not members of the OAS to participate in the embargo of Cuba and sever relations with the island.

One item of importance which has been omitted from this discussion of Cuban isolation is the Bay of Pigs invasion. The formulation of the invasion plan had started during the Eisenhower Administration, and was executed by the administration of President John Kennedy in April, 1961. As is well known, the invasion was a complete failure, with many explanations being offered by officials and scholars for the fiasco. The point is that, though the focus of this study has been the regional isolation of Cuba, the effects of the Bay of Pigs can not be omitted. Up until the time of the attempted invasion, President Kennedy said that the United States could not accept a communist Cuba or Fidel Castro. The importance of the Bay of Pigs is that the Cuban government was shown in concrete terms that its own survival could be in jeopardy through even the force of arms.<sup>10</sup>

This problem for Cuba would arise once again in 1981. Castro perceived that the United States was preparing another invasion of Cuba; in fact, the governments of Mexico and Britain contacted Washington, inquiring as to the intentions of the US. Questions arose with regards to American plans because of the rhetoric coming from the Reagan Administration. Especially strong was that of Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who said that the United States would get to the source of problems in Latin America; it was assumed that he was referring to Cuba. Once again, the government of Cuba perceived that its security may be at risk, no doubt reinforcing a feeling of isolation.<sup>11</sup>

TABLE I  
CUBAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Name of State	Type of Relationship <sup>1</sup>
Argentina	established 1973
The Bahamas <sup>2</sup>	1974
Barbados <sup>2</sup>	1972
Canada	prior to 1959
Columbia	re-established 1975
Costa Rica <sup>3</sup>	1977
Dominica <sup>2</sup>	1980
Ecuador	re-established 1979
Grenada	1979
Guyana	1972
Jamaica	1972
Mexico	prior to 1959
Nicaragua	re-established 1979
Panama	re-established 1974
Peru	re-established 1972
St. Lucia <sup>2</sup>	1979
Suriname <sup>2</sup>	1979
Trinidad and Tobago <sup>2</sup>	1972
United States <sup>4</sup>	1977
Venezuela	re-established 1974

1. Unless otherwise noted, there is an embassy in each of these countries
2. Relations at the ambassadorial level, but ambassador resides elsewhere
3. Consular relations only
4. Special Interests Section

Source:

The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review, National Foreign Assessment Center of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, March, 1981.

While the vast majority of the OAS members complied with the resolutions adopted in 1964 (only Canada and Mexico did not sever relations), today all American states have relations at some level with Cuba, even if it is only a Special Interests Section. Table I provides a list of American states and at what level they carry on relations with Cuba, and when those relations were established.

### The Cuban Economy

The study of the Cuban economy, as a reminder, will be based upon the indices explained in Chapter III. If Marshall Singer's benchmark figures concerning dependence are correct, then this examination will clearly demonstrate that the Republic of Cuba is dependent upon its export sector, that a position of dependence is further reinforced through a reliance on sugar exports, and that a state-to-state situation of dependence exists with the USSR due to the high amount of trade carried on with the Soviet Union.

Cuba's dependence on its export sector is quite obvious. By examining Table II, it can be seen that from a low point in 1971 and 1972, when exports accounted for less than twenty percent of Cuba's GDP, exports have since risen to over thirty percent of the island's GDP. This would seem to indicate, but once again empirical specification is difficult, that the stability of the Cuban economy is directly **dependent** upon its exports. A case of further Cuban dependence can be argued when the state's sugar exports are taken into account. As can be seen in Table II, Cuba's exports have never been comprised of less than seventy percent sugar. This of course strengthens any argument that the health of the Cuban economy is dependent upon the health of that country's export sector; this is

TABLE II  
THE CUBAN ECONOMY

Variable	1958	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Gross Domestic Product (Mil \$US)	2140	4818	5544	5636	6154	6638	6576	6660
Total Exports (Mil \$US)	742	805	840	1222	2669	2961	2284	2225
Exports as a % of GDP	35%	17%	15%	22%	43%	45%	35%	33%
Sugar Exports as a % of Total Exports	79%	76%	74%	75%	86%	90%	87%	83%
% of Exports to: (Sugar)								
East Block	2% (4%)	65% (59%)	53% (55%)	64% (63%)	54% (61%)	67% (70%)	76% (71%)	83% (76%)
USSR	+2% (3%)	35% (27%)	29% (26%)	41% (35%)	36% (35%)	56% (55%)	61% (53%)	71% (61%)
East Germany	0% (0%)	5% (0%)	5% (6%)	4% (5%)	8% (3%)	2% (3%)	3% (3%)	3% (4%)
Bulgaria	0% (0%)	3% (4%)	3% (4%)	4% (4%)	3% (4%)	3% (3%)	3% (4%)	3% (4%)
Western	98% (96%)	35% (41%)	47% (45%)	36% (37%)	46% (39%)	33% (39%)	24% (29%)	17% (24%)
Canada	2% (3%)	1% (1%)	1% (*1%)	1% (*1%)	3% (2%)	2% (3%)	2% (3%)	1% (2%)
Japan	6% (10%)	12% (17%)	18% (22%)	13% (21%)	16% (22%)	8% (6%)	2% (3%)	1% (3%)
Spain	2% (1%)	4% (1%)	5% (2%)	4% (2%)	6% (7%)	8% (6%)	8% (2%)	1% (3%)
United States	67% (59%)	0% (0%)	0% (0%)	0% (0%)	0% (0%)	0% (0%)	0% (0%)	0% (0%)

Sources:

The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review, 1968-1976, United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1976.

The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review, National Foreign Assessment Center of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, March, 1981.

Cuba: Foreign Trade, United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1975.

especially so considering the large role played by sugar. Not only is Cuba dependent upon its export sector, given the fact that domestic consumption probably could not be increased to absorb such huge amounts of sugar, but it is also dependent upon an agricultural crop which is itself dependent upon world demand, world price, and weather conditions. While this shows the impact of sugar on Cuba's economy, it does not answer the question of the exclusivity of those exports to one other state, thus leading to the proposition that Cuba is engaged in a dependent, dyadic relationship with the Soviet Union.

The exclusivity of Cuba's exports, and the implicit question as to Cuba's existence in a dependent dyadic relationship with another state, can be answered by examining which states are the recipients of the majority of Cuba's exports. As can be seen in Table II, in 1958 over one-half of both of Cuba's total exports and sugar exports (once again, comprising over thirty percent of that state's GDP) were received by the Western countries, in particular the United States. Since the 1958-1959 Revolution, the United States and other Western states have boycotted trade with Cuba to various degrees, and the "East Block" countries have become the major recipients of Cuba's exports. As demonstrated in Table II, the Soviet Union has accounted for the majority of those exports received. In 1958, the USSR imported less than two percent of all Cuban exports (three percent of its sugar exports), but by 1977 it was receiving well over one-half of that state's exports, both in total exports and sugar exports. This information can be used with more force to argue that Cuba's economy is dependent upon trade with the Soviet Union when it is realized that from 1973 to 1977, over ten percent of Cuba's GDP was represented by exports to the Soviet Union, and from 1975 to 1977, at least thirty percent of

Cuba's GDP was earned through Soviet importation of Cuban products (see Table III).

It can be assumed, then, that the Cuban economy is dependent upon its export sector for health and stability, and within this sector, sugar plays the dominant role. It can be further postulated that the Soviet Union, at least since the mid-1970s, has been the principal importer of Cuban products, giving in return a substantial portion of Cuba's total GDP. The final missing factor, in fact the one question which will solidify any argument of dependence, is that of asymmetry. While for the Soviet Union it is difficult to determine what portion trade with Cuba comprises the total Soviet GDP, information is available that will allow an examination of Soviet imports and exports, and what portion of this trade is conducted with Cuba. As can be seen from Tables IV and V, trade with Cuba represents only a small portion of total Russian imports and exports. At no point from 1971 thru 1977 did exports to Cuba represent over five percent of total exports. On the import side, a low was reached in 1972, when imports from Cuba represented less than two percent of total Russian imports. By 1977, this had reached six percent. Thus, as indicated from this information, Cuba and the Soviet Union are engaged in an asymmetric relationship: the majority of Cuba's exports are sent to the USSR, earning roughly one-third of that state's GDP. For the Russians, on the other hand, trade with Cuba represents only a small portion of their total foreign trade and it would seem to follow that very little of its GDP is earned through trade with Cuba.

From the evidence presented above, it would seem as though the Cuban-Soviet relationship meets Marshall Singer's criteria for determining dependence. As Singer said, if at least twenty percent of a state's GDP



TABLE III

CUBAN EXPORTS TO VARIOUS COUNTRIES AS A PERCENTAGE  
OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

Country	1958	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
East	*1%	12%	8%	16%	24%	36%	38%	46%
USSR <sup>1</sup>	*1%	6%	4%	10%	16%	30%	30%	39%
E. Germany	0%	*1%	*1%	*1%	1%	1%	1%	2%
Bulgaria	0%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	1%	1%	1%
West	34%	6%	7%	9%	21%	18%	12%	9%
Canada	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	1%	1%	*1%	*1%
Japan	2%	2%	3%	3%	7%	4%	*1%	*1%
Spain	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	3%	4%	4%	4%
United States	23%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

\* = less than

1. Includes Soviet export subsidies

Source: The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review, National Foreign Assessment Center of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, March, 1981.

TABLE IV  
IMPORTS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES FROM CUBA AS A  
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTS

Country	1958	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
USSR	*1%	3%	2%	3%	4%	4%	5%	6%
E. Germany	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%
Bulgaria	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%
Canada	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%
Japan	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%
Spain	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%
United States	NA	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

\* = less than

Sources:

The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review, National Foreign Assessment Center of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, March, 1981.

1974 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, Vol. I, United Nations: New York, 1974

1977 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, Vol. I, United Nations: New York, 1974.

TABLE V  
EXPORTS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO CUBA AS A  
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS

Country	1958	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
USSR	*1%	5%	5%	4%	5%	5%	5%	5%
E. Germany	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%
Bulgaria	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%
Canada	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%
Japan	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%
France	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%
United States	NA	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

\* = less than

Sources:

The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review, National Foreign Assessment Center of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, March, 1981.

1974 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, Vol. I, United Nations: New York, 1974.

Cuba: Foreign Trade, United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1975.

is in the form of foreign trade, then at least the monetized sector of that state's economy could be considered dependent upon foreign trade (for example, the need for foreign exchange and the ability to create a stable currency not subject to drastic fluctuations in value). Cuba meets this requirement. Further than this, more than one-third of Cuba's total foreign trade is exclusively with the USSR; according to Singer, the "weaker (Cuba) could legitimately be considered economically dependent upon the stronger (Soviet Union)."<sup>12</sup> As Singer pointed out, if more than one-third of a country's trade is with just one other state, then the decisions made in that stronger state effecting trade between the two powers could have a profound impact on the weaker. And finally, the Cuban-Soviet relationship matches Singer's third benchmark figure; from the 1973 thru 1977, Cuba earned at least ten percent of its GDP through exports to the USSR. According to Singer, this in effect ties the Cuban economy to that of the Soviet Union.

Of a more descriptive nature, but as equally important to the understanding of Cuban dependence, are the various technologies the state of Cuba has imported from the Soviet Union. In 1979 it was pointed out by the Soviet newspaper Pravda, that with Russian aid, Cuba could eventually become one of the world's major suppliers of the mineral nickel.<sup>13</sup> In fact, Soviet aid to the Cuban nickel industry has been one of the major areas of cooperation between the two states. It has been reported that Cuba will eventually be producing roughly one-fourth of the world's nickel.<sup>14</sup>

Also of importance to Cuba is Soviet aid in the field of electric power generation. From 1975 thru 1979, the Soviet Union helped Cuba with the construction of six power generating stations, with four more under

construction. The largest of these plants, called "Maximo Gomes," is located near Havana; this facility alone produces more electrical power than all of the power stations combined before the 1958 Revolution. In 1979, another "Soviet-made turbine of 100-megawatt capacity" (one-fourth of what the plant was already producing) was added to Maximo Gomes.<sup>15</sup> Also, as reported by the TASS news agency, the "Socialist countries render big assistance to the young Republic (Cuba) in training national personnel" to operate and maintain these power stations.<sup>16</sup> Topping the list of Soviet aid to the Cuban power industry has been the construction of a nuclear power plant. This plant is to become operational in 1985, and will produce 880,000 kilowatts of power. A second generating unit will be added after the first becomes operational.<sup>17</sup> The Soviet Union also helps Cuba with the construction of the power lines necessary to carry the generated electricity.

Finally, though perhaps not of a direct benefit to the island of Cuba, but none-the-less representative of Cuba's technical and scientific dependence on the Soviet Union, has been Cuban participation in the Soviet space program.<sup>18</sup> On September 16, 1980, Cuban cosmonaut Arnaldo Tamayo Mendez joined four Russian counterparts for a seven day space flight. The Cuban cosmonaut was trained in the Soviet Union at the Yuriy Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center. The cosmonauts performed a series of biological and physiological experiments, and of particular benefit to Cuba was a series of experiments, using Cuban equipment, to explore saccharose, a sugar compound. As the Moscow Domestic Service reported, "Since sugar is the basis of the Cuban economy, these experiments are of great interest to Cuban scientists and will... have a bearing on the production of sugar on earth."<sup>19</sup>

TABLE VI  
SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO CUBA AND  
RELATIONSHIP TO GDP

Type of Aid	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Sugar and Nickel Subsidies (Mil \$US)	56	0	150	38	611	995	1444
Petroleum Subsidies (Mil \$US)	0	0	0	369	290	362	328
Total Subsidies	56	0	150	407	901	1357	1772
Subsidies as a % of GDP	3%	0%	3%	7%	14%	21%	27%
Soviet Subsidies Plus Trade as a % of GDP	6%	4%	10%	16%	30%	30%	39%

Sources:

Cuba: Foreign Trade, United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1975.

The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review, National Foreign Assessment Center of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, March, 1981.

In terms of financial aid, Cuba received support from the USSR in the form of subsidies above the world market price when the Soviet Union purchased sugar and nickel from the island. In Table VI, it can be seen that from the years 1971 thru 1977, these subsidies ranged from zero to over one billion dollars. On the import side for Cuba, the USSR has extended to Cuba subsidies for the importation of oil. When these subsidies are added to the purchase price for sugar, nickel, and oil at world prices, it can be seen that the Soviet Union contributes almost forty percent of Cuba's GDP.

#### Cuban Military Imports

The final portion of the analysis of Cuba will deal with that country's military imports, especially in understanding how much military hardware is imported from the Soviet Union. This will be accomplished in terms of several statistical indices for easy comparison to other states; in particular to this study, the example of Israel. These indices include:

1. Military expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
2. Military imports as a percentage of GDP.
3. Military imports as a percentage of total military expenditures.
4. Major military suppliers.
5. Military imports as a percentage of total military expenditures.

An examination of these factors should fill out the picture of Cuban-Soviet relations.

As can be seen in Table VII, from 1971 thru 1975, Cuba's military budget was four to six percent of that state's GDP, with military imports representing roughly one percent of that GDP. A perusal of the data reveals

TABLE VII  
CUBAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES  
AND MILITARY IMPORTS

Variable	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Total Military Expenditures (Mil \$US)	239	249	291	340	393	NA	NA
Military Expenditures as a % of GDP	5%	4%	5%	6%	6%	NA	NA
Total Military Imports (Mil \$US)	30	70	70	60	70	130	100
Military Imports as a % of GDP	*1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%
Military Imports as a % of Total Military Expenditures	12%	28%	24%	18%	15%	NA	NA
Major Suppliers, Cumulative 1976-1980 (Mil \$US)	Soviet Union.. 4300 All others.... negligible						

\* = less than

Source:

World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1971-1980, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, March, 1983.



that the importation of military hardware ranged from twelve to twenty-eight percent of total military expenditures. The best information available indicating Cuba's principal military suppliers is a cumulative figure for the years 1976-1980, which shows that the Soviet Union was Cuba's main supplier, with all other states registering zero or negligible military sales to Cuba.

### The Case of Israel

#### Regional Isolation

In some ways, the regional position of Israel is comparable to that of Cuba's, and in some ways it is very different. However, examining a table listing the countries of the Middle East and the level of relations carried on with Israel will give little real information about the situation of the latter in the region. Suffice it to say that only Egypt has had contacts with Israel to any large extent in formal diplomatic exchanges.

Briefly, on May 14, 1948, the Jewish Agency Executive Committee declared that those parts of Palestine under Jewish control were to be considered an independent state.<sup>20</sup> The next day, Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq sent forces into Palestine to take control of the Palestinian territories. It should be noted that the Armistice ending the war was negotiated with the Israelis having no face-to-face interaction with any Arab leaders. The talks that brought this round of fighting to an end were the Rhodes Proximity Talks, with United Nations mediator Dr. Ralph Bunche carrying messages between the delegations.

Since 1948, various Arab states and Israel have clashed. Conflict broke out in 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982, and between 1969 and 1970 Egypt and Israel engaged in a War of Attrition. These wars, coupled with the fact

that until 1977 no Arab government sought formal relations with Israel; they kept the state of Israel completely isolated within the Middle East. Nineteen seventy-seven brought about a dramatic breakthrough with regards to Israel's position of regional isolation by the Arab states.

On November 19, 1977, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat flew to Jerusalem to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. This was followed by several conferences and the Camp David Summit in September, 1978. Camp David, of course, produced two frameworks in which a Middle East peace was to be concluded: the first between Egypt and Israel, and the second a comprehensive regional peace. On March 26, 1979, with the further personal involvement of President Jimmy Carter, a peace treaty was signed between the two Middle Eastern powers on the lawn of the White House. Today, however, the relationship between Israel and Egypt is described as a cold peace, with little progress being made between the two countries. Also, no other Arab state has recognized the state of Israel, with a few Arab leaders continuing to call for the final destruction of that state.

### The Israeli Economy

This portion of the study of Israel will employ the same indices as used in the examination of Cuba. However, a review of the Israeli economy describes a somewhat different situation than that of Cuba. As will be elaborated below, Israel received the majority of its aid from one stronger power, the United States, but did not carry on a preponderant amount of trade with the US. As will be demonstrated, given any of the measurements advanced by scholars or used in this study, it is extremely difficult to characterize the Israeli economy as dependent upon one other

state. This is quite different from the situation of Cuba. A fuller discussion of the similarities and differences will await the end of this chapter, when such a discussion of any similarities will be made.

First, Israel does not experience an overall reliance on its export sector. By examining Table VIII, it can be seen that at no point from 1975 thru 1980 did Israel's exports comprise more than thirty percent of that state's economy. The year 1980 was the exception to a general pattern of exports representing from fourteen to eighteen percent of Israel's GDP. An increase in the importance of exports to that state's GDP was experienced in 1980, but in that year there was an overall drop in the total Gross Domestic Product.

Also, as elaborated in the theoretical review of dependence, if greater definitional precision is to be attained, then export concentration must be taken into account. Israel is in the position of having a large portion of its exports concentrated in one broad category, precious and semi-precious stones, with a large percentage of these being in the form of cut industrial diamonds (see Table VIII). Israel imports the rough stones, processes them, and exports the resulting products. Israel also has other commodities that contribute to its exports: fruits and vegetables representing nine to fifteen percent, chemicals ten to fifteen percent, and clothing five percent. While Israel's exports of precious and semi-precious stones do represent from between twenty-nine and thirty-eight percent of its GDP, the country does have other exporting sectors which reduce dependence on any one sector.

The question of the exclusivity of the importers of Israeli products also renders answers that do not support a case for Israeli dependence. Although Israel receives the majority of its economic aid from the United

TABLE VIII  
THE ISRAELI ECONOMY

Variable	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Gross Domestic Product (Mil \$US)	13793	15150	16950	27762	33223	21540
Total Exports (Mil \$US)	1941	2415	3082	3911	4553	5543
Exports as a % of GDP	14%	16%	18%	14%	14%	26%
Major Commodities as a % of Total Exports						
Precious and Semi- Precious Stones	33%	33%	36%	38%	31%	29%
Fruits and Vegetables	15%	13%	12%	10%	11%	9%
Chemicals	12%	11%	11%	10%	14%	15%
Clothing	5%	5%	5%	4%	5%	5%
% of Exports to:						
United States	16%	18%	19%	18%	17%	17%
United Kingdom	9%	8%	7%	7%	9%	8%
France	6%	6%	5%	5%	5%	5%
West Germany	8%	8%	9%	9%	10%	10%
EEC	39%	38%	37%	35%	39%	40%

Sources:

Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 1982, International Monetary Fund.

1978 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United Nations: New York, 1978.

1981 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United Nations: New York, 1981.

1981 United Nations Yearbook of National Account Statistics, United Nations: New York, 1981.

States (see Table IX), it is not carrying on trade with the US to an equal degree. While the majority of Israel's exports are received by the United States, at no point from 1975 thru 1980 did the amount reach twenty percent of all exports. The actual amount was between sixteen and nineteen percent. As a group of countries, the European Economic Community (EEC) received the greatest share of Israeli exports, with West Germany, the United Kingdom, and France topping the list. Israel's import schedule yields the same results. The majority of Israel's imports came from the United States, but in no way are they equal to the proportion of US aid received. The EEC, once again, was responsible for the greatest portion of Israel's imports.

The one major piece of evidence that would indicate Israel's economic dependence would be the condition of asymmetry. As can be seen in Tables X and XI, Israel's exports comprised from between fourteen and twenty-six percent of its entire GDP. However, for those states engaged in trade with Israel, the exports to and the imports from Israel comprise only a fraction of their total foreign trade; in fact, for no state, be it the US, West Germany, the United Kingdom, or France, does trade with Israel represent more than one percent of their total foreign trade. Also, as can be imagined, trade with the state of Israel represents less than one percent of their respective GDPs. But even this examination of asymmetry does not yield conclusive results with respect to Israeli economic dependence. While it would appear that an asymmetric relationship exists, and this was said to be an important factor in identifying a dependent relationship, this asymmetry must be considered with the inputs of trade exclusiveness in terms of partners and products.

Finally, United States economic aid received must be added to the

TABLE IX  
ECONOMIC AID TO ISRAEL AND  
RELATION TO GDP

Variable	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Economic Aid to Israel (Mil \$US) (Aid as a % GDP)	501 (4%)	678 (4%)	836 (5%)	1028 (4%)	1319 (4%)	1003 (5%)
United States	437 (3%)	617 (4%)	787 (5%)	919 (3%)	1246 (4%)	830 (4%)
France	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0.2 (*1%)
West Germany	63 (*1%)	59 (*1%)	48 (*1%)	80 (*1%)	54 (*1%)	137 (*1%)
United Kingdom	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
US Aid plus Trade as a % of GDP	4%	5%	6%	4%	5%	5%

\* = less than

Sources:

Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1976/1979, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: Washington, DC, 1980.

Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1978/1981, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: Washington, DC, 1982.

TABLE X  
IMPORTS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES FROM ISRAEL  
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTS

Country	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
United States	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%
United Kingdom	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%
France	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%
West Germany	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%

\* = less than

Source:

1981 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United Nations: New York, 1981.

TABLE XI  
 EXPORTS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO ISRAEL AS  
 A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS

Country	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
United States	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%
United Kingdom	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%
France	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%
West Germany	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%	*1%

\* = less than

Source:

1981 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United Nations: New York, 1981.



trade conducted with the United States if Israeli-American economic relations are to be more fully understood. It should be pointed out that this discussion of US aid only refers to official aid, and does not include private donations made by American individuals and groups to Israel. When the percentage of GDP earned by trade with the US is added to the percentage of GDP received in American aid, it can be seen that official economic interaction with the United States has accounted for four to six percent of Israel's total GDP.

In concluding the economic analysis of the Israeli economy and in particular its export sector, one must return to the figures advanced by Singer as suggesting a condition of economic dependence. As for the first figure proposed by Singer, that if a state's GDP is comprised of more than twenty percent exports then at least the monetized sector could be considered dependent, in only one year did the Israeli economy meet this condition. That was in 1980, when twenty-six percent of Israel's GDP was in exports. In his second benchmark figure, that being if more than one-third of a state's trade is conducted with only one other power then the former is vulnerable to decisions in the latter, no state claims one-third of Israel's GDP or foreign trade. Even when exports to the US are added to aid received from the US, a case cannot be made that Israel is tied to the United States.

#### Israeli Military Imports

The state of Israel spends a great deal of its national treasure on its military establishment. In 1977, regardless of national wealth, Israel tied Iraq as the second leading arms importer in the world (Iran was the leading importer). As illustrated in Table XI, Israeli military

TABLE XII  
ISRAELI MILITARY EXPENDITURES  
AND MILITARY IMPORTS

Variable	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Total Military Expenditures (Mil \$US)	3502	3761	3786	3409	4814	5051
Military Expenditures as a % of GDP	25%	25%	22%	12%	14%	23%
Total Military Imports (Mil \$US)	725	975	1100	925	525	825
Military Imports as a % of Total Military Expenditures	21%	26%	29%	27%	11%	16%
Major Suppliers, cumulative 1976-1980 (Mil \$US)	United States... 4300 United Kingdom... 60 Italy..... 30					

Source:

World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1971-1980, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, March, 1983

expenditures ranged from between twelve and twenty-five percent of its GDP. Of those military expenditures, the importation of military hardware represented between eleven and twenty-nine percent. According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the major supplier of arms to Israel was the United States, with the United Kingdom and Italy contributing negligible amounts.

### A Comparison of Cuban-Soviet and Israeli-American Relations

#### Regional Isolation

Now that two representative cases of strong-weak state relationships have been examined in some detail, reviewing the regional positions of Cuba and Israel, and their economic relations with and military imports from the Soviet Union and the United States, comparisons between these two countries and the interaction carried on with the USSR and US must be made. Do similarities with regards to their regional positions exist? What similarities and differences concerning their trade relations can be found? What does a comparison of their military imports produce in the way of similarities?

In the question of regional isolation, it can be seen that similarities existed between Israel and Cuba. Both states have found themselves isolated within their respective regions, conditions that the leaders of both countries have had to consider when formulating trade and security decisions. For Cuba, however, the condition of isolation has not been quite as critical as that of Israel's. In terms of total years, Israel has been politically and economically isolated for a much longer period of time than Cuba. Between 1972 and 1979, most states within the Americas

re-established or established for the first time relations with Cuba.

Israel has not been as fortunate in the Middle East.

The differences between Israel and its Middle East neighbors are of course at the heart of each state's regional positions. For Cuba, its isolation was one based primarily on political grounds. The governments of the Hemisphere feared for their stability and the stability of important allies. The fall of the Batista government provided an example of the possible future fate of others. Also, this isolation was spurred on by the action of the Cuban government. While many reasons and justifications have been advanced by politicians and theorists attempting to explain Cuban actions, the point is that Cuba was implicated in attempts to destabilize the government of Venezuela, and for supporting communist "fronts" in Columbia, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Haiti. It was of course the 1964 resolutions adopted by the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers that isolated Cuba within the region. A decade later, it would be the call for negotiation rather than confrontation, a belief on the part of some that Castro sought power and legitimacy through movements throughout the Third World, that would lead governments throughout the Western Hemisphere to recognize the communist government of Cuba.

The question of recognizing Israel, for the Arab states, involves much more than political differences. The island of Cuba in a fact, regardless of which group of leaders or what type of government is in control; the problem is recognizing the legitimacy of those leaders and their government. The recognition of the state of Israel involves much more than an agreement to engage a government in negotiations; it requires an acknowledgement that Israel itself exists with geographically defined borders, as well as accepting its government as sovereign. The question

for the Arab leaders is whether such a piece of territory even exists, or should exist. This is a fundamental difference in the positions of Israel and Cuba, and perhaps contributes to a greater sense of insecurity on the part of Israel.

### Economic Comparisons

Economically, great differences can be seen between the trade patterns of Israel and Cuba. In order to facilitate a comparative analysis of these two countries, comparisons will be based on the factors outlined in Chapter III.

Impact of Trade. Once again, it is difficult to declare an empirical value which reliably reflects when a state is dependent upon its exports, but Marshall Singer seems to believe that the financial sector of a state is dependent if it receives twenty percent of its GDP from exports. Whether or not one takes this figure into account, the importance of exports to Cuba and Israel is quite different. It would appear as though exports are of much greater importance to Cuba than they are to Israel.

The impact of trade with the US and USSR on Israel and Cuba reflect differences that are equally startling. Cuban exports to the Soviet Union represented a considerable portion of that state's GDP-- up to thirty-nine percent (including subsidies) by 1977. For Israel, exports to the United States accounted for only two to four percent of that country's GDP.

Export Concentration. An argument can be further suggested that Cuba is dependent upon its exports when one takes into account the degree to which the state's economy is dependent upon its sugar exports. At no

point in the years studied did sugar comprise less than seventy percent of Cuba's exports. This is quite different from the composition of Israel's exports. While precious and semi-precious stones, principally rough diamonds imported from South Africa to be cut and then exported, command a substantial share of the products Israel ships abroad, that country has other items of importance. Fruits and vegetables as well as chemicals constitute over ten percent of Israel's exports, which produce more diversification and reduce the possibility of dependence on one product.

Exclusivity. As generally is well known, though rarely put into concrete terms, the majority of Israel's exports are received by the United States; and the majority of Cuba's exports are shipped to the Soviet Union. However, once again there are great differences between the situations of Israel and Cuba. Israel is in the position of having more principal importers of its products than does Cuba, reducing the possibility of being affected by the decisions of American importers as compared to Cuba's vulnerability to Soviet decisions. Israel, in addition to exporting to the United States, sends large amounts of its products to the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany. But Cuba is almost totally dependent on the Soviet Union for buying its exports. Even Soviet allies such as East Germany buy very little from Cuba.

Economic Aid. For both Cuba and Israel, their primary trading partners are also their primary aid donors. From 1975 thru 1980, US economic aid to Israel consistently represented from three to five percent of the latter's GDP. For Cuba, Soviet aid played a much greater role, comprising up to twenty-seven percent of that state's GDP. This trend holds when the

percentage of GDP earned in foreign trade is added to the percentage of GDP received in official economic aid.

### Military Relations

When considering the question of military relations between the actors of these case studies, one finds that military expenditures as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product is much less for Cuba than for Israel. In fact, except in 1978 and 1979 when Israel was the recipient of large amounts of US military aid during the Camp David negotiations, military expenditures for Israel were more than twenty percent of its GDP. For Cuba, on the other hand, military expenditures were never more than six percent of the GDP.

When considering the importation of military hardware, a similar picture evolves for both countries. For Cuba, military imports represented between twelve and twenty-eight percent of its military expenditures. For Israel, military imports represented from eleven to twenty-nine percent of total military expenditures. The difference comes when one remembers that as a portion of GDP, Israel spent much more on its military than Cuba. As a portion of GDP, Cuba's military imports represented between one and two percent, while Israel's represented from two to six percent.

#### NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

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3. The phrase "international communist movement" occurs regularly throughout the US government documents pertaining to Cuba, as well as in the OAS documents and resolutions. As an example, the phrase figured prominently in: Caracas Declaration of Solidarity, 1954, in Inter-American Relations, United States House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee Print, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1973, pp.199-200.
4. Caracas Declaration of Solidarity, 1954, pp.199-200.
5. Declaration of San Jose, 1960, in Inter-American Relations, United States House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee Print, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1973, pp.202-203.
6. Ibid., p.203.
7. Ibid., p.203.
8. Resolutions Adopted at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Punta del Este, in Inter-American Relations, United States House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee Print, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1973, p.228.
9. Resolutions Adopted at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, Washington, DC, July 21-26, 1964, in Inter-American Relations, United States House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee Print, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1973, pp.235-239.
10. While many scholarly volumes on the Bay of Pigs can be found, an excellent general account of the event can be found in Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, Tenth Edition, Prentice-Hall, Inc.: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1980 pp. 868-874.



11. Wayne S. Smith, "Dateline Havana: Myopic Diplomacy," Foreign Policy, No. 48, Fall 1982, pp.157-174.
12. Marshall Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relations, The Free Press: New York, 1972, p.238.
13. "Commentator Assesses Benefits of Soviet-Cuban Relations," Moscow, Pravda in Russian, translated by the Federal Broadcasting Information Service, March 20, 1979, Newsbank, Inc.: Stamford, Conn., 1979, p.K1.
14. Ibid., p.K1.
15. "Cuba Electric Power Development, Soviet Aid Reviewed," Moscow, TASS in English, Federal Broadcasting Information Service, June 1, 1979, Newsbank, Inc.: Stamford, Conn., 1979, p.K1.
16. Ibid., p.K1.
17. "Aid to Cuba in Building Atomic Power Plant," Moscow TASS in English, Federal Broadcasting Information Service, July 7, 1982, Newsbank, Inc.: Stamford, Conn., 1982, p.K1.
18. A series of items were carried by Soviet news agencies. All herein included are from the Federal Broadcasting Information Service, Newsbank, Inc.: Stamford, Conn., 1980.
  - "Cuban, Soviet Cosmonauts Begin Joint Spaceflight," Moscow, TASS in English, September 16, 1980.
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  - "Soviet, Cuban Cosmonauts Continue Experiments," Moscow TASS in English, September 22, 1980.
  - "Flight Program," Moscow TASS in English, September 24, 1980.
19. "Biological Experiments," Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, translated by the Federal Information Broadcasting Service, September 22, 1980, Newsbank, Inc.: Stamford, Conn., 1980, p.U2.
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  - Arhtur Goldschmidt, Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East, Westview Press: Boulder, Co., 1979.

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## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS

This study has focused on an examination of the dependent relationships between states employing several hypotheses suggested by the literature. The first problem presented in this study of dependence is that of regional isolation. One would assume that the more isolated the state and the greater the threats to its security, the greater will be the possibility that state will be dependent upon a stronger state to help satisfy security concerns. This proclivity to be dependent can be observed by examining military expenditures as a percentage of total GDP, and the amount of national wealth spent on military imports from stronger states. It was found that Israel, which is more regionally isolated than Cuba, spends a much larger percentage of its GDP on military preparedness, as well as spending more for military imports, with the United States being the main supplier. The less isolated state, Cuba, spends less on its military overall and less on military imports. This trend supports the generalization advanced by the security oriented theorists that the more isolated the state, the greater will be its dependence for security purposes.

The second area of concern, and in fact the subject which has taken the greatest amount of space, is the economic dimension of dependence. Several factors were considered important to the concept of dependence. The first was the impact foreign trade had on the economies of Cuba and

Israel. The findings indicate that foreign trade is of a much greater importance to Cuba than it is to Israel. Secondly, export concentration, or the degree to which a state's exports are concentrated in one chief export, was of importance to the examination of dependence. It was found that once again, Cuba is more dependent than Israel in terms of export concentration. Cuba is extremely dependent upon its sugar exports, while Israel enjoys a diversity of exports. For a domestic economy, then, the more a state is dependent upon foreign trade, and the more a state's exports are concentrated in one chief export, the more dependent that state is upon its exports and its exports of that important product. However, such factors as the impact of foreign trade and the importance of one chief export suggest a hypothesis which does not take into account the dependent state's full relations with one stronger state.

Other factors have been presented which elaborate a dependence of one state upon another. The first of these was the exclusivity of trade relations between a weaker and stronger state. Given the fact that a state exists in a position of being dependent upon its exports and/or exports of one chief commodity, the possibility arises that that state may be dependent upon a stronger state receiving the majority of those exports. As was observed, both Cuba and Israel carry on the majority of their trade with the Soviet Union and the United States. However, statistically at least, since Israel's economy is more diversified, it is not as dependent upon its exports, and has more trading partners, it would appear as though Israel is not as dependent as Cuba with respect to trade exclusivity.

Another factor of importance to explaining a position of dependence

is that of trade asymmetry. This is a key indicator of dependence because for a case of trade dependence to exist, it is naturally assumed that one state is more reliant than the other; that for the weaker state trade between the two states must continue. It was found that for the United States and the Soviet Union, imports to and exports from Israel and Cuba were almost insignificant when taken in the context of their total imports and exports.

Finally, economic aid was examined. This posed a much greater problem, however, because it is difficult to distinguish between aid in the forms of grants, loans, and subsidies, and aid in the form of technical assistance. In both instances, however, Cuba seemed to be the greater beneficiary. Cuba received large amounts of aid in the form of subsidies, and has received much help in the area of electrical power production and in the expansion of its nickel industry. If aid received from the United States and the Soviet Union is added to the proceeds from exports to these respective countries, a yet stronger case can be made that Cuba is more dependent upon the USSR than Israel is upon the US.

An examination of these factors leads one to question the arguments of the Marxists and particularly the depentistas. According to their literature, stronger capitalist states so infiltrate a weaker state that the latter's entire domestic economy becomes structured by that stronger state, whether directly through pure investment decisions, or indirectly through repercussions from multinational (not specifically corporate) economic activity. The depentista view of dependency refers to the domestic makeup of a country, and not the reliance one state has on another. Industries are determined by the stronger state, along with

the unemployment rate and all other aspects of the weaker state's economy. Yet, it would seem that a portion of the depentista argument is flawed when considering the position of Cuba. Here, it would seem, a weaker state's economy is being largely structured by a larger socialist country. Cuban development is surely a non-autonomous development. Indeed, the depentista literature is not being challenged on the concept of a weaker state's economy being structured by a stronger state's, but on its sole focus on relations between stronger capitalist states and weaker states. On the basis of this study the ideological orientation does not make that much difference. This will allow for more accurate theoretical generalizations, and at the same time reduce what would seem to be political posturing by some depentistas.

The overarching concern of this study, of course, has been the comparison of dependence across ideological systems. Regrettably, of the various types of dependence described throughout this study, only one seems to apply to both Cuba and Israel, given the methodologies used. This dependence is that of regional isolation, in which the correlation indicated that the more isolated the state, and seemingly the more threatened, the more dependent that state is upon a stronger state for security concerns. Economically, the factor of trade asymmetry is the sole correlation found. Statistically, this does not prove a condition of dependence, but it does show that the trade carried on between the USSR and Cuba, and the US and Israel, is more important to the weaker states than it is to the stronger. As for the rest of the economic factors, Cuba seems to be much more dependent than Israel.

It must be pointed out, however, that the refinement of Marshall Singer's framework for describing dependence may be in order. While

using the statistics he provides, a firm case of Israeli dependence could not be established. Both Israeli officials and citizens seem to perceive their state as being economically dependent upon the United States. It is believed by some that the United States has the power to exert its will over Israel in the event of a policy disagreement between the two:

The increasing economic dependence on the United States could next year dangerously reduce Israel's political maneuvering space both in the international arena, as well in matters pertaining to the implementation of the peace treaty with Egypt.... Israeli elements have already estimated that military and economic aid would serve the US administration as a 'whip' for putting political pressure on Israel....<sup>1</sup>

Labor Party leader Shimon Peres has declared in speeches that Israel had better move towards economic independence. He stated in one speech, "If we get accustomed to living on aid from others, we will lose our respect in our eyes as well as in the eyes of others."<sup>2</sup> The Israeli public is also conscious of this question of dependence upon the United States. In 1980, a public opinion poll taken in Israel showed that a large section of the population (38.2%) favored severing US aid, even if it meant reducing their standard of living.<sup>3</sup> And finally, even Israeli officials in positions of power have acknowledged Israeli dependence. In 1981, Finance Minister Yoram Aridor said to a reporter, "We are dependent on the United States because we require economic and military aid from the United States... we must see reality for what it is."<sup>4</sup> According to these statements, it would seem as though there are grounds on which to question the usefulness of Singer's benchmark figures (not the individual factors themselves). Perhaps future studies using a larger sampling of case studies will bring greater accuracy to his framework, and improve that elusive index of dependence.

## NOTES FOR CHAPTER V

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2. "Peres Says Economic Independence Should Be Goal," Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew, September 9, 1981, translated by the Federal Broadcasting Information Service, Newsbank, Inc.: Stamford, Conn., 1981, p I3.
3. "Post Poll: Slim Majority of Israelis Favor U.S. Aid," Jerusalem Post in English, June 10, 1980, Federal Broadcasting Information Service, Newsbank, Inc.: Stamford, Conn., 1980, pp. N4-N5.
4. "Finance Minister Aridor on Dependence on U.S.," Tel Aviv Israeli Defence Forces Radio in Hebrew, October 20, 1981, as reported and translated by the Federal Broadcasting Information Service, Newsbank, Inc.: Stamford, Conn., 1981, pp. I7-I8.



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