CONGRESSIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL VOTING:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF
PARTISANSHIP, IDEOLOGY, AND
CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS

By
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CONGRESSIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL VOTING:
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PREFACE

The analytic goal of this study is to determine the impact of partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteristics on Representatives' and Senators' support for environmental legislation in the 97th Congress. The degree to which a member supports such legislation is determined by scores developed by the League of Conservation Voters. These scores represent the percentage of time the member voted in accordance with the League's position on selected environmental votes. The findings of this study suggest that partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteristics do affect congressional pro-environmental voting behavior.

I wish to express my gratitude to those who have assisted me in the development and completion of this work. I am particularly indebted to my thesis adviser, Dr. Robert England, for his invaluable comments, suggestions, and friendship. I am also very appreciative of the input of Dr. Joseph Westphal during the initial stage of this project and for the methodological comments from Dr. Barrie Blunt. Overall, the support provided by the members of this committee extends far beyond the work on this thesis. Throughout my graduate work they have been invaluable
sources of information, motivation, and friendship. For these things I am eternally grateful.
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<td>1. A Heuristic Model of the Economic-Environmental Policy Process</td>
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"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times" is a description that is equally appropriate for literary and actual realities. The present "times" illustrates this duality of condition when one examines the complexity of the economic and environmental nexus. Society is constantly using and demanding more resources while at the same time becoming more aware of the costs of such consumption. As a result,

the prognosis is that the economy, left to its present course, will produce more and more consumer goods, but will offer them to a society in which filth, noise, and other forms of pollution grow and in which public services continue to deteriorate (Baumol and Oates, 1979: 2).

Environmental degradation is largely the result of the common ownership of many natural resources. No one specifically owns resources such as the air or water and as a result, there may be no incentive to protect or preserve them. Consequently, producers are free to use these resources and escape the resulting social costs of such use (Hardin, 1968; Baumol and Oates, 1979). The following example illustrates this problem.
If a community of 5,000 people owns a property, say a lake, in common, and one of those 5,000, the owner of a sawmill on the lake, creates $100,000 worth of water-pollution damage to the lake, he or she suffers only $20 or 1/5,000 of that damage; the rest of the cost of the damage is spread among the other members of the community. Furthermore, even if the sawmill owner were to be moved by conscience from polluting the lake, competition may allow no choice in the matter. So long as some unprincipled business rival is prepared to take advantage of the opportunity to save in abatement costs by letting (most of) the damage to the common property be borne by others, our original sawmill owner cannot afford to bear the entire cost alone. Competition can force the hand of even the best-intentioned decision maker (Baumol and Oates, 1979: 113).

Methods of protecting these common properties, while maintaining economic growth, generates factions of opinion. Many industrialists, chambers of commerce, and economists believe that growth is equated with progress and that maximum production and consumption are a sign of a healthy economy (Beckerman, 1974; Feinberg, 1977; Maddox, 1972; Wilson, 1977). This growth, they indicate, will produce a high standard of living, low unemployment and inflation, and provide sufficient funds for the maintenance of environmental quality. Critics of this viewpoint—environmentalists, some economists and industrialists—argue that this growth is neither desirable or possible (Barkley and Seckler, 1972; Commoner, 1971; Ophuls, 1977). They are concerned with the finite nature of our resources, and the environmental costs of maximum consumption and production.

The American public also maintains conflicting perspectives on the economic-environmental dilemma. Surveys which are designed to determine citizen's views toward growth,
energy development, and environmental protection find no clear consensual preference among citizens (see Table I). It is possible that this consensus does not emerge because "the public want[s] both of these facets of a bountiful life—a healthy and growing economy, and a healthful and safe environment" (Ladd, 1982: 19).

The dilemmas posed by these issues will undoubtedly manifest themselves in the political system. To influence this system and its policy decisions, interest groups and citizens may concentrate their efforts on any or all branches and levels of government. Serving as receptors for these demands and preferences, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches must make policy choices which may involve tradeoffs in the economic-environmental arena. The bureaucracy is then responsible for developing specific regulations and guidelines to implement the broad policy decisions of the other branches. The results are economic-environmental policies which may then generate further interest group and citizen demands and preferences. This system is summarized in model form in Figure 1.

The present study examines one facet in the economic-environmental policy process—the legislative branch. Within this branch, policy preferences and decisions are expressed through voting decisions. An examination, therefore, of factors affecting these decisions may enhance our ability to understand and predict individual and congressional policy outputs. Specifically, this study considers
**TABLE I**

PUBLIC OPINION ON THE ECONOMIC-ENVIRONMENTAL NEXUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions and Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Protecting the environment is so important that requirements and standards cannot be too high, and continuing environmental improvements must be made regardless of cost.&quot;&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45% Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42% Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13% No opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>b</sup> Roper Organization, September 19-26, 1981.
<sup>c</sup> ABC News/Washington Post, February 19-10, 1981.

Figure 1. A Heuristic Model of the Economic-Environmental Policy Process
pro-environmental voting among U.S. Representatives and Senators in the 97th Congress.

Previous studies (see Chapter II) have examined the effects of partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteristics on congressional and environmental voting decisions. This inquiry extends these past examinations in two ways. First, earlier studies have not considered the effects these factors may have on senatorial environmental voting. For example, Dunlap and Allen (1976: 388) justify their exclusion of the Senate by stating:

Since it is impossible to provide meaningful constituency measures for senators—due to the size and heterogeneity of entire states—we will confine our analysis to the members of the House, who represent smaller and more homogeneous districts.

Although it may be difficult to obtain useful constituency measures for senators, indicators do exist and are employed in this study.

Second, this examination considers the effects of partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteristics on legislators during a period which is unlike those which previous studies have examined. The conflict between encouraging economic growth and maintaining environmental quality has become particularly pronounced in the 1980s. In one effort to resolve this dilemma, the Reagan administration has developed a set of guidelines for federal agencies in the calculation of benefits and costs of water and related land resources development projects. While considering environmental quality, the principles and
guidelines suggest that the project's contribution to national economic development is the prime consideration in an assessment of its feasibility. This economic priority represents a change of emphasis away from the previously strong commitment to environmental quality considerations (U.S. Water Resources Council, 1983). Because of this new administrative priority, this study provides an examination of a Congress which is subject to new priorities and pressures from the executive branch.

The study is organized into four remaining chapters. Chapter II presents an overview of this general area of inquiry. Based on this review of the literature, several hypotheses are posited with respect to variables affecting congressional environmental voting. Chapter III outlines the research design employed in the study. Chapter IV reports the findings resulting from the analysis. Finally, the findings and their implications are summarized and discussed in Chapter V.
CHAPTER II

LEGISLATIVE VOTING AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: A REVIEW OF FINDINGS

Legislators are faced with a variety of pressures and cues that affect their decisions. In brief, their decision making process is extremely complex and a plethora of factors may influence the outcome of the process—voting decisions. Previous research suggest that background characteristics of legislators (Asher and Weisberg, 1978), electoral realities (Cooper et al., 1977) and partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteristics (see below) may affect a legislator's voting choices.

The following is an overview of factors examined in this study which are associated with legislative and environmental voting.

Partisanship

The study of the influence of partisanship on congressional voting is not a new consideration. Early studies have found that floor votes do indeed fall into patterns and that partisanship explains one such pattern (Lowell, 1901; Rice, 1928; Turner, 1951). More recently, Davidson (1969: 147) states that party "constitutes the single most
important group loyalty for members of Congress" and Schneier (1970: 239) argues that party is "the single most important factor in roll call voting." Other studies also support the existence of party line voting in Congress (MacRae, 1958; Truman, 1959; Mayhew, 1966; Kingdon, 1981).

Although differences undoubtedly exist between the two major parties which affect congressional voting, it is reasonable to assume that some issues do not generate a variance of opinion. Because the maintenance of environmental quality is a collective good in which all may benefit, it is reasonable to believe that this may be one such consensus issue. Ogden (1971: 246) states that:

in their competition for power, both parties are certain to favor environmental quality, to oppose pollution, [and] to support conservation.

Other scholars, however, do not agree with this observation (see below).

Englebert (1961), in an historical examination of political parties and natural resources policies from 1790 - 1950, finds significant differences between the parties in this area. By reviewing party platforms he concludes that:

of the two major parties since 1860 . . . the Democrats, on the whole, have placed more emphasis on natural resources in their platforms than the Republicans. Not only have the Democrats devoted more statements to the subject, but they have tended to be more specific (240).

By examining the 1980 Democratic and Republican Party platforms, one continues to find differences between the two parties. In general, Democrats believe that conservation is the cheapest form of energy production and they propose a
program of energy-conservation grants. They suggest that federal funds should be used to develop renewable resources, with the goal of using solar power to meet 20 percent of U.S. energy needs by the year 2000. In addition, the Democrats would stop major oil companies from acquiring coal and solar energy firms (Democratic Party, 1980).

In contrast, the Republicans emphasize energy production over conservation and reject massive governmental involvement and incentive programs. They propose to repeal the windfall profits tax and dismantle all remaining controls on oil and gas. In general, Republicans advocate less governmental involvement in the economic-environmental area than do Democrats (Republican Party, 1980).

Clearly, from the standpoint of what the parties propose to do in this area, there are significant differences. To further test the extent of these differences, one must move from the rhetoric of party platforms to the reality of congressional voting. Voting represents a concrete choice on substantive issues and thus serves to further our understanding of partisan differences.

In addition to finding differences between party platforms, Englebert (1961: 241) discovers that the Democrats have had a "slightly better congressional voting record on natural resources than the Republicans" for the period of 1860 to 1950. His findings are presented in Table II.

Recent examinations of congressional roll call voting on environmental issues supports Englebert's historical
TABLE II

CONGRESSIONAL VOTING RECORD OF POLITICAL PARTIES
ON LEGISLATION FOR NATURAL RESOURCES
FROM 1861 TO 1950*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party and Votes</th>
<th>1861-1890</th>
<th>1891-1920</th>
<th>1921-1950</th>
<th>1861-1950**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UF</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NV</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UF</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NV</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UF</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NV</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F = Vote favorable to the conservation and development of natural resource.

UF = Vote unfavorable to the conservation and development of natural resource.

NV = Non-voting.

*The figures are based on outstanding natural resources legislation enacted after 1860 for which voting records were available. They are expressed in terms of percentages of the total vote (including non-voting) for each party for each period.

**This column represents an average of the three periods.

analysis. By extending Turner's (1951) analysis of voting patterns through 1964, Schneier (1970) finds that there are partisan differences on environmental issues and that the Democrats generally take the most environmentally favorable position. In his analysis of seven recent congressional sessions, Clausen (1973) states that roll call votes can be classified into a few broad dimensions and that the environmental issues are classified in the "government management" dimension. Clausen argues that this dimension provokes the greatest amount of opposition between the two parties with the Democrats supporting government management (including environmental control) more so than Republicans.

Other roll call studies, of a less comprehensive scope, also support the existence of partisan differences on environmental legislation. By examining the 1971 U.S. House of Representatives and an index of environmental voting compiled by the League of Conservation Voters, Ritt and Ostheimer (1974) find that Democrats ranked significantly higher than Republicans on the index. Dunlap and Gale (1974) find in the 1971 Oregon state legislature that Democratic legislators rank higher than Republicans in terms of pro-environmental voting on roll calls. Similarly, Dunlap and Allen (1976) and Kenski and Kenski (1980) conclude from examinations of the 92nd and 93rd-95th Congresses, respectively, that Democrats are indeed more favorably disposed toward environmental legislation.
Given these findings, a brief explanation of why such differences exist is in order. Clausen (1973: 143) summarizes the differences in parties by stating:

partisan differences in behavior reflect the traditional alignment of the Republican party with the business community and the ideology of free enterprise, and the Democratic party's support for the intervention of the federal government in economic affairs.

Clearly, the business community may be expected to oppose costly pollution abatement regulations because such controls are expensive and add nothing to the value of the product they are producing. Regulatory controls also require governmental intervention and this runs contrary to the Republican ideology of free enterprise. Therefore, partisan differences on environmental legislation are evident because the parties are committed to different policy goals.

Ideology

In addition to the effects of partisanship on legislator's voting decisions, the literature suggests that ideology also provides explanatory power (Clausen, 1973; Schneider, 1979; Shaffer, 1980). It is customary to think of legislators as either conservative or liberal. Although conventional understanding of these terms may be sufficient, a brief definition of their meaning is appropriate.

Central aspects of conservatism are experience (tradition), stability, and the prudent use of power. The liberal values imagination, change, and broad distribution of power resources while not being adverse to centralization of the
employment of power . . . . The liberal favors the use of government to ameliorate the ills of society, the conservative looks upon the growth of government as an unnatural and even malignant phenomenon. To the liberal, government is good; to the conservative good government is limited (Clausen, 1973: 101-102).

Given this delineation, one might conclude that conservatives are more likely to oppose active governmental involvement in environmental protection programs while liberals may advocate the use of government to deal with the problems of environmental quality. Realizing that Republicans are more conservative and Democrats more liberal leads one to obvious predictions about their policy preferences.

Mitchell (1977) provides an interesting comment on the role of ideology in the environmental area. Speaking on energy issues and ideology he states:

When people do not understand an issue they tend to moralize, and act on the basis of ideology. By ideology I mean that general body of beliefs that you consult when you have to make a judgement on something you know nothing about . . . . the energy crisis is a crisis of public policy founded on misconceptions of the issue and therefore a slave to ideology (21082).

In his study on the affects of ideology, Mitchell (1977) groups Congressmen into 22 classes using the liberal-conservative ratings of the Americans for Democratic Action. He finds a significant correlation between the natural gas deregulation vote and these ratings. He concludes that ideology is more important than partisanship and constituency variables in predicting a Congressman's voting decision on this bill.
Other studies have also found the importance of ideology in influencing legislator's voting decisions on environmental issues. In the area of government management (which includes environmental programs and regulations), Clausen (1973) finds that liberals are more supportive of these types of policies than conservatives. Ritt and Ostheimer (1974), Dunlap and Allen (1976), and Kenski and Kenski (1980) also discover that liberals vote more pro-environmentally than conservatives. Given these findings, an examination of legislative voting in the area of environmental policy should include ideology as an explanatory variable.

Constituency Characteristics

In addition to partisanship and ideology, congressional voting behavior may be influenced by constituency characteristics. This influence may arise out of a legislator's desire to accurately vote in accordance with constituency desires. In return for this type of "actual" representation (see Pitkin, 1967), a legislator expects electoral support. Miller and Stokes (1963) discuss the control a constituency can have on legislative voting behavior. They state:

Broadly speaking, the constituency can control the policy actions of the representative in two alternative ways. The first of these is for the district to choose a representative who so shares its views that in following his own convictions he does his constituents' will . . . . The second means of constituency control is for the congressman to follow his (at least tolerably accurate) perceptions of district attitude in order to win re-election. In this case constituency opinion
and the congressman's actions are connected through his perception of what the district wants (50).

Miller and Stokes (1963) found for certain issue areas, that if one knows a representative's policy view and his perception of his constituent's views, then prediction on roll call votes is quite successful.

Given these constituency influences, it is reasonable to assume that areas composed of environmentally concerned citizens will be represented by legislators which share their concern. Evidence indicates that environmental concern is positively associated with socioeconomic status and education, and negatively associated with age (Tognacci et al., 1972). Trop and Roos (1971: 53) state that "the poor, the black, and those with only a grade-school education have been least likely to care about improving environmental quality."

Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to obtain direct and accurate measures of constituency's environmental concern. Constituent's policy preferences, however, may be inferred from demographic characteristics. Early roll call studies have used this method to explain voting behavior of legislators (MacRae, 1958; Shannon, 1968; Turner and Schneider, 1970; Clausen, 1973). Similarly, in the environmental area, Ritt and Ostheimer (1974: 462) found that "Ecology minded congressmen tend to come from relatively well-to-do metropolitan districts in the East with higher proportions of white collar workers." Dunlap and
Allen (1976: 392) report that urban and socioeconomic variables are "significantly correlated with representatives' pro-environmental voting scores." Kenski and Kenski (1980) also found that support for pro-environmental voting is strongest in the east and urban and suburban districts and is weakest in the south and rural and mixed districts. Constituency characteristics, then, may also affect legislative roll call behavior.

Summary and Hypotheses

Previous studies support the assertion that partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteristics affect a legislator's support for, or opposition to, environmental legislation. To further test this conclusion, the following hypotheses are tested for the 97th Congress.

H₁ Democratic members of Congress (representatives and senators) are more supportive of environmental legislation than Republican members.

H₂ Liberal members are more supportive of environmental legislation than conservative members.

H₃ Members from the east are more supportive of environmental legislation than members from the midwest, south, or west.

H₄ The more urban a district or state is, the more supportive the members will be of environmental legislation.

H₅ The more affluent a district or state is, the more supportive the members will be of environmental legislation.
H₆ The more industrialized a district or state is, the more supportive the members will be of environmental legislation.

The following chapter is an examination of the research design employed in this study to test these hypotheses.
CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

The analytic goal of this study is to examine the impact of partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteristics on legislators' support for, or opposition to, environmental legislation in the 97th Congress. This chapter outlines the research design employed in the study and includes a discussion of the dependent and independent variables and the statistical methods utilized.

Dependent Variable

A member's support for environmental legislation serves as the dependent variable. This support is determined by ratings of the League of Conservation Voters (LCV). These ratings are based on the percentage of time each legislator voted with the League's position on selected votes. These votes involved such issues as water projects, synthetic fuels, and energy conservation (see Appendix B). Lobbyists for many leading national environmental groups select LCV's key votes; thus, the votes should represent a consensus of opinion on what constitutes pro-environmental voting (LCV, 1981).
Although the use of interest group ratings has its limitations (see Keller, 1981; Fowler, 1982; Anderson et al., 1966), scholars continue to employ these ratings in their analyses of Congress (Kingdon, 1973; Deckard and Stanley, 1974; Parker and Parker, 1979; Schneider, 1979; Abramowitz, 1980). Ritt and Ostheimer (1974: 460) justify the use of LCV ratings by stating:

(1) they are "hard data" subject to empirical analysis; (2) they allow the researcher to view each legislator's behavior over a wide variety of issues; and (3) they are considered to be important by the various groups which rate congressmen, regardless of any warnings that they may give.

In their analysis of pro-environmental voting, Kenski and Kenski (1980) also claim that the LCV scores are representative and valid.

Independent Variables

In general, the independent variables--partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteristics--are used to explain variation in members' LCV scores. The indicators used for each independent variable follows and are summarized in Table III.

Partisanship

Partisanship, of course, is determined by party affiliation. In the 97th Congress there are 193 Republicans and 242 Democrats in the House. The Senate is composed of 55 Republicans and 45 Democrats.
### TABLE III

MEASURES OF FACTORS AFFECTING CONGRESSIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL VOTING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Environmental Support&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Partisanship&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Ideology&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Constituency Characteristics&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>House</strong> (District Data)</td>
<td>LCV Score</td>
<td>Party Identification</td>
<td>ADA ACA</td>
<td>Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Median Family Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percent Blue Collar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Residential Pattern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senate</strong> (State Data)</td>
<td>LCV Score</td>
<td>Party Identification</td>
<td>ADA ACA</td>
<td>Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Affluence Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Industrialization Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percent Urbanization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>LCV scores, party identification, and ADA/ACA ratings are from *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (July 3, 1982): 1612-1619.

<sup>b</sup>Regional designations are based on *The Alamanac of American Politics* 1984. District data on median family income, percent blue collar, and residential patterns are found in CQ's *Congressional Districts in the 1970s*, 2nd ed. (1974). State data on affluence and industrialization are from Hofferbert (1968) and Morgan and Lyons (1975). Data on the percent of urbanization in each state is found in *Statistical Abstract* 1981: 12.
**Ideology**

Ideology is determined by two interest group ratings—the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA). ADA ratings are a measure of a legislator's liberalism. For example, the group opposes cuts in social programs and supports a limitation of U.S. military aid to El Salvador. ACA is a conservative group which, among other things, stands for limited government, free enterprise, and anti-communist foreign policy. Both ADA and ACA ratings are determined by the percentage of time a member voted in accordance with the group's position on their selected votes (Keller, 1982). Poole (1981: 58) confirms the validity of these scores by stating:

Many investigators over the years have used the ADA and ACA ratings as measures of liberalism/conservatism in empirical studies of Congress... the confidence investigators have had in these ratings as measures of liberalism/conservatism was not misplaced. The mean r-squares for the ACA and ADA over the ten years were .937 and .913, respectively, indicating that as measures of liberalism/conservatism the ACA and ADA ratings are good bets.

**Constituency Characteristics**

The impact of constituency on member's pro-environmental voting records is examined at the district level for the House and the state level for the Senate. In general, region, residential patterns, affluence, and industrialization are considered for both houses. With the exception of region, different measures are employed for
each level due to the unique characteristics of district and state constituencies and the availability of more sophisticated measures at the state level for affluence and industrialization.

A member's district or state is classified into one of four regions—east, south, midwest, or west (Barone, Ujifusa, 1984). There are 12 states in the east and midwest and 13 in the south and west.

A district's residential pattern is designated as either urban, suburban, non-metropolitan, or mixed according to Congressional Quarterly data which is based on Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CQ, 1974). If a district is 50 percent or more urban, suburban, or non-metropolitan then it is classified as such a district. The remaining districts which are composed of less than 50 percent of a given residential pattern are designated as mixed (Kenski and Kenski, 1980). States are classified with U.S. Census data by the percent to which they are urban (Statistical Abstract, 1981).

For congressional districts, affluence is measured by the median family income of the district and industrialization is a reflection of the percent of blue collar workers in the district. For states, more sophisticated indicators of affluence and industrialization are available and therefore employed. Hofferbert (1968), through a process of factor analysis of 21 socioeconomic variables and indicators, developed scores for each state which measure the degree to
which the state is industrial and affluent. Morgan and Lyons (1975) updated these scores and confirm their validity for determining socioeconomic distinctions among the states. These updated scores are utilized in this analysis.

Statistical Methods

To determine the effects of the three types of independent variables on pro-environmental voting, a series of crosstabulation analyses are performed. To facilitate this analysis, LCV, ACA, ADA, state urbanization, affluence, and industrialization measures are each collapsed into three categories. This division by percentages equally divides the scores into high, moderate, and low values (see Appendix A). An analysis of mean LCV scores is also performed for each category of the independent variables. In addition, Somers' d (Andrews, et al., 1981) and Cramer's V (Nie, et al., 1975) are used as measures of association to determine the extent to which the variables covary. The chi-square test of statistical significance is also employed.
NOTES

1. LCV scores are computed by dividing the number of correct votes—as defined by LCV—by the total number of votes actually cast (ignoring absences). Then one point is subtracted for each unexcused absence. Excused absences are official committee business, family business or illness, or district disaster. The 1981 ratings considered 16 Senate votes and 14 House votes (LCV, 1981). Appendix B contains a list of these votes for both houses.

2. Dunlap and Allen (1976) and Kenski and Kenski (1980) also collapse their pro-environmental voting scores into three categories. Unfortunately, neither explain the basis by which these scores are divided.

3. Somers' d is a measure of association between two ordinal variables when a distinction is made between dependent and independent variables (Andrews, et al., 1981). The statistic ranges from 0, for no association, to 1, for perfect association. See also Somers, 1962, for a discussion of this statistic.

4. Cramer's V is a measure of association between two nominal variables when at least one variable has more than two categories. Cramer's V ranges from 0, no association, to 1, perfect association (Nie, et al., 1975). In this analysis, Cramer's V is used to measure association between an ordinal and nominal variable with more than two categories. The ordinal variable is treated as nominal so that a measure of association may be employed. This technique is utilized because a consensus does not yet exist on a proper measure of association between ordinal and nominal variables with more than two categories.

5. Labeling an association between two variables as weak, moderate, or strong is a subjective determination. This author realizes the discretionary nature of this task yet engages in such labeling given his understanding of the variables and data.

6. Strictly speaking, tests of statistical significance are not appropriate except where a sample is being analyzed. Nonetheless, it has become common practice to note "significance" for population data as a way of
indicating those relationships that are especially strong or noteworthy.
CHAPTER IV

CONGRESSIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL VOTING:
A CROSSTABULATION ANALYSIS

The effects of partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteristics on pro-environmental voting were analyzed using data on the 97th Congress and district and state characteristics. The results of this analysis follows.

Partisanship

In general, the data support the existence of partisan differences on environmental issues (see Table IV). In both the House and Senate, Republicans have lower average LCV scores than do Democrats. For example, in the House, a majority of Republicans (55%) exhibit low support for environmental legislation while a majority (55%) of Democrats are highly supportive of such legislation. Similarly, in the Senate, 49 percent of the Republicans have low LCV scores while 65 percent of the Democrats have high LCV scores. A comparison of both houses indicates that Senate Republicans and Democrats are less favorable of environmental legislation than their House colleagues. Overall, partisanship and environmental support are strongly
associated \( (d = .56 \text{ House, } .57 \text{ Senate}) \) and the relationship is statistically significant \( (p < .01) \).

### TABLE IV

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTISANSHIP AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Support</th>
<th>Republicans ( \bar{x}(%) )</th>
<th>Democrats ( \bar{x}(%) )</th>
<th>All Members ( \bar{x}(%) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HOUSE(^a) - LCV Score</strong></td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SENATE(^b) - LCV Score</strong></td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Chi-Square = 118.15  
Degrees of Freedom = 2  
Significance, \( p < .01 \)  
Somers' \( d = .56 \)

\(^b\)Chi-Square = 30.01  
Degrees of Freedom = 2  
Significance, \( p < .01 \)  
Somers' \( d = .57 \)
Ideology

Ideological differences also explain variations in member's support for environmental legislation. An examination of ACA scores, which measure a member's level of conservatism, indicates that the majority of Representatives and Senators with high ACA scores are classified as low on the environmental support scale. Also, the lowest LCV scores are from members with the highest ACA scores. In other words, this negative association (d = -.66 House, -.57 Senate) implies that the more conservative a member is the less supportive he/she will be of environmental legislation (see Table V).

ADA scores, which are a measure of a member's liberalism, exhibit a strong positive association (d = .75 House, .77 Senate) with pro-environmental voting. A substantial majority of Representatives (89%) and Senators (90%) with high ADA scores also have high LCV scores. This association indicates that the more liberal a member is the more supportive he/she will be of environmental legislation (see Table VI).

Constituency Characteristics

To analyze the effects of constituency on member's environmental voting, with the exception of region, different measures are employed for district and state constituencies. These measures differ because of the unique nature of district and state constituencies and the
availability of more sophisticated indicators of industrialization and affluence at the state level. Consequently, these separate measures prevent direct comparison between the House and Senate.

### TABLE V

**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACA SCORES AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Support</th>
<th>ACA Scores</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low (%)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; - LCV Score</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; - LCV Score</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Chi-Square = 262.04  
Degrees of Freedom = 4  
Significance, p < .01  
Somers' d = -.66

<sup>b</sup>Chi-Square = 49.61  
Degrees of Freedom = 4  
Significance, p < .01  
Somers' d = -.57
### TABLE VI
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADA SCORES AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Support</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X(%)</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE$^b$ - LCV Score</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>72.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE$^c$ - LCV Score</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$To eliminate the affect of zero cells on the measure of association, LCV and ADA scores for the House and Senate are collapsed into 2 X 2 tables.

$^b$Chi-Square = 246.21  
Degrees of Freedom = 1  
Significance, $p < .01$  
Somers' $d$ = .75

$^c$Chi-Square = 57.75  
Degrees of Freedom = 1  
Significance, $p < .01$  
Somers' $d$ = .77

**Region**

To determine the effect of geographical location on environmental support, both Senators and Representatives are classified by the region of the country which they represent. An analysis of mean LCV scores by region and the
degree of association suggests that the use of such a classification system does account for variations in environmental support. As Table VII reveals, in both the House and Senate, eastern members have the highest average LCV scores and southern members have the lowest scores. The variables are moderately associated (V = .26 House; .28 Senate) and the relationship is statistically significant (p < .01). It is interesting to note that the differing strengths of regional support for environmental legislation in the Senate is mirrored in the House—even though Representatives must consider much smaller geographical constituencies.

Residential Patterns

Although residential patterns of districts and states are examined with separate measures, both indicate that the extent of urbanization affects pro-environmental voting. In the House, Representatives from urban and suburban districts have the highest average LCV scores while those who represent districts which are classified as non-metropolitan or mixed have the lowest scores. A majority (53%) of Representatives from urban districts have high LCV scores while a majority (55%) of those from non-metropolitan districts have low scores. The variables are also moderately associated with a V score of .24 (see Table VIII). Although only the extent of urbanization is examined in states, the data suggests that Senators from highly urbanized areas are the
most supportive of environmental legislation (see Table IX). The relationship, however, is somewhat weak ($d = .19$) and is not statistically significant ($p < .12$).

### TABLE VII

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGION AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Support</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Midwest</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$%$</td>
<td>$%$</td>
<td>$%$</td>
<td>$%$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE$^a$ - LCV Score</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE$^b$ - LCV Score</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$Chi-Square = 58.46
Degrees of Freedom = 6
Significance, $p < .01$
Cramer's $V = .26$

$^b$Chi-Square = 16.81
Degrees of Freedom = 6
Significance, $p < .01$
Cramer's $V = .28$
### TABLE VIII

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISTRICT RESIDENTIAL PATTERNS AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT IN THE HOUSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Support</th>
<th>Residential Pattern</th>
<th>[%]</th>
<th>[%]</th>
<th>[%]</th>
<th>[%]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Suburban</td>
<td>Non-metro-politan</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE - LCV Score</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square = 50.91  
Degrees of Freedom = 6  
Significance, p < .01  
Cramer's V = .24

### TABLE IX

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE URBANIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT IN THE SENATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Support</th>
<th>Urbanization</th>
<th>[%]</th>
<th>[%]</th>
<th>[%]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square = 7.12  
Degrees of Freedom = 4  
Significance, p < .12  
Somers' d = .19
Affluence

The extent of affluence in a district or state is moderately associated ($d = .27$ House, .39 Senate) with a member's support for environmental legislation. Representatives from districts with the highest median family income have the highest average LCV scores (see Table X). An examination of state affluence, as determined by Hofferbert (1968), also indicates that those states which are classified as the most affluent have the highest LCV scores (see Table XI). In both cases, the relationships are statistically significant.

### TABLE X
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME OF A DISTRICT AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT IN THE HOUSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Support</th>
<th>Median Family Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low (x%) %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HOUSE - LCV Score</strong></td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square = 45.01
Degrees of Freedom = 4
Significance, $p < .01$
Somers' $d = .27$
TABLE XI
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AFFLUENCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT IN THE SENATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Support</th>
<th>Low (%)</th>
<th>Moderate (%)</th>
<th>High (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SENATE - LCV Score</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>.40.1</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square = 21.16
Degrees of Freedom = 4
Significance, p < .01
Somers' d = .39

Industrialization

At the district level, industrialization is measured by the proportion of blue collar workers in the district (see Table XII). The data suggests that a significant relationship between industrialization and environmental support does not exist (p < .38). At the state level, although the relationship between industrialization and environmental support is not strong (d = .24), it is significant (p < .05). Senators from the most industrialized states, also defined by Hofferbert (1968), have the highest average LCV scores. A majority (53%) of Senators from these highly
industrialized states also exhibit the highest level of environmental support (see Table XIII). The absence of a significant relationship between industrialization and environmental support at the district level may be attributed to either the crudeness of the measure or the lack of association between the variables.

### TABLE XII

**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROPORTION OF BLUE COLLAR WORKERS IN A DISTRICT AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT IN THE HOUSE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Support</th>
<th>Percent Blue Collar Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low $\overline{X}$(%) $%$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE - LCV Score</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square = 4.15
Degrees of Freedom = 4
Significance, $p < .38$
Somers' d = -.01
TABLE XIII
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT IN THE SENATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Support</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X(%)</td>
<td>X(%)</td>
<td>X(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE - LCV Score</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square = 9.40
Degrees of Freedom = 4
Significance, p < .05
Somers' d = .24

In summary, an analysis of data for the 97th Congress indicates that partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteristics affect a legislator's support for, or opposition to, environmental legislation. Specific findings of this study are:

- Democratic members are more supportive of environmental legislation than Republicans.
- Liberal members are more supportive of environmental legislation than conservative members.
- Members from the east are the most supportive of environmental legislation, while those from the south are the least supportive.
Representatives from urban and suburban districts are more supportive of environmental legislation than those from non-metropolitan and mixed districts.

- The more urbanized a state is, the more supportive the Senator is of environmental legislation.
- The more affluent a district is, the more supportive the Representative is of environmental legislation.
- The more affluent a state is, the more supportive the Senator is of environmental legislation.
- The more industrialized a state is, the more supportive the Senator is of environmental legislation.

In general, all hypothesized relationships posited in Chapter II were supported by the data except for the relationship between district industrialization and environmental support. As previously mentioned, the crudeness of the measure or the lack of association between the variables may account for the failure of the data to support this hypothesis.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

In general, this study supports the findings of previous examinations in this area of inquiry and confirms the influence of partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteristics on environmental voting behavior. This study also indicates that the influence of these factors has persisted under an administration which values economic growth over the previously strong commitment to environmental quality considerations. The persistence of these influences may indicate that legislators rely more heavily on pressures and cues from their party, ideology, and constituency than from presidential priorities. If this is indeed true, presidents should expect to find it difficult to substantially affect legislators' environmental voting decisions.

This examination extended previous studies by considering the factors affecting senatorial environmental voting. Partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteristics were all found to be important variables affecting Senators' environmental voting behavior. Senators were found, however, to be less favorable of environmental legislation than Representatives. The mean LCV scores for
Senators is 42.8 while Representatives have a mean score of 48.9. This finding is somewhat surprising given the influence that liberals have had in the Senate (Foley, 1980). Perhaps this difference in environmental support is attributable to the Republican majority in the Senate and the Democratic majority in the House. The variation may also be related to the differing constituencies of Representatives and Senators.

Average LCV scores in both the House and Senate may be considered somewhat low with both scores below 50 percent. Environmentalists might claim that, in general, legislators are not adequately protecting the environment. It is possible, however, that legislators are merely being affected by the lack of public consensus on economic and environmental issues mentioned in Chapter I. Consequently, in the absence of clear citizen preferences, legislators may be unsure of how to best represent their constituents. As a result, voting decisions may significantly vary as legislators seek to resolve vacillating constituency views and preferences.

Overall, this study may provide explanatory and predictive power in the area of economic-environmental policy. At the individual level, if one knows a member's party, ideology, and constituency characteristics, then he may make assumptions about the members' level of support for environmental legislation. For example, given the findings of this study, if a member is democratic, liberal, and from the east
he is more likely to support environmental legislation than a member which is Republican, conservative, and southern. Similarly, at the aggregate level of the House or Senate, one may assume that if a majority of a house is Democratic and liberal then they are more likely to produce pro-environmental policies. Such generalizations may be used to understand individual and collective policy decisions.

Knowledge and understanding of legislators' dispositions toward environmental issues provides citizens and interest groups with valuable information. For example, those among these groups which are environmentally concerned may choose to support Democrats and liberals over Republicans and conservatives. This knowledge, then, allows particular inputs to be channelled to the most receptive facets of the economic-environmental policy process.

While the legislative branch and voting behavior served as the focal point of this analysis, it is necessary to again emphasize that the Congress is but one arena among many which may be used to examine the economic-environmental policy process. In addition, partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteristics do not wholly constitute the universe of factors which influence congressional voting. They are, however, significant factors which are related to environmental voting behavior. Further research is needed to determine what influence these factors have on environmental voting over time as well as the independent effects
they have on policy decisions. Measures for these factors may also be expanded and improved for future analyses.

In conclusion, the resolution of conflicts arising in the economic-environmental nexus provides a variety of unique problems for both citizens and legislators. To resolve these conflicts, the legislative branch will continue to debate and vote on policies which may have substantial impacts on the quality of life for all citizens. An understanding of factors affecting these decisions may be important to those interested in influencing the outcome of this policy process. Therefore, knowledge of the impact of partisanship, ideology, and constituency characteristics on legislators' environmental voting behavior may facilitate the effective channelization of demands and preferences within the economic-environmental policy process.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A

RECODED MEASURES
### TABLE XIV
VALUES OF RECODED MEASURES FOR HOUSE AND SENATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCV</td>
<td>0 - 33</td>
<td>34 - 62</td>
<td>63 - 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>0 - 29</td>
<td>30 - 70</td>
<td>71 - 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>0 - 30</td>
<td></td>
<td>31 - 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Income</td>
<td>0 - 8,550</td>
<td>8,551 - 103,550</td>
<td>103,551 - 171,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Blue-Collar</td>
<td>0 - 32</td>
<td>33 - 39</td>
<td>40 - 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCV</td>
<td>0 - 25</td>
<td>26 - 48</td>
<td>49 - 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>0 - 38</td>
<td>39 - 67</td>
<td>76 - 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>0 - 30</td>
<td></td>
<td>31 - 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affluence</td>
<td>-2.224</td>
<td>-.299</td>
<td>.369 - 1.823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td>0 - 32</td>
<td>33 - 39</td>
<td>40 - 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>33.8 - 62.3</td>
<td>62.7 - 73.3</td>
<td>73.6 - 91.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*To facilitate crosstabulation analyses, each variable was collapsed into three categories. This division by percentages equally divides the scores into low, moderate, and high values. Collapsing the variables by equally dividing the potential range of scores (e.g. ACA 0-34, 35-67, 68-100) into thirds does not significantly change the resulting degree of association. Also, this technique results in zero cells which distort the measure of association.*
APPENDIX B

LCV HOUSE AND SENATE VOTES
LCV HOUSE VOTES*

1. Gramm (D-TX) – Latta (R-OH) substitute to the Budget Committee's fiscal year 1982 First Budget Target Resolution. This was the substitute supported by the Reagan Administration, to set its initial budget targets and reduce non-military spending by $180 billion over several years. About $18 billion of these cuts came out of energy, environmental and natural resource programs. Environmentalists oppose the substitute.

2. Bolling (D-MO) motion to allow separate votes on funding cuts for individual programs (including energy and the environment), in the fiscal year 1982 Budget Reconciliation bill. Environmentalists believe they would have fared much better had the lawmakers been forced to vote separately on energy and environmental programs and consider them on their merits. Therefore, they favor the motion.

3. Dannemeyer (R-CA) amendment to a fiscal 1982 appropriations bill to forbid the Environmental Protection Agency from spending money to enforce Clean Air Act requirements for vehicle emissions inspection and maintenance programs. Environmentalists oppose the amendment.

4. Pritchard (R-WA) – Edgar (D-PA) amendment to the fiscal year 1982 Energy and Water Development appropriations bill to remove $189 million for the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. Environmentalists are against the development of the Waterway, and therefore favor the amendment.
5. Conte (R-MA) – Dingell (D-MI) amendment to fiscal year 1982 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill to delete $4 million in planning funds for the Garrison Diversion Water Project in North Dakota. Environmentalists do not support the development of the Project.

6. Bevill (D-AL) motion to the fiscal year 1982 Energy and Water Appropriations Conference to agree to a Senate amendment allowing construction to continue on the Garrison Diversion Water Project. Environmentalists strongly objected to this attempt to disregard the environmental impacts, circumvent the federal courts and violate U.S. Treaty obligations.

7. Frank (D-MA) amendment to the Fiscal year 1982 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill to delete $17.8 million for the Stonewall Jackson Dam in West Virginia and prohibit further federal spending on the project. Environmentalists favor this amendment and oppose the Dam.

8. Loeffler (R-TX) motion to recommit for further cuts the House-Senate Conference Report on appropriations for the Department of Interior, Forest Service, and some Department of Energy programs. Environmentalists were against the motion and further budget cuts in these programs.

9. Simon (D-IL) amendment to the fiscal year 1982 Defense Authorizations bill to require advance approval of both houses of Congress before the funds in the bill could be spent on a basing mode for the MX missile.
10. Rousselot (R-CA) amendment to the Labor-Health Appropriations bill, to stop enforcement of the Mine Safety and Health Administration regulations for surface mining of sand, gravel, and stone. Environmentalists oppose the amendment which they feel will decrease protection for miners.

11. Zablocki (D-WI) - Pritchard (R-WA) motion to adopt a Joint Resolution expressing dismay at the U.S. vote against the World Health Organization's international marketing code for infant formula. Environmentalists believe that the U.S government has the responsibility to restrict the export of dangerous products and thus favor the amendment.

12. Weber (R-MN) - Wolpe (D-MI) amendment to the fiscal year 1982 Interior Appropriations bill to remove $135 million for a solvent refined coal demonstration plant in Newman, Kentucky. Environmentalists favor the amendment and oppose the solvent refined coal plant.

13. Coughlin (R-PA) amendment to the Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill to delete the $228 million appropriated for the Clinch River nuclear breeder reactor. Environmentalists favor the amendment.

14. Derrick (D-SC) - Corcoran (R-IL) amendment to the fiscal year 1982 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill to transfer $10 million in research
money away from the privately owned Burnwell Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facility in South Carolina, and spend it on government nuclear waste research instead. Environmentalists favor the amendment.
1. Nomination of James Watt to be Secretary of Interior. Environmentalists oppose Watt's nomination.

2. Nomination of John Crowell to be Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for Natural Resources and Environment. Environmentalists oppose Crowell's nomination.

3. Garn (R-UT) motion to table (kill) the Hart (D-CO) amendment to the fiscal year 1982 Continuing Appropriations. The Hart amendment would have restored funding for the Environmental Protection Agency and the Council on Environmental Quality to levels contained in the Conference Report. Environmentalists oppose the motion.

4. Metzenbaum (D-OH) and Heinz (R-PA) amendment to the fiscal year 1982 Budget targets to reduce funding for water projects by $300 million. Environmentalists favor the amendment.

5. Percy (R-IL) - Moynihan (D-NY) amendment to the fiscal year 1982 Energy and Water Development Appropriations to remove $189 million for the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. Environmentalists favor the amendment.

6. Mattingly (R-GA) amendment to make a 5% cut of $380 million in the fiscal year 1982 Appropriations for the Department of Interior, Forest Service, and some Department of Energy programs. Environmentalists oppose the amendment.

7. Tower (R-TX) motion to table (kill) the Levin (D-MI) - Kassenbaum (R-KS) amendment to the fiscal year 1982
Defense Authorization bill to require advance approval of both houses of Congress before the funds in the bill could be spent on a basing mode for the MX Missile. Environmentalists favor the amendment.

8. Proxmire (D-WI) - Nickles (R-OK) amendment to the fiscal year 1982 Interior Appropriations bill to remove $139 million for a solvent refined coal demonstration plant in Newman, Kentucky. Environmentalists favor the amendment.

9. Johnston (D-LA) motion to kill the Bumpers (D-AR) - Humphrey (R-NH) amendment to the Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill to reduce by half the money for the Clinch River nuclear breeder reactor. Environmentalists oppose the motion.

10. Kennedy (D-MA) amendment to the Budget Reconciliation Act to reduce the nuclear fission research and development budget by $309 million. Environmentalists favor the amendment.


12. Mitchell (D-ME) - Cohen (R-ME) amendment to the fiscal year 1982 Interior Appropriations bill to add $27.5
million for energy conservation and weatherization of low-income homes. Environmentalists favor the amend-
ment.

13. Dole (R-KS) amendment to the fiscal year 1982 Interior Appropriations bill to cut $7 million for the Residen-
tial Conservation Service. Environmentalists oppose the amendment.

14. Chafee (R-RI) amendment to the Budget Reconciliation bill to restore $500 million for public transportation and $100 million to help poor people insulate their homes. Environmentalists favor the amendment.

15. Kasten (R-WI) amendment to the Noise Control Authoriza-
tion bill to keep federal authority to preempt state noise control standards for new motorcycles. Environmentalists oppose the amendment.

16. Byrd (D-WV) - Specter (R-PA) amendment to exempt the Mine Safety and Health Administration from the 4% funding cut in the fiscal year 1982 Continuing Appropriations Resolution. Environmentalists favor the amendment.

* This information on votes is taken directly from LCV's 1981 Voting Chart. More specific information on these votes may also be found in this publication.
VITA

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Candidate for the Degree of
Master of Arts

Thesis: CONGRESSIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL VOTING: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF PARTISANSHIP, IDEOLOGY, AND CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS

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