THE SEMANTICS OF OLD AND NEW RHETORICAL

TERMINOLOGY: A CLOSE EXAMINATION

OF ETHOS

By

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PREFACE

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The environment in which discourse operates has
become more and more complex since the time of Aristotle.
To accommodate the increasing complexity of the environ-
ment, discourse has undergone several modifications.
It changed from pure public oratory to written discourse,
and it changed from mainly persuasive content to four major
types of content: expressive, referential, literary, and
persuasive. As discourse progressed into the twentieth
century, the emphasis on the subjective and the emotional
aspects of discourse gradually diminished, states Richard
Weaver, the spotlight having shifted to scientific methods
and logic (201). Weaver believes that this shifting of
emphasis contributed largely to the downfall of rhetoric, a
discipline which depended heavily on the appeal to the
rational _and_ the emotional aspects of man, causing the once
noble and most honored discipline in the humanities to
become less and less important as a standard both for the
composition and the criticism of discourse (201).

The downfall of rhetoric since the turn of the century

coincided with the appearance of new terminology in composition literature. Terms such as _voice, stance, tone, inductive_ and _deductive logic_ have gradually replaced the rhetorical terms _ethos, pathos,_ and _logos_. The physical appearance of the new terms is obviously different from that of the traditional Greek counterparts; the new terms are pronounced differently, they look more familiar, and they come from different languages. However, does the meaning of the new terminology differ substantially from that of the old? This question has not attracted much attention from researchers. Most researchers appear to accept the replacement of one term with another; few seem interested enough to investigate whether the new terminology actually changed the essential meaning conveyed by the traditional rhetorical terminology.

This paper represents one researcher's effort to answer the question of whether the meaning of the new terminology differs substantially from that of the traditional terminology. However, to compare and contrast all the replaced rhetorical terms with their new counterparts would be a monumental undertaking beyond the scope of this thesis. To keep the topic within a manageable scope, I chose in this paper to investigate only one classical rhetorical term and its new counterparts. The result of this investigation should shed some light on the question

regarding the substitution of meaning. Ideally the result of this investigation will stimulate interest in similar research.

The rhetorical term I chose to investigate is _ethos_ because of the emphasis Aristotle placed on _ethos_. In his _Rhetoric,_ Aristotle describes _ethos_ as "the most potent of all the means to persuasion" (Cooper 9). Given the choice of the entire pool of rhetorical terms, I believe it appropriate to investigate the most significant component of rhetoric. Thus the choice of _ethos_.

The first step in any investigation of terminology should be to define the meaning of the crucial terms, and I do not intend to break from that tradition. However, an attempt to define _ethos_ can be a difficult task, because there is no consensus among rhetoricians about the definition of _ethos_. Students of rhetoric tend to quote or refer to one famous rhetorician's specific definition rather than to a consensus definition. This lack of consensus may be attributed to the long history of rhetoric or to the lack of academic conferences in ancient times. Nevertheless, the problem with scattered, individualized definitions can be solved in two ways. One solution is to combine the elements offered in all the individualized definitions into one general definition. This solution has one drawback: the eventual general definition will be too cumbersome,

broad, and possibly self-contradictory to be useful as a standard. The second solution is to pick out two extremes from the individualized definitions and propose a working definition of ethos along a continuum between the two extremes. The resulting continuum may encompass all the individualized definitions and still be accurate enough to serve as a standard. I chose to adopt the second solution in seeking a general, working definition of ethos.

A preliminary survey of the ancient Greek and Roman rhetoricians' individualized definitions reveals that ethos can be limited by two extremes. One extreme defines ethos as the portrayal of the human character of the speaker or writer, implying human goodness, morality, and virtues. The other extreme presents ethos as any technique, ethical or otherwise, that will help the orator to appear to be a worthy individual so that he can attain his persuasive goals. The results of this preliminary survey indicate that the interpretational continuum for ethos appears to be anchored by two poles, normative and utilitarian. Ideally, ethos should paint a moral and ethical portrait of the orator or that of his client. However, to attain this normative image, the orator must use techniques that may or may not be consistent with the moral and ethical image. In other words, the end is lofty and pure, but, for the speaker to reach this lofty end, means which

are not so pure but are quite useful may be employed.
Definitions of _ethos_ move along this continuum throughout
the ages. Indeed, quite often the definition of a single
rhetorician swings from one extreme to another. The
rhetorician will define _ethos_ as the purest sentiment on
earth, and then advise techniques not so pure to attain the
goal. Because each rhetorician holds such conflicting
views of _ethos_, it is difficult to rank a rhetorician along
the continuum. It is easier, however, to place his
internally inconsistent views at the appropriate spots
along the continuum. This latter method, which is adopted
in later chapters, will help eliminate confusion in
examining the usually internally inconsistent views of
ethos.

Before I can engage in a comparison of _ethos_ and its
twentieth-century counterparts, I need to supply a back-
ground of the origin and the definitions of _ethos_ through-
out the ages to clarify the essential meaning of the term.
Consequently, Chapter II and Chapter III will be devoted
to an historical survey of the most important rhetoricians'
views of _ethos_. The rhetoricians surveyed in these two
chapters are chosen because they are probably the most
influential and because their definitions of _ethos_ are the
most often quoted. In Chapter IV, I will investigate the
similarities and differences between _ethos_ and its twen-

tieth-century counterparts. Chapter V will summarize
my findings.

CHAPTER II

ETHOS AS DEFINED BY GREEK AND ROMAN RHETORICIANS:
ARISTOTLE, QUINTILIAN, AND CICERO

Aristotle

Ethos was first defined by Aristotle, the father of rhetoric. His definition of ethos set down the guidelines that the majority of rhetoricians followed until the turn of this century. In his Rhetoric (c. 333 B.C.), Aristotle divides all persuasive appeals into three categories: logos, pathos, and ethos. Logos appeals to the audience through logical argument; pathos appeals to the audience by engaging the audience's emotions; and ethos appeals to the audience by the speaker's "evincing through the speech a personal character that will win the confidence of the listener" (Cooper xxxvii). This "personal character" can be that of the speaker or that of his client, depending on the occasion. The past reputation of either the speaker or his client cannot be considered as part of the "personal character." Instead the personal character portrayed in the speech should be created by the speech itself (Cooper 8).

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A personal character that can inspire the confidence of the audience cannot be immoral or unethical. On the contrary, Aristotle believes that the personal character of the speaker as portrayed in the speech must be virtuous, noble, and above reproach (Cooper 46). To properly portray a personal character in a speech, Aristotle states, the speaker should have a thorough knowledge of human character, which involves knowing how to evince intelligence, good character, and good will through the speech (Cooper 92).

To portray intelligence and good character in the speech, advised Aristotle, the speaker should portray himself or his client as "just, courageous, liberal [generous], temperate, magnanimous, sagacious, magnificent, gentle, and wise" (Cooper 47). Mentioning deeds that are performed in the spirit of the above nine virtues in the speech can also produce the same desired effect of portraying intelligence and good character (Cooper 48-9).

To evince goodwill, advises Aristotle, the speaker should have a thorough knowledge of important human emotions such as anger, mildness, love, hatred, fear, confidence, shame, shamelessness, benevolence and the lack of it, pity, indignation, envy, emulation, and contempt (Cooper 93-131). For each emotion, Aristotle discussed in detail three aspects: (1) the mental state of the person

aroused by the emotion, (2) the kind of people who usually arouse the emotion in the person, and (3) the things that easily make a person feel that emotion (Cooper 92). To evince good will, says Aristotle, the speaker should know the three aspects of each emotion so that he can put the audience in the right state of mind, receptive to the speaker and the purpose of the speech (Cooper 91).

In his discussion of ethos, Aristotle was mainly concerned with the ways of creating the impressions of a personal character in a speech. He was not concerned with the speaker's true personal character, a lack of concern that comes from Aristotle's definition of rhetoric: the "faculty of discovering in the particular case . . . the available means of persuasion" (Cooper 7). In other words, Aristotle was interested in investigating and teaching the means to achieve persuasion. Thus, regardless of the speaker's past reputation and his true character, as long as the speaker mastered the techniques of creating an appropriate personal character for a particular speech, he could sway the judgment of the audience in his favor. Aristotle's emphasis on techniques and his lack of interest in the speaker's true character place his definition of ethos closer to the utilitarian pole of the continuum than to the normative pole. Graphically, the location of Aristotle's definition on the continuum should be close to

the area where the normative half blends into the utili-
tarian half (see Appendix).

Marcus Tullius Cicero

Cicero, holding a different view of ethos in his
Oratory (c. 45 B.C.), believed that an orator should be a
"good man" and that ethos referred to the goodness of the
orator, not to the character to be created in the speech
(105-6). However, Cicero did not define goodness, nor did
he offer a criterion for measuring goodness. Cicero's
translator, J. S. Watson, offers a reason for the rather
short discussion on the goodness of the orator. Watson
states that Cicero "thinks a good character [is] of great
importance in an orator," though Cicero does not deny that
much eloquence may at times be found in a man of bad
character (Oratory 105).

This internally inconsistent view of ethos makes
placing Cicero's definition of ethos on the continuum a
little more difficult. By definition, Cicero's view of
ethos belongs to the normative pole of the continuum.
However, Cicero's reluctance to state that a bad man cannot
be an orator indicates that Cicero does not hold as extreme
a view as the definition might suggest. Consequently, in
placing Cicero's definition of ethos on the continuum, I
chose to place it in the normative half of the continuum

but close to the area where the normative half blends into the utilitarian half (see Appendix).

The same problem with internal consistency appears in Cicero's discussion of the techniques that an orator can employ. Cicero claims that the secret to rhetorical victory lies in the orator's possessing a minute and thorough knowledge of all the details involved in each situation: a thorough preparation, a thorough knowledge of all the rhetorical skills, and a good presentation of the speaker's or his client's character (Oratory 110). These four elements are "more easily adorned by eloquence if they really exist, than [they are] invented if they have no existence" (Oratory 132). This statements implies that particulars involving the four elements may sometimes be invented. However, in making this statement, Cicero was not condoning cheating or the use of techniques that are inconsistent with his definition of ethos. Rather he was pointing out that goodness and skills alone do not always guarantee victory, nor do lack of them guarantee defeat.

In placing on the continuum Cicero's discussion of techniques to project the orator's or his client's character, I face the same problem as I did with placing his definition of ethos. Cicero's discussion contains extremely utilitarian views, such as inventing details if necessary, and views that are utilitarian but not extreme,

such as advice to know the subject matter and the audience.
The extreme views are not typical of Cicero's practice or
advice, so I placed his discussion of techniques in the
middle of the utility half of the continuum (see Appendix).

Marcus Fabius Quintilianus

Like Cicero, Quintilian also views *ethos* differently
from Aristotle. In his *Institutes of Oratory* (c. 88 A.D.),
Quintilian states that *ethos* refers to the "moral goodness"
of the speaker, not to a created personal character in the
speech (2:391-402). Quintilian's view of *ethos* is consis-
tent with his distinction between orators and those who are
merely eloquent. He claims that orators possess *ethos*,
defined as moral goodness, while those who are merely
eloquent lack the moral goodness of the orators
(2:391-402). In making the distinction between an orator
and one who is merely eloquent, Quintilian solved Cicero's
dilemma of being unable to claim that only a man with a
good character can be an orator.

In his discussion of the qualities of the orator,
Quintilian went a step further than merely defining *ethos*
as the moral goodness of the speaker. He equated *ethos*
with sainthood. The orator Quintilian envisions must be
"a man who, being possessed of the highest natural genius,
stores his mind thoroughly with the most valuable kinds of

knowledge; a man sent by the gods to do honour to the
world, and such as no preceding age has known; a man in
every way eminent and excellent, a thinker of the best
thoughts and a speaker of the best language" (2: 397).
Quintilian's description of the qualities, or _ethos_, of the
orator qualifies his view for placement on the normative
pole of the continuum. Graphically, this location should
be right on the pole. It is difficult to envision a more
extreme view of _ethos_ (see Appendix).

However normative his definition of _ethos_ is, Quinti-
lian has a surprisingly utilitarian view of the techniques
that an orator can employ to attain his persuasive goals.
The saintly orator can employ all rhetorical techniques,
even those which are not consistent with sainthood, such as
"withhold[ing] the truth from the judge" (Quintilian
2:399). Such acts are permissible as long as the orator
always possesses "uprightness of intention" (Quintilian
2: 402). Thus the unsaintly means justify the saintly
ends. Obviously, Quintilian's view of the techniques that
an orator can employ is very different from his view of the
qualities of an orator. On the continuum, his view of the
rhetorical techniques available to an orator should be
located close to the utilitarian pole, indeed, closer to
that pole than Aristotle's because Aristotle never went so
far as to advise hiding the truth from the audience (see

Appendix).

Quintilian seems to deal in extremes. His model for
an orator is extremely normative, while his advice on
techniques certainly leans toward the opposite extreme.
Cicero's views are not split into such extremes. His
definition of ethos and his advice about rhetorical
techniques tend to lean toward the area where the normative
and the utility halves converge. Thus Cicero expresses
both some normative and utilitarian views, quite inconsis-
tent and paradoxically quite practical. Quintilian,
however, held more extreme views.

Both Cicero and Quintilian believe that ethos should
refer to the real character of the speaker, not merely to
the character created by the speech. As we shall see in
the following chapters, their view of ethos triumphed
frequently over that of Aristotle in later centuries.

CHAPTER III

ECCLESIASTICAL, EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY, AND NINETEENTH-

CENTURY RHETORICIANS: ST. AUGUSTINE,

CAMPBELL, BLAIR, WHATELY

AND CHANNING

Saint Augustine

Saint Augustine wrote on the subject of eloquence to
set a model for ecclesiastical students to follow in their
ecclesiastical careers. In his On Christian Doctrine (c.
426 A.D.), Saint Augustine was not interested in teaching
"the rules of rhetoric" which he had learned and taught in
secular schools (118). Rather he wanted to paint a picture
of what the ideal preacher should be and to describe how
the ecclesiastical students should go about attaining such
a status. True to his purpose, Saint Augustine did not
organize his treatise on the basis of rhetorical cate-
gories, nor did he discuss any specific rhetorical termino-
logy. As a result, the term ethos was not discussed
directly in On Christian Doctrine. Instead ethos was
discussed under the general terms of how an ecclesiastical
student can attain eloquence.

Before discussing Saint Augustine's ideas concerning ethos, we need to gain an understanding of his concept of eloquence. Saint Augustine regards eloquence as a tool that can be employed successfully by both truth and falsehood: "the faculty of eloquence, which is of great value in urging either evil or justice, is in itself indifferent" (On Christian Doctrine 118). In admitting openly that eloquence can be employed successfully both by evil and goodness, Saint Augustine went a step further than Cicero, a secular rhetorician whom Saint Augustine greatly admired. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Cicero only implied that eloquence can be found in a man of bad character, but Saint Augustine left no room for doubt regarding the relationship between eloquence and truth and falsehood.

Saint Augustine had a reason for stating so clearly the relationship between eloquence and truth and falsehood: to shake the ecclesiastical students out of their complacence and their belief that truth equals eloquence. A reading of Saint Augustine's On Christian Doctrine leaves one with the impression that the ecclesiastical students were content to disregard the techniques of rhetoric, believing that truth, which was on their side, would miraculously effect desirable changes in the audience. Well schooled in secular rhetoric, Saint Augustine did not believe that truth without eloquence can effect any

favorable changes in the audience at all. The following statement indicates clearly the relationship that Saint Augustine perceived between eloquence, truth, and falsehood.

> For since by means of the art of rhetoric both truth and falsehood are urged, who would dare to say that truth should stand in the person of its defenders unarmed against lying, so that they who wish to urge falsehoods may know how to make their listeners benevolent, or attentive, or docile in their presentation, while the defenders of truth are ignorant of that art? Should they speak briefly, clearly, and plausibly while the defenders of truth speak so that they tire their listeners, make themselves difficult to understand and what they have to say dubious? Should they oppose the truth with fallacious arguments and assert falsehoods, while the defenders of truth have no ability either to defend the truth or to oppose the false? Should they, urging the minds of their listeners into error, ardently exhort them, moving them by speech so that they terrify, sadden, and exhilarate them, while the defenders of truth are sluggish, cold, and somnolent? (118)

Clearly, Saint Augustine wanted the ecclesiastical students to master the techniques of eloquence. Armed with these techniques, they can "teach, delight, and move" the audience, stating truth or justice in "pleasing" terms so that "the just rather than the wicked [will] be more willingly heard" (On Christian Doctrine 137-9). He regards an individual as eloquent who can "teach, delight, and

persuade" and who will be heard "intelligently, willingly, and obediently" (On Christian Doctrine 142). In not using persuasion as the sole test of eloquence, Saint Augustine may have made the goal of eloquence more attainable for the ecclesiastical students. Such an attainable goal as compared to a vague goal of persuasion (it is difficult to measure the audience's acceptance of the speaker's view) may have better served Saint Augustine's purpose for writing his treatise--to help the ecclesiastical students be better servants of God.

Saint Augustine's ideas regarding ethos evolve from his concept of eloquence. Because he did not intend his writing to be a textbook on rhetoric, Saint Augustine did not set down specific techniques whereby his readers could learn how to create ethos in their speeches. Instead he discussed two phases of ethos: one phase containing his ideas about what the ecclesiastical students should do; and the other phase containing ideas about what the ecclesiastical students can do. In discussing what ecclesiastical students should do, Saint Augustine states that an ecclesiastical student should be "the expositor and teacher of the Divine Scripture, the defender of right faith and the enemy of error . . . [he] should both teach the good and extirpate the evil. And in this labor of words, he should conciliate those who are opposed, arouse

those who are remiss, and teach those ignorant of his
subject what is occurring and what they should expect" (On
Christian Doctrine 120-121) (italics mine). The lofty and
abstract diction of this statement corresponds to that of
Quintilian in his discussion of the ideal orator. In both
Saint Augustine's and Quintilian's discussion, the goal was
an ideal, a normative model, a goal that one should work
toward but not necessarily attain. The repetition of the
word should in the statement bears evidence that the
discussion is geared toward what should be, not what is.
The discussion in the following paragraphs will further
substantiate my claim that the goal set forth by Saint
Augustine was considered to be an ideal, but not ne-
cessarily attainable, goal.

In discussing what the ecclesiastical students can
do, Saint Augustine states that the ecclesiastical students
need to learn the techniques of rhetoric so that they can
state the truth in such a manner that the speech not only
teaches but also delights and persuades (On Christian
Doctrine 137). Saint Augustine also warned the ecclesias-
tical students against employing eloquence devoid of
content, quoting Cicero's statement that "wisdom without
eloquence is of small benefit to states; but eloquence
without wisdom is often extremely injurious and profits no
one" (On Christian Doctrine 121).

Regarding the character of the ecclesiastical student, Saint Augustine states that the ecclesiastical student in his personal life does not have to follow the standards that he preaches to his congregation. He states that a preacher "who speaks wisely and eloquently, but lives wickedly, may benefit many students" (On Christian Doctrine 164). This comment implies that the character of the preacher should be created by the speech; the true character or the reputation of the preacher are, in Saint Augustine's view, not usually relevant to the issue of eloquence.

However, Saint Augustine does concede that a good character can benefit the preacher greatly under three situations. The first situation occurs when those who live evil lives use the discrepancy between the preacher's personal life and his preaching as an excuse for not accepting the content of his preaching (On Christian Doctrine 165). At such times, being consistent "in word, in conduct, in charity, in faith, [and] in chastity" will carry more weight than being merely eloquent (On Christian Doctrine 165). The second situation occurs when the preacher fails to master the techniques of eloquence (On Christian Doctrine 166). His only choice then would be to use the strict conformity between his preaching and his way of living as a substitute for lack of eloquence. The

example set by his way of living will be as eloquent as a
well-delivered and eloquent speech in preaching the words
of God. The third and not the least important situation
arises when the preacher would like to "prepare a reward
for himself" (On Christian Doctrine 166). As Saint
Augustine put it, the preacher who "lives wickedly . . . is
unprofitable to his own soul," while the preacher who lives
according to the standard he preaches prepares rewards for
himself (On Christian Doctrine 164-6).

Except for the last situation, the character of the
preacher is used as a mean to persuasion. Thus, for Saint
Augustine, the character of the preacher functions as a
backup for the ethos created by the speech. When the
content of the speech is questioned, the good character of
the preacher functions as a refutation of frivolous
excuses. And when the ethos is not created very well in
the speech due to the preacher's lack of training in
rhetoric, the good character of the preacher compensates
for the poorly created ethos in the preaching. This use
of the character of the preacher as a means of persuasion
indicates that Saint Augustine regards ethos both as
created by the speech and by the orator's reputation. The
amount of emphasis laid on the former indicates that Saint
Augustine tends to regard ethos as created by the speech.

Saint Augustine's use of two phases for ethos--one

normative, dictating what should be, and one positive, describing what is--diminished the gap between this divine teacher of the words of God and the secular rhetoricians that came before him. His normative phase is no different from Quintilian's, and his positive phase is similar to Cicero's though at a more developed stage. Consequently, in placing Saint Augustine's two phases of ethos on the continuum, I placed the normative phase close to the point that denotes Quintilian's definition of ethos (right next to the normative pole) and the positive phase to the right of Cicero's definition of ethos (see Appendix).

George Campbell

George Campbell devoted little space to ethos in his The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776). His lack of enthusiasm about ethos is understandable since he did not consider ethos as a means of persuasion. Campbell believed that ethos, properly subsumed under pathos, should be considered as a means of persuasion through emotion.

Short as his discussion of ethos is, Campbell still considered ethos from two perspectives, the personal morality of the speaker and the practical techniques of gaining ethos. Regarding the morality of the speaker, Campbell follows closely the Ciceronian belief that "in order to be a successful orator, one must be a good man;

for to be good is the only sure way of being long esteemed good, and to be esteemed good is previously necessary to one's being heard with due attention and regard" (97). This comment might lead one to believe that Campbell believes ethos comes from the speaker's reputation. Actually, he believes that ethos comes from both the creation in the speech and the speaker's reputation. For instance, he defines ethos as the quality in a speech that shows the speaker as "both a wise and good man . . . in the opinion of those whom he addresseth" (99). Consequently, Campbell's ethos is a combination of both reputation and the creation of character in the speech.

Regarding the techniques of creating ethos in the speech, Campbell was mainly concerned with the means of combating prejudice, either personal or partisan. Camp-bell described partisan prejudice as "party-spirit," which is the "most pernicious, being at once the most inflexible and the most unjust" (97). Personal or partisan prejudice cannot do justice to the ethos of the speaker, states Campbell, because the "divinest eloquence" uttered by a speaker whose "life were ever so blameless" can fall on deaf ears if the speaker happens to be of the wrong party, either religious or political (97).

Campbell also claims that the quality of the audience may influence the amount of prejudice directed toward the

speaker. "The more gross the hearers are, so much the
more susceptible they are of such prejudices," states
Campbell (97). Usually the more educated and refined are
less susceptible to prejudice. However, Campbell was quick
to warn that "even men of the most improved intellects, and
most refined sentiments, are not altogether beyond the
reach of preconceived opinion, either in the speaker's
favour or to his prejudice" (98).

To overcome prejudice, Campbell advises the speaker
to be "more cautious in every step he takes, to show more
·modesty, and greater deference to the judgment of his
hearers" (98). To win a hostile and prejudiced audience,
Campbell believes that the speaker "must attempt, if
possible, to mollify them, gradually to insinuate himself
into their favour, and thereby imperceptibly to transfuse
his sentiments and passions into their minds" (98).

In discussing the relationship between eloquence and
truth and falsehood, Campbell differs from all his prede-
cessors. Campbell claims that the "mental powers" employed
in rhetoric are "more friendly to truth than to falsehood,
and more easily retained in the cause of virtue, than in
that of vice" (72). None of Campbell's predecessors
who have been surveyed in this paper held such an opinion.
Aristotle considered rhetoric as means to persuasion; he
did not consider rhetoric as favoring either truth or

falsehood. Cicero implied that a person with a bad character might be truly eloquent, but he was so reluctant to admit to the possibility of an orator with a bad character that we had to obtain this piece of information indirectly from the translator's footnote. Quintilian believed that a good speaker devoid of moral goodness is merely an eloquent person, not deserving the title of an orator, thus brushing aside all argument about the relationship between eloquence and falsehood. Saint Augustine believed that eloquence is an indifferent tool--favoring neither side--that can serve truth and falsehood equally well.

Campbell's opinion that rhetoric favors truth more than falsehood does not agree with any of his predecessor's opinions. Actually, his opinion is more consistent with the view that Saint Augustine tried to combat in his treatise, the equating of truth with eloquence. However, Campbell's opinion differs from the opinion that Saint Augustine tried to combat on one major issue: Campbell strongly recommends the studying of rhetorical rules and even offers some techniques himself. Thus even though Campbell believed that rhetoric somehow favors truth rather than falsehood, he did not believe truth could persuade the audience without some help from rhetoric. Given this qualified belief, Campbell's opinion can be better classi-

fied as advocating an attitude, a righteous attitude, rather than an actual practice.

Campbell's belief in both the moral goodness of the speaker and the favorable treatment rhetoric gives to truth places his definition of ethos closer to that of Quintilian than to that of Cicero, and so I have placed it there on the continuum. However, the techniques Campbell recommends are fairly commonplace, unlike his definition of ethos. They bear a close resemblance to the techniques recommended by Cicero, so they are placed fairly close to those of Cicero on the continuum (see Appendix).

Hugh Blair

Hugh Blair has been accused of copying others' lectures and claiming them to be his own. The accusation has been both advanced and attacked by critics and followers of Hugh Blair for generations. This controversial issue is mentioned here because it might explain why Blair did not develop any new ethical theories in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783). In his defense, Blair and his followers attributed this lack of development to the purpose of his book; it was intended as a series of lectures delivered to fairly young scholars, the education of whom requires more a knowledge of traditional material than new and controversial concepts.

Whatever the reason, the fact remains that Blair did not offer any original ethical concepts in his <u>Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres</u>.

In his highly lucid and remarkably well-written series of lectures, Blair reiterated the concept that rhetoric can be used for good and bad purposes. However, Blair believes that given the same techniques truth is more likely to win than falsehood: "Give truth and virtue the same arms which you give vice and falsehood, and the former are likely to prevail" (263). On this issue, Blair's belief is no different from Campbell's.

Regarding the speaker's character, Blair states that "in order to be a truly eloquent or persuasive speaker, nothing is more necessary than to be a virtuous man" (379-80). This comment refers to the speaker's reputation. However, Blair does not regard <u>ethos</u> as created solely through the speaker's reputation. For he states in a different lecture that "there is no instrument of persuasion more powerful, than an opinion of probity and honour in the person who undertakes to persuade" (305). This opinion of probity and honor is created both through the speaker's reputation <u>and</u> through the speech itself. Again, Blair's opinion agrees well with that of Campbell. Because Blair's concepts agree closely with those of Campbell, Blair's concepts are placed in close proximity to

those of Campbell on the continuum (see Appendix).

Richard Whately

In discussing ethos in his Elements of Rhetoric (1828), Richard Whately both accepted some traditional views and introduced some views of his own. He agrees with Aristotle and even quotes Aristotle in delineating the contents of ethos, which he defines as good principle, good sense, and friendly disposition toward the audience addressed (188). Whately claims that if the speaker wants "a permanent effect" he should "keep on the side of what he believes to be the truth; and, avoiding all sophistry, to aim only at setting forth that truth as strongly as possible, without any endeavour to gain applause for his own abilities" (214).

The ideas that Whately set forth so far are not new; they correspond with those of Aristotle. However, Whately presented those ideas solely on the basis of their influence on the audience. In defining ethos, Whately announces that morality on the part of the speaker is not a quality required for its own sake. Innate morality is required solely for the purpose of producing the audience's "entire confidence" in the speaker (Whately 217). Such inspiration of confidence in the audience is the most important means of persuasion when the "hearers are not

completely competent judges" of the issues under dis-
cussion (Whately 217).

Whately's view of ethos as merely a technique to
influence the audience shows even more clearly in his
explanation of methods the speaker uses for insinuating
himself into the audience's favor. The speaker is advised
to introduce his own character "in an oblique and seeming-
ly incidental manner" (Whately 204). Under no circumstan-
ces should the speaker appear "pompous" or appear to
insult the audience's intelligence by explaining the
simplest concepts (Whately 204). In exploring the
difference between the speaker and the audience, the
speaker should be "gentle and conciliatory," not "abrupt
and offensive" (Whately 209). Whately also advises the
speaker to appeal to "party-spirit" either directly or
indirectly to advance his argument. Whately also commented
on the quality of the audience and the corresponding degree
of sophistication required of the speaker. The ignorant
and less educated audience is easier to rouse, while the
more learned audience needs more sophisticated argument to
satisfy its curiosity (205-6). Whately's comment about
those born to power and wealth is worth noting. He
states that those who possess "the advantages of birth,
rank, high connexions, and wealth" have "a suspicion and
dread of all intellectual superiority" (211).

Whately's concern with the audience's reaction led to his introduction of two ideas which are indirectly related to ethos. The first is that the speaker's established reputation for eloquence detracts from the persuasiveness of the speaker's speech instead of augmenting it: "For though a reputation for eloquence, generally, is . . . influential, still in each individual case that arises, the more is thought of the eloquence of the speaker, the less will he be, really, persuasive" (Whately 213). In other words, the speaker's reputation may win him clients for his personal business, but it may not help him to persuade an audience on a particular occasion. Prior to Whately, the rhetoricians surveyed in this thesis all agreed that the speaker's good reputation augmented the ethos created by the speech. Some rhetoricians preferred to restrict ethos to that created by the speech alone. But no rhetorician even implied that the speaker's good reputation would be detrimental to the speaker's persuasiveness. However, Whately believes otherwise.

The second idea Whately introduced is that the display of rhetorical skill during the speech may be harmful to the speaker's persuasiveness even when the speaker's does not have an established reputation. Whately believes that "of intellectual qualifications, there is one which, it is evident, should not only not be blazoned forth, but should

in a great measure be concealed, or kept out of sight;
viz. Rhetorical skills; since whatever is attributed to
the Eloquence of the speaker, is so much deducted from the
strength of his cause" (210).   Again this idea has
never been hinted at by Whately's predecessors surveyed in
this thesis. Whately's predecessors all encouraged
studying and using rhetorical skills; in fact, they
believed that the more rhetorical skills the speaker
possessed, the more eloquent he would be, and the more
persuasive his speech would be. The displaying of rhetori-
cal skills was never discussed, though it is hard to
imagine an eloquent speech not utilizing rhetorical skills,
whether displayed ostentatiously or not.

In insisting that a reputation for eloquence and a
display of rhetorical skill will detract from the speaker's
persuasiveness, Whately went a little further than Aristo-
tle toward the utilitarian pole. Aristotle was concerned
only with the _ethos_ created by the speech, which should be
worthy of the audience' approval. Aristotle was not
concerned with the speaker's reputation for eloquence, nor
was he concerned with how the speaker's reputation should
fit into the persuasiveness of the speech. Whately went a
step further than Aristotle in believing that the audience
would mistrust any display of rhetorical skills or any hint
of a reputation for eloquence.

Both of Whately's beliefs also break completely
with the tradition set up by the rhetoricians who came
after Aristotle regarding the speaker's reputation. They
tend to believe that innate morality, if not a quality
desirable for itself, greatly enhances or is essential for
the persuasiveness of the speaker. Whately's belief
about the speaker's reputation is in direct contrast to
this tradition. His belief represents a more sophisticated
sense of the utility of the speaker's reputation; conse-
quently his definition of _ethos_ should be placed on
the utilitarian side of Aristotle's definition (See
Appendix).

The techniques that Whately recommended are not as
unique as his caution that display of rhetorical skills
may decrease the persuasiveness of the speech. His
caution represents a more acute awareness of the audience
and its reaction toward the use of rhetoric. In other
words, he is more aware of the utility of rhetoric and
ethos. His heightened sense of the utility of _ethos_
places the techniques he recommends the closest to the
utilitarian pole on the continuum (see Appendix). For
Whately, morality was subordinate to method.

Edward Channing

In his _Lectures Read to Seniors in Harvard College_

(1856), Edward Channing did not offer any new development
to ethical theory. The concepts he offered in this book
are ones that are already familiar to us at this stage of
our survey. Channing's definition of ethos will illustrate
my point:

> It is his [the orator's] virtues, his
> consistency, his unquestioned sincerity
> that must get the orator attention and
> confidence now. He must not rely too
> much upon the zeal or even the sound-
> ness with which he treats a question
> under immediate discussion. His
> hearers must believe that his life is
> steadily influenced by the sentiments
> he is trying to impress on them,--that
> he is willing to abide by principle
> at any hazard, and give his opinions
> and professions the full authority of
> his actions. There are, indeed,
> accidents and artifices that may
> secure present success to the worst
> men; but it is the general effect of
> our improved society to give an
> influence to purity, firmness, and
> stability, on which every public
> speaker may rely for lasting considera-
> tion and weight. (23)

In other words, the speaker must have the purest character.
The diction and the sentiment of Channing's description
of the speaker's character belong on the same plane as
Quintilian's. The concepts Channing taught to his seniors
hark back to those taught in the days of ancient Rome,
where the character of the speaker was held sacred. The
similarity between Channing's and Quintilian's definition
of ethos earns Channing's definition a place right next to
that of Quintilian (see Appendix).

Though Channing did not offer any new development of
ethical theory, he did offer some new insights into
the responsibilities of the speaker, concepts that relate
indirectly to ethos. Of all the rhetoricians surveyed so
far, Channing is the first to consider social responsibili-
ty a part of the speaker's ethical duties. Channing
believes that the speaker's ultimate duty was to help
promote the "security of the individuals and of the state"
through "laws and institutions" (13). Channing stressed
again and again that in modern society, which differs
drastically from the social structure of ancient Greek or
Rome, the speaker cannot and should not use eloquence to
advance his own wild dreams. He states that the speaker
should help to "place the security of nations and of every
individual on the broad foundation of laws and institu-
tions, and to make it the interest of the highest as
well as the humblest citizen to respect and trust in them"
(15).

According to his editors, Dorothy I. Anderson and
Waldo W. Braden, Channing's claim to fame was not his
rhetorical theories nor his written work. Channing earned
eternal fame through the students he taught, wrote Anderson
and Braden, many of whom became famous literary figures in
American literature (xi). Channing's editors believed that
the students imbued with Channing's concepts of rhetoric's

ethical and social duties went out into the world to help
shape American literature and the ethical attitude as we
have it today (xii-xiii). It is this ethical attitude that
we are concerned with in the next stage of our survey.

Summary

The Appendix gives a good summary of the results of
this survey. Definitions of ethos and the techniques
recommended fall along the range of the continuum, from the
normative pole to the utilitarian pole. Some of the
definitions fall right on the normative extreme, claiming
that orators must be morally pure and sacred, while other
definitions fall on the utilitarian half of the continuum,
some hardly considering the orator's moral character to be
relevant.

There is more similarity between discussions of
techniques than definitions of ethos. Graphically, all
discussions of techniques fall on the utilitarian half of
the continuum, and most of them are grouped in a cluster.
Semantically, most of the techniques recommended encompass
all possible means that will lead to the goal of persua-
sion. Graphically and semantically, Whately's discussion
of techniques is the only irregularity, since he cautions
against the display of rhetorical skills.

The continuum so far has served its purpose; it

contains all the personalized definitions and is still accurate enough to serve as a standard against which the new twentieth-century terminology will be judged in the next chapter. One thing we need to bear in mind before we begin another chapter. The definition of _ethos_ and the discussion of the techniques to gain _ethos_ by each rhetorician are not usually located on the same half of the continuum. In other words, the two are located on opposite halves of the continuum, encompassing two contrasting points of view. No one rhetorician can be placed squarely on one or the other half of the continuum. This important point is displayed very nicely by the continuum. And this point is very important for the analysis of the new terminology offered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

TWENTIETH-CENTURY VIEWS OF ETHOS

Overview

Since the late nineteenth century, many technological
changes influenced the status of rhetoric as a discipline.
The introduction of telephone, radio, and television
drastically changed the means of everyday communica-
tion. The introduction of automobiles, interstate high-
ways, airplanes, spaceships, and satellites greatly
shortened the spatial and temporal span of communication.
These major changes in communication, coupled with the
advances in science and technology, altered the environment
in which rhetoric functions.

To document these drastic changes and to stimulate
science and technology, twentieth-century society demanded
a kind of discourse different from the subjective and often
personal writing and oratory of the past. This discourse
places clear, objective, and parsimonious description of
facts above persuasion. As the need for a new kind of
discourse grew, two new disciplines, technical writing and
journalism, came into being. Accompanying the rise of

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journalism and technical writing was the gradual dis-
appearance of rhetoric as a discipline. In comparing the
fate of rhetoric in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
Richard Weaver commented that rhetoric has fallen from
grace since the turn of the century (201).

In some respects, _ethos_ suffered the same fate that
rhetoric did. The emphasis on objectivity and logic
dimmed the value of _ethos_ as the writer's or speaker's
guide for projecting the appropriate image to the reader or
audience. In fact, the role of _ethos_ in technical writing
and journalism was largely ignored by scholars until
recently, because manuals and reports were considered to be
too impersonal and factual to need any persuasive techni-
ques.

In other respects, however, _ethos_ fared better than
rhetoric. Instead of disappearing from the literature on
composition, it appeared in new forms under such terms as
voice, _implied author_, _stance_, and _juice_. In its new
forms, _ethos_ became applicable to a wide variety of
discourse forms, from creative writing to expository
writing. Aside from its new form, _ethos_ also lingered on
in its original form in a few isolated instances, which
will be discussed in detail later in the chapter. Because
ethos, in its original form, did not completely disappear
from the composition literature and because _ethos_ blossomed

in its new forms, ethos continues to influence the composi-
tion process and the criticism of the composition process
in the twentieth century.

In this chapter, I will examine in some detail the
various new forms that ethos has acquired in this century
and also examine ethos in its original form as it appears
in this century.

Wayne Booth: Ethos as implied author

Wayne Booth championed a trend of analyzing literary
work within a framework of ethos. Interestingly, Booth
never used the term ethos in his literary criticism.
Instead in The Rhetoric of Fiction, he uses the terms
"implied author" and the author's "second self." Booth
defines the two terms as the techniques creative writers
use to obtain the desired ethical response from their
readers (71).

According to Booth, the implied author instructs the
reader "where, in the world of values . . . the author
wants him to stand" (73). If created right, the implied
author "is one that his most intelligent and perceptive
readers can admire" (395); if created wrong, the implied
author alienates the readers:

> Nothing will so certainly consign a
> work to ultimate oblivion as an implied
> author who detests his readers or who
> thinks that his work is better than it

> is. And nothing is so certain to lead
> an author into creating such a picture
> of himself as the effort to appear
> brighter, more esoteric, less commer-
> cial than he really is. (Booth 395-6)

In this statement, Booth implies that the _ethos_ of the
writer affects the _ethos_ of the implied author, which in
turn affects the reader's ethical response. Since the
writer obtains the reader's response through manipula-
tion of the _implied author_, an entity separate from the
writer according to Booth, the _implied author_ is the
projection of the writer's _ethos_, an idealized form of the
writer's real personality. In other words, the _implied
author_ is the creative writers' technique of projecting
the writers' _ethos_ to the reader.

Interpreting the _implied author_ in this perspective,
we may conclude that analysis of the _implied author_ is
actually analysis of _ethos_ in creative writing. This
claim may be substantiated by our considering the title of
his book, _The Rhetoric of Fiction_. The title should
indicate clearly the orientation Booth chose for discussing
creative writing, for he could just have easily chosen to
use _poetics_ rather than _rhetoric_ in his title had his
orientation of analysis not been from a rhetorical point of
view.

Besides indicating the relationship between the
implied author and _ethos_, Booth also implies that, to

gain the reader's trust and favorable response, the
implied author should not intentionally mislead the reader
concerning the writer's personality and artistic ability.
Ostentatious embellishments of either element will destroy
the reader's trust in the implied author, and hence the
writer. Booth's stress on the truthfulness of presentation
indicates that his version of ethos leans more toward the
normative pole of the continuum, where truth, sincerity,
and moral goodness are emphasized.

Peter Elbow: Ethos as juice

Whereas Booth is concerned with the reader's response
to the "implied author," the projection of the author by
the text, Peter Elbow is interested in the reader's
response to the concepts presented through the writing.
Instead of emphasizing the reader's ethical response, Elbow
is specifically concerned with the reader's acceptance of
the authenticity of the concepts conveyed through the
writing. Because ethos includes the appropriate presenta-
tion of both the orator's character and the material,
Elbow's concern with the acceptance of the written contents
falls under the domain of ethos.

Elbow's technique for ensuring the reader's acceptance
of the authenticity of the written content lies in the
writer's investing intense emotional and intellectual

involvement in the subject matter so that the scene
presented or the thought explained becomes vividly clear in
the reader's mind. The amount of the writer's emotional
and intellectual attachment to or involvement in the
subject matter distinguishes a good writer from a bad
writer. Intense involvement will enable the writer to
see with his mind's eye the scene or understand the
thought clearly in his mind before writing, endowing the
writing with "juice," or voice, and allowing the reader no
choice but to believe in the authenticity of the presented
scene or the idea (Writing with Power 322-6). The credibi-
lity of the voice depends on the amount of emotion and
intellect invested. A superficial investment may result in
a superficial and unconvincing voice, while intense
involvement with the subject matter results in a pro-
foundedly convincing voice, urging the reader to accept the
scene or thought.

In urging that the writer be intensely involved with
the subject matter, Elbow states that the writer must "See
it! Hear it! Feel its texture!" (340). Since the subject
matter can be either a scene or an idea, the technique
Elbow advocates can be employed in both creative and
expository writing.

Because Elbow is primarily concerned with presenting
a believable scene or an idea (belief, thought, concept),

his technique carries no ethical implications. Readers either accept or reject the authenticity of the scene or thought regardless of the ethics involved. Elbow's concern with truthful representation and lack of concern with representation of truth indicates that Elbow's version of ethos, or juice as he calls it, leans heavily towards the utilitarian pole of the interpretation continuum.

<div align="center">Ethos as Voice, Stance, and Tone</div>

In twentieth-century composition studies, the term voice, often interchanged with stance and tone, can be used in different contexts and carry different meanings. It may refer to the writer's style, his attitude, persona, etc. Mostly, however, voice has been used as a twentieth-century substitute for ethos. A close look at some of the definitions offered for voice will clarify the connection between voice and ethos.

Theresa Enos defined voice as the "projection of one's participation in and attitude toward the subject and one's tone toward the intended reader" (5). Virginia Draper defined voice as the "writer's attitude toward the reader . . . [and] the writer's attitude towards the subject or object about which s/he is writing" (4). Rise B. Axelrod and Charles R. Cooper defined voice as the "writer's attitude toward his or her subject and readers" (215).

William H. Gilbert defined voice as "a helpful clue to [the] audience and [the writer's] purpose, as well as [to the writer's] attitude" (35). Dan Donlan defined voice as "the point of view and the emotional tone that the student must assume in conveying the message" (4). All these definitions share one common theme: they all refer to the writer's attitude toward either the audience or the subject matter.

The phrase "the attitude of a writer," a common definition of voice, shares similarity with, yet differs from, the phrase "the character of the speaker," Aristotle's definition of ethos. The attitude of a writer expressed through the writing indicates to the reader the personality and the point of view of the writer, the same way that the character of a writer does. However, the similarity ends once we pursue further the semantics of the two terms. The term "attitude" does not by itself carry any negative or positive connotation. It merely describes the writer's state of mind as conveyed through the writing. The term "character," on the other hand, indicates positive connotation and ethical implications.

A closer look at the adjectives that usually accompany either ethos or voice will further clarify the subtle difference between the two terms. Aristotle used terms such as "intelligence," "goodwill," and "virtue" in his

discussion of ethos (Cooper 92). Quintilian used terms
such as "morality," while Cicero used terms such as
"goodness." In the twentieth century, however, the
adjectives that usually accompany voice are "personal,"
"formal," "witty," "businesslike," "serious," "playful,"
"authoritative," "trustworthy," and "reasonable." This
second group of adjectives carries more stylistic than
ethical implications.

Occasionally, however, voice is defined as "the
implied character" of the speaker as Wayne Booth did in
his famous article "The Rhetorical Stance" (141). Booth's
discussion of the three elements in communication indicates
that his definition of voice is very similar to Aristotle's
definition of ethos. Booth believes that three elements
are at work in any communicative effort: "the available
arguments about the subject itself, the interests and
peculiarities of the audience, and the voice, the implied
character, of the speaker" (141). His three elements as
offered in his article appear to correspond closely with
Aristotle's three means of persuasion: logos, pathos, and
ethos. Booth's understanding of voice, defined as the
implied character of the speaker, resembles his under-
standing of the implied author, both of which resemble
closely the definition of ethos as offered by Aristotle and
both of which belong to the normative half of the

continuum.

As famous as Booth's article is, the previous dis-
cussion on the various definitions of voice indicates that
Booth's definition of voice with its emphasis on the
normative half of the continuum appears not to be the only
definition of voice. In fact, voice is often used to
describe the stylistic aspects of the text, and stylistic
implication, we should note, falls on the utilitarian half
of the continuum.

The term voice has been used to describe all kinds of
discourse: literary, referential, expressive, and persua-
sive. In discourses other than persuasive, the character
of the writer as expressed through the discourse seems less
important than the style of the discourse. Since the term
voice carries more stylistic implications than ethical
ones, the profuse use of voice in the twentieth century
seems to imply a movement away from the normative pole of
the continuum.

Ethos as a Twentieth-Century Term

Just as voice, a twentieth-century derivation of
ethos, takes on many colorful stylistic characteristics,
ethos in its own form has also ventured into more colorful
and previously ignored situations. For instance, Robert
Tremmel applied ethos to the teacher-student relationship

in the composition classroom (191). In this rhetorical situation, the teacher takes on the role of the speaker, while the students take on the role of the audience. Ethos in this situation implies that teachers should have "an open, inviting stance toward their students, their students' language, and the whole teaching and writing process" (Robert Tremmel 191). Teachers should not dictate to the students.

As a second example, a guest editorial in Teaching English in the Two Year College applied ethos to the correction of students' composition papers (176-8). To demonstrate a winning ethos in the rhetorical situation of commenting on students' papers, teachers are advised to follow the commonly acknowledged virtues of respect, discretion, fairness, promptness, and realistic world view in commenting on and grading the students' composition papers. Teachers are advised not to criticize the students' papers for reasons other than the improvement of the students' writing skills. Teachers are also advised not to provide comments damaging to the students' learning process (176-8).

As yet another example, Patricia L. Bizzell recently applied ethos to the media under the guise of media image (351). The rhetorical situation is the television talk show. Ethos in this situation refers to the media image

the talk show host and his guests project, an image which consists mainly of the physical appearance and the mannerisms of the persons presented on television. Traditional ethical implications, Bizzell shows, such as virtues, are not part of the media version of ethos (351).

Also, ethos has recently become an important part of commerce. In the rhetorical situation of business attracting a clientele, ethos helps businesses and consumers choose between alternatives. For businesses, ethos means putting up the best front for the consumers, so businesses, states Richard Weaver, erect tall and imposing buildings to house their headquarters and branch offices (140). For consumers, the tall and imposing buildings of banks and business corporations convey a certain character of the organization (ethos) that smaller and less imposing buildings cannot project. Thus, the contribution of ethos to commerce lies in supplying a common orientation for both businesses and consumers toward the image represented by buildings and other artifacts.

James L. Kinneavy says that in advertising and politics, image and ethical argument reign supreme (240). Famous personalities from the sports, entertainment, or industrial worlds dominate the screen in advertising products, companies, or industries. Seldom is there a link

between the product being advertised and the famous personality presenting the information. The famous personalities are used merely to elicit trust, respect, and goodwill, and ultimately to induce the audience to buy the product. This use of famous personalities for the sole purpose of eliciting favorable responses from the audience indicates that advertising depends heavily on ethos. This use of ethos comes not from the Aristotelian tradition; rather it comes from the Ciceronian tradition, in which the creation of ethos comes both from the speaker's reputation and from the speech itself.

The same emphasis on ethos occurs in politics. Politicians usually represent themselves as moral, hardworking, competent, and well-informed. They attempt to present as ethical an image to the public as they possibly can. In referring to their political rivals, however, politicians usually paint them as immoral, lazy, incompetent, and ignorant. Fighting for the most ethical position in the public's mind, politicians assume, rightly or wrongly, that success in politics depends on ethos. This assumption leads to ethos as the ethical image of the candidate being used often as the main theme in political campaigns.

Colorful and original as these applications are, the definition of ethos in the twentieth century has not

differed from that of the ancients. In fact, in defining ethos, rhetoricians in the twentieth century either refer to the ancients' definition or agree with the ancients' definition. For instance, one rhetorician agrees with Quintilian's comment that "the true orator is the good man, skilled in speaking--good in his formed character and right in his ethical philosophy" (Richard Weaver 224). Textbooks which discuss ethos in detail tend to follow the ancients' definition and application, as does Edward P. J. Corbett's Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student and Robert M. Brown's Writing for a Reader. Occasionally, ethos may be defined in a textbook as "authority-based reasoning," but the term is quickly modified with terms such as "ethical-based reasoning" (Fred. D. White 125). Even when ethos is finally applied to technical writing, as has been done in recent years, the definition of ethos still remains the same. The ethos of technical writing is defined as the character of the writer or, in the case of the manuals, the character of the corporation (Eve Walsh Stoddard 234-5).

Summary

In the twentieth century, drastic environmental changes appear to have shifted emphasis away from persuasive discourse. Other forms of discourse, such as ex-

pressive, referential, and literary, seem to gain more academic attention and recognition. Under such drastic environmental changes, rhetoric gradually disappeared as a discipline until its recent rebirth.

Ethos, on the other hand, fared better than rhetoric in this century. Instead of gradually disappearing from composition studies and practices, _ethos_ retained its original form and took on new forms to accommodate the changes in the environment. It took on the form of "implied author" in literary criticism, and it took on the form of "voice" or "juice" in expressive and literary works. When _ethos_ appears in its original form, the definition and application tend to swing toward the normative pole of the interpretative continuum. However, when _ethos_ appears in its new forms, the definition and application tend to swing toward the utilitarian pole of the interpretative continuum.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The environmental changes since the ancient Greek and
Roman times have been many and complex. To accommodate
these changes, discourse has undergone several correspon-
ding changes: rhetoric has gone from glorious and politi-
cally powerful oratory, to written discourse--and to
eventual decline as a discipline in the twentieth century.
The most recent change comes in the form of replacing
traditional rhetorical terminology with the increasingly
more popular new terminology.

This thesis investigated whether the meaning of the
new terminology differs substantially from that of the
traditional terminology. Ethos was picked to be the target
of investigation. A short historical survey of various
individual definitions of ethos was conducted, followed by
a survey of the various forms that ethos has assumed in the
twentieth century.

The survey conducted in Chapter II and III established
the fact that no historical consensus about the definition
of ethos exists. Rhetoricians prior to the twentieth

century tend to develop their own personalized definitions of _ethos_ and advise techniques for creating _ethos_. Frequently, the definition of _ethos_ and the techniques recommended for creating _ethos_ by each rhetorician differ in intent. The definitions of _ethos_ were intended to be used as normative models, as ideal standards for behavior, recommending _what should be done_. The techniques offered for creating _ethos_ were intended, on the other hand, to be used as positive models, recommending _what can be done_.

The working definition of _ethos_ proposed in Chapter I--the interpretative continuum anchored by normative and utilitarian poles--encompasses all the definitions and techniques cited in Chapter II and III, thus confirming its efficiency. The next question is whether the same continuum can be just as efficient in encompassing the meaning of _ethos_ in the twentieth century, thereby confirming that the new terminology does not differ in meaning from the traditional terminology.

As Chapter IV shows, the meaning of the various forms of _ethos_ in the twentieth century _all_ fall within the range of the continuum. The normative model of _ethos_ appears to have changed little: no new definitions of _ethos_ has been offered in the twentieth century. The positive model of _ethos_, on the other hand, appears to have changed a great deal. _Ethos_ is used in situations which were not familiar

to our predecessors: television, commercial advertising, architecture, creative writing, classroom teaching, grading, etc. However, these changes in techniques are more superficial than substantive: they come more from difference in applications than from inherent differences.

Drastic environmental changes necessitated the new applications of ethos. With the introduction of different communication technology, many new situations became available to discourse; oral and visual communication became possible as well as written discourse. Rhetoric adjusted to these changes by applying ethos to the new communication situations, using terms such as media image. However, the basic, underlying rhetorical situation did not change; only the terminology used to describe the communication situation changed. Interpreting from this perspective, we see that the new applications of ethos in the twentieth century represent nothing more than rhetoric once more adjusting to its changing environment.

Aside from offering different applications of ethos, the twentieth-century interpretation of ethos also laid a heavier emphasis on the utilitarian half of the continuum as shown by the greater popularity of the term voice. A look at the appendix reveals that in previous centuries rhetoricians were concerned both with the normative and the utilitarian poles of the definition of ethos. In this

century, however, the emphasis is mainly on the utilitarian
pole of the continuum as shown by the popularity of voice
and the various new applications of ethos. However, this
trend is a continuation of that started by Whately, whose
definition of ethos and whose techniques for creating
ethos both fall within the utilitarian half of the conti-
nuum.

Well aware of the utility of ethos, Whately recom-
mended the hiding of rhetorical skills and the speaker's
reputation from the audience to gain maximum persuasiveness
in each situation. His recommendation represents a very
sophisticated orientation toward the audience and the
control of its reaction. The twentieth-century emphasis on
voice, which carries more stylistic than normative implica-
tions, is a continuation of that sophistication manifested
by Whately. Analysis of discourse in terms of voice rather
than ethos carries less normative implications, thus
throwing more light on what can be done. The increased
attention to what can be done improves the subtlety and the
sophistication of audience control, thus continuing the
trend started by Whately.

As the above discussion indicates, there are no
substantive changes in either the normative nor the
positive models in the twentieth century: the continuum
continues to encompass contemporary definitions of ethos.

The continuum's efficiency proves two points. First, the
new terminology does not differ in meaning from the
traditional terminology. Second, the continuum can be a
good, encompassing definition of _ethos_. According to this
definition, _ethos_ can be _both_ normative and positive. It
can be an ideal standard by which rhetoricians should model
their conduct, and it can be specific techniques by which
rhetoricians can gain their persuasive goal in a particular
discourse. It can range from extreme to moderate for
either model, and individuals can choose their stand within
the continuum according to their beliefs and values. And
it can encompass all definitions of _ethos_, ancient or
modern.

To conclude, the investigation of _ethos_ shows that
the twentieth-century terminology does not differ signifi-
cantly in meaning from that of traditional terminology.
However, the investigation of one term cannot represent the
fate of the vast rhetorical terminology. But it does raise
an interesting point: does other rhetorical terminology
share the fate of _ethos_, changing names but not meaning?
Much more research is needed to answer this question in any
satisfactory way. I hope that this thesis will stimulate
this additional research.

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APPENDIX

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normative pole --------- <---- Quintilian's definition of ethos
                         |
                         | <-- Edward Channing's definition of ethos
                         |
                         |
                         | <-- Saint Augustine (normative)
                         |
                         |
                         |
                         | <-- Campbell's and Blair's definition of ethos
                         |
                         |
                         |
                         | <-- Cicero's definition of ethos
                         |
                         |
                         | <-- Saint Augustine (positive)
                         |
                         ||
                         ||
area where normative and ||
  utilitarian halves     ||
       coverage          ||
                         ||
                         ||
                         |
                         | <-- Aristotle's definition of ethos
                         |
                         |
                         |
                         | <-- Whately's definition of ethos
                         |
                         |
                         |.
                         |
                         |
                         | <-- Quintilian's discussion of techniques
                         |
                         | <-- Cicero's discussion of techniques
                         |
                         | <-- Campbell's and Blair's discussion of techniques
                         |
                         |
                         |
                         |
                         | <-- Whately's discussion of techniques
                         |
utilitarian pole ---------
```

Figure 1.   The Interpretative Continuum of <u>Ethos</u>

VITA $\mathcal{2}$

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