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CYPRUS: A POSSIBLE PROTOTYPE FOR TERMINATING THE COLONIAL
STATUS OF A STRATEGICALLY LOCATED TERRITORY

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CYPRUS: A POSSIBLE PROTOTYPE FOR TERMINATING THE COLONIAL
STATUS OF A STRATEGICALLY LOCATED TERRITORY

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INTRODUCTION

A case study on the formation of the Republic of Cyprus must necessarily be an investigation of precedent and contemporary forces which have interacted to produce this one solution to a modern colonial problem. The Cyprus conflict was initiated primarily in Great Britain's need for strategic bases in the Eastern Mediterranean as it was countered by an aggrieved need of the Cypriots for self-determination. The struggle appears to have its origin both in the eighty-two years of British occupation, as well as in the composition of the Cypriot mentality, which is an ancient legacy. The inter-relation of these two forces is most profitably evaluated by examining formative eras, since events such as independence or self-determination do not occur in isolation. Hence, a single-case study must be placed in its historical perspective before one can unlock its real meaning and impact for the world generally.

Since the story of Cyprus is one that has its birth far back in the past, the intricacies of its development are often unknown to students of international affairs. The purpose of this work will be an attempt to establish the proper place of the Cyprus issue in the course of world

politics, as well as to try and show its importance in the continuum of related social processes. The struggle for enosis (union with Greece), and the reactions to this movement by Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey are also essential facets of the study. The creation of the Republic of Cyprus resolved all the major issues and marked the disposition of the last vestige of colonialism in the Eastern Mediterranean. Of equal importance is the possibility that the Cyprus settlement might have created a prototype applicable in solving similar territorial disputes. The Cyprus prototype, viz., securing minimum size sovereign base areas, while simultaneously granting independence to the remainder of the territory, was found to be a unique but workable alternative to the tensions that characterized the island in the three years before the 1959 London Agreements were signed by Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey. The Republic was to be created by the target date one year later, but it actually never was granted formal independence until August 16, 1960. It was significant that the London Agreements not only ostensibly ended colonialism in the Eastern Mediterranean, but also repaired the threatened harmony in the eastern flank of NATO, the western world's security system.

The key to the Cyprus settlement was the meeting in January, 1959, between the Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis, and the Turkish Prime Minister, Menderes, in the peaceful country of Switzerland. These two leaders,

great rivals under the most favorable circumstances, resolved finally their differences and thus ended the bloody guerilla action for control of the island of Cyprus. This bi-lateral accord known as the Zurich Agreement, was the first time the Greeks and the Turks were ever en rapport concerning Cyprus. The Agreement was immediately presented in London, where Great Britain's Cabinet concurred eight days later. The leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus could do little but go along with the "powers" as a formality, and the London Agreements were then consummated. The British, Greek, and Turkish parliaments added their respective endorsements before any of the signatories could express any reluctance. As a last step, the Tripartite declarations and documents of February 19, 1959, were published in an official British White Paper, and thereupon became "the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus."

The Cyprus prototype was devised because the procedures involved in administering in the island permitted an effective separation of British military considerations from domestic Cypriot affairs. Consequently, Great Britain was able to delineate two coastal enclaves as "Sovereign Base Areas" in perpetuity and have the agreement formalized in the Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Application of the prototype was found to be of limited use in other areas appearing to have similar colonial

syndromes. Caution should first be adhered to in attempts to superimpose the Cyprus framework over other situations. It would indeed be rare to find completely analogous conditions elsewhere as existed in Cyprus. Cyprus was at a sufficient level of socio-cultural development to allow a system of self-government in a political setting virtually uninhibited by the functioning of the two British bases. The prototype could not be utilized, for example, to end the American occupation of the Ryukyu Islands and the reasons are analyzed in the final chapter. Still, the settlement of certain other colonial conflict areas, especially in the Mediterranean, might lend themselves in part to the Cyprus prototype.

As an admonition, it should be remembered that emerging nations jealously guard every bit of newly won sovereignty and the existence of foreign bases in any form often may not be tolerated. The crucial lesson in the entire study of the fledgling Republic of Cyprus is that few strategic territorial problems are so complex that they defy resolution, provided that goodwill, empathy, and diplomacy are employed in the combined light of past history and current social forces.

The detailed study of the Cyprus problem is one that is filled with valid as well as specious legal arguments, logical as well as baseless deductions, and rational

as well as emotional pleas. When one is working with such a variety of sources and materials, it is difficult to avoid bias to some extent. Nebulous aspects of nationalism must be pitted against the sounder realities of colonialism in the treatment of the Cyprus question. The resulting antagonism was treated as objectively as possible, but here again the latent value judgments of the author might inadvertently slip into the final analysis. Nonetheless, the author practiced conscientious restraint throughout in an effort to avoid making conclusions before sufficient evidence had been presented.

CYPRUS: A POSSIBLE PROTOTYPE FOR TERMINATING THE COLONIAL
STATUS OF A STRATEGICALLY LOCATED TERRITORY

CHAPTER I

CYPRUS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 1878-1951

The name of Cyprus, along with scores of other virtually unknown or hitherto forgotten geographical areas, has helped to make headline news in the post-war wave of nationalism and the emergence of former colonies as nation-states. The already dynamic arena of foreign affairs is enhanced in the public eye by typical journalistic penchants for emphasis on the fanfare, chaos, or misgivings which often accompany the entry of a newly sovereign nation into the world community. While this embellished treatment of an event long in gestation may certainly fire the imagination of the casual observer of international relations, it contributes little to the critical mind of a serious student. In fact, throughout the fanciful musing, which usually results from a distant country's splash of notoriety, there can often be detected a pathetic bewilderment on the part of the naive--as well as many of the alert--students of global problems. The explanation is the same in both cases, namely, a lack

of awareness as to the specific historic development which had led up to a particular culmination--this last phase being only what the news media have chosen to report. The result of this absence of sophistication and lack of depth prevents insight necessary for a scholarly evaluation. Therefore, contemporary problems must be placed in their historic setting in order to discover the meaning and message these problems have for the world in general.

Indeed with the independence struggle of Cyprus, as with most current events, it can be shown that the roots of the crisis are traceable far back into history. This is especially true of studies in nationalism, which should be considered in the light of their long, colorful, and occasionally shameful pasts. With such a background, one can begin to understand why conflict is generally inherent in nationalistic movements and why the attempted resolutions of these conflicts are fraught with disappointments. Moreover, history helps one to begin to understand such important contemporary concepts as social structure, factionalism, national myths, loyalties, attitudes, and resulting behavioral patterns, which heretofore were simply described but never explained. This broad and deep analysis is particularly crucial with nations that have never known any sort of autonomy in their recent histories, yet have still been forced to embark on the hazardous transition from traditional

society to twentieth-century nationhood.¹ Here the story of classical imperialism can help make vivid the indelible heritage which has shaped the destinies of nations that did not exist before World War II.

Therefore the importance of a thorough and systematic treatment of the political developments of an emergent nation cannot be minimized. Of the many fledgling states in the present world community which should first be studied by the historical method, as a preface to more penetrating analyses, the case of the Republic of Cyprus is for numerous reasons an excellent example.

Ancient Cyprus

Archaeologists have determined that the island of Cyprus was occupied in the Neolithic Period by human inhabitants who were skilled in the use of the characteristic flint, bone, and stone implements of that age. The knowledge of life during that period was a comparatively recent discovery of a Swedish expedition in the 1930's and consequently caused a regeneration of interest in Cyprus as a key to life as it existed in the fourth millennium B.C.² Therefore, chro-

¹It is purely a relative matter as to what "recent" history must constitute. For the purposes at hand, the adjective refers only to the last sixty years which would rule out the nearly three hundred years of independence which Cyprus knew under the Lusignans, 1192-1489, A.D., or at other brief periods in its early history.

²Major Gordon Home, Cyprus Then and Now, London: J. M. Dent, 1960, pp. 13-16. This is the most current account of the history of Cyprus, but mention should also be

nologies of Cyprus written in the 19th Century generally date life back only to the Bronze Age and agree that recorded history began with the Mycenaean culture (1500-1200 B.C.) Those ancient records made it apparent that Cyprus had continually been sought as a prize by imperialists of the day and the first conquest came after an invasion by Egyptian seafarers under the leadership of Thutmose III.³ The pattern of future events for Cyprus was thus established over three thousand years ago, and since that time Cyprus has been ruled, inter alia, by Phoenicians, Persians, Macedonians, Ptolemies, Romans, Byzantines, Crusader Kings, Venetians, Ottoman Turks, and finally the British.⁴

The remnants of each successive invader can be seen tangibly in the ruins on the island, but more important are the intangible qualities which have contributed to the complex mosaic that characterizes the temperament of the modern Cypriot. The resulting congeries tends to make the native-born Cypriot a rara avis, and hence seems to belie the claims that Cyprus should belong to any one country or

made of the monumental four volume work of Sir George Hill, The History of Cyprus, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), as well as Stanley Casson, Ancient Cyprus, Its Art and Archaeology, (London: Methuen & Co., 1937).

³This was the fifth king of the XVIII dynasty of ancient Egypt and the date is given as circa 1479 B.C., which was the zenith of the New Empire of Egypt over the entire Eastern Mediterranean. Casson, Ibid.

⁴The Middle East, 1959, 7th Ed., (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1960), p. 63.

another. The present state of independence may have more lasting importance in allowing the unique Cypriot identity the chance to emerge, but this is a subject to be treated by the historians of the future. It is of more relevance to this study to look at the various eras of importance which Cyprus has held in the history of the Eastern Mediterranean, and thus determine why the island has always found itself in the strategic and vital place which it still maintains today.

A British writer in the latter part of the 19th Century made this concise summary of the place of Cyprus in history:

A race advancing on the East must start with Cyprus. Alexander, Augustus, Richard, and Saint Louis took that line. A race advancing on the West must start with Cyprus. Sargon, Ptolemy, Cyrus, and Haroun-al-Rashid took this line. When Egypt and Syria were of first-rate value to the West, Cyprus was of first-rate value to the West. Genoa and Venice, struggling for the trade of India, fought for Cyprus and enjoyed supremacy in that land by turns. After a new route by sea was found to India, Egypt and Syria declined in value to the Western Nations. Cyprus was then forgotten; but the opening of the Suez Canal [1869] has suddenly restored her to her ancient place of pride.⁵

Surprisingly enough, the seventy years which have lapsed between the writing of that account and the present day have done little to alter its veracity as to the role of Cyprus in Mediterranean politics.

⁵W. Hepworth Dixon, British Cyprus, (London: 1887), quoted in Lawrence Durrell, Bitter Lemons, (New York: Dutton, 1957), p. 11.

Various epochs of history in the island of Cyprus are fascinating studies in themselves. The Ptolemaic Period lasted approximately two hundred and fifty years, during which time the self-styled "Kings of Egypt and Cyprus" grew even more opulent from the wanton exploitation of the raw materials in the island.⁶ This phase of Cypriot history ended when the island was incorporated into the Roman Empire circa 58 B.C. The story of the Roman Period corresponds to chapters out of the Bible.⁷ The proselytism of Paul and the martyrdom of Barnabas are to the Christian synonymous with the name of Cyprus. The Byzantine Period, dating from the 5th Century A.D., marks the beginning of the Christian era in the island and the establishment of the Orthodox Christian Church in Cyprus--a branch completely independent of the Orthodox Eastern (Greek) Patriarch, as well as the Roman Catholic Pope.⁸ The eight centuries which are encompassed in the Byzantine Period were highlighted by back and forth struggles between the Cypriot Christians and the Moslem

⁶Home, op. cit., pp. 26-31.

⁷See in particular Acts of the Apostles and Romans, passim.

⁸The Church of Cyprus became autonomous at the Council of Ephesus in 431 A.D. and was justified on the grounds that the original text of Matthew was discovered in the island. It should be noted that the Orthodox Church comprises seven autocephalous branches, which correspond to the traditional patriotic church of the particular nation, and are held together in a vague sort of confederation today. See Donald Attwater, The Christian Churches of the East, (Oxford: Blackfriars Pubs., 1947). Also note: Franz Von Loher, Cyprus: Historical and Descriptive, New York: Worthington 1878, pp. 235-243.

"infidels" who invaded periodically from the Syrian coast fifty miles to the east--these events presaged the series of Crusades which were to follow between the 11th and 14th centuries, when the European Christians originally attempted to wrest the Holy Land from Islam, but ultimately succeeded in the greater purpose of familiarizing the Occident with the culture of the then more advanced Orient.

Cyprus During the Crusades

It was the third of the great Crusades that was to leave a telling effect on the future of Cyprus. Richard I of England made history with his shrewd maneuvering against the Moslem chief, Saladin, and the island of Cyprus played a crucial role in his overall strategy. Gordon Home describes the fortuitous circumstances around Richard and Cyprus in this way:

It was by accident of a storm in the year 1191 that finally terminated the Byzantine control of Cyprus and gave birth to the line of Lusignan kings who ruled in the island for close on three centuries. The tempest also brought about the first contact of England with Cyprus when Richard Coeur-de-Lion took possession of the island by force of arms and held it tentatively for a year.⁹

Richard had no intention of seizing the island as a part of his religious mission and proved it by selling his newly acquired territorial booty to the Knights Templars as soon as was feasible. When an indigenous uprising threatened the

⁹Home, op. cit., p. 43.

Templars' control of the island, Richard took back Cyprus, upon the invitation of the Templars, in a proposed exchange for the original sum paid. Possibly this was to set a precedent for the English attitude regarding fiscal matters and Cyprus, for Richard unscrupulously resold the island to a consortium headed by Guy de Lusignan, a former king of Jerusalem. As for the Templars, "one can almost hear his laughter when the question of his returning the cash was raised."¹⁰ This act may have resulted in ostensibly nothing more than establishing the Lusignan dynasty. Still it was curiously similar to the policy of the English rulers who were to reacquire Cyprus seven hundred years later by an equally devious means and then were to administer the profits from the island in an equally unprincipled method, viz., the Cyprus Tribute, infra.

The Lusignan Period lasted almost three hundred years and is noteworthy as the longest unbroken span that Cyprus had been an independent entity. Cyprus flourished commercially under the rule of this European dynasty, despite the fact that the autonomous Orthodox bishops were forced to swear fealty to the Latin Hierarchy.¹¹ The Lusignans withstood nearly two hundred years of continual seige by Mameluke sultans, Ottoman janissaries, Genoese marauders,

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 54.

¹¹ Hill, op. cit., Vol. II.

and Venetian infiltrators; however, the latter part of the 14th Century heralded the decline of the proud little principality. At the height of the House of Lusignan's power, the kingdom, in association with the Hospitallers of Rhodes, established and maintained the most effective containment policy against the swelling tide of Islam in the post-Crusade era. Cyprus even joined the Venetians at one instance in a naval campaign against the Asia Minor coast and succeeded in capturing Smyrna from the Ottoman Turks.¹² Yet the strategic value of the island could not be overlooked, even by the Christian nations which had designs on the Eastern Mediterranean, and Cyprus once again could not escape attack, this time by the Genoese.

Kidnap and ransom seemed to be one of the most efficacious weapons short of war in this medieval period, and Cyprus, as a direct result, found itself in the embarrassing position of paying tribute to both Genoa and the Mamelukes in Egypt. In fact, the entire city of Famagusta was ceded to Genoa in 1374 as security for an indemnity to be paid in return for the release of King Peter II, whom the Genoese had captured earlier. The situation so degenerated after years of successive forays by the grasping nations on its periphery, that the Lusignan Kingdom of Cyprus was forced to turn to Venice to save itself from being divided and

¹²Alastos, Doros, Cyprus in History, (London: Zeno Publishers, 1955), p. 152.

conquered. By virtue of a convenient marriage, the royal families of Cyprus and Venice were joined.¹³ While this tactic served to preserve the territorial integrity of the island against the Turks, it concomitantly brought about the end of the Lusignan dynasty when Cyprus was finally annexed by Venice in 1489.

The status of a sovereign Cyprus was thus to be interred for a period of nearly five hundred years, and the heritage of independence was all but unknown to the conditioned Cypriot mind when the decision was made in 1959 that Cyprus should once again be free. Whether a strong tradition of sovereignty is a prime requisite to the successful self-governance of a modern nation will be decided as the futures of the emergent former colonies are recorded. In this respect, Cyprus can claim little more than some of the most primitive Afro-Asian countries which have also been recently placed on the precarious pathway of freedom.¹⁴

The Pre-British Period

The final three hundred years before the British occupation of Cyprus is separated into two distinct eras--the Venetian and the Ottoman. The Venetian rule survived

¹³Alastos, op. cit., p. 170.

¹⁴Cyprus does not fit into the composite picture of the typical emergent nation, e.g. Vera Micheles Dean's peripatetic "Bandungia." The institutions of 20th Century Cyprus are decidedly "different from those it had four or five centuries before." V. M. Dean, The Nature of the Non-Western World (New York: Mentor Books, 1957), pp. 14-16.

almost a century of Turkish assaults before it yielded to the powerful Ottoman Imperial armies. The Venetian rule was most oppressive and marked the beginning of a decadence, that was magnified under the Turks, and not arrested until the British assumed the administration of Cyprus. While the historians of Cyprus will remember the Venetians for their virtual enslavement of the Cypriots,¹⁵ the more literary types will recall that the plot of Shakespeare's Othello centered around Cyprus during the Venetian period. Whether the dark-skinned protagonist in the great drama was actually one of the Venetian governors of the island is a matter still disputed among experts. Nevertheless, the port city of Famagusta today is extremely proud of a citadel in its harbor named "Othello's Tower" and the matter of historic authenticity is a closed matter there.¹⁶

¹⁵Alastos, op. cit., p. 206.

¹⁶Home, op. cit., pp. 70, 130. Literature has furnished many insights to life in certain eras which the historians tend to overlook. For that reason, a reading of the Shakesperean classic will provide an emotional picture of Cyprus under the Venetians' rule. It should also be noted that the Bard of Avon was not the only author to immortalize Cyprus. Besides the mentions in the Bible, the legends of Homer attribute Cyprus as the birthplace of Aphrodite, as well as the site of the mythical king Pygmalion's making the statue, Gaitea, come to life. These romantic traditions are reflected in the current fiction, about Cyprus, as well as in the indigenous writings. The idyllic, pastoral outlooks of the past have permeated the attitudes of the present-day Cypriot, and these illusions persist despite the fact that the independent Republic of Cyprus has been immersed into the modern world of Realpolitik. (See, for example, Sir Harry Luke, Cyprus: A Portrait and An Appreciation, (New York: Roy Publishers, 1957)).

The defeat of the Venetians by the Ottoman Turks in 1571 was looked upon by the native populace, paradoxically, as an emancipation of sorts. The Turkish victory in Cyprus directly ensued from the decision of the rulers in Venice to concentrate their forces with the navy of the Holy League (composed mainly of Spanish, Papal, and Venetian ships) in the epochal battle of Lepanto, which culminated in the defeat of the Ottoman navy and averted for all time the threat of Turkish supremacy in the Mediterranean. Venice, however, had sustained such severe losses in the campaign that it never tried by force to recapture Cyprus. In many respects, however, the Christian inhabitants were to fare much better in the next two hundred years under the Moslem rulers of Cyprus, than they had under their Roman Catholic captors. The Battle of Lepanto, therefore, was just as crucial to the future of Cyprus as it was to the future of the Western Mediterranean, and that of Europe as well.

It was in the period of Moslem domination that the Cypriots had the opportunity to develop their intense ethnocentrism and identification with the Greek mainland. This budding nationalism was caused in part by the Greek independence struggle, during the 1820's, but more by the brutal reprisals the Turks inflicted on the Greeks in Cyprus. The waning years of Turkish rule in Cyprus were blemished by a wanton slaughter of Greek Christians, in an

effort to discourage Cypriot participation in the Greek revolt. An ancient Cypriot historian summed up the order of the Sultan, sent to his pasha in Cyprus at that time, as simply "to kill as many of the Christians as he thought worth killing."¹⁷ The public execution of high Cypriot Greeks, along with many of the peasant class, caused so much disgust that legations from Western European nations freely opened consulate doors to fugitives, but these humanitarian acts saved relatively few.¹⁸

Possibly, the most significant development in Cyprus under the three centuries of Ottoman suzerainty was the liquidation of the Latin Church and the restoration of the independent Orthodox Archbishopric. This event occurred in 1575 and marked the end of almost four hundred years under the Roman See. This major concession of the Turks was matched only by the subsequent abolition of serfdom in Cyprus, and both of these can be looked upon as rewards to the peasants for the help they gave the Turks during the

¹⁷Spyridon Tricoupi, History of the Greek Revolution, translated from the Greek by Cotham in Excerpta Cypria, (Cambridge U. Press, 1902), pp. 465-66, quoted in Home, op. cit., p. 96.

¹⁸It may be noted that the British based later demands for Ottoman reforms of administration in predominately Christian territories on the inhuman treatment meted out in Cyprus, especially during the Greek revolution. In the Cyprus Convention, such negotiations were an integral part of the British position.

invasion. The landless class had been deprived and discontented under the two prior regimes (the Lusignans and the Venetians), and had the Cypriot peasants not supported the Turks when they did, the course of history could well have been altered. Successive years of steady degeneration in the Ottoman administration of the island may have made the Cypriots regret their fateful decision to help the Turks. Yet the fact still remains today that the Church commands such an important position in Cypriot life and politics because of the many years it has enjoyed a free hand in domestic religious matters. While Cyprus has ostensibly been under alien domination for centuries, it has always been "in fact governed by the Greek Archbishop and his subordinate clergy."¹⁹ Such was the case up till independence in 1960 and many feel it still sums up the political scene today.

Turkish rule of Cyprus was, at best, indifferent and, at worst, oppressive, depending upon the temperaments of the Sultans and governors who emerged on the scene during the "three dreary centuries" that followed the expulsion of the Venetians. At one point in the 18th Century Cyprus was considered hardly more than a piece of property apropos for including in the dowry of the Sultan's daughter. As a consequence, Cyprus was independent of the Ottoman Empire

¹⁹ Stanley Mayes, Cyprus and Makarios, (London: Putnam, 1960), p. 7.

between 1720 and 1745, before finally being reunited.²⁰ Still Cyprus prospered no better under a spend-thrift puppet king than it did under direct control from Constantinople. By the time the British were to demand the transfer of Cyprus to fulfill the terms of the Cyprus Convention, the Turks were quite surfeited with the bothersome affairs in Cyprus. Besides the continual state of alert the island was under, due to the petty forays of former rulers of Cyprus, there were numerous insurrections among the indigenous population. In essence, the Turks were most disenchanted with Cyprus by 1878 and the relinquishment of the island, in exchange for insurance against possible Russian aggression, was regarded as quite a good bargain.

The Turks, while they ruled, assumed the role of the common enemy in the eyes of the Greek Cypriots. This negative attitude served as a focal point for solidifying the tribal penchants of the island population--at least in those matters which loomed as a threat to the Greek-Cypriot identity.²¹ Unwittingly the Turks created conditions that forced the Greek population of Cyprus to relate with

²⁰Home, op. cit., p. 91.

²¹Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, Outline of Social Psychology, (New York: Harpers, 1956), Chapter 21, "Men in Critical Situations," pp. 715-743.

everything anti-Turkish. Therefore, the Orthodox Church--the most antithetical institution to Islam--was the symbol of the frustrated Greek nationalism that became increasingly more manifest in Cyprus.²² The Turkish policy of alternating oppression and indifference created a sore spot in the politics of the Eastern Mediterranean that was to fester and plague the status quo for centuries. But the Ottoman Turks were never to be remembered for their perceptive nature or the ability to interpret the rumblings of their subjects. As long as the Turks held a power position by means of intimidation and violence, they felt no need to consult barometers of public opinion. Nevertheless, by the middle of the 19th Century the Ottomans were showing signs of becoming the "sick man of Europe," and they could not have changed much of their colonial policy even if they had seen fit to do so. When the British took over the forces of Greek-Cypriot nationalism had already crystallized. The policies of the British were not too unlike that

²²The Islamic Empire of the Ottoman Turks saw little difference between Church and State, e.g. the Sultanate and the Caliphate were the same in their governmental system. Similarly, the Sultan declared religious authorities to have jurisdictional rights over his other subjects, Christian or Jew, as the case might have been. Different professions of faith were organized into separate subordinate groups known as millets (nations). The Churches consequently became identified with the national purposes of their peoples, as well as those of a religious nature. "The Church of Cyprus, because of the peculiarities of the island's history, had always been political..." Doros Alastos, Cyprus Guerilla, (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 36.

of the Turks and could only result in aggravating the existing discontent.

The Beginning of the British Occupation

There is no debating the fact that the epoch which made the deepest impression in the island's political future opened in 1878, when the British leased the island from the Ottoman Turks. One must begin tracing the development of this historic event in the year 1875, when the one-year old government of Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield) was called upon to deal with the "ever-recurrent problem of what to do with the Ottoman Empire--the so-called 'Eastern Question.'"²³

Ottoman power was at a low ebb at this juncture and the Russians were attempting to fill the power vacuum by expanding their Empire west and southward toward the warm-water port of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. England and the other European powers did not try to hide their alarm and fear of Russian designs. Protests were regularly sent to the Czar, but he disregarded them with equal regularity and proceeded with his aggressive policies. The specific incident which reopened the "Eastern Question" was the insurrection of Bosnia and Herzegovnia in the Ottoman-held Balkan region. The demand of the Christians

²³Dwight E. Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878, (Cambridge: Harvard U., 1934), p. 3.

there for reform in the territorial government were met concomitantly by the altruistic sympathies of the European nations and the avaricious interests of Russia. The only concern the British had in the Near East at this time was the protection of her imperial interests in India, and this could be done only by preventing Russian advances in Ottoman Asia. The British wished to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Bosnian uprisings with no repetition of the Crimean War of twenty years earlier. To this end, the Concert of Europe, under the inspirational leadership of Disraeli, had outlined certain reforms for the Turks to put into effect in her European possessions. When these reforms were refused by the Sultan, Russia declared a long threatened war on Turkey in April, 1877.²⁴

The war lasted less than a year, and the Turks were forced to sign the Treaty of San Stefano in March, 1878. The powers in Europe, however, refused to accept this arbitrary arrangement, since the provisions in the treaty had virtually given Russia control of the Dardanelles. The other European nations insisted that the same matters be discussed at a six-power conference at Berlin in June of 1878.²⁵ In the meantime, in a period that was characterized

²⁴Ibid., p. 43.

²⁵Sir Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. IV (London: H. M. S. O., 1891), p. viii.

by diplomatic deceit and subtle subterfuge, the Disraeli government--a masterful practitioner of the art--went ahead with some undercover negotiations. While the Congress of Berlin was parceling out bits of the Ottoman Empire, the British Ambassador to Constantinople, Sir Austen Layard, had privately concluded a pact with the Ottoman Sublime Porte on June 4, 1878. This pact, or the Cyprus Convention as it was commonly called, was the joint design of Disraeli and his Foreign Minister, Lord Salisbury. It may be looked upon as a prime example of the way Great Britain played the role of the "balancer of world power," in order to perpetuate the "Pax Britannica" of the 19th Century.

The British idea behind the Convention was to deter the psychological advantage the Russian would gain over the entire Ottoman Empire, if Russia were to occupy Ottoman Asia. In a letter from Salisbury to Layard on May 30, 1878, the situation was stated in this way:

Even if it were certain that Batoum, Ardahan, and Kars will not become the base from which the emissaries of intrigue will issue forth, to be in due time followed by invading armies, the retention of them by Russia will exercise a powerful force in disintegrating the Asiatic dominion of the Porte. As a monument of feeble defense on the one side and unsuccessful aggression on the other, they will be regarded by the Asiatic population as foreboding the course of political history in the immediate future and will stimulate by combined action of hope and fear, devotion to the Power which is in the ascendent, and desertion of the Power which is thought to be falling into decay.²⁶

²⁶Correspondence Respecting the Convention Between Great Britain and Turkey of June 4, 1878. No. 1, The Marquis

Considering the potential threat, the resulting British policy was the only logical pathway open to avert the political conditions which had been created:

[H. M. Government] does not propose to attempt the accomplishment of the object by taking military measures for the purpose of replacing the conquered districts in the possession of the Porte. Such an undertaking would be arduous and costly, and would involve great calamities and it would not be effective for the object which Her Majesty's Government have in view, unless subsequently strengthened by precautions which can be taken almost as effectively without incurring the miseries of a preliminary war. The only provision which can furnish a substantial security for the stability of Ottoman rule in Asiatic Turkey, and which would be essential after the re-conquest of the Russian annexations as it is now, is an engagement on the part of a Power strong enough to fulfill it, that any further encroachment by Russia upon Turkish territory in Asia will be prevented by force of arms.²⁷

After the plan was presented, the British imposed two conditions before the pact was consummated and the Porte had no alternative, but accept. The first dealt with reforms in the government of Ottoman territories that were inhabited predominately by Christians. The second condition, however, was vastly more important as it mentioned the desire of the British "to occupy a position near the coast of Asia Minor and Syria." It was finally agreed that "the island of Cyprus appears in all respect the most

of Salisbury to Layard (Foreign Office), [C-2057], 1878, LXXXII, 1 p. 1. (Note: British Sessional Papers will be cited by title, command number, year, volume, volume page, and original page).

²⁷Ibid.

available for the object."²⁸

These preliminary points were included almost verbatim in the final form of the Cyprus Convention. The essential sections of the Convention stipulated that "England engages to join HIM the Sultan in defending them [Ottoman territories] by force of arms..." In order to execute the agreement, "HIM the Sultan...consents to assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England."²⁹ A further provision was the guarantee of the Porte to "safeguard the British overland route through the Ottoman territory to India,"³⁰ which was an important concession at that time.

The occupation of Cyprus by Great Britain on July 12, 1878 and the signing of the Treaty of Berlin the very next day had "meant not the end, but the beginning of increased anxiety and responsibility for Lord Beaconsfield (Disraeli) and Lord Salisbury."³¹ The disclosure of the secret treaty with the Porte had caused heated cries of treason on the homefront from Gladstone's Liberal "loyal opposition"; while on the international level, England had

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Convention of Defense Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey To Protect Against Russian Intervention, June 4, 1878, Article IV, Hertslet, op. cit., p. 2722

³⁰Lee, op. cit., p. 105.

³¹Ibid., It could have been at this time that Disraeli made his famous quote: "What we anticipate seldom occurs: what we least expect generally happens."

to face up to the flabbergasted and vindictive powers that lodged protests on her claim to Cyprus. France, in particular, felt the occupation of Cyprus would not only command the coasts of Syria and Egypt, but also, by the terms of the Convention allow Britain the right to intervene in the administration of all Asiatic territory subject to Ottoman jurisdiction. France felt the Mediterranean had surely become "an English pond" and the messages between the Quay d' Orsay and Whitehall stated this apprehension in no uncertain terms. One said in part:

France respects England as a great Asiatic power, but looks upon herself as a great Mediterranean power... The two nations must stress the need for action in concert of a friendly policy founded on a just and reciprocal consideration for one another's interests.³²

In a most solicitous way, Salisbury answered:

[Great Britain's] policy had been inspired by no projects of aggrandizement upon the shores of the Mediterranean, but purely by a solicitude for vast interests which we (UK) possess in Asia and which is our duty to defend. The interests of France as a great Catholic power in the Lebanon and in the Holy Places of Palestine have always been scrupulously respected by this country.³³

Such was the diplomatic manner of Great Britain in the 19th Century, but it can hardly be said that France received any satisfaction from those amenities.

Salisbury's rationale for the acquisition of the

³²Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Turkey, [C-2138], July 21, 1878, LXXXII, 15, p. 3.

³³Ibid.

island of Cyprus as a base was quite logically presented. He had reasoned that the "onerous obligation" to contain Russia, should it attempt to extend its frontiers, could not be fulfilled from a distance as far as Malta. The other two alternatives were even worse: the occupation of Suez would probably be resisted by France, and a base at Alexandretta "might be construed as indicating an intention to acquire territory on the mainland of Western Asia." Since Great Britain did not want "to be suspected of designs," which were wholly absent from their thoughts, Cyprus, through a process of elimination, became the only place which could satisfy all the considerations at hand.³⁴

Great Britain, in the usual custom of the age, had to do something to palliate her decision to occupy Cyprus, and this could best be done by agreeing to territorial concessions to the dissident members of the Congress of Berlin, as well as some others. The final compromises, or territorial adjustments, were made along this order: Russia was permitted to keep Kars and Batum; Austria was allowed to occupy the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovnia; France was invited to administer Tunisia; Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece were given considerable areas of Turkish territories; Italy, in her turn, had to be contented with the recognition of her ascendancy to the status of a Great Power;

³⁴Ibid., (Salisbury to Lord Lyon, No. 3, August 7, 1878), p. 8.

and finally Germany had acquired the prestige that Berlin had formally replaced Paris as the focal point of European diplomacy.³⁵ This arbitrary disposal of territories without the least regard for the sentiments of the native inhabitants, was a common practice on the diplomatic tables of that day.

Great Britain indeed found herself in possession of Cyprus in 1878, but also it was soon apparent that she had taken upon herself an almost staggering commitment to protect the vast Ottoman Asian possessions against the Russian menace. Party loyalty even broke down on this issue and the arrangement made by the Tory statesmen, Disraeli and Salisbury, "was looked upon with the same suspicion, distrust, and apprehension in the Conservative as well as the Liberal ranks."³⁶ Perhaps this dissension did not reach its zenith until the change of government in 1880, when Gladstone became the Liberal Prime Minister. Gladstone personally referred to the Cyprus Convention as "shabby," and stated that he "regrets the secret agreement... by which the annexation of territory has impaired the reputation of England as one of the most clean-handed members

³⁵Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny, The Great Powers in World Politics, New Ed., (New York: American Book Co., 1939), pp. 174-75.

³⁶Lee, op. cit., p. 112.

of the European family."³⁷ The Liberal Government even considered the "retrocession" of Cyprus, because "the act would give England the splendid opportunity of disinterested renunciation."³⁸

This moralistic declaration on the part of the Gladstone government were triggered less from contrition and more from the belief that the acquisition of Cyprus could never bring any military or political advantage to the Crown. When a memorandum, expressing this same thought, was sent to Queen Victoria, the great monarch simply wrote in the margin: "I do not agree in the least with this."³⁹ With such formidable opposition, coupled with the legalists in Parliament who felt that England had entered a contract and it was "only common morality to accept the position,"⁴⁰ Gladstone could do nothing other than retreat from his original stand. His attention, however, was soon transferred to another Middle Eastern territory that was ultimately to diminish the value of Cyprus as a strategic base. For it was Gladstone who was responsible for the British

³⁷W. N. Medlicott, "The Gladstone Government and the Cyprus Convention, 1880-85," Journal of Modern History, XII, March-December, 1940, pp. 186 ff.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Sir Reader Bullard, Britain and the Middle East, (London: Hutchison, 1951), p. 50.

⁴⁰Medlicott, loc. cit.

occupation of Egypt in 1882. The four year period that Cyprus was in the limelight of Eastern Mediterranean politics hardly benefitted the island in any material way.⁴¹

At first Cyprus was thought to have all the combined requisites of location, size, population, and defensibility to carry out England's commitments in the Eastern Mediterranean. Then, many began to realize the deficiencies of the island. Strategically, its use in defense of Ottoman Asia was doubtful, for "what was to prevent an attack upon the Persian Gulf from the highlands of Armenia?"⁴² Also there was no suitable harbor, and the cost of constructing one was prohibitive. As early as 1881, the plans for improving the piers in Larnaca and Limassol were "postponed for engineering reasons."⁴³ A year later the High Commissioner, Sir Robert Biddulph, made this eloquent plea for the construction of a harbor in Cyprus, but it was met with little sympathy in Britain. In Biddulph's words:

the want of harbours in Cyprus so totally prevents the formation of any commercial entrepot that I believe the expenditure of the money⁴⁴ in question cannot fail to be most advantageous.

Still conceding these drawbacks, most British and foreign

⁴¹Bullard, op. cit., p. 51.

⁴²Lee, op. cit., p. 79.

⁴³Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Cyprus, [C-2930], 1881, LXV, 67, p. 11.

⁴⁴Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Cyprus, [C-3384], 1882, XLV, 15, p. 39.

observers agreed that Cyprus was, nonetheless, an essential bulwark in the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, to the majority of the English populace, the "acquisition of Cyprus was completely justified in spite of the failure [of the British] to make the best use of it."⁴⁵

In a comprehensive historical study of Cyprus, Sir George Hill lists three causes for the unfortunate failure of the British in the affairs of the island.⁴⁶ First, the primary blame can be attributed to Prime Minister Gladstone. Though the Liberal leader could not dispute the possibilities of the island as a means of protecting the route to India (one of the chief goals of British foreign policy at that time), he nevertheless let his personal vendetta against his political rival cloud his thinking and, thus, prevented his government from developing the island, which could possibly have put the Tories in a better light in history. Second, France stepped out of joint control of Egypt shortly after Britain's leasing of Cyprus, and consequently, gave Great Britain the undisputed right to develop Alexandria and Port Said as Mediterranean bases. The last of Hill's reasons was the rather tenuous conditions on which the island had been held, i.e., England would evacuate Cyprus if Russia restored to Turkey the Ottoman

⁴⁵Hill, op. cit., Vol.IV, p. 274.

⁴⁶Ibid.

lands seized in Armenia.⁴⁷ This tended to discourage private English capital from being poured into the island's economy, as there was no guarantee of indemnity for improvements in event the British would actually evacuate Cyprus. In the last year the Conservatives were in power, 1879, Salisbury wrote to Layard concerning investments in Cyprus:

I am informed by the First Lord of the Admiralty and Secretary of State for War, who have recently returned from the island, that the application of capital is arrested by the uncertainty of tenure.⁴⁸

When the Liberals came to power the following year, they attempted nothing which would alleviate the fears of potential English entrepreneurs in Cyprus, thus foreign private investment in Cyprus has almost been nonexistent.⁴⁹

To the convincing list posited by Hill, a fourth point may be added to help in the explanation of British indifference concerning Cyprus. This was the immediate cognizance by the British that imperial loyalty would be most difficult to capture among the Cypriots, if and when the island would become a colony.⁵⁰ The drive towards

⁴⁷ C-2057, 1878, LXXXII, 9, op. cit., Annexe, p. 5.

⁴⁸ Correspondence Respecting the Island of Cyprus, C-2324, 1878-79, LIV, 453, p. 6.

⁴⁹ The largest private enterprise in Cyprus is the Cyprus Mines Corporation, which is an American firm that has been exploiting quite profitably the copper mines on the island for over fifty years.

⁵⁰ Elizabeth Monroe, The Mediterranean in Politics, (London: Oxford U. Press, 1939), p. 48. (This point will be treated further infra.)

enosis (union with Greece) was not kept secret by the Cypriots, and many Englishmen were most sympathetic with the Greek-Cypriots. In fact some philhellenists in England criticized their government for the embarrassment the inhabitants of Cyprus were forced to suffer after they had witnessed "their island handed over like a chattel as part of a bargain;" but these idealists did not realize, evidently, "that [the act] was merely in accordance with the rules of the diplomatic game as played in those days."⁵¹

Actually England had acquired Cyprus for purposes it could never fulfill with complete satisfaction, and this fact was seemingly proven beyond doubt to the Liberal government of Gladstone within the first four years of British occupancy of the island. The fundamental moral or defense problems that Disraeli admirably wanted to solve with his Cyprus policy either were handled in due course by the occupation of Egypt, or the subsequent Entente with Russia in 1904, or were set aside entirely.⁵² Much was

⁵¹Hill, loc. cit., As late as 1959, Professor Preston W. Slosson of the University of Michigan's History Department, in reference to the final Cyprus settlement, expressed his endorsement of that particular method of power politics. In his words: "In many cases, cold-blooded diplomats removed from the scene of difficulty are better able to work out a solution than those on the spot." Quoted in The Michigan Journalist, (Ann Arbor), April 22, 1959, p. 1.

⁵²Lee, op. cit., pp. 164-165.

promised for the island and the native inhabitants, but little was actually accomplished. England, by the 1930's, had become disenchanted with Cyprus and the modicum of interest shown previously in the island had just about dwindled entirely. In the words of Miss Monroe: "England allowed it Cyprus to degenerate into a Cinderella, and the Fairy Godmother, though announced two or three times, has not yet put in an appearance."⁵³

British Administration of Finances and the Cyprus Tribute

Prior to the signing of the Cyprus Convention, Salisbury wrote Layard about the matter of payment to the Porte, since the island was still to be an Ottoman possession. The important part of the correspondence stated:

Her Majesty's government do not wish to ask the Sultan to alienate territory from his sovereignty, or to diminish the receipts which now pass into his Treasury. While administration and occupation be assigned to Her Majesty, the territory shall still continue to be part of the Ottoman Empire and the excess of revenue shall be paid over annually by the British government to the Treasury of the Sultan.⁵⁴

In the Annexe to the Cyprus Convention, which was signed about six weeks after negotiations on finance had begun, Article III originally stated: "England will pay to the Porte whatever is the present excess of revenue over expenditure in the island..."⁵⁵ This provision did set the stage

⁵³ Monroe, op. cit., p. 49.

⁵⁴ C-20577, 1878, LXXXII, 1, op. cit., p. 3.

⁵⁵ Cyprus Convention Annexe, Article III, Hertslet, op. cit., p. 2724.

for the one positive measure Britain managed to introduce in Cyprus during the period immediately following her leasing. That was the infamous "Tribute," which was so hated by the Cypriots and was to be remembered as a scourge always to be held against the British. In a most apologetic tone--obviously directed at her readers who feel historical backgrounds should be slighted--Miss Monroe states: "The story of the Cyprus Tribute is long, and shows the British Government in the unbecoming role of Shylock, but, long though it is, it affects Cypriot opinion, and therefore must be told."⁵⁶

British-Cypriot relations commenced in a most friendly manner, but the pleasant relationship was short-lived. The Cypriots warmly greeted the arrival of the British not only because the Cypriots "had throughout their history welcomed any change of this kind," but also because "they generally seemed to entertain the expectation that all taxes would be abolished."⁵⁷ A more fallacious prognostication could never have been conjured up, and the rude awakening came in 1882, when it was finally decided with the Ottoman government what the "annual fixed payment" should be. As determined by Article III of the Annexe to the Cyprus Convention, supra, the annual Tribute to the

⁵⁶ Monroe, op. cit., p. 50.

⁵⁷ Hill, op. cit., p. 293.

Porte was to be "22,936 purses, (11,468,000 piastres, or at 120 piastres per pound sterling, it would amount to 103,212 pounds sterling.)⁵⁸ Negotiations brought this figure down to 85,000 pounds sterling, and with the additional 5,000 pounds awarded as a rental by an agreement signed February 3, 1879,⁵⁹ the figure was left at 90,000.⁶⁰ Further negotiation in 1889, subsequently fixed the Tribute at approximately 92,800 pounds sterling, or the equivalent of ten shillings (\$2.50 then) per every man, woman, and child in Cyprus.⁶¹

The imposition of the Tribute has been aptly described as one which "failed to allow for Turkish methods."⁶² The Turks traditionally spent the barest minimum on the governing of their outlying possessions, while the British administration at its worst was lavish in comparison. Thus, the Cypriots found themselves paying not only for the onerous Tribute, but also they were supposed to cover the expenses incurred by the British rule of the island. This steady

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 463 and Hertslet, loc. cit.

⁵⁹Correspondence Respecting the Island of Cyprus, [C-2329], 1878-79, LIV, 453, p.

⁶⁰Agreement for a Fixed Annual Payment, Hertslet, op. cit., p. 2844.

⁶¹Hill, op. cit., p. 464. (It might be noted here that there is a mistake on these figures in the Monroe book, op. cit., p. 50, where the final sum of the Tribute is listed as "99,000 pounds sterling.")

⁶²Monroe, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

drain of an already poor economy in Cyprus left nothing for internal improvements. In fact, Cyprus was neither "able to repay amply the charge of its own establishment as was initially thought,"⁶³ nor was the island even able to make its domestic ends meet. Therefore, many a sizable deficit had to be made up by the British citizenry each year, which was hardly a popular expenditure. A contemporary editorial, April 1, 1879, in the London Examiner and Times stated the dilemma in this way:

The English troops had hardly landed when every inhabitant considered that he would henceforward be free from any tax payments... On the contrary, the Government had been very considerate and has accepted all arrears due to the Turkish government in caime currency, which is worth less than 25% of Turkish real money, viz. gold and silver. Generally the Cypriots were not unjustly treated in financial matters.⁶⁴

The chief rub in the whole affair of the Cyprus Tribute was the fact that the money was never actually paid to Turkey, and this disturbed both the Cypriots and the Turks. Actually the money was deposited in the Bank of England to pay off an old Ottoman Loan of 1855, guaranteed by both England and France, on which Turkey had defaulted from 1877 onward.⁶⁵ The small sum that was left over went

⁶³J. M. Kinneir, Journey Through Asia Minor, Armenia, and Koordistan /sic/ in the years of 1813 and 1814, (London: 1818), p. 185, quoted in Hill, op. cit., p. 270.

⁶⁴Correspondence Respecting the Complaints Made Against the Government of Cyprus, /C-2324/, 1878-79, LIV, 501, p. 38.

⁶⁵Hill, op. cit., pp. 465-66.

into a Consols Fund to pay for such contingencies as ransoms of Englishmen captured by Turkish brigands, and this too irritated the Porte.⁶⁶ Cyprus, on the other hand, felt she was paying for a debt with which she was not in the remotest way connected. Agitation against the Tribute never did stop and it was continually used as a symbol of British oppression.

Attacks on the Tribute came not only from the Greek-Cypriots in the island's Legislative Council, but a special deputation visited England in 1889 to implore Queen Victoria's "high succor" and plead for remission of fiscal burdens, which were disproportionate to the island's resources and means. The group, headed by Archbishop Sophronios, stressed the fact that after ten years, Cyprus "whose fate was entrusted to the most well-governed and civilized nation," had witnessed the instituting of many reforms, but the "reforms which had been given could not meet the desires of Her Majesty, which dictated them."⁶⁷ The Queen was gracious enough to receive the deputation, but it was obvious she planned to do nothing about alleviating the fiscal burdens in Cyprus. Instead the Archbishop had his

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 468.

⁶⁷Further Correspondence Relating to Affairs and Finances of Cyprus, /C-5812/, 1889, LVI, 99, p. 70. Each individual paid an annual tax equal to about 1/5 of his yearly income, by way of production.

ego salved by being created a Doctor of Divinity in the University of Oxford.⁶⁸

The Turks too levelled criticism at Great Britain for the handling of the Cyprus Tribute. The Turkish semi-official press, Tarik, at Constantinople, charged that Britain had not carried out the reforms which were contemplated at the time they took over the island. It went on:

It is well-known that although the speedy prosperity of the island of Cyprus (whose administration was by a special treaty temporarily entrusted to England) was announced, nothing has been effected except the imposition of additional taxes, a general depression of local trade, and similar results... Certain officials have evolved nothing but a number of strange schemes for wasting the revenue of the country, by transferring the capital to the hills for benefit of change of air. Even the existing schools are shut and the population, both Mussulman and Christian have commenced to emigrate, and those who remain have hastened to implore the assistance and compassion of the civilized world.⁶⁹

The attacks in the Greek newspapers in Athens were even more sarcastic, as can be seen in this excerpt from the Messenger d'Athens entitled, "Chypre Sans Les Anglais:"

En effet, Chypre est devenue un bon placement pour des cadets de l'aristocratique britannique. En fait d'administration, c'est le cas de dire que les Chypriotes n'en ont jamais en pour leur argent.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Home, op. cit., p. 218.

⁶⁹ Correspondence Relating to the Affairs and Finances of Cyprus, /C-5523/, 1888, LXXIII, 253, p. 103.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 91.

There is little doubt that these criticisms carried far less weight with Queen Victoria than the report of the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Winston Churchill, who visited Cyprus in 1907. In the report Churchill (now Sir Winston), declared: "We have no right, except by force majeure, to take a penny of the Cyprus Tribute to relieve us from our own obligations, however, unfortunately contracted."⁷¹ It was largely through the efforts of Churchill, and others, that the Imperial Parliament voted a permanent annual grant-in-aid of 50,000 pounds sterling to Cyprus in 1907, which reduced the Tribute accordingly.

Administration Between the War and 1931

At the onset of the war in 1914, Turkey joined forces with the enemy Central Powers, hence Great Britain immediately annexed Cyprus. One might have thought that the Tribute to the Ottoman Porte would have been abrogated by the annexation, but it merely changed names and was thereafter known as the "Share of the Turkish Debt Charge," which did not serve in any way to mollify the Cypriots. The war years made the internal problems of Cyprus seem insignificant. Yet, it was in 1915, that the island was offered to Greece for an obvious threefold purpose. First, it was offered as a bribe to induce Greece to enter the war on the side of the Allies, in order to save Serbia. Second,

⁷¹Hill, op. cit., p. 468.

it was doubtless a concession to the fanatic Greek Cypriots who had cried enosis ever since 1878, and third, giving the island to Greece would have relieved Great Britain of continuing with the bothersome Tribute.⁷² Surprisingly, King Constantine's government at Athens refused the offer. While this produced no discernable psychological effect, it did somewhat curtail the growing sentiment of those Cypriots who had favored union with Greece. However, ten years later, when the Colony was established, the British Empire was placed in the same light as had been the Ottoman Empire --namely, "the obstacle to the union of Cyprus with the Greek national state"⁷³ --and the ardent enosis feelings were consequently regenerated.

With Cyprus legally under the sovereignty of an enemy state, England found itself in a peculiar position at the beginning of the war. There was little else for her to do, but annex Cyprus and, by so doing, eliminated a position which was continually used in specious answers to Cypriot pleas, i.e. that Britain was merely a "tenant" on Cyprus. Cyprus' part in the war was small; it was used primarily as a naval base and supply station, yet it did

⁷²It was definitely known that the Tribute "was a millstone around the neck of the early administrators," and would become nothing other in the future than a "sorry tale of obtruseness and obstinacy." Mayes, op. cit., p. 161.

⁷³Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1931, (London: Oxford U. Press, 1932), p. 361.

withstand a series of enemy air attacks. The island was, however, more important as the subject once again of secret diplomacy, this time with France. Along with the plan to partition the Near East into respective spheres of influence, the furtive Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 promised that Britain would not negotiate about Cyprus without the consent of France. This pact was not made public until four years later, when the France-British Convention was signed on December 23, 1920.⁷⁴ The British annexation of Cyprus was never actually recognized by the Ottoman Porte (since the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 was never ratified); thus, formal recognition was not made until the Treaty of Lausanne, when Turkey was under its benevolent despot, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk Gahzi Pasha.⁷⁵

The signing of the Armistice ending the First World War heralded a period of thirteen years of relative calm on the island of Cyprus. Still there was an openly organized movement among the Cypriot Greek intellectuals

⁷⁴For the full text of these two documents, see J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. II, (New York: Van Nostrand, 1956).

⁷⁵"The Lausanne Conference," Round Table, XIII, No. 50, 1923, p. 342. For the text of the Treaty of Lausanne, see The Treaties of Peace, 1919-23, Vol. II, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924). The signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, were: the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, Roumania, and Japan.

in favor of secession from the British Empire and union with Greece, though this view was hardly the view of the Greek majority nor Turkish minority on the island.⁷⁶ Also there were cries for complete independence from some extremists who had possibly taken Wilson's "Fourteen Points" too seriously, and this forced Britain to face a dilemma not too unlike the one presented in 1959, but the earlier solution was decidedly more arbitrary. As Arnold Toynbee described it:

The British Government at Westminster, on the other hand, took the view that the people of Cyprus--Greeks and Turks alike--were unripe for self-government; and the British authorities in Cyprus held that the Cypriot Greek national movement, while general and genuine among the urban minority of the Cypriot Greek population, was neither spontaneous nor deep-rooted among the peasantry.⁷⁷

Still, it must be said to the credit of the Greek Cypriots that their protests against British occupation were, up till that time, pacific and presented in accordance with the Constitution of 1882 and its later modifications.

The first Constitution, which was unchanged by the annexation in 1914, provided for a Legislative Council consisting of twelve elected and six appointed members. The

⁷⁶As early as 1881, there was a rumor circulated that Cyprus had been offered to Greece. The Greek natives claimed such a thing would "be their ruin," while the Turkish population applied simultaneously to the Sublime Porte for "Protection of their honour and lives." There was no indication that the situation was any different in 1921. Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Cyprus, [C-2930], 1881, LXV, 67, pp. 105 and 113.

⁷⁷Toynbee, op. cit., p. 363.

High Commissioner's Report for 1882 summarized the functioning of the Council in this way:

After nearly five years of existence as a Crown Colony [sic], Cyprus has been endowed with representative institutions. The new Legislative Council consists of eighteen members, six of whom are public officers appointed by the Crown and twelve are elected by the people. Of the twelve elected, three are elected by Mahometans [sic] and nine elected by non-Mahometan inhabitants, these numbers being based on respective numbers of Mahometans and non-Mahometans as revealed by the census taken in 1881.⁷⁸

The accepted legislative practice was for the three Moslem (Mahometan) members to side with the six appointed members so as to bring about a nine-to-nine stalemate with the Greek members, and this was in turn broken by the vote of the High Commissioner. In this manner, Great Britain was always able to parry the efforts of the Cypriot Greeks to enhance their nationalistic aspirations through legal means.⁷⁹

When Cyprus was made a Crown Colony on March 10, 1925, a Royal Governor replaced the High Commissioner. The Legislative Council was subsequently enlarged to 24 members, of which twelve were Greek, nine were appointed, and three still designated for the Turks. It is curious that the Greeks continued to complain that the Turks were over-represented in the new Council, as the Turks at the time supposedly "formed only one-sixth of the population."⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Cyprus, Report by H. M. High Commissioner for 1882, [C-3772/], 1883, XLVI, 51, p. 9.

⁷⁹ The Middle East, 1957, op. cit., p. 64.

⁸⁰ Hill, op. cit., p. 428. The three official Turkish members out of 24 figures out to be one-eighth of the

The revised constitution for the colony of Cyprus did not, as many Cypriots had hoped, change the financial system. Therefore, the Tribute, which was equally hated by both the Greeks and Turks in the island, was still being collected. In 1926, the elected members of the Legislative Council passed a resolution that "the obligation to pay the share of the Turkish Debt Charge should cease."⁸¹ This was followed by the rejection of the budget estimates for the coming fiscal year by the Greek members, merely because it contained provisions for the burdensome Tribute. In retaliation, Great Britain threatened to invoke the "Royal Prerogatives" and "modify the constitutional arrangements" which had made possible the recent unfortunate events.⁸² Such modifications were never instituted, for Britain soon relieved the Cypriots of their whole share in the Turkish Debt Charge (the Tribute) by substituting a grant-in-aid for the remaining amount. The only condition was that Cyprus pay to the Crown, as did all other Crown Colonies, the annual sum of 10,000 pounds sterling toward "Imperial

body, which is decidedly less than one-sixth. If the Turks had a disproportionate number of the nine appointed members, it was purely a temporary condition which could be blamed on favoritism of the Governor or any number of other factors. As a result, the Council was derisively termed the "toy parliament."

⁸¹Ibid., p. 476.

⁸²Ibid.

Defense," and that was to close the matter once and for all. What the Cypriots did not know "was that they were expected to waive any claim to the surpluses in London--now amounting to over 1,000,000 pounds sterling."⁸³

The Cypriots unfortunately were not that easily placated. When they saw that Britain was in a conciliatory mood, they pressed further. The Cypriots claimed that two different sums were owed to them: first, was the "ransom fund," or the unexpended surplus which had been invested in Consols since 1878; and second, the Tribute payments since 1914, when Cyprus became a "colony" (the term was incorrectly used by some of the more patriotic Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council.)⁸⁴ The British rejected outright the pleas made by the Cypriots, and after much evasion finally explained their actions "when Philip Snowden, Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, told Parliament in July, 1931 that the money had gone into a sinking fund for the Ottoman Loan of 1855."⁸⁵ This announcement was soon followed by the Government's proposal to increase Cypriot taxes to meet the deficit that was brought on by economic conditions in the island and over the world generally in the late

⁸³Mayes, op. cit., p. 161.

⁸⁴Monroe, op. cit., p. 51.

⁸⁵Mayes, loc. cit.

1920's.⁸⁶ The seething discontent in the island was soon to erupt. In October, 1931, "resentment flared up in Cyprus, till the flames, blown on by Enosis agitators, burned down Government House," in a vivid act of protest.⁸⁷

The mob action was not spontaneous. It was later proven that the archbishop of Cyprus and his Prelates (the Ethnarchy) had a direct hand in inciting the Greek Cypriot community.⁸⁸ It was all provoked by the resignation of the twelve Cypriot Greek members of the Legislative Council, and the news of this served as an obvious prearranged signal. Immediately, demonstrators started shouting for enosis and small isolated units formed into the mob which marched on Government House in Nicosia singing the Greek national anthem. Before the riot was quelled, the House was burned to the ground, six civilians were killed, scores injured, and 400 arrests were made.⁸⁹

Britain reacted after the outbreak with stern

⁸⁶The depression in the U. S. was felt with even greater intensity by nations closely linked to the American economy.

⁸⁷Mayes, loc. cit.

⁸⁸British Information Services (B.I.S.), Cyprus, 1D 1340, July 1960, p. 3. The ruling authority, or elite, of the Greek Orthodox Church is termed the "Ethnarchy," which means literally headship of the race or nation, (Cf. Patriarchate, literally headship of a family or tribe.)

⁸⁹Royal Institute of International Affairs, (hereafter, R.I.I.S.), Cyprus, (London: Chatham House Memorandum, Oxford U. Press, 1959), p. 4.

punitive measures. Reinforcements were dispatched to the island and the first official act was to abolish the Constitution and all elected bodies, which included the Legislative Council, but not the Executive Council which continued in being. The next action was the deportation of ten Cypriots, including two bishops, who were directly implicated in the riots.⁹⁰ Civil liberties were severely limited and the island was autocratically ruled by the Royal Governor, with the assistance of the six-member Executive Council, of which only two represented the Greek Cypriots. In 1933, the emergency measures were eased somewhat and an Advisory Council was established, with four ex officio members and ten others appointed by the Governor. No legislative powers were granted either council, but they both could advise on internal policies. It was during this time that terrorism was first manifested, with the occasional assassination of a member of the Advisory or Executive Council, for no other ostensible reason than his willingness to see that his fellow Cypriots were represented, to some extent at least, in the government of the island.⁹¹

The Early Enosis Movement

Under Ottoman rule, the Ethnarchy had led a

⁹⁰B.I.S., Cyprus, loc. cit.

⁹¹Hill, op. cit., p. 432.

persistent effort to free Cyprus from the Turks. The drive as such met with little success, but was soon to be modified by certain developments during the Ottoman reign. In particular, the Greek revolt and liberation gave the nationalists on Cyprus a new focal point, for it was at that time that the idea of independence shifted to one of union with Greece (enosis). Despite the inhuman reprisals inflicted on the Cypriots during the Greek revolution of 1825, the idea of enosis continued to gain currency among the indigenous Cypriots. It was traditional that the Ethnarchy should assume leadership in such matters, and therefore it became the center of political activities. After the British occupation, the Ethnarchy increased their efforts for enosis and conservative Cypriot-Greek political parties were formed with the "union" issue being the key plank of their platforms. Dissatisfaction with the existing administration was the crucial weapon the enosists exploited in the hope of broadening the base of their support. Less than a year after the British ascension, Cypriot nationalists charged: "The present regime of Her Majesty's Government is not new, but just a continuation of former Turkish misrule."⁹² Also these same forces marshalled rumours, allegations, and isolated incidents into

⁹²Correspondence Respecting Complaints Made Against the Government of Cyprus, /C-2324/, 1878-79, LIV, 501, p. 2.

a case against the British administration. These accusations included flogging, forced labor, "manacled priests," and the exclusion of Greek newspapers.⁹³ The British Colonial Office naturally investigated and turned up an interesting revelation. A letter to Salisbury from the first High Commissioner, Sir Garnet Wolseley, described the men who were the source of these allegations:

One was a schoolmaster from Greece, who is one of a very small and insignificant party here whose avowed object is the spread of Hellenic views and a nationalistic movement in favor of Greece, their native country. Athens is the hotbed of the revolutionary party and they make free reference to "their war-like brothers, the Cretans," in hopes that the Cypriots will follow suit/. One is not Cypriot, but President of a small Greek society in Alexandria, which has for its object the spread of disaffection amongst the people of Cyprus and the general propagation of Hellenism through the Levant.⁹⁴

After thoroughly refuting the charges, the High Commissioner sent this vindication of his administration of Cyprus.

When writing in defense of carefully-selected English officers who have devoted themselves to the task of governing a mixed population under no ordinary difficulties, it is not easy to write calmly regarding reckless charges, wherein truth has been intentionally suppressed, and cruelty and wrongdoing designedly imputed to others by those who originated them.⁹⁵

The Colonial Office in London urged sufficient investigation

⁹³Ibid., p. 4.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 15.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 19.

of these irresponsible charges, so that each and every official in Cyprus could honestly give "an unequivocal denial to every statement."⁹⁶ When this had been accomplished, it was readily apparent that the enosis movement was not a product of the native Cypriots. The few who openly advocated the principle had been trained either in Athens or one of the other centers of Greek culture, despite the fact that some might have been native-born Cypriots. The drive toward enosis was initially an alien idea to Cyprus and the predominate peasant class in the island was totally unaware of the consequences one way or another. (See footnotes, #76 and #77) The matter of British misrule was temporarily closed when the Archbishop of Cyprus formally refuted the charges later in the year 1879.⁹⁷

The First World War, Greece's refusal to annex Cyprus, and the subsequent elevation of Cyprus to the status of Crown Colony overshadowed the minor activities of the enosists for over two decades. After the 1931 enosis riots, the British took such stern measures that the movement was virtually destroyed. In Parliament, sympathizers with Cypriot aspirations continually pressured the Colonial Office to promulgate a new constitution, but their efforts were frustrated. A proposed Royal Commission of Inquiry

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 8.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 19.

was asked for and refused even as late as 1939.⁹⁸ Under the strict island rule, Cypriots were not allowed to form nationalistic groups--this activity for enosis was shifted en masse during the late 1930's to London, where civil rights were more scrupulously guarded. In 1937, a "Committee for Cyprus Autonomy" was formed in London with the expressed purpose of getting some degree of "home-rule" for Cyprus.⁹⁹ In this period, petitions demanding a constitution were quite numerous, but by 1939, the Colonial Office Secretary had reason to believe "that petitions have been placed in front of villagers by persons upon whose favor they are dependent." The observer concludes:

I am satisfied that the great majority of people of Cyprus are not discontented under the present administration. The policy of the administration is to work in the direction of more representative government; but this process cannot be hurried, and in my view it must proceed first through a gradual increase of responsibility in local government.¹⁰⁰

Since enosis was not subscribed to by the majority of Cypriots, the Colonial Office policy was therefore to encourage the people to develop an interest in the administration of their municipal affairs. At the time, Britain had no intention of writing a new constitution for the entire island, thus the matter of enlarging local governing

⁹⁸ Hill, op. cit., p. 433.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Hill, op. cit., p. 434.

units, with the hope of eventually extending the governing powers of these bodies, became a prime concern. A standard answer was consequently devised by the Colonial Office when anyone would ask about the possibility of a Constitution for Cyprus: "The policy of H. M. Government is to develop representative institutions locally before extending them to the central machinery."¹⁰¹ This same policy was expressed as late as 1945 by the Labor Party's Colonial Secretary, George Hall, when the problem still was unresolved.¹⁰²

Such a decentralization of government should have been nothing new to the Cypriots who claimed a Greek heritage. Since the days of the city-states, the Greeks have preferred to govern themselves in small geographic units, and the same phenomenon has carried over to modern times. The formation of the Greek National State in the middle 19th Century met most of its difficulty because it could not break down the community form of government and get the populace to pledge loyalty to the central government. In present-day Greece, the feeling of a citizen is that he is not at "home" unless he is back in his village or on his natal island. On Cyprus, the present institution of the Mukhtar, the village-elected leader and the four elected azas (elders) was well established in the Ottoman hierarchy,¹⁰³

¹⁰¹R.I.I.A., Cyprus, op. cit., p. 6.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 8.

and the modern concept of this office is in just as respected and powerful a position as it was two centuries ago.¹⁰⁴ History, therefore, bore out the British position that the majority of Cypriots would be content to be autonomous on their local level of government, and allow the island to stay under British ownership. In view of this, enosis with Greece could not possibly have been advocated by more than an influential few, inter alia, the church.

The World War II Era and Later

Great Britain had not even considered granting the Cypriots a voice in their government at the outbreak of World War II. Much of the clamoring ("monotonous" was the adjective generally used by the British here) of the Cypriots waned when Italy annexed Rhodes in the late 1930's. The Orthodox Cypriots became apprehensive when they considered the Mediterranean ambitions of Roman Catholic Italy: British rule was considered by Cypriots to be decidedly better from the religious aspect than that of Italy. When Italy entered the War and invaded Greece in 1940, Great Britain found that she had acquired a firm ally in the Cypriot people. This loyalty was proven by the 6,000 Cypriots who fought next to the British in the Greek campaign

¹⁰⁴Durrell, op. cit., explained through out his work how valuable it was for a new resident to gain the confidence of the mukhtar in Cyprus. These were ordinarily appointed by the Royal Governor, and were consequently thought to be pro-British, especially by EOKA.

and the 19,000 who were under arms by late 1941.¹⁰⁵

Despite the brave services the Cypriots performed in the early part of the War, Britain had indicated no intention of granting the island a constitution and of guaranteeing its civil liberties. A major concession did come in 1943 when municipal elections were held for the first time since the constitution was revoked. Two years earlier a labor group had obtained permission from the British Governor to meet and organize the "Progressive Party of the Working People" (AKEL).¹⁰⁶ At the time of the elections AKEL had demonstrated that it was fairly well-organized party, and thereby won the elections in Famagusta and Limassol.

AKEL gained strength after the election and, during the years 1943-44, it supported many strikes and generally protested the absence of a popularly-elected legislative body. Moreover, it was quite vociferous about its platform, which included a listing of all of the grievances that the Cypriots had nurtured since 1931,¹⁰⁷ so as to appeal to the enosists. While AKEL was hard at work trying to

¹⁰⁵R.I.I.A., Cyprus, op. cit., The figures cited here did not include the famous Cyprus mules, a breed which has distinguished itself for warfare ever since the Abyssinian Campaign, 1867. Hill, op. cit., p. 435.

¹⁰⁶Hill, op. cit., p. 435.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

establish itself, another party, catering to the right-wing middle class and boasting the endorsement of the Church, was garnering support. The backing of the Church has been the key to success in Cypriot politics and the past pattern had not changed by 1946. This church-backed party, the Nationalist, had quite naturally enosis as its main platform. Advocating enosis in fact, was the only shared value these two parties had, but it still could not prevent great conflicts between them. In early 1945, during the celebration of Greek Independence Day, the parties clashed and the police, trying to stop the melee, were forced to fire into the crowds and caused many casualties before order was restored.¹⁰⁸

A year before the 1946 municipal elections were held, eighteen persons belonging to the Pancyprian Trade Union (PEO) were convicted of attempting to violently overthrow the Government.¹⁰⁹ Yet this had no effect whatsoever in the May, 1946, elections. A left-wing coalition of PEO and AKEL was victorious in all but two of the principal cities.¹¹⁰ There has been little doubt from the start that AKEL was inspired by the Communists. Its actions, though once in a while seeming to disprove its orientation, have

¹⁰⁸R.I.I.A., Cyprus, op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁰⁹Hill, op. cit., p. 438.

¹¹⁰R.I.I.A., op. cit.

never caused anyone to wonder whether or not it was run by the Communists.¹¹¹ By 1958, AKEL's power laid in the fact that it controlled 7/8 of all trade unions in Cyprus.

Cyprus escaped serious attack during the Second World War, in much the same manner as it had in World War I. It was used chiefly as a supply station as it had been previously. A unique problem arose during the War concerning the flow of Zionist immigrants into the British mandate of Palestine. The British restrictions were not being obeyed, so Britain was compelled to use force to curtail immigration. On Cyprus, Britain placed large detention camps to hold the Zionists who were apprehended trying to enter Palestine illegally. The formula for many a Jewish immigrant was: from a Nazi concentration camp in Poland, via a Greek or Italian ship, to a British concentration camp in Cyprus. Nobody liked the unpleasant task of prolonging the hardship of pitiful Jewish refugees, and the Cypriots were no exception. The Communists circulated the rumor that Britain was intentionally trying to weaken the Greek Cypriot population by an influx of foreigners, and by causing shortages and increased prices due to the excess foodstuffs required by the camps.¹¹² To add confusion to

¹¹¹ Cyprus, Colonial Reference Division, No. R 3389, Sept., 1956, p. 3. AKEL was later proscribed by the British colonial government in Cyprus.

¹¹² R.I.I.A., Cyprus, op. cit., p. 7.

this, another unofficial report was circulated in 1946 to the effect that British troops had to evacuate Egypt and would have to install a massive military base on Cyprus. These rumors and events caused much of the wartime good will between the British and Cypriots to vanish rapidly, but this good will was tenuous even at its height.

When the Labor Party came to power by the elections of 1945 in England, the new Colonial Secretary, Mr. Creech Jones, expressed the desire to "seek opportunities to establish a more liberal and progressive regime in the internal affairs of the island."¹¹³ The Governor was asked to call a Consultative Assembly for sometime in 1947, and invitations to the Assembly were sent to twenty-eight carefully selected Cypriots. Sir George Hill reports that the "response was discouraging." The Church had declared a boycott and subsequently fourteen Cypriot Greeks refused stating that "enosis" was their "sole political aim";¹¹⁴ nevertheless, the Assembly was held with eighteen in attendance. The first motion presented by the eight left-wing Greeks who were present was that self-government be considered. When this was refused by the presiding governor, they joined with the other members of the Assembly in demands for a constitution similar to that of Malta and

¹¹³Hill, op. cit., p. 437.

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 438.

Ceylon featuring an elected legislature, and curtailing the powers of the Governor to external matters only.

The Assembly ended in a deadlock, but the British did present their proposals for a new constitution. It was not formally presented to the people until six months later, but the Archbishop of Cyprus called for the rejection of the plan before he had even seen it.¹¹⁵ The intransigent stand of the politically inclined Cypriot Church had not changed in over twenty years. Though the Cypriots leaders must be lauded for constancy, they were certainly chided by many observers, for their poor eyesight, whatever it was, myopia or hyperopia. The new proposal would have established an elected legislature, giving the Greeks an eighteen to four majority over the Turks with four seats to be appointed by the governor. A stronger Executive Council was proposed and the Governor was supposed to accept their recommendations or report the reasons for his refusal to the Foreign Office. Many points were left open for discussion, but enosis and self-government were specifically prohibited.¹¹⁶ Though the proposal would have been gingerly accepted ten years earlier, it was still not an ideal arrangement, but as a base for further negotiation, it was certainly worth more than a flat, blind refusal by the Cypriot Greeks. The

¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶Central Office of Information, Cyprus, (London: 1958), p. 8.

Offer remained open, but both Left and Right-wing Cypriot Greeks felt that any rational acquiescence toward constitutional development would mean an abandonment of enosis. Colonial Secretary Creech Jones stated at one point in negotiations that people "in the grip of nationalism are impervious to rational argument," but he hoped the situation would change in some way ¹¹⁷--but that was never to come until over ten years had passed.

The Militant Enosis Movement

The next municipal elections, in May, 1949, saw AKEL keep their strength in the coastal cities, but it was a stinging defeat for them otherwise. The Right-wing party was victorious in Nicosia, the capital, and in ten of the other fourteen municipalities. In the final tally, the Rightists polled approximately three-fifths of the votes cast. More developments that year were the resignation of the governor, Lord Winster, and the appointment of the more moderate Sir Andrew Wright. These happenings, however, did not overshadow the elevation in 1950 of the Bishop of Kitium to the position of Archbishop Makarios III of Cyprus. ¹¹⁸ This occasion laid the foundation for the period of terrorist chaos that was to seize Cyprus between 1954 and 1958.

¹¹⁷Doros Alastos, Cyprus Guerilla, (London: Heineman, 1960), p. 32.

¹¹⁸C.O.I., Cyprus, op. cit., p. 9.

It should be stressed here that in spite of nearly 100 years of formal Cypriot demands that they be united with "mother Greece," Greece had never made a formal diplomatic request that enosis be fulfilled. After an alleged petition was presented to the Greek government, showing that 95.7% of the Cypriots wanted enosis,¹¹⁹ Prime Minister Venezelos in 1951 urged the Chamber of Deputies to incorporate the Cypriot plea in the official national policy. Still the Greeks hesitated, possibly because of their recent admission along with Turkey into NATO, or perhaps public opinion was not yet roused. Though in 1951, the Greek delegate to the United Nations Assembly in Paris did raise the question in the Trusteeship Committee, the Greeks were still chary of enosis.

It was not until 1954 that enosis finally became an official part of Greek foreign policy, and the official Panhellenic Committee for the Union of Greece with Cyprus was formed. Soon thereafter Greece began her fruitless efforts to annex the island of Cyprus.

At the same time Great Britain attempted to reach a peaceful settlement. Another constitution was offered Cyprus in 1954, but this was met with a violent response, due in part to the concurrent announcement that the British Middle East Land and Air Headquarters would be transferred

¹¹⁹ This plebiscite petition is explained in detail in Chapter II, under "The Greek Current."

to Cyprus from Jordan.¹²⁰ Violence again erupted in 1955 after the UN refused to discuss the Greek petition and these were organized activities, spearheaded by the youthful Greek terrorist movement, EOKA (National Organization of Cyprus Struggle).¹²¹

When the situation on the island became extremely tense, Britain called a Tripartite Conference with Greece and Turkey in 1955, but the firm stands on both the British and Greek parts soon revealed that the Conference would accomplish nothing. Soon after the talks broke down a state of emergency was declared in Cyprus, and the anti-EOKA campaign was placed in the firm hands of Sir John Harding, the newly appointed Governor. The state of emergency was highlighted by the 1956 deportation to the Seychelles Islands of Archbishop Makarios and certain other Prelates who were accused of encouraging the terrorist activities of EOKA. Nothing the British would have done could have more exacerbated the situation in Cyprus than deporting the Archbishop. This, therefore, paved the way for an all-out British onslaught on the terrorists, and vice-versa.

Despite the seemingly hopeless turn of events

¹²⁰R.I.I.A., Cyprus, op. cit., p. 11.

¹²¹The story of EOKA is a study in itself. Many recent works have analyzed its role in the Cypriot struggle. One of the best and least biased is: Dudley Barker, Grivas: Portrait of a Terrorist, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1960).

on Cyprus, Britain still went ahead with plans to give the island an acceptable constitution. Lord Radcliffe was commissioned with the job and he devised a most liberal constitutional draft in December of 1956. The chief provisions of the proposal were not unlike former ones, especially that one of 1948. Moreover, the proposals recognized the future option of self-determination, with appropriate safeguards for the Turkish minority. The Turks accepted this as a basis for negotiation but the Greeks refused it outright. The Cypriot people themselves never had a chance to voice what probably would have been a negative response to the Radcliffe proposals.

The Cyprus question was discussed in the UN in 1957, but nothing positive was expressed by the General Assembly except "the earnest desire that a... just solution will be found." This did little except to insure the Archbishop's release later that year provided he would not return to Cyprus. The British gradually released the emergency measures on the island--though violence had not stopped --and proposed a plan in early 1958 calling for a seven-year "period of partnership" between the three governments. This was set aside at the time both because of the concurrent Greek demand for enosis and the Turkish demand for partition. When deadlock and the shaky status quo looked to be the final solution, NATO Secretary-General Spaak dramatically stepped into the picture and set up the

conferences which later led to the Zurich Agreement and the final London Agreements. These negotiations should be discussed at length, in order to place in perspective the complexities of the British, Greek, and Turkish policies as they affected the attempts of the parties to resolve the "Cyprus Muddle." (Infra, Chapters II and III.)

Chapter II

POLITICAL FORCES EMERGING AFTER 1951 AND THE RESULTING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM

Preface

The Cyprus problem was far more involved than that of a "classic" colonial struggle--with the indigenous population desiring independence and the mother-country denying it. While the rising wave of protest against imperial oppression, exploitation, and deprivation contributed to the separatist movement in Cyprus, there were other factors on the international level which played a significant role in making the matter as acute as it ultimately became. The post-World War II era has been characterized by the success of colonies in their drives for freedom from foreign domination, and this is vividly demonstrated by the number of emergent Afro-Asian nations which did not exist two decades ago. The age-old clamoring of the Cypriots found an ideal outlet in the wave of nationalism that has prevailed in contemporary world politics, but the promise of success in Cyprus was no more assured at that time than it was at the beginning of British rule. Indeed, it was not until the Cyprus problem had become an "apple of discord" between three sovereign nations that Great Britain was

finally compelled to make a reassessment on her Cyprus policy. It therefore should be emphasized that it was not primarily the domestic turmoil in Cyprus that caused a change of heart in Whitehall, rather it was provoked, among other things, by the threat of a grave upheaval between allies of the cold war.

Surges toward self-government, or at times merely a new government, are explained by Hans Kohn as "due not so much to external pressure as to Western ideas themselves."¹ In other words, it was neither rioting students nor active terrorists that brought independence to certain colonies; it was more a result of the philosophy inherited from the colonizing motherland. It was an attitude which acknowledged the natural right of reasonable men to choose their own forms of government; or what some like to call self-determination, which is historically an element of American foreign policy.²

¹Hans Kohn, "Reflections of Colonialism," from Strausz-Hupe and Hazard, The Idea of Colonialism, (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 10.

²Norman D. Palmer and H. C. Perkins, International Relations, 2nd Ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957), p. 697. Many writers feel that self-determination is not an absolute right and "President Wilson did mankind not the only disservice of his career when he insisted on bestowing this concept upon it against the advice of his Secretary of State (Robert Lansing), who uttered the warning that it would bring 'untold misery' to the world." From Sir Henry Luke, Cyprus, New York: Roy Publishers, 1957, p. 183. It was this point, among others, that caused the break between Wilson and Lansing and ended in the latter's being dismissed from the cabinet in 1920. See Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 3rd Ed. (New York:

This right, however, has been granted by colonial powers only on a selective basis, and much discontent has resulted. An analogy might be drawn here to what de Toqueville has said about a minor concession in voting rights leading ultimately to universal suffrage.³ For here we see occasional concessions in self-determination ultimately leading to self-determination for all, which means the eventual demise of historic colonialism.

Thus, Professor Kohn is careful to avoid placing the blame for the rise of anti-colonialism fully on either native liberationists or upon the "legalistic, moralistic" nations, as George Kennan has labeled the United States.⁴ Instead he nostalgically observes:

Western imperialism has had only a brief day in history. Its sun is now setting, and though this sun has shone over many injustices and cruelties--though these were in no way worse than the normal cruelties in Asia and Africa--it has brought lasting benefits to both continents...⁵

Crofts and Co., 1946), pp. 650, 674. It might also be noted that the principle of self-determination was reconfirmed in Point 2, of the Atlantic Charter signed by Roosevelt and Churchill in 1941. *Ibid.*, p. 783. The United National Charter also declared that the interest of non-self-governing territories is "paramount." (Article 73) More to the point is Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the UN Charter which refers to the development of friendly relations among nations, "based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."

³Alex de Toqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. I, (New York: Vintage Books, 1959), (The Henry Reeve Text), p. 59.

⁴George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 95.

⁵Kohn, loc. cit.

The receding tide of colonialism can be attributed, therefore, to evolution rather than revolution. The twentieth century with its changing system of values, and its consequential effect on all the nations of the world, has brought colonialism into a new and unsympathetic light. Whether such a change is justified or abortive is another matter, but Professor Kohn indicates by his mention of "lasting benefits" that the usefulness of colonialism, i.e., to nurture backward areas to political maturity, might not be completely passe. The fundamental reason for the present moribund state of world-wide colonialism is, with little doubt, the altruistic ethical standard which has emerged in this new century. Moreover, the Western world has been guilty of applying this criterion to what already happened in the 19th Century, and the result is that "the West suffers from an unnecessarily bad conscience which naturally anti-Western propaganda is shamelessly exploiting."⁶ Cultural disparities forced European countries to become colonizers; and the exposure of the colonial powers' civilization, in formerly undeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, and even America, has indeed reduced the previous cultural lag. Still this creates no valid reason that colonialism has served its purpose and, therefore now must die. Professor Kohn feels that the West has a "neurotic urge to make

⁶Ibid., p. 11.

disproportionate atonement for imaginary wrongs"⁷ This anxiety and guilt feeling could do the free world infinitely more harm than the propaganda engendered by the existence of a few remaining primitive territories which necessarily must be ruled by some power.

Cyprus has been occupied by Great Britain for almost eighty years; prior to that the island had known centuries of varied rulers. Cyprus has been an official colony only since 1925, but it has always been--and still is considered by some--an ideal colonial type.⁸ In view of this, the factors which determine when a colony has become "politically mature" can be a perplexing problem. Some observers have suggested scientific guages to facilitate the determination of whether a colony should be self-governing or not, i.e. literacy, crime rate, per capita income, technical progress, success of local government, etc.⁹ Nevertheless, there is no absolute standard and each case must be judged on its individual merits. What individual merits Cyprus had for self-government were not quite apparent. It had no recent historical tradition of internal autonomy, and since 1931 has been relieved completely of a hand in its government, other than on the municipal and

⁷Ibid.

⁸Hill, op. cit., p. 191, 613 ff.

⁹Stefan T. Possosny, "Colonial Problems in Perspective," from Strauss-Hupe and Hazard, op. cit., p. 27.

village levels.

Various proposals since the abrogation of the constitution in 1931 have stressed the necessity for improved management of local affairs before a part in the government of the island would be granted to the Cypriots, (see Chapter I, supra). Later proposals pointed toward self-government as a distant goal¹⁰ but no one imagined it would ever come as soon as it did. The last British proposal in July, 1958, the so-called "seven year plan," envisioned a seven-year sharing of the sovereignty of the island with Greece and Turkey in order to establish self-government followed by self-determination.¹¹ It is evident that the alternative of self-government was hastily precipitated in the face of the mounting agitation and terrorism from both ethnic elements on the island, neither of which

¹⁰The Labor Government suggested self-government for Cyprus at some nebulous future date, but at the time (1948) said no change in the sovereignty of the island was intended for the present. Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 20, 1954. Also the Radcliffe Proposals took bold steps toward the establishment of self-government first, and then self-determination due at an unspecified future date. Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 44, Jan., 1957, pp. 10 ff.

¹¹Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 61, July, 1958, pp. 1 ff. It should be made clear here the above periodical (correctly called The Survey of . . .) is the official publication of the Conservative Party Political Centre in London. The views expressed are those of the Conservative Party, and are fully endorsed by the Conservative British Cabinet. With the Conservative Party in power now--and in fact for as long as the writer has used the periodical for this study--The Survey. . . may be considered a semi-official source.

could be placated from 1954 onward. The Greeks cried enosis, the Turks demanded partition, and British tried to compromise with the suggestion of gradual self-government; none of the parties was successful in getting exactly what it wanted.

The Cyprus question came into prominence for the British, as well as the rest of the world, in 1954. It was in that year Greece first openly encouraged the enosis movement on Cyprus and presented the question to the United Nations. In that same year the EOKA terrorist activities were initiated. Also in October, 1954, an agreement was signed with Egypt for the complete evacuation of British troops from Suez. Consequently, Cyprus had to become the center for British power in the Eastern Mediterranean. This development could do little to appease the dissident Greek Cypriots, but Britain declared that she had a legal right to the island and intended to make it her Middle Eastern base. The Turks were firmly opposed to enosis from the start, for fear of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and "partly from misgivings about Greece's ability to defend an island so vital to Turkish security."¹² Both of the stands were speciously reasonable; but they mattered little to Great Britain who, manifesting her own intransigence, proceeded to impose martial law on the island and went about building her

¹² Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 20, Aug., 1954, p. 11.

military installations. Thus, began a period of tension and bloodshed which was to last almost five years, until it was resolved by the unexpected Zurich and London Agreements.

This period enabled each of the participants time to devise intricate cases defending their own particular views and the political currents in which these developed became apparent. These cases, presented primarily to the court of world public opinion, were obvious reflections of the international milieu and inter-group tensions functioning therein. All three currents were eventually to influence the final outcome of the Cyprus problem.

The Greek Current

The desire of some Greek Cypriots to be united with Greece enosis can be traced as far back as 1830.¹³ The official endorsement of the Cypriot desire by the Royal Greek Government, however, was never announced until 1954. The reasons for this puzzling lag are many, but the one that the Greek will give is the traditional friendship--some view this "friendship" more as dependence--the Greeks have always felt for the British.¹⁴ The Greeks had postponed

¹³Hill, op. cit., p. 496. Most Cypriot Greek sources will push this date back to 1821, or the start of the Greek fight for independence.

¹⁴This had been the case ever since Lord George Gordon Byron, the poet, lost his life fighting for Greek independence in 1825. However, Greek anglophiles will cite

an inevitable situation as long as they could; but--particularly after a personal rebuke of Prime Minister Papagos by Prime Minister Eden in 1954--the Greek government felt they could no longer stem the tide of world public opinion to which the Cypriot Greeks had been appealing so intensely through their clergy. The Cypriot Greek case was based on the moral issue that a subjugated people under foreign colonial-rule had the right to determine how they wanted to be governed. The case presents the same principle of self-determination which has been embodied into various international documents since the First World War. (see Footnote #2 supra).

The acceptance of the Cypriot Greek case by the Royal Greek government altered the whole psychological picture. To enhance the moral case of the Cypriots, the Greeks introduced an emotional aspect, designed to appeal to recently freed former colonies. More important than that innovation, the Greek case gave the Cypriot Greeks an "endorsement for the right of Union /enosis/ which never existed before, which, if it is not taken seriously /by the British/ might land anywhere."¹⁵ The case did lead to an end that few people expected; but not before it had

the Battle of Navarino in 1827 as the beginning of Anglo-Greek amity. See Hill, op. cit., p. 150.

¹⁵Durrell, op. cit., p. 116.

experienced vicissitudes, unwanted supporters, and violence to such an extent, that many of the Greek endorsers were sorry they had ever expressed their support.¹⁶

Cyprus has never been a part of Hellenic Greece, but the island had known extensive Greek influences ever since ancient times. It was part of the Byzantine Empire and during that time the Eastern Orthodox Church was introduced and allowed to flourish on the island, "thus religion combined with language to foster the idea the Cypriots were Greek in origin."¹⁷ Language and religion were important considerations in the enosis idea, but the undue amount of emphasis placed on racial affinity as well by the enosists is a curious fact. Race was the weakest link that the Cypriots Greek had in their case. Extensive anthropological and archaeological evidence has been in existence to prove that the primitive population of Cyprus was "an

¹⁶This feeling was evident to any objective viewer who would speak with open-minded Greeks in Athens, Istanbul, or Nicosia from 1956 onward. This fact is part of the writer's observation while in those cities, since few of these opinions were ever published for fear of ridicule, ostracism, or retaliation. One must also bear in mind at this point that the so-called "Cypriot case" was one that did not have the allegiance of all the Cypriot Greeks. On the contrary, it has been sufficiently proven by a number of sources that enosis was a doctrine of only a very few on the island, but the church helped to make up the membership of this "few" and for that reason the movement had powerful support.

¹⁷Hill, op. cit., p. 488.

offshoot from the regions of Asia Minor and North Syria."¹⁸ Notwithstanding, racial derivation is certainly not considered a prerequisite to nationalism. Nationalism can come from countless sources and Cyprus was an example of what is termed "particularistic nationalism," which is based upon "secessionist demands of a people."¹⁹ A former governor of Cyprus stated a case for enosis before the turn of the century:

The Greekness of the Cypriot Greeks, in my opinion is indisputable. Nationalism is more, is other, is greater than pigmentation or cephalic indices. A man is of the race of which he passionately feels himself to be. No sensible person will deny that the Cypriot is Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, Greek-feeling, ...²⁰

Greek nationalism, slow as it was to seize the opportunity the Cypriots made for it,²¹ is quite unlike

¹⁸Ibid., The Cypriots are Mediterranean dolchocephals, while the Greeks are Balkan brachycephalic.

¹⁹Khosrow, Mostofi, Aspects of Nationalism, (Salt Lake City: U. of Utah, 1959), p. 12. The author notes that Cyprus once shared the lead with Northern Ireland as that nation which best represented the "frustrated attempts" of this type of nationalism.

²⁰Sir Ronald Storrs, Orientations, (London: 1932), p. 470 quoted in Hill, op. cit., p. 489.

²¹Here again it must be accentuated that the support for enosis by the Greek Cypriots was not all-inclusive. Sir Harry Luke is careful to note this in his work, and the following is an accurate summary of the real Cypriot feeling toward enosis: "A Frankenstein monster greater than even terrorism is Enosis itself. The villagers have had to pay lip-service to it when all that most of them wanted was to be left alone. No one dares to say he is against it for fear of being branded a traitor, it is the stigma of disloyalty /to enosis/ that the strength of the movement resides." Luke, op. cit., p. 180.

that which is understood by other Europeans. The fundamental concept is that all countries inhabited by Greeks should be united under one central Greek government. Some Greeks today still espouse the concept of irredentism, i.e., regaining all territories which were once occupied by Greece. This belief consequently, makes the contemporary irredentists aspire to regain the entire Byzantine Empire of old. This irredentist dream, fantastic as it may sound to anyone who knows modern Greece, has nevertheless been the underlying element of Greek foreign policy. Despite the traditional internal disintegration or clannishness of the Greek nation--which consequently causes the Greek to hold his village in higher esteem than the state--Greek nationalism has still developed because of the Greek people's common concentration on foreign policy.²² The Greek feels that territorial aggrandizement will bring the powerful nation status which, due to her pathetic lack of national resources and the other qualitative factors which determine national power, has thus far been denied Greece. The inordinate

²²Adamantia Pollis (Koslin), "The Megali Idea-- A Study of Greek Nationalism." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1957, pp. 1-43. The Megali Idea" or the "The Great Idea" is the dream to bring about a greater Greece. The roots of this idea go back to the beginning of modern Greece, 1830, and though most writers feel the "great idea" is no longer thought of in its broadest concept, i.e., to bring about "a resurrected Byzantine Empire," (p. 262), Turkey fears it nonetheless. In fact, Turkey charges that this idea has "fired the imagination of many Greeks and lent strength to the Greco-Cypriot movement of enosis." See "The Cyprus Question," Mediterranean Documents, Vol. 1, No. 3, Nov., 1958, p. 4.

concern for foreign policy did more than just give the Greek extrinsic aspirations. One scholar explains another result:

By concentrating on foreign policy, through the structuring of the superordinate goal of irredentism, the internal divisiveness of the nation, while not eradicated was successfully ignored.²³

Following this policy, Greece has entered wars--especially the First World War--for the sole purpose of territorial gain. Her statesmen have tried to justify any territorial acquisition resulting from any war as:

. . . constituting not an extension of the state by conquest, but a natural return to the limits within which Hellenism has flourished ever since the pre-historic period. . . .²⁴

In view of these facts, it is understandable why "Greek history portrays...the subservience of internal issues to the exigencies of foreign affairs," which included "...tangential escapades of territorial aggrandizement..." and "...enosis of unredeemed territory..."²⁵ Thus it is not unwarranted to deduce that Greece had designs on Cyprus, as was alleged by some scholars since 1830.²⁶ Why the claim

²³Ibid., p. 207.

²⁴Speech delivered in the Greek Parliament by Eleutherios Venizelos, October 21, 1915, quoted Ibid., p. 209 n.

²⁵Ibid., p. 245.

²⁶Hill, op. cit., p. 496. See also Luke, op. cit., p. 171 and Cyprus Demands Self-Determination, (Washington: Royal Greek Information Service, October, 1954), pp. 5, 24, 36, and Durrell op. cit., p. 24.

was suppressed so long can be explained by pointing out that Greece had more exigent territorial objectives closer to home. When these objectives were either fulfilled, (e.g., Thessaly, Thrace, Macedonia, Crete, etc.) or frustrated, (e.g., Constantinople and Asia Minor) then Greece was afforded the time to make a claim on Cyprus. This time did not come, evidently, until the post War II era.

The success of the early movement of enosis, which expressed itself unmistakably within a year after Great Britain took over the island in 1878, can be ascribed to the extreme toleration, almost laxity, which characterized the British Administration at the time. The British took no interest initially in trying to dissuade the Cypriot Greeks from expressing their Hellenic ties. Possibly the British felt the island was legally part of the Ottoman Empire--which it was until 1914--and therefore, they had no right to make the Cypriots loyal subjects of the British crown. As a result, schools were allowed to pursue their own curriculum from the replica of that in Greece and it was taught from the start that Greece was the motherland.²⁷

²⁷ One of the first reports on education in 1879 stressed the fact that Cypriot students should be allowed "to obtain instructions in English as well as Greek and prevent schools from being a focus of Hellenic propaganda" Correspondence Respecting Complaints Made Against the Government of Cyprus, March 5, 1879, /C-2324/, 1878-79, LIV 501, p. 20. Despite this warning, Colonial Secretary, Lord Kimberly, stated three years later: "Considering the rich and varied literature of ancient Greece...Greek is regarded for the attainment of a high degree of mental culture."

That was only part of what was permitted under the early British rule, Hill also notes:

Their /Greek Cypriot/ maps represented Cyprus as part of 'unredeemed Greece.' Portraits of King Constantine, Queen Sophia, Venezelos and of the heroes of the Greek War of Independence decorated the walls. And it was the glories of Greek History, not the achievements of the British nation, that were made familiar to the pupils.²⁸

With such a start, it is little wonder why the British had to contend with the endless cries for enosis which gradually increased in intensity every year. Moreover, the desire of the Cypriots became a political issue on the homefront. The Greek Club in London, was the center of pressures to recognize enosis, which were put on the Liberal Government after they came into power in 1880. Prime Minister Gladstone might have privately sided with the Greek case, but said often in public "that proposals involving a violation of the Cyprus Convention could not be discussed."²⁹ This same man, nevertheless, later acknowledged the Greek case and a famous passage he wrote in 1897 has been frequently cited in many of the propaganda publications put out by the Greek Information Office after the Athens government officially took the case:

I subjoin the satisfaction I should feel were it granted me before the close of my long life to see the population of that Hellenic island placed

²⁸Hill, op. cit., p. 492.

²⁹Ibid., p. 498.

by a friendly arrangement in organic union with their brethren of the Kingdom of Greece.³⁰

From the beginning of the occupation in 1878 until the First World War, the British continually invoked the obstacle that Cyprus was legally under Ottoman sovereignty. With this maneuver, they could successfully frustrate the claims of the Cypriot Greeks by pointing out that Great Britain was not free to dispose of the island. The claims made by the Cypriot Greeks during this period became more fervent, however, as their population increased.³¹ When the British formally annexed the island in 1914, the enosists saw a possibility that their case would be viewed in a new light. But, in the same manner that had characterized the British behavior in the years prior, the demands for enosis were tepidly received in London. Most Cypriots felt after the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, that Britain was absolutely free to deal with Cyprus as she planned, i.e., without any reference to the Turks; but these hopes were shattered when the island was made a Crown Colony in 1925, and Great Britain considered the Cyprus question a closed issue. It is interesting to note that even after the disturbances in 1931, the Greek Cypriot case for enosis was

³⁰ Cyprus Demands Self-Determination, (Washington: Greek Information Office, October, 1954), p. 18.

³¹ The Greeks increased to 80% of the population by 1931. See Cyprus, Touchstone for Democracy, (Athens: Union of Journalists, November, 1958), p. 1.

not endorsed by Greece. The numerous petitions which were signed on the island and the endless Cyprian delegations that invaded London all were ostensibly spontaneous and purported that the majority of Cypriots wanted union with Greece. Yet not a single instance is recorded where the Royal Greek Government spoke up in diplomatic channels in favor of the enosis movement until after World War II.³² As was indicated before, the reason for this failure might have been justified; but it has led some observers to think that Greece actually thought the Cypriot "moral" case was weak and to side with such a movement would either make them look foolish in the same arena of power politics or at least make their efforts appear ill-intended.³³ A British agent on Cyprus at the time made this amusing summary of enosis, prior to the Greek acceptance of the case: "Well, old man, officially it doesn't exist, but unofficially it's a bit of headache."³⁴

The acceptance of the Cypriot case by the Greeks has never been fully explained, but one can easily cite circumstances which may have contributed to the change in policy when it finally came about. First, the Truman

³²The Greek Parliament approved a demand for enosis in 1947, however, the Greek government never communicated the resolution to the British. See Hill, op. cit., p. 565.

³³See Luke, op. cit., pp. 178 ff. and Hill, op. cit., 565 ff.

³⁴Durrell, op. cit., p. 119.

Doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey was announced in 1947, and this diminished the importance Greece had placed on aid and assistance from Britain. Second, Marshall Plan economic aid had been poured into Greece from 1948 to 1951 and the economy of Greece was at last approaching viability. And lastly, Greece and Turkey were invited to join NATO in 1951, and thus becoming allies with the West against their mutual enemy of Communism. (Regarding the last point, it could be noted that this expression of Greco-Turkish accord jolted many of the advocates of Greece's claim on Constantinople [Istanbul] and other parts of Asia Minor.)

These conditions allowed Greece time to concentrate her foreign policy efforts on other areas which had seemed insignificant before, i.e., Cyprus and Greece's realization that the Cypriot case of self-determination, could bring nothing but eventual union. Greece had intentionally waited for the ideal time to express her stand on Cyprus and by the Cypriot plebiscite 1950, it had come. This policy change by the Greek government made the century-old Greek Cypriot plea for enosis take on new dimensions. A Dutch journalist devised an analogy to explain the new Cypriot feeling:

Cyprus is like a man who has been told he is impotent for generations; suddenly he finds himself in bed with a lovely girl and discovers that he isn't--he can actually make love!³⁵

³⁵Quoted, in ibid., p. 202.

The Cypriots thought there was no stopping the enosis dream, now that Greece had expressed their support; but Greece actually disliked being badgered by the Cypriots.³⁶ From 1951 on, Greek government officials had tried to get some kind of concession from the British, so that they could present a "face-saver which would enable them to shut the Cypriots up."³⁷ Their efforts were to little avail, since the Cabinet of Anthony Eden regarded the Cyprus case as closed. The Greeks perhaps would have been satisfied if they could have got the British to change "closed" to "postponed" but it never happened.³⁸ A statement made by Henry Hopkinson on the floor of Parliament in July, 1954, summarized the "notorious never" position of the British which so irritated the Greeks:

³⁶After the Radcliffe proposals were announced the official Greek policy became one of moderation. Upon hearing this, Col. George Grivas, leader of EOKA, sent a demand to the Greek government for more determined action. The Foreign Office in Athens replied with forceful rejoinder: "The foreign policy of Greece is not determined by any area of Greece, nor by any organization of free or unredeemed Greeks; it is determined in the name of the Greek people by the Government elected by them which, without ceasing to fight for freedom of the Greeks, must safeguard the more general and stable interests of the nation." Quoted in Doros Alastos, Cyprus Guerilla, (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 182.

³⁷Durrell, op. cit., p. 117.

³⁸Had the British known the Greek mentality better, they could have alienated less of these emotional people by answering with an evasive promise, than with an honest refusal.

It has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent.³⁹

It was this complete impasse facing the Greek government that forced them to take their struggle for self-determination in Cyprus to the United Nations.

The Cyprus Issue in the UN

In September of 1950, an unofficial Cypriot delegation submitted to the Secretary General the plebiscite petition, signed in January, 1950, which indicated that 95.7 per cent of the Cypriot population wanted union with Greece.⁴⁰ The next claim in 1951 was that registered by Greece when the Venizelos government demanded the union of Cyprus with Greece after the British had declared that no formal request for enosis had ever been received. In the fall of that same year, Mavros, the Greek delegate to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly in Paris, raised the matter in the Trusteeship Committee and claimed it was within the scope of the UN Charter, but there was no UN action taken on the proposal.⁴¹

³⁹Quoted in Cyprus Touchstone for Democracy, op. cit., p. 10.

⁴⁰Cyprus Demands Self Determination, op. cit., p. 6.

⁴¹The New York Times, Nov. 23, 1951, p. 14. The Greeks and their counterparts in Cyprus were especially grieved at this time because Libya had been given its independence, while the "descendants of Socrates were still

During the Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly in 1952, the Greek delegation once again raised the question of self-determination for Cyprus. The Secretary-General did not refer the question to any committee and the matter was dropped. During that same year, Archbishop Makarios III of Cyprus visited the General Assembly in New York in order to plead the Cypriot case and build up support for the Greek case. The next year during the Eighth UN General Assembly, the Chairman of the Greek Delegation, Alexis Kyrou, was pressured by Greek public opinion to raise the Cyprus question though it was not on the UN Agenda. He insisted the Greek government preferred bilateral talks with Great Britain, but Great Britain was non-cooperative at this time. So with the help of a group of Cypriots, the Greek Delegation petitioned individual UN delegates and cultivated a favorable field of opinion for their big effort which was to come the following year.⁴²

By 1954, Field Marshal Alexander L. Papagos was the new Prime Minister and he along with his cabinet were rabidly pro-enosis. The Greek Delegation again raised the Cyprus question, and this time it was finally placed on the Agenda of the Ninth General Assembly by the Steering Committee.⁴³ The Greek case was presented clearly in a letter

slaves." The London Times, May 29, 1952, quoted in Cyprus, Background to Enosis. (London: R.I.I.A., Oct., 1955), p. 12.

⁴²The New York Times, Sept. 22, 1953, p. 5.

⁴³Ibid., p. 245.

Archbishop Makarios sent to the Secretary General, in which the Archbishop alleged that the British Administration in Cyprus contravenes the UN Charter:

It contravenes Article 1 of the Declaration which provides that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.

It contravenes Article 19 whereby everyone has the right of opinion and expression without interference.

It contravenes Article 20 whereby everyone has the right of peaceful Assembly and Association.

It contravenes Article 21 which provides that the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of Government.

It also contravenes Article 26 (2) which provides that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and Article 26 (3) which provides that parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

All these violations of fundamental freedoms follow in the furrow of the major violation of Human Rights, namely the denial to the people of Cyprus of their right to self-determination. They are herein stated only in order to show some of the evils that denial of national liberty entails; for it should be made clear that our claim is that of self-determination and nothing less.⁴⁴

In the debate which followed the United Kingdom countered Greek claims by stating that the United Nation Assembly "lacked competence" to handle this issue, which to Great Britain was a domestic one. Also Britain claimed that self-determination was merely a legal way by which Greece could annex Cyprus and it would not bring about self-government. In further debate, New Zealand proposed a draft resolution, supported by Turkey, that Article 2, paragraph

⁴⁴ Explanatory memorandum in letter from Archbishop Makarios III to the Secretary General of the UN, August 22, 1954. From Cyprus Demands Self-Determination, op. cit., p. 35.

7, of the Charter precludes the discussion of Cyprus, because there was a domestic issue involved, and UN should never take the matter into consideration again. This resolution was amended to read "for the time being" instead of, "never," and it was adopted by fifty votes to none with eight abstentions.⁴⁵

The argument against the British claim that Cyprus was a domestic issue was raised by the Greek delegate, and supported by the Russian representative. It was that under Article 73 of the Charter, Cyprus was considered a "non-self-governing territory" and her interests were "paramount"; the United Kingdom had conceded this by submitting annual information reports on Cyprus to the Assembly as provided for under this Article. Nevertheless, the British influence in the Assembly won out and the matter was dropped until the next year.⁴⁶

The Tenth Session of the UN General Assembly convened soon after the London Tripartite Conference broke down in the Fall of 1955. Before the Plenary Session of the Assembly, the Greeks again presented a resolution requesting that the Cyprus question be placed on the Agenda. The Greek Foreign Minister continually had accused the other members of the London Conference of its failure. In a speech

⁴⁵Yearbook of the UN 1954, op. cit., pp. 94-96.

⁴⁶Ibid.

before the UN General Assembly he tried to substantiate the Greek viewpoint and get the Cyprus issue placed on the Agenda. But it was fruitless effort as the Plenary Assembly voted not to include the resolution.⁴⁷ The Greek delegation maintained throughout that they were acting for the Cypriot people only in a defense against British Administration which was "neither constructive nor democratic."⁴⁸ It was after these frustrated negotiations that widespread violence broke out in Cyprus, and led to the deportation of Archbishop Makarios in March of the following year.

The Eleventh Session of the UN General Assembly convened in 1956 and again the Greek Delegation presented their request that the Cyprus issue be placed on the Agenda. The Greek Delegation made application for consideration on the Agenda under the auspices of the UN principle of "equal rights and self-determination of peoples."⁴⁹ In general, the Greek case for the UN that year was presented exactly as it had been the year before. This time during the debate, however, the Greek representative stressed the great "military machine" which the British were employing to rid the

⁴⁷ Yearbook of the UN 1955, op. cit., pp. 77-79.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Yearbook of the UN 1956, op. cit., pp. 94-125. By this time the case the Greeks were presenting to the British was one of demanding the outright annexation of Cyprus without even a plebiscite. See Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, op. cit., No. 37, May, 1956.

island of terrorism. Also there was an allegation by the Greeks that Britain's sole interest in Cyprus was to protect her oil interests in the Middle East (such an argument obviously intended to arouse the newly freed nations, especially those of the Middle East). Moreover, the Greeks maintained that the Lausanne Treaty did not rule out the possibility of self-determination by the Cypriots, as Turkey and the United Kingdom had held all along. Article 16 (not Article 20) of the treaty specified that "the disposal of these territories and islands is to be settled by the parties concerned."⁵⁰

To bolster these logical arguments, Greece introduced emotional "evidences" of British atrocities committed during the emergency period on the island. Numerous signed statements of British cruelties and intrigue were presented to the delegates to consider along with other information presented during the debates. Great Britain did not want to be left out of this emotionalism altogether, therefore, she introduced the "captured" diary, supposedly written by the leader of EOKA, Dighenis (Col. George Grivas). Greece thought so little of what she called a "forgery" that she included much of the diary in the appendix of the Greek publication dealing with the Cyprus question before the

⁵⁰ The Treaties of Peace (1919-1923), Vol. II, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924), p. 964.

United Nations.⁵¹

Four solid days of debate ensued and no less than eighty nations took part in the proceedings. Greece had two resolutions in front of the Political and Security Committee: one calling for self-determination for Cyprus, and the second asking for a fact-finding commission to investigate the charges which the British made to the effect that the Greek government was supporting the terrorist EOKA movement in the island. Part way through the debate, the U. S. delegate to the UN, J. J. Wadsworth, appealed to Greece, Turkey and Great Britain to settle the dispute among themselves and urged that no UN action be taken to aggravate the situation.⁵² Finally, the Political Committee adopted a resolution proposed by India, 76 votes to none with two abstentions, and the General Assembly endorsed the decision of the First Committee.⁵³ The resolution stated:

⁵¹Cyprus Before the United Nations, 11th Session, (Washington: Royal Greek Information Service, 1958), pp. 311-314.

⁵²The New York Times, February 21, 1957, p. 9. In the autumn of 1958 at a time when Queen Frederika of Greece had been touring the U. S., she was advised by the State Department that an end to the Greco-Turkish dispute was highly desirable. The Middle East had become an intense problem area for the U. S. due to the Arab-Israeli struggle, topped by the real or imagined, Soviet penetration in the area. As a result the State Department "could no longer afford the luxury of a perpetual conflict among her allies." Alastos, op. cit., p. 198.

⁵³Yearbook of the UN, 1956, op. cit., pp. 121-125.

The General Assembly
 Having considered the question of Cyprus,
 Believing that the solution of this problem requires
 an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression,
 Expresses the earnest desire that a peaceful,
 democratic and just solution will be found in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the hope that negotiations will be resumed and continued to this end.⁵⁴

This resolution was greeted with undue enthusiasm by members of the UN. There was little that was subsequently done in "an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression." Archbishop Makarios was freed from the Seychelles where he had been deported, but the violence on the island continued. The Radcliffe proposals for a new constitution on Cyprus was presented after the UN resolution, but the Greeks maintained that there was no provision for self-determination, and refused to discuss it.⁵⁵ Great Britain tried to resume Tripartite talks, but these were not warmly received by Greece's Foreign Office, which had always resented the British invitation to include Turkey. The Greeks insisted that the "negotiations" referred to in the UN Resolution meant those between Great Britain and a representative of the Cypriot people, who in the Greek estimation was Archbishop Makarios. On this point, the British were adamantly

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Survey of Colonial Affairs, June, 1957. It should be noted that Krishna Menon of India then argued in a lengthy speech that the obvious "just democratic solution" was "independence," but the resolution was never acted upon. Alastos, op. cit., p. 154.

opposed to talks with Makarios, as they felt he was directly responsible for the rampant terrorism on Cyprus.⁵⁶ In view of the deadlock, NATO offered the use of "Lord Ismay's good offices" since the parties concerned were all members.⁵⁷ Greece refused this because it would amount to a virtual Tripartite Conference and ignore completely the opinion of the Cypriot people on this matter.

When the Twelfth General Assembly of the UN convened in September, 1957, there was little evidence that the disputants present could show that they subscribed to the resolution passed by the previous Assembly. Greece again requested inscription of the Cyprus question on the Agenda. It was once more included on the Agenda under a two-part title: first, was the usual contention of self-determination for the Cypriots, and second, was the claim of "violations of human rights and atrocities by the British Colonial Administration against Cyprians."⁵⁸ As in the previous Assembly, the debate on the question lasted through four days, during which time the Greek resolution was amended by Canada and others in the Political Committee, and was approved as follows:

⁵⁶Survey of Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, April, 1957, p. 6-8.

⁵⁷Ibid., March, 1957, p. 11.

⁵⁸Yearbook of the UN, 1957, op. cit., p. 76.

Considering further that the situation in Cyprus is still fraught with danger and that a solution at the earliest possible time is required to preserve peace and stability in that area, the Political Committee expressed its hope that further negotiations and discussions will be undertaken in a spirit of cooperation with a view to having the right of self-determination applied in the case of the people of Cyprus.⁵⁹

When the resolution reached the General Assembly it managed to get only thirty-one votes in favor and, as this was not the two-thirds required for General Assembly approval, the resolution was not adopted.⁶⁰

The Thirteenth General Assembly of the United Nations convened in the Fall of 1958. A determined Greek Delegation once again introduced the question of Cyprus to be placed on the Agenda for the General Assembly's consideration. During the discussion in the Political Committee, America, Turkey, and seven other nations also introduced resolutions to be considered along with that of Greece.⁶¹ The final resolution, which was adopted by the Committee, was the one submitted by Iran with amendments by Greece and Turkey. This draft called for a conference with the interested parties and a representative of the Cypriot people, but it again failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds vote in the General Assembly.⁶² The following day Mexico

⁵⁹Ibid., also Cyprus Before the United Nations, 12th Assembly, (Washington: Greek Information Services, 1958), p. 276.

⁶⁰Yearbook of the UN, 1957, loc. cit.

⁶¹The New York Times, Dec. 5, 1958.

⁶²Ibid., Dec. 6, 1958, p. 1-2.

introduced a resolution which repeated much of what the previous Assembly had suggested for Cyprus, i.e., the General Assembly "expresses its confidence that continued efforts would be made by the parties to reach a peaceful, democratic, and just solution in accordance with the charter of the United Nations."⁶³ This resolution was adopted.

To say that the Greek case was successful before the UN would not be an accurate statement. However, one must not call the results a defeat for Greece either. The Greek Delegation made five successive appeals to the General Assembly and, through the debates which were carried on, virtually the whole world became aware of the legal and moral background of the Cyprus issue. The faith the Greek Delegation had in the UN, even after their last attempt proved fruitless for their case, must be admired. If the independent status had not been granted Cyprus, Greek Foreign Minister Evangelas Averoff would undoubtedly have gone to the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly in 1959 making a similar statement to the last one he made:

The duty of the UN General Assembly is to arrive at a clear and unequivocal decision between--on the one hand--the right of the people of Cyprus to an independent status (as proposed by us)--on the other hand--the Turco-British proposals, which under various excuses, aim at partition...we appeal to the United Nations carrying with us the hopes of a distressed people.⁶⁴

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Quoted in Cyprus Touchstone for Democracy, op. cit., p. 53. Also see: Survey on Commonwealth and Colonial

The vast Greek efforts in the UN had, in final analysis, little to do with the final settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Summary and Analysis of the Greek Involvement

The Cypriot Greek case was one that took on exaggerated proportions after the Greek government officially came to the aid of the Cypriots in 1954. By 1959, the Greek case had made a full cycle and then started to repeat itself. The first demand for Cyprus by the Greek government on the British was enosis, which was tantamount to annexation. When this policy appeared slightly aggressive in the eyes of some disinterested nations of the world, Greece then demanded self-determination for the Cypriots. In 1956, the British government had shown to the Greek government that self-determination was also unacceptable, as a result the Greeks for a time began to demand enosis again. In 1957, considering the sympathy the UN had shown to their case, the Greeks shifted back to a demand for self-determination, but with less aggression. Making no headway with this tactic, the Greeks then decided that self-government (immediate or eventual) would be the answer

Affairs, No. 46, March, 1957, p. 16. The difference between "good offices" and mediation is that in the former the third state acts simply as amicable go-between, while in the latter a mediator may make suggestions for settlement on his own without consulting the disputants. See Palmer and Perkins, op. cit., p. 289.

to the problem, and this was their policy through the negotiations in 1958.

It is apparent that, though the tactics changed, the Greek strategy of ultimately unifying Cyprus with their nation had never altered. Who, therefore, can say the Greeks have given up enosis now that Cyprus is independent? EOKA leader, George Grivas, was given a hero's welcome when he returned to Greece, as well as being promoted to Lieutenant-General, with full pay for life. Grivas did not wage his four-year guerilla struggle for independence in Cyprus, but rather for enosis, and publicly, he has expressed disappointment with the Republic of Cyprus. It is doubtful, however, that this remarkable military genius will be able to do anything to alter the political future of Cyprus' fait accompli.

The Greek case was based solely on the fact that 78 per cent of the population of Cyprus allegedly wanted union with their motherland, Greece.⁶⁵ There was no legal justification to it, only the moral case that peoples should determine how they are to be governed. The case was

⁶⁵The British have always maintained the petition signed by practically all the Greek Cypriots in 1950, which formed the basis for enosis in Greece's opinion, was a product of coercion and threats by the clergy. Cyprus, Background to Enosis, (London: R.I.I.A., 1955), p. 11; also Cyprus, the Background, (London: R.I.I.A., 1955) and Luke, op. cit., p. 180.

essentially weak, but the Greeks bolstered it with emotional appeals that won over many supporters, including some strong advocates in the U. S. Senate.⁶⁶ Regardless of how precarious or shallow the Greek case might have been, it did hold its own for eight years against a world power such as Great Britain, as well as against a lesser, but in no way a less formidable power, Turkey. When the Greek felt they were losing ground, their policy was flexible enough to change. With the help of persistent "patriots" on the island, Greece assisted in finally bringing about an honorable solution to the Cyprus question. Since Greece lost nothing but her pride, i.e., by giving up her demand for enosis, the Cyprus settlement must, in the final analysis, really be considered a diplomatic victory for Greece.

The Turkish Current

Regarding the geographic value of Cyprus any map of the eastern Mediterranean will clearly show why the aphorism of "a pistol pointing to the heart of Turkey," was devised to describe Turkey's security interest in Cyprus. Cyprus lies forty miles off the southern coast of

⁶⁶The late Senator William Langer of North Dakota took great pride in stating on the Senate Floor on February 17, 1959 that: "I joined with my colleagues in the Senate in sponsoring a resolution that had been in front of the Foreign Relations Committee /of which he was a member/ for several years." U. S. Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959, Vol. 105.

Turkey and is visible from the mainland on clear days. The island faces three of Turkey's growing Mediterranean ports: Antalya, Mersin, and Iskenderun. The southern coast is the only boundary of Turkey which is not virtually locked by another country. And the acquisition of Cyprus by her historic rival, Greece, would complete a two-sided island encirclement of the Turkish peninsula by Greek possessions. With these strategic considerations in mind, the Turkish government had waged an incessant verbal battle to prevent the union of Cyprus with Greece.

Security measures regarding Cyprus, important as they are to Turkey, were not her sole interest in the island. The island's minority population of approximately 80,000 Turkish Cypriots would have been enough justification for Turkey's concern in the future of Cyprus, even if the island had no strategic value to the mainland. Turkey knew that her two interests in Cyprus would continue to be protected if Great Britain could maintain the status quo. For this reason, Turkey sided with everything Great Britain did from the start, consequently the initial role of Turkey was comparatively a minor one. However, when the course of events veered in 1955, and presented Greece's moral case in a better light, Turkey lost her complacency and actively entered the struggle for Cyprus.

Turkey's relatively late entry as an independent participant in the Cyprus imbroglio was met with consternation

by Greece on the one hand, and skepticism by Great Britain, on the other. These two nations wondered what Turkey could possibly offer as a solution to the confused situation at the time; but by the beginning of 1957, they had learned. It was then that Turkey began to advocate the future partition of Cyprus, which, to her, was a logical alternative to the international problem.⁶⁷ At the same time, Turkey had sufficiently impressed diplomatic representatives of both Greece and Great Britain that if the latter would ever concede self-determination to the Cypriots and the resulting plebiscite would lead to union of the island with Greece, then Turkey would go to war to protect her interests. When Turkey had thus expressed her policy, the other two disputants realized that no final decision could be reached regarding Cyprus without Turkey's approval.

The early enosis movements on Cyprus were never of a concern for Turkey. Like Greece, Turkey knew of the island's sentiments, but could not forsake more exigent matters at home to concern herself about Cyprus. While Greece was aspiring to fulfill her "Great Idea" during the aftermath of World War I, Turkey was trying to salvage enough remnants of the fallen Ottoman Empire to make a new nation. When the opposing Greek and Turkish doctrines

⁶⁷ Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 30, May, 1956, p. 7.

again clashed in Asia Minor (1921-23), the Turks led by Mustapha Kemal (Ataturk) came out victorious and the Greeks were left only the grudge to harbor. Hence, the Cyprus issue was no cause of Greco-Turkish discord, it was merely a continuation, when it came, of something that had its roots far back in history.

One of the many liberation organizations in Cyprus, which was a forerunner of EOKA, published in the early 1950's the Cypriot-Greek attitude of the Cypriot-Turks:

We look upon the Turks as our brothers. We have nothing against them and we will do nothing to harm them. We ask them not to create difficulties for us, nor stand in our way by becoming tools of the British.⁶⁸

Accordingly the early attitude of Turkey in 1951 was one of opposing the claims of Greece, in principle, while not venturing forth any positive Cyprus proposals of her own. From the beginning of the resuscitation of militant Greek Cypriot demands for enosis in 1950, Turkey had regarded Great Britain as her true friend and trusted ally; thus, Turkey felt she needed no Cyprus policy of her own. The official Turkish view from that time until 1957 was expressed like this:

The status of Cyprus is a domestic question for Great Britain. That being assumed, in case Great Britain deemed it convenient to confer with or consult other countries on this subject, or, if of her own free will she waived her right to consider the question a domestic one, Turkey before and

⁶⁸ Alastos, op. cit., p. 54.

above all others, should be the one to be conferred with or consulted.⁶⁹

Nevertheless, this official view does not show the apprehensions with which Turkey regarded the Cyprus question, especially after Greece became so active in the matter. In an interview in July of 1956, the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, reaffirmed the official line, yet he hinted at a possible course of action undoubtedly being considered at the time in Ankara:

We have not been called upon to accept or reject a specific British plan for the future of Cyprus, but it is true to say that conversations have been conducted with our British friends. In the course of these talks our views have, of course, been made clear. We have presented no Turkish plan for the future of Cyprus because we are fully convinced there can be nothing better than the constitutional status quo.⁷⁰

Despite the seemingly negative approach that Turkey took toward the Cyprus question, i.e., the status quo, tension was mounting between Turkey and her Mediterranean neighbor, Greece. Greece had tried to show that Turkey had no part in the question of the future of Cyprus. When Turkey tried to comment on the situation, Greece retorted with the charge that Turkey had no rights in Cyprus--though the potential validity of Turkey's "interests" in Cyprus was never

⁶⁹Turkey and Cyprus, (London: Press Attache's Office, Turkish Embassy, 1956), p. 26.

⁷⁰The Daily Telegraph, (London), July 2, 1956, quoted ibid., p. 70.

formally considered by the Greek government. In 1955, there were bombings and riots in both Salonika and Istanbul, and the two governments accused one another of provoking them for devious reasons. The Turkish Foreign Minister at the time, Fuad Koprulu, made this summary of the events:

The Greek efforts to show that the Salonika explosion was engineered by Turkey in order to provide a pre-text for the anti-Greek riots which followed in Istanbul, and then to present these riots as unparalleled acts of barbarism, were clearly an attempt to disqualify Turkey from having any voice in the Cyprus dispute.⁷¹

These two particular disturbances happened at a very inopportune time. The first Tripartite Conference was in progress when the news of the Istanbul riot and another at Izmir reached London. The Turkish government was most apologetic about the damage that was done to the Greek property in those two cities, and offered to pay compensation. Even so, this did little to close the breach that was made in Greco-Turkish relations.

The Tripartite Conference in 1955 was the first attempt by Great Britain to find an equitable solution--

⁷¹From a speech by Fuad Koprulu, to the Grand National Assembly, Ankara, February 25, 1956, quoted in a press release, (Washington: Office of the Turkish Press Attache, 1956). There were some allegations and "proofs" during the trial of deposed Prime Minister Menderes in 1960, that he engineered the whole plot for the expressed purpose of provoking a muddled condition that would take the Turkish citizenry's mind off domestic problems. See The New York Times, November 1-6, 1960.

in better words, an end to hostilities--in Cyprus. Prior to that time Great Britain had only carried on bi-lateral negotiations with the powers concerned and the year before had expressed her stand on Cyprus to the Political Committee of the UN, thus, the Tripartite Conference marked a new Cyprus approach by Great Britain.

At the time of the Conference few persons realized the strength of the Turkish feeling over the Cyprus issue. The calm and conciliatory Cyprus policy, which the Turks had adopted from the onset, clouded over the real concern of the Turkish public. It was during the Tripartite Conference that the Turkish Foreign Minister first made known the fears his government had on Cyprus' falling into Greek hands:

. . .strategically the vital interests of Turkey and the requirements of defence and logistics made it imperative that the island should belong either to Turkey or to a country which was closely interested in Turkey and in the fate of Turkey's Eastern neighbors. In case of war Turkey could be supplied only through her southern ports and whoever controlled Cyprus was in a position to control those ports.⁷²

By the time the Tripartite Conference was called in 1955, Turkey had already begun to doubt if Great Britain were acting in Turkey's best interests. Turkey made no outright accusation to this effect, but at the Conference the acting Foreign Minister, Fatin Zorlu, directed two

⁷²Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 30, Aug. and Sept., 1955.

questions to the British Foreign Secretary, then Harold Macmillan, which showed easily where Turkish interests resided.⁷³ The first question:

Does the British Government intend to maintain in the present and in the future the right of sovereignty on the island of Cyprus, devolved upon Great Britain by the Treaty of Lausanne?

Mr. Macmillan's answer was to the effect that nothing was permanent in a world such as ours, but "we face facts as they are." He did stress that Britain's "sovereignty over Cyprus was beyond dispute" and that the island was essential to Britain's "obligations in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as in the Middle East." Moreover, he stated that he could foresee no condition in the future "enabling us to abandon" this policy position. The second question asked by the Turkish Foreign Minister was:

If the British Government is determined to maintain sovereignty on the island, does it for the present or for the future accept any principle of self-determination which might lead to the independence of the island or to its accession to any other country?

Foreign Secretary Macmillan's reply was to the point:

We do not accept the principle of self-determination as one of universal application. We think that exceptions must be made in favor of geographical, traditional, historical, strategical, and other considerations.

These two incisive questions and their authoritative answers by the Foreign Secretary made the British Government accept

⁷³Ibid. See also Cyprus, The Background, op. cit., pp. 18, 36, and 37.

Mr. Macmillan's remarks as a virtual statement of policy on Cyprus and the full exchange was published in a special White Paper,⁷⁴ which was issued at the same time the British constitutional proposals for Cyprus were made public.

The 1955 British constitutional proposals for Cyprus were rejected by both the Turkish and Greek government, but for entirely different reasons. The Greeks maintained that the elaborate plan for eventual self-government for the Cypriots, as proposed by the British, failed to take into account the aspiration of the Greek Cypriots "of the right to choose the regime they prefer."⁷⁵ The Turks, in contrast, felt the proposals were too liberal and maintained "if any changes were to take place in the status quo of the island, this island should come back to Turkey."⁷⁶ The Tripartite Conference failed to produce an agreement, but it did produce a "get-tough" Cyprus policy for Great Britain and Sir John Harding was soon after appointed governor of the island.

A Unique Policy for Turkey

The original policy that Turkey took on Cyprus confined her to the narrow stand that the island should

⁷⁴ Cmnd. 9594, 1955, quoted, ibid., p. 17.

⁷⁵ Rossides, Zenon, The Problems of Cyprus, (Athens: Greek Information Office), 1957, p. 18.

⁷⁶ In a speech, Fatin Zorlu at London Conference on Cyprus, 1955, Cmnd. 9594, op. cit.

forever remain a British Crown Colony. As long as Turkish interest were protected by this strict policy, there was no need for concern on the part of the Turks. The Turks purposely withheld a positive plan and felt that British intransigence would keep the case of Cyprus a closed issue. As pointed out above, Turkey for the first time suggested something other than the British policy at the Tripartite Conference, i.e., that Cyprus should go to Turkey if any change is made in the administration of the island. Indeed, the Conference marked a turning point, but it did little to bolster Turkey's faith in the future British policy for Cyprus. Prime Minister Menderes later explained how Turkey felt in this period:

Following the Tripartite Conference held in London in 1955, the appeasing and tolerant attitude of the United Kingdom towards Greece, on the one hand, convinced Turkish public opinion of the necessity of protecting Turkey's own rights and interests, the general feeling on this respect reached such a high point that it became difficult to resist the pressure, and on the other hand produced inevitable reactions on the part of the Turkish community in Cyprus which had to resort to self-defense against these terrorist activities.⁷⁷

Terrorist activities did rage on Cyprus during the early part of 1956, and Turkey consequently formed another policy position in July of that year. Prime

⁷⁷In a letter from Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, June 14, 1958, quoted in Documents on Cyprus, (London: Turkish Information Office, 1958), p. 1.

Minister Menderes, who was truly the chief Turkish policy maker and spokesman while he was in power, insisted that his country could take no part in negotiations regarding Cyprus while the terrorism continued in the island. In his words: "Let calm first return and this artificial agitation first be discontinued, then it might be possible for us all to talk matters over. Certainly not before." Publicly, Menderes also lauded the Baghdad Pact (now CENTO), emphasized the absence of Turkish desire for more territory, and looked to Britain to "remain firm and strong...in the Mediterranean and Middle East."⁷⁸ Privately, he and his government must have considered the alternatives that Turkey could employ especially against Greece and even against Britain. There was no positive declaration on the part of Turkey, however, until after the Radcliffe Proposals were published in December, 1956.⁷⁹

Lord Radcliffe's elaborate proposals would have brought about a gradual process of self-government to Cyprus, and at the end of an unspecified period of time there would be appropriate steps toward self-determination. On December 19, 1956, the Colonial Secretary Mr. Lennox-Boyd, made this promise for the future, to the members of the House of

⁷⁸The Daily Telegraph, (London), July 2, 1956.

⁷⁹Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 44, January, 1957, p. 5.

Commons, that "Cyprus must include partition among the eventual options."⁸⁰ In 1957, Turkey stated unequivocally that she had abandoned her former position that Cyprus would always remain under British colonial rule, and "at the greatest possible sacrifice" had accepted the idea of partition as a compromise solution. For the two year period following the official announcement of the Turkish policy of partition until the London Agreements in 1959, Turkey would hear no suggestion on a future plan for Cyprus unless it contained some sort of partition arrangement. To Turkey, partition was a final solution and an inevitable solution. Some Turkish extremists had maps drawn showing the northern portion of the island as Turkish domain, and other extremists even began to encourage trans-migration of the Turkish Cypriots to the northern part of the island. Turkey now had her turn to become intransigent. She was then to play the partition issue to the hilt, in the same manner as Greece had demanded enosis for so long and as Great Britain had tenaciously held to her insistence on the colonial status for Cyprus.⁸¹

⁸⁰Hansard, (Commons), 1956, Vol. 562, Col. 1268.

⁸¹In reality, the British government had no thought of partition. Foreign Secretary Selwyn-Lloyd, speaking about the difficulties of self-determination at the time stated, "If it were to be accepted that people have a right to self-determination whenever they ask for it, it would make nonsense of organized international society. I have never heard the most virulent supporters of self-determination suggest that the Turkish Cypriots should have the right of self-determination." Quoted in, Stanley Mayes, Cyprus and Makarios, (London: Putnam, 1960), p. 95

Partition as a Practicality

"The monster of partition" was the favorite expression of the Greeks whenever they made reference to the Turkish plan.⁸² The fact was that the Greeks were forgetting they were the first ever to suggest partition. Prior to the 1956 British statement, progressive Greek Foreign Minister Averoff had suggested partition as a solution to the Cyprus tangle, just as he had also suggested independence for the island at an early date.⁸³ In spite of these conciliatory offers by her Foreign Minister, Greek public opinion would not accept anything but enosis in the five earlier years of her struggle over Cyprus. The British Colonial Secretary, Lennox-Boyd, made a visit to Istanbul in the summer of 1956 in order to urge the Turkish government to accept partition as a final solution to the Cyprus problem. When Turkey at last formally subscribed to this original Greek, later British, plan and demanded immediate partition, Greece and Britain looked upon their former plans as completely unrealistic. (See footnote #81.)

At the same time, Turkey considered that she had adopted a most constructive attitude. Greece had disavowed her original idea of partition in the meantime, and tried to show the world that Turkey's adopted partition policy

⁸² Cyprus, Touchstone for Democracy, op. cit., p. 19.

⁸³ Letter of Adnan Menderes, July 14, 1956, op. cit.

had led to tragedy wherever it had been applied, "in places like Ireland, Palestine, and Corea [sic]"⁸⁴ In addition, Greece asserted that partition would deny "self-determination to a people as a whole"; that it would establish "a dangerous precedent" in the troubled Middle East; that it was "a logical paradox" because it uses "undemocratic methods in the pursuit of democracy" and finally that partition was simply "unjust and impracticable."⁸⁵ To these arguments, Turkey merely replied that Greco-Turkish tensions were tearing the island apart anyway, and the only way to stop hostilities would be "by separating the two communities juridically and actually from each other."⁸⁶

Continually, Turkey had to dispel the many misconceptions which arose when the people of the world considered the plan of partition for Cyprus. Regardless of what Turkey may have thought initially of partition, her views by 1958 could certainly not have been considered as extreme as the Greeks had alleged. Turkey did not want two separate independent entities in Cyprus, rather she wanted a recognition of Cypriot basic rights--separately for both communities on the island. The Turks were most

⁸⁴Cyprus, Touchstone for Democracy, loc. cit.

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Cyprus and Turkey, (Washington: Turkish Information Office), p. 14. This pamphlet contains reprints of interviews with Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rustu Zorlu in 1957.

open-minded of how their partition idea could be effected. The Turks realistically acknowledged that the island had traditionally been divided into two communities, with separate organizations and communal authority. Thus, when Prime Minister Harold Macmillan offered his "seven-year plan" in June of 1958, Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu in the official Turkish response showed his government's compromising nature:

. . . this problem of Cyprus is, above all, clearly a topic of conflict and intransigence among the three states. There is no possibility of trying to hide behind the communities on the Island. There should be a tripartite conference at which the new British plan could be used not as a basis but as a document. The principle of co-operation could very well be compatible with partition.⁸⁷

Turkey always felt there was a geo-political rationale for her demand of partition for Cyprus. As long as strife had torn the island assunder, it was a fertile field for Communist intrigue. Partition, which would treat both Greek and Turk equitably, was in the Turkish mind the only practical solution. Turkey had pleasure in citing the examples of places in the world--to refute the examples the Greeks gave against--where partition did function as a political reality, and one of the most widely used was the island of Hispanola in the Carribean, where "the Dominican Republic and Haiti is a happily going concern."⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Cyprus, (London: Reference, Central Office of Information, July, 1958), Quote No. 3932, p. 18.

⁸⁸ Cyprus and Turkey, op. cit., p. 15.

The Turkish argument was perhaps the stronger during 1957 and early 1958, when it appeared that the two communities on Cyprus could no longer live peacefully on the island together. The Turkish Cypriot underground movement VOLKAN had pledged in November, 1957, that five Greeks would be killed for every Turk murdered on the island.⁸⁹ Moreover, British rule could not bring peace to the island short of a full-scale commando operation, and Great Britain did not intend to do this on Cyprus, because of the potential world censure. In view of this, the Turks grew further away from their status quo argument--though they did not entirely give it up--and stressed partition all the more. The leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, was in deep agreement with the Turkish government throughout the years of negotiations prior to the final settlement of the Cyprus issue.⁹⁰

The Turkish Case before the United Nations was essentially one of refuting the claim of the Greek government. There was no notable change between what the Turks

⁸⁹ The Manchester Guardian, Nov. 12, 1957, quoted in Cyprus (R.I.I.A.), op. cit., p. 40. Volkan was organized after its Greek counterpart EOKA. The Turkish group later became known as T.M.T., Turk Mudafa Tosklat, (Turkish Defense Organization).

⁹⁰ Dr. Kutchuk, and his colleague, Rauf Denktash, with help from the Turkish mainland had formed the "Cyprus-is-Turkish Party" by 1958. The Prime purpose of this group was to disseminate Turkish propaganda directly from Cyprus.

presented in 1954, when the Cyprus question was first debated, and what they offered in the last debate in 1958.⁹¹ The Turkish Case was three-fold: first, Turkey emphasized that Cyprus was made up of two different people, who lacked the characteristics of a nation as well as that of juridical state organization; secondly, Turkey stressed her strategic interest in Cyprus; and thirdly, the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 had, according to Turkey, decided the sovereignty of Cyprus, since this valid international document, which had been signed by all three disputing powers, was still good international law today. Turkey added her charges of unmitigated terrorism being directed at her "brothers" by the devious Athens government, but this was interjected purely for self-defense of similar charges hurled at her by Greece. Lastly, Turkey tried to impress on the minds of the UN representatives that self-determination in the Greek manner would bring Cyprus into Greece's "island empire," and that annexation was the only interest Greece had in Cyprus.

Turkey was more amenable than Greece to the attempts of NATO to bring about a Cyprus settlement. Turkey has always been regarded as a valuable part of the western defense arrangement and had taken pride in full and continued cooperation with NATO strategists. It was only

⁹¹The New York Times, November 7, 1958, p. 3.

logical that Turkey would warmly receive both offers of the good offices of the Secretary-General of NATO. The attempts of Secretary-General Spaak to negotiate a settlement of the Cyprus question, of course, failed and the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers charged one another with the failure.⁹² The failure was due, in actuality, to the futile patriotic stands of both Greece and Turkey-- a condition which had existed throughout the whole era of the question of Cyprus.⁹³

The Turkish case in its gestation was exactly the same as that of the British. Gradually, the two cases grew apart and eight years later, 1958, the Turks had this to say about the British:

London is certainly to blame for its irresolute policies, consisting one day in ineffectual repression, the other in far-reaching appeasement, and never cleaving for a long time to a clearly stated, undeviating line. It would seem that here as elsewhere the British are over-sensitive to the propagandistic reproach of being old fashioned "colonialists." They behave as though some perverse guilt-complex prevented them from clinging as firmly as they should to this essential base of their once proud Empire. Yet the issue of Cyprus transcends all questions of British political psychoanalysis; nor has it much to do with the fashionable dispute of colonialism versus

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³"It must be pointed out that in reality the Cyprus question has nothing to do with NATO and that the island is not even included among the territories covered by the NATO agreements." Background Papers on Cyprus VI, Responsibility for the Failure of Efforts to Convene a Conference on the Cyprus Question, Office of the Turkish Press Attache, Washington, D. C.

anti-colonialism. The island is not a colony in the usual sense, but rather a strategic aero-naval stronghold--a Gibraltar or a Malta of the Eastern Mediterranean. As such, its safety is of concern to all free nations, particularly to those of the Levant and Asia Minor.⁹⁴

The Turkish case grew so concrete by 1958, that they had made geographical suggestions of an acceptable partition of Cyprus by means of a line "roughly from Famagusta through Nicosia to Lefka." They would not object to British military bases, and would even grant extraterritorial rights to the British. Such an elaborate scheme was admittedly no simple matter to implement, and would need years in the initial stages. Turkey used the time argument as a substantiation for their demand partition proceedings should be instituted immediately.⁹⁵ Up until the time of the Zurich Meeting, the Turks, despite their national cry, of taksim (Partition) admitted there were still two alternatives left for Cyprus:

1. Either the British continue administering Cyprus while furthering in the island the development of such forms of home rule as might be acceptable to both the Greek and the Turkish communities there.
2. Or, barring that, a partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey will have to be accepted by all parties concerned, and--if need be--imposed by the major powers of the Western World as well as those of the UN.⁹⁶

⁹⁴"The Cyprus Question," Mediterranean Documents, Vol. 1, No. 3, November, 1958, p. 4.

⁹⁵Mayes, op. cit., especially Chap. 4, "Makarios and the Turks," pp. 82-103.

⁹⁶"The Cyprus Question," loc. cit.

Summary and Analysis of the Turkish Involvement

The Turks had based their case on the legal rights granted by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. Their strategic concern for Cyprus was also on second footing. Hans Kohn observed in the case of Cyprus, "the strategic interests of the Turks and their well-founded fears should be taken as much into consideration as those of the French interests and fears in the Saar." Further, the welfare of upward of 100,000 Cypriot Turk "brothers" was a matter that Turkey could not turn her back upon. Under these circumstances, Turkey could not help but assume the active role which was meant for her in the Cyprus question and its solution.

Turkey had justified fears of a possible revival movement of the "Megali Idea" in Greece. She reasoned what else could cause the small number of fanatical enosists on Cyprus, backed by a country such as Greece to defy a power so formidable as Great Britain? If that was to mean that the Greeks had intentions of renewing their antiquated claims on Istanbul and Asia Minor, as they had tried in 1921, then Turkey would be fully prepared this time.

Moreover, Turkey, though a God-fearing Moslem nation, had maintained a strict separation of church and state ever since its inception under Ataturk. For this reason, the prosaic, medieval indulgences of the Cypriot Greek Orthodox Church, undeniably in politics and allegedly in the murders and terrorism of EOKA, were resented and resisted by

the Turkish Cypriots and Turkish nationals living just forty miles off the shores of their mother-country. If Turkey would have administered the island in place of Great Britain, one of the earliest reforms the new government would have instituted would probably have been a ban of the church in politics and an encouragement for the clergy to go back to the proper place in the spiritual life of the Greek Cypriots.⁹⁷

Turkey had never garnered near as much support in America, or in other places of the world, as did the Greeks in the Cyprus struggle. The reasons are obvious: first, to most Americans Turkey is a mysterious nation, still perched on the brink of the modern industrial world and the old Ottoman world of the sultan; second, the Turkish-American population is quite small compared to that of the Greek-American, and this was a big factor in the Greek support in the U. S. Congress; third, Turkey entered the Cyprus picture late and with little fanfare, thus many people all over the world believed in the Greek claim that Turkey had no business regarding the considerations of Cyprus; fourth, after Turkey had entered the struggle actively, she did not use effective

⁹⁷ While Makarios was deeply involved in Cypriot politics most objective viewers felt he was "too politically immature" for the task, this was demonstrated by the fact that he totally ignored the Turkish factor in the island, "where a subtler mind would have paid court to the Turkish Cypriots and made every effort to convince them that they would not be at a disadvantage under Greek rule . . ." Mayes, op. cit. p. 87.

nor extensive propaganda devices immediately, and her case, though honest and valid, appeared weaker than it should have; fifth, Turkey associated her Cyprus policy too long with that of Great Britain's and many thought Turkey to be a pawn of the colonial powers; and lastly, Ataturk's "Turkey for the Turks" program had kept Turkey busy with internal developments and the demands of her progressing economy, e.g., oil, steel, construction and agricultural advancements.⁹⁸ The Turkish people, though concerned, were never as fanatic about possessing the island of Cyprus as the Greeks.

Considering these factors, in the light of the final outcome, one must conclude that Turkey made an exceptionally good return on her investment in the Cyprus issue.

The British Current

Events in the history of Cyprus since 1878 have forced the British to adopt numerous policy positions in regard to their interest on the island. Still and all, throughout the years there have been certain general tenets to which British policy on Cyprus has adhered. Moreover, the demands of the Greek and Turkish governments added an additional factor in the 1950's to this list of traditional

⁹⁸T. W. Adams, "A Profile on the Turkish Petroleum Industry," Lands East (Middle East Institute, Washington), October, 1959, pp. 7 ff. Turkey is currently engaged in a vast economic revitalization and petroleum exploration, which was initiated before the overthrow of the Menderes government.

considerations. Thus by the middle of 1958, the British government had four main purposes which controlled her Cyprus policy. On the floor of the House of Commons on June 19, 1958, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan outlined these purposes:

- (a) To serve the best interests of all the people of the island;
- (b) To achieve a permanent settlement acceptable to the two communities in the island and to the Greek and Turkish Governments;
- (c) To safeguard the British bases and installations in the island, which are necessary to enable the United Kingdom to carry out her international obligations;
- (d) To strengthen peace and security, and cooperation between the United Kingdom and her allies, in a vital area.

The Prime Minister then added that "these are the aims which Her Majesty's Government have consistently pursued," in regard to Cyprus. With the exception of Point (b) supra, the Prime Minister could have easily said that these were the aims always pursued by the British in their Cyprus policy. By and large the underlying elements affecting the British attitudes toward Cyprus were substantially unchanged from 1878 up till 1954. Cyprus, to the British, had always been a domestic problem of administering a non-cooperative native population; but when the UN chose in 1954 to debate the Cyprus question as presented by the Greek

⁹⁹ Cyprus, Official Text of the statement by Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, M.P., in the House of Commons, June 19, 1958, (New York: British Information Services, 1958), p. 1.

government, the British knew that their former domestic issue had grown to international stature.

British administration on Cyprus, as noted supra, was quite liberal from the beginning of the occupation. It can therefore be properly deduced from that fact that the policy behind the administration was equally as liberal. Britain's early position on Cyprus was one that developed within the strict legal terms of the Cyprus Convention of 1878. Sir George Hill claimed that Great Britain "acquired de facto, if not de jure sovereignty in Cyprus" by the terms of the Convention; and he goes on to substantiate this claim by quoting the renowned publicist, L. Oppenheim, who commented on the rule in Cyprus between 1878 and 1914.

a cession of pieces of territory had for all practical purposes taken place, although in law it still belonged to the former ownerstate. Anyhow, only one sovereignty could be exercised. . . namely that of the State which exercised administration.¹⁰⁰

This weight of evidence would lead one to believe that Great Britain formed her Cyprus policy as if she had a free hand in the matter, but this is far from the actual case. Up till the annexation of the island in 1914, Great Britain had honored the legal sovereignty of Turkey over Cyprus. When any consideration arose over Cyprus, Britain felt she had at least to take into account the feelings of

¹⁰⁰Oppenheim, International Law, (1928), p. 363, quoted in Hill, op. cit., p. 285, Turkey's rights in Cyprus had come about de facto in 1914 (British annexation), and de jure in 1923 (the Lausanne Treaty.)

the Sultan, even if she did not consult the Porte directly on the matter. Moreover, the obstacle of the Ottoman Empire was used as a convenient scapegoat when internal situations on Cyprus would become rather difficult. The Colonial Office in London turned aside the many pleas of early enosists by stating British hands were tied because of the interests of Turkey in the island. By this same sophistry, Britain justified the Tribute as a rental supposedly paid to the Porte for the use of Cyprus. Therefore, prior to 1914, the place of Turkey in the Cyprus issue relieved Great Britain of actually having to form a policy on Cyprus. Britain soon found out, after the annexation, that many of the problems which were avoided before then had to be faced.

Of all the old Cypriot problems that were to be faced with a new approach after the annexation, the most pressing was that of enosis. After Great Britain had lost the excuse she had been using for decades to ward off the enosists, i.e., the legal ownership of Cyprus by Turkey, the British Colonial Office undoubtedly anticipated the trouble the Cypriots were going to make with their demands of union with Greece. It might have been this reason alone which caused Britain to offer Cyprus to Greece in 1915. Regardless of why the offer was made, it showed that Britain was unsure of her status in Cyprus immediately after 1914. Thus one of her chief policy aims regarding the island at this time was to get an official recognition from Turkey of the

British ownership of Cyprus, which was never forth coming from the Ottoman Government. Cypriot discontent at that time seemed quite insignificant.

At the end of the First World War, the British included in the first peace settlement between the Allies and Turkey, the Treaty of Sevres, a provision that the Ottoman government recognized British suzerainty over Cyprus.¹⁰¹ When the Ottoman government failed to ratify the Treaty and new hostilities broke out between the Allies and what was to be the new Turkish Nationalist government, Great Britain was more than ever concerned about her claim to Cyprus. At the end of the belligerency in 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne was signed. It was in this document that Britain finally got from Turkey the legal transfer of title to Cyprus, some nine years after the British had annexed the island.

Internal Cypriot Policy

Once the British sovereignty over Cyprus was legally acquired, Great Britain could then turn her attention to the internal problems which had developed on the island. Two years after the British title to the island was secured, it was made a Crown Colony. This act did not end any of the monotonous, yet peaceful, protesting that the Greek nationalist movement had demonstrated in Cyprus ever

¹⁰¹Treaty of Sevres, Article 115-117. See J. C. Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 86.

since the signing of the Armistice. If anything, formal colonization exacerbated the potential violent situation which was building up in Cyprus, and contributed directly to the anti-British uprising in 1931. Before the Constitution was abrogated in 1931--and even afterwards, for that matter--the favorite tactic of the Cypriot Greeks to express their enosis desires was by sending "memorials" to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, which were "almost invariably followed by counter-memorials from the Turks of Cyprus, urgently requesting assurances that no change of sovereignty was contemplated."¹⁰² Each time the Colonial Secretary would send back an unfavorable response to the effect that "the Cyprus issue was closed," the enosists would retort that "the British connection [to Cyprus] was an anathema".¹⁰³ This unhealthy exchange of feelings typified the Anglo-Cypriot relationship during the 1930's.

Constitutional reform was always a subject of discussion whenever the Cyprus policy was mentioned in Parliament. The various Cypriot pressure groups, which were organized in London for the purpose of making their case known to members of Parliament, had made some noticeable inroads in that august body, especially with the Opposition Party. Consequently, the Colonial Secretary always had to be ready to answer critical questions about the government's Cyprus

¹⁰²Mayes, op. cit., p. 86.

¹⁰³R.I.I.A., Cyprus, op. cit., p. 4.

policy. One of the best justifications of the British lack of policy toward enosis was given by Malcolm Macdonald, the Colonial Secretary on July 5, 1939:

There has been a great deal of discussion in Cyprus regarding constitutional reform . . . /however/ I am satisfied that the great majority of the people of Cyprus are not discontented under the present administration. The policy of the administration is to work in the direction of more representative government; but this process cannot be hurried, and in my view must proceed first through a gradual increase of responsibility in local government.¹⁰⁴

This excerpt is a good illustration of the usual old-type reports on Cyprus which "curiously omit all reference to what is the most intractable problem on the political side," namely the enosis movement.¹⁰⁵ The movement was not mentioned during this pre-World War II period, nor during the war, and was conveniently forgotten after the war. This is clear proof that "successive British Government have regarded enosis as a contingency which cannot be contemplated and which is, therefore, undiscussable."¹⁰⁶

By 1946, the island of Cyprus had been administered for fifteen years by "direct rule"--an authoritarian manner by means of governor with the aid of an Executive Council, but without the encumbrance of a legislature and a constitution. In 1946, a Cypriot delegation to London was refused

¹⁰⁴Hansard, (Commons), 1939, Vol. 349, Col. 1285.

¹⁰⁵1954, p. 4. Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 15, March,

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 7.

its request for enosis by the Socialist government in power at that time. Yet the Socialists did concede that Cyprus had had enough of so undemocratic a form of government. The Labor Government made every effort to get the Cypriots to meet at a consultative assembly and assist in the drafting of a new constitution. But as every effort of the Conservative government in the 1930's had met with failure, so did this attempt by the Labor Party end up to be abortive. Strangely enough, the Communists were the only ones who did not boycott the assembly, but they came with the sole purpose of chanting "Enosis and nothing else" in the midst of the proceedings.¹⁰⁷ The Socialists were not discouraged and proceeded to draw up a proposed constitution, which they presented in 1948.

At this time there were still no external considerations, as such, which would affect in any way the British policy for Cyprus. The Socialist proposals were not accepted by the Cypriots because there was no mention of future enosis. The proposals were not withdrawn and stood, for all intents and purposes, until 1954 when the next proposal was ventured by the Conservative government. All that was

¹⁰⁷The Turks have alleged that the Communists, with the obvious purpose of creating tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, took the initiative of the enosis movement both in Cyprus and Greece. See Cyprus and Turkey, op. cit., p. 12. See also Mayes, op. cit., especially Chapter III "Makarios and the Communists," pp. 61-81.

lacking was for some enterprising Cypriot political leader to come forth and accept the British offer to bring about a more representative government for his people. But such an act by a Cypriot would have been political suicide, if not actual suicide. The militant enosis movement was well into the first stage of its development at this time, and could easily devise some sort of punishment for anyone who was too cooperative with the British. The Socialists too felt the growing discontent and made their policy declaration in 1948: "no change in the sovereignty of the island is intended."¹⁰⁸

The tenets of the British policy for Cyprus, as referred to supra, can now be shown by means of a recapitulation of the British stands on Cyprus up to the elections of 1949. The MacDonald government in 1924 refused enosis because of the strategic importance Cyprus had assumed in view of the unrest in India. Also, it was alleged that the best interests of the people would not be served if the Cypriots were allowed to unite with Greece, as Greece had not even expressed the desire to incorporate Cyprus. Colonial Secretary Sidney Webb (Lord Passfield) in 1929 said the question of Union with Greece was definitely closed. In the 1930's, the refusals of enosis were based on the contention that the idea was not completely acceptable to the

¹⁰⁸ Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 20, August and September, 1954, p. 12.

whole island population;¹⁰⁹ thus the best interest of the people would not be served. During the Second World War, the strategic importance and the need for maintaining peace and security in the area were given as overriding reasons for the refusal of the British to recognize any forms of self-determination in Cyprus. In 1946, Cyprus had strategic value, not because of any war, but primarily as a link to the important base at Suez, as well as for other British commitments in the vital Middle East.¹¹⁰ To fulfill the goal of working for the best interests of the Cypriot people, the British policy was designed to bring about a gradual system of self-government first, and then to consent to self-determination at a future time. When these constitutional proposals were refused by the enosists, the aims of the British policy for Cyprus were in no way affected. As long as Cyprus was a colony, Britain felt that the Cypriots were living a far better life than if they were under the Greeks, or independent for that matter. By this clever sort of beguiling, the British could look at their Cyprus policy before 1950 as one that was completely successful.

¹⁰⁹ There could be no doubt that the Turkish minority was opposed to enosis definitely, while there doubtless was a great number of Greek Cypriots who were opposed or did not care one way or the other.

¹¹⁰ British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East, (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 25-35.

The Change in British Policy

The first indication that the British would eventually have to revamp their approach to meet the internal conditions on Cyprus came in 1947, when the Greek Parliament passed a resolution expressing the hope that "Greece's national claim to Cyprus would be met within the framework of Greco-British friendship."¹¹¹ Greek demands were in full swing by 1951, but Great Britain chose to avoid all negotiations on the future of Cyprus. To Britain, any problem occurring on Cyprus were domestic matters and should be treated without interference from an outside country, viz. Greece. Moreover, before 1954, Britain refused to acknowledge that there was any problem at all on Cyprus and the matter to her was a "closed one". In 1954, the British Conservative government offered another proposal for a Cyprus constitution. This offer gave the Cypriots a chance to form a representative legislature, but there were so many of the usual British restrictions (e.g., the appointed and official members were to form a majority of the legislature and there was no mention of a future system of self-government) that it was little wonder that the proposal was rejected by the Cypriots.¹¹² When the refusal of the consti-

¹¹¹Cyprus Demands Self-Determination, op. cit., p. 6.

¹¹²R.I.I.A., Cyprus, op. cit., p. 11.

tutional proposals was followed by unrest, the British enforced the rather severe, existing sedition laws on the island.

Later that same year, the Cyprus question was debated before the UN, and the British delegation argued that Article II, Section 7 of the UN Charter precluded any discussion of "matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State."¹¹³ The Foreign Minister, Selwyn Lloyd, appeared before the Steering Committee of the General Assembly, and made the Greek claim out as one of asking the UN "to interfere in the domestic affairs of a foreign Power, so as to effect a territorial change favourable to herself."¹¹⁴ The British thought that their case for Cyprus was so airtight in the legal aspect, by virtue of the Lausanne Treaty, that if the UN approved the Greek position "the flood gates would be opened to claim and counterclaim; friction, bad feeling and subversive activization [sic] everywhere be encouraged."¹¹⁵

While this apparently sound position was being defended in New York by the Tory Foreign Minister, the Socialist Party back home was deploring the Government's policy for Cyprus. The Party's policy conference had agreed that

¹¹³Yearbook of the UN, 1954, op. cit., p. 73.

¹¹⁴Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 21, October, 1954, p. 9.

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 10.

self-determination should replace the present Conservative position of retaining the status quo. When the Socialists were asked in the debate which followed, how they expected to safeguard the strategic position of the island, the Socialist members were split in their answers. One Labor M. P. admitted that "it would be very serious to abandon the bases on Cyprus," while another hypothesized that "in an atomic age the strategic importance of Cyprus could be exaggerated."¹¹⁶ Though the "out-party" members made an eloquent attempt to tear down the Conservative policy in 1954, the Tories' stand for maintaining the status quo and handling the Cyprus issue as a domestic matter did successfully weather the barrage against it.

During the following year the firm British policy for Cyprus eased up somewhat. Prime Minister Eden took the initiative and invited representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments to London for a conference "on the political and defense questions which affect the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus,"¹¹⁷ After the invitations were accepted by both of the governments, tension on Cyprus was not as marked as it had been. The Colonial Secretary then visited the Archbishop for the first time since the burning of the Government House in 1931. This meeting could not have been too decidedly fruit-

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 11.

¹¹⁷ Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 29, July, 1955, p. 6.

ful, because the Archbishop went off to Athens soon after to urge that the Greek government not give up its efforts to have the Cyprus questions heard before the UN.¹¹⁸

The reason for the calling of the Tripartite Conference was to make the Cyprus case swell to international importance. By so doing, Great Britain had abandoned her contention that Cyprus was purely a domestic issue. The assumption was, "while the parties concerned disagreed about the ultimate status of Cyprus, they might yet agree on limited self-government."¹¹⁹ Moreover, intentionally bringing Turkey into the struggle was not done so much as an acknowledgement of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots on the island; rather it was merely a tactical move to make the problem seem more complicated than it was. At the time, Britain, more than likely, never dreamed that Turkey would ever take an independent policy on the Cyprus question. The Turkish position in its final form was to cause Great Britain almost as much worry as that of the Greeks. The only lasting effect of the Tripartite Conference of 1955 was to establish Turkey as one of the disputants in the Cyprus problem, which prior to the Conference had been strictly a Greco-British hassle.

¹¹⁸ Rossides, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

¹¹⁹ Mayes, op. cit., p. 208. The new proposals for a degree of self-government were presented in the hope that the Conference would not end in a complete failure, but, notwithstanding, it did just that.

The State of Emergency in Cyprus

When the London Tripartite Conference broke down, the British decided they had better rid Cyprus of all its trouble-makers. The tough veteran Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, former Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was made the new governor. Violence had been so widespread on the island that a state of emergency was proclaimed by the new governor. Under these conditions, Sir John (now Lord Harding of Petherton) was given sweeping powers, e.g., to impose the death penalty as he saw fit and to levy collective fines on communities or groups of suspected persons. Though the governor was encouraged by the Colonial Office to adopt a severe policy for the island, Harding did not use the full extent of his powers until the Archbishop had been deported in March of 1956. Soon after Makarios' deportation, the Communist-controlled AKEL party was proscribed as an "unlawful association", and the campaign against EOKA was intensified (even as far as to the searching of monasteries, where firearms caches were often uncovered.)¹²⁰

¹²⁰ Harding could not afford to pay homage to the unwritten law that the Church should not be desecrated. It was proven that the clergy had a direct hand in the terrorist movement, so the governor, took no chances with them. Thus even Greek Orthodox nuns were searched by female security officers at the airports and harbors after the nuns had returned to the island from abroad, Greece in particular. See especially, Alastos, Cyprus Guerilla, op. cit., pp. 97-119.

While Makarios was in exile in the Seychelles, the nationalization of the Suez Canal was effected by the President of Egypt, Gamal Adbul Nasser. This particular action by Nasser came on the heels of his campaign in Jordan against the Baghdad Pact. As a result of Nasser's influence in Jordan, Great Britain lost her command of the Arab Legion, and consequently much of her sphere of influence in the small Arab kingdom. Britain was still nursing her wounds from Jordan when Nasser surprised the world with his sudden move in Suez. It was then Britain took it on herself, with the aid of France, to stop Nasser before he would do any more damage to Britain's interest. With this turn of events, the perspective on Cyprus was now changed:

Tension and violence in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, and the search for a solution of their problems satisfactory to the inhabitants of the island and to the British, Greek, and Turkish Governments, became part of a wider Middle East crisis.¹²¹

Cyprus was a key base in what could have been a major operation in Suez and the Middle East had the United States' intervention not disrupted what the British had planned to do. Cyprus had demonstrated her potentialities as a "bastion of the Eastern Mediterranean," and this gave even more weight to the British argument of the island's strategic value. Despite the chaotic happenings on the island and in the Middle East in general, Great Britain went ahead with

¹²¹R.I.I.A., Cyprus, p. 24.

her series of plans to give the island a constitution that would be acceptable to all interest in Cyprus. (See Chapter III, infra.)

Summary and Analysis of the British Involvement

The British case was, in comparison to either the Greek or Turkish cases, the only one which had a sound legal justification. Great Britain had been administrator of Cyprus forty-five years before the island was officially ceded to her. It was twenty-seven years later before another sovereign nation actually made a claim to Cyprus in defiance of the British right of ownership. Thus, the legality of British suzerainty over Cyprus was hardly a point of contention when it was officially challenged in 1954. The question which remained unanswered was whether any other nation had a legal, or even moral, right to the island. The answer to this was never forthcoming, as the question was conveniently skirted in the final settlement of the Cyprus problem.

In view of the way the Cyprus issue was finally settled, one might be led to believe that none of the disputants had legitimate claims to Cyprus. On the other hand, if the Gordian knot had not been cut and the question had been solved purely by existing international law standards, there is little doubt that the British could have continued sovereignty over the island as long as they might have desired. Possibly the situation was too complex for so sim-

ple an application of international law. The juridically proper solution would have, in actuality, satisfied none of the parties, including the British. Thus, the peculiar circumstances surrounding the Cyprus imbroglio might have called for a novel, and in some ways rash, solution. Such a thing was precisely what was to emerge.

The British policy toward Cyprus passed through clearly discernable periods. The historic view was that Cyprus was in internal matter that concerned Great Britain alone. When this no longer proved tenable, by the 1950's, the issue was elevated to the international level with the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in conferences designed to reach a just solution through discussion and compromise. When these attempts appeared futile, Britain then embarked on a policy of direct negotiation with the Cypriot populace, via Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk. By that time the Greek-Cypriots were well into their guerilla warfare and had sufficiently convinced Makarios that anything less than self-determination was to be considered a defeat. This intransigence, coupled with the turmoil the Eastern Mediterranean faced during 1956, forced the British to break off parleys with the Cypriots and reaffirm the strategic need of British bases in Cyprus.

The claim that the island was a strategic link in the defense picture of the Eastern Mediterranean was the most consistent aspect of British policy toward Cyprus. It

has not only proven traditionally sound throughout history, but the claim is even more valid today. Beyond the legal argument, the British insistence on the strategic value of Cyprus was her strongest and most effective plea for the continuation of the status quo. Prime Minister Eden in 1956 told the House of Commons:

Neither NATO obligations, nor the Tripartite declarations of 1950 (in relation to Israel), nor the Baghdad Pact, nor any agreement in the Middle East area on the Persian Gulf could be speedily and effectively carried out unless Britain had the assured and unfettered use of bases in Cyprus.¹²²

A look at the treaty commitments in this area and the use Britain has made of Cyprus to fulfill these obligations so far will sufficiently prove the point, e.g., the Anglo-French attack on Suez, landing of paratroops in Jordan in 1958, and the potential use of British troops to prevent the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. These military factors compelled Britain to keep the strategy argument in the forefront of all negotiations on Cyprus, and the British insistence was ultimately rewarded by the guarantee of her bases in the Cyprus settlement.

Though Britain was as guilty as both Greece and Turkey, as far as clinging tenaciously for long periods to one basis policy for Cyprus, it must also be conceded that Britain made the Cyprus settlement possible by her willing-

¹²²Quoted in Alastos, op. cit., p. 113.

ness to explore all avenues of peaceful negotiations. Perhaps Britain did recognize too late the position the Ethnarchy commanded over the internal affairs in Cyprus, but this was nothing in comparison to their classic inability of the British to evaluate the strength of the enosis movement. Whether these failures can be attributed to obstinance or ignorance is unimportant, the crucial fact is that such neglect contributed significantly to the cohesiveness of the mass social movement that tore Cyprus asunder during the four years of terrorist activities. Throughout these trying times, Britain was patently seeking a peaceful and just solution for Cyprus, but the British motives were continually suspected by the parties in the conflict and this aura was hardly conducive to successful negotiations. The bold move that lead to the Cyprus settlement, i.e., the Zurich agreement, was taken by Greece and Turkey, with little or no encouragement from Great Britain. Nevertheless, Britain consented to discuss the Greco-Turkish accord, and this concession along with the accedence of Makarios, allowed the plan for Cypriot independence to reach fruition.

Chapter III

THE CYPRUS AGREEMENTS AND THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

By the time the 20th Century had passed its mid-way point, Cyprus had fully recovered from any ill-effects of World War II and was on its way to become a profitable little colony for the British Empire. Exports had reached an all-time high and the problem of unemployment in the island was negligible factor in its economy. The building and agricultural industries were operating at full capacities, and the tourist trade had returned to a flourishing stage. All indications pointed toward a rosy future for the Cypriots, but this was not to be. Instead of taking advantage of the optimistic outlook, the people of the island were once again to be torn asunder by a complex interplay of internal dissention and external rivalries.

Despite the apparent high standard of living enjoyed by the indigenous population, the germs of discontent were lying quiescent in the bosoms of the Cypriots--especially within the Greek Cypriots. The bitter memories of the frustrating attempts to bring the dream of enosis to a reality was too vividly implanted in the minds of the Greek Cypriots, and this delusion clouded the rational thought processes of an otherwise clever people. Moreover,

the issue had reached grave international proportions, and it was apparent that the matter of the status of Cyprus had to be resolved once and for all before secondary affairs could be undertaken. The British government was indeed aware of the conflicting political currents and, consequently, pledged itself to work out a solution which would reconcile the interests of all parties concerned, while still guaranteeing the British strategic requirements in Cyprus. The conundrum was thus spelled out, all that was needed was a denouement.

Attempted British Solutions Prior to 1959

It is not difficult to highlight the events which led up to the prolonged onslaught of violence and bloodshed that was launched in Cyprus during 1955. (Chapters I and II traced these events in detail.) The terrorist operations were not spontaneous quirks of an emotional populace or an opportunistic leadership rather they were a mass protest of the seven decades the British government had arbitrarily ruled Cyprus. The riots of 1931 presaged the clashes which were to come twenty-four years later. But it was not until the zionist Jews in Palestine proved to the Cypriots after 1948 that a "campaign of terrorism succeeded in driving Britain to relinquish the mandate,"¹ that a similar pathway

¹Vera Micheles Dean, The Nature of the Non-Western World, (New York: Mentor Books, 1957), p. 63.

was contemplated for the cause of enosis.

The reaction in Britain to the turmoil in Cyprus was one of increasing concern to the more reasonable Englishmen. Why a great democratic nation, such as England, would have to resort to methods that the Greek press likened to "the Gestapo and the S.S."² mystified the students of international relations. In particular, the members of the Labour Party's "loyal opposition" expressed on May 5, 1955 in the House of Commons that the government should seek an immediate modus vivendi by offering a constitution that would allow the Cypriots a chance to develop a self-governing "political set-up on the British model." At the same time, the government should agree to a future time at which the Cypriots would be permitted to vote on self-determination.³ This procedure was to be employed with a scrupulous concern for the interest of both Greece and Turkey, who were allied with Britain in NATO. There was little disagreement that the obvious "democratic" solution was to determine the question of Cyprus' future by a general plebiscite in the island, but the result of this would be, much to Turkey's dismay, an overwhelming vote for enosis.⁴ Therefore, in

²Scotsman, August 3, 1955, quoted in R.I.I.A., Cyprus the Background, (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1959), p. 14.

³Hansard (Commons), 1955, Vol. 540, col. 1972.

⁴The first unofficial plebiscite in 1950 showed the Greek-Cypriot majority to be sufficiently intimidated by the Ethnarchy, so as to vote for nothing other than enosis.

view of the Turkish involvement in both Cyprus and NATO, the Labour Party officially adopted the policy that both Greece and Turkey ("two good Allies"), should be included in a conference on the future of Cyprus.⁵

The Tripartite Conference, London, 1955

The Government of Prime Minister Anthony Eden was as anxious as the opposition to reach some sort of a compromise in the case of Cyprus, in particular to end the hostilities that had aroused world-wide criticism of British colonial administration. To this end, the Conservative government invited both Greece and Turkey to a conference on the broad question of strategic and political conditions in the entire Eastern Mediterranean. The scope of the area of study would naturally include Cyprus, but Great Britain was still insisting the problem of the island to be a domestic matter and, hence, a representative of the Cypriots was certainly conspicuous by his absence. Britain had been dilatory about openly stating her case on Cyprus. She had been put on the defensive between 1950 and 1955 by the ambitious Greeks who were quicker to seize the Cyprus issue with a view to political gain. The whole British defense of her stand in Cyprus was the strategic argument--but this was an anathema to the British anti-colonialists and to the Communists as well. Instead of trying to expose

⁵Ibid., Col 1943.

the duplicity behind the claims of the Enosists, especially the rigged plebiscite of 1950, Britain had lost valuable ground by turning a deaf ear so long to the clamorings of both the Cypriots and interested nations. As one contemporary observer in England later wrote:

It must be a matter of regret that the Labour Government first, and the Conservative Government later, failed to grasp the nettle firmly after the Greek Cypriot Left had rejected constitutional advances by stages--so denying it to the Cypriot Turks--and when the Church resurgent showed it would not hesitate to use force to achieve its political aims. That was the time when Britain might have set out fully for Greece and Turkey, and perhaps for the rest of the world, the reasons why she could not contemplate a change of sovereignty in Cyprus within the foreseeable future and lines along which she intended that political and economic development should move.⁶

The important fact regarding the Tripartite Conference was simply that Great Britain had at long last conceded that Cyprus had ramifications on the international level and not merely within the Colonial Office.

The concession Great Britain made in inviting two foreign powers into discussion on Cyprus cannot be minimized. The year before, the Ninth Session of the UN General Assembly had first consented to hear Greece's plea for self-determination in Cyprus. The resolution which finally passed stated: "considering that for the time being it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question

⁶ Stanley Mayes, Cyprus and Makarios, (London: Putnam, 1960), p. 176.

of Cyprus, [the General Assembly] decides not to consider further the item."⁷ This resolution could not have been better stated for Britain's purposes, notwithstanding the "for the time being" phrase. Before the resolution, the official British opinion of Greece's lack of legal right to take the case of Cypriot self-determination to the UN was presented in no uncertain terms: "...in effect asking the United Nations to interfere in the domestic affairs of a foreign power in order to effect a territorial change favourable to herself."⁸ Only one year had passed from that statement until the invitation to Greece to join Turkey and Great Britain in dealing with what the UN seemed reluctant to undertake, i.e., the future of Cyprus. It was less a change of attitude on the part of British that provoked this action, and more the acknowledgment of the disfavor with which the Cyprus policy had been met both at home and abroad.

The Conference itself opened most cordially, but it was soon apparent to the two invited nations that Britain planned to dictate its terms and expect nothing more than pro forma ratifications from both Greece and Turkey. The terms in themselves, however, were not inordinate.⁹

⁷Yearbook of the UN, 1956, p. 125.

⁸Cyprus, Cmd. 9300, Sept. 24, 1954. p. 5.

⁹Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, Cmd. 9594, Sept. 7, 1955, pp. 28-35.

An orderly constitutional progression toward self-government was proposed in the British plan. The new constitution would have created a general assembly with an elected majority--obviously Greek Cypriot--with a specified number of seats for the Turkish minority. A cabinet responsible to the assembly would assume all policy-making, with the exception of foreign affairs, defense, and public security which were still to remain in the hands of the Royal Governor. A percentage of the civil service and a number of the ministries were to be reserved for the Turks, but a chief minister was to be elected by the assembly in order to head-up the local government.

The plan proposed the creation of a unique institution of Greek, Turkish, and British representatives, working in London to examine the functioning of the new Cypriot administration. This committee's job was to guarantee the rights of the two communities in the island and was to remain in existence during, as well as after, the constitution had been put into operation. Any matter that could not be resolved in the Cypriot assembly was to be referred to the committee and the three governments would jointly decide the proper path to pursue. The crucial issue of the future of Cyprus was thus nearly side-stepped in the proposals since the three governments held such a "divergence of views" on what should eventually become of the island. The British postponed such discussion at the time, but

promised to call another tripartite conference to deal with that and other problems in the Eastern Mediterranean after local self-government in Cyprus had been shown to work.

When the presentation of the British plan had been concluded it was apparent the Greek delegation was far from satisfied. The Greeks expressed regret that the plan did not include "the recognition in favour of the people of Cyprus of the right to choose the regime they preferred."¹⁰ Yet, at the same time, the Greek Foreign Minister, Averoff, lauded the British for finally "facing up to the problem of Cyprus." The Turks, on the other hand, were quite a bit more receptive to the scheme. This was especially so after Foreign Minister Macmillan stated the principle of self-determination was not "one of universal application." Rather it "must be made in view of geographical, traditional, historical, strategical, and other considerations."¹¹ The Turks, nonetheless, could do little to convince their traditional enemies, the Greeks, to consent to the plan. Essentially, there was little contact between these two delegations, since the Greeks felt the Turks had no right whatsoever to be in a conference discussing the future of a territory "in which they [the Turks] has so little justifiable interest."

¹⁰Ibid., p. 36.

¹¹Ibid., p. 37.

The Tripartite Conference thus ended in creating more tensions than existed at its inception. The question of Cyprus was brought up at the Tenth UN General Assembly shortly after the London Conference had broken down. When the Greek Foreign Minister had described to the General Assembly that the British proposals were a "negation of democracy," the British representative, Anthony Nutting, expressed surprise that Greece was not more grateful for at least being invited to a conference in which she could have a hand in the future affairs of Cyprus. Nutting insisted that the Greeks had distorted the true aim of the British proposals and, by so doing, unfortunately had created a situation which

can only go to prove once more that the real aim of Greece--and I say this with a heavy heart about a friend--is the acquisition of Cyprus and not the development of constitutional self-government in the island. This is the root of the matter. What we are here confronted with is not a colonial issue. This is a straight, if disguised, bid for Enosis--that is, for the union of Cyprus with Greece.¹²

The British were quite possibly more hurt, than affronted, by the Greek allegations. What was thought by the British to be an magnanimous gesture had turned out to be an imbroglio that reaped them far more international damnation than good will.

The British Policy During the Emergency in Cyprus

The failure of the Tripartite Conference might

¹²Ibid., p. 46.

have been used as the excuse for the extreme attitudes which were manifested during the last quarter of 1955. The Greco-Turkish tensions over Cyprus were felt not only in the island, but on the mainlands as well. The British had tried, but accomplished little to mitigate the international implications of the Cyprus issue. This frustration, however, was not faced in the island itself. Still acting under the traditional belief that Cyprus was an internal matter of the British Empire, Her Majesty's Government did not hesitate to impose severe restrictions in Cyprus when it was shown that the terrorism and rampant disorder was seriously threatening life and property. An emergency proclamation gave the Royal Governor the power to impose the death penalty for being in possession of firearms, the right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, the discretion to deport, and finally the privilege to impose collective fines. To carry out the new policy--or the lack of policy, as some saw it--for Cyprus, Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., was appointed governor.¹³

Field-Marshal Harding was primarily a military man and constantly kept the matter of the strategic importance of Cyprus uppermost in his thinking. He was, therefore,

¹³Doros Alastos, Cyprus Guerilla, (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 97. The chapter of this book entitled, "Archbishop versus Field-Marshal," is a pro-Cypriot Greek account of this period.

personally dedicated to the dual-task of securing the British bases in Cyprus, and the restoration of peace and order in the island. Still Harding was far from opposed to the idea of diplomatic negotiations with the acknowledged leader of the majority of the Cypriots, Archbishop Makarios. Shortly after his assumptions of the duties of Governor, Harding held several meetings with Makarios. In some respects, Makarios was taking a great risk entering into these parleys with the British Governor. By the end of 1955, the terrorist organization, EOKA, had committed itself to the all-out fight for independence--or enosis would be the more accurate principle--and those who had any dealing with the British were suspect of being traitors to the cause. Consequently, the Archbishop tactfully kept many of the meetings secret and the result was that much of what the British had proposed through Harding was never revealed to the Cypriot people. Whether news of the continuous British attempts to reach "a final settlement of the problem of Cyprus" could or could not have prevented much of the violence and loss of life in the following three years, is highly speculative. What should be borne in mind in an analysis of this period is the fact that the stern British attitude could have been a direct reaction to the equally uncompromising stand of EOKA and the Ethnarchy.

That which transpired between Harding and Makarios was essentially an endeavor to foist on the Cypriots what Greece and Turkey had turned down at the London Tripartite Conference. The statements from the Colonial Office, however, did indicate an obvious relaxation of the "never" position on self-determination. A letter from Harding to Makarios in January, 1956 declared in part:

Her Majesty's Government adhere to the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the Potomac Charter, and the Pacific Charter, to which they have subscribed. It is not therefore their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition on account of the present situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. *[Italics supplied.]*¹⁴

The British felt that this concession only rated another from the Cypriots, thus Her Majesty's Government

will be prepared to discuss the future of the island with representatives of the people of Cyprus when self-government has proved itself capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community.¹⁵

Nevertheless, the British had, at long last, decided to talk directly with the Cypriots--an alternative that had been rejected in actuality ever since 1878.

The Harding proposals, as the previous tripartite plan, were designed first to create self-government in the

¹⁴Cyprus: Correspondence Exchanged Between the Governor and Archbishop Makarios. Cmd. 9708, 1956, p. 3.

¹⁵Ibid.

island before self-determination could be considered. The concept of a "liberal and democratic constitution" was perfectly acceptable to the Archbishop, but he insisted that the essential prerequisite to the framing of the constitution would have to be a general amnesty for the political prisoners then being detained by the colonial government. The Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, made a special visit to the Archbishop to urge him to drop this reservation since the detainees had been convicted via a "legal" process. On the return of the Colonial Secretary, the House of Commons was told that the Archbishop was even more insistent on the amnesty terms and had even introduced demands that the Governor be stripped of security powers.¹⁶ The House of Commons made no declaration of policy at this point, but it was apparent to every member of Parliament that Makarios had to be dealt with before any changes in Cyprus could be effected.

The Emergency Period in Cyprus was first complicated by the deportation of the Archbishop on March 9, 1956 and then by Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal, on July 26 of the same year. Prime Minister Anthony Eden in a speech before the House of Commons stressed that the government was slow to take action against Makarios and certain of his Prelates, but "it was established beyond all reasonable doubt that the Archbishop had not only countenanced

¹⁶Hansard, (Commons), 1956, Vol. 549, Cols. 1715-19.

but actively fostered terrorism in order to promote his political ends."¹⁷ The strategic argument was again alluded to, but the "loyal opposition" avoided that matter and could only see in the deportation egregious aggravation to the internal chaos in Cyprus. Moreover, the deportation concurrently meant the break-down of negotiations, since Makarios was the only person through whom any sort of rapprochement could be attained. The Royal Greek Government was quick to react by recalling its ambassador from London and then proceeded to lodge a formal protest with the UN Security Council. Despite the furor the deportation of Makarios caused, the extreme action was soon to be justified as the only possible step toward securing the unencumbered use of the British bases in Cyprus. Especially after Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal, the classic claim about the strategic value of Cyprus was brought into sharp focus.

By the middle of August, 1956, military action in the Suez had been planned and the security forces in Cyprus were augmented far beyond the number required to maintain order in the island. The abortive Anglo-French escapade into Egypt was thus launched from Cyprus, and the failure of it can be more attributed to the United States' policy against the use of force in the Middle East, rather than an over-estimation of the value of Cyprus as a base

¹⁷Hansard, (Commons), 1956, Vol. 550, Col. 417.

of operations. While the Suez campaign did not succeed in its original intent, it did demonstrate that Cyprus had grown with the air-age. Also the old 19th Century skepticism about the effectiveness of Cyprus as a naval base was corroborated during the Suez crisis, since naval forces had played such a minor role. The logistical limitations Cyprus might have in campaigns toward the north against Russia, or east toward the oil-fields of Arabia are apparent, but the same arguments could not be used as far as the Eastern Mediterranean is concerned. Instead there existed in England among students of history

a general consensus of opinion that, whatever strategic value Cyprus had for Britain when Disraeli acquired it, a good deal was lost only four years later when Britain occupied Egypt. Equally, it was the loss of the Suez base in 1954 that gave a new strategic importance to Cyprus.¹⁸

The consequences of the Suez crisis were disastrous to the British Foreign Office, but they did, one and at the same time, allow validity of the claim regarding Cyprus' strategic value to be enhanced greatly.

Neither the Archbishop's deportation nor the Suez struggle forced the British to take novel policy positions on Cyprus. On the contrary, throughout the complexities of 1956 the British still made sincere efforts to write a constitution for Cyprus. On July 12, 1956, Lord Radcliffe was appointed British Constitutional Commissioner with the

¹⁸ Mayes, op. cit., 158.

assignment to frame a liberal constitution for the island, while guaranteeing simultaneously, and primarily, the British base rights in the island. Radcliffe left for Cyprus immediately, but the mounting unrest in the island was by then an augury of what the future had in store for the Constitutional Commissioner.¹⁹ Lord Radcliffe worked from July until November, 1956, under the most adverse conditions, but he was nonetheless able to present to the Secretary of State for the Colonies a plan that represented "a fair balance between the different and often conflicting interests" which were evident in the contemporary picture of Cyprus.

The Radcliffe Proposals

Lord Radcliffe could hardly have been described as having carte blanche privileges in his undertaking for Cyprus. He had a definite frame of reference laid down for him by the Foreign and Colonial Offices.²⁰ First, Cyprus was to remain under British sovereignty as long as the constitution was in force; secondly, Cyprus was always

¹⁹The acts of violence in the four months prior to Radcliffe's appointment were far from conducive to peaceful negotiations. In March there were 246 incidents of various degrees of severity; in April, 234; in May, 395; and in June, 276. Hansard, (Commons), 1957, Vol. 565, Col. 104.

²⁰Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus. Report Submitted by Lord Radcliffe, November 12, 1956, Cmnd. 42, 1956, p. 6. The text of the whole constitution is given on pp. 25-48, ibid.

to be able to fulfill the demands made upon her as a base, as necessitated by Britain's international obligations; thirdly, all external affairs, defense, and internal security, were to be in the hands of the Royal Governor; fourthly, the constitution was to allow for a "wide measure of responsible self-government to the elected representatives of the Cypriots;" and lastly, the constitution was to embody principles of eventual self-determination, along with guarantees for the minorities in the island. With these points as his guide, Lord Radcliffe went ahead with the task of devising a fundamental body of laws for the troubled island of Cyprus. On December 19--after the Colonial Office had checked each provision thoroughly--a White Paper was published and became the official government policy for Cyprus.

Basically, the Radcliffe Proposals followed the instructions given by Her Majesty's Government. From the beginning, Lord Radcliffe made it clear that some of the measures would take a transitional period before their actual institutionalization, but the reward for a patient, conscientious effort on the part of the Cypriots would be self-determination once self-government had been achieved. The difficulties of the constitution were readily apparent. The basic form of government was a diarchy system, with two separate law-making authorities and two distinct forms

of administrative bodies.²¹ The legislature was to be composed of a speaker, a deputy speaker, and thirty-six other members: twenty-four were to be elected from the Cypriot Greek majority, six seats were allotted for the Cypriot Turks, and the other six were to be appointed by the Governor.²² The Governor was to have control of all external matters and was to be assisted by a chief minister, supposedly one of the legislature members who appeared to the Governor to command "the largest measure of general support in the Legislative Assembly."²³

Radcliffe made an interesting proposal for the composition of the Supreme court which was to have judicial review of the acts of the legislature. The chief justice, under the terms of the constitution, was to be appointed from outside Cyprus and the remaining justices were to have been equally balanced between the Greek and Turkish elements. Radcliffe claimed he saw a great possibility for the judicial power in the island to bring about the

²¹This system was patterned after that of Malta's; see Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 44, January, 1957, p. 2.

²²To safeguard the interests of the expatriated Britishers in Cyprus, one of the appointed members was to be, if possible, a British subject resident from one of the indigenous communities in the island. Cmnd. 42, 1956, op. cit., p. 36.

²³Cyprus, (London: Central Office of Information, July, 1958), Quote No. 3932, p. 18.

"resolution of inter-communal disputes."²⁴ Part of the legal apparatus for bringing this about was a Tribunal of Guarantees, which Radcliffe himself once declared to be the most novel aspect of the constitution, in comparison to any other such document derived from "British sources."²⁵ This particular Tribunal was to be analogous to the Civil Rights Commission in the United States in theory, but was to be far more comprehensive in actual operation. The functions of this instrumentality were to investigate any charges of discrimination or deprivation of constitutional rights, as well as to carry out studies in basic civil rights as directed by the supreme court or the Governor. The Tribunal was to have been composed of an equal number of Greeks and Turks, but it was not to have the power to review specific civil rights acts of the legislative assembly, this function being left to the supreme court. To secure the greatest possible degree of impartiality in the Tribunal, the chairman was to be a representative of neither the Greek nor Turkish communities in the island.²⁶

The Radcliffe proposals were significant as the first departure from the former intransigent British policy

²⁴ Cmnd. 42, 1956, op. cit., p. 17.

²⁵ R.I.I.A., Cyprus, the Background, op. cit., p. 30.

²⁶ It is a tribute to Radcliffe to see the number of provisions regarding the judicial system that were finally included in the final constitution for the Republic of Cyprus. (Infra., Chapter IV).

of maintaining the status quo. In commenting on the proposals, the Colonial Secretary made this statement early in 1957:

When the time comes for this review ^{For self-determination}, that is, when these conditions have been fulfilled, it will be the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriots community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words...the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options.²⁷

Unwittingly, the Colonial Secretary had introduced into the Cyprus problem a new wrinkle. While not endorsing the principle of partition as one of the alternatives after self-government had been shown to work in Cyprus, the British suggestion gave Turkey the first positive position which was to satisfy her combined demand for the protection of the Turkish minority and the security of her southern coastal region. The partition statement, which was reluctantly received by Turkey initially, was soon to be the cause of much worry for the British in the two years of futile negotiations that were to follow the Radcliffe Proposals. Turkey did not care for the gradual process of self-government preceding self-determination, but rather pressed for immediate partition if any change in the status of Cyprus were contemplated. The Greeks, on the other hand, would not

²⁷Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 44, January, 1957, p. 5.

consider anything other than immediate self-determination, which then would have brought about gnosis. As a result, the British were to find themselves between the proverbial Scylla and Charybdis, still trying to chart a course that would avoid either of the "monsters" of partition or enosis.

The "brilliantly-conceived constitution"²⁸ of Lord Radcliffe was to meet an unmerited fate. The Royal Greek Government immediately rejected the proposals even before the Cypriots had a chance to pass judgment on it. Their contention was that the constitution did not provide for self-determination at any specified future date and this was tantamount to no guarantee whatsoever. The Greek Foreign Office made a captious criticism of the document and insisted that it "aimed at the continuation of a colonial status in Cyprus."²⁹ The Turkish government, as expected, accepted the entire proposition, provided certain provisions of the constitution were re-phrased so as more clearly to spell out the rights the Turkish Cypriot community were to be guaranteed. Even Archbishop Makarios, ten months after his deportation, was sent a copy of the constitution, but he declared, after having studied the proposals, that the Seychelles Islands were not the proper place to discuss

²⁸ Mayes, op. cit., p. 214.

²⁹ The Manchester Guardian Weekley, February 25, 1957, p. 2.

the future of Cyprus.³⁰ The Secretary-General of NATO urged, for the first time in public, that the feuding allies try this plan temporarily in order that the eastern flank of the West's collective security arrangement might once again be stabilized.³¹ No such compromise was to be effected, however, and the Radcliffe Proposals were finally to survive merely as another landmark in the frustrating record of the British efforts to solve the Cyprus question.

Most observers blamed the Greek Government for defeating the Radcliffe proposals, and by so doing, committing a "political folly...matched only by the political ineptitude of the Ethnarchy in turning down the 1948 offer" of the Labour Government.³² The Government of Prime Minister Eden had to cope with this embarrassment along with the ridicule of the Suez fiasco, and no one is sure how much the Cyprus issue contributed to Eden's humiliating decision to resign his post. In the final analysis, it was the Royal Greek Government which was to feel the greatest loss by the failure of the Radcliffe constitution. This conclusion was definitely proven three years later, looking back to the miscalculation of the Greek Government:

³⁰Hansard, (Commons), 1957, Vol. 565, Col. 246.

³¹The Cyprus Question, Discussion at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (Athens: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1958), p. 5.

³²Mayes, op. cit., p. 215.

The constitution devised by Lord Radcliffe and published in December, 1956, had the jewelled precision of a fine watch, yet was sturdy and sensible enough for everyday use. It deserved better fate than to be thrown aside, unlooked at, by the Greeks, because it did not do what it was not designed to do--promote Enosis. The speed with which the Greek Government rejected it showed that the Greeks had no real answer to such fair-minded proposals. So the press and radio were given their cue to bury them in abuse, and arguments were found later to justify the rejection. Yet the time was to come when the Greeks looked back with genuine regret that they had not accepted this offer of self-government.³³

Now that the union of Cyprus with Greece had been effectively barred forever, this summary is far from exaggerated.

(See Chapter IV, infra.)

The next offer from the British did not come until fully eighteen months had elapsed after Lord Radcliffe's attempt. In the interim much had happened to change the picture of Cyprus: Makarios had been released and had begun personally to propagandize the cause of enosis; the UN General Assembly became more sympathetic to the cause of colonial Cyprus; NATO had offered "good offices" of mediation; violence had increased in Cyprus with the formation of the Turkish terrorist group, Volkan (T.M.T.), to counterbalance EOKA; and finally the harsh administration of Field Marshal Harding was succeeded by the more moderate governorship of Sir Hugh Foot. In view of these changes, Her Majesty's Government was ready again by early 1958 to initiate efforts to reach a settlement for Cyprus.

³³Ibid., p. 213.

The Macmillan Plan

The last policy stand taken by Great Britain before the final Cyprus settlement was the "seven-year partnership plan," which was announced by Prime Minister Macmillan on June 19, 1958. In this announcement, Britain declared a new policy "which represents an adventure in partnership--partnership between the communities in the island and also between Greece, Turkey, and the UK."³⁴ The Macmillan Plan presented a unique offer of a tri-dominium of Cyprus in an international status to remain unchanged for the period of seven years.³⁵ Among other provisions: Greek and Turkish representatives were to be on an advisory council with the British Governor; the residents would assume Greek or Turkish citizenship or retain British nationality if they wished; a system of representative government would be worked out and local autonomy would be guaranteed; and finally a constitution respecting each community's rights would be written. The essential provisions of the new constitution, as specified by the British government, would have been:

- (a) There will be a separate House of Representatives for each of the two communities, and these Houses will have final legislative authority in communal affairs;

³⁴COI, Cyprus, op. cit., p. 15.

³⁵Hansard, (Commons), 1958, Vol. 589, Cols.

- (b) Authority for internal administration, other than communal affairs and internal security, will be undertaken by a Council presided over by the Governor and including the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments and six elected Ministers drawn from the House of Representatives, four being Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots.
- (c) The Governor, acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments, will have reserve powers to ensure that the interests of both communities are protected.
- (d) External affairs, defense and internal security will be matters specifically reserved to the Governor acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments.
- (e) The representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments will have the right to require any legislation which they consider to be discriminatory to be preserved for consideration by an impartial tribunal.³⁶

When the Prime Minister concluded the presentation of the proposal, he said that he wished "this imaginative plan would be welcomed by all concerned in the spirit in which it is put forth."³⁷ but the plan was doomed from its inception. The Macmillan Plan first met difficulty in the debate in the House of Commons, where the Opposition was won over, however, and the Plan was approved as the official British policy. The Greeks rejected the Plan, as was feared by most members of Parliament, but the Turks endorsed it, and the British had decided to go ahead and put it into

³⁶ Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 61, July, 1958, p. 1.

³⁷ Ibid.

effect without the Greeks.³⁸ This would have been a most embarrassing situation for Britain--to put the very intricate tri-dominium rule of Cyprus into effect without Greek help. In view of this, NATO Secretary-General Spaak urged Great Britain in October, 1958 to postpone the implementation of the Macmillan Plan and call a three-power conference. This was the status of the Plan when the Zurich Agreement was reached in January, 1959.

NATO and the Cyprus Question

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization saw immediately after the Eleventh Session of the UN General Assembly in 1956 that there was little choice for a settlement of the Cyprus question through that body. In December, 1956 the North Atlantic Council passed a resolution that it would make the "good offices" of the Secretary-General available for conciliation on the peaceful settlement of disputes.³⁹ In accordance with this resolution, the

³⁸The Greek rejection of the Macmillan Plan on August 19, 1958, was tendered on the grounds that it "contained elements which would divide the Cypriot people." Asian Recorder, Vol. V, No. 11, March 14-20, 1959, p. 2503. A possible reason for Greek rejection of the plan is the simple fact that the Turks had previously accepted it.

³⁹Survey on Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 46, March, 1957, p. 16. The difference between "good offices" and mediation is that in the former the third state acts simply as an amicable go-between, while in the latter a mediator may make suggestions for settlement on his own without consulting the disputants.

Secretary-General of NATO in March, 1957, Lord Ismay tendered his good offices to the British, Greek and Turkish governments for talks on the Cyprus question. Both the British and the Turks were receptive to the idea, but "within a few hours of its announcement the Prime Minister of Greece issued an uncompromising refusal of the NATO offer."⁴⁰ The three powers did meet later in 1957 at Paris during the NATO Council meeting but there was little constructive discussion about Cyprus despite a personal plea to that effect by President Eisenhower.⁴¹

Terrorism ran amuck on Cyprus through the first half of 1958 and the NATO allies of Greece and Turkey grew further and further apart. In the meantime, Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium had become Secretary-General of NATO. He had encouraged friendly talks throughout the year for the three powers and suggested his good offices for possible negotiations leading to a settlement of the Cyprus question. All along Greece was reluctant because the talks were to include Turkey, whom she insisted, as late as the Fall of 1958, had no valid part in the problem. By September 23, 1958, Secretary-General Spaak could neither take the Greek nor the UN procrastination any longer, so made a surprise visit to Athens to urge the Greek government to

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 11.

⁴¹The New York Times, December 22, 1957, p. 8.

come to terms. The next day, September 24, he submitted a plan (subsequently and appropriately called the Spaak Plan) to the NATO Council Meeting in Paris and requested that the plan be accepted in principle immediately and later it could be discussed in detail. The Spaak Plan was similar to the Macmillan Plan, or the "Seven-year Plan," in that it proposed two separate houses of representatives, one for each community on Cyprus, both of whom would advise and aid the British governor for a period of seven years. The end of that period of time would "mark important progress towards the possibility of the Cypriot community governing itself..."⁴² The British delayed acceptance of the Plan in order that Her Majesty's government could study the various proposals. The discussion lasted another month. Though the participants (Greece, Turkey, and the UK) made concessions and finally agreed to have a future conference, they could not agree on what outside parties should be in attendance and whether the conference would lead to a final solution for Cyprus or merely a provisional solution. After the British Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd made a speech in England on October 9, 1958, in which he declared "Cyprus is Turkey's offshore island"⁴³ and the Turkish government on October 24, denied

⁴²The Cyprus Question Discussion at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, op. cit., p. 8.

⁴³Ibid., p. 22. See also The Manchester Guardian Weekly, October 16, 1958.

a statement in The New York Times that she "has given up the claim for partition";⁴⁴ the Greek government on October 24, instructed their NATO representative that "Greece would take no further steps, seeing that her efforts and concessions had not met with the least response."⁴⁵ The NATO talks broke down without success by November 1, 1958. After the UN General Assembly failed to endorse a resolution on Cyprus in December, the Tripartite powers knew they would have to act on their own. At the NATO meeting in Paris later that month, Greece and Turkey scheduled bi-lateral talks which led to the Zurich Agreement and London Agreement of the Cyprus question.

The Agreed Foundation for the Final
Settlement of the Problem of Cyprus

The Cyprus question was at long last settled by the London Agreements of February 19, 1959. These Agreements (basically on the structure of the Republic, a Treaty of Guarantee and a Treaty of Alliance) provided that one year after the date of signing, the independence of Cyprus as a Republic with a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Vice-President was to be granted. The Agreements specifically prohibit the union of Cyprus with any other state (the former Greek stand), as well as prohibit any future

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 23. See also The New York Times, October 16, 1958.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 5.

partition of the island (the former Turkish position). In addition British sovereignty would be continued over the two areas (Episkopi and Dhokelia, see Appendix I) where she has maintained military bases. During the last year of British control of Cyprus, Britain agreed to ease her stern internal Cypriot policy, release all political prisoners, and grant amnesty to all members of EOKA and T.M.T. The burning issues of Cyprus which had caused the loss of over 600 lives in a four-year period were thus amicably resolved in less than two-weeks' time.

By the terms of the Agreements, three different committees were charged with the responsibility of laying the foundations of the Republic of Cyprus. Two of the committees did their work on the island, while the other worked in London, in a triple effort to breathe life into the London Agreements.⁴⁶ The first, a Constitution Commission in Cyprus, worked on a constitution for the Republic based on the structure agreed to at London. The second, a Transitional Committee, also operated in Cyprus, "with the responsibility for drawing up plans for adapting... the Governmental machinery" in order to prepare for the transfer of sovereignty to the independent Republic. The second Committee was headed by the British Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, and assisting him were the leader of the

⁴⁶Conference on Cyprus, Cmnd. 679, 1957, pp. 14-15.

Greek Cypriot community, Archbishop Makarios, and the leader of the Turkish community, Dr. Fasil Kutchuk.⁴⁷ The third, a Joint Committee in London, included representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot committees, as well as the Tripartite Powers. This last group had the "duty of preparing the final treaties giving effect to the conclusions of the London Conference."⁴⁸ The important details of the British bases on Cyprus, the nationality of ex-patriated Cypriots and other related problems were ironed out by this last committee.

The provision in the London Agreements regarding security armed forces on the island were most interesting. In the section of the Agreements on the "Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey," there were definite arrangements made for the stationing of Greek and Turkish troops and the training of a Cypriot army.

Articles 4 and 5 of the Treaty state:

Greece shall take part in the (military) Headquarters ...with a contingent of 950 officers and soldiers... and Turkey with a contingent of 650 officers and soldiers (which) shall be responsible for the training of the Army of Cyprus.⁴⁹

Further provisions of this Treaty empower the Greek President and the Turkish Vice-President (who jointly share veto

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 15.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 7.

⁴⁹This provision is contained in the first article of the Zurich Agreement, ibid., p. 5.

power of all legislation) to increase or decrease the size of the body of the Greek and Turkish troops, and to rotate command of the tripartite military headquarters yearly with a Cypriot, a Greek, and a Turkish general officer.⁵⁰ The creation of the military forces along these divided lines--though such a system must yet show itself to be practicable--did allay the "Turkish anxieties" which grew out of the fear that independence for Cyprus would soon be followed by its union with Greece.⁵¹

The perpetual independence of Cyprus was provided for in the "Treaty of Guarantee," which was signed by Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, and the Republic of Cyprus.⁵² This provision allows any of the guarantor nations to act from without the island if any direct or indirect subversion threatens the status quo. In fact, if joint action to guarantee peace is not possible, then any one of the guarantor nations may act unilaterally. This means that Great Britain could send her armed forces to Cyprus from her bases there if she felt the government of the island was not conducting itself according to the provisions of the London Agreements. The Manchester Guardian notes on this point that there must necessarily be a three-nation decision at

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 11.

⁵¹"Cyprus: Conflict and Reconciliation," op. cit., p. 146.

⁵²Cmnd. 679, op. cit., p. 10.

all times on what constitutes the status quo and "especially on what constitutes 'indirect subversion' of the status quo."⁵³ Since Great Britain is supposed to be taking a back seat, compared to the roles of Greece and Turkey, in the affairs of Cyprus, the best hope for harmony in Cyprus "is the continuing agreement between Greece and Turkey on the chief aims of their respective foreign policies." The Guardian concludes that this unsure condition coupled with the "ambiguities contained in the treaties [London Agreements]" carries within itself many unresolved conflicts as Cyprus copes with independence. There is no doubt that the Republic of Cyprus is destined for scores of problems, large and small; but, it may be added that few fledgling nations have ever proceeded on the road of self-government without conflicts of some sort (See Chapter IV).

Other provisions agreed to at the London Conference concerned the legislature and the civil service of the new Republic. Each of the two communities would hold separate elections and choose their representatives to the Legislature in the ratio of seven Greek Cypriots for every three Turkish Cypriots. The civil service was designed to operate with the same proportion of employees, i.e., two and one-third Greek Cypriot employees for every one

⁵³The Manchester Guardian Weekly, February 26, 1959, p. 8.

Turkish Cypriot employee.⁵⁴ It could be noted here that the above ratio constitutes a virtual diplomatic victory for the Turkish Foreign Office, for at no time since before the British occupation in 1878 have the Turks had anywhere near 30 % of the island's population. The last official census was in 1946, but current estimates show that there are approximately 78.8% Greek Cypriots, 17.5% Turkish Cypriots, and 3.7% made up by small minorities, i.e., Armenians, Maronites, and British.⁵⁵

Lastly, the London Agreements established separate Communal Chambers for the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. These local representative bodies are to control the religious, educational, cultural, and certain economic affairs of their respective communities. Moreover, each of these Chambers will have the authority to impose taxes and levies on their own constitutencies to provide for operational needs.⁵⁶ This proposal coupled with the

⁵⁴Conference on Cyprus, op. cit., p. 7. The army in contrast to the Legislature and the civil service is to be made up in the ratio of 60 Greek Cypriots to 40 Turkish Cypriots, ibid. Possibly this military ratio was an unconscious concession to the superior reputation of the "terrible Turks" in the bellicose art.

⁵⁵Colonial Office, Cyprus, 1957, (London: H.M.S.O., 1958), p. 15. These estimates were acquired chiefly because of mandatory registration with police of all residents over the age of 12, which was a carry-over of one of the stern policy measures instituted during the emergency period on Cyprus, 1955-57.

⁵⁶Conference on Cyprus, op. cit., p. 6.

provision creating separate Turkish municipalities in the five largest towns,⁵⁷ caused Archbishop Makarios, who was representing the Greek Cypriots, to balk initially and refuse to sign the London Agreements. Pressures by the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and a "night of prayer and reflection" apparently was all that it took to convince the Archbishop that his objections were without foundation.⁵⁸ Still the tricky job of implementing the London Agreements was ahead for the three countries and Cyprus.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 8.

⁵⁸For an interesting account of the diplomatic maneuvers behind the London Conference, see: Doros Alastos, Cyprus Guerilla, op. cit., pp. 181-201.

Chapter IV

THE CYPRUS TREATY AND THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

The Work of Transition in Cyprus

The "agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus," was initialled by the representatives of Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Cyprus on February 19, 1959, but the greater task of implementing the agreements was still ahead for the nations concerned. The colonial government of Cyprus, under the leadership of Governor Sir Hugh Foot, launched immediate attempts to bring the island back to the normality of the pre-emergency period. The Governor was empowered by the London Agreements to select the seven Greek Cypriot and three Turkish Cypriot members of the Transitional Committee, after he had consulted with leaders of both communities in the island. This was accomplished in a period of six weeks, when the full Committee met for the first time on April 5, 1959.¹ After this was accomplished, the Governor aided the work of the committee by appointing members of his Executive Council to sit in the meetings of the Committee, and this

¹Manchester Guardian Weekly, April 9, 1959, p. 2.

joint council was the administrative arm in Cyprus until the Republic was officially established on August 16, 1960. It was also during that seventeen month period that certain members of the Transitional Committee were invited by the Governor to assume the duties of the various ministries and departments, thus carrying out some of the specific terms of the London Agreements.²

The next step on the road to self-government was the formation of the Constitutional Commission, which was to work in Cyprus parallel to the Transitional Committee. The job for this Commission was to draft a constitution for the Republic of Cyprus, building on the basic structure agreed upon in the London Agreements. The commission met for the first time on April 13, 1959 under the informal leadership of Marcel Bridel, (professor of law and one-time Rector of the University of Lausanne), who held the official title of "legal adviser to the commission."³ Less than one year later, April 6, 1959, there was a ceremony in Nicosia to announce the completion of the Draft Constitution. The task of filling in the frame set up by the London Agreements, with specific constitutional provisions was no mean effort. The burden of work fell upon

²Conference on Cyprus, Cmd. 679, February 19, 1959, VIII, "Agreed Measures to Prepare for the New Arrangements in Cyprus," No. 2 (b), p. 15.

³British Information Service, Cyprus, ID 1340, July, 1960, p. 9.

the leading legal experts of Greek and Turkish nationality, since the British authorities had no representatives on the Commission.⁴ However, when the Draft Constitution was submitted to Her Majesty's Government, they informed the other interested nations that they had neither comments on it, nor any additions or deletions. "Thus, after almost a year of complicated negotiations, the Committee's [sic] assignment was fulfilled."⁵

The one great achievement, prior to the final Draft Constitution, was the Greco-Turkish compromise on the power of the Executive Office. The first article under the "Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus," as provided in the London Agreements, states:

The State of Cyprus shall be a Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President being Turkish, elected by universal suffrage by the Greek and Turkish communities of the island respectively.⁶

The only other provision in the London Agreements relating

⁴The London Agreements stated: "This Commission shall be composed of one representative each of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot community and one representative nominated by the Government of Greece and one representative nominated by the Government of Turkey, together with a legal adviser [M. Marcel Bridel] nominated by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey..." Conference on Cyprus, loc. cit.

⁵"The Constitutional System of the Republic of Cyprus," Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists, December, 1960, p. 20.

⁶Conference on Cyprus, op. cit., p. 5

to the executive concerned the joint veto of the President and Vice-President over decisions of the Council of Ministers, as well as the bills of the House of Representatives.⁷ The rights and duties of the two offices thus had to be decided upon by the Constitutional Commission. The compromise was effected and signed November 10, 1959, by the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Fazil Kutchuk. This agreement removed a large obstacle and thus cleared the way for the presidential election, which was to be held before the actual declaration of the Republic.⁸ This compromise was to become Part III of the final Constitution of Cyprus.

Basically, the compromise, and therefore the final agreement on the Constitutional powers of the Executive Office, were quite simple.⁹ The President was to be the head of state and was to represent the Republic in all its official functions. Also he would sign and receive all credentials of diplomatic personnel, and his office was to have "precedence over all persons in the Republic." The Vice-President would be allowed to attend all official

⁷ Ibid., Article II, Sec. (a), Par. 5.

⁸ In a personal interview with Sir Hugh Foot, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, January 12, 1961.

⁹ Draft Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Part III: "The President of the Republic, the Vice-President, and the Council of Ministers," Arts. 36-60. Included in Cyprus, Cmnd. 1093, July, 1960, Appendix D.

functions as the vice-head of State, and would be empowered to suggest the names of members of the Turkish community for special honors, which the State might confer. It is interesting to note that the Vice-President does not have the power of succession in the event of the death of the President. Succession would come from the President of the House of Representatives, who is constitutionally required to be member of the Greek community.¹⁰

In order to "ensure the executive power, "the President and Vice-President were authorized to appoint a Council of Ministers.¹¹ The Council was to be composed of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish. The Council was empowered by the Constitution to give general direction and control to the government, particularly in the fields of foreign affairs, defense, security, and coordination of the affairs of the two communities in the island. The decisions of the Council were to be reached by an absolute majority and the President and Vice-President were allowed to exercise vetoes of these decisions. With the matter of the Executive Office finally agreed upon, the first election was subsequently scheduled to be held on December 13, 1959.

¹⁰Ibid., Art. 44 and Art. 72.

¹¹Ibid., Art. 46.

Elections During the Transition

Prior to the first elections in Cyprus, the Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, promulgated the Registration of Electors Law¹² on November 9, 1959, after it had been agreed upon jointly by the Transitional Committee and the Governor's Executive Council. This provided, in essence, that anyone already twenty-one years of age and resident of the island for the six months prior to passage of the law, could register in either the Greek or Turkish community. Members of the Armenian, Maronite, and Latin Church minorities would register with the Greek community, while other minorities could choose their community upon application and approval of the governor. Those specifically disenfranchised were those who had been in prison for the past six months, had been detained as a mental patient, were judged of unsound mind, or had been convicted of an electoral crime.

The total registered electorate for the Greek community ran over 238,000. In the presidential election of December 13, 1959, Archbishop Makarios received 144,501 votes as the candidate of the United Democratic Reform Front (EDMA), and other right-wing parties. His opponent, John Clerides of the Cyprus Democratic Union, received 71,753 votes. The new president found most of his support in the countryside, while Clerides was notably successful

¹²See B.I.S. Cyprus, op. cit., p. 9.

in the larger towns, where the labor unions were strongest. The election of the Vice-President was uncontested at the December 3rd primary, when Dr. Fazil Kutchuk ran unopposed.¹³

The other elections were held in Cyprus before the actual grant of independence, and the election laws enacted by the last Governor were still in force at the time. The elections to the 50-member House of Representatives were held on July 31, 1960 and those of the two Communal Chambers were held on August 7, 1960. Members of the religious minorities who were registered as part of the Greek Community, were each to have representatives in the Greek Communal Chamber.¹⁴ These particular election laws were designed, unlike other laws passed during the transitional period, to lose their effectiveness and legality once the Republic had been established.

The Proposals for the Public Service

¹³The New York Times, December 13, 1959, p. 1.

¹⁴The New York Times, August 1, 1960, p. 2. The concern for the rights of smaller religious groups prior to the granting of independence was a paramount concern of both the Transitional and Constitutional Commissions in Cyprus. A statement of Her Majesty's Government, for example, provided that the Constitution of the Republic should give an "assurance that the smaller religious groups need have no fear that they will be at a disadvantage in future in the allocation of public funds." Cyprus, Cmd. 1093, op. cit., Appendix E, p. 175.

The Transitional Committee was given the responsibility to reorganize the Civil Service, within the framework established by the London Agreements.¹⁵ The ratio of the Civil Service was to be seven Greeks for each three Turks, and the Committee was not concerned with debating the merits of the obvious Turkish advantage. Sir Hugh Foot stated, after independence had been granted, that his most difficult task, regarding the reorganization of the civil service, was the order in which the British colonial officers would be released.¹⁶ The London Agreements served as the guide by which the Governor's Executive Council gradually gave way to Cypriot members of the Transitional Committee, who were virtually administering the island's affairs by the time the Republic was officially declared.

The Cypriot officers were promoted to the highest posts in the governmental bureaucracy, as soon as the terms of the colonial officers expired. The Governor had devised a special scheme by which the replacement process would take place progressively up to the inauguration of the Republic of Cyprus. By July, 1960, it was announced that the implementation of the 70:30 ratio stipulated in the London Agreements, would take place no more than five months after the Republic was inaugurated, and this hopeful

¹⁵Conference on Cyprus, op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁶Interview, Sir Hugh Foot, loc. cit.

prediction was corroborated by the last Governor of Cyprus. In fact, it was the success of the reorganization of the public service that caused Sir Hugh to refute the statement of some dismal commentators who had predicted the people of Cyprus would destroy each other bit by bit. He stated in retrospect: "There are some critics of the newly independent Republic who say this generation will live to see Cyprus drown in a sea of blood and hate. Of course, anything can happen, but I don't believe it would ever go that far."¹⁷

In the one year's period that the island has experienced independence, there have been some unfortunate examples of how the inflexible 70:30 Civil Service ratio has been abused. According to the last Royal Governor of Cyprus, the Turks have difficulties filling their proportion in certain specialized areas of the Civil Service. An early example of the built-in difficulty of the rigid ratio occurred a month after independence when six vacancies for government doctors was announced. The Greek applicants for the position were qualified, and the Turks were not, yet the Turkish members of the House of Representatives insisted on their constitutional share.¹⁸

Such an institutional check on the rights of the Turkish

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Part VII, Arts. 122-125.

minority might cause some friction, but it would never bring about open conflict since (in the Governor's words): "the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus never had intended consciously to fight one another."¹⁹ Still the Turkish members of the House of Representatives have resorted to political maneuvers to secure their constitutional rights. This arises most readily in the matters of general taxes, which need the approval of the Turkish members of the House before such laws are passed. At one point, the Greek members of the House wished to continue an existing tax, while the economy was being studied. However, the Turks refused to go along with the proposal in the hope that they could trade the tax bill for their constitutional share in certain areas of the Civil Service.²⁰ Nevertheless, if one were to adhere strictly to the terms of the Constitution, the Turks have a valid legal right in making their stand on the guarantee of the ratio in the Civil Service. Once that point is conceded, there remains only the question as to the wisdom of the Constitutional provision in the first place.

More recently, in February, 1961, the Turkish Vice-President of the House of Representatives, Raul Denktash, charged that the Public Service Commission had acted ultra vires in its failure to appoint Turks to Forest

¹⁹Interview, Sir Hugh Foot, loc. cit.

²⁰Ibid.

Guard vacancies, which should have been allocated to them.²¹

The case was appealed to the Supreme Constitutional Court and the Turkish case rested on the fact that the ratio should be filled despite the fact that some of the Turkish candidates were six months short of the qualified training period. While this case was routine in its implications, the curious aspect arose when the Attorney General, who happens to be a Greek-Cypriot,²² was accused of taking the case of the Public Service Commission only after receiving instructions from the Greek members of the House. The independent Attorney-General, in theory, is not supposed to represent any side or party, yet in this case his sentiments seem to force him into an unenviably biased position. Whether he should strictly uphold the law and risk political retaliation and private sanctions, or go along with his community interests and violate his oath of office, is the dilemma in which such a public servant finds himself. It is in view of such constitutional complexities that "citizens will find it difficult to live in this country," declared the Turkish-Cypriot leader at one stage in the hearing.²³ Still the Turkish Community does not seem to

²¹Cyprus Mail, February 15, 1961, p. 1 ff.

²²The Constitution states that the Attorney-General and Deputy-Attorney shall be appointed by the President and Vice-President, provided they "shall not belong to the same community." Art. 112.

²³Cyprus Mail, loc. cit.

be inclined to compromise on some of the Constitutional provisions, in an effort to make the operations of the country any less difficult for the Cypriot citizens generally.

The Work of Transition Outside Cyprus

In London a Joint Committee was established with the expressed purpose "Of preparing drafts of the final Treaties giving effect to the conclusions of the London Conference."²⁴ The Committee was composed of the United Kingdom's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, the Greek and Turkish Ambassadors in London, and representatives of both the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Communities. The work of the Committee commenced on March 23, 1959, and the members met regularly during the following months under the auspices of an appointed Committee of Deputies. After nine-months--and only one month before the originally proposed date for the transfer of sovereignty--a high level meeting was called for in London, in order to review the progress of the Joint Committee. The aim of the meeting was to reach "final decisions on outstanding questions," in time for the planned date of independence, February 19, 1960.²⁵ Yet this goal was not to be realized and the conference ended by postponing the date of independence one

²⁴ Cyprus, Cmnd. 1093, op. cit., p. 4.

²⁵ Ibid.

month, in order that considerations of all outstanding matters might be completed.

One of the chief matters facing the Joint Committee in London was the question of Cyprus' joining the British Commonwealth then or at some later date. The matter was not easily resolved, since the Cypriot leaders wished to show the world that their proposed freedom need not be tied automatically to economic union with the former mother country. But, on the other hand, the Cypriots knew that the trade and financial advantages of Commonwealth membership could be a tremendous catalyst in the effort to achieve economic viability. The problem was neatly handled in the following manner:

It was agreed that the question of Cyprus' future association with the Commonwealth must be left for consideration by the Cypriot House of Representatives meeting after Independence. Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk requested that the United Kingdom Bill providing for the Independence of Cyprus should be prepared in a form which would make this possible and that it should also provide for Cyprus in the meantime to continue to be treated under United Kingdom law in the same way as the independent countries of the Commonwealth.²⁶

It was thus guaranteed to the fledgling Republic, both the right of a sovereign nation, plus the security of economic ties with a prosperous union of nations. There was little surprise caused six months after the proclamation of the Republic, when the Cyprus House of Representatives voted in

²⁶Ibid., Appendix F, p. 177. Commonwealth Relations Office, January 20, 1960.

a 4-1 majority to make application for the admission of Cyprus for a five year trial period to the Commonwealth. Nor did the world register any degree of amazement when the British Government welcomed the application.²⁷ Possibly the only startling aspect of the Commonwealth question came when Cyprus was given full status along with the other twelve member-nations in the "association of equals."²⁸

The British Bases in Cyprus

The announcement of the Cyprus independence date being postponed one month served simultaneously to suspend the operations of the Joint Committee in London and to shift the bargaining to Nicosia. Subsequent negotiations were then carried out in Nicosia between the Under Secretary

²⁷"Cyprus Joins the Commonwealth," Commonwealth Affairs, March, 1961, No. 89, p. 5. Also Cyprus Mail, February 17, 1961, p. 1.

²⁸In a personal letter to the author from the Secretary of the Conservative Overseas Bureau on September 21, 1960: the pre-Commonwealth problem of Cyprus had ramifications of a much larger magnitude than just the one small island in the Mediterranean. "What is of special constitutional interest in the case of so small a territory is what form such membership could take in regard to official Commonwealth gatherings. The same question is likely to arise in the case of Sierra Leone. Obviously, some form of regional structure of the Commonwealth would make this conundrum easier to solve; but in any case there would have to be some form of representation at the centre so as not to detract from sovereign status." While this one observer was incorrect in his prediction for Cyprus, the matter of small nations in the Commonwealth is far from resolved.

of State for the Colonies, Julian Amery, the Governor of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot, and the leaders of the two ethnic communities in the island. After the nine months of preliminary discussions in London, there were still four principal problem areas remaining to be settled and three of them had to do with the bases:²⁹

- (a) the future of the sovereign base areas if Britain ever were to decide to relinquish them;
- (b) the arrangements for administering the areas;
- (c) the exact delimitation of the areas;
- (d) the amount of financial assistance to be given to the Republic of Cyprus.

The original declaration of the British regarding base rights in the independent Republic of Cyprus came after the Zurich Agreements, but well before the signing of the London Agreements. The prime ministers of both Greece and Turkey made no mention of British base rights in their first accord, but they must have known that the British would come up with an annex to the Zurich Agreements. The British Foreign Office had learned by 1959 that contractual lease arrangements made with independent former colonies were not the safest way to secure legal occupation of distant bases, e.g., Suez, Jordan, Iran, the Trucial Sheikdoms, inter alia. Therefore, the British were inclined to agree to the independence of Cyprus, provided that two areas

²⁹B. I. S. Cyprus, op. cit., p. 11.

--Akrotiri and Dhekelia--would be "retained under full British sovereignty."³⁰ The British declaration went on, that before sovereignty could be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus, the following conditions had to be met:

that such rights are secured to the United Kingdom Government as are necessary to enable the two areas to be used effectively as military bases...and that satisfactory guarantees are given by Greece, Turkey, and the Republic of Cyprus for the integrity of the areas retained under British sovereignty and the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights referred to above.³¹

The British declaration ended by spelling out ten areas in which rights would have to be maintained in connection with the successful operation of the bases, i.e., ingress, egress and overfly; use of public utilities; access to other sites on the island, particularly ports and the Nicosia airport; and jurisdiction of the British forces comparable to NATO's Status of Forces agreement.³² These conditions were granted by the interested parties in the

³⁰Conference on Cyprus, Cmnd. 679, op. cit., p. 12.

³¹Ibid. This statement might be called the euphemized version of the policy position expressed by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd at the United Nations five years before: "The strength of my country in that part of the world is still one of the main bulwarks of peace. We have treaty obligations to the Arab States; we are vitally interested in the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in the defense of Turkey, and of Greece itself. We have great responsibilities under the Charter. Cyprus is vital to the discharge of those responsibilities...there is no acceptable alternative in the circumstances to sovereignty. Full administrative control is necessary because leases expire, treaties have a habit of being whittled away and..Greek governments, like other governments change." Cyprus, Cmnd. 9300, 1954, p. 12.

³²Ibid., pp. 12-13.

London Agreements and thus became part of the "agreed foundation..."

The base negotiations brought about the most difficulty for the Joint Committee in London. The vague aspects of this part of the London Agreements were made even more nebulous by the continual shifting of the British claim as to the necessary size of the retained areas. After the Joint Committee had suspended its negotiations, the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, tried to explain to the House of Commons the cause for the breakdown of the base treaty talks. Originally the Government had estimated and demanded:

that it would be necessary to retain areas in which about 16,000 Cypriots resided.../then/ an area between 160 and 170 square miles, with 4,500 Cypriot inhabitants.../and finally/ areas amounting to 120 square miles and involving the reduction of the number of Cypriots living in them to under 1,000. ³³
/with/ no question of a separate little "colony."

Still this final British offer did not prove acceptable until the sovereign base areas "were whittled down to two separate areas totalling some ninety-nine square miles."³⁴

The negotiations on the sovereign base areas, as well as on the other unresolved problems, were protracted far beyond the newly scheduled independence of the island, viz.

³³Hansard (Commons), February 1, 1960, Vol 616, Col. 636.

³⁴"The Cyprus Settlement," Commonwealth Affairs, No. 82, July, 1960, p. 2. See also, Cyprus, Cmd. 1093, op. cit., Annex A. p. 16.

March 19, 1960. After this second target date had passed without the necessary legislation having come out of the British Parliament, a period of four months lapsed before the parties were sufficiently en rapport, so as to justify any hopes of a speedy settlement. In early May, 1959, it appeared that the differences of opinion between the two sides had narrowed down to a few manageable points and a wave of optimism was to sweep through the British Isles. This outlook, however, soon proved abortive, since no formal meetings were to be held for the next seven weeks. The parleys up till then were looked upon as "an almost grotesque race against time," i.e., whether the Cyprus Bill would go through Parliament before the recess for the year.³⁵ The crucial obstacle was to be overcome by late June, 1960, when the agreement on the civil administration of the base areas was finally concluded.

Archbishop Makarios had made a rigid demand throughout the negotiations that there should be created certain special arrangements whereby the Cypriots were to run the civil administration of the bases. Any concessions of this sort on the part of the British would have infringed on Her Majesty's Government policy of "unfettered control of the base areas." In order to bring the two extremes closer together, the British had made the series of

³⁵The Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 25, 1960.

proposals which continually reduced the total square miles the bases were to encompass. The idea was obviously to delineate an area sufficiently large for military purposes, yet small enough so that the number of Cypriots living in the areas would not be a bone of contention. In the British mind, sovereign authority over the bases meant sovereignty all the way. Thus, any resident within the areas of the bases would be completely under British sovereign jurisdiction, and this would include any Cypriots who chose to remain in the areas. It was clear that the British were prepared to make any number of necessary concessions, provided they contributed in some way to securing the sovereignty of the bases. In other words, the British would bargain any aspect of the London Agreements except the sovereign nature of their future bases in Cyprus.

The question of the administration of the base areas was finally decided in Britain's favor. Makarios dropped his demands that the civil administration of the bases be controlled by the Cypriots, which he originally wanted in a binding, legal guarantee by the British Government. He settled for something far less than this, but by doing so gained something far more valuable to the formative years of his Republic. The British "declaration of policy"--"which the Cypriots have always argued has no validity in international law"³⁶--granted no concession on

³⁶Ibid.

the sovereignty of the base areas, but it did include an assurance that Great Britain had no intention of ever invoking certain special privileges of the Cypriots living in the area, such as citizenship rights and free access. What made the Archbishop retreat from his original position was evidently the counter-offer made by the British negotiators on the continuance of aid even beyond the first five years, as was informally agreed to during the London negotiations. The British were cautious not to go overboard in their offer for future aid, since "too generous aid might be regarded as a precedent for other territories in the throes of gaining their independence."³⁷ Still the figure (totalling over 14 million pounds sterling, infra) was tempting enough to bring the inordinate demands of the Archbishop back within the limits established by Her Majesty's Government.

By July 1, 1960, a joint communique was issued stating that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders had agreed with the United Kingdom delegation on all major outstanding questions, such as:

the text of the treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus; the boundaries of the sovereign base areas; the future of the sovereign base areas; the system of administration within the sovereign base areas; and financial aid to the Republic from Her Majesty's Government.³⁸ [the word "sovereign" was actually used as often as is noted/

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ B. I. S., Cyprus, op. cit., p. 12.

Also it was pointed out that the Turkish and Greek Governments were kept informed of the negotiations throughout and there would be no opposition from those quarters when the final treaty was to be signed. On the floor of the House of Commons, the Colonial Secretary, Iain McCleod, was able to make this summary statement of the results of the nineteen month period of negotiations which followed--and breathed life into--the London Agreements:

The date of independence will be fixed in agreement with the Cypriot leaders. On that day, which will be after the holding of elections in Cyprus, the Treaties and related documents will be signed and become operative. The sovereign base areas will comprise two separate areas totalling some ninety-nine square miles. The villages of Ormidhia and Xylotymbou and the Dhekelia power station will be enclaves of Cypriot territory with the sovereign base areas and there will be special arrangements for access to them. Akrotiri, which is too closely adjacent to the main airfield to permit of an enclave solution, will be the only village under British sovereignty. Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that, with the special arrangements for training and other facilities in the Republic itself which have been agreed in full detail, the sovereign base areas are adequate for our requirements. A point which was not susceptible of easy and rapid solution and which involved lengthy and involved consultations between all parties, was the future of the base areas. Her Majesty's Government's view on this is that since we have no intention of relinquishing sovereignty the question of cession does not arise. Nevertheless, in view of the importance attached by the Greek Cypriots to this issue, an undertaking has been reached that should Her Majesty's Government in the future decide in view of changes in their military requirements, that sovereignty should be relinquished, it shall be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus. As regards the administration of the base areas, a declaration will be made by the United Kingdom Government describing their intentions, subject to military requirements and security needs in respect of various aspects of administration. It has been agreed that Her Majesty's Government will provide over the next five years a sum of 12 million pounds sterling. Provision is made for the amount of aid

in the future five-year periods to be determined, after full consultation with the Republic. In addition, there will be payments and commitments made by Her Majesty's Government for particular purposes, including a special grant to the Turkish Cypriot Community. The negotiations have been long and complicated. It has, however, proved possible on all points at issue to reach an accommodation between the essential requirements of the United Kingdom and the requests put forward by the Cypriot leaders and to achieve a settlement in full accord with the Zurich and London Agreements. I trust that these matters will now move forward swiftly to a final conclusion.³⁹

Thus, with the solution to the British uncompromising stand on the sovereignty of her base areas in Cyprus--which was complete sovereignty of the areas, other than the Cypriot's three enclaves--the path was finally cleared for the signing of the three Treaties on August 16, 1961, viz. the Treaties of Establishment and Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. However, before this was to be accomplished the Cyprus Bill was debated in the House of Commons on July 14, 1960. The loyal opposition of the Labour Party, smarting apparently from their own failures in the past with the Cyprus issue, took the opportunity to level charges of procrastination at the Tory Government. Mr. Marquand, speaking for the Opposition, declared that the settlement should have been reached years before, but the delay and weakness in handling the situation "had arisen from a fear of the Conservative's own backbenchers."⁴⁰ There was little debate on the terms of the actual

³⁹Hansard (Commons), 1960, Vol. 616, Cols. 32-33.

⁴⁰Hansard (Commons), 1960, Vol. 626, Col. 1720. An editorial in the Greek language newspaper in Cyprus,

Bill, for most of the members of Parliament were relieved that the thorny problem of Cyprus was once and for all cleared-up. On July 29, 1960, The Cyprus Act was "enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled."⁴¹

As expected, the first order of business in the act concerned itself with the "sovereign base areas":

2.--(1) The Republic of Cyprus shall comprise the entirety of the Island of Cyprus with the exception of the two areas defined as mentioned in the following subsection, and

- (a) nothing in the foregoing section shall affect Her Majesty's sovereignty or jurisdiction over those areas;
- (b) the power of Her Majesty to make or provide for the making of laws for the said areas shall include power to make such laws (relating to persons or things either within or outside the areas) and such provisions for the making of laws (relating as aforesaid) as appear to Her Majesty requisite for giving effect to arrangements with the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus.⁴²

Phileleftheros, July 27, 1960, made this comment about the Cyprus Bill in Parliament: "The debate in Parliament has made one thing clear, that the colonial mentality is an incurable disease for Britain. No treaty or agreement can survive that is not based on morality and justice, as in case of Cyprus where settlement was dictated by expediency, absolutely alien to the interests of the people concerned." USIS Translation of the Cyprus Press.

⁴¹Cyprus Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2 Ch. 52, p. 1.

⁴²Ibid.

The text of the Treaty of Establishment, along with the usual "Exchange of Notes," was published in February, 1961, in what might be one of the last White Papers the British Government may issue in the matter of the Island of Cyprus.⁴³ The eventful history of the British Colony of Cyprus was thus finalized by the typical bureaucratic touch, which seems so necessary before decisions are considered both conclusive and legal.

The Treaty of Guarantee between the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, and the Republic of Cyprus, which was signed the same day, August 16, 1960, was designed to secure the provisions of the Treaty of Establishment.

Article III states that the four nations jointly would:

undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under the United Kingdom sovereignty at the same time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment of the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.⁴⁴

Moreover, by the terms of the Treaty, the Republic of Cyprus must maintain "its independence, territorial integrity, and security, as well as respect for its Constitution."⁴⁵ However, if the Republic for any reason breaches

⁴³Treaty Series No. 4 (1961), Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, Cmd. 1252, February, 1961.

⁴⁴Treaty Series No. 5 (1961), Treaty of Guarantee, Cmd. 1253, February, 1961.

⁴⁵Ibid., Art. I.

provisions of the Treaty, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom could "undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions."⁴⁶ This was designed primarily to prevent the former positions of either Greece or Turkey, i.e., enosis or partition, ever to reach actuality at any future date.

Other Institutional Aspects in the Constitution of Cyprus

The State structure of the Republic is most intricate, and the long and complicated Constitution (199 Articles) seems apropos for the existing situation. The framers of the Constitution of Cyprus tried to find equitable solutions to the many traditional complications in the islands. The history of Cyprus, if anything, does serve to explain the built-in conflict between the Greek and Turks, which still can be detected so readily today by the impartial observer in the island. By the same method, the Cypriot hatred and distrust of the British can be proven when one sums up the 80 years of colonial occupation of the island. The Constitutional authors would, therefore, have to have been students of the history of Cyprus if they were ever to find pragmatic answers in the present to the problems of the past. To say that the independent Republic of Cyprus should never be in existence because of its two currents of nationalism, or

⁴⁶Ibid., Art. IV.

because of the historic mutual suspicions and lack of goodwill, would be foolish in view of the fact that a year has passed without unusual conflict. In fact, notable signs of progress have been registered. It is apparent that the legalists who wrote the Constitution of Cyprus had profited from the warning signs of the past, in as much as they were clever enough to avoid traditional enmities in the creation of the institutional framework of the Republic of Cyprus.⁴⁷

From the very beginning of the Constitution there is the recognition of the historic separateness of the two ethnic communities in the island. In Part I, General Provisions, there is the definition of what the Greek and Turkish communities, as well as related matters, are to be. It is also provided in this section for the official languages, which are both Greek and Turkish--though much business is unofficially carried out in English, which is common to both groups. Part II, Fundamental Rights and Liberties, enumerates the rights of the citizens of the Republic generally, and then states certain rights which are derived from community membership.⁴⁸ To a great extent the rights

⁴⁷ Chapters I and II, trace in detail the origins of the communal distinctiveness in the island. To force the two ethnic elements to live together and identify with common symbols, would have spelled doom for the Constitution and the Republic of Cyprus.

⁴⁸ In a like manner, Americans derive certain rights from national citizenship, while other rights are derived from state citizenship.

were patterned after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but the source per se is not given any credit in the Constitution itself. Among other guarantees, each citizen of the Republic has the constitutional right of social security, as well as the privileges and immunities of the particular community in which the citizen chooses to reside.

Part III, The President of the Republic, and the Vice-President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers, (discussed at length, supra) states simply that the executive power is to be shared jointly by the Greek President and the Turkish Vice-President, in what amounts to a mixed presidential and parliamentary system. Certain of the powers are exercised jointly, i.e., the appointment of the Council of Ministers and the signing of bills into law, while others are left to either one office or the other acting individually. Both the President and the Vice-President have a veto over any decisions of the Council of Ministers or on the bills voted by the House of Representatives. It should be stressed that the office of the Cypriot Vice-President is in no way similar to that of the same name in the U. S. or other countries that have instituted a presidential system. The Council of Ministers operates under the two executives and are directly appointed by and responsible to both of them. While the concept of ministerial

responsibility (respondeat superior) is not stated specifically in any of the articles, this principle may be reasonably implied to be operative in the Republic.

The legislative powers are treated both in Part IV, The House of Representatives, and Part V, The Communal Chambers. In matters which are reserved to the competence of the two communities, the Communal Chambers have complete legislative authority. The 50-member House (in the ratio of 7 Greeks for each 3 Turks) primarily legislates on matters of general interest to the island, i.e., security, finances, etc.; while the Communal Chambers deal with the more parochial matters, i.e., religious matters, education, agricultural co-operatives, etc. There is not any conflict of interest or incompatibility in holding offices simultaneously in both the House and one of the Communal Chambers. Any subject which may result in a conflict between the House and either, or both, of the Communal Chambers, or between the Chambers themselves, may be brought up before the Supreme Constitutional Court.

Part VI, The Independent Officers of the Republic, establish four offices which are intended to be above the political process being appointed jointly by the President and Vice-President. These posts are to be considered under the permanent civil service, but the tenure and grounds for removal vary with the office. The Attorney General and Deputy hold office, as do the judges of the

Supreme and High Courts, until the age of sixty-eight and may be removed only for misconduct or incapacity of a mental or physical nature. The Auditor General and the Deputy are appointed and removed in the same manner. The Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic and his Deputy are less secured in the posts, since they may be removed at the pleasure of the President and the Vice-President acting jointly. The Accountant General and the Deputy are removed or disciplined under the competence of the Public Service Commission (which is analogous to the Civil Service in the United States.) It should be noted that each chief officer and his deputy should not belong to the same community in the island, i.e., if the one be a Turk, the other must be a Greek.

Part VII, The Public Service, established the civil service composed of 70% Greeks and 30% Turks. There is a ten-member Public Service Commission which lays down rules of conduct and qualifications for the various positions, and these members serve at the pleasure of the Executive Office. The general principles of the public service are similar to those of the British Civil Service, and the ideas of permanency and career-status, i.e., promotion from within the ranks, are paramount. Part VIII, The Forces of the Republic, creates a 2,000 man standing army, of which 60% will be Greek and 40% Turkish. The army

will be made up of voluntary enlistments, and the matter of compulsory military service would not be instituted without the consent of both the President and Vice-President. While the Army was made up of the 60:40 ratio, the police force was be in the 70:30 proportion, as the rest of the public service.

The next two parts create the judicial system of the Republic. Part IX, The Supreme Constitutional Court, is composed of a Greek, a Turkish, and neutral judge, who are appointed jointly by the President and Vice-President. The Greek and Turkish judges are appointed "from amongst lawyers of high professional and moral standard," (if there be such a type). The neutral judge, ex officio President of the Court is to be appointed for a period of six years from outside the island, and the first one to hold the post is a German national. The Supreme Constitutional Court is to pass on any controversy arising or relating to an interpretation or violation of the Constitution. Particularly important are disputes and matters relating to the separation of powers as established under the Constitution, and on these matters the highest organ of the judicature must pass. Part X, The High Court and the Subordinate Courts, determines jurisdiction in matters concerning the two communities. Civil disputes in which the plaintiff and defendant belong to the same community are decided by a tribunal composed of judges who are inhabitants

of that community. However, in criminal cases the judge must be a member of the same community as the accused party. Where more than one community, or members of different communities, are in dispute then the High Court of Justice must decide. This High Court is composed of a Turk, two Greeks and one neutral judge. The indigenous judges have the same independence as the Supreme Court judges, and the alien neutral is appointed for a six-year term (the first one being an Irish national).⁴⁹

Part XI, Financial Provisions, deal with the matters of monies collected or paid out by the Government. This part also empowers the separate communities to establish funds for taxes collected from their individual members, and these funds may be dispersed as the communal chambers see fit, provided the appropriation is for something within the scope of the communal Chambers. Accountability, budgeting and control are also mentioned in this part, and this procedure is modelled after that in the British government.

The last two parts, (Part XII, Miscellaneous Provisions and Part XIII, Final Provisions and the section on Transitional Provisions) deal with general matters in the Republic. Possibly one of the most interesting and

⁴⁹The neutral judge has two votes to break any possible tie decision.

unique--not mentioning the disputable aspect of it--article is #173. Under this article, the five largest towns are set up into separate municipalities, viz. Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Paphos. Each municipality was to have its own council, elected only by the members of the respective community in the town. For joint services, each town was to establish a co-ordinating body, made up of two members of each community and the fifth member, acting as the president, was chosen by both of the councils. This scheme was to be under the close scrutiny of both the President and the Vice-President who would "within four years... examine the question whether or not this separation of municipalities in the aforesaid towns shall continue."⁵⁰

This provision of the Constitution has been the most difficult to implement because certain basic procedural aspects were omitted, e.g., whether the municipalities should be geographic or merely administrative in character. Some close observers feel that the creation of the separate municipalities was an extreme bit of deference to the historic distinctiveness of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and there may be a mutual decision to abolish the system entirely or alter it drastically.⁵¹

⁵⁰Art. 173, Sec. 1, Par. 2.

⁵¹Interview, Jacovides, op. cit.

The Institutionalizing of Communal Distinctiveness

The problem of the communal rights and interests of the two largest ethnic elements in Cyprus was the chief concern of the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers when they sat down to discussions in Zurich and the matter has not been resolved to this very day. The breach between the two groups of Cypriots had reached such proportions by the beginning of 1959 that there was certainly no hope of repairing it simply by a Greco-Turkish accord. The job for the two foreign ministers was to prevent the internal conflict from amplifying, and this had to be done by institutionalizing the distinctiveness of the two communities. "The 'Basic Structure' [the Zurich and London Agreements] therefore accepts that what must be consolidated is not so much the integrity of the island's life as the rights of the two communities vis-a-vis one another."⁵² While the establishment of the communal chambers, as well as the communal town council, were done as expediciencies, there were still attempts to introduce symbols with which the two communities could both identify: Thus the creation of the Cypriot flag, the co-ordinating bodies in the five large municipalities, the mention of the UN Charter, and lastly the rule of law, without which the complex Constitutional System

⁵²Eric Baker, "The Settlement in Cyprus," The Political Quarterly, (London), July-September, 1959, p. 248.

could never function. Whether these values will in time cause the Cypriot Greeks and Turks to join closer together is a matter of conjecture. Or possibly there would have to emerge a super-ordinate goal, (e.g., a threat to common security, the desire for economic viability, common language and religion, or even the drive to rid the island of foreign bases) which would cause a departure from traditional anchorages and the formation of a single Cypriot identity.

But is the creation of the Cypriot identity the over-riding goal of the clearer-thinking Cypriots? The answer would seem to be no. Not only has the Constitution accentuated the difference of the groups, but the two elements were working toward separateness long before the Zurich Agreements. In June, 1958, the Cypriot Turks were the first to create communal town councils in the four largest towns.⁵³ As a result of the Emergency Period, in which pressures were applied to those crossing communal lines to do any business, there has developed a sense of integral economic sufficiency within each of the communities. As one Turkish Cypriot put it, functional or "economic partition" has taken over where geographic partition was not allowed.⁵⁴ In view of these factors, there seems to be little sense in pushing something the natives obviously do

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 250-51.

not desire. Thus, the aim of the Republic of Cyprus sums up to be "that the amount of unity to be achieved in the island shall be that minimum which is compatible with the maximum expression of communal individuality."⁵⁵ Considering the examples of Switzerland, Belgium, The Lebanon, inter alia, the communal distinction in Cyprus is "no bar to political continuation."⁵⁶

The Constitutionally established institutions, as is true of all such systems, have not provided the Republic of Cyprus with all the answers. The new government still faces periods of hesitation and instability, when the rest of the world would prefer seeing a smoothly running internal order. The British traditionally have tried to introduce measures and responsibilities in their colonies, which necessarily go along with self-government. Whether or not this British governmental training period for Cyprus has been sufficient and effective enough will be revealed as the young nation faces the vicissitudes and future challenges along the road of independence.

Analysis of the Independence of Cyprus

The peaceful settlement of what had appeared to be one of the most perplexing and insoluble problems of the day has finally been recorded in the pages of history.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 248.

⁵⁶Interview, Jacovides, loc. cit.

Indeed, the amazing rapidity with which the Cyprus settlement was made cannot be over-emphasized. As a British Conservative publication has observed:

A short time ago it seemed beyonds the bounds of possibility that the situation in Cyprus could be transformed almost overnight from one of guerilla fighting and bitter political animosity, with repercussions far wider than the island itself, to one of agreement on an independent State involving concessions by all parties concerned. Yet that is exactly what happened...Interests that had seemed irreconcilable gave way to a spirit of reason and cooperation.⁵⁷

Compromise, concession, and relinquishment of former intransigent stands paved the way to the final outcome for the Cyprus problem. None of the parties involved received their original demands. The British ostensibly lost the most, since they had to give up their insular possession; but, in reality, they were probably the ones who benefitted most--no surprise to anyone who has followed British diplomacy through the years. The British were allowed to retain permanent sovereignty over their two Cyprus bases, and at the same time they were relieved of a colonial problem which had become a malignant cancer in the Colonial Office. The Greeks, in contrast, had to give up enosis, but it was something which they never really had in the first place. Thus, no one should say that the Greeks are the greatest losers by the terms of the London

⁵⁷Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 68, March, 1959, p. 4.

Agreements. As the matter stands the Turks gained a noteworthy diplomatic achievement, in view of the favorable proportions given the Turkish Cypriots and the sound minority protections guaranteed to them in the Agreements; at the same time, the Turks only had to give up their demand for partition, a stand which was taken reluctantly merely to appease Turkish public opinion. If anyone should be called losers by the terms of the London Agreements, it is the Cypriot people themselves.

The Cypriot people were the ones who had to give up in actuality what the Greek and Turkish governments only thought they were losing. Self-determination and partition on Cyprus were forsaken for independence, and many doubts exist as to any advantages this decision has given the Cypriot people.⁵⁸ The first year of Cypriot independence has shown that to translate the delicately balanced provisions of the London Agreements into a sound administrative

⁵⁸The New York Times, February 24, 1959. Another journal states that following the announcement of the London Agreements, British troops again placed barbed wire on the "Mason-Dixon" line /sic/ which separates the Greek and Turkish quarters in the capital city of Nicosia so as to prevent clashes. However, there were demonstrations of dissatisfied Turks who carried placards stating "Menderes, you were sold for dollars," while pleased Greeks carried among other favorable signs, "Long live Dighenis (the pseudonym of George Grivas, leader of EOKA)." Generally most Cypriots seemed in favor of their new independence. Asian Recorder, V, No. 11, March 14-20, 1959, p. 2562.

order, had required the combined cooperation and blessings of the British, Greeks, Turkish and other governments of the world. Greek and Turkish Cypriots, now must turn aside petty differences and seek a mutually agreeable course of conduct. A New York Times news headline succinctly stated the internal problem which has been created when the Republic of Cyprus was in the offing: "Cypriotes [sic] Say Communal Enmity Must End If Freedom Is To Work."⁵⁹ Undoubtedly, the news of independence was "like a shock to Cypriotes [sic],"⁶⁰ but any individual therapy for this new Cypriot malaise is out of the question--most things of this sort in Cyprus must now be treated by mutual efforts.

While the Cypriots look at their newly gained independent status under understandable apprehensions, the other parties to the London Agreements have welcomed the outcome, Great Britain, which had lost 142 subjects in the violence on Cyprus the last four years,⁶¹ witnessed another jewel fall from her imperial crown but paradoxically felt no loss. Prime Minister Macmillan at the close of the Conference stated in a speech before the House of Commons:

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 10.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹"Cyprus: Conflict and Reconciliation," The World Today, April, 1959, p. 147.

I regard this Agreement as a victory for reason and cooperation. No party to it has suffered a defeat-- it is a victory for all. By removing a source of bitterness and division it will enable us and our Allies and the people of Cyprus to concentrate on working together for peace and freedom.⁶²

The Greeks and the Turks miraculously agreed on this view and have so far continued to supply the cooperative spirit, which Prime Minister Macmillan had called the "missing factor which had so long eluded us...in the terms of the settlement."⁶³

Nevertheless, the London Agreements and the eventual establishment of the Republic of Cyprus has many areas of unexplained behavior on the parts of the interested nations. But the question of outstanding interest still surrounds the Zurich and London Agreements, and this must necessarily be directed to the historian:

what alteration in the balance of internal or external policies of the three countries principally involved made it possible for their respective governments so to modify their positions as to negotiate on what had previously been held with the utmost intransigence?⁶⁴

The materials now available only open up more areas of speculation in this matter. The true answers must come as the other diplomatic secrets of the past have revealed themselves, namely only through the passage of time.

⁶²In a speech by the Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan in the House of Commons, February 19, 1959. (Official text, British Information Service).

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Baker, op. cit., p. 245.

Chapter V

THE CYPRUS PROTOTYPE AND FEASIBILITY OF ITS APPLICATION ELSEWHERE

As long as the problem of Cyprus had appeared to be interminable, publicists in many nations were pondering the question of what criteria should be employed in the settlement of similar disputes between colony and mother-country. In the case of Cyprus, every imaginable claim was presented by the interested parties and the final settlement was somewhat of a synthesis of the many viewpoints. The ethnocentric Greek claims, appealing more to emotion and sentiment, were offset both by the historical-legal petitions of the British and by the strategic, as well as geographic, case of the Turks. But the validities of all three positions were seriously doubted by the objective viewer at one time or another. In reality, the dispute was simply the need of the colonial power for bases in a strategic area versus the indigenous drive for independence and self-government. The solution in the case of Cyprus was one which ostensibly satisfied both sides. What confused the Cyprus issue and made it atypical in the annals of international law was the complex interplay of three sovereign nations exerting what was felt to be legal rights.

When the conflict had reached a stalemate among the three disputants, it was, by default, thrown into the court of world public opinion. In this intangible, yet increasingly influential, tribunal, the matter was reduced to the bare essentials: colonial oppression versus rising nationalism. Tradition and legalistic claims seldom persist in defiance of international opinion, and the three countries soon yielded their inflexible positions. The compromise on Cyprus, therefore, brought a welcome end to a protracted conflict between moribund colonialism and the tradition of Western liberalism.

But just what were the special ingredients of the final solution to the Cyprus problem? Why did this last proposal succeed when so many others had failed? Was there a "magic touchstone" in the case of Cyprus which helped to reconcile this particular colonial situation while others, e.g., Algeria, continue in a hopeless impasse? Does the solution in Cyprus, therefore, have applicability to other strategic British dependencies: Aden, Bermuda, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Gilbert Islands, Honduras, Hong Kong, Malta, North Borneo, Pitcairn Island, the Solomon Islands, or Zanzibar? Could the Cyprus example find a use in resolving other persistent colonial and trusteeship problems: Algeria, Martinique, the Trucial Sheikdoms, West Irian, Bizerte, or the Ryukyus? The question also arises whether the Cyprus settlement is really successful, i.e., will it

continue to work? Moreover, one must speculate as to the future importance of Cyprus, i.e., will it always be a strategic base? Finally, the philosophical enigma presents itself, namely should there be an ideal prototype for terminating the colonial status of a strategically located territory? Obviously these questions have no exact answers, but they, nonetheless, are necessary to consider when one tries to devise a model solution to age-old problems.

Summary of the Cyprus Prototype

It is generally conceded that the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus required more goodwill than diplomatic acumen.¹ The so-called explanations of the "alteration in the balance of internal or external politics of the three countries principally involved,"² are not sufficiently convincing to critical students of the subject. If Turkey dropped its contention for the status quo in Cyprus--or its "second best" alternative of partition--merely because of the fear of a weakening alliance on her eastern flank (the Baghdad Pact), then just what assurances of a stronger

¹Eric Baker, "Two Islands in Trouble," The Christian Century, August 5, 1959, p. 900. Yet it still might be argued here whether or not "goodwill" is a sine qua non of "diplomatic acumen."

²Ibid., "The Settlement in Cyprus," The Political Quarterly, July-September, 1959, p. 245. The author admits that his, as well as other attempts to explain the Cyprus solution, seem to leave much unanswered.

Asiatic border did Turkey derive from the London Agreements? If Greece departed from her historic position of enosis simply to concentrate energies on domestic improvements, where are the demonstrable proofs that the Greek economy has improved between 1959 and 1962? If the Tory government primarily feared that the results of the 1959 elections would have been disastrous had the "Cyprus muddle" not been resolved, then why did the Tories not stress the Cyprus victory more in the campaign?

Timing of the Cyprus solution was an important factor, but not as much of the overarching concern of the three countries as some analysts would have readers believe. The Cyprus settlement apparently did not come about because of sheer transitory and selfish political expediencies. Rather, there must have been a more pervasive motivation that brought the conflicting elements into line. For want of a better interpretation, the case of Cyprus may have just been caught up in the postwar trend in international affairs that has come to favor, in territorial disputes, the independence of colonies over the precedents of international law. As had been shown in the development of the case, supra, it would be an oversimplification to think that Cyprus was given freedom because of humanitarian sentiment or international pressures alone. Still it appeared that world public opinion did play some part in the final outcome. By

the beginning of 1959, it was manifest that Cyprus had to be made an independent state. Consequently, the task for the three nations concerned was to save as much individual prestige as they could in face of the inevitable course of events. The ultimate Cyprus accord was designed to do just that.

The unusual circumstances surrounding the case of Cyprus, i.e., the two native ethnic currents, the geographical island status, and the scope of its international implications, would limit the chances for the settlement, per se, to have a universal application. However, the unique agreement on the British bases therein--which, after all, seems to be crux of most colonial problems--may have a general relevancy to parallel situations. Most agreements on foreign bases in sovereign countries are lease-type treaties, in which base rights are granted only for a stated length of time, e.g., the 99-year leases of United States bases in the Philippines and Guantanamo, Cuba. After the specified period has elapsed, there are seldom assurances that the treaty will automatically be renewed. In such instances, certain foreign bases in strategically located areas have occasionally been closed down at a most inopportune time, e.g., the British evacuation of Suez. Lease arrangements may be effective in satisfying strategic requirements for matters immediately at hand, but the course

of world events cannot always be shaped to fit rigid treaty considerations.

By the time the independence of Cyprus seemed imminent, Great Britain had lost a number of strategic areas due to conditional base agreements. The loss of Suez emphasized to the British the importance of retaining Cyprus as the symbol of Western power in the Eastern Mediterranean, if for no other than a psychological reason. It was, therefore, imperative that a solution be reached that would fulfill military needs in that area, and Britain preferred it to be one of a permanent nature. While advocates in Britain of an appeasement policy toward Cyprus casually dismissed the importance of it as a base--since, it was claimed, one well-placed missile with a nuclear war-head could easily demolish the entire island³--the British Foreign Office on the other hand, never minimized the crucial nature of Cyprus in the Western base system. Britain knew perfectly well that in theory each strong component in NATO's collective security pattern would serve to lessen the probability that any of the other components might one

³This line of argument was attributed to, among others, Archbishop Makarios who alluded to the doubtful nature of Cyprus as a base as early as 1956. He stressed this point during his speaking tour of the United States in 1957, and the critics of the Tory Party's firm Cyprus policy took up the campaign in England. See: Cyprus: Correspondence Exchanged Between the Governor and Archbishop Makarios, Cmnd, 9708, March, 1956; also The New York Times, December, 1957, passim. Supposedly Makarios had a "fall in prestige" after "he had been compelled to retract charges

day be annihilated, e.g., a proposed attack on one base would be deterred by the readiness of the others. The air distance between Cyprus and the borders of the Soviet Union is less than 800 miles, and this made the island significant enough in the eyes of NATO. Thus, the merits of Cyprus as a base were not debated in Whitehall. On the contrary, the chief consideration at that time was how to secure at least part of the island as a permanent military installation.

The model modern-day solution to the vagaries of British colonial bases policy in general, and to Cyprus in particular, would be to retain the base areas as sovereign parts of the United Kingdom while granting independence to the remainder of the colony. In this way, there would never be a need in the future to re-negotiate treaties or leases, also internal administration could be handled as seen fit, long-range plans could be made without the threat of abrupt termination of occupancy, and, above all, colonial status would be eliminated. Under such a scheme, base areas would actually be a chunk of Great Britain resting in a far-off land. The enclaves would not be "little colonies," since the proposed number of indigenous inhabitants living in these areas would be negligible, if any at all. But the most important, the solution would be

made against the British while he was in the United States." See Baker, "The Settlement in Cyprus," op. cit., p. 246.

permanent "since Her Majesty's Government would have no intention of relinquishing sovereignty."⁴ This marks a departure from the typical colonial settlements since 1947, and shows a marked degree of ingenuity in the combined talents of the Foreign and Colonial Offices. True, this was the denouement tailored especially for Cyprus, but with alterations, the solution might easily fit other problem areas in the shrinking British Empire.

The Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus

The Treaty of Establishment between the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus⁵ contains twelve different sections of Annexes, and eight of these deal with the sovereign base areas. In the hopes of apparently not cluttering up the main body of the Treaty, most of the important provisions were placed in the Annexes, which "shall have force and effect as integral parts of this Treaty."⁶ The matters covered therein were: the delineation of the sovereign base areas, definition of terms, sites and facilities, land tenure, training, access to the

⁴Hansard (Commons), 1960, Vol 626, Col. 35. Statement by Secretary of State for the Colonies, Ian Macleod.

⁵Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, Cmd. 1252, February, 1961, Treaty Series No. 4 (1961).

⁶Ibid., Article 11, p. 7.

Nicosia Airfield, payments, and the status of forces. Scrupulous care was taken by the framers of the Treaty to cover each detail thoroughly, and the finished product is a prolix re-phrasing of essential points for the purpose of clarity, emphasis, and, supposedly, for the avoidance of loopholes. While the Treaty patently anticipates and exhausts every potential misinterpretation, one is reminded of the phenomenon in legal history about the longest documents having the least area of agreement. If, however, there are points of discord in the base arrangement in Cyprus, they have certainly not been raised during the first year of its operations.

Essentially, the Treaty defines the boundaries of the sovereign base areas, including their territorial waters, (Map #2, Appendix.) Provisions were made in this regard for a boundary commission of combined representatives of the United Kingdom and the Republic, who would first lay out the exact boundaries. Then, with the advice of an independent expert, the commission would settle any future questions of interpretation of the maps, and other relevant materials, which helped define the boundaries. The Khekalia power station, situated on territory of the Republic, is to supply hydroelectric power to both the base areas and the Republic. Under certain "exceptional circumstances" the British Government reserved the right

to "ensure" that adequate supplies of power and water were delivered to the base areas. Such a reservation was introduced to discourage the Republic from ever trying, at some future date, to freeze out the bases by cutting off sources of essential supplies.

Certain defense rights and facilities were secured to the United Kingdom in the territory of the Republic. Among these were: freedom of movement between the sovereign base areas and certain specified places in the Republic, the right of military aircraft to overfly the territory of the Republic, the right to use ports and harbors, the right to establish separate postal and communications systems, and lastly there was included the right to employ Cypriot nationals at the "existing wage levels." The use of the Nicosia Airfield for both civil and military purposes was guaranteed in perpetuity, and the British government promised almost \$1.5 million (500,000 pounds sterling) for the construction of a terminal at the Nicosia Airfield. The matter of payments was lightly covered in the agreement, (Appendix B. Part VI of the Treaty deals with port fees and the acquisition of immovable property, which were to be calculated with respect to relevant legislation of the Republic). The question of the "rental" for the base areas was included under the five year aid agreements which were determined before the Treaty was signed.⁷

⁷Hansard (Commons), 1960, Vol. 626, Col. 35.

The status of forces agreement (Appendix C of the Treaty) dealt with the presence of British, Greek, Turkish, or Cypriot soldiers in the base areas. The agreement was patterned after the NATO provisions in this regard, and defines which offenses were in the province of the Service courts and which were under the jurisdiction of the Republic courts. In cases whereby "a member of a force or civilian component or a dependent is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of the receiving State," the accused is guaranteed procedural rights consonant with the traditional Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and common law.

Possibly the most complicated aspect of the sovereign base agreement was the compromise regarding the type of administration in the base areas. Archbishop Makarios was apprehensive of military administration, because he felt it would be tantamount to colonial rule. On this he was adamant almost to the point of breaking off the treaty talks.⁹ The final arrangement on this particular issue was clearly a British victory. Anything less than unfettered British military rule would have jeopardized the concept of the sovereign base areas. Only two villages were to remain under British rule and this would encompass a total of less than 1,000 Cypriots if they chose to continue living in the villages. The British guaranteed the resettlement of any of these inhabitants desirous of leaving. To

⁹See Chapter IV, supra.

eliminate one sore point, the British reluctantly entrusted three enclaves in the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area to Cypriot rule (Map #2), but this was the sole concession that Britain made. Under the final agreement therefore, completely unrestricted British sovereignty and jurisdiction would be exercised in the two base areas. The chief administrator was an ex officio post of the Air Officer Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Air Forces, Royal Air Force. In this capacity he would still be responsible to the Secretary of State for Air. By so doing the British avoided the mistake of making the chief administrator of the Cyprus base areas responsible to the Colonial Secretary, which had been the case before the Republic was established.

The base administrator was empowered to make rules for the "peace, order, and good government" of the sovereign base areas, but these had to be in line with a broader policy. In the final declaration regarding the administration of the sovereign base areas, Her Majesty's Government stressed "the main objects to be achieved:"¹⁰

- (1) Effective use of the Sovereign Base Areas as military bases.
- (2) Full co-operation with the Republic of Cyprus.
- (3) Protection of the interests of those residing or working in the Sovereign Base Areas.

The British Government went on at greater length to outline its intentions:¹¹

¹⁰ Cyprus, Cmnd. 1093, op. cit., Appendix O, pp. 201-205.

¹¹ Ibid., Article 2, p. 201.

- (i) Not to develop the Sovereign Base Areas for other than military purposes.
- (ii) Not to set up and administer "colonies."
- (iii) Not to create posts or other frontier barriers between the Sovereign Base Areas and the Republic.
- (iv) Not to set up or permit the establishment of civilian commercial or industrial enterprises except in so far as these are connected with military requirements, and are not otherwise to impair the economic, commercial or industrial unity and life of the island.
- (v) Not to establish civilian or commercial seaports or airports.
- (vi) Not to allow new settlements of people in the Sovereign Base Areas except for military purposes on payment of fair compensation.

The section then goes on to specify seventeen distinct areas-- e.g., "freedom of access," "criminal proceedings," "commerce and industry," etc.--where possible conflict might occur.

A Joint Consultative Board was created to "advise the authorities of the Republic and those of the Sovereign Base Areas on such arrangements as may be necessary from time to time to give effect to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government set out in this Declaration."¹² Throughout, the relations between the Republic and the Sovereign Base Areas were supposedly to be characterized by a non-discriminatory treatment of those Cypriots who either lived or worked in the base areas.

¹²Ibid., Article 5, p. 204.

The British declaration of intent for the Sovereign Base Areas was the key element which caused Archbishop Makarios to drop his demand for civil administration of the base areas. His fears that the gestation of colonialism would always be represented in the bases were not eliminated by the virtue of the declaration, but they were sufficiently allayed for as long as it took to sign the final treaties. Makarios' rationale for the retreat from his original stand was explained by him in this way:

We had to accept the offers made to us and to sacrifice some of our rights temporarily *[italics supplied]* instead of sticking to all our demands and obtaining nothing. That was because we wanted to get rid of the colonial shackles. I am happy that we have gained our freedom...we oppose colonialism and support freedom everywhere.¹³

The allusion of the President of the Republic of Cyprus made to the temporary sacrifice of rights has the tendency to disturb certain students of international affairs. It appears that Makarios looks upon the intricate Cyprus solution more as a modus vivendi than a finality, and such an attitude in a person of his stature is indeed portends a threat to the future of the British bases. An Egyptian journalist managed to draw this statement from the Archbishop during an interview in Cairo:

We have made it clear to Britain that if the bases were ever used in a manner that prejudiced our

¹³"Cyprus Breaks the Shackles," Arab Observer, Vol. I, No. 11, September 4, 1960, p. 16.

relations with other countries or were equipped with atomic weapons, we would rise in revolt once more. Personally, I believe that all bases, particularly atomic bases, should be put under the supervision of the United Nations. The world seeks peace and does not want to live in the shadow of fear. At any rate, it was not Cyprus that gave the bases to the British. Those bases must return to Cyprus one day.¹⁴

It is obvious that viewpoints as expressed above can contribute little to the perpetuation of the status quo in Cyprus. The source may not be completely accurate, but the essence of the statement seems consistent with many of the past expressions of the Archbishop. Makarios, however, is too shrewd a politician and diplomat to attack the Cyprus treaties so blatantly. While he would like to place restrictions on the uses the British make of their sovereign base areas, he knows full well that there is no legal, economic, nor political way by which he can justify such action. Still even the unconscious desire of the Archbishop to place one day the British bases under Cypriot sovereignty creates a disruptive potential. Makarios represents, or better yet embodies, the two most powerful institutions in the Republic; the presidency, or the repository of the political power of the Cypriot nation, and the Church, or the repository of the national conscious of the majority of the Cypriot people. Together these two institutions are a potential force that could be suppressed only by military power--an alternative the British would rather not face, either

¹⁴Ibid., p. 15.

now or at some future date.

Nevertheless, should provocative action against the British bases arise which would necessitate naked military power as a measure to counter any insurgency, the Treaty of Guarantee establishes the right of the British, the Turks, or the Greeks to employ such an extreme. The base agreements, while almost to the letter exactly what Great Britain had wanted all along, are by no stretch of the imagination completely foolproof. For example, the bases are not self-contained in the two coastal areas. There are thirty-one training areas, installations, and sites which, for a number of geographical and technical considerations, could not possibly have been included under British sovereignty. (See Map #4). British access to these sites have been secured by every legal instrument devisable, yet the Archbishop could easily harass British troops movements to and from these areas by any number of means. It is indeed a remote possibility that the Cypriot President would attempt to violate the treaty arrangement so early in the game. It is hoped that the energies of the Cypriots, even during the brutal Mediterranean summers, will be channelled into more productive outlets, but this hope might not hold true for all time. In reality, as long as the bases constitute an economic asset to the Republic, there is every likelihood that the Treaties will remain intact.

Criticism of the existence of British bases in Cyprus has originated from sources other than those from within the island. The aim of the Republic, as stated by the Archbishop, is to serve as "the bridge of unity in the Middle East."¹⁵ If this be the case, how can Cyprus secure relations with the United Arab Republic, for instance, as long as Nasser feels the British bases are "directed solely toward Cairo?"¹⁶ Makarios answers only in broad generalities concerning the present, but he has been more definitive about the future, as his projected goal "to return the bases to Cyprus one day" indicates.¹⁷ When that "day" will come is a matter of grave speculation for the British. Neither Makarios, nor the British may be able to withstand future pressures to remove the bases in Cyprus, especially if these feelings are vociferous enough and emanate from sufficiently powerful quarters. British sovereignty of the bases in Cyprus could ostensibly be submerged in a wave of adverse feeling based on morality, that could be more potent than any international legal document. It

¹⁵"Cyprus Sniffs At Neutrality," The Economist, September 17, 1960, p. 1102.

¹⁶"Neutral Between Neutral," The Economist, Sept. 10, 1960, p. 1096. It was from Cyprus that the Suez campaign was launched against Egypt in 1956.

¹⁷See Footnote #14.

should not be forgotten that a similar moral force in 1959 contributed in part to Britain's retreat from under the legal umbrella of the Lausanne Treaty, so as to pave the way for the independence of Cyprus. Thus, moral argument has already rendered a legal instrument obsolete in Cyprus and the occasion could quite possibly arise once again in the matter of the British base treaty.

In most respects, the sovereign base areas agreement with the Republic of Cyprus presents a model arrangement for the United Kingdom. Hypothetically, there are more than enough legal safeguards included in the Treaties of Establishment and Guarantee to protect the bases for as long as the British would chose to remain. Principally, the continuation of the British bases in Cyprus will require more goodwill than adherence to legality. One analyst summed up the future of the bases in this manner:

the success of the arrangement made for the bases will mainly depend upon political stability in the Island and continuing cooperation between the British and Republican authorities.¹⁸

This statement will doubtless prove most accurate in the next few years to come, but an important factor has been excluded from the above prediction. Political stability in any country rests on the spirit of the people, and the spirit of the people more often than not reflects the spirit of the

¹⁸ Nancy Crawshaw, "The Republic of Cyprus: From the Zurich Agreements to Independence," The World Today, December, 1960, p. 539.

times, the Zeitgeist. If the Zeitgeist should one day deem that foreign military bases are no longer valid and useful, it would be most difficult to perpetuate even the most perfect of base agreements. Still and all, unless the tenor of international relations changes radically in the next decade or so, Britain should continue to enjoy unchallenged rights and privileges in her sovereign slices of the Republic of Cyprus.

Possible Application of the Cyprus Prototype:
The Case of Okinawa

Possibly none of the remaining British dependencies, with perhaps the exception of Malta or Zanzibar, embodies more of the peculiar conditions that surrounded the Cyprus problem than does a group of Pacific islands under the provisional administration of the United States. Reference is made here to the Ryukyu Archipelago, which is a group of 64 small islands that stretch curvilinearly southwest for almost 400 miles between Japan and Taiwan. The largest in the group is the 65-mile long island of Okinawa, which accounts for over half of all the land area of the archipelago and one-fourth of the 882,000 total population. The main island has been termed among other appellations recently "Keystone of the Pacific," "America's Last Colony" and the "Cyprus of the Pacific."¹⁹ In actuality, the islands are

¹⁹ John Barr, "The Ryukyu Islands: A U. S. Bastion in the Pacific," The World Today, May, 1961, p. 187.

not a United States's colony, nor are they insular possessions in the usual sense, nor are they considered a trust territory under the United Nations. Rather, the United States has been given complete administrative and governmental control of the Ryukyus by virtue of the terms of Article 3 of the 1952 Treaty of Peace with Japan. Occupation of the islands has been in effect since the end of World War II, but all the time Japan was exercising, what John Foster Dulles later terms, "residual sovereignty."²⁰

The Ryukyu Islands are now controlled by the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR), under the terms of an executive order, issued by President Eisenhower in 1957.²¹ The authority granted to the United States in the Treaty of Peace with Japan continues to be exercised by the Secretary of Defense, in turn delegated to the Department of the Army, and finally control of the President. The chief U. S. official in the islands is a high commissioner who is ultimately appointed by the Secretary of Defense after consultations with the Secretary of State. The commissioner serves as the direct representative of the U. S. Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC).²²

²⁰Ibid., The concept of "residual sovereignty" was defined by Dulles to mean that the U. S. holds the islands for strategic reasons, but has a view to their eventual return to Japan.

²¹Providing for the Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Executive Order No. 10713, June 5, 1957.

²²This ranking of Cabinet members might indicate the esteem in which the islands are held by the United

The other U. S. government agencies on Okinawa and the powers they exercise may be summed up as follows:²³

The Department of Defense:

Along with control of the local administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the islands by the Secretary of Defense, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps all conduct military and related operations in the Ryukyus.

The Department of State:

A consular Unit (attached to the Embassy in Tokyo) supplies consular services to military and other personnel stationed in the islands. Also a Foreign Service Officer acts as Political Advisor to the High Commissioner. Responsibility for conducting the Ryukyu Islands' relations with foreign countries and international organizations is that of the Secretary of State directly. An aspect of this responsibility is the control of the Voice of America station in the islands which is operated by the United States Information Agency.

The United States Coast Guard (under the Treasury Department) A long range navigation (LORAN) station is maintained in the Ryukyus.

Central Intelligence Agency

Among other responsibilities, the C. I. A. monitors radio broadcasts for inclusion in the daily Foreign Broadcast Information Service series.

The following agencies have limited interests in the Ryukyus within their own spheres, but do not normally keep permanent representatives there: The Department of Justice deals with legal matters involving United States citizens in the area.

The Civil Aeronautics Administration has control over air space. The Department of the Treasury has control of the use or shipment of narcotics in the area.

States, i.e., military considerations come first while diplomatic deliberations come second.

²³Condensed from a personal communication from Paul Blackburn, Analyst in U. S. Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., February 7, 1962.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Civil Service Commission also have periodic interests in the Ryukyu Islands.

A sizeable amount of self-government is now exercised by the Ryukyuans in their local affairs compared to what the islanders had enjoyed under their previous overlords, the Japanese. The Eisenhower Executive Order of 1957 added to the number of democratic institutions in the islands and these now include: universal suffrage, an elected 29-member biennial legislature, a bill of rights, and a system of local courts.²⁴ Possibly the best term to use in describing the local form of Government in the Ryukyu Islands would be "quasi-parliamentary" or a modified parliamentary system.²⁵ The plenary powers are entrusted to the American appointed high commissioner, who then appoints the Ryukyuan chief executive from the party which had obtained a majority in the Legislature. This

²⁴"Cyprus in the Pacific," The Economist, Feb. 8, 1958, p. 499. A bit of wry British humor was used in describing the selection process in Okinawa: "As every race and color waited in line to cast their votes, some Negro soldiers from Alabama stood watching them enviously."

²⁵Harold Seidman, Assistant Chief, Office of Management and Organization, United States Bureau of the Budget, was instrumental in setting up the form of government now being implemented in the Ryukyus. In his paper, "Our Territorial Dilemma," which was published in the Congressional Record, February 4, 1960, Dr. Seidman used both of these terms in his description of the present governmental structure in the Ryukyus, which in his words, "plants the first seed of a parliamentary system."

"Majority Party System" agreement was made with the high commissioner and representatives of the two leading political parties on June 14, 1960, in an effort to assuage the sentiment for the popular election of the Chief Executive.²⁶

Under the system, the territorial chief executive is to be politically responsible to the Legislature, in respect to all matters other than those directly affecting American interests. Theoretically, the number of American matters, other than those dealing intimately with military strategy, would decrease as the Ryukyuan leaders increase their sophistication in the governmental process. Such a modified parliamentary system "would have the flexibility to permit the evolutionary growth of responsible self-government without breaking essential Federal [U. S.] ties."²⁷ At the present political and cultural juncture in the Ryukyus, self-government is still a long-range goal, but that does not obviate planning for the day when that eventuality might have to be faced. The immediate concern of the United States in the Ryukyus is how strategic interests can be protected. The future concern is whether these strategic interests can ever be separated from domestic interests, if and when self-determination is applied in the Ryukyus.

²⁶The High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands, 1 April 1960, to 30 September 1960, Vol VIII, No. 2, (RCS CSCAMG-5), Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 1960, p. 3.

²⁷Seidman, op. cit.

The Contemporary Okinawan Question

With the extensive measure of self-government and home-rule existing in the Ryukyu Islands, one might be lulled into thinking that the islanders are contentedly waiting under the aegis of the United States for the day when they will either be returned to Japan or made independent. This is not, however, the present situation in the Ryukyus. There is a good of discontent facing the American administrators because of six major problem areas.²⁸ The first of these is the excessive commandeering of scarce arable land for military purposes. The second is the penal code, which "smacks of martial law" and tends to deny Ryukyuans their basic procedural rights. The third area is that of over-population and the lack of an adequate emigration program. The fourth area concerns the inability of the populace to elect their chief executive. The fifth area centers on the opposition to the building of nuclear missile sites on the island. And the last, and most demanding, problem area is the extant movement to revert the Ryukyus immediately back to Japan, "regarded as the islands' spiritual and cultural fatherland."²⁹ In these areas there have been few significant advances made with the help

²⁸ Barr, op. cit., pp. 188-89.

²⁹ "We Have Colonial Troubles Too," The Christian Century, July 4, 1956, p. 795.

of the United States; but when any sort of progress is made toward resolution, there invariably seems to be one of the numerous Ryukyuan Communists on hand to take credit.³⁰ Thus, the problem of Communism in the islands is another potential problem area, though it now seems to be effectively controlled.

It is readily apparent where the similarities exist between the cases of Okinawa--the principal island of the Ryukyus--and Cyprus. Both are islands, both are strategic bases in the West's defense system, pre-independence and election discord in Cyprus is partially analogous to turmoil in the Ryukyus today; and lastly there is the mutual problem of the majority of the populace seeking union with another than the one last administering it. The differences are equally obvious. There has not existed a long-period of enmity between the Ryukyuans and the Americans, as was the case in Cyprus.³¹ Another chief difference in the two situations is the fact that in Okinawa there is no effective opposition to the majority's drive

³⁰ Editorial, The Christian Century, March 20, 1957, p. 349.

³¹ It has been alleged, however, that the Americans have seemingly made a collective effort to cause as much ill-will in the Ryukyus in as short a period of time as possible. But this has been said of many of the occupation forces of the United States, both in Europe as well as Asia. "Why Discriminate Against Okinawa," Christian Century, July 25, 1956, p. 868.

toward union with Japan; the seven leading political parties all included a plank for the reunification with Japan in the 1960 election platforms.³²

A further distinction is the standard of living and level of governmental accomplishment thus far attained in Cyprus and the Ryukyus. Cyprus had profited by the eighty years of Great Britain's "white man's burden" and there were developed sufficient administrative personnel able to take over the reins of government when independence was finally granted. On the other hand, in the Ryukyus, as a Japanese prefecture, there was rank discrimination and actually little local rule by the indigenous population.³³ In Cyprus the standard of living was relatively high under the British--certainly far higher than that of the Greeks, with whom the majority of the Cypriots wanted enosis. In Okinawa, the people are indigent and, with the possible exception of a few entrepreneurs, still primitively try to scratch out an existence in the thin farming soil between the islands' rocky surfaces. The Ryukyuans now logically seek union with one of the richest and most materialistic, modern nations in the Far East.

³²This concept of fully compatible with the Communists's objective for the Ryukyus, i.e., to force U. S. withdrawal.

³³The Japanese could never visualize self-government for Ryukyu Islands then or at any time in the foreseeable future. Personal communication with Harold Seidman, Washington, D. C., February 8, 1962.

Despite the fact that there is no long history of hatred between the Ryukyans and the Americans, there is still a degree of animosity in evidence. Since the majority of the islanders desire union with Japan, the American occupation forces loom as the primary obstacle to this. As a result, the Americans are the target of opportunistic local politicians and any good which has thus far been accomplished under the occupation is often submerged in the way of trumped-up anti-Americanism. Nevertheless, the United States had indicated conditionally that "reversion" to Japan is plausible, but conveniently, and understandably, no date has ever been set for this event.³⁴ Thus, there are deeper causes for the strained American-Ryukyuan relations and heading this list is the wanton seizure of Okinawan land by the United States, "under the guise of needing it for one military reason or another."³⁵ Most of the area taken by the U. S. authorities is arable farming land, but what makes the situation more intense is the manner in which this land is appropriated. The military authorities insist on buying the land under eminent domain

³⁴The United States has pledged its withdrawal when conditions of "threat and tension" no longer exist in east Asia. See: U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy, Study No. 5, U. S. Foreign Policy in Asia, by Conlon Associates, Ltd., Vol. I, 86th Congress 2d sess., September, 1960, p. 500.

³⁵"The Hot Seat," The Economist, January 1, 1958, p. 194.

proceedings, while the Okinawans would prefer to own it and have rental paid on it.³⁶ In an effort to mitigate the situation a congressional committee was created in 1956 to investigate the matter of military land in the Ryukyus. Under the chairmanship of Congressman Charles M. Price, (D. Illinois), hearings were held in the islands, at which time pleas were made for the Congress to reconsider the U. S. land policies. The committee's recommendations to Congress, however, included none of the suggestions, offered by the Ryukyuan delegation, to improve the state of affairs. Instead, the Committee felt the U. S. military forces needed 12,000 more acres--which would give the necessary area for a new golf course--and the payments would be given in a lump sum rather than spread over a number of years.³⁷

The unpopular land policies of the United States in the Ryukyus are but a part of the overall picture of economic development, with which American authorities must concern themselves as long as the islands are occupied. Since the investigations of the Price Committee, lump sum payments for land has been abandoned and the Congress passed, in 1960, a bill which set a \$6 million fiscal year limitation on the funds to be spend for economic and social development

³⁶"Why Discriminate Against Okinawa?" op. cit., p. 869.

³⁷Ibid.

in the islands.³⁸ The American military involvement in the Ryukyus, as in Hawaii, provides the largest source of income for the islands.³⁹ Thus, any change in U. S. military policy would have a resounding effect in the economic sector of the islands. Prior to the current fiscal changes instituted for the Ryukyus, the American administration of the islands has followed the initiative of the local democratic legislature, which has tended to place the Americans in a secondary role in economic affairs. The subsequently poor economic growth, invariably compared by Ryukyuan to that of Japan, was rationalized by past American military officials just to be one of the many vicissitudes to be encountered in a fledgling democracy. But this has made even the most conservative Ryukyuan official feel that "the United States has assumed the responsibility for governing their people but not for taking adequate care of them."⁴⁰ Since the American military commitment in the Ryukyus appears to be that of a permanent nature, the economic progress of the islands must be part of the long-range policy toward the islands. As one observer stated it:

³⁸U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Far East and the Middle East, Report of Sen. John Sparkman, 86th Cong. 2d Sess., November 30, 1960, p. 11. In 1958, the funds available to the High Commissioner for economic assistance were only \$750,000. Ibid.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 10.

We [the United States] cannot afford to pretend that we are relatively unconcerned with the Okinawan economy when in fact we are the power ultimately responsible for that island and its people. Funds would give us both the means and right to exert greater influence.⁴¹

It might not be quite fair to say that the United States is able to buy its way wherever it may choose, but peace and harmony in the Ryukyus are certainly variables dependent to a large extent on the economic well-being in the islands. And the economic well-being of the Ryukyus is indeed an epiphenomenon of how many, and in what way, dollars are spent in the islands.

In view of all the interacting forces, there are possibly only two broad policy alternatives open to the United States in Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands. The first is the obvious one of perpetuation the existing arrangement in the face of any and all opposition, i.e., to keep the unilateral American control over the islands and not to discuss reversion with Japan. Or the second alternative would be to plan for the gradual takeover of the island by Japan and, consequently, decide on the best means to protect American strategic interests, both during and after the process. The first policy alternative would be the less complicated. As the status quo in the Ryukyus has been described, it offers the United States "maximum military flexibility and convenience, together with less complexity of

⁴¹U. S. Foreign Policy in Asia, op. cit., p. 505.

administration."⁴² Yet this attitude would apparently overlook the growing discontent which the present American administration generates. The second alternative, therefore, looms as the more realistic of the two and the United States should now prepare for the day of reckoning when the indigenous clamorings for "reversion" can no longer be contained--a condition which the British too long denied in Cyprus, resulting in their being forced to negotiate from a defensive position when the time finally came for the Cypriots to act.

Isolated incidents in the last few years have emphasized the need for the Americans to make long-range plans for the Ryukyus. Local politicians have magnified the importance of certain events in order to marshal public opinion against the American administration of the islands. For example, the building of U. S. nuclear sites in Okinawa, as well as the public pronouncement that programs are being designed for even more "sophisticated types of military hardware,"⁴³ have provoked fear and suspicion in the minds of the natives. The leading newspaper in the islands, the Okinawa Times, has carried stories of how the Russians have promised to retaliate in kind on those bases from which nuclear attacks are launched. Mass protests have done little to alter the freehand the United

⁴²Ibid., p. 502.

⁴³Report of Senator John Sparkman, op. cit., p. 12.

States has enjoyed in Okinawa, but American authorities are far from oblivious to the psychological concomitants of locating nuclear bases. The nuclear issue was dramatically demonstrated in June of 1959 when a U. S. jet plane crashed into an Okinawan village and killed or injured almost 150 natives. Had the plane been carrying nuclear armaments, so claimed the critics of the Americans, there would have been untold damage done to the island. The American military authorities, realizing the public furor over this accident, were quick to pay some 278 liability claims and send plastic surgeons to Okinawa to perform necessary operations.⁴⁴

Unfortunately, the humanitarian and generous gesture given the Okinawans could not be appreciated for anything more than what it did to them, viz. one more manifestation of why the Americans must leave and islands then returned to Japan.

The lesson the Americans should have learned by now in the Ryukyus is exactly the same one the British had so much difficulty perceiving in Cyprus: simply, that local patriotism cannot be forever suppressed solely in the name of international strategic responsibility. Or as it was put by a British journalist in Okinawa: "The Americans can't damp down the fire of aggrieved nationalism by just sitting on it."⁴⁵ It would be far better in such

⁴⁴Barr, op. cit., p. 192.

⁴⁵"The Hot Seat," loc. cit.

disputes for each adversary to understand first the basic justice of each other's position and then try to assess their own individual demands honestly. It is hoped by this method, an accommodation can be reached through common sense before less desirable alternatives emerge after a senseless period of bloodshed. The British did not utilize such means in the case of Cyprus and the four years of emergency is looked upon in retrospect with much sorrow and chagrin. The Americans in the Ryukyus still have the opportunity to bargain with the natives in good faith over the future disposition of the islands. There have not been any periods of violence and most of the Ryukyuans have visibly profited by the American occupation--the so-called "Golden Era." The United States, however, cannot rest on the mere fact that they have brought somewhat of a higher standard of living to the people of a once obscure archipelago in the South Pacific Ocean. The British learned that the material glitter they brought to Cyprus was no substitute for enosis, or at least freedom from colonial rule. And the Americans in Okinawa, and the rest of the Ryukyus, should also realize the establishment of a university or the introduction of soft drinks have not replaced the Ryukyuans dream of union with Japan. The matter of "reversion" must be met with candor, and the sooner it is done, the better it will be for American interests in the islands,

as well as in Southeast Asia generally.

The Value of the Cyprus Prototype to Future
American Policy in the Ryukyu Islands

If one were more concerned with appeasing nationalistic demands and less with military strategy, the solution for the Ryukyuan problem would be to return them as soon as possible to Japan and then hope for extracting some sort of guarantee from Japan for the retention of the American military bases. The hard military strategist, however, would first maintain the security of the American bases and then gradually work toward step-by-step reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan. It should be emphasized that the present stage of development in the Ryukyus, self-government certainly must be looked upon as a goal rather than an immediate possibility. The policy of the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) is now to encourage greater responsibility in local affairs as well as to invite certain non-political endeavors on the part of Japan, i.e., technical assistance, private investment, and education. This would serve the combined goal of increasing Ryukyuan governmental sophistication along with promoting the natural ties the Ryukyuans share with Japan, which the U. S. has already acknowledged under the residual sovereignty concept. In this manner, American policy in the Ryukyu can be both progressive and flexible, with minimal concessions being made at the most propitious time. This sort of spaced

negotiations would ultimately be more effective than attempting to handle all the multifarious Ryukyuan self-government problems at a later, more critical date.

The gradualist's approach to reconciling the Ryukyuan dilemma would concentrate first on the domestic aspects and would not immediately touch upon American strategy in the Pacific area. The military bases are now, and will continue to be, "of central importance to the West's global defense structure."⁴⁶ This military area as such cannot be negotiated upon as freely as the domestic institutions, since the islands are considered such essential elements to our military commitments in Asia, e.g., Okinawa's Kadena Air Force Base has two runways that are longer than any other available to U. S. military aircraft in that part of the world.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the United States should look toward a forward strategy for the Ryukyu Islands, when changing needs of modern warfare might minimize the value of a massive Asian military installation. Foreign bases implicitly require domestic considerations, yet in the present cold war the military requirements must necessarily take precedence. If the bases in the Ryukyus were nothing more than staging areas for low-level contingency (limited war) operations, then one might conceivably be able to

⁴⁶Robert Strausz-Hupe, Alvin J. Cottrell, and James E. Dougherty, American-Asian Tensions, New York: Praeger, 1956, p. 113.

⁴⁷Report of Senator Sparkman, op. cit., p. 10.

separate military from domestic factors. Also if geographic location of the bases were remote and logistic and/or deployment problems were not inextricably connected with indigenous governmental affairs, then a solution such as that in Cyprus could be plausible for the Ryukyus.

However, the Cyprus prototype has its best application where bases are not so enmeshed with local functioning and this does not appear to be the case for the United States in the Ryukyus. As early as 1954, one analyst could see no possible way to divorce political or legal considerations from the military strategy in Okinawa:

If the geography of Okinawa were like that of Japan proper, joint control of this important base might be feasible. In reality, however, the entire southern third of Okinawa is a vast network of American military installations intertwined with Okinawan economy and vitally affecting every aspect of Okinawa's life. To cut through this maze of relationships and isolate those elements which are essentially military and those which are civilian would be exceedingly difficult.⁴⁸

It has almost become axiomatic today that where a base territory is geared to a massive modern military environment, and not merely to considerations of contingency problems, then ideal solutions to colonial enigmas may not entirely be applicable.

Regardless of the fact that the Cyprus prototype is of little immediate use to the United States in the

⁴⁸ Ralph Bribanti, "The Ryukyu Islands: Pawn of the Pacific," The American Political Science Review, XLVIII, December, 1954, p. 973.

Ryukyus, it would nonetheless be advantageous for the American officials involved with Far Eastern affairs to be familiar with the experience of the British in Cyprus. The problem in the Ryukyus is more complex than simply American base rights versus native nationalism, as it was with the British in Cyprus. Still the pattern of preliminary historic events is so strikingly similar in both cases, that one could be led to believe that the same forces were at work in both examples--it would, however, be much too convenient to say that this same force was international communism, for instance. The United States has been guilty of trying to introduce a noble purpose in the Ryukyus, while still attempting to protect national self-interest, i.e., to prove democracy can work in Ryukyuan internal politics, yet simultaneously to make a Far East bastion out of the same area. One mistake might have been trying to perpetuate democratic methods under a military government, as the two tend to be mutually contradictory concepts.

The Cyprus prototype, i.e., securing the minimum size of sovereign base areas, while granting the remainder of the territory independence, might one day have a use in ending the American occupation of the Ryukyus. International factors, which cause the Ryukyus to be so profoundly a part of the United States' nuclear strategy, prevent this

day from coming in the near future. Moreover, the entire islands' economy and politics are so commingled with the American occupation that any sudden withdrawal would probably cause such a disarticulation that the result would be disastrous for orderly governmental and economic development. If one day a Cyprus-type solution could be effected in the Ryukyus, with American strategic requirements protected while the islands are administered by Japan, a heavy burden could be taken off the U. S. military arm, and maybe even the U. S. Treasury as well. The United States does not fit the role of "colonists" and it would be a grave insult to the innate American political genius if a way could not be uncovered soon that would rid the United States of the stigma, which is now suffered because of the present Ryukyuan position. It is now a necessity that the United States reassess its policy toward the Ryukyu Islands, but in so doing, a delicate balance must be struck between strategic requirements and the matters of justice, humanity, and morality. The Cyprus prototype is not the panacea, it is but an admonition and a lesson from recent history. At some point in the near future, the United States may no longer astutely circumvent the "reversion" issue and an agreement will have to be made about the retention of the American bases. Even then it is doubtful if the Japanese would, indeed could, accept

any type of conditional American sovereignty in the Ryukyuan base areas.

Conclusions

The Cyprus settlement is a prime example of how even the most bitter territorial disputes can be resolved. Mature Western minds should not find it difficult to compromise territorial differences, especially when the fate of the free world is the dependent variable. In any internal conflict between allies against the Soviet system, the only party to profit is inevitably the communists. A schism in NATO was caused because of Cyprus and further situations should not be allowed to develop, if the North Atlantic Alliance is to remain intact. Diplomats have learned from the Cyprus settlement and other recent cases that they can ply their ageless trade in present day territorial conflicts, which almost without exception pits the aspirations of colonial peoples against the economic and strategic requirements of the mother-country. The negotiations behind "the agreed solution to the problem of Cyprus" proved that an air of goodwill can still characterize diplomatic parleys. The most deep-rooted enmities can be forgotten if both sides can recognize a common need to solve a problem which jointly threatens both if left unsettled. The case of Cyprus was just that sort of problem and

its outcome must have brought hope to many colonial areas in search of a super-ordinate goal, beneficial to all concerned.

By virtue of the Cyprus settlement, Britain maintained her security needs in the island, yet lost the unpopular label of "colonist." Akrotiri and Dhekelia are analogs in Cyprus of what Gibraltar is in Spain, but the crucial difference is that Gibraltar is still a colony. The rights Great Britain enjoys in the two sovereign base areas are all-inclusive, which means the advantages of a colony are derived without having to sustain the burdens. Other "Gibralters" exist in the Mediterranean area: France has one in Bizerte, Tunisia and another in Mers El Kebir, Algeria; Spain has two in Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla; and Britain controls Malta. Still the distinction between Britain's bases in Cyprus and the other "Gibralters" is that the ones in Cyprus are sovereign, whereas the others are maintained purely on a lease arrangement, or as in the case of Malta and Gibraltar are still formal colonies.

Britain and France may soon have to face other Cyprus-like situations in their Mediterranean possessions. In Malta, the inability to separate military and domestic requirements there made the operation of complex dyarchical government impossible. Also indigenous pressures in Spain has pushed the Franco government toward a reappraisal of

the archaic situation in Gibraltar. Many extremists openly declare, "Gibraltar es para Espana," (Gibraltar is for Spain), but a Cyprus-type accord might be the best Spain could hope to achieve. Demonstrations in Bizerte have recently shown the French will be forced to re-negotiate base rights there. Still the Mediterranean is not all chaos. The successful arrangements the United States has already demonstrated with its bases in Libya, Greece, Turkey, and Spain prove to all the nations of the world that international security considerations may be met, while the sovereignty or freedom of the host nations are left unimpaired.⁴⁹ Other bases in the Mediterranean might well be re-established on the model given by the United States there, but in those particular places, where applicable, the ideal solution would probably be the Cyprus prototype.

The approach the British took in the final settlement of the Cyprus base problem has a definite application to other international puzzles concerning the clashes between strategic interests on the one side and self-determination on the other. Other aspects of the Cyprus solution, however, are so closely related to the peculiar circumstances in the island that they could well prove to have no adaptability elsewhere. The chief lesson in the entire Cyprus


⁴⁹It should never be forgotten that emerging nations jealously regard their unencumbered sovereignty above

story is simply that no colonial problems, or those related, are so complex that they defy settlement. If the four conflicting elements in the Cyprus conflict, the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, and the Cypriots, could ostensibly be mollified by the final compromise, then it is reasonable to claim that other colonial tensions, which involve fewer actors, would even have a better chance for resolution.


The unique example of Cyprus has shown to the few remaining colonial powers that ways and means can be devised to compose settlements of most any conflict situation. The British will do well to take heed of their own lead in Cyprus and apply similar settlements in other colonial areas under the aegis of the United Kingdom. Moreover, the Cyprus prototype should be an inspiration and even guidepost for some of the other nations presently engaged in brutal colonial impasses, i.e., the French in Algeria, as well as to some of the nations who are faced with potential upheavals, i.e., the United States in the Ryukyu Islands. The prototype, above all, should show that goodwill, empathy, and diplomacy are often the missing catalysts in the attempts to solve territorial disputes. With these elements, the prologue of the past, and the sincere desire on the parts of the involved parties to conciliate nationalistic disputes, there might be few strategically located territories that factors which might seem more consequential to other, more established countries.

would ever demand force and violence in the effort to resolve differences.

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


Figure 1. Schematic representation of the experimental design. The subjects were divided into two groups: the control group and the experimental group. The control group received a placebo, while the experimental group received a 100 mg dose of the active ingredient. The subjects were then subjected to a 1000 Hz ultrasound treatment. The subjects were then subjected to a 1000 Hz ultrasound treatment. The subjects were then subjected to a 1000 Hz ultrasound treatment.

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
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SITES AREAS IN CYPRUS



LEGEND

SOVEREIGN AREAS

TRAINING AREAS

- | | | | |
|--------------|---|---|------------------------------------|
| A | GOSHI FIELD FIRING RANGE | F | PRASTIO DROPPING ZONE |
| B | AKAMAS FIELD FIRING AND RN BOMBARDMENT RANGE | G | POLEMIDHIA RIFLE RANGE DANGER AREA |
| C1 } C2 } | LEFKONIKO ARTILLERY RANGE | X | AIR TO GROUND FIRING RANGE |
| D | AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TRAINING AREA | Y | HIGH LEVEL BOMBING RANGE |
| E | AYIOS VASILIOS DROPPING ZONE | Z | INSTRUMENT FLYING AREA |

SITES AND INSTALLATIONS

| NO. SCHEDULE A.....● | NO. SCHEDULE B.....▲ | NO. SCHEDULE C.....■ | NO. SCHEDULE D.....△ |
|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| 1 AT LIMASSOL | 1 AT POLEMEDHIA | 1 AT TROODOS | 1 NEAR NICOSIA |
| 2 AT TROODOS | 2 NEAR LARNACA | 2 NEAR LIMASSOL | 2 AT KARAOLOS |
| 3 AT MOUNT OLYMPUS | 3 NEAR ZYI | 3 NEAR PAPHOS | 3 NEAR KALOPSIDHA |
| 4 NEAR ZYI | 4 AT FAMAGUSTA | 4 NEAR AYIA IRINI | |
| 5 AT CAPE KITI | 5 NEAR FAMAGUSTA | 5 AT KISSOUSA | |
| 6 AT CAPE GRECO | 6 NEAR NICOSIA | 6 AT LIMASSOL | |
| 7 AT MOUNT YAILA | 7 AT NICOSIA | 7 NEAR FAMAGUSTA | |
| 8 AT HERAKLIS | 8 NEAR LARNACA | 8 AT FAMAGUSTA | |
| 9 AT FAMAGUSTA | 9 NEAR NICOSIA | | |
| 10 AT NICOSIA AIRFIELD | 10 NEAR FAMAGUSTA | | |

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