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A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

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Dedicated to my incredibly loving parents...without you none of this was possible.

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Abstract

This mixed-method study examines how terrorism affects civilian reporting behaviors. I conducted a content analysis of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) designated domestic terrorism cases between the years of 1985 and 2012 to examine civilian vigilance, measured by how potential terrorism cases came to the attention of the FBI. The goal was to assess the extent to which terrorism cases were the result of citizen reporting and how citizen-reporting rates have changed over time. I utilized social solidarity, collective efficacy, broken windows theory, and vigilance decrement theory to assist my argument. Using data by the American Terrorism Study and online media sources, I identified the most common pathways that terrorists are detected. I found law enforcement intercepted potential terrorists the most, followed by civilian intervention and self-incriminators. I also sought to determine if civilian reporting waned over time following a large-scale act of terrorism. I found that civilian reporting was highest immediately following the September 11th attacks but decreased over time. However, civilian reporting was higher in the P2-9/11 period compared to all other periods (excluding the Post-9/11 period). This finding suggests that while civilian reporting has experienced some decrement, it still remains at a higher level of vigilance compared to previous periods.

Chapter One: Introduction

Why do citizens report possible criminal behavior to the police? There are numerous factors that affect decisions by members of the public to call for police intervention. Studies show, for example, that cultural and attitudinal variables are of crucial significance in this decision making process (Birbeck et al. 1993). Likewise, the type of crime committed impacts the prospect of citizens calling for police services – the more serious the crime, the more likely it is to be reported. Also, crime that is seen as a direct threat to the person making the report (as opposed to being a threat to someone else) increases the likelihood of the crime being reported (Halow 1985).

Among the most serious crimes facing the American public in the past four decades is terrorism. In spite of this, little is known about how Americans' relatively recent terrorism experiences have changed their decision to become more vigilant. Interestingly, the US government's "See Something, Say Something" campaign seems to recognize (and, indeed, promote) the importance of civilian vigilance. This begs the question: Are Americans more likely to report terrorism to the police now than they were before the threat was more salient? In spite of the government's apparent increased interest in civilian vigilance, no studies have examined what the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) calls "prevented cases" (those where terrorists were arrested before any attack took place). We do not know how these prevention cases come to the attention of the FBI or if this is changing over time.

In this dissertation, I examine how terrorism affects civilian reporting behaviors. I conducted a content analysis of FBI designated domestic terrorism cases between the years of 1985 and 2012 to examine civilian vigilance, measured by how

potential terrorism cases came to the attention of the FBI. The goal was to assess the extent to which terrorism cases were the result of citizen reporting and how citizen-reporting rates have changed over time.

Terrorism is unique among all crimes in that it threatens the values and beliefs of a society and because the targets are often symbolic (as opposed to instrumental). Terrorism continues to be one of the top political priorities in the United States and around the world (Waxman 2011). Substantial attention is paid to the goals and strategies of terrorist groups whereas less attention is generally focused on the impact terror attacks have on society. This research addresses the dearth in the literature regarding the social consequences of terrorism. I examined the impact of large-scale acts of terrorism like the Oklahoma City bombing and the attacks on September 11, 2001, on civilian reporting trends of suspicious behaviors. I also documented the various ways in which the FBI is alerted to potential terrorists.

The dissertation describes the nexus between formal and informal types of social control – where citizens play a crucial role in stimulating the exercise of control by the state. The acceptance of law and order within a society is dependent on a variety of factors, all of which impact the likelihood of civilians calling for police assistance. Cooperation and communication between the police and the public are essential elements for upholding safe communities. That is because the ability of the police to “fight crime” without the assistance of the public is extremely limited.

The United States has nearly 17,000 public law enforcement agencies at different levels of government (Bohm & Haley 1997). Federal, state, and local levels of law enforcement operate semi-autonomously within their specific jurisdictions to

investigate criminal activity. Local law enforcement agencies such as municipal, county, tribal, and regional police represent the bulk of law enforcement and are tasked with three primary roles: order maintenance, law enforcement, and service (Cole 1974). At an operational level, factors like availability of resources and variance of police efficiency affect the way police fulfill these obligations.

The Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment (KCPPE) is arguably one of the most famous studies that sought to examine police effectiveness on crime prevention. The Kansas City Police Department conducted a year-long study to determine whether the resources normally apportioned for preventative patrol could be used more effectively to deter would-be criminals. The study was designed with 15 patrol districts divided into three matched groups. The districts were matched according to a number of demographic factors such as size and record of calls for service. Three Kansas City patrol beats patrolled at differing operational levels. In the first group, the “control beat,” operated at the same level of patrol prior to the start of the study. The second group, the “proactive beat,” significantly increased the number of patrol officers that typically patrolled that district. The final group, the “reactive beat,” only responded to calls for service and received no preventive patrol (Bohm & Haley 1997; Kelling et al. 1974).

The analysis revealed no significant difference in level of crime or community attitudes toward police services (Kelling et al. 1974). The results of the KCPPE illustrate that police, as a mechanism of social control, are extremely limited in their ability to both prevent crime and apprehend offenders (Kelling et al 1974). Increasing police presence in a community alone is not going to be successful in deterring crime;

rather, a partnership between community residents and law enforcement is crucial for effective crime prevention.

Social troubles affecting the world today require collective solutions; yet, people often feel no sense of personal responsibility (May 1990). A person's inaction makes him or her to some extent, responsible for the harms that person could have prevented. The same can be said for collective inaction. Collective inaction is especially apparent when the community is loosely structured (May 1990). A notable example of such a phenomenon is the horrific murder of Kitty Genovese. Kitty Genovese was stalked and viciously murdered by Winston Mosely in one of the most infamous murders of the 20th century. Mosely chased Genovese to her apartment complex and repeatedly stabbed her as she screamed for help. Initially Mosely fled, but returned when law enforcement failed to arrive. He continued to attack Genovese and ultimately murdered her. Two weeks after her murder, The New York Times printed an article titled "*Thirty-Seven Who Saw Murder Didn't Call the Police.*" The article depicted Genovese's neighbors as a group of apathetic New Yorkers who refused to intervene in her defense (Tierney 2014).

The story spread worldwide and spawned a number of interesting psychological studies. While the reported facts of the case are controversial, the story itself raised an interesting question: What factors affect reporting criminal activity? This question can be extended to terroristic activity. If citizens are hesitant to call authorities for "ordinary" crimes (even a serious crime like murder), are they just as resistant to the idea of calling the police regarding a potential terrorist threat?

Individual and collective inaction leads to serious harm (May 1990). When faced with an unfamiliar and difficult issue, individuals are unsure how to respond. As previously stated, the police alone cannot deter crime and individuals can fail to act to help one another. Therefore, developing a structure that creates a sense of collective responsibility is necessary in combating modern-day terrorism.

Statement of Problem

The illusion that Americans are safe from terrorist attacks was destroyed on September 11, 2001. The attacks were a defining moment in world history and forced the American people to tackle a new type of threat. Yet, combating terrorism is as much about fighting an ideology as it is an organized military force (Howard and Forest 2008). Having a non-traditional enemy lends to a unique set of challenges and consequently, requires a unique set of solutions.

In the years following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the federal government stressed the importance of an alert public as the first line of defense against future terrorism. Former Deputy National Security Advisor to the President Dennis McDonough stated at the All Dulles Area Muslim Society in Sterling, Virginia, “We know, as the President said, that the best defense against terrorist ideologies is strong and resilient individuals and communities” (McDonough 2011:1).

In order to create and maintain resilient communities, policies and practices were formed to heighten public awareness. The New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s “If You See Something, Say Something” campaign, later adopted by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is a prime example of

encouraging community involvement in crime prevention. The campaign seeks to encourage Americans to actively watch and report anything suspicious in an effort to proactively prevent another terrorism incident from occurring. The campaign is a reminder that the threat of terrorism is legitimate (Gunn 2012). The campaign also does something else - it ensures American citizens that looking out for one another can prevent the devastation of another terror attack. In essence, the campaign aims to create a sense of collective responsibility to prevent terrorism.

Identifying the common pathways by which potential terrorists are discovered is a key aspect in strengthening counterterrorism policies and practices. Since September 11, 2001, prevention of terror-related crimes has become an important policy issue. The United States counterterrorism policies have transitioned from traditional intelligence information gathering to engaging community partnerships in order to combat terrorism (Spalek 2010). The change in paradigm to diffuse responsibility to the general public of potential threats is a notable and extensive task. This study examines if the public is truly aiding in the prevention of terrorism by reporting suspicious activity.

To date, there have not been any studies that examine the extent to which these efforts have affected how the general public and federal government have responded. The goal of this study is to examine how terrorist enterprises come to the attention of the FBI. Moreover, this study seeks to examine if incidents of terrorism results in greater civilian vigilance. In examining rates of reporting, I add to the scholarly debate about the social implications of terrorism. I use the American Terrorism Study (ATS) data to answer these research questions. The ATS consists of terrorism cases

dating back to the 1980s and embodies an ample history of persons indicted from a terrorism enterprise investigation¹. My theoretical framework utilizes collective efficacy, collective consciousness, broken windows theory to guide my research process. While these theories differ on the causal factors of neighborhood crime, each theory provides an important and necessary analysis of social disorder. I also utilize vigilance decrement theory to study the likelihood of the populace remaining vigilant.

¹ It is important to note, while the ATS is comprised of cases designated by the FBI as terrorism, a significant portion of these cases do not appear to be terrorism-related. Though the FBI is not adhering to its own definition of terrorism, the cases were specified as such and therefore, included in the ATS database.

Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

I divide my theoretical framework into two primary sections. The first section focuses on answering the question: Why do people call the police? Three theories suggest that in times of crisis, reporting of possible terrorism activity should increase. Specifically, I use Durkheim's theory of social solidarity, Sampson's et al. (1997) collective efficacy theory, and Wilson and Kelling's (1982) broken windows theory. Using Durkheim's theory, I examine mechanical and organic solidarity and the degree to which collective consciousness is achieved. I use the theory of collective efficacy (Sampson et al. 1997) as an outcome of a high rate of collective consciousness. It is important to note, that while I use collective efficacy to structure my theoretical framework, I am not actually measuring collective efficacy as an outcome. Wilson and Kelling's (1982) broken windows theory draws on the idea that small crimes are precursors to larger crimes. The theory suggests that, from the law-abiding citizens' viewpoint, disorder is ultimately connected to serious crime through the process of weakened social controls. The perception of weakened social controls feed residents' fears of more serious crime. Traditionally, collective efficacy theory and broken windows theory have been seen as competing explanations of why crimes are more likely to occur. Yet, both theories are also important in understanding the different ways in which the community responds to crime.

The second section of my theoretical framework uses a psychology theory called "vigilance decrement" to examine my second research question: What factors affect reporting over time? This theory suggests that vigilance is hard to maintain for long periods of time and that it tends to wane eventually unless a new crisis becomes

salient. Vigilance research requires observers to monitor displays over prolonged periods for the intermittent episode of critical events (Grier et al. 2003). Studies find that vigilance tasks require hard mental work (Warm et al. 2008). Such mental work inflicts a considerable burden on observers which can be highly stressful (Hitchcock et al. 1999; Grier et al. 2003). Vigilance decrement purposes the notion that over time, the ability to maintain high levels of vigilance inevitably declines.

1. Why Do People Call The Police?

A. Social Solidarity

Durkheim stated that social solidarity can be understood in the collective response to crime. He defined crime as an act that is universally condemned by the members of that society and is punishable by repressive laws (Durkheim 1933). He argued that ignorance of the law is no excuse for committing crime, as every functioning member within that society has been socialized to understand right from wrong. Therefore, if an act is punished, it is because there is a collective acceptance that the act is wrong.

Durkheim defined this notion as “collective consciousness” or “common consciousness,” in which “the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average citizens of the same society forms a system which has its own life” (Durkheim 1933:79). Each individual recognizes or grasps the collective consciousness, however it is different from individual consciousness as it outlasts individuals themselves. Crime, therefore, “...offends the strong and defined states of the collective conscience” (Durkheim 1933: 80). Rules that punish crime are the product of the most

essential social likeness in that they uphold social cohesion. Durkheim described this as mechanical solidarity because the collective consciousness connects individuals to a society based on homogeneity.

Durkheim also described organic solidarity, which he stated emerges in industrialized societies. While mechanical solidarity is derived from a shared sense of similarity, organic solidarity is based on the interdependence of various components of society (Durkheim 1933). Society has different, separate functions that unite individuals due to our reliance on one another. Accordingly, this type of social solidarity is sustained in more developed societies through mutual dependence (Durkheim 1933). Durkheim attributed organic solidarity to the division of labor.

Individuals are bound together in a mechanical society by homogeneity, whereas in an organic society, individuals are bound together through mutual dependence. Whether it is mechanical solidarity or organic solidarity, individuals are bound to society and have vested interests within that society. A threat against society is a threat to the social cohesion of that society. Thus, it can be argued that once social cohesion is threatened, individuals within that society are more likely to come together to protect their vested interests. While I make mention of organic and mechanical solidarity, for the purpose of this study I am primarily interested in organic solidarity.

Research shows that neighborhoods where residents view themselves as part of a collective with shared pro-social norms are more likely to address neighborhood problems (Kochel 2012). Sampson (2011) defines this concept as “collective efficacy” or the bond of shared trust and the mutual willingness to intervene for the collective good.

B. Collective Efficacy

Collective efficacy is a byproduct of social disorganization theory. Collective efficacy researchers argue that structural characteristics of neighborhoods and neighborhood cohesion most affect levels of crime (Sampson et al. 1997; St. Jean 2007). Collective efficacy can be considered an outcome of high rates of collective consciousness because the community acts to achieve goals for the greater good rather than individuals acting in their own self-interests. For example, a community that works together towards a common goal, like crime control, engages in collective efficacy. Collective efficacy requires a mutual sense of trust, cohesion, and reciprocal expectations among neighbors (Kochel 2012).

Collective efficacy has been shown to depress crime in disadvantaged communities, as well as build social capital within these neighborhoods (Sampson et al. 1997; Kochel 2012). It allows for the establishment of shared norms and expectations, including that of public safety. The effects of fostering collective efficacy include supervising youth, questioning unusual activity, and minimizing disorder (Kochel 2012). Neighborhoods with high rates of collective efficacy can mediate some of the detrimental effects of structural disadvantage (Kochel 2012). Therefore, police have a vested interest in pursuing policies that will support neighborhood collective efficacy (Kochel 2012). One such strategy that nurtures collective efficacy through a partnership between formal and informal control mechanisms is community policing.

C. Broken Windows Theory

“Broken Windows Theory” was inspired by the New Jersey Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program. This program was funded by the state of New Jersey to take police out of patrol vehicles and put them on foot in certain neighborhoods. The goal of the program was to improve the quality of community life. Five years after the program began, the Police Foundation published an evaluation of the foot-patrol program (Wilson and Kelling 1982). The results of the study indicate that having officers on foot did not reduce crime rates. However, residents felt more secure in their neighborhoods and had more favorable opinions of law enforcement. A similar study conducted in Flint, Michigan found analogous results (Trojanowicz 1982; Cordner 2010).

Wilson and Kelling (1984) found that the foot patrol officers functioned to uphold order-maintenance. Specifically, informal rules violated by disorderly people like panhandlers and loiterers were policed. At times officers enforced the formal law, but largely the police required compliance of informal public order laws of neighborhoods. The authors argue that disorder and crime are “inextricably linked” (Wilson and Kelling 1984: 2). The argument is further illustrated with the “broken windows” analogy. If a building is left with a broken window, soon all the windows will be broken. The unrepaired window signifies that no one cares about the building. It is viewed as easy prey to vandals and even to those who consider themselves law-abiding citizens. The building with the broken windows acts as a sign of community apathy and leads to a breakdown of community controls. The unchecked panhandler or other obstreperous person can be viewed as the first “broken window” in a

community (Wilson and Kelling 1984). If disorderly behavior of one individual is left unimpeded, then opportunistic criminals may view the community as an easy target. Regardless of whether serious crime is actually increasing; the salient feature is that residents will have the impression that serious crime is increasing and will modify their behavior as a result.

In seemingly apathetic communities, residents will feel less confident to regulate public behavior. Observing disorderly conduct, even past displays of disorderly conduct such as graffiti, sends a message that residents are living in an uncontrolled environment. Such observations generate fear and the perception that those in charge of maintaining order are ineffective. The key factor of broken windows theory is that small problems left unresolved will inevitably turn to larger problems.

Social solidarity and collective efficacy both emphasize the value of *community* in terms of crime reduction. Broken windows theory stresses the importance of policing minor offenses to prevent major offenses. All of these theories are crucial to deliberate counterterrorism strategy at the local level. Each of these theories suggest factors that would affect reporting possible terrorists to law enforcement. Using these theories to guide my research, I argue community members who feel solidarity with other residents and engage in collective responses to address community problems are more likely to identify and report suspicious behavior. Particularly, in times of crisis, community members will be more vigilant of their surroundings and more inclined to report crime.

2. What Factors Affect Reporting Over Time?

A. Vigilance Decrement

A psychology theory called “vigilance decrement” asserts that intense and sustained attention declines over time (Warm 2008; Caggiano and Parasuraman 2004). Vigilance requires strenuous mental labor in order to maintain high levels of focus and concentration. Often, incidents or “signals” are unpredictable and infrequent and demand a substantial degree of situational awareness due to the uncertainty of presentation (Hubal et al. 2010). Vigilance researchers find both naïve and experienced observers undergo vigilance decrement over time (Warm 2008). Airport security is frequently used to illustrate this idea. Airport security agents are required to monitor multiple channels simultaneously to which they infrequently identify legitimate threats. As such, their sustained attention or vigilance in detecting small threats declines over time (Hancock and Hart 2002). The obvious problem of airport security vigilance decrement is that missing a signal can have disastrous consequences. For example, the 9/11 hijackers used both box cutters and knives² to commandeer the aircrafts. The weapons were not detected at airport security. Vigilance decrement is an important aspect in many other work environments including industrial and military systems, cockpit monitoring, long-distance driving, and agricultural inspection tasks (Warm 2008; Caggiano and Parasuraman 2004).

While psychologists use vigilance decrement theory to examine micro-level incidents of diminishing alertness, I use vigilance decrement to examine macro-level incidents of decaying alertness. Specifically, I employ vigilance decrement theory to

² Prior to 9/11, the TSA allowed knives with small blades to be carried on board commercial airplanes. Some of the 9/11 hijackers set off metal detectors but they were allowed to board after further inspection.

examine civilian reporting behaviors before and after large-scale acts of terrorism.

From a vigilance decrement standpoint, I anticipate reporting will increase following large-scale acts of terrorism, but wane over time until the next significant act of terrorism.

In order to understand the context with which these theories will be applied, I first examine the literature of policing, terrorism, and counterterrorism strategies in the United States.

Literature Review

The criminal justice system is comprised of three key components: the police, courts, and corrections. The police investigate crimes and arrest suspects. The material gathered during the course of an investigation is turned over to the courts so that the individual can be prosecuted. If the offender is found guilty or negotiates a plea bargain, he or she will receive a punishment defined by the penal code that is specific to the crime³.

Why do people call the police?

Across societies and history there is massive variability in how law enforcement is implemented. The police are generally held as a mechanism of social control, however, the function of the police is, in reality, more diverse and complex than strictly law enforcement. Police officers' roles fluctuate between crime fighters, social service providers, and peacekeepers (Dempsey and Forst 2014). Police are not

³ For an overview of plea bargaining and sentencing refer to Appendix A.

a homogenous group; rather each officer performs his or her job dependent on the context of the situation and the personality of the officer.

The legitimacy and acceptance of police intervention is dependent on diverse factors. For instance, neighborhood characteristics, demographic components, and even type of crime all affect the probability of citizens reporting crime to law enforcement. Urban and rural residents have different needs and expectations of law enforcement. The out-migration of manufacturing and other semi-skilled jobs in the 1970s accelerated social disorder in urban centers (Williams 1996). During this period, those who were capable of escaping the stagnated economies of urban communities fled to the suburbs. The remaining residents, who were primarily comprised of low-income minorities, witnessed increased rates of poverty and crime. Coupled with the decriminalization of minor offenses like public drunkenness in the 1970s, and the deinstitutionalization of mentally ill persons in 1980s, urban centers became characterized as crime “hot spots”. Policing high crime areas has proved challenging for both law enforcement and community residents. Members of these communities report feeling marginalized and mistreated by law enforcement for either over or under policing (Kane 2005). As such, residents from disadvantaged communities report higher rates of legal cynicism and levels of dissatisfaction with police (Smith et al. 1991).

While crime is less frequent in rural areas, police face unique challenges (Weisheit et al. 1994). First, differences vary across and within regions which shape both crime and policing. For example, drug trafficking may be a primary concern in the Southwest whereas in other parts of the country it is less of an issue (Weisheit et

al. 1994). Crimes in rural areas differ somewhat from crimes in urban areas. Agricultural and wildlife crimes are more common in rural areas (Weisheit et al. 1994). Likewise, perpetrators and victims are more likely to be acquainted in rural areas than in urban areas for crimes like rape, homicide, and assault. Rural police departments face the additional challenge of limited resources. Police are expected to perform an assortment of social services like providing emergency medical services and fighting fires (Weisheit et al. 1994). Finally, social ties of rural community residents are generally stronger than urban community residents by the very nature of the social structure. Stronger social bonds suggest that informal social controls are both stronger in rural areas and that officers are under greater scrutiny (Smith 1980). This can lead to challenges of officers separating their personal and professional roles (Weisheit et al. 1994).

Attitudes about law enforcement are also shaped by demographic factors which effect the decision to call the police. The racial unrest in recent decades makes race and ethnicity key factors in examining satisfaction with law enforcement. Departments that fail to gain legitimacy are more likely to be challenged by residents. Incidents like police brutality combined with public distrust can have dire consequences for both residents and law enforcement (Lai and Zhao 2010). Scholars find that African Americans tend to have less favorable views of law enforcement compared to Whites and Hispanics (Carr 2007; Lai and Zhao 2010; Sullivan et al. 1987; Brown and Benedict 2002). African Americans are more critical of police and more likely to report harsh treatment and unprovoked searches (Holmes and Goodman 2010). Hispanics tend to fall in the middle of the continuum between Whites and

African Americans regarding attitudes towards law enforcement (Lai and Zhao 2010). Whites tend to have the most favorable views of law enforcement.

Variables like gender and age affect the likelihood of whether a witness or victim will call for police intervention. The effect of gender differences in police satisfaction reveal inconsistent findings. Some studies find females tend to rate the police higher than males (Cao et al. 1996); while others find that men were significantly more satisfied with police treatment (Brown and Coulter 1983). Studies generally find a positive relationship between age and attitudes toward the police (Cao et al. 1996; Lai and Zhao 2010). Younger people are more likely to think the police use too much force and report less satisfaction with police treatment (Brown and Benedict 2002). Such attitudes impact whether a resident will call the police if he or she sees something suspicious.

The type of crime and severity of injury also affect whether a citizen will call for police services. Victims of motor vehicle theft and aggravated assault are more likely to report the crime to authorities than victims of rape and household larceny (Baumer and Lauritsen 2010; Harlow 1985). Likewise, reporting rates are higher for crimes resulting in serious injury than those resulting in minor injury or no injury (Halow 1985). The more expensive an item is the more likely the owner calls authorities if the item is damaged or stolen. There are four main reasons generally given as to why citizens either delayed calling authorities or did not call at all. First, citizens state they do not feel they have an adequate amount of information to report a crime. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) found over 25 percent of crime reporting was delayed by roughly two minutes due to citizen's ambiguity regarding whether a

crime occurred (Spelman and Brown 1984). Second, citizens will take actions to help cope with the crime. For example, a significant amount of individuals delayed calling authorities because they first called someone else to obtain assistance (Spelman and Brown 1984). Third, some citizens reported first calling someone for advice before calling authorities. The NIJ found citizens who made a telephone call for advice prior to calling authorities resulted in an average delay of about three minutes (Spelman and Brown 1984). Finally the reason most often given as to why citizens did not report a crime was because they felt it was not important enough to report (Halow 1985).

Additionally, the benefits of calling law enforcement must outweigh the costs. Both victims and witnesses weigh the decision to call for police intervention both consciously and subconsciously (Spelman and Brown 1984). If a victim or witness of a crime believe that calling the police will result in a higher chance of retaliation by the offender, he or she may choose not to call the police. For example, intimate partner violence tends to be underreported in part because past attempts by the victims to seek outside help, including police intervention, led to increased violence by the abusers (Grauwiler 2008). Likewise, if a victim determines the benefits outweigh the costs, like having a better chance of recovering stolen property, he or she will feel more inclined to call the police (Spelman and Brown 1984).

Significant effort has been made in the past few decades to increase the public's reporting of violent crime (Baumer and Lauritsen 2010). One such effort is to improve police-public relations. Attitudes towards police is a significant factor in whether citizens will call the police in case of emergency. Effective policing is dependent on the willingness of citizens to trust and cooperate with authorities (Carr et

al 2007). The community policy reforms of the 1980s are an example of efforts by the government to improve police-community relations.

Community policing is a philosophy that emphasizes proactive problem solving and recognizes the necessity for police and community partnerships. Fundamentally, community policing recognizes that police do not operate in a vacuum; rather, to be effective, law enforcement and the community must unite to identify and address matters of crime and social disorder (Baker and Baker 1999; Cordner 2010; Docobo 2005). Federal and state legislative actions attempt to nurture police-public relations. For example, the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, the Presidential proclamation of a National Crime Victims' Rights Week in 1998, and the Crime Victims' Rights Act of 2004 are broad organized efforts to encourage victims of crimes to call the police (Baumer and Lauritsen 2010). Without citizen trust and cooperation, police officers lack the essential information needed to accomplish their basic duties (Baker and Baker 1999). Establishing good relationships between police and the community promotes confidence in institutional mechanisms of crime prevention. Therefore, to achieve any degree of success for crime prevention, citizens need an open line of communication with police to voice their concerns and provide suggestions for community safety.

Various policing reforms have occurred in the United States, including a transformation of community concerns (Greene 2011). In the 1960s, the crime control model of policing lost public support. Many viewed the crime control model as too severe and subsequently, resulted in higher levels of dissatisfaction with local police, particularly among the African American community (Reisig 2010). A number of

important articles published in the 1970s questioned the effectiveness of crime control strategies and departments began to try alternative approaches. In the mid-1970s to early 1980s one such transformation resulted in an emphasis of police sensitivity to the social and ethnic differences in their local communities (Fielding 1995; Greene 2011; Reisig 2010). This reform also included community engagement, in which teams of officers were assigned to certain geographic areas in order to increase community contact and learn specific neighborhood mores (Greene 2011). The goal of this transformation was to depart from the historic practice of policing in which officers had little contextual knowledge of neighborhoods and to encourage officers to proactively identify community problems. Community policing attempts to redefine the role of the public as an active partner in neighborhood security (Reisig 2010).

There are two key elements in cultivating relationships between the community and police: initiating and maintaining contacts. The officer's first task is to foster public contacts. The tactics used to develop such contacts vary. Some officers utilize a friendly and outgoing manner while others may demonstrate active listening skills when interviewing citizens (Fielding 1995). Some departments encourage officers to attend formal meetings and other community organizing efforts to increase police-public contact (Cordner 2010). Most importantly, officers want to become known to the community. In doing so, he or she becomes "their policeman" solving "their crime". When officers have several contacts they begin to segregate the community into distinctive areas. Officers are then able to recognize the complex relationships between community members and better understand the diverse social realities of that community (Fielding 1995).

The second stage of cultivating relationships between the police and the community is maintaining contacts. Maintaining working contacts implies being attune to the expectations of a variety of people and organizations (Fielding 1995). Interactions with multiple contacts with differing needs can lead to a sense of divided loyalty. Officers have to gauge how beneficial a potential contact will be in order to be the most effective in his or her role. Favors are commonly used in exchange for information. The officers must view their policing strategy as a long-term approach and be willing to refrain from full enforcement on minor infractions.

While community policing is not a new phenomenon, it has gained tremendous momentum in the last couple decades (Bayley and Shearing 1996; Garofalo and McLeod 1989). Neighborhood watch programs are the most widely known and accepted form of community policing (Garofalo and McLeod 1989). Neighborhood watch programs started to become officially organized during the late 1960s but rapidly developed during the 1970s and 1980s (Baumer and Lauritsen 2010). The director of the Neighborhood Watch Association estimates more than 20,000 official neighborhood watch programs and an estimated 50,000 unofficial programs are currently operating in the United States (Morse 2009; Reeves 2012). The objective of neighborhood watch programs is to encourage people to employ some degree of social control in their individual neighborhoods (Garofalo and McLeod 1989). While informal surveillance by residents is the primary activity of neighborhood watch programs, other activities such as improvement of street lighting and block parenting are also common (Garofalo and McLeod 1989). Furthermore, shows like the incredibly popular *America's Most Wanted*, emphasized the importance of ordinary

citizen's role in crime prevention and encouraged participation in programs like neighborhood watch (Baumer and Lauritsen 2010). The organized efforts of community policing policies generated significant increases in reporting crimes to law enforcement and greater public awareness (Baumer and Lauritsen 2010).

Policing Terrorism

Domestic terrorists have been active in the United States since the 1960's; however the bulk of media attention was initially focused on international terrorism by the end of the 1980's (Smith 1994). The bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 was the first time domestic terrorism was considered an "American issue" by the general public as it was the first large-scale act of terrorism on American soil (Dampousse and Shields 2007). Six years later, Islamic terrorists took the lives of almost 3,000 victims in the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. Following the 9/11 attacks, noteworthy changes occurred at all levels of government – changing forever how we police terrorism. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act) was drafted by Attorney General John Ashcroft and signed into law by President George W. Bush on October 26, 2001. The USA Patriot Act gave the Justice Department and its agencies a variety of new powers in intelligence gathering and criminal procedure against drug trafficking, immigration violations, organized criminal activity, money laundering, and terrorism (Lerner and Lerner 2004). It also encouraged information sharing among intelligence agencies and local law enforcement. Moreover, DHS was formally established November 25, 2002, and

is responsible for protecting the United States against future acts of terrorism

(Department of Homeland Security 2014). The FBI defines terrorism as:

The unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objective⁴

This study employs the FBI's definition of terrorism because the FBI has exclusive authority to investigate acts of terrorism in the United States and against American citizens and property abroad⁵. These responsibilities are outlined in Title II of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (FBI.gov).

According to Smith (1994), there are two noteworthy attributes of the terrorism definition. First, the term "unlawful" is a significant feature of the definition as it confines the use to criminal conduct (Smith 1994). Second, the *motivation* behind the crime is fundamental for the terrorism label. While the FBI investigates many crimes, what distinguishes a traditional crime from a crime of terrorism is motivation. The element of motivation for "political or social change" intensifies the criminal act and is the salient characteristic of terrorism (Smith 1994).

Terrorism ideology in America is as diverse as its population. Right-wing, left-wing, and environmental terrorist groups have all committed acts of terrorism on United States soil. While these groups have distinct philosophical, ideological, and religious backgrounds, all share an accession to use undiscerning violence to further their political or social goals (Smith 1994).

Terrorism and Community Policing

⁴ The FBI further differentiates between domestic and international terrorism. See FBI Policy Guidelines in *Terrorism in the United States: 1999* (FBI 2000).

⁵ For an overview of the various Federal Agencies refer to Appendix B.

The fight against terrorism is a responsibility shared among all levels of government (Docobo 2005). In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, local law enforcement has taken on a substantial role partnering with communities to prevent and respond to incidents of terrorism (Docobo 2005). In doing so, local law enforcement has shifted their responsibilities to addressing homeland security as well as traditional crime prevention (Greene 2011). Various crime prevention strategies such as community policing have been implemented to fight against terrorism-related crimes. Neighborhood watch programs have modified their responsibilities beyond traditional crime prevention to address the issues and consequences of acts of terrorism (Neighborhood Watch Program-National Sheriff's Association 2014). For example, according to the Neighborhood Watch Manual,⁶ community members should discuss possible terrorist targets within the community and the consequences of an attack on these targets.

The community policing philosophy can provide a structure to identify possible terrorist threats and aid in the development of crisis plans. Senior Analysts at the Office of COPS, “contend that by applying the principles of organizational change, problem solving, and external partnerships, community policing can help police to prepare for and prevent terrorist acts” (Docobo 2005: 2). Effective community policing involves communication and transparency between all levels of government, including state and federal agencies. These partnerships are vital for collecting intelligence and detecting threats and vulnerabilities (Neighborhood Watch Manual; Docobo 2005).

⁶ The Neighborhood Watch Manual was created by the National Sheriffs' Association in cooperation with the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The manual was created for citizen organizers and law enforcement officers to establish watch programs.


The phenomenon of community policing as a counter terrorism nexus can best be observed with the “If you See Something, Say Something” campaign. The New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority developed a campaign called “If You See Something, Say Something,” which sought to raise public awareness of suspicious activity in New York City. The policy was later adopted by DHS in 2010 and has since spread internationally. For instance, a “See Something, Say Something” app has been created to enable users to report anti-social behavior in the United Kingdom. The national campaign emphasizes the importance of reporting suspicious activity to proper local law enforcement authorities (Department of Homeland Security 2014). The DHS’s goal is to redistribute surveillance responsibilities to the public in hopes of creating a more vigilant mindset (Reeves 2012). In other words, the DHS hopes to generate macro-level collective efficacy in order to prevent another terrorism incident like 9/11 from occurring.

Research Questions

Based on the above discussions, Durkheim would likely argue that acts of terrorism offend defined states of collective conscience. As a result, the social cohesion within that society is threatened. Once the social cohesion is threatened, collective efficacy will likely increase as individuals within the society are more apt to act en masse to protect their shared interests. Reporting suspicious behavior can also be viewed as a preventative act against “broken windows” in that, the potential terrorism conspiracy is prevented from developing into a completed act of terrorism. Collective efficacy is manifested in community policing policies and practices as they

engage the general public to actively participate in surveilling suspicious behavior. It is plausible to argue that collective efficacy or civilian vigilance can be measured via rates of reporting suspicious activity to authorities (refer to Figure 1).

Figure 1. Relationship between terrorism and civilian reporting



There are two key research questions in this dissertation.

1. What are the common ways by which the FBI is alerted to potential terrorist threats?

There are many ways the FBI may become aware of potential terrorist threats. For example, the FBI may become involved with a terrorism enterprise investigation as a result of information provided by undercover agents or confidential informants; or, a civilian may spark an investigation due to suspicious activity witnessed in his or her neighborhood. Identifying common pathways to uncovering terrorism plots is clearly an important factor in strengthening counterterrorism policies and practices.

Determining the distribution of these categories is essential in understanding where to focus resources and money.

2. Do incidents of terror increase civilian vigilance and thereby affect how terrorism plots come to the attention of the FBI?


As previously mentioned, the “See Something, Say Something” campaign aims to increase public awareness of potential terrorist threats. While this study is not an evaluation of the “See Something Say Something” campaign, it seeks to examine the idea of civilian vigilance. In theory, communities under threat are more likely to come together. Acts of terrorism against the United States threaten American values and freedoms. Following this logic, in the wake of terrorism incidents, citizens will more likely feel compelled to report potential threats. Due to the exploratory nature of my research, I do not have formal hypotheses; however, I have two expectations.

E1. Directly following large-scale incidents of terrorism, civilian reporting of suspicious activity will increase.

While I expect an increase in reporting following large scale acts of terrorism, I also anticipate the level of reporting to eventually diminish over time. I apply the vigilance decrement theory to the country as a whole. Immediately following a terrorism incident, citizens likely are very aware of potential terrorist threats. Yet, over time people presumably experience vigilance decrement and are less attentive in monitoring threats (refer to Figure 2). As such, I developed my second expectation.

E2: Civilian reporting of suspicious activity to decrease over time following a terrorism incident.

Figure 2: Theory of Changing Vigilance



Chapter Three: Methodology

The research questions were addressed using a mixed methods approach. Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998:17-18) define mixed methods studies as “those that combine the qualitative and quantitative approaches into research methodology of a single study or mulitphased study.” Two arguments have been made for the use of mixed methods. First, mixed method analysis offers a more comprehensive analytical technique that draws on the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative data analysis (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). Second, mixed method data analysis offers more opportunities to legitimize findings than do solely quantitative or qualitative analyses (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). The combination of the descriptive accuracy of qualitative data analyses and the numerical accuracy of quantitative data analyses permit a more meticulous interpretation of the data.

Employing this methodology better facilitates understanding of causes and consequences of varying degrees of “vigilance” (Axinn and Pearce 2006). The qualitative portion of this study uses content analysis of the American Terrorism Study (ATS) dataset and digital media sources. The quantitative portion of this study is primarily descriptive as this study is largely exploratory.

Approach to Research

This dissertation has two correlated research goals. The first research goal is to determine the common pathways through which the FBI is alerted to potential terrorist threats. Terrorism, like traditional organized crime, is often well organized and complex (Docobo 2005). These groups frequently commit ancillary crimes such

as drug trafficking and identity theft to support their terrorism activities (Smith and Roberts 2005; Docobo 2005). Thus, there are multiple ways in which the FBI comes to be involved with a terrorism enterprise investigation. For example, the FBI may become involved as the result of a police investigation at the local level. A case in North Carolina provides a relevant example. An off-duty police officer noticed a group of men putting large quantities of cigarettes into the trunk of a car with out-of-state license plates. The initial crime of cigarette smuggling instigated a complex terrorism investigation in which the individuals were engaging in immigration fraud, racketeering, and money laundering to aid al Qaeda and Hezbollah groups. The larger terrorism plot was exposed as the result of an investigation of the ancillary crime. The FBI is also alerted as the result of ongoing investigations in which undercover agents and confidential informants, or some other form of security inspection are used. These cases fall under the law enforcement umbrella but are unique in their launching of the terrorism investigations.

Citizens represent another form of protection against potential terror threats. The thwarted terrorist attack against Fort Dix, New Jersey is an excellent example of citizen intervention. The case began in 2006 when a Circuit City employee contacted local law enforcement about a “disturbing” video someone brought in to be copied (Bohn and Arena 2007). The video depicted young men with assault weapons at a firing range calling for Jihad (Bohn and Arena 2007). The FBI began an investigation in which they infiltrated the group and discovered a conspiracy to attack U.S. military personnel stationed at Fort Dix. Authorities were unaware of the potential threat until a citizen alerted authorities to the suspicious activity.

The second goal is to determine if civilian vigilance increases following a major terrorism incident and if so, does vigilance decay the more time passes from the event. Terrorism is distinctive in that it threatens the values and beliefs of a society. A community is both directly and indirectly affected by a terrorist attack because the targets are often representative of the society as a whole. The argument can therefore be made that because acts of terrorism threaten the entire group, rather than a single individual, the entire group will become more vigilant to protect their vested interests.

To achieve these goals my research draws on two methodological approaches: content analysis of the ATS and media sources, and descriptive analysis of the distribution of categories and trends by time period. Content analysis of the ATS data is my primary source of information with digital media as my secondary source. The ATS is comprised of terrorism cases designated by the FBI's Research and Analytical Center. Unlike the Oklahoma City Bombing or the 9/11 attacks, most terrorism cases involve crimes that do not garner much media attention. Therefore, I derived most of my data from the court documents in the ATS files and used media sources as supplementary information. The content analysis revealed underlying themes of how the FBI learns of would-be terrorists.

Finally, I used a quantitative approach to assess patterns by which the FBI is alerted to potential terrorist threats to determine if there are factors that increase public vigilance. For research question one, I used frequencies to analyze the various ways the FBI becomes involved with a terrorism investigation. Identifying the distribution of ways the FBI is alerted to potential plots is important when deciding where resources should be allocated. For example, if citizens are not actually alerting the

FBI to potential threats, then concentrating resources into campaigns like “See Something, Say Something” are ineffective and costly. To answer my second research question, I used a contingency table to determine the interrelation between the way incidents were reported and time period.

Data Description

The ATS is comprised of terrorism cases dating back to the 1980s and represents a comprehensive history of persons indicted in federal courts. The FBI’s Research and Analytical Center provided lists to the ATS of persons indicted as a result of terrorism enterprise investigations (Terrorism Research Center 2014). Those lists include information such as the names of those indicted, the federal district court in which the indictments were issued, the federal court case numbers, date of arrest and indictment, and the name of the terrorist group involved (Shields et al. 2009). ATS staff retrieve cases from the federal district courts where the cases were tried and make both electronic copies and hardcopies of the court case documents. The cases are then coded into the ATS database. Due to time and resource constraints, some cases have not been collected or coded. The ATS currently includes information on roughly 700 terrorists from nearly 60 terrorist groups indicted for over 9,000 federal criminal counts from 1980 through 2006 (Terrorism Research Center 2014). Cases as recent as 2012 are included in the database; however, there are missing cases due to the constraints previously mentioned.

The ATS database is comprised of two integral parts. First is a statistical database that allows for analyses (refer to Figure 3). The second part consists of PDF

files of case documents such as dockets and affidavits that make each case unique (Terrorism Research Center 2014). For the purpose of this study, I primarily used the PDF files to examine various documents for information as to how the FBI is alerted to potential terrorist threats.

Figure 3. Screenshot of the ATS dataset

	COUNT_ID	CT_NUM	ACTUALCT	USC_NUM	USC_CHAP	CTRESULT	CT_SENT	CT_TIME	CT_FINE
43	10384	6	16	15	14	4	0	0	0
44	10385	7	23	15	14	4	0	0	0
45	10386	8	27	15	14	4	0	0	0
46	10387	9	28	15	14	4	0	0	0
47	10388	10	32	15	14	4	0	0	0
48	10389	11	33	15	14	4	0	0	0
49	10390	12	34	15	14	4	0	0	0
50	10391	13	35	15	14	4	0	0	0
51	10392	14	36	15	14	4	0	0	0
52	10393	15	1	507	32	3	0	0	0
53	10394	16	2	33	32	3	0	0	0
54	10395	17	3	89	31	3	0	0	0
55	10396	18	4	75	42	3	0	0	0
56	10397	19	5	88	31	3	0	0	0
57	10398	20	7	91	15	3	0	0	0
58	10399	21	10	91	15	3	0	0	0
59	10400	22	11	15	14	3	0	0	0
60	10401	23	18	15	14	3	0	0	0
61	10402	24	23	15	14	3	0	0	0
62	10403	25	24	15	14	3	0	0	0
63	10404	26	25	15	14	3	0	0	0
64	10405	27	26	15	14	3	0	0	0
65	10406	28	27	15	14	3	0	0	0
66	10407	29	1	164	14	2	1	10	0
67	10408	30	2	164	14	2	1	10	0
68	10409	1	1	506	32	4	0	0	0
69	10410	2	3	91	15	4	0	0	0
70	10411	3	5	91	15	4	0	0	0

The second source of data I used was derived from digital media resources. While each case may not have extensive media coverage, I used LexisNexis and Newspaper Source Plus to investigate how each terrorism case came to the attention of the FBI. I picked these two sources specifically because they are two of the most reliable resources for content analysis (Deacon 2007). If I failed to find any substantial news articles from LexisNexis and Newspaper Source Plus, I did a general Google search of the case. This was sometimes successful in providing additional


information. Digital news largely focused on cases that involved a completed terrorism incident or a conspiracy that had developed into a serious threat. Cases that involved crimes like bank fraud and identity theft were largely underreported.

Coding

The formation of my final dataset was a multi-stage process (refer to Figure 4). I started with a total of 1,182 cases. The ATS is divided into two categories: “coded” and “not coded”. There are 454 cases that are designated as coded and 782 cases that are designated as not coded. A number of factors, such as time and money, dictate how quickly a case can be collected and coded by ATS researchers. The coded cases include all the court documents and are linked in the statistical database which allows for analysis. For the purposes of this study, I only used coded cases so that statistical analysis could later be performed. I did an initial examination of the cases to further decide which cases I would keep in my database. I only kept cases that involved the prevention of a terrorism incident. “Preventions” are cases that involve an act of terrorism that was planned, prepared, or attempted but not successful (American Terrorism Study Codebook Version 3.0). “Completions” are considered acts of terrorism that were carried out and at least partially successful (American Terrorism Study Codebook Version 3.0). Cases that involved a completed act of terrorism were eliminated. I also eliminated cases that had limited information. This left me with a total of 257 cases, of which I then did a more extensive examination. As I combed through the data, I found that some cases I previously thought were usable were not. In most of these cases, this was due to insufficient information. However, some of

these cases involved a completed terrorism incident. The reason they were not previously removed from my analysis was because the defendants were “discovered” due to a citizen and/or confidential informant alerting authorities after the fact. Ultimately, I removed these cases because this study is primarily concerned with “prevented” terrorism incidents; so, even though the defendants were captured as a result of someone “seeing something and saying something”, they did not fall within the parameters of this study. Consequently, my final dataset was composed of 187 cases.

Figure 4: Stages of Data Formation



Variables

I created a variable called **Era**. This variable documented when the conspiracy was first reported. This categorical variable was coded: “1 = Pre-OKC bombing” which included anything prior to April 19, 1995; “2 = Post-OKC” which included anything from April 19, 1995 to April 30, 1998; “3 = Pre-9/11” which included anything from May 1, 1998 through September 10, 2001; and finally “4 = Post-9/11” which included anything following September 11, 2001 (refer to Figure 5). The Pre-9/11 period was created as the midpoint between Post-OKC and Post-9/11 periods. If it was unclear exactly when the person or plot was discovered, the date the indictment was issued was used.

Figure 5. Era distributions



While my main examinations used Pre-OKC, Post-OKC, Pre-9/11, and Post-9/11 categories, I created an additional category within this variable called “P2 9/11.” P2 9/11 was coded “5” and included all the cases after September 12, 2005. To create the P2 9/11 period, I divided the original Post-9/11 era into two distinct groups: Post-9/11 (included cases from September 11, 2001, through September 11, 2005) and P2 9/11 (included cases from September 12, 2005, and after) to allow for an examination of vigilance over time. I created the September 12, 2005, starting point of P2 9/11 as I

originally had cases only through 2008. I later received an updated dataset from the ATS that contained cases coded through 2012 which allowed for a more rigorous test of decrement. In future studies, I will divide the time periods into equal parts. P2 9/11 was included to determine if the changes directly after Post-9/11 are still apparent as we move further away from the incident (refer to Figure 6).

Figure 6. Era distributions including P2 9/11



I used the Oklahoma City bombing and September 11, 2001, attacks as my time period measures because they are the two largest acts of terrorism on United States soil. The Oklahoma City bombing resulted in 168 fatalities and more than 650 injured. The attacks on September 11, 2001, resulted in 2,977 fatalities and over 6,000 reported injured.

Finally, after reviewing each case, I wrote a brief summary about each case. I documented how the individual or plot was discovered and in what documents I found the information. The most fruitful information was predominantly found in four court case documents: the docket, the affidavit, the criminal complaint, and the judgment. A docket is an official outline of legal proceedings in a court of law (Federal Bar Association 2010-2012). The defendant or defendant's names, charges, and case outcomes are located in the docket (refer to Figure 7).

An affidavit (Figure 8) is a voluntarily created written declaration of facts sworn to be true by the person making it and used as evidence in court. Typically, the federal agent assigned to the case makes the affidavit. The affidavit sometimes includes a criminal complaint. A criminal complaint (Figure 9) is a legal document that states the essential facts of the offense. A criminal complaint is usually filed by the District Attorney's Office in cooperation with the police. The criminal complaint lists the criminal charges and the available facts related to each charge. Finally, a judgment is the court's official decision at the conclusion of a trial. The judgment states the rights and obligations of those involved in the court's decision (refer to Figure 10). Although these documents generally yielded the most valuable information, I examined all the court documents in each case.

Figure 7. Example of U.S. District Criminal Docket

Date Filed	#	Docket Text
10/14/1998	1	Magistrate's complaint. Eric Robert Rudolph (1) count(s) emp [1:98-m -1088] (pmw) (Entered: 10/15/1998)
10/14/1998	2	MOTION to Seal 1 Criminal Complaint and accompanying affidavit, this motion and associated order with motion by USA as to Eric Robert Rudolph. (bh) Additional attachment(s) added on 2/4/2005 (dfb). (Entered: 10/25/2004)
10/14/1998	3	ORDER granting 12 Motion to Seal Affidavit accompanying criminal complaint, motion and this Order but denying as to face of criminal complaint as to Eric Robert Rudolph (1). Signed by Judge Joel M. Feldman on 10/13/1998. (bh) (Entered: 10/25/2004)
11/15/2000	4	INDICTMENT filed. Eric Robert Rudolph (1) counts 1-21 (bh) (Entered: 11/16/2000)
11/15/2000	5	Defendant Information Sheet for Eric Robert Rudolph. (bh) (Entered: 11/16/2000)
11/15/2000		Praecipe filed. Arrest warrant issued as to Eric Robert Rudolph and delivered to USM 11/15/00 (bh) (Entered: 11/16/2000)
11/15/2000	6	Arrest Warrant Returned Unexecuted as to Eric Robert Rudolph (originally issued on 10/13/1998). (bh) Additional attachment(s) added on 2/4/2005 (dfb). (Entered: 10/25/2004)
11/15/2000		Praecipe Filed. Arrest Warrant Issued as to Eric Robert Rudolph and delivered to USM on 11/15/2000. (bh) (Entered: 10/25/2004)
06/04/2003	7	ORDER by Mag Judge Gerrilyn G. Brill as to Eric Robert Rudolph, Appointing Public Defender as Counsel. (ddm) (Entered: 06/05/2003)
06/06/2003		Government motion to unseal affidavit accompanying the Magistrate Complaint (1:98-M-1088) and Order granting same as to by Eric Robert Rudolph was issued on 6/06/03. (ddm) Modified on 09/04/2003 (Entered: 09/04/2003)
06/06/2003	8	MOTION to Unseal Affidavit Accompanying Complaint and motion requesting complaint be filed under seal by USA as to Eric Robert Rudolph. (bh) (Entered: 10/25/2004)
06/06/2003	9	ORDER granting 15 Motion to Unseal Affidavit accompanying complaint; Unseal 12 MOTION to Seal Affidavit accompanying complaint 1 ; 13 Order on Motion to Seal Documents, and Unseal 1 Affidavit within Magistrate Complaint as to Eric Robert Rudolph (1). Signed by Judge Joel M. Feldman on 6/6/2003. (bh) Additional attachment(s) added on 2/4/2005 (dfb). (Entered: 10/25/2004)
12/05/2003	10	ORDER by Judge Orinda D. Evans as to Eric Robert Rudolph VACATING 06/04/03 Order appointing the Federal Defender Program as counsel (cc to USA and Federal Defender Program).(sjk) (Entered: 12/08/2003)
01/12/2004	11	ORDER by Judge Orinda D. Evans as to Eric Robert Rudolph, Appointing Public Defender as Counsel Paul Stephen Kish, Brian Mendelsohn, Warren Carl Lietz III. (cc to USAO & Federal Defenders Office) (ddm) (Entered: 01/12/2004)
05/11/2004	12	Sealed Document as to Eric Robert Rudolph (fsw) (Entered: 05/14/2004)

Figure 8. Example of U.S. District Criminal Complaint

United States District Court
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.
LEO V. FELTON
59 Salem Street
Apt. 3R
Boston, MA
(Name and Address of Defendant)

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
CASE NUMBER: 01-M-875-133

I, the undersigned complainant being duly sworn state the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. On or about April, 2001 in Suffolk and Essex county, in the Massachusetts District of Massachusetts defendant(s) did, (Track Statutory Language of Offense)

(1) having previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment in excess of one year, knowingly possess in and affecting commerce, a firearm, to wit: a .40 caliber Iberia semi-automatic pistol;


(2) with intent to defraud, falsely make, forge and counterfeit obligations and other securities of the United States;

(3) with intent to defraud, pass, utter and keep in his possession and coceal falsely made, forged and counterfeit obligations

in violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section(s) 922(g)(1), 471 and 472

I further state that I am a(n) Special Agent, ATF and that this complaint is based on the following facts:
Official Title
See attached affidavit

Continued on the attached sheet and made a part hereof: Yes No


Signature of Complainant

Sworn to before me and subscribed in my presence,
April 24, 2001 @ 3:15PM at Boston, MA
Date City and State



MARIANNE B. BOWLER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE



Figure 9. Example of U.S. District Affidavit

AFFIDAVIT

I, David P. Oliver, being duly sworn, depose and state that:

1. I am a Special Agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, United States Treasury, and have been so employed since April of 1999. Prior to this I was employed as a police detective at the Middletown, RI police department for approximately ten years. I am a graduate of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and the ATF National Academy. As a result of my training and experience as an ATF Special Agent, I am familiar with Federal criminal laws and know that it is a violation of 18 USC 922 (g) (1) for a person who has been convicted by a crime punishable by more than one year to possess a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.
2. The information herein is the result of my own personal involvement in this investigation, as well as my discussions with members of other law enforcement agencies involved in this investigation. In particular, I have been working with a Special Agent of the United States Secret Service, Erin Gifford. She has been so employed since April 23, 2000. She is currently assigned to the Boston Field Office, Boston, Massachusetts. The Boston Office has investigative responsibilities for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Secret Service, including those that relate to the counterfeiting of United States currency that occur in the

1

Figure 10. Example of a Judgment in a Criminal Case

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United States of America											
v.	JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE <small>(For Offenses Committed on or After November 1, 1987)</small>										
Malek Mohamed Seif, True Name: Malek Mohamed Ben Mohamed Seif Mokbel Abdallah Marseille, France	No. CR 01-00977-001-PHX-PGR ✓ No. CR 01-00164-001-PHX-PGR Thomas Hoidal (Appointed) <small>Attorney for Defendant</small>										
USM#: 46453-008 DOB: 9/24/65 SSN: 600-21-2861 INS#: A75620768											
THE DEFENDANT ENTERED A PLEA OF guilty on 2/26/02 to Count ONE in CR 01-00977-PHX-PGR of the Superseding Indictment and Count TWO in CR 02-00164-PHX-PGR of the Indictment.											
ACCORDINGLY, THE COURT HAS ADJUDICATED THAT THE DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF THE FOLLOWING OFFENSE(S) violating Title 42, USC §408(a)(6), Social Security Fraud, a Class D Felony offense, as charged in Count ONE of the Superseding Indictment in CR 01-00977-PHX-PGR; Title 18, USC § 1001, False Statements , a Class D Felony offense, as charged in Count TWO of the Indictment in CR 02-00164-PHX-PGR.											
IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT THAT the defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a term of TIME SERVED . This term consists of time served on Count One in CR 01-00977-PHX-PGR and time served on Count Two in CR 02-00164-PHX-PGR, all counts to be served concurrently. Upon release from imprisonment the defendant shall be placed on supervised release for a term of THREE (3) YEARS . This term consists of three years on Count One in CR 01-00977-PHX-PGR and three years on Count Two in CR 02-00164-PHX-PGR, terms to run concurrently.											
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all remaining counts DISMISSED on motion of the United States.											
CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES											
The defendant shall pay to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Attn: Finance, Suite 130, 401 West Washington St., SPC 1, Phoenix, Arizona 85003-2118, the following total criminal monetary penalties:											
SPECIAL ASSESSMENT: \$200.00	FINE: \$0	RESTITUTION: \$0									
Defendant does not have the ability to pay a fine or only has the ability to pay a fine less than the guideline minimum.											
<small>All monetary penalties are due immediately or in regular monthly installments. If incarcerated, payments shall begin under the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. Any unpaid balance shall become a condition of supervision and shall be paid within 90 days of the expiration of supervision.</small>											
71											

Chapter Four: Results

The results section is divided into two parts: qualitative and quantitative findings. The qualitative section includes examples of the case summaries by category. The quantitative section includes a frequency table to analyze the distribution of categories and contingency tables to examine the interrelation between rates of reporting and time periods.


1. Qualitative Results

The qualitative results are separated by how the FBI was alerted to the potential threats. In each section, I provide a general summary of what I found in that particular classification of cases, including outcomes of the cases. In some cases with multiple defendants, the individuals within the case had different outcomes. For example, one case had some defendants make a plea deal while others had charges dismissed. I made a note of the diverse outcomes in the category summary. I also provide several case summaries to illustrate the kinds of cases within that specific category (all the case summaries are available in the appendix).

I used content analysis to create a variable called *FBI Aware*. This variable coded how the FBI became aware of the potential terrorist threat. Initially, the categories were: civilian, law enforcement, undercover agent, confidential informant, other, and unknown. As I went through the court documents, however, I realized that cases I was coding into the unknown category typically did not have a lot of the necessary information to determine how the FBI became aware of the potential terrorist plot. As a result, I omitted the category and the cases I coded into it. I developed the “self” category during the process of coding civilian cases because I

realized during field coding that many terrorists brought attention to themselves. The end result was a six-category variable that measured how terrorism cases came to the attention of the FBI: civilian, law enforcement, undercover agent, confidential informant, self, and other (refer to Figure 11).

Figure 11. Coding of FBI Aware



Civilian: I coded cases as *civilian* if an individual who was not involved in the case alerted authorities to the potential terrorist threat. I developed two subcategories in the civilian classification: *Intimate* and *Non-Intimate Connections*. In the intimate connections category, the informer intimately knew the individual. For example, a wife who contacted authorities because her husband was making pipe bombs would be considered an intimate connection. Intimate connections cases were, by and large, instigated by family members such as siblings, significant others, or friends.

I coded civilian cases as *non-intimate connections* if they involved relationships where the informer and the potential criminal did not personally know one another. For example, a maintenance worker who entered an apartment to perform repairs and found pipe bombs in the apartment did not intimately know the tenant would be coded as a non-intimate connection. A gun dealer contacting the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) after a customer tried to buy assault weapons and used fraudulent documents is another example of a non-intimate connection. While they may have engaged as customer and merchandiser, the relationship was not personal.

It was not always clear whether a relationship was an intimate connection or a non-intimate connection. For example, a prison inmate who tried to convince another inmate to become involved in a crime may have a meaningful relationship with that inmate or they may just be serving their sentence in the same correctional facility. The depth of the relationship would be unclear. When the relationship was vague, I included it in the non-intimate category.

Law Enforcement: I coded cases as *law enforcement* if municipal, county, tribal, or regional police were involved in the identification of a potential terrorist. Federal agencies like U.S. Customs Agency and Department of Homeland Security were included in the law enforcement category if the defendants were discovered during the process of these agencies' routine duties. Security services, like retail security guards, were included in the law enforcement category, as well.

Smith and Roberts (2005) demonstrate that most terrorists participate in criminal activities before a planned attack. In my initial examination of the data, I also found in most law enforcement cases that an ancillary crime occurred which led to the individuals' capture. Therefore, I included cases where an individual was caught for a preliminary crime that led to the discovery of terroristic activities. For example, if a person was pulled over for a routine traffic violation and officers discovered explosives in the car, I coded this as law enforcement.

Undercover Agent: I coded cases as *undercover agent* if an agent acting in an undercover capacity exposed an individual or plot. Undercover agents are a subcategory of law enforcement. Undercover operations were initiated by both government agencies and traditional law enforcement agencies. I included them in a separate category because they differ from traditional law enforcement cases in that their involvement in terrorism-related cases tended to be more active and deliberate. Court documents in these cases specifically stated an undercover agent was involved and often included an affidavit from the agent regarding his or her role in the investigation. In these cases, it was unclear why the agent initially came to be involved with the case.

Confidential Informant: I coded cases as *confidential informant* if an individual linked to the case prompted the investigation. I used the terms ‘confidential witness,’ ‘confidential informant,’ ‘cooperating witness’ and ‘informant’ interchangeably in the case summaries. I did this because I wanted to keep with the language used in the court documents. Confidential informants were different from civilian cases because the informants were connected or became connected to the criminal activity. For instance, an individual arrested in a different case may have alerted authorities to other criminal activity in order to get a more lenient sentence for his or her crime. These cases are also different from law enforcement because they did not originate with an individual associated to law enforcement whose goal is to apprehend potential threats. Confidential informants are citizens with privileged information that are peripherally involved in the investigation of a case. While some confidential informants are paid by the government, their task is specific to a particular operation.

Self: The *self* category included people who incriminated themselves to law enforcement. This group was constructed in the later stages of the content analysis. It became clear that cases in which defendants incriminated themselves was very different from the civilian cases where someone else alerted authorities to the potential terrorist. An example of a case coded into the self-category would be a defendant calling the FBI making false claims about a terrorist attack. The FBI were unaware of the individual until his or her actions brought them to the authorities' attention.

Other: Cases were coded into the *other* category if they involved some type of fraud or did not clearly fit into one of the previously mentioned categories. Fraud was defined as a false representation of a matter deliberately used for unlawful gain. Cases that involved a type of fraud, like immigration fraud or bank fraud made up the majority of cases coded as other. For example, if the FBI was contacted by bank security regarding suspicious cash deposits and this led to the opening of a terrorism enterprise investigation it was coded as other.

A. Civilian

Civilian cases were coded into two subcategories: *intimate* and *non-intimate connections*. The intimate connections category included cases in which the informant intimately knew the defendant. The non-intimate category included cases in which the informer did not have a personal relationship with the defendant.

Civilian Intimate Connections. There are 12 intimate connections initiated cases (refer to Table 1.1 Intimate Connections). Four of those cases were instigated by family members of the defendants, all of whom were siblings of the defendants. Six

of the cases were instigated by significant others of the defendants. All but one of the significant other instigated cases involved some form of an estranged relationship. One case was instigated by a friend of the defendant; and finally, one case was instigated by a roommate who had recently moved in with the defendants.

Table 1.1 Intimate Connections	
Intimate Type	Number of Cases
Family	4
Significant Other	6
Friend	1
Other	1

The intimate connections cases had assorted outcomes (refer to Table 1.2 Intimate Connections Outcomes). Five of the cases ended with plea agreements. Five cases went to trial and the defendants were sentenced as the result of a jury in all of them. Two cases were dismissed by the judge presiding over the case.

Table 1.2 Intimate Connections Case Outcomes	
Non-Intimate Type	Number of Cases
Plea Agreements	5

Found guilty at trial	5
Dismissed	2

In the following examples, I present typical case summaries that highlight how people with intimate connections reported plots to the FBI.

03-CR-15 (TX-E) Gennings

The Queen City Police Department was contacted on July 8, 2003, by Sheila Holloway in regards to her brother, **Marty Gennings**. Holloway suspected Gennings was engaging in illegal activity, specifically child pornography [Affidavit⁷]. While executing the search warrant officers noticed various items consistent with the manufacturing of destructive devices. They found manuals on how to build bombs and handwritten notes regarding a plan to leave a bomb at the International Paper facility where Gennings worked as a security guard before being fired. The officers contacted the ATF and Gennings was arrested. Shortly following Gennings' arrest, his brother-in-law discovered a box in a storage unit and brought it to the Queen City Police Department. The Queen City Police Department contacted the ATF and FBI regarding the box. The box contained a completed pipe bomb and two unfinished bombs (Brackin 2004). Gennings pleaded guilty to possession of an explosive device and sentenced to 28 months in prison.

⁷ In the summaries of the court cases, I reference which court document I found the information in using square brackets. Each document referenced in the summary is specific to that particular court case. If I cite a court document followed by a number (i.e. [Affidavit 3]) I am referencing the specific page where I obtained the information.

03-CR-60259 (FL-S) Jordi

Stephen Jordi, a devout evangelical Christian, became radicalized after watching a HBO documentary on the Army of God (Nieves 2003). According to court documents, Jordi was in the final stages of carrying out plans to bomb abortion clinics including buying gasoline cans, flares, starter fluid, and propane tanks. He had also “cased” abortion clinics in Florida (Murphy 2003). The FBI first learned of Jordi’s plans when his brother, Michael Jordi, and two other people he knew from church contacted law enforcement about alarming comments Jordi was making (Nieves 2003). The FBI used an undercover agent posing as an anti-abortion sympathizer to further uncover Jordi’s plot. Jordi was arrested and charged with solicitation to commit a crime of violence; distribution of information relating to making and using explosives for arson; and possession of an unregistered firearm (Murphy 2003). Jordi pleaded guilty to the arson charge and was sentenced to 60 months in prison.

94-CR-92 (MN) Wheeler et al. 95-CR-85 (MN) Henderson et al.

Douglas Baker, Leroy Wheeler, Dennis Henderson, and Richard Oelrich were all members of a group called the Patriots Council. The Patriots Council is a right-wing anti-government group operating in central Minnesota (START “Patriots Council” n.d.). The group saw the U.S. tax system as a symptom of the government’s authoritarian nature. The men of the Patriots Council met in secret and plotted to use a biological toxin known as ricin against government targets. Ricin comes from the castor bean and is six thousand times more potent than cyanide (Gustafson 1996; START “Patriot Council” n.d.). In May 1992, Baker’s wife, Colette Baker, contacted

the Swift County Sheriff's Department and informed law enforcement that her husband had weapons, ammunition, explosives and poison that "could kill a person on contact" (Walsh 1995). Baker's wife who reportedly feared for her life and the lives of her parents, showed officers a coffee can that contained ricin and a solvent called DMSO. Officers also found a note that said:

"Doug, be extremely careful! After you mix the powder with the gel, the slightest contact will kill you! If you breathe the powder or get it in your eyes, you're a dead man. Dispose all instruments used. Always wear rubber gloves and then destroy them also. Good Hunting! P.S. Destroy this note!" (Walsh 1995).

The FBI was notified and an investigation revealed the men had purchased the castor beans from an Oregon book-store with instructions on how to make ricin. Electronic surveillance was installed and captured the defendants discussing blowing up federal buildings, killing a sheriff's deputy, and obtaining assault rifles (Wangstad 1995). The men were all found guilty at trial for the possession of ricin and conspiracy to use a biological weapon. Baker and Wheeler were sentenced to 33 months imprisonment but Wheeler's sentence was reduced to 23 months after he aided in the prosecution of Henderson and Oelrich. Henderson was sentenced to 48 months imprisonment and Oelrich was sentenced to 37 months imprisonment. Douglas Baker and Leroy Wheeler's conviction was the first conviction in the United States under the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 (Gustafson 1996).

97-CR-804 (NY-E) Mezer et al

On July 31, 1997, the New York Police Department (NYPD) received a tip that explosive devices were present in an apartment at 248 4th Avenue in Brooklyn

[Criminal Complaint]. Abdel Rahman Mosabbah, had just arrived in New York from Egypt and was living in the apartment with the defendants. He called 911 after **Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer** showed up to the apartment with two pipe bombs and a letter to the U.S. State Department threatening to explode the bomb in a public place. Due to Mosabbah's limited English, he could not convey the threat over the phone to the 911 operator. He walked several blocks to the targeted subway station and was able to convince two police officers to help (Pyle 1998).

NYPD officers responded to the tip and were granted access to the apartment building. The officers announced themselves and entered the apartment. Mezer and **Lafi Khalil** ran towards the officers and both defendants were shot and wounded [Criminal Complaint]. The officers discovered two metal explosive devices inside the apartment along with a Jordanian passport and a completed American applicant for asylum form belonging to Mezer. An agent working with the United States State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security spoke with Mezer who informed the agent that the bombs were going to be detonated on a busy Brooklyn subway station.

On August 28, 1997, a four-count indictment was issued for Mezer and Khalil charging them with violations of conspiracy to kill a U.S. citizen; knowingly and intentionally use and carry of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence; and knowingly and intentionally possessing counterfeit alien registration receipt card (ATS Report⁸). Khalil was found guilty of one count and sentenced to 36 months imprisonment. Mezer was convicted of three counts and sentenced to life

⁸ The ATS provides summaries of all the cases in its dataset. Each summary cited is specific to the case in which it appears.

imprisonment. This case generated harsh criticism of how the INS handles immigration cases as both Mezer and Khalil were in the United States illegally.

Civilian Non-Intimate Connections. There are 21 non-intimate connections cases. The informers varied widely in their social distance from the defendants. Some were complete strangers with no connection to the defendant of any kind like two street vendors who witnessed a smoking vehicle and called authorities; others became involved in the case as a result of their professions like maintenance workers or cleaners who entered an apartment or house and discovered suspicious materials. All of the informers saw or heard something suspicious and reported it. Plea agreements were reached in fifteen of the cases and only three cases went to trial, all of which resulted in convictions. No cases resulted in a total dismissal; however, two cases involved multiple defendants with diverse outcomes. In both of these cases, some defendants made plea bargains while other defendants had charges dropped against them. Because these cases have defendants with varied outcomes in a single case, they were included in the “diverse outcomes within case” category.

Table 2 Non-Intimate Connections Case Outcomes

Case Outcome Type	Number of Cases
-------------------	-----------------

Plea Agreements	16
Found guilty at trial	3
Dismissed	0
Diverse outcomes within case	2*

* 02-CR-399 (OR) Battle et al. and 98-CR-415 (TX-S) Grebe Jr. et al. had mixed outcomes

The following case summaries illustrate typical non-intimate connection cases reported to the FBI.

01-CR-455 (VA-E) Moussaoui

Zacarias Moussaoui is a textbook example of a non-intimate civilian initiated investigation. Moussaoui moved to Norman, Oklahoma in 2001, where he received minimal flight training at Airman Flight School (Linder 2006). Moussaoui later moved to Minnesota for commercial aircraft training at the Pan Am International Flight Academy. An instructor at the academy, Clarence Prevost, became suspicious of Moussaoui as he said he was from France but spoke very little French and became argumentative when asked about his background (Linder 2006). Prevost, a Navy veteran and former pilot for Northwest Airlines, grew troubled that an individual with such little flying experience would enroll in lessons to fly large commercial airliners (Testimony of Clarence Prevost in Zacarias Moussaoui Trial 2006). Prevost consulted with colleague Timothy Nelson about his suspicions. Nelson phoned the Minneapolis office of the FBI on August 15, 2001 about Moussaoui’s suspicious behavior (Linder 2006). The FBI interviewed both Pan Am employees during which Prevost stated,

“Do you realize how serious this is? This man wants training on a 747. A 747 fully loaded with fuel could be used as a weapon!” (Linder 2006).

Moussaoui was arrested August 16, 2001, on an immigration violation (Lichtblau 2004). While being detained on immigration violations, the FBI field office in Minneapolis learned Moussaoui may have had terrorist connections even though he denied being a member of any terrorist organization. FBI agent Harry Samit attempted unsuccessfully to convince FBI Headquarters to launch a full-scale investigation into Moussaoui (Barakat 2006; Linder 2006). Agent Samit worked with French officials to have Moussaoui deported to France, where they would conduct a further investigation into his background. On September 11, 2001, agent Samit drove to his office expecting to make final plans for Moussaoui’s deportation (Linder 2006). Following the 9/11 attacks, an investigation into Moussaoui’s personal belongings revealed a handwritten note by Moussaoui listing the phone number of al Qaeda cell member Naamen Meziche in Germany who managed financial arrangements in the United States for the 19 hijackers (Linder 2006). Moussaoui is the only person charged with conspiring to help the 9/11 hijackers (Cosgrove-Mather 2002). He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

02-CR-985 (NY-S) Attas

Hussein Al Attas came to the attention of the FBI as a result of his friend and roommate, Zacarias Moussaoui. Moussaoui was arrested by the FBI on suspicion of an airline-hijacking plot (ATS Report). Moussaoui and Attas were briefly roommates in Norman, Oklahoma where Moussaoui took flying lessons at Airman Flight School

(Cosgrove-Mather 2002). Attas admitted he lied to investigators in Minnesota regarding Moussaoui's plans to participate in violent jihad. Attas was arrested by INS when he admitted to having worked without a work visa (ATS Report). Attas was charged on seven counts of making false statements [Docket]. He pleaded guilty to the charges and sentenced to time served.

02-CR-10013 (MA) Reid

Richard Reid attempted to blow up a transatlantic jetliner with explosives in his shoes on December 22, 2001. The American Airlines Flight 63 was en route from Paris to Miami when Reid attempted to light a fuse protruding from his shoe. Reid first aroused suspicion when he refused anything to eat or drink on the lengthy flight (Goldiner 2002). Later, flight attendant Hermis Moutardier noticed a sulfurous smell of a lighted match coming from Reid (Goldnier 2002). Seeing what Reid was attempting to do the flight attendant yelled, "Oh my God! Somebody help me!" (Elliot 2002). Two flight attendants struggled to keep Reid from igniting his shoes at which point Reid bit the hand of flight attendant Cristina Jones. Several passengers rushed to their aid and subdued Reid by wrapping Reid up in belts and headphone cords immobilizing him in his seat (Flynn 2001). The FBI later concluded Reid had two functional improvised explosive devices in his sneakers with enough explosive material to blow a hole in the fuselage of the aircraft (Evans and Whitworth 2001; Elliot 2002). Reid pleaded guilty to eight counts and was sentenced to the maximum of three consecutive life sentences plus 110 years and fined \$2 million. Reid wrote a

letter from the supermax prison in Colorado in which he stated he felt he spoiled the attempt to ignite the shoe bomb and therefore, failed God (Connor 2015).

03-CR-36 (TX-E) Krar et al.

A misdelivered UPS package developed into one of the most substantial domestic terrorism cases (Axtman 2003). Michael Libecci, a private citizen, contacted police when a package mistakenly delivered to his address was accidentally opened by his family [Criminal Complaint]. Libecci discovered the package contained multiple identification documents displaying photographs of the same person but having different names. Libecci contacted the police who contacted the Newark, New Jersey FBI office. The package contained birth certificates from North Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia, a Social Security card, and other identifications including a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) card [Criminal Complaint]. The sender of the package, **William J. Krar**, included a letter to the receiver, Edward S. Feltus, which stated “Hope this package gets to you O.K., We would hate to have this fall into the wrong hands” [Criminal Complaint]. The New Jersey FBI office contacted the Dallas, Texas FBI office about the package and its’ contents.

Feltus was interviewed by the FBI and admitted to being a member of the “New Jersey Militia” and confessed to sending photos to Krar to develop fraudulent identifications for him. During a nine-month investigation of Krar and his common-law wife, Judith Bruey, the FBI uncovered a would-be deadly plot. FBI agents found five machine guns, boxes filled with over 100,000 rounds of ammunition, two silencers, homemade bombs, bomb-making instructions, chemical weapons, antidotes

for nerve agents, grenades, various military hardware, electronic and non-electronic blasting caps, trip wire, two small containers of Thermite, and documents regarding the production of poisonous gases and methods for delivery (Criminal Complaint; Holguin 2004). Krar was arrested on April 10, 2003, and Bruey was arrested shortly after on May 6, 2003. Krar pleaded guilty to possessing a chemical weapon and was sentenced to 135 months imprisonment. Bruey pleaded guilty to conspiring to be in possession of machine guns, unregistered firearms; and a firearm with an obliterated serial number. She was sentenced to 57 months imprisonment. Feltus cooperated with the FBI against Krar and Bruey and received a \$1,500 fine and no prison time.

04-CR-41 (AL-N) Hemphill

On January 9, 2004, Ben Spittal, a contract maintenance worker for Moncalm Apartments was contacted by the owner of the apartments to enter and clean apartment number 8, **David Nelson Hemphill's** former apartment. While inside, Spittal came across what he believed to be bomb-making material and other suspicious items [Finding a Probable Cause of Detention]. Spittal contacted the Birmingham Police Department who contacted the ATF. ATF agents found multiple pipe bombs and homemade silencers in the apartment. Sometime before Hemphill's arrest, agents from the JTTF returned to the apartment where they discovered a thirty pound bag of fertilizer, and books titled *Homemade C-4: A Recipe for Survival, Improvised Weapons of the American Underground*, and *How to Make War: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare for the Post-Cold War Era* [Finding a Probable Cause of Detention]. Hemphill was arrested with Bruce Metzler. Agents found out that Metzler and

Hemphill stayed at Metzler’s property in Perry County, Alabama. A search of the property revealed more than 700 pounds of ammunition, multiple firearms, end caps and galvanized pipes, detonator cord, and homemade silencers [Finding a Probable Cause of Detention]. Authorities interviewed a former girlfriend of Hemphill’s who stated Hemphill expressed sympathy for militias and made statements that he would defend their apartment when the government came. Hemphill pleaded guilty to 1 count of possession of an unregistered firearm was sentenced to 23 months imprisonment (FBI 2002-2005).

B. Law Enforcement

There are 41 cases where law enforcement officials were responsible for bringing terrorism threats to the attention of the FBI. This category represents the largest group of cases. The cases vary widely in both the types of criminal activity and the law enforcement organizations who discovered the individual(s). Cases were coded “law enforcement” if a potential threat was apprehended through routine police work. Several of the potential threats were discovered as the result of routine traffic stops. Of the cases that went before a trial, five resulted in guilty verdicts and three resulted in not guilty verdicts. Plea agreements were made in twenty-seven cases. One case was dismissed by the judge presiding over the case. One case was dismissed because the defendant was imprisoned abroad. Four cases had split outcomes in which some defendants reached plea agreements, some were convicted at trial, and some were imprisoned overseas.

Table 3 Law Enforcement Case Outcomes

Case Outcome Type	Number of Cases
Plea Agreements	27
Found guilty at trial	5
Acquitted at trial	3
Dismissed	2
Diverse outcomes within case	4*

* 99-CR-666 (WA-W) Ressam et al, 00-CR-15 (NY-S) Haouari et al, 87-CR-78 (VT) Kabbani et al, and 00-CR-147 (NC-W) Hammound had mixed outcomes.

In the following examples, I present typical case summaries that demonstrate how law enforcement agents caught potential terrorists.

00-CR-147 (NC-W) Hammound

Mohamad Youssef Hammoud was arrested with his brother and 22 others in the Western District Court of North Carolina on numerous counts including cigarette trafficking, immigration violations, weapons offenses, and money laundering (Nowell 2000). The scheme involved buying cigarettes in North Carolina, where taxes were five cents a pack, and selling them in Michigan, where prices were 75-cents a pack (The Associated Press 2000). The profits from the cigarette operation were used to fund Hezbollah in Lebanon. The investigation began when a sheriff observed a group of men stuffing large amounts of cigarettes into the trunk of a car with out-of-state tags (DeKieffer 2010). Even though none of the individuals were linked to any planned acts of terrorism, this investigation resulted in one of the most complex

terrorism cases in United States history. Many of the defendants struck a deal with U.S. prosecutors in exchange for their testimony and received probation for their cooperation. **Bassam Hammoud** and **Said Harb** pleaded guilty to 2 counts and received 46 months imprisonment. **Mohamad Darwiche** and **Ali H. Darwiche** pleaded guilty to 2 counts and received 37 months imprisonment. **Mehdi Moussoi** pleaded guilty to 1 count and received 12 months imprisonment. Mohamad Youssef Hammoud and his brother **Chawki Hammoud** were tried before a federal jury and found guilty of providing material support to a terrorist organization. Each was sentenced to 155 years imprisonment (ATS Report). Mohamad Youssef Hammoud's sentence was later reduced by a federal judge to 30 years (ICE 2011).

99-CR-666 (WA-W) Ressam et al **01-CR-832 (NY-S) Doha** **00-CR-15 (NY-S)**
Haouari et al

On December 14, 1999, **Ahmed Ressam**, later known as the Millennium bomber, drove a rental car filled with explosives on the ferryboat "Coho" from Victoria, British Columbia to Port Angeles, Washington. As Ressem departed the ferry in his vehicle, he was stopped by a customs inspector in Port Angeles who noticed Ressam acting suspicious and asked to search his vehicle. During the search of the vehicle, U.S. Customs inspectors discovered in the tire well ten plastic bags containing over 100 pounds of fine white powder, two plastic bags containing roughly 14 pounds of crystalline powder, two 22 ounce jars of filled with yellowish liquid, and four small black boxes containing a circuit board connected to a Casio watch and 9 volt battery connector [Criminal Complaint]. While Ressam was being escorted away

from the car he broke free from inspectors and fled on foot into the neighboring area. A chase ensued for five or six blocks but Ressay was eventually captured and taken into custody [Criminal Complaint]. The FBI was contacted and agents discovered Ressay belonged to a Canadian based Algerian terrorist cell linked to Al-Qaeda. During the investigation Ressay admitted to officials that he had traveled to Afghanistan in 1998 where he trained at a jihad camp and developed the Millennium plot. Ressay along with others, plotted to detonate explosive devices at Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve. Ressay was indicted and convicted of nine counts including conspiracy to commit an international terrorist act (PBS 2014). **Abdelmajid Dahoumane** was also named in a superseding indictment for his involvement in the Millennium plot but escaped to Afghanistan before capture. Dahoumane was later apprehended by Algerian security forces and convicted of terrorism related crimes (PBS 2014).

With a potential 130 year prison sentence looming, Ressay agreed to cooperate with the FBI and other foreign governments for a reduced sentence. Ressay implicated **Abu Doha** as the gatekeeper to Islamic militant training camps in Afghanistan (Hirschkom 2001). Doha, an Algerian-born Montreal shopkeeper, trafficked in fake passports and identification papers. Doha moved to the United Kingdom after serving in a leadership position in al Qaeda's training camps in Afghanistan (Center for Defense Information 2003). Doha's London apartment was searched and contained materials linking him to the Millennium plot (Hirschkom 2001). Doha was arrested in February 2001 and imprisoned in Britain.

Ressam also linked **Mokhtar Houari** and **Abdel Ghani Meskini** to the conspiracy. The men were indicted on a number of charges including providing false identification for the purposes of acquiring explosive materials, bank fraud, and importing and exporting firearms without a license [Indictment]. Meskini negotiated a plea with prosecutors for a reduced sentence if he testified against Haouari. He was sentenced to 72 months imprisonment. Haouari was sentenced to 288 months imprisonment (ATS Report). Ressam initially received a reduced sentence of 22 years imprisonment for his cooperation, however was resentenced in 2005 when he ceased cooperating claiming he had “forgotten” earlier information he provided (Crumley 2006).

03-CR-90 (TX-S) Carpenter et al

A multi-state identity theft ring was discovered as the result of an attentive deputy in Harris County, Florida. The deputy noticed a number of parcels being delivered to a vacant home in his patrol area (Feldstein 2004). He learned the house had been previously burglarized by **Jason Michael Carpenter**, a kid whose parents lived in the neighborhood. The deputy’s investigation into the mysterious packages resulted in the uncovering of a complex identity theft ring, at which point the FBI became involved. Carpenter had already shown up on the FBI’s radar due to his activities as a self-proclaimed anarchist (Feldstein 2004). Carpenter provided the FBI with information regarding his coconspirators, however he neglected to inform the agents of his own wrongdoings. His role and depth in the crime was revealed because of the deputy’s investigation (Feldstein 2004). Posing as AOL, Carpenter sent emails

to thousands of people asking for their personal information. The “phishing” scheme, as it is known, resulted in Carpenter and his cohorts illegally incurring more than \$1.4 million in credit (Feldstein 2004). **Jonathon Lee Riches** and **Stephanie Costley Doyle** were arrested in Texas as main actors in the computer scam along with Carpenter. Numerous superseding indictments were filed resulting in five more individuals identified in the scheme. **Timothy Riches, Donna Riches, Michael Scott Pesce, Stephen Paul Marcenko, and Bernard Duzinski** were named as coconspirators. All the defendants agreed to plea deals. Carpenter was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment after pleading guilty to one count of conspiring to launder funds and one count of fraud in connection with access devices (ATS Report). He was also ordered to pay restitution of \$341,366.38. Jonathon Lee Riches was sentenced to 125 months imprisonment after pleading guilty to one count of conspiring to launder funds and one count of wire fraud. He was ordered to pay restitution totaling \$92,680. Doyle was sentenced to two years imprisonment after pleading guilty to one count of conspiring to launder funds. She was ordered to pay restitution totaling \$56,800. Timothy and Donna Riches each pleaded guilty to one count of withholding information and were sentenced to three years of probation. Pesce’s disposition and sentencing were sealed (ATS Report). Marcenko pleaded guilty to one count of fraud in connection with identification documents and was sentenced to three years imprisonment. Duzinski also pleaded guilty to one count of fraud in connection with identification documents and was sentenced to one year imprisonment (ATS Report). During an interview with CNN documentary filmmakers, Carpenter stated, “stealing identities was fun and ‘incredibly easy’” (CNN 2006).

88-CR-166 (NJ) Kikumura

A New Jersey state trooper's attentiveness led to the prevention of a potentially deadly act of terrorism. Officer Robert Cieplensky spotted a car driving carelessly and pulled the vehicle over. During the exchange between Officer Cieplensky and **Yu Kikumura**, the officer noticed several cylinders on the backseat of the car [Sentencing Opinion]. Officer Cieplensky conducted a more thorough search of Kikumura's car and found three homemade bombs along with a bag of lead shot and gunpowder canisters. An investigation into Kikumura revealed he was a member of the Japanese Red Army. The Japanese Red Army is an international terrorist group with the objective of overthrowing the Japanese Government and instilling a worldwide communist revolution (The Associated Press 2000). Investigators claimed Kikumura intended to bomb the Navy recruiting office located in New York City on April 14 in retaliation to the U.S. bombing of Libya two years prior (Drogin 1989). Kikumura was indicted in July 1988, and charged with unlawful transporting of explosive material with intent to intimidate and destroy property; unlawful transportation and possession of a firearm; possession of an unregistered firearm; possession of a firearm without a serial number; use of an altered passport; misuse of a passport; and fraud and misuse of a visa. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment (ATS Report). The federal judge presiding over the case stated to Kikumura at sentencing, "There is no conclusion that can be drawn, other than that you are an international terrorist." (Drogin 1989).

C. Undercover Agent

The undercover agent category is a subcategory of the law enforcement category. Undercover operations were launched by both federal government agencies and local police. Operations took many forms from general meetings with unsuspecting defendants regarding stolen merchandise to complex years-long operations with multiple undercover operatives. Undercover agent is the smallest category with a total of 24 cases. This is, again, to be expected. Undercover operations are deliberate and typically occur in the later stages of an investigation. As such, most cases involved some other informer alerting the FBI to the potential threat earlier in the process. Many of the civilian and law enforcement cases involved undercover operations in the later stages of the case, but were coded as civilian or law enforcement because I was able to determine the initiator of the case. In some of the cases, an agent was already in place when he or she learned of a potential plot. For example, an agent was already part of a jihadist online forum when a prospective terrorist with plans to carry out violent terrorist acts joined the group and started communicating about his plans. In many of the cases coded as undercover agent, I was unable to determine exactly how or why the undercover operation was originally put into effect; still, these cases resulted in the apprehension of possible terrorists so they were included as a distinct category.

The majority of the cases in this category resulted in plea bargains (19 cases). One case went to trial and resulted in a guilty verdict. Four cases resulted in mixed outcomes that included plea bargains, convictions at trial, acquittals at trial, charges dismissed, and a fugitive from the law. The high rate of plea bargaining in this category

is likely due to the amount of evidence accumulated by the undercover agent against the defendant(s).

Table 4 Undercover Agent Case Outcomes

Case Outcome Type	Number of Cases
Plea Agreements	19
Found guilty at trial	1
Dismissed	0
Diverse outcomes within case	4*

* 86-CR-184 (MA) Murphy et al, 86-CR-354 (CO) Gumaer, 86-CR-572 (IL-N) Fort et al, and 92-CR-587 (AZ) Maguire et al had mixed outcomes

In the following examples, I present typical case summaries that highlight how undercover agents reported plots to the FBI.

09-CR-294 (TX-N) Smadi

Hosam Maher Husein Smadi first came to the attention of the FBI as a result of his own actions. Smadi posted in an online group about his plans to conduct terror acts in the United States [Criminal Complaint]. An undercover FBI agent was a member of the online group and made contact with Smadi. Smadi made it clear to the agent that he served Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda and planned to engage in violent jihad [Criminal Complaint]. The undercover agent communicated with Smadi roughly 40 times over a two month period. Two other undercover agents were introduced to

Smadi. One agent played the role of a lower level operational soldier for a sleeper cell while the other agent played the role as a senior al-Qaeda member [Criminal Complaint]. Smadi strongly conveyed to all the undercover agents his desire to engage in violent jihad within the United States. The undercover agents frequently urged Smadi to reconsider his understanding of jihad but he refused to consider nonviolent actions. Smadi met with undercover agents several times and conveyed various targets he was considering attacking. Smadi and the agents travelled to some of the locations to conduct surveillance. Again agents tried to discourage Smadi from engaging in violent jihad but he was resolute. Smadi decided the Fountain Place office building in Dallas, Texas was an ideal target. One of the undercover agents provided Smadi with inactive explosives which Smadi placed in his car and parked at the base of the building [Criminal Complaint]. When Smadi was trying to execute his plan, he was apprehended and taken into custody. Smadi was indicted with two counts of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction; and bombing of a place of public use. He pleaded guilty to count 1 and was sentenced to twenty-four years imprisonment [Judgment].

03-CR-434 (TX-N) Chewning et al

In March of 2002, **Kathy Chewning, James Peavler Jr., Scott Hall** and **Melissa Templin** arranged with an undercover FBI agent the exchange of an explosive device, specifically a hand grenade for \$500.00. The defendants met with the undercover agents several times and discussed locating more “suppliers” in order to provide the undercover agent with machine guns, grenades, and other weapons

[Indictment]. Hall met with the undercover agent at his residence and offered to sell the agent a homemade explosive device for \$300.00. Hall offered to reduce the price to \$50.00 if the weapon would be used to attack African Americans or Mexicans [Indictment]. The individuals were issued a 5-count indictment on December 17, 2003, with violations of conspiracy to possess and transfer unregistered weapons; and unlawful transfer of an unregistered destructive device and aiding and abetting. All the defendants made plea agreements. Chewing pleaded guilty to counts one and three and was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment. Peavler and Templin pleaded guilty to counts one and three. Peavler was sentenced to 37 months imprisonment and Templin was sentenced to 46 months imprisonment. Hall pleaded guilty to counts one, four, and five of the indictment. He was sentenced to 71 months imprisonment.

89-CR-192 (AZ) Davis et al

On May 30, 1989, **Mark Leslie Davis**, **Margaret Katherine Millett**, and **Marc Andre Baker** were arrested attempting to cut down a Department of Energy electrical transmission line that serves the pump stations for the Central Arizona Project (Criminal Complaint). The individuals were members of the Evan Mechem Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy (EMETIC) group whose goal was to disrupt nuclear power in the western United States. The individuals discussed their plans to take down the tower in front of an undercover FBI agent who warned authorities of the plot. The plan was part of a larger conspiracy to take out numerous electrical transmission towers in Arizona, California, and Colorado simultaneously. **David Foreman** was arrested following the attempted strike. Foreman had previously told

the undercover agent that he provided \$580.00 to finance the attack and would provide more funding as necessary. Numerous indictments were filed against the defendants and another defendant **Ilse Asplund** was added. The defendants were charged with several violations including conspiracy to damage the property of an energy facility; attempting to destroy an electrical transmission line used in interstate commerce; and causing damage to an electrical transmission tower of Department of Energy (ATS Report). All the defendants negotiated plea bargains. Asplund and Baker pleaded guilty to count one. Asplund was sentenced to 30 days imprisonment and ordered to pay a \$2,000.00 fine. Baker was sentenced to 6 months imprisonment and ordered to pay a \$5,000.00 fine (ATS Report). Millet and Davis pleaded guilty to count two. Millet was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of \$19,821.00. Davis was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of \$19,821.00. Foreman's defense team separated him from the other defendants on the premise that he did not actively engage in the incident. He pleaded guilty to felony conspiracy for distributing copies of *Ecodefense* and was placed on 5 years of probation (Long 2004).

90-CR-587 (NJ) Warrayat

On August 31, 1990, **Jamal Mohamed Warrayat** spoke with an undercover FBI agent and stated he and his group had weapons and materials to carry out a terrorist operation. He indicated that each member of his group had military training [Criminal Complaint]. On November 8, 1990, Warrayat met with an undercover agent in the Newark International Airport area. He stated again that he and his group,

consisting of seven others, were planning to conduct terrorist acts and had a number of targets identified (Ostrow 1990). These targets included military bases in Texas and North Carolina and high-level government officials. On December 6, 1990, a 3-count indictment was issued for Warrayat charging him with violations of conspiracy to damage and destroy federal buildings; committing depredations against the United States property; threats against the President; and threats to assault and murder a United States official (ATS Report). He pleaded guilty to making threats against the President and was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment.

D. Confidential Informant

There are 32 confidential informant cases. The cases vary widely in the way by which they were brought to the attention of authorities. It was not always clear how the confidential informant came to be involved with a case or when they started working with the authorities. In some cases the confidential informant was aiding authorities in order to get a more lenient sentence for his or her own criminal acts. In other cases, the confidential informants became nervous by the actions of others in the group and decided to go to authorities.

The case outcomes were extremely varied in this category. Plea agreements were made in fourteen cases. Six cases went to trial, which all resulted in guilty verdicts. Twelve cases had diverse outcomes involving plea bargains, dismissals, and guilty findings. It appears the use of confidential informants allows for the case to proceed further into the conspiracy; as such, a lot of the cases that involved

confidential informants had multiple defendants in a single case. This potentially is why there are so many diverse outcomes cases in this category.

Table 5 Confidential Informant Case Outcomes

Case Outcome Type	Number of Cases
Plea Agreements	14
Found guilty at trial	6
Dismissed	0
Diverse outcomes within case	12*

* 02-CR-39 (CA-C) Rubin et al, 04-CR-134 (AR-E) Kahlil, 05-CR-200 (AR-E) Kahlil, 96-CR-40 (WV-N) Looker et al, 96-CR-41 (WV-N) Looker et al, 96-CR-42 (WV-N) Looker et al, 96-CR-43(WV-N) Coon et al, 98-CR-30035 (IL-S) McGiffen et al, 88-CR-168 (VA-E) Hawamda, 93-CR-89 (MO-E) Musa et al, 96-CR-500 (WA-W) Pitner et al, and 99-CR-551 (CA-E) Patterson all had mixed outcomes.

The following examples demonstrate standard case summaries that highlight how confidential informants reported plots to the FBI.

00-CR-9 (TX-E) McCool

Former leader of the Texas Militia, **Mark Wayne McCool** planned to attack the Houston Texas Federal building (Southern Poverty Law Center 2005). McCool made comments about his plot to an FBI cooperating witness. He indicated he had conducted surveillance on the building and knew how to construct a bomb [Affidavit]. McCool’s motive for the planned attack stems from experiences he had in the past with various minority groups. For example, McCool stated to the cooperating witness he was passed up for promotion in the Navy in favor of African Americans [Affidavit]. McCool gave the cooperating witness a bag with \$10,000.00 in cash, literature on how

to construct different explosive devices, and a phone book with numbers and location coordinates for other possible attacks. Under the direction of the FBI, the cooperating witness mentioned to McCool that he knew of someone trying to sell weapons such as Light Anti-Tank Weapons and automatic rifles. After several meeting with undercover agents posing as arms suppliers, McCool attempted to purchase C-4 from an undercover agent and was arrested by Houston's JTTF. C-4 is a highly effective explosive used only by the military and therefore, assumed stolen if distributed by a private dealer [Affidavit]. McCool was charged with unlawful possession of an unregistered firearm and receipt of stolen explosive materials transported in interstate or foreign commerce [Judgement]. He pleaded guilty to the second count and received six months imprisonment (Southern Poverty Law Center 2005).

02-CR-39 (CA-C) Rubin et al

On October 19, 2001, **Earl Leslie Krugel, Irving David Rubin** and an individual who would later become a confidential witness for the FBI, attended a meeting to discuss plans to commit bombings against buildings associated with Arab religious or political institutions [Indictment]. Krugel and Rubin were members of the Jewish Defense league (JDL), a Jewish militant organization whose goal is to protect Jews from anti-Semitism by whatever means necessary. Following the initial meeting, Rubin and Krugel met with the confidential witness on numerous occasions to advance the bombing plot. Such meetings included identifying targets, acquiring bomb making materials, and determining the logistics of the scheme. Based on the confidential witness's information, a 7-count indictment was issued for Krugel and

Rubin charging the men with violating conspiracy; use of a destructive device; attempted arson at King Fahd Mosque; attempted arson of a Muslim public office; attempted arson of Congressman Darrell Issa's office; possession of firearms; and solicitation to engage in committing arson (ATS Report). In addition to the previous charges, Krugel was charged with machine gun possession; and non-registered gun possession. The men pleaded not guilty to all charges. A superseding indictment was filed against the defendants charging them with violations of arson by destructive use of weapons of mass destruction (ATS Report). Eventually, Krugel agreed to a plea agreement. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate civil rights and carrying an explosive device during the commission of a federal felony. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Rubin's case was dropped when he died from injuries suffered during a jailhouse suicide attempt (Wides 2005).

06-CR-35 (CA-E) McDavid et al

In July 2005, **Eric McDavid** attended a CrimethInc-organized convergence of anarchists in Bloomington, Indiana [Criminal Complaint]. Shortly after the event, McDavid spoke with a confidential informant (CI), who had been embedded within the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) cell by the FBI since 2004, regarding his plans to engage in criminal activity. McDavid planned to target various commercial and government facilities with explosive devices he made from household items. McDavid specifically identified banks, commercial trucks, mountaintop removal projects, Communist party Offices, and a facility in Placerville, California engaged in the genetic engineering of trees [Criminal Complaint]. In August 2005, McDavid

requested CI acquire gas masks and a chemical equivalency list to help build the homemade explosive devices. McDavid told CI he planned to commit the bombings in spring 2006 [Criminal Complaint].

During Pointless Fest, McDavid invited two anarchists, **Zachary Jenson** and **Lauren Weiner**, to partake in his bombing plot. Weiner's role was to take care of the details of the plot while Jenson's role was to write the letters claiming responsibility following the bombings. In January 2006, the individuals along with CI traveled to Auburn, California where they conducted research on potential targets and surveilled the California Department of Fish and Game Region II Nimbus Fish Hatchery [Criminal Complaint]. The group purchased various items to make an explosive device including bleach, rubber gloves, glassware, and respirator masks. The individuals were arrested on January 13, 2006, and charged with violations of conspiracy to damage and destroy property by fire and an explosive. Jenson and Weiner pleaded guilty to conspiracy and testified against McDavid in exchange for lenient sentences. They both received time served. McDavid pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 235 months imprisonment. McDavid accused CI of leading him on romantically and ultimately entrapping him; however, three U.S. District Judges upheld the conviction stating McDavid was an active participant, if not leader, in targeting the Institute of Forest Genetics (Walsh 2010).

98-CR-30035 (IL-S) McGiffen et al

In May of 1997, a source contacted the FBI to report some of his acquaintances were forming a new group called the "New Order," a group with white supremacist

ideology seeking a pure white Christian country (U.S. Court of Appeals 2001). The source along with undercover agents from the FBI and ATF infiltrated the group.

Dennis McGiffen, Wallace Weicherding, Ralph P. Bock, and Glenn L. Lowtharp, all members of the New Order, stockpiled various weapons including fully automatic machine guns, grenades, pipe bombs, and LAWS (referring to the LAWS rocket). The New Order intended to raise money by robbing banks and armored cars to fund the newly formed group [Criminal Complaint]. McGiffen acted as the leader of the outfit and organized meetings and instituted plans to acquire weapons and money to pursue the New Order's agenda (U.S. Court of Appeals 2001). McGiffen enlisted Weicherding to conduct surveillance on armored trucks and various banks while Bock was tasked with coordinating the procurement of weapons and explosives. Lowtharp aided in converting semi-automatic weapons into illegal fully-automatic weapons [Criminal Complaint]. Members of the group discussed in detail attacking the Southern Poverty Law Center in Montgomery, Alabama and Morris Dees who co-founded the center.

On February 23, 1998, the FBI obtained search warrants for several New Order locations and produced substantial evidence against the group while executing the search warrants. Authorities found stockpiles of weapons and seized thousands of dollars in cash. On March 5, 1998, a single count indictment was filed against the men charging them with violations of conspiracy to defraud the United States. A superseding indictment was later filed charging Weicherding with violations of conspiracy to make firearms not registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record; and conspiracy to possess a machine gun (ATS Report).

Weicherding was convicted of both counts and sentenced to 70 months imprisonment.

McGiffen pleaded guilty to count one and sentenced to 87 months imprisonment.

Bock pleaded guilty to count one and was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment.

Lowtharp pleaded guilty to count one and sentenced to 20 months imprisonment (ATS Report).

97-CR-162 (CO) Cole et al

A confidential informant (CI) provided the majority of information against the Colorado First Light Infantry (CFLI). The CI joined the Marine Corps Reserves in January 1994 and was given an honorable discharge a year later after developing exercise-induced asthma [Criminal Complaint]. The CI stated the military was a defining moment in his life and helped him to establish priorities. In July of 1996, the CI began working at the Westminster Mall Sam Goody store. While there, **Kevin Terry** was the assistant store manager. Terry and the CI bonded over a shared interest in firearms and tactics. Terry invited the CI to go shooting with him and his two roommates, **Ron Cole** and **Wallace Stanley Kennett**. The CI learned that Terry, Cole, and Kennett were members of the CFLI. He also learned Cole had founded the group following the events that took place at the Waco siege in Texas in 1993.

Over the span of several months, the CI observed the members with various weapons including automatic firearms and pipe bombs [Criminal Complaint]. Furthermore, Cole told the CI he had created a website for the North American Liberation Army (NALA) in an attempt to unite groups from around the world whom

are fighting oppression from their governments. The CI discovered that Cole and the other roommates engaged with various terrorist groups via the internet.

After 8 months of extensive investigation into the group, the FBI raided their Aurora, Colorado home on May 1, 1997. Authorities found stockpiles of weapons and explosives. The men had also engineered explosive booby traps around their home to alert them of trespassers (Chronis and Pankratz 1997). An 8-count indictment was issued on May 8, 1997, charging the men with violations of conspiracy; unlawful possession of a machine gun; and possession of an unregistered firearm. Cole pleaded guilty to four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 27 months imprisonment. Kennett pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. Terry pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a machine gun and sentenced to 12 months imprisonment.

E. Self

The self category is comprised of cases where the individual incriminates himself or herself to law enforcement. For example, an individual who mailed a threatening letter to a federal judge was included in this category. The person was unknown to law enforcement until their actions, not the actions of anyone else, brought them under the scrutiny of the FBI.

Many of the cases in the self category involve some type of hoax. For instance, an individual who was upset with her boyfriend at the time, called the airline and claimed her boyfriend was planning on blowing up his flight. She was unknown to the FBI until her actions brought attention to herself. A number of self-

incriminating cases involved prisoners already incarcerated; many of whom had some type of mental illness. This, perhaps, speaks to the fact that when the government deinstitutionalized mental healthcare facilities in the 1980s, a significant portion of mentally ill persons were unable to receive appropriate treatment and have since ended up in the criminal justice system. A study conducted by the Department of Justice on mental illness found roughly 64 percent of local jail inmates, 56 percent of state prisoners, and 45 percent of federal prisoners have symptoms of severe mental illness (Fitzpatrick 2006). Finally, a handful of self-incriminated cases were the result of “declarations of war” made public by the defendants. These cases typically involved defendants associated with some radical group that opposed the United States government.

The self case outcomes were mixed. Twenty-four cases resulted in the defendant(s) making plea bargains. Four of the cases went to trial and of those, three were found guilty and one was acquitted. Four cases were dismissed for a variety of reasons. One case had diverse outcomes in which some defendants made plea bargains and others were sentenced at trial.

Table 6 Self Case Outcomes

Case Outcome Type	Number of Cases
Plea Agreements	24
Found guilty at trial	3
Acquitted at trial	1
Dismissed	4
Diverse outcomes within case	1*

*87-CR-3247 (MO-W) Jackson et al had mixed outcomes

In the following examples, I present typical case summaries that highlight how people incriminate themselves to the FBI.

01-CR-1181 (NY-S) Saldanha

At Grand Central Terminal in New York City, New York, a Private First Class with the United States National Guard had just completed his tour of duty when a man approached him with two envelopes. The man told the Private he found the envelopes by a nearby telephone booth and did not know who had placed them there [Complaint]. The envelopes were addressed to Tom Brokaw and the Editor of the New York Post. At the time, a number of incidents had occurred with the mailing of anthrax to various public figures throughout the United States and in the state of New York [Complaint]. The Private told Saldanha to carefully put the envelopes on the ground and then the men contacted the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Police

Department. The envelopes were removed by law enforcement and sent to the Department of Health to be analyzed. Saldanha voluntarily went to the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Police Department office where he gave his statement of events. The FBI became involved in the investigation and interviewed Saldanha who maintained he did not know who left the letters there. After further questioning, Saldanha admitted he brought the letters to Grand Central Terminal and planned on giving the letters to military personnel. Saldanha confessed he had downloaded copies of the anthrax-contaminated letters that were in the media and added talcum powder to the envelopes [Criminal Complaint]. Saldanha was indicted on two counts of making materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements; and making false statements about envelopes containing anthrax [Docket]. He pleaded guilty to both charges and was sentenced to six months imprisonment [Judgment].

03-CR-226 (HI) Ferguson

On April 18, 2003, Royal Caribbean Cruise ship LEGEND OF THE SEAS departed Ensenada, Mexico on a ten day cruise to the Hawaiian Islands [Criminal Complaint]. **Kelly Marie Ferguson** was a passenger on this cruise with her parents. While the ship was in international water, two handwritten notes were found. One note stated:

“Very importante (sic): I have been sent on a mission to kill all Americanos aboard (sic) Legend if we port on American soil. Once we port on American soil in any form of transportation all Americanos are dead. Give this warning to El Capti'on (sic) to save all lives. Do take this serious he sent me from far away land for mission I will complete if port on American soil. **I Will Kill All.**”
[Criminal Complaint]

The second note had basically the same message threatening to kill Americans if the boat docked on American soil. The Captain informed the passengers and crew of the notes and diverted the boat to Hilo, Hawaii [Criminal Complaint]. Once at bay, law enforcement interviewed crew and passengers and searched the ship for explosive materials. During an interview with law enforcement, Ferguson confessed to writing the notes in hopes that the cruise ship would return to Mexico. Ferguson thought if the cruise was cancelled, she could return home to Orange County and get to be with her boyfriend (Sanchez 2003). Ferguson was arrested and indicted on two counts of conveying false information concerning an attempt to cause death to passengers and employees of a mass transportation provider engaged in an affecting foreign commerce (ATS Report). Ferguson's mother, Debra Ferguson, told news reporters her daughter was a "brat" and refused to post bail for her crimes (Honolulu Star-Bulletin Hawaii News 2003). Ferguson pleaded guilty to count one on the indictment and was sentenced to two years imprisonment [Judgment].

04-CR-609 (CA-C) Mohamed

The Department of Homeland Security received an anonymous phone call on April 23, 2004, regarding a potential terrorist plot. The caller, later identified as **Zameer Nooralla Mohamed**, claimed four terrorists affiliated with al Qaeda were entering the United States illegally from Canada and planning to bomb a shopping mall near UCLA (Rosenzweig 2005). Mohamed named his ex-girlfriend and three of her friends as the perpetrators. After a massive terrorism investigation ensued, FBI agents discovered Mohamed had been arrested in Boulder, Montana on immigration

violations. During an interview with FBI agents, Mohamed admitted he made the phony claim against the four individuals because they owed him money (Rosenzweig 2005). The increased security around the shopping mall resulted in hundreds of thousands of dollars lost for retail businesses (The Canadian Press 2004). Mohamed was indicted on one count of use of a telephone to threaten and convey false information concerning an attempt to damage or destroy building or property by means of fire or explosive [Indictment]. Mohamed pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 60 months imprisonment.

11-CR-1177 (CA-C) Sariol

On September 25, 2011, an anonymous telephone call was made to the TSA office at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) regarding a bomb threat. The female caller stated she did not want to give her name but received a suspicious text message regarding a potential threat. The caller, later identified as **Lizet Sariol**, stated she met a group of foreigners in downtown Los Angeles and one of the individuals had sent her a very threatening text message. She would not elaborate on the message but maintained the message was very frightening. Sariol stated the group was traveling from LAX to Las Vegas, Nevada, and then to Paris, France. She gave the full name of passenger Adnen Mansouri and first names of Annie and Sergio; the rest of the group she did not have names for [Affidavit]. Mansouri was stopped by FBI and TSA agents when he checked in and stated he was not surprised they were investigating him. Mansouri indicated he had met Sariol while on vacation in the United States and she was harassing him [Affidavit]. Mansouri and Sariol had a sexual relationship. When

Mansouri ended the relationship with her and un-friended her from Facebook, she became upset with him. Sariol sent Mansouri multiple messages on Facebook indicating she was unhappy with the way she was being treated by him. She ended one of her messages with “Really hope you all have a great flight” [Affidavit 8]. Sariol was interviewed by FBI agents. In the beginning of the interview Sariol maintained that the group was suspicious and need to be investigated further. Towards the end of the interview however, she stated that she realized what she did was wrong and was remorseful for her actions. Sariol was indicted and charged with false information and hoaxes. She pleaded guilty to the offense and was sentenced to two years of probation and 100 hours of community service (Judgment; Romero 2012).

86-CR-292 (AZ) Hagen et al **86-CR-336 (AZ) Schlecht et al** **86-CR-337 (AZ) Schlecht** **86-CR-338 (AZ) Hoover**

The Arizona Patriots, an anti-Semitic group who focused on amassing weapons and taunting public officials, first achieved public notice by its efforts to jam the Arizona court system with nuisance lawsuits in the 1980s (Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium 2014). Leader of the Arizona Patriots Ty Hardin, edited *The Arizona Patriot*, a monthly journal that printed tirades against government officials. In June 1984, an “indictment” was released by the Arizona Patriots which stated if Arizona elected officials did not resign within 30 days they would face a “grand jury inquest” (The Nizkor Project 1991-2012). The FBI intensified its investigation of the group as a result of the threats made in their indictment. The FBI was able to insert undercover agents into the group and discovered a meticulously organized plot to rob

a Wells Fargo armored truck in Nevada to finance a paramilitary base (The Nizkor Project 1991-2012). The investigation also revealed the Arizona Patriots were in possession of a homemade blowgun, night-vision goggles, spent shell casings, gas masks, numerous rocket ammunition crates and Aryan Nation materials. As a result, several Arizona Patriot members were arrested.

On December 17, 1986, a number of indictments were issued naming **Jack Oliphant, Daniel Arthur, Monte Ross, Jack Schlecht, J.R. Hagen, Tom Palmer, Rita Schlecht, and Foster Thomas Hoover**. In one indictment, Hagen and Palmer were charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Hagen pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years imprisonment. Palmer pleaded guilty but was transferred to Kansas to await additional sentencing there (ATS Report). In the second indictment, Oliphant, Jack Schlecht, Arthur, and Ross were charged with solicitation to commit a crime of violence; possession of unregistered explosive devices; and possession of unregistered firearms. Each defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to solicit a crime of violence. Oliphant, Arthur, and Ross were sentenced to four years imprisonment; Jack Schlecht was sentenced to five years of probation (ATS Report). In the third indictment, Rita Schlecht was charged with two counts of assaulting a federal officer; and carrying a firearm during an assault on a federal officer. Chargers against her were dropped shortly after the indictment was issued (ATS Report). In the final indictment, Hoover, one of the most prominent of those arrested due to his expertise with explosives, was indicted on one count of possession of a destructive device; and two counts of possession of illegal firearms. Hoover was found guilty of

illegal possession of a homemade mortar and a pistol and sentenced to five years of probation. Following these highly politicized arrests, the Arizona Patriots disbanded.

F. Other

Cases that were coded “other” were typically cases that involved a type of fraud. For example, a case was coded “other” when authorities identified a money laundering scheme and notified the FBI. Some of these cases did not explicitly state who alerted the FBI to situation; rather, it just stated fraud was discovered. I kept these cases in because while it did not specifically state who notified authorities, it was clear that the fraud was the reason the individual(s) were arrested. In one case, a “tip” alerted authorities to a potential plot. As it did not state who the tip was from, I coded this into the “other” category. Many of the fraud cases were identified Post-9/11. This is likely due to the proactive shift in the counterterrorism paradigm Post-9/11.

Cases that did not clearly fit into one of the previously discussed classifications were also grouped into the other category. For example, a number of cases involved the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation conducting its own investigation into one of its employees and later notified the FBI about the situation. These cases were not obvious matches to one of the previously mentioned categories and thus, were included in other.

The “other” case outcomes had a large concentration of plea bargains. Fourteen cases resulted in plea bargains. This category also had a high proportion of cases that went to trial. Six cases went to trial and all of them resulted in guilty verdicts. One case was dismissed and three cases had diverse outcomes.

Table 7 Other Case Outcomes

Case Outcome Type	Number of Cases
Plea Agreements	14
Found guilty at trial	6
Dismissed	1
Diverse outcomes within case	3*

*01-CR-10423 (MA) Hussein et al, 01-CR-3240 (CA-E) Abdulah et al, and 03-CR-64 (NY-N) Dhafir et al had mixed outcomes.

In the following examples, I present typical case summaries that highlight how cases coded as other alerted the FBI to potential terrorist's plots.

97-CR-205 (FL-M) Orns

A gruesome murder plot and robbery was prevented as the result of an early tip made to federal agents. In response to the tip, an undercover ATF agent posing as a driver for an armored car met with **Bradley James Orns** to discuss Orn's plot, which included robbing two Jacksonville armored car guards. Specifically, he told the undercover agent he planned to suffocate the guards and cut up their bodies with a hacksaw. The money from the armored car would be concealed in storage lockers and they would make a clean getaway using false identities (Schoettler 1997). Orns had already collected materials such as duct tape, plastic bags, and guns to use during the robbery and murder of the guards. Orns was arrested in April 1997 in Jacksonville, Florida. A search of his belongings revealed a computer disk containing a fake Florida Driver's License with his picture. A 2-count indictment was filed against Orns charging

him with violations of interference with commerce by threat or violence; and fraud with identification documents [Indictment]. Orns was convicted and sentenced to 240 months imprisonment. The FBI determined Orns was planning to use the profits from the robbery to fund militia groups and assist them in performing violent conflicts with the U.S. government (FBI 1997).

01-CR-325 (MN) Halvorson

Steven Mark Halvorson was prosecuted on June 3, 1999, for illegally operating a motor vehicle in Minnesota [Indictment]. Halvorson retaliated against those whom he perceived wronged him by filing fictitious forms claiming various law enforcement officials, public officials, and public employees had made money orders payments on his behalf. Halvorson alleged seventeen individuals, most of which consisted of Minnesota law enforcement, wrote money orders totaling more than \$48,000,000.00 to the State of Minnesota and Kandiyohi County on his behalf [Indictment]. Halvorson was indicted on November 8, 2001, after filing numerous Form 8300's and two fictitious sight drafts at the Atwater State Bank in Atwater, Minnesota and Bremer Bank in Alexandria, Minnesota. He was charged with 14 counts of making false statements; one count of false statements; and three counts of fictitious obligations [Indictment]. On September 30, 2002, Halvorson was found guilty of all 18 counts and he was sentenced to 37 months imprisonment (ATS Report).

02-CR-177 (MN) Cunningham

An IRS investigation revealed from September 1998 through November 1999 **Richard Cunningham** used fraudulent sight drafts to pay various debts [Government's Response to the Motion Under 28 U.S.C. 2255]. Cunningham wrote a number of fictitious sight drafts to cover his child support debt as well as to other individuals and businesses. Cunningham also filed a number of Form 8300s against many of the individuals and businesses who refused to accept his counterfeit payments [Government's Response to the Motion Under 28 U.S.C. 2255]. A 17-count indictment was issued on June 4, 2002, charging him with 11 counts of fictitious obligations and 6 counts of making false statements to the IRS. Cunningham was found guilty of all counts and sentenced to 52 months imprisonment (ATS Report).

03-CR-30 (MS-N) Ahmad et al

The coordinated efforts of the U.S. Postal Service, INS, FBI, and Tupelo Police Department led to the arrest and indictment of **Khaled Ahmad, Jamal Awad,** and **Osama Ismail** for a multi-million dollar coupon scheme. Between November 22, 1999, and December 30, 2002, the men obtained large quantities of coupons from newspapers and submitted them to International Data Inc., a coupon redemption clearing house, where they redeemed more than \$4.5 million illegally (Mitchell 2003). The individuals submitted coupons from hundreds of stores and fictitious stores and used the fraudulent earnings to support various Palestinian groups. On March 20, 2003, a 209-count indictment was filed against Ahmad, Awad, and Ismail charging them with violations of laundering of monetary instruments; frauds and swindles; and aiding and abetting mail fraud (ATS Report). Ahmad pleaded guilty to one count and


was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment; Awad pleaded guilty to 1 count and was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment; and Ismail pleaded guilty to 33 counts and was sentenced to 7 months imprisonment [Docket]. All three men were ordered to pay restitution to International Data Inc.

2. Quantitative Results

The quantitative portion of this study is primarily descriptive as I am ascertaining characteristics of relationships and not answering questions as to why the characteristics appear. Due to the nature of exploratory research, explanatory relationship distinctions cannot be made at this point in time. As such, I am predominantly examining distributions and trends.

A. Research Question One

Research question one investigates the common ways the FBI is alerted to potential terrorist threats. As previously mentioned, there are many ways the FBI is informed of possible threats. I used a frequency distribution of the variable *FBI Aware* to determine the distribution of categories (refer to Graph 1)



The distribution of categories are relatively equal. The largest category is *law enforcement* with 41 cases followed by *civilian* and *self* with 33 cases each. *Confidential informant* is the fourth largest category with 32 cases followed by *undercover agent* and *other* with 24 cases each. These results are not entirely unexpected. It was anticipated that law enforcement would constitute the largest category. While there is some debate as to whether police can actually deter crime, law enforcement is comprised of professionals who are trained to identify and intercept suspicious persons. It does appear that they can and do, in fact, deter some potential terrorist threats.

Likewise, civilians tied for the second largest category holds with the literature. Many of the objectives of terrorism prevention incorporate a shared responsibility between the community and law enforcement. It does appear that civilians are acting as a first line of defense against possible terrorists. It was

surprising that the self-incriminating category was tied for second largest group. Possibly, threats that were brushed off as “unsubstantial” in the past were taken more seriously following larger incidents of terrorism. The growth of technology and social media may also be a factor. I will examine these two aspects more in the discussion section.

Confidential informants constituted the fourth largest category. I did not find this very surprising, as the use of confidential informants is standard procedure at both the local and federal levels of policing. Undercover agent is tied with other for the smallest category. This again, was expected. A number of cases that used undercover agents were originally instigated by another category (i.e. civilian, law enforcement, confidential informant) and therefore, coded into those categories. Typically undercover agents were used later on in the investigation. Other was primarily comprised of fraud cases. Like previously mentioned, this is likely due to more advanced high-tech security checks in later time periods.

B. Research Question Two

Research question two seeks to determine if major incidents of terrorism result in increased civilian vigilance (and if that vigilance waned over time). I use reporting rates as a measure of vigilance. In theory, following large-scale acts of terrorism incidents, citizens will more likely feel compelled to report potential threats. I expected to see an increase in reporting following the Oklahoma City bombing and the 9/11 attacks (E1). I also expected to see a dip in reporting in the Pre-9/11 period due to the “vigilance decrement” theory (E2).

I used two variables to examine these expectations: *FBI Aware* and *Era*. I used a contingency table to examine the changes over time of civilian vigilance. While my chief goal was to determine if civilians are more vigilant following terrorism incidents, I examined all the categories to identify if there are any trends across periods. The civilian, law enforcement, undercover agent, and self categories each had the highest rates of reporting in the Post-9/11 period. In Table 8 and Table 9 the first number listed is the represents the actual number of cases in that category for that time period. The percentage indicates the percent of reporting within the time period by each category.

Civilian reporting does appear to increase following a terrorism incident supporting my first expectation (refer to Table 8). However, there does not appear to be a decrease in vigilance over time. In fact, civilian reporting rates increase each time period. In the Pre-OKC era, the FBI was alerted to potential threats by civilians in 6.3 percent of cases. In the Post-OKC era civilian reporting dramatically increases. Civilians alerted the FBI of potential threats in 12.5 percent of cases. In the Pre-9/11 era, the FBI was alerted of threats by civilians in 17.2 percent of cases. Finally, in the Post-9/11 era, 22.5 percent of cases were instigated by civilians. As such, I did not find support for my second expectation that there would be a decline in reporting the Pre-9/11 period due to vigilance decrement (refer to Graph 2).

Table 8: Reporting Trends by Era

	Pre OKC	Post OKC	Pre 9/11	Post 9/11	Total
Civilian	2 6.3%	3 12.5%	5 17.2%	23 22.5%	33 17.6%
Law Enforcement	10 31.3%	3 12.5%	7 24.1%	21 20.6%	41 21.9%
Undercover Agent	7 21.9%	6 25.0%	0 0.0%	11 10.8%	24 12.8%
Confidential Informant	5 15.6%	11 45.8%	6 20.7%	10 9.8%	32 17.1%
Self	7 21.9%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	26 25.5%	33 17.6%
Other	1 3.1%	1 4.2%	11 37.9%	11 10.8%	24 12.8%
Total	32 100.0%	24 100.0%	29 100.0%	102 100.0%	187 100.0%

The civilian category is the only category in which there is an increase in reporting in every time period. The law enforcement category shows a decline from the Pre-OKC era (31.3%) to the Post-OKC era (12.5%). It increases in the Pre-9/11 era (24.1%) and decreases again in the Post-9/11 era (20.6%). Undercover agent increases from Pre-OKC (21.9%) to Post-OKC (25.0%), and Post-OKC to Pre-9/11 (0.0%), but increases from Pre-9/11 to Post-9/11 (10.8%). The confidential informant category increases from Pre-OKC (15.6%) to Post-OKC (45.8%). It decreases from Post-OKC to Pre-9/11 (20.7%), and decreases again from Pre-9/11 to Post-9/11 (9.8%).

The results of the self and other categories are very interesting. In the self category, there is a decline from Pre-OKC (21.2%) to Post-OKC (0.0%). It remains at that level until Post-9/11 in which case it increases significantly (25.5%). The other category has the same number of cases in the Pre-OKC and Post-OKC period and Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 period, however, each time period has a different number of cases and therefore, each era has different percentages. In the Pre-OKC period, other represents 3.1 percent of cases whereas in the Post-OKC period other represents 4.2 percent of cases. There is an increase in the Pre-9/11 era with other representing 37.9 percent of cases but a decrease in the Post-9/11 period (10.8%). The number of other cases reported in the Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 periods are significantly higher than the Pre-OKC and Post-OKC periods which may suggest changes due to technological advances in the later periods.


The civilian reporting rates increasing in each time period is a noteworthy result. I wanted to examine if the rates of reporting would continue to follow the same trend if the Post-9/11 period was segregated into two smaller time periods. I utilized the P2 9/11 distinction in my second contingency table to examine this notion (refer to Table 9).

When I included the P2 9/11 period I actually found support for the second expectation of vigilance decrement. Civilian reporting in the P2 9/11 period appears to be declining. In the Post-9/11 period, the civilian reporting of potential threats represented 23.7 percent of cases. In comparison, civilians reporting of potential threats represented 20.9 percent of cases in the P2 9/11 period. This finding suggests that as time goes on, civilians become less vigilant. However, civilian reporting in the


P2 9/11 period (20.9%) is still much higher than in the Pre-9/11 (17.2%), Post-OKC (12.5%), and Pre-OKC (6.3%) eras (refer to Graph 3).

	Pre OKC	Post OKC	Pre 9/11	Post 9/11	P2 9/11	Total
Civilian	2 6.3%	3 12.5%	5 17.2%	14 23.7%	9 20.9%	33 17.6%
Law Enforcement	10 31.3%	3 12.5%	7 24.1%	15 25.4%	6 14.0%	41 21.9%
Undercover Agent	7 21.9%	6 25.0%	0 0.0%	4 6.8%	7 16.3%	24 12.8%
Confidential Informant	5 15.6%	11 45.8%	6 20.7%	5 8.5%	5 11.6%	32 17.1%
Self	7 21.9%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	10 16.9%	16 37.2%	33 17.6%
Other	1 3.1%	1 4.2%	11 37.9%	11 10.8%	0 0.0%	24 12.8%
Total	32 100.0%	24 100.0%	29 100.0%	59 100.0%	43 100.0%	187 100.0%

Graph 2. Trends in reporting by Era



Graph 3. Trends in reporting by era including P2 9/11



Chapter Five: Conclusion

The previous chapter presented the distribution of how terrorism plots come to the attention of the FBI over time. Examples of content analysis of the court case documents of each category were also included. I theorized about the relationship between large incidents of terrorism and community vigilance. In particular, I predicted that citizen vigilance (as measured by the percent of terrorism preventions that came to the attention of the FBI via citizens) would increase after the Oklahoma City bombing and after 9/11. I also predicted that vigilance would diminish over time when a new attack had not taken place.

Discussion

This study examines the relationship between large-scale acts of terrorism and civilian vigilance measured by trends in reporting. The results reflect the impact of many interrelated factors. The first research question looked at the distribution of categories of how the FBI is alerted to possible terrorism conspiracies. I found a moderately even distribution between the groupings.

Law enforcement represented the largest category followed by civilian and self. The policing literature provides a solid justification for such a finding. First, law enforcement agents are trained to identify behaviors that are consistent with crimes related to terrorism. Case 99-CR-666 (WA-W) Ressay et al. perfectly illustrates this argument. The defendant's nervous behavior tipped off a watchful customs agent that something was amiss. The agent prevented a planned terrorism incident from coming to fruition. Second, law enforcement has made efforts to enhance procedural practices in the years following September 11, 2001. Turf battles over jurisdiction led to crucial

intelligence catastrophes (Downing 2015). In the months and years since, law enforcement professionals strongly emphasize the gravity of terrorism and the importance of inter-agency communication. The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan was developed under the direction of U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft which argued for a system that allowed for information-sharing between local and federal law agencies (Deflem 2011). As a result, transparency between departments has become an essential feature of cooperative policing and the prevention of terrorism.

The civilian and self categories represent the second largest groups and have an equal number of cases. Civilians do appear to be an important part of identifying potential threats. Again, this holds with the literature. Civilians act as the first line of defense and are a critical aspect in the fight against terrorism attacks. Civilian willingness to intercede allows for proactive policing. Community policing programs like neighborhood watch have increased significantly in the Post-9/11 era and include expanded roles incorporating terrorism awareness practices. Of the civilian reported cases, roughly 63 percent were reported by non-intimates. This finding suggests that of the civilian reported cases, the majority represent citizens who witnessed something dubious and reported it to the authorities.

The self-incrimination cases are very interesting. People incriminated themselves in the Pre-OKC period and the Post-9/11 period (refer to Table 8). The self-incriminators in the Pre-OKC period were predominantly made up of individuals or groups issuing “declarations of war.” After the Oklahoma City bombing, there were

no domestic groups or individuals issuing such statements publically⁹. This may be due to the nature of the Oklahoma City bombing itself. The Oklahoma City bombing was carried out by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols in response to the Waco siege in 1993. It was the largest incident of terrorism on American soil prior to the 9/11 attacks. The Oklahoma City bombing resulted in some national security policy changes; likewise, it may have resulted in changes in how right-wing terrorists group operate in the United States. Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, self-incriminators still did not come in the form of “declarations of war” issued by groups or individuals; rather, the Post-9/11 cases included an array of perpetrators incriminating themselves in various ways. Some of these cases have defendants who suffer from mental illness. Case 02-CR-380 (CA-E) Hoganson illustrates this example. Hoganson made threatening comments against FBI agents at the Sacramento FBI Field Office. An investigation revealed Hoganson suffered from schizophrenia and was no longer taking his medication. While he was investigated and charged under a terrorism enterprise the charges were later dismissed. This finding reflects the failure of public mental healthcare in the United States. After mental health was deinstitutionalized, many mentally ill Americans have not received appropriate treatment and have since been involved with the criminal justice system.

Several cases in this category involve individuals who made false claims about terrorist attacks for a variety of reasons. These cases typically involve hoaxes made in retaliation against an individual; while others involve threats against public figures like the President of the United States. The final explanation for a high level of self-

⁹ While I am specifically talking about domestic terrorism, Osama bin Laden issued his first “Declaration of War” or “fatwa” against the United States in August of 1996.

incriminating cases, particularly in the Post-9/11 period, may be due to the improvement in technology. The World Wide Web only became publically available in the early 1990s. Since then, the internet boom has resulted in social networking sites as a focal point for social activity. The advanced technology has created a new avenue for authorities to identify potential terrorists. For example, case 12-CR-288 (NC-W) Sims, involves an individual who posted on Twitter, a social networking site, threats against the President and consequently, was arrested and incarcerated.

The authorities use confidential informants and undercover agents as a means of acquiring information. Both the informant and undercover agent categories are in the lower range of the distribution. This is not a surprising finding. These policing methods can be laborious, expensive, and at times, controversial. Confidential informants often have ulterior motives for aiding law enforcement while undercover operations can be extremely dangerous and stressful for the agents involved. Furthermore, these methods of gathering information typically take place farther along in the investigation. As such, many of the cases that involved an undercover operation or the use of confidential sources were originally initiated by civilians or law enforcement.

The final category, other, is tied for the smallest category with undercover agent. The other category has significantly more cases in the Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 periods. Again, this is likely due to advancements in technology. Many of the cases coded as other involved a type of fraud. As technology advances, fraud may be easier to detect now than in the past. Another possible explanation for the higher rate of other cases in the Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 periods, is perhaps due to the changing

definition of terrorism and terroristic acts. Prior to 9/11, crimes like immigration fraud were not investigated under terrorism enterprises. After 9/11, prosecutors began charging defendants with a broader array of crimes than in previous time periods (Shields et al. 2009). In essence, the terrorism umbrella has expanded to encompass crimes like immigration fraud and money laundering.

The second research question yields very interesting results. To begin, I found support for my first expectation, which states following a large incident of terrorism civilian reporting would increase. Both Post-OKC and Post-9/11 have higher rates of civilian reporting than their individual counterparts. This finding indicates that when our values and interests are threatened, the collective consciousness is heightened. It appears large incidents of terrorism increase our awareness of other suspicious behavior, or of potential “broken windows,” that may ultimately lead to another act of terrorism.

I expected a decline over time following large incidents of terrorism. I anticipated society would experience vigilance decrement and reporting rates would dwindle as more time passed following the incident. I did not find support for this expectation initially. In fact, civilian-reporting rates increased each time period. However, when I divided the Post-9/11 era into P2 9/11, I did see a vigilance decrement effect (refer to Graph 3). In the P2 9/11 period rates of civilian reporting are starting to descend; yet, the reporting rates of the P2 9/11 period are still higher than in all the other periods besides Post-9/11. This finding suggests that while people have experienced some vigilance decrement, they are still more alert than in the past.

There are two interrelated explanations that can potentially shed light on this finding. First, we may still find higher rates of reporting in the P2 9/11 period compared to other periods (Post-9/11 notwithstanding) because we have not moved far enough away from the 9/11 attacks to determine if civilians really are more vigilant than in the past. It is possible that the farther we move away from a large-scale act of terrorism, the less likely we are to act collectively for the common good. The fact that there was some signs of decrement suggests this may in fact be the case. Vigilance in terrorism reporting is also largely dependent on the social and political climate at the time. For example, counterterrorism was considered the top policy priority in 2007 by 80 percent of Americans, but only 69 percent of Americans considered it the top policy priority in 2012 (Pew Research Center 2012). Rather, in 2012, 86 percent of Americans thought strengthening the economy should be the government's top policy priority.

The second justification for higher reporting rates in P2 9/11 compared to the other time periods (again, apart from the Post-9/11 period) is that terrorism is still a very real threat in our collective consciousness. Stories of both prevented and completed acts of terrorism are constantly reported by national media outlets. Al Qaeda is no longer the only international terror group frequently reported on by the major media outlets; now, groups like Boko Haram and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are often credited as significant international threats. Domestic threats are too reported regularly. DHS recently released a report that focused on the threat of right-wing extremists; specifically, DHS warned of the increasing threat of groups like the

Sovereign Citizen that believe the federal and state government have no authority over them (Perez and Bruer 2015).

DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson recently announced a revamping of the See Something Say Something campaign that emphasizes the role we all play in keeping our communities safe (DHS 2015). Campaigns like See Something Say Something remind us daily to be vigilant of suspicious behavior; even terrorism prevention plans are regularly incorporated into neighborhood watch programs. In other words, terrorism is still very much a part of our daily lives. Consequently, even if civilian reporting rates decline, it may still remain higher than in past periods as terrorism continues to be seen as a genuine threat and something we are continuously made aware of.

Limitations and Need for Future Research

As is the case with any study, the results of this research should be considered within the context of its limitations. My two limitations include small sample size and the lack of information in newspapers and online media. While there are two primary issues, the overall integrity of the examination should not be threatened.

The size of my primary dataset showed one limitation of this research. Overall, acts of terrorism in the United States are rare. Furthermore, by removing cases with completed acts of terrorism and cases with insufficient information, my final dataset was fairly small. As such, more advanced quantitative analysis could not be utilized. While future researchers may encounter similar issues, it may be advantageous to examine how both prevented and completed acts of terrorism came to

the attention of law enforcement. Including completed acts of terrorism would increase the sample size and allow for more complex analysis and hypothesis testing.

The second important limitation of this study is the use of newspapers and other online media sources to determine how the FBI was alerted to potential terrorist threats. Newspaper searches did not always yield any information. In particular, many of the smaller cases involving more traditional crimes rarely generated any information. In cases that had no additional media coverage, the only information available came from the court documents. If available, future researchers could examine calls made to 911 operators that resulted in prevented terrorism attacks. Examining 911 calls would allow for additional information regarding how and why citizens utilize formal social controls like the police.

Policy Implications

The consequences of terrorism attacks are far-reaching. The cost of terrorism is not felt solely by its actual victims, but is also indirectly felt by society as a whole. Understanding the extensive impact of terrorism on society is important when creating and implementing strategies to prevent another incident from occurring. The results of this study suggest programs like See Something Say Something and neighborhood watch may operate as a beneficial informal social control mechanism to sustain civilian vigilance. The heightened level of public awareness may also be an outcome of improved police-public partnerships. The exchange of ideas between the community and law enforcement concerning crime prevention arguably helps both law enforcement and community residents in effective terrorism prevention. By

developing community partnerships facilitated by community policing, law enforcement can create responses aimed at preventing acts of terrorism.

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Appendix A: Plea Bargaining and Sentencing

Plea Bargaining and Sentencing

Plea bargaining and sentencing are a major part of the criminal justice process. Plea bargaining is defined as “an agreement in which the defendant enters a guilty plea in exchange for a reduced sentence in comparison to the sentence allowable for the charged offense” (Seiter 2008: 47). Offenders typically plead guilty to avoid a more serious charge. Prosecutors are inclined to accept guilty pleas to move cases along quicker and avoid expensive trials. More than 90 percent of all convictions in felony cases are the result of guilty pleas (Bohm and Haley 1997). In regards to terrorism, researchers find terrorists are less likely to plead guilty than their non-terrorist counterpart; they are also more likely to receive a longer sentence for the same severity of crime as their non-terrorist counterpart (Smith and Damphousse 1998). While the plea bargain rate for terrorism cases is still lower than traditional offenders, following September 11, 2001, the rate of convictions as the result of a plea bargains has increased to roughly 80 percent (Dervan 2010).

Sentencing is decided by the judge presiding over the case. The array of sentences that can be used by a judge is classified in the state penal code and depends on a range of factors like criminal history, whether or not someone was injured as a result of the crime, or whether the individual displays regret for his or her actions. The judge can authorize economic sanctions, probation, intermediate sanctions, short-term confinement, imprisonment, or capital punishment (Seiter 2008). Furthermore, if a defendant is charged with more than one crime, he or she can be sentenced either concurrently or consecutively. Concurrent sentences are assigned to run at the same

time whereas consecutive sentences run one after the other (Seiter 2008). Much of the sentencing decisions are determined during the plea negotiations.

Appendix B: Federal Agencies

There are a number of agencies charged with preventing and interdicting terrorism. The Department of Justice (DOJ) is comprised of several of these agencies including the FBI, the U.S. Attorneys, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). The FBI is the lead agency for handling domestic terrorism cases. After September 11, 2001, Director of the FBI Robert Mueller enhanced the FBI's Counterterrorism Division and increased the number intelligence analysts in the agency (White 2009). The FBI works with state and local agencies in Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). JTTFs are based in 104 cities nationwide; 71 one which have been created since September 11, 2001 (FBI 2015).

The U.S. Attorney's office has three primary responsibilities: prosecute criminal cases brought by the Federal government; prosecute and defend civil cases in which the United States is a party; and the collection of debts owed the Federal government (U.S. Department of Justice 2015). The U.S. Attorney's serve as the nation's chief litigators under the leadership of the Attorney General. The U.S. Attorney's Office deals with every category of cases including investigating and prosecuting terrorism enterprises.

The DEA is charged with enforcing the United States controlled substance laws and regulations. Specifically, the DEA is responsible for policing any person or organization involved with growing, manufacturing, or distributing controlled substances intended to be illegally trafficked in the United States (U.S. Department of Justice 2015). The DEA has a range of duties including: investigating and aiding in

the prosecution of major violators of controlled substance laws; investigating and aiding in the prosecution of drug gangs who enact violence and threaten citizens through fear and intimidation; and coordinating with federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts on preventing the production and distribution of illicit drugs (DEA 2015).

The ATF conducts criminal investigations, controls the firearms and explosive industries, and aids other law enforcement agencies (U.S. Department of Justice 2015). One of the ATF's primary goals is to prevent terrorism and promote national security. This organization is one of the lead agencies in explosive training and arson investigations. Consequently, the ATF has played a substantial role in counterterrorism as bombs and firearms are frequently used by terrorists (White 2006).

The DHS was created following the September 11, 2001, attacks. The DHS has several responsibilities including: preventing terrorism and enhancing security; securing and managing borders; enforcing and administering immigration laws; safeguarding and securing cyberspace; and ensuring resilience to disasters (DHS 2012). The DHS has a number of departments assigned to it including the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Secret Service (White 2009).

The U.S. Coast Guard was the first agency assigned to the DHS and is responsible for protecting the United States maritime interests worldwide. The U.S. Coast Guard defends the coastal and inland waterways as well as enforces maritime law (White 2009). In terms of counterterrorism, the U.S. Coast Guard is in charge of intercepting terrorist and weapons at sea.

The U.S. Customs and Border Protection became the first comprehensive border security agency on March 1, 2003 (CBP 2015). The primary focus of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency is to maintain the integrity of the United States borders. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency works in conjunction with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE upholds homeland security through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws regarding border control, customs, trade, and immigration (ICE 2015). ICE agents are tasked with identifying dangerous persons before they enter the United States or violate immigration and customs laws. ICE's Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit prevents terrorists from exploiting the immigration system through fraud (ICE 2015).

The Secret Service ensures the safety of the President, the Vice President, and their families as well as countering financial crime like identity theft, fraudulent banking practices, and cyberattacks (White 2009). The agency was previously part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury but was transferred to DHS in 2003. The Secret Service is the primary agency tasked with investigating any threats against the President, the Vice President, or their families.

Appendix C: Civilian – Intimate Connections Case Summaries

03-CR-19 (TX-E) Crawford

According to court documents an anonymous call, later identified to be Donna Fox, was made to Lewisville Police Department regarding concerns over **Dwight Robert Crawford Jr.**'s numerous weapons. Fox, Crawford's girlfriend, was the only one at the apartment when Lewisville Police Department officers, ATF agents, and FBI agents arrived and asked if they could conduct a "knock and talk". A knock and talk is recognized by the courts as a legal and reasonable investigative tool to inquire about alleged criminal activities ("Knock and Talk", n.d.). While inside, officers found 21 firearms, various powders, and a black cylinder device they suspected was a silencer [Defense Motion 4]. Crawford pleaded guilty to possession of an unregistered firearm and was sentenced to 37 months imprisonment.

03-CR-292 (OR) Clark

Jeffrey Mark Clark was indicted in June 2003, for knowingly producing, stockpiling, retaining, and possessing ricin, a biological agent for toxin, for use as a weapon. Clark's ricin was discovered by his ex-wife's boyfriend and brother in the spring of 1998. The men found a bucket buried under the house of where Clark and his ex-wife used to live before he was incarcerated. The bucket contained video tapes of sexual activity and a packet of white powder labeled "ricin" [Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Prosecution as Barred by the Statue of Limitations]. Clark's ex-wife brought the materials to the attention of authorities in the spring of 1998. The materials were sent to the FBI on January 25, 2001, who determined the

substances were in fact ricin. Clark had fled on bail to the Philippines but was captured in February 2002, and returned to the United States. Clark filed a motion to have the case dismissed because the time between when he allegedly committed the act and his indictment exceeded the statute of limitations by a year and five months. The Judge ruled in Clark's favor and the case was dismissed.

03-CR-5136 (WA-W) Brailey

In March 2001, a confidential witness informed authorities of an assassination plot against Washington State Governor Gary Locke that had been developing since 1998. **James David Brailey Jr.** was a member of the Washington Branch of the Jural Society, a group that advocates for the establishment of a "people's government." Brailey hated Governor Locke because Brailey believed he was the one "true governor" of the state (Southern Poverty Law Center 2003). Brailey informed a friend that he was plotting to assassinate Locke and was close enough on one occasion to see him but decided the time was not right. The friend informed authorities of his plans. Brailey was eventually voted out of the Jural Society as members felt he was becoming increasingly violent, however, Brailey still spent a significant amount of time with the group. Brailey travelled with a confidential witness hired by the FBI to Arkansas on New Year's Eve. During the trip, Brailey told the confidential informant he still had plans to assassinate Governor Locke. The informant also told the FBI he witnessed a cache of weapons at Brailey's home (Rivera 2003). Brailey was arrested two weeks later and indicted on charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Brailey was issued a superseding indictment charging him with being in possession of

a firearm that was possessed in connection with another felony offense (ATS Summary). He pleaded guilty to the count on the superseding indictment and was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment. Much of Brailey's sentence was credited as time served.

04-CR-399 (UT) Brown

Cynthia Jane Brown was an acquaintance of the organization known as Soldiers of the Aryan Culture (SAC). SAC is the second largest white supremacist prison gang in Utah (Anti-Defamation League "Soldiers of Aryan Culture" n.d.). According to court documents, Brown's son Issac Snarr was a member of SAC and was under a federal indictment for racketeering violations. Clinton Alls was a former member of SAC and was scheduled as a witness against Snarr in the racketeering case. In an attempt to prevent Alls from testifying, Brown tried to convince her friend William Patrick to deliver a "hot shot" to Alls. A hot shot is a fatal dose of methamphetamine. Patrick refused and contacted authorities about the potential deadly plot. Brown pleaded guilty to witness tampering but the court found this plea inappropriate and dismissed the indictment.

04-CR-46 (TX-E) Golightly Jr

Anderson County Sheriff's Department (ACSD) received a call from Kim Golightly in reference to what appeared to be a pipe bomb located on her the front step to her home. The ACSD contacted the ATF who arrived at the Golightly residence. Kim Golightly told agents her and her husband, **Tom Lee Golightly Jr.** were having

serious marital problems and he was harassing her [Criminal Complaint]. Both Mrs. Golightly and a neighbor of the Golightly's observed Mr. Golightly making and using pipe bombs in the past [Criminal Complaint]. Nine days following the detection of the pipe bomb, a cooperating individual (CI) contacted the FBI and informed them that he was living with Mr. Golightly in a motel in Jacksonville, Texas. The CI stated Mr. Golightly was in possession of multiple pipe bombs and was interested in selling the devices. The CI agreed to wear a wire and recorded Mr. Golightly agreeing to make and sell more explosive devices. He also admitted to making explosive devices in the past. Mr. Golightly was arrested and charged with possessing an unregistered firearm; a felon being in possession of an unregistered firearm; and a felon being in possession of an explosive device. Golightly pleaded guilty to possession of an unregistered firearm and was sentenced to 71 months imprisonment [Criminal Complaint].

10-CR-17 (KY-E) Collins

Patricia Ringler contacted the Lexington Resident office of the U.S. Secret Service regarding letters her sister, **Susan Collins** wrote to President Barack Obama and President George W. Bush. Collins was located by Secret Service agents and admitted to threatening President Obama and President Bush. When asked why Collins made these threats, she stated she planned to kill President Bush for sending the troops to "...finish what his father couldn't...and someone would eventually threaten to kill President Obama. It might as well be me" [Criminal Complaint 3]. Collins told agents she would do whatever it took to get arrested because she desired

lethal injection. Collins was arrested and indicted on one count of threats against a former President. She pleaded guilty and was sentenced to time served. In September of 2011, Collins violated her supervised release and was arrested and indicted on one count of possession of a firearm, destructive device, or any other dangerous weapon [Judgment]. Collins was sentenced to six months imprisonment with the recommendation she serve it at a mental health facility to address her psychological needs.

99-CR-8 (CA-E) Rudolph

Donald Rudolph initially came to the attention of the FBI as a result of his own actions. On April 25, 1997, Rudolph called the California Franchise Tax Board and complained about penalties charged to a tax debt he owed [Criminal Complaint]. Within this conversation Rudolph threatened he would take out his frustrations “in lives.” Officers interviewed Rudolph and he admitted to calling the employees but denied making any threats. Rudolph later pleaded guilty to making terrorist threats and served 10 days in jail.

Roughly a year later Rudolph’s sister, Debbie Bilney, contacted the FBI in regards to her brother. Bilney explained Rudolph had become increasingly paranoid after his arrest. Bilney reported Rudolph was stockpiling handguns, rifles, gas masks, ammunition, night vision goggles, camouflage clothing, CB radios, bullet proof vests and other related equipment [Criminal Complaint]. Rudolph’s family and friends were interviewed by FBI agents in which they all agreed Rudolph was unstable and potentially violent and had made threats of killing government officials. A search of

Rudolph's residence revealed numerous weapons including a machine gun. Rudolph pleaded guilty to possession of a machine gun and was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment.

Appendix D: Civilian – Non-Intimate Connections Case Summaries

02-CR-399 (OR) Battle et al.

Homegrown terrorist **Jeffrey Leon Battle** believed America was the land of the enemy (Jeffrey 2006). Battle sought to become an Islamic martyr levying war against Americans by fighting alongside al Qaeda in Afghanistan (FBI 2003). According to an undercover informant who infiltrated the group, Battle and other members discussed targeting Jewish schools and synagogues in the Portland area (Bernton 2003). Battle was a key member of a terrorist cell later named the Portland Seven which formed in Portland, Oregon shortly before the 9/11 attacks (Jeffrey 2006). The group included Battle, **Patrice Ford**, **Ahmed Bilal**, **Muhammad Bilal**, **Maher Hawash**, **Habis Al Saoub** and **October Lewis**. The men traveled to China to gain entry into Afghanistan but all failed except for Al Saoub (FBI 2003).

The Portland Seven were first discovered when a nearby resident called authorities after hearing gunfire in Skamania County, Washington (Jeffrey 2006). The resident came across a group of men wearing turbans and shooting guns in a fenced and gated gravel pit. Acting on the tip, Deputy Sheriff Mark Mercer encountered the group engaging in shooting practice and took down the group's names (Jeffrey 2006). Mercer later reported the incident to the FBI after recognizing one of the men from the gravel pit named Ali Khaled Steitiye, a Lebanese-born immigrant, who had just been arrested for attempting to illegally purchase an assault rifle (Newsweek 2010).

The group was charged with violations of conspiring to wage war against the United States; conspiring to provide material support and resources to a terrorist organization; conspiring to contribute services to the Taliban and al Qaeda; conspiring

to possess and discharge firearms in furtherance of crimes of violence; and possessing firearms in furtherance of crimes of violence. Ford and Lewis received an additional charged of money laundering. Hawash agreed to turn state's evidence and testify against his co-defendants in exchange for a lighter sentence. As a result, the remaining defendants brokered plea agreements (ATS Report). Hawash pleaded guilty to conspiring to contribute services to al Qaeda and the Taliban and was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment. Battle and Ford pleaded guilty to conspiring to levy war against the United States. Each received a sentence of 18 years imprisonment [Judgment]. The Bilal's both pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiring to contribute services to al Qaeda and the Taliban. Ahmed was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment; Muhammad was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment. Lewis pleaded guilty to six counts of money laundering and was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment. The indictment against Al Saoub was dismissed.

03-CR-336 (AZ) Shah

An anonymous letter alerted authorities to **Mustajab Shah**'s criminal activity. On September 24, 2001, an unidentified letter was sent to the INS regarding Shah's immigration status. Specifically, the letter indicated Shah had falsely obtained benefits based upon his filing asylum application as an Afghanistan national when in fact, Shah is a native and citizen of Pakistan [Criminal Complaint]. An investigation revealed that Shah had multiple family members in the United States, all of which claim birth and nationality of Pakistan. Shah was interviewed by an INS agent on March 5, 2003, where he admitted the information he detailed on his Form I-589 was

false and that he was born in Pakistan not Afghanistan [Criminal Complaint]. A 2-count indictment was filed against Shah with violating fraud and misuse of visas, permits and other documents; and Social Security fraud. Shah pleaded guilty to count one on the indictment and was sentenced to 60 months of probation. He was turned over to immigration officials for immediate deportation (ATS Report).

04-CR-110 (OR) Steitiye

This case is related to Portland Seven case. According to ABC News, **Ali Khaled Steitiye** tried to buy an assault weapon using fraudulent documents (ABCNews 2014). The gun dealer contacted the ATF who made the arrest. The JTTF began an investigation into Steitiye, a convicted felon. In a search of Steitiye's home, police found multiple guns, ammunition, a plaque displaying the name "Hamas," fake documents, and a calendar highlighting September 11, 2001 (ABCNews 2014). Deputy Sheriff Mark Mercer remembered Steitiye from the gravel pit and quickly called the FBI which began an intense 10 month investigation into the group.

While the investigation had already begun, another civilian acted to protect the community against the threat of terrorism. Habis al Soub, leader of the "The Squad of Death" and an associate of the Portland Seven group, threw out a plastic grocery bag at his apartment complex in Portland, Oregon. (Jeffrey 2006). A neighbor removed the bag from the garbage and found an Islamic "martyr's will" and Jordanian passport inside (Jeffrey 2006). The neighbor turned the materials over to the FBI.

Stetiye was charged with being in possession of a firearm illegally; and being in possession of a machine gun. He pleaded guilty to one count and was sentenced to 60 months imprisonment.

03-CR-228 (CT) DelVecchio

Raymond DelVecchio lived on Bank Street in Derby, Connecticut. According to friends and neighbors, DelVecchio bragged about attending Ku Klux Klan meetings and resented changes in the neighborhood (Bass 2003). Law enforcement first learned of DelVecchio when landlord Robert Vontell, who owned several homes in the neighborhood, reported he had been threatened by DelVecchio (Stowe 2003). Vontell told police someone had contacted him and told him DelVecchio offered the individual money to shoot Vontell and burn down one of his rental homes (Stowe 2003). DelVecchio feared Vontell would rent the property to an African American family (Potok 2003). Detective Mancini, a 17-year veteran of Derby's police department, contacted the ATF about DelVecchio and together they devised an undercover operation to investigate the alleged threats. The undercover operation ended with a raid of DelVecchio's house and discovery of an arsenal of illegal weapons (Potok 2003). DelVecchio was arrested and charged with violations of possessing a firearm while being a convicted felon; and threatening or attempting to murder a federal law enforcement officer. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 174 months imprisonment.

04-CR-20067 (KS) Mindreci

Ion Mindreci, a naturalized U.S. citizen, born in Romania, was a fugitive from justice from District Court of Olmstead County, Minnesota [Indictment]. Mindreci failed to appear at court for charges of fleeing a peace officer, misdemeanor assault, obstructing arrest, expired registration, and no insurance (Judgement; Washburn Law 2006). Mindreci relocated to Olathe, Kansas and avoided capture until 2004. In May 2004, an arrest warrant was executed by police officers for an individual named Michael Strain. Mindreci was with Strain at the time of arrest; however, Mindreci was released when officers did not find any outstanding warrants. Michelle Knight, a resident at the apartment complex, witnessed the encounter between Strain, Mindreci, and the police. Once the officers left with Strain, Knight observed Mindreci hastily carrying several items from his apartment to a nearby garage [Judgment]. The following day, Knight called the FBI and reported seeing Mindreci make several trips to an adjacent garage carrying various items including a long object covered by an orange sheath [Judgment]. Knight assumed the object was a shotgun because of its shape. Based on this information, the FBI obtained a search warrant of Mindreci's apartment and garage and discovered several firearms and boxes of ammunition. The defendant was charged with being a fugitive in possession of firearms and was later found guilty. He was sentenced to 21 months imprisonment.

04-CR-290 (CA-C) Hardesty

Two witnesses were skateboarding in the Food 4 Less parking lot in Yucca Valley, California when **Brant S. Hardesty** and Denise Alyea exited their car. The two began assaulting skateboarders and stole one of the skateboards. The two

witnesses identified Hardesty, a convicted felon, as the attacker who stole the skateboard [Affidavit]. A search warrant was granted and executed for Hardesty's residence. Officers found multiple weapons and ammunition [Affidavit]. Hardesty was charged with violations of felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment.

05-CR-149 (OH-S) Obeid

Mohammed Radwan Obeid, was brought to the FBI's attention as a result of an attentive librarian. Obeid used the screen name "ahmed_ assalafil" on jihadist internet forums. Under the guise of a university student studying nuclear physics, he sought information on how to build an H-bomb and other weapons at home (Rossmiller 2011). Obeid had been logging on to a computer at the Troy branch of the Miami, Ohio public library where he sought to recruit jihadists from other countries (FBI 2002-2005). A librarian became suspicious of Obeid when she noticed the content of his searches. The librarian contacted the FBI and a Norfolk, Virginia police officer and reported the seditious online searches (Haaretz Israel News 2006). Obeid sent a number of e-mails to various individuals, but when questioned by the FBI denied ever sending them. The FBI searched the library's computer and Obeid's personal computer and found Obeid's searches were synonymous with terrorist activities (Haaretz Israel News 2006). Obeid was arrested and pleaded guilty to making false statements to the FBI and JTTF investigators. He was sentenced to one year imprisonment with deportation immediately following his sentence.

05-CR-83 (CA-E) Lewis et al.

Ryan Daniel Lewis, Lili Holland, Eva Rose Holland, and Jeremiah

Colcleasure attempted arson in two homes by planting homemade incendiary devices. The homes were located in an upscale housing development in Lincoln, California that was still under construction [Criminal Complaint]. A third home and tractor were also vandalized with graffiti saying “Enjoy the world as is—as long as you can,” and “Leave” [Criminal Complaint]. The vandals also painted the letters “ELF” in the cul-de-sac where the homes were located. On January 12, 2005, in Auburn, California, five incendiary devices were found in a commercial building under construction. The devices were found by construction workers who quickly notified the Auburn Police Department [Criminal Complaint]. The devices found at the site were similar to the devices located at the housing development in Lincoln, California. A civilian witness had a casual conversation with Greg Lewis, the father of Ryan Lewis, on January 13, 2005, in which Greg Lewis told the witness he thought his son may be involved with the arson attempts in Auburn, California [Criminal Complaint]. According to the witness, Greg Lewis thought his son was involved because of Ryan’s political views and his pickup truck was missing the night of the attempted arson. Greg Lewis told the witness he confronted his son about the attempted arson and Ryan Lewis neither confirmed nor denied any involvement [Criminal Complaint]. Authorities interviewed Ryan Lewis on February 2, 2005, where Lewis admitted to his involvement with the Auburn arson attempt and revealed that he did not act alone. Lewis pleaded guilty to arson and attempted arson and was sentenced to six years imprisonment (The Associated Press 2005). The two Holland sisters and Jeremiah Colcleasure also

pleaded guilty and received a two year prison sentence each (Freerepublic 2006; Johnson 2006).

06-CR-154 (NY-E) Awan

Khalid Awan was convicted of fraud and money laundering for a terrorist organization in 2001. While in prison Awan attempted to recruit other inmates to join Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) upon release. KCF is composed of Sikh militants who want to create a distinct Sikh state in the Punjab region of India (FBI Press Release 2012). KCF is responsible for thousands of deaths in India and is designated as a terrorist organization. An inmate at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn reported Awan was bragging about knowing Paramjit Singh Panjwar, the leader of the KCF. The government recorded Awan's prison phone conversations and discovered he talked about recruiting other members to KCF and admitted to funding the terrorist organization (FBI Press Release 2012). Awan pleaded guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists; providing material support to terrorists; and money laundering. He was sentenced to an additional 14 years in prison.

10-CR-358 (NC-M) Moose

Justin Moose, a self-proclaimed 'Christian counterpart to Osama bin Laden' was first brought to the attention of the FBI in August 2010 (Southern Poverty Law Center 2011) The Planned Parenthood association notified the FBI that an individual

was advocating extreme violence against women's healthcare clinics on his Facebook page [Criminal Complaint]. Moose stated on his Facebook page,

“Whatever you may think about me, you're probably right. Extremist, Radical, Fundamentalist...? Yep! Terrorist...? Well....I prefer the term ‘freedom Fighter’. ‘End abortion by any means necessary and at any cost’. ‘Save a life, Shoot an Abortionist’” (UPI Top News 2010).

Moose made numerous statements advocating for violence against abortion clinics and told an FBI informant he was the leader of a “phantom cell” for the Army of God (Southern Poverty Law Center 2011). The Army of God is an anti-abortion group that emerged in the early 1980's (Kushner 2003). Moose was arrested with providing information to create a bomb to an undercover FBI informant (UPI Top News 2010). Moose pleaded guilty to distributing information relating to the making of an explosive device to be used to commit a federal crime of violence and received 30 months imprisonment.

10-CR-413 (VA-E) Ahmed

A tip from a source inside the Muslim community alerted law enforcement to **Farooque Ahmed**. According to the source, Ahmed was trying to find a way to join a terrorist group and kill Americans overseas (Apuzzo and Goldman 2010). Ahmed was radicalized while living in the United States. Some attribute his radicalization to Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical Muslim cleric who preached in Virginia until 2002 when he went into hiding in Yemen (Apuzzo and Goldman 2010). Following the tip from the source, an undercover operation was put into place. From April 2010 through October 25, 2010, Ahmed attempted to assist others whom he believed were al-Qaeda in planning multiple bombings of the Metrorail in Washington, D.C. (FBI 2010).

Ahmed conducted surveillance at multiple locations including a hotel in Washington D.C., and a Metrorail station in Arlington, Virginia. He also provided diagrams he drew of three Metrorail stations to individuals he believed were affiliated with al-Qaeda. Ahmed provided suggestions to the undercover agents of locations the bombs could be placed in order to cause the maximum level of fatalities in a simultaneous attack (FBI 2010).

Ahmed was issued a 3-count indictment on October 26, 2010, with charges of attempting to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization; collecting information to assist in planning a terrorist attack on a transit facility; and attempting to provide material support to terrorists. Ahmed pleaded guilty to Count 1 and 2 of the indictment and was sentenced to 276 months imprisonment [Judgment].

10-CR-541 (NY-S) Shahzad 11-CR-10147 (MA) Ali

In 2010, street vendors Lance Orton and Duane Jackson alerted New York City Police Officer Wayne Rhatigan of a smoking SUV that was left in Times Square (Johnson 2010). Officer Rhatigan contacted the fire department and bomb squad who evacuated the area. Officers found the Nissan Pathfinder loaded with improvised explosives and incendiary devices (Scherer 2010). According to Kevin Barry, New York police department bomb-squad detective, the SUV had enough explosive material to potentially injure or kill anyone within five city blocks of the vehicle (Chua-Eoan et al. 2010). **Faisal Shahzad**, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan was linked to the SUV and arrested within days trying to board a flight at John F. Kennedy International Airport (Chua-Eoan et al. 2010). Shahzad admitted driving the

vehicle to Times Square and trying to detonate it. During the trial, Shahzad defended his actions and claimed to be a “Muslim soldier” avenging the deaths of Muslims killed by Americans abroad (Scherer 2010). Shahzad pleaded guilty to all charges. In October 2010, Shahzad pleaded was sentenced to life in prison after pleading guilty to a 10-count indictment which included charges such as attempted use of weapon of mass destruction and conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism [Judgment]. Reflecting on the incident, Sean Basinski, of the Street Vendors Project, states, “...the city should use vendors to act as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the police in combating real crime” (Johnson 2010: 26).

While investigating the Times Square incident, law enforcement learned of **Aftab Ali**. It was discovered that Shahzad had called both Ali’s land line at his place of work and his cell phone. Law enforcement also discovered through GPS tracking on the SUV that Shahzad had spent time at Ali’s apartment and that Ali had given Shahzad \$4,900 in cash through a hawala transaction. A “hawala” is a system for transferring money in a way that circumvents regulatory oversight and grants both sender and receiver anonymity [Criminal Complaint]. Through the investigation, law enforcement discovered Ali entered the United States in August 2009, on a K-1 nonimmigrant visa that permits an alien to enter the country for 90 days for the purpose of marrying his fiancé. The alien must marry the person listed on the visa application in order to apply for permanent residency [Criminal Complaint]. A K-1 visa does not permit employment unless other documentation is filed and approved. Ali was scheduled to marry Sharon Jeffcott but she broke off the engagement in March 2009. Ali refused to accept that the relationship was over and entered the United

States on the terms she was going to marry him. After Jeffcott refused to marry Ali on several occasions, he married another woman by the name of Lila Sylla. Friends and family of Sylla told investigators the marriage was purely a business arrangement.

While Ali was in the United States he worked at multiple Mobil stations. He was not authorized to work. When filing documents to change his immigration status Ali omitted he had been working in the United States without authorization. An indictment was filed against Ali with one count of unlicensed money transmitting and one count immigration document fraud [Judgment]. He pleaded guilty to both counts and was sentenced to time served; furthermore, Ali was scheduled for deportation to Pakistan. Ali was not charged in Shahzad's case.

11-CR-30002 (AR-W) Krause et al.

Employees hired by Rogers Land Company to clean out a single family residence in Huntsville, Arkansas discovered documents that described the making of explosive devices [Affidavit]. Alarmed by the material, the employees contacted the Madison County Sheriff's Office who contacted the FBI. FBI agents who responded to the call found various books and manuals related to making bombs as well as militia extremism documents. Authorities recognized the bomb making material from a previous unsolved case.

Six months prior, a bomb hidden in a Pepsi can was discovered at Osage Baptist Church in Osage, Arkansas. At the time, the church was being used as a polling location for run-off elections. The IED was unwittingly moved into the church and handled by several people throughout the day. It was not until the following day

that someone noticed the wiring on the bottom of the can and contacted law enforcement. According to an FBI explosive expert, the IED was capable of causing death or serious injury had it not malfunctioned [Affidavit]. The same schematic at the Huntsville home matched the materials that were used to build the Pepsi can IED. The home was last occupied by **Mark Krause**. Krause worked as a blacksmith and metal artist in Fayetteville, Arkansas. Krause was arrested in Seattle, Washington and sentenced to two years in prison for an unregistered weapon. As part of the plea deal, the charge related to a destructive device was dropped (Brantley 2011).

98-CR-415 (TX-S) Grebe Jr. et al.

John Cain was recruited by members of the Republic of Texas (ROT) to do freelance computer work. The ROT is a militia organization that claims the annexation of Texas by the United States was illegal. According to Cain, **Johnie Wise, Jack Abbott Grebe Jr., and Oliver Dean Emigh**, all members of the ROT, requested that Cain find e-mail addresses of various officials of the United States Government [Superseding Indictment]. During this conversation, Wise and Grebe informed Cain they intended to create a delivery system for a biological weapon to be used against officials of the government [Superseding Indictment]. The men intended to convert Bic lighters into mechanisms with cactus needles that could infect people with various types of diseases such as botulism, rabies, and HIV. It was at this point that Cain contacted the FBI about the plot and agreed to become an informant. The government recorded conversations between Cain and the other men in which the men discussed sending the threatening e-mails out to government officials (Baro 1998). On

June 12, 1998, the men emailed a “Declaration of War” to top government officials denouncing the United States government and threatening their families. The men were arrested and charged with threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction. Grebe and Wise were each convicted and sentenced to 292 months imprisonment. Emigh was acquitted of all charges.

03-CR-291 (WA-W) Revak

While viewed by many as a “normal kid,” **Paul Revak** was a self-proclaimed anarchist who was attempting to plot a revolution against the United States Government (Fehrenbacher 2003). The FBI initially learned of Revak’s plan when a Western Washington University student contacted authorities about a potential bomb plot. Revak attempted to recruit another student to help bomb the U.S. Coast Guard station in Bellingham, Washington (The Associated Press 2003). An undercover agent contacted Revak who informed the agent of his plans to bomb multiple government facilities. Revak was arrested and pleaded guilty to attempting to receive interstate commerce explosive materials and sentenced to five years’ probation.

Appendix E: Law Enforcement Case Summaries

01-CR-10198 (MA) Chase et al

The capture of **Leo V. Felton** and **Erica Chase** is an instance of the right person being in the right place at the right time. Boston police officer Christopher Connolly was waiting to pay his bill at a local Dunkin' Donuts when he overheard a dispute regarding a counterfeit bill (Coogan 2001). Chase was attempting to pay for her iced coffee with a counterfeit \$20.00 bill. Connolly followed Chase out of the Dunkin' Donuts to question her and encountered her boyfriend, Leo Felton. The couple fled the scene but were captured by Connolly and fellow officer Robert Anthony (Coogan 2001). Among the couple's personal belongings, authorities discovered \$390.00 in counterfeit bills. A search of the couple's apartment revealed much more than counterfeit bills. Local police along with the FBI, Secret Service, and ATF discovered an illegal gun, bomb-making information, timing devices, and books on false identities and homemade silencers (Coogan 2001). Authorities also discovered Felton had purchased pounds of ammonium-nitrate fertilizer and a note written by Felton alluding to starting a race war. The couple was charged with multiple counts including conspiracy to make a destructive device; possession of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence; and passing counterfeit currency. Chase was found guilty on 4 counts and sentenced to 57 months imprisonment. Felton was found guilty on 10 counts and sentenced to 262 months imprisonment. The *Boston Herald* later reported that Felton was actually biracial and viewed it as "a curse" (Washington 2001).

01-CR-323 (MO-W) Badri

Adel F. Badri, a Saudi Arabian citizen, was arrested in Missouri on bank fraud charges (Gullo 2001). On October 16, 2001, officers pulled over Badri for three outstanding traffic warrants and found a forged check in the vehicle. The check was made out to Badri in the amount of \$4,000 from Fatmah B. Ibrahim, a supposed close female associate whom he knew from Saudi Arabia [Affidavit]. An investigation revealed Badri had received an authentic check from the Ministry of Higher Education to aid with his education expenses at Central Missouri State University in Warrensburg, Missouri. He then duplicated the checks and overdrew his account at Chevy Chase Bank by \$10,700.00 (Gullo 2001). Badri was charged with bank fraud to which he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to time served and order to pay restitution. In addition to paying restitution, Badri was turned over to INS [Judgment].

02-CR-119 (KY-E) Anderson

A routine traffic stop evolved into a much larger terrorism case. On October 14, 2001, Deputy Sheriff Scott Elder pulled over **Steve Anderson** for a broken taillight (Anti-Defamation League n.d.). Anderson, a radical member of the Kentucky Rifleman Militia, told Elder he was on militia patrol at the time. Elder saw a loaded pistol magazine inside the truck and asked Anderson if he had any weapons present in the vehicle. Anderson stated there were multiple weapons in the truck and as a Kentucky Militia member he was permitted to carry them [Affidavit]. Elder asked for his license and registration at which point Anderson became irritable. Elder informed

Anderson he was going to be placed under arrest at which point Anderson drove off and a pursuit ensued. Anderson attempted to crash into Deputy Elder's vehicle and eventually opened fire on the officer with an AR-15 rifle. The vehicle was later discovered abandoned in a ravine with the rifle inside along with six pipe bombs and thousands of rounds of ammunition [Affidavit]. A search warrant of Anderson's property uncovered instruction manuals to create silencers and explosive devices, bomb and grenade making materials, and numerous weapons. After a year of hiding, Anderson was arrested and charged with multiple counts including the possession of unregistered firearms and weapons, engaging in violent crimes with a machine gun, and possessing an automatic rifle [Judgment]. Anderson pleaded guilty to all but one charge and was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment (Shiel 2003).

02-CR-297 (MO-W) Logan

The Johnson County Sheriff's Department in Centerview, Missouri was executing a search warrant of **Lawrence Logan's** residence in relation to a homicide investigation [Affidavit]. While executing the search of Logan's residence, officers found a briefcase with a small black pipe bomb inside. In the same room officers discovered a tackle box filled with switches, wires, and clocks; handwritten notes concerning chemical compounds for building pipe bombs; anti-government literature; and an additional assembled pipe bomb hidden in a black camera bag [Affidavit]. After the bombs were safely removed by the U.S. Air Force Bomb Disposal team, the FBI was notified and sent the suspicious materials. Agents learned Logan held deep anti-government opinions and viewed the Murrah Federal Building bombing as a

“good start” (The Associated Press 2003). Logan was arrested and charged with possession of firearms and unregistered weapons. He pleaded guilty to possessing illegal explosive devices and was sentenced to nearly six years imprisonment (The Associated Press 2003).

02-CR-550 (CA-E) Askildson

Marysville Police Officer Osbourn pulled over **Johnny Walter Askildson** after witnessing Askildson cross over the double yellow lines (Blackwell 2013). Officer Osbourn checked the Department of Motor Vehicles and discovered Askildson’s license plate was issued to a Honda while he was driving a Chevrolet (Blackwell 2013). Osbourn also discovered Askildson was driving the vehicle without identification and had an outstanding no-bail warrant issued in Oregon [Government’s Opposition to Motion to Suppress]. After Askildson was arrested a search of his vehicle was conducted which produced a homemade military style hand grenade and a Super Soaker water gun that contained smokeless powder and ball bearings (Blackwell 2013; Kruger 2013). Askildson was charged with violations of possession of a destructive device; felon in possession of a destructive device; and felon in possession of a firearm. He pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a destructive device and received a sentence of 10 years imprisonment.

03-CR-196 (NY-W) Van Der Keijl

Pierre Achille Van Der Keijl was travelling on an Amtrak train from Niagara Falls, New York into Canada when an employee from Department of Homeland

Security, Bureau of Customs and Immigration Enforcement (BICE) initially questioned him [Criminal Complaint]. The BICE employee found information in the TECS system¹⁰ that Van Der Kejil was a known associate of two suspected Algerian terrorists. A search of Kejil's belongings revealed a hidden passport photograph of Sebti Haoua, one of the suspected Algerian terrorists. At this point, the FBI was contacted to conduct an interview of Van Der Kejil. After initially telling agents the purpose of his travel was tourism, Kejil later admitted he was travelling to meet Haoua [Criminal Complaint]. According to court documents, Van Der Kejil was planning to pick up a package from Haoua and deliver it to the other suspected terrorist, Lyes Lekkat. Van Der Kejil also admitted to having regular contact with Haoua and Lekkat and knew Lekkat used a fraudulent passport to enter the United States. Van Der Kejil pleaded guilty to making false statements and was sentenced to time served and scheduled for deportation following the proceedings [Judgment].

03-CR-204 (WA-W) Christ

A long term investigation was instigated by Detective Christine Lynn Bonner of the Seattle Police Department regarding a number of threatening letters. Detective Bonner identified approximately 30 victims who had received letters that contained a copy of the poem "Gossip" and a strip of paper which contained a typed threat such as "Replace the name Gossip with [victim's name] and this is exactly what your are you little faggot. And you thought Matthew Shepard had problems, you're next."

[Affidavit 1]. **John Wayne Christ** was arrested on May 7, 2003, at his home. The

¹⁰ TECS is one of the largest information technology and data management systems used by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents to determine the admissibility of individuals wishing to enter the country (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2013).

FBI found various incriminating documents in Christ's home and car including the poem "Gossip" and strips of papers containing similar threats received by the victims. Victims claimed Christ made incessant hang-up phone calls and in some cases, slashed their tires [Government's Memorandum on Sentence Imposed Pre Booker]. The investigation, which included seven other police agencies in the area and later the FBI, revealed Christ would pose as a professional photographer and attempt to get pictures of his victims. Christ photographed some of the victims in compromising positions and would later use the photo to try and get the victims fired [Government's Memorandum on Sentence Imposed Pre Booker]. Christ was charged with four counts of mailing threatening communications. Five months later, a superseding indictment was issued charging Christ with seven counts of mailing threatening communications. He pleaded guilty to all seven counts and was sentenced to 51 months imprisonment.

03-CR-20486 (TN-W) Abdelfattah

On December 17, 2003, **Sami Fattouh Abdelfattah** was travelling from Memphis, Tennessee to Amman, Jordan when he was stopped and questioned by a U.S. Customs and Boarder Control Officer. Abdelfattah claimed that he was carrying seven thousand dollars in currency however, officers discovered he was carrying in excess of ten thousand dollars concealed on his body and in his luggage [Indictment]. Abdelfattah was arrested and charged with attempting to smuggle bulk cash out of the United States; making false statements; and criminal forfeiture. Abdelfattah pleaded guilty to two counts and was sentenced to two years of probation [Judgment].

03-CR-436 (WA-W) Walton

On April 26, 2003, a Snohomish County patrol officer discovered a pickup truck parked on the shoulder of the road in Lynnwood, Washington. **David Lawrence Walton** was asleep in the driver's seat [Criminal Complaint]. After a check of the vehicle's VIN number and license plates, the officer discovered the truck had been stolen during a robbery [Criminal Complaint]. Walton was arrested and his truck was searched. The search revealed a loaded Ruger 9mm handgun under the front seat. Walton had multiple felony convictions and therefore, was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 57 months imprisonment [Judgment].

04-CR-111 (Wi-E) Hussein

Wajhee Hussin-Hussin was arrested by the Milwaukee Police Department for recklessly endangering safety and possession of a firearm by a felon [Plea Agreement]. While executing a search warrant, the City of Milwaukee Police Department observed and confiscated numerous documents of identification, including a passport issued to "Darcy L. Gurrero". While being interviewed by officers, Wahjee confirmed the photograph on the passport was his brother **Issa Ahmad Hussein**. Issa was interviewed by Milwaukee Police and an agent from DHS. Issa stated that his name was formerly "Darcy Louis Guerrero" but he changed it to Darcy Decoro due to identity theft. Issa was shown the passport bearing his photograph with a different name to which he stated the photograph was not him and that he had never applied for a United States passport [Plea Agreement]. DHS handwriting specialists examined the

signature on the passport and samples of Gurrero's handwriting and concluded they were written by the same person. An investigation revealed Hussein had gone to the West Allis post office in West Allis, Wisconsin, to obtain the passport. Hussein was once again interviewed by DHS and Milwaukee Police. He was shown the passport again and he positively identified his photograph on the passport [Plea Agreement]. Hussein was indicted with one count of making false statements in application/use of passport [Docket]. Hussein pleaded guilty to the charge and received 6 months imprisonment with credit for time served.

04-CR-10004 (MA) Almohandis

Essam Mohammed Almohandis was arrested at Logan International Airport on January 3, 2004, after U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents discovered three pyrotechnic devices in his carry-on luggage (Milford Daily News 2004). When questioned about the devices, Almohandis said they were artist's pens and did not know how they got into his backpack (Sun Journal 2004). The incendiary devices were discovered to be "sparklers" and are illegal to carry aboard a commercial airliner. Almohandis's wife had given birth to their child the day before he travelled on business to the United States. Almohandis stated one of his relative's children could have slipped the sparklers into his bag while visiting the new child. Almohandis was charged with carrying an explosive or incendiary device on an aircraft and making false statements but was found not guilty at trial. He was later deported back to Saudi Arabia.

04-CR-1190 (CA-C) Jomaa

On August 4, 2004, **Assad Mohamad Jomaa** was arrested at Los Angeles International Airport. Jomaa was attempting to board a flight travelling to Beirut, Lebanon when he made conflicting statements to U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer Benjamin Valdivia. Jomaa reported he was travelling with \$8,998 in his front pocket. Jomaa stated to officers that he had no other currency other than the money in his pocket. When Valdivia informed Jomaa that they were going to do an additional currency check in his suitcase Jomaa exclaimed “TRUST ME, TRUST ME!” [Affidavit]. A search of his suitcases revealed an additional \$21,000. Jomaa was charged with bulk cash smuggling; failure to report transportation of United States currency in excess of \$10,000 out of the United States; false statements to a government agency; and forfeiture [Docket]. He pleaded guilty to bulk cash smuggling and was sentenced to three years of probation.

04-CR-16 (MN) Bradai

Algerian born **Abdelhafid Bradai** was a supporter of the Islamic Salvation Front, a popular party of moderate and radical Islamists in Algeria (Find A Case 2004). Bradai claims due to his support for the party (which was a legal political party at the time), he was harassed by government officials and police officers and therefore decided to flee. After travelling to multiple countries Bradai decided to travel to the United States. While in Istanbul, Turkey he acquired a fraudulent French passport with the name “Guillanumie Granier” (Find A Case 2004). Bradai attempted to use the falsified passport upon entry into the United States (Indictment). Bradai was

questioned by an INS officer at Twin Cities International Airport in Minneapolis, Minnesota about his passport. Almost immediately Bradai confessed to knowing the passport was fraudulent and was detained by immigration officials. Bradai pleaded guilty to using a false, forged, and altered passport and was sentenced to six months of probation [Judgment]. Bradai was granted political asylum in the United States (Find A Case 2004).

04-CR-1623 (AZ) Al-Haj

On July 21, 2004, **Mohamed Abdulla Omer Al-Haj** attempted to enter the United States through Nogales, Arizona using a fraudulent resident alien card. When he was questioned by Customs and Border Protection agents for his entry documents, Al-Haj provided agents with the counterfeit alien resident card [Criminal Complaint]. Al-Haj was indicted on two counts of presenting a fraudulent resident alien card and possessing a counterfeit alien resident card containing the alien number of a Mexican citizen. The indictment was dismissed without prejudice.

04-CR-2088 (AZ) Nethercott

Border Patrol agents Rudy Lopez, Salvador Valencia, and Joseph Ramos attempted to pull over **Casey James Nethercott** for suspicious driving. Nethercott was driving very slowly and drifting in and out of the shoulder lane [Criminal Complaint]. The Border Patrol Agents activated their sirens and lights but Nethercott refused to pull over. Agents followed Nethercott to a Ranch Rescue compound in Douglas, Arizona. Ranch Rescue is a volunteer organization in which independent

citizens take up arms against illegal immigrants at the United States-Mexico border (Hendricks 2004). Ranch Rescue is known to be generally hostile towards federal law enforcement and members of the group are typically heavily armed [Criminal Complaint]. After Nethercott entered the compound he got out of his vehicle and began yelling at the agents and giving orders to other members of the group. He yelled to the other Ranch Rescue members to “maintain coverage” and that there was going to be a “shoot out” [Criminal Complaint]. More Border Patrol agents arrived and Nethercott was eventually arrested before a violent shoot out could occur. He was charged with three counts of threatening to assault a federal officer. Nethercott pleaded not guilty to all charges and at trial was acquitted on all counts [Order of Acquittal].

04-CR-30028 (MA) Alkhaolani

ICE Special Agent Gregory C. Nevano began an investigation into **Mohamed Alkhaolani**. Nevano used the Non-Immigrant Information System to look up Alkhaolani’s information which indicated he was admitted to the United States at Chicago as a nonimmigrant student [Criminal Complaint]. Alkhaolani was enrolled at Vincennes University in Indiana but had transferred to Springfield Technical Community College (STCC) in Springfield, Massachusetts. Records obtained from STCC revealed that Alkhaolani had withdrawn from classes in the fall of 2000. Alkhaolani reapplied for enrollment in the spring of 2003 with an Employment Authorization Card with the name Mohamed Abdul Al-Kholani [Criminal Complaint]. The card also had different font than used on a typical ICE Employment Authorization

Cards. Alkhaolani was arrested and charged with fraud and misuse of other documents; and false representation as United States citizen. He pleaded guilty to both counts and was sentenced to time served (ATS Report).

04-CR-85 (TX-N) Palmer

Grapevine Police Officer Keller was following behind **Troy Dean Palmer** when Palmer parked his truck in a residential driveway. Keller ran Palmer's license and registration which revealed Palmer had several outstanding traffic warrants (ATS Report). Keller was preparing to arrest Palmer when Palmer indicated he was cooperating with an ongoing, unrelated FBI investigation and insisted on being let go. Officer Keller contacted the FBI who also requested Palmer be let go but after talking with his supervisor, Keller arrested Palmer. After the arrest was made, Officer Keller searched Palmer's truck where he found a .38 caliber Smith & Wesson handgun and a small amount of methamphetamine (ATS Report). Palmer was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a firearm with obliterated serial number [Indictment]. Palmer pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 63 months imprisonment.

04-CR-88 (OH-S) Abdi

The discovery of **Nuradin Abdi** was the result of international collaboration. Abdi, a Somali national living in Columbus, Ohio, applied for a travel document wherein he claimed he intended to visit Germany and Saudi Arabia to visit relatives (Kouri 2007). Abdi's true intentions were to travel to Ogaden, Ethiopia where he

obtained military-style training in preparation for violent jihad (Tyler 2011). Ethiopian intelligence contacted the FBI and ICE agents in regards to Abdi's activities while in Ethiopia. The FBI began surveillance on Abdi after he returned to the United States and discovered Abdi, along with others, were plotting to bomb a shopping mall in Columbus as well as launch missile attacks against various landmarks in Washington, D.C. (Tyler 2011). Abdi was charged with providing material support to terrorists; and fraud and misuse of visas/permits [Docket]. Abdi pleaded guilty to providing material support to terrorists and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. ICE Assistant Secretary Julie L. Myers stated in regards to Abdi's sentencing, "Today's sentencing brings to conclusion one aspect of a critical joint investigation that identified and stopped three terrorist supporters bent on causing panic and significant harm to US citizens" (Kouri 2007).

05-CR-80476 (MI-E) Rahal et al

Nemr Ali Rahal was born in Lebanon and became a naturalized United States citizen in March of 1999. He married **Rania Mohamad Fawaz Rahal** in November 1999 who was also from Lebanon. Rania applied for "green card" resident status and became a lawful resident in 2002. Rahal has one brother living in Germany and another living in Canada. Rahal was returning from Canada with his son through the Windsor-United States boarder when he was stopped for secondary inspection. During the secondary inspection, a chemical test revealed vapor signs of high level military explosives RDX and HMX on his passport and his son's passport [Order of Detention]. A search warrant was issued for Rahal's home where agents discovered

numerous credit card and bank fraud schemes and several materials including videotapes related to Hezbollah.

An investigation into both Rahal and Rania revealed they were deeply involved in “bust out” credit fraud schemes. Bust out credit fraud, also known as sleeper fraud, involves an individual who establishes credit and obtains many credit cards in his or her true name. This individual builds a history of good behavior by making timely payments and eventually requests higher credit limits. The individual eventually uses all the available credit and stops making payments. He or she inflates the credit line by making overpayments with bad checks and either disappears or declares bankruptcy (Experian Information Solutions 2009). By 2003, Rahal established roughly 50 credit card accounts and “busted out” over \$300,000 in funds [Order of Detention].

The FBI obtained an additional search warrant to collect the evidence related to the Hezbollah materials. The FBI seized numerous videotapes, audiotapes, and books relating to Hezbollah including a videotape of their son at a rally in Lebanon for Mahdi Scouts, Hezbollah’s youth group [Order of Detention]. Rahal pleaded guilty to bank fraud; and aiding and abetting and was sentenced to 33 months imprisonment [Judgment]. Rania Rahal pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit federal crimes and was sentenced to one year of probation [Docket].

06-CR-5 (CA-N) Quinonez

Jose Quinonez is a native citizen of Mexico. He was deported from the United States to Mexico in 2002. The San Francisco Police Department encountered

Quinonez in 2005 in San Francisco, California. Quinonez's photo and fingerprints were taken by ICE officers and electronically entered into IDENT, DHS's automated biometric database [Criminal Complaint]. Quinonez's prints produced a positive match that linked him to his immigration file in which revealed he re-entered the United States illegally. Quinonez was charged with illegal reentry following deportation [Docket]. He entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to 42 months imprisonment [Judgment].

09-CR-292 (MN) Abdow

On October 6, 2009, Nevada Highway Patrol stopped a vehicle for speeding. The officer asked the purpose of travel to the four individuals in the car. The individuals stated they were attending a wedding in San Diego but gave inconsistent information [Criminal Complaint]. A search of the car revealed \$4,000.00 and one passenger was on the FBI terrorist watch list. The trooper called the FBI but was told there was no need to hold or arrest the passengers in the vehicle. The FBI later questioned **Abdow Munye Abdow**, one of the passengers the in the vehicle. Abdow told FBI agents that he did not know the names of the men in the vehicle or who had rented the vehicle (Hanners 2010). Unbeknownst to Abdow, agents were already aware that he used his VISA debit card to rent the vehicle. Abdow was charged with obstruction of justice. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 120 days in prison and 120 days home confinement [Docket]. Abdow was connected to an alleged recruitment ring of al-Shabaab fighters from the Twin Cities area.

10-CR-38 (OK-W) Dyer

On January 12, 2010, a search warrant was issued for **Charles Alan Dyer's** residence for an alleged rape of a minor child. While executing the search warrant, officers noticed multiple weapons including a Colt M-203, 40 millimeter grenade launcher [Criminal Complaint]. Officers arrested Dyer for the alleged rape and contacted the FBI as Dyer is known to have contacts with the militia group Oath Keepers in Oklahoma. The Oath Keepers is an organization devoted to protecting constitutional rights [Defendant's Motion in Limine]. Officers later returned to Dyer's residence and obtained the grenade launcher. The serial number revealed the grenade launcher had been stolen from Fort Irwin. FBI agents interviewed Dyer about the weapon and he indicated he received the device from his best friend who is also with the Marine Corps [Criminal Complaint]. Dyer was charged with forfeiture of destructive devices; and possession of an unregistered destructive device [Docket]. At trial, Dyer was found not guilty and acquitted of all charges.

11-CR-57 (WA-W) Myrland

On August 10, 2010, a Kirkland Police officer noticed a Volvo without a visible license plate and pulled the vehicle over. As the officer approached the vehicle, he noticed a black semiautomatic Springfield XD pistol laying in the front passenger seat [Complaint for Violation]. The officer told the driver, later identified as **David Russell Myrland**, to keep his hands on the steering wheel and started to ask Myrland questions about the weapon. Myrland stated the gun was not loaded and that he was allowed to have it. The officer asked Myrland why his vehicle did not have

license plates and Myrland responded that he was not subject to Washington State laws [Criminal Complaint]. Furthermore, Myrland maintained the officer lacked the legal authority to pull him over. The officer asked for Myrland's driver's license, registration, and insurance information to which Myrland responded that he did not have a license or registration because he was not subject to Washington State laws. Myrland continued to state he was not subject to Washington State laws and began to become agitated. More Kirkland Police officers arrived at the scene and conducted a search of the vehicle. The officers found Myrland was wearing a shoulder holster with two additional loaded magazines for the pistol. Myrland's record indicated he had a suspended driver's license and expired registration; therefore, he was promptly arrested and his car was impounded [Criminal Complaint]. During the arrest, Myrland stated the officer was in a dangerous position due to Myrland's "unlawful" arrest. On August 30, 2010, Myrland sent an email to the Mayor of Kirkland's office stating that armed men would be coming to the homes of all those involved with his arrest and arresting them by "competent" authorities [Criminal Complaint]. Myrland later called the Kirkland Assistant City Attorney and threatened to come to his house and arrest him. As a result of these and other threats made by Myrland, he was arrested and indicted on one charge of transmission of threatening interstate communication [Docket]. Myrland pleaded guilty to count one and was sentenced to 40 months imprisonment. The court recommended Myrland attend an intensive drug treatment program [Judgment].

84-CR-124 (MN) Schmitt et al **84-CR-125 (MN) Schmitt et al**

In an effort to locate a known tax-protestor, Richard Nelson of the FBI spoke with U.S. Army Sergeant David Kipfinger who at the time was assigned to the National Guard Armory in Bemidji, Minnesota [Affidavit]. Kipfinger had come to know of a local active tax protestor organization known as the Sheriff's Posse Comitatus (SPC) through his participation with the First Baptist Church in Bemidji. The SPC was formed in 1969 in Portland, Oregon. SPC members believe in the superiority of the Aryan race and maintain the federal government is controlled by Jews (Smith 1994). **William Schmitt** attempted to recruit Kipfinger to the SPC chapter in Bemidji and was responsible for organizing group meetings. **Roger Luther** and **Harry Mott** were very active members of the organization and advocated for violence against federal agents as a means to defend one's self against the government [Affidavit]. The group met regularly at Schmitt's residence. Through his conversations with Kipfinger and his own investigation, Nelson learned Schmitt was trying to instill a paramilitary aspect to his tax-protest organization. **Ernest Foust's** former wife told investigators he was an active member of the SPC. She observed a cache of weapons and ammunition in Schmitt's basement and overheard Schmitt and Foust making statements about killing those who oppose the group or their goals. Mott and Schmitt discussed bank robbery as a means to fund their "war" against the IRS and other federal agents (Smith 1994). Multiple confidential sources infiltrated Schmitt's organization and gathered incriminating information for law enforcement officers [Affidavit]. Two separate indictments totaling 19 charges were filed against members of the group. The first indictment filed against Schmitt, Luther, and Foust included charges of threats and acts of intimidation towards federal officers. The

second indictment filed against Schmitt and Mott included charges of possession and the manufacturing of illegal weapons. In January 1985, Schmitt, Luther, and Foust were found guilty of conspiracy to injure and impede the performances of an IRS agent (Smith 1994). Luther and Foust were sentenced to 8 years imprisonment while Schmitt received 26 years imprisonment (Judgment). As a result of the bank robbery plot, Schmitt and Mott received additional 5 years added to their sentences (Smith 1994).

86-CR-118 (MA) Murray Jr. et al 87-CR-181 (MA) Murray Jr. et al 87-CR-225 (MA) Murray Jr. et al

The *Valhalla* incident revealed an international criminal conspiracy. Leeward, Inc. bought an oceangoing shipping boat named the *Valhalla* at a U.S. Marshal's Service auction (Smith 1994). Leeward hired **Robert Anderson** to captain the boat for fishing trips [Statement of Evidence]. Anderson set sail with **John Crawley** and **John McIntyre**, two of seven members of the conspiracy, for a supposed fishing trip. Weeks later, the *Valhalla* was spotted off the coast of Ireland by the Irish naval authorities. Authorities witnessed military items being transferred from the *Valhalla* to another boat called the *Marita Ann*. The *Marita Ann* was seized by Irish law enforcement authorities and contained over 150 firearms, 71,000 rounds of ammunition, and other military hardware (Smith 1994). After being notified, American authorities seized the *Valhalla* when it returned to Boston, Massachusetts

An investigation revealed a highly structured scheme to acquire weapons for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) financed through drug trafficking. The

PIRA is an extension of an older group known as the Irish Republican Army which fought against British rule in Ireland in the early 20th century (Gregory 2010). PIRA is a violent terrorist group in Northern Ireland that has engaged in multiple assassinations and bombings.

Joseph Murray, Patrick Nee, Michael Nigro, and William Winn were implicated in the case along with Anderson, Crawley, and McIntyre. Indictments were filed against Murray, Nee, and Anderson. Murray, Nee, and Anderson pleaded guilty to drug trafficking and violations of the Export Administration Act and RICO statutes (Smith 1994). Murray was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment; Nee was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment; and Anderson was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment. Murray and Anderson's sentences were later reduced (Smith 1994).

87-CR-78 (VT) Kabbani et al

On October 23, 1987, Immigration Inspector David Grant was on duty at the Richford port of entry at Richford, Vermont when a silver-colored van carrying **Walid Majib Mourad** and **Georges Fouad Nicolas Younan** approached [Affidavit]. The men told Inspector Grant they were travelling to Boston, Massachusetts for the weekend and crossed the border. Police Chief of Richford Richard Jewett was on routine patrol that same night and observed an individual walking on Province Street with a dark-colored bag. Chief Jewett also saw a silver-colored van, later discovered to be the same van, carrying Mourad and Younan, in a no trespassing area. Chief Jewett informed Mourad and Younan they had to move their vehicle and provided the men with directions to a local motel. Chief Jewett returned to where he originally saw

the man walking and saw him again somewhat north of the previous location. He noticed the man was no longer carrying the bag. Chief Jewett stopped and talked to man whom he discovered was **Walid Nicolas Kabbani**. Jewett gave him a ride to the port of entry at Richford and made contact with the immigration officials there. He found out Kabbani had entered close to where the silver-van had entered earlier that day. Jewett returned to the area he first saw Kabbani walking and searched the vicinity. He discovered the bag and took it to the port entry at Richford. Chief Jewett and Immigration officers examined the bag and found it contained two metal cylinders taped together with wooden plugs, a small metallic cylinder with wires attached to it, wire cutters, tape, and a black nylon head mask [Affidavit]. The bomb squad was notified and determined the cylinders contained explosive powder. After linking the location of the van to Kabbani, Mourad and Younan, the individuals were arrested by Border Patrol officers. A soldering iron with wire wrapped around its handle was discovered inside the van. The wire matched the detonating device found in Kabbani's bag further linking the men together. It was found that Kabbani, Mourad, and Younan were members of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party advocates for the radical reform of society along secular lines (Pipes 1988). The men were charged with transportation of an illegal alien; knowingly entering the United States at a time and place other than as designated by Immigration Officers and eluding examination and inspection by Immigration Officers; illegal transportation of explosive materials; and possession of an unregistered firearm [Indictment]. Kabbani and Younan were convicted and sentenced to 16 imprisonment. Mourad pleaded guilty and was sentenced to nine years imprisonment [Judgment].

93-CR-20070 (CA-N) Knesal et al 93-CR-20135 (CA-N) Knesal 93-CR-20136 (CA-N) Wooten

A J.C. Penny security guard witnessed a shoplifting offense and detained the two individuals. The security guard called the Salinas Police Department and officers responded. The shoplifters were identified as **Jeremiah Gordon Knesal** and **Wayne Paul Wooten**. The responding officer obtained a consent to search Knesal's vehicle and discovered three pipe bombs and four loaded long-barrel weapons [Affidavit]. Furthermore, the vehicle contained military-type clothing, ammunition for numerous weapons, repelling gear, wigs, and white supremacist literature. The literature in the vehicle linked Knesal to the Church of the Creator. The car also contained documents such as telephone book listings of various Jewish agencies and synagogues in the Portland, Oregon area, falsified birth certificates, and numerous white supremacist business cards [Affidavit]. Knesal was questioned about the materials in his vehicle and admitted they were accumulated to commit racially-directed bombings and murders in Washington State and Oregon. Knesal and Wooten had identified various Jewish synagogues and agencies to bomb. Knesal revealed he and Wooten along with others, took part in the bombing of the Tacoma N.A.A.C.P. The bombing caused two plate-glass doors to crack but no one was seriously injured (Los Angeles Times 1994).

The men were arrested and issued a number of indictments. Knesal and Wooten were issued a 4-count indictment for violations including transporting explosive materials across state lines; failure to register firearms; possession of firearms; and possession of stolen firearms. Knesal and Wooten pleaded guilty to all

four counts. In a separate indictment Knesal pleaded guilty to conspiring to interfere with the civil rights of religious and racial minorities by constructing and transporting explosives in connection with the Tacoma N.A.A.C.P. bombing. Wooten was issued a separate indictment to which he pleaded guilty to damage of a building by means of an explosive, and aiding and abetting. They both were sentenced to a total of 6.5 years imprisonment.

98-CR-10022 (KS) Griesacker

A traffic stop led to the arrest of **Ronald Arthur Griesacker**, member of the Kansas Territorial Agricultural Society, a militia group (Davis 1998). Stemming from investigations into the 1st Mechanical Kansas Militia, Griesacker was indicted for various counts of bank and check fraud. Griesacker was a fugitive since 1996 but was finally captured when Shady Cove, Oregon Police Officers pulled over a truck he was a passenger in. A law firm in Texas notified law enforcement that Griesacker was living in the Shady Cove area (Davis 1998). Prior to Griesacker's capture, an FBI's investigation into the militia group revealed Griesacker was leading seminars for private citizens in how to defraud the United States Government. A superseding indictment was filed with charges of bank and mail fraud as well as conspiracy to defraud the United States. Griesacker was found guilty of all charges and sentenced to 57 months imprisonment [Judgment].

06-CR-62 (GA-N) Shorbagi

An ICE investigation led to the arrest of **Mohamed Shorbagi**. Shorbagi made regular monetary contributions to the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) on behalf of himself and others from 1997 to 2001. The investigation revealed HLF was providing the funds to Hamas. Hamas is a Palestinian militant Islamist organization and designated by several world powers, including the United States, as a terrorist group. The Muslim charity group was shut down in 2001 after the investigation revealed HLF had funneled over \$12 million to Hamas (Aljazeera 2007). It was discovered Shorbagi knew the donations would support the terrorist organization. He was indicted on August 28, 2006, and charged with providing materialistic support to terrorists [Docket]. Shorbagi pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 92 months imprisonment. Shorbagi received a lighter sentence because he assisted the government's investigation.

01-CR-418 (CO) Rizvi

Arsalan Absar Rizvi entered the United States on January 20, 2001, as a lawful non-immigrant worker for the purpose of working for SCC Communications in Colorado. Rizvi was fired from his job at SCC Communications in April 2000, and as a result, lost his lawful non-immigrant worker status. Rizvi falsified his INS Form by claiming he was a U.S. Citizen eligible for employment and created a falsified social security card. Law enforcement first learned of Rizvi when an arrest warrant was issued for domestic violence and third degree assault against Rizvi's former wife. During the search of Rizvi's home, officers found a number of Pakistani identification documents displaying Rizvi's photograph and various different names, an expired Pakistani passport, a copy of Rizvi's driver's license and falsified social security card,

a Browning 12 gauge shotgun, and 325 rounds of ammunition [Affidavit]. Rizvi was charged with assaulting his wife and illegal alien in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 99 days in prison (Desert News 2002). Upon release, Rizvi was sent to INS for deportation [Judgment].

Appendix F: Undercover Agent Case Summaries

04-CR-516 (CA-C) Preciado

ICE Senior Special Agent Phil Salacup acting in an undercover capacity entered the Casa Nova clothing store in El Monte, California [Criminal Complaint]. Salacup observed a Latin man, later identified as **Rigoberto Miguel Preciado** enter the Casa Nova store with a plastic bag that appeared to hold a shoe box. Agent Salacup saw Preciado give the manger a bundle of cash. He also observed Preciado leave the plastic bag containing the shoe box in a box at the store. While the FBI and BICE were executing a search warrant at Casa Nova, Preciado was arrested. The bag Preciado delivered contained 5lbs. of crystal methamphetamine. During the interview with Preciado, agents noted that he appeared nervous and anxious [Criminal Complaint]. Preciado admitted to delivering the drugs but would not name the person who provided him with the methamphetamine (ATS Report). Preciado was issued a 1-count indictment on May 5, 2004. He was charged with aiding and abetting the distribution of methamphetamine to which he pleaded guilty. Preciado was sentenced to 46 months imprisonment [Judgment].

04-CR-925 (TX-W) Hamilton

On April 19, 2004, a FBI undercover agent met with **Harold Richard Hamilton** to discuss acquiring pipe bombs. Hamilton told the undercover agent that he was familiar with pipe bombs and had successfully made pipe bombs in the past. Hamilton learned how to make pipe bombs through various books and internet forums. Hamilton specifically mentioned reading *The Anarchist Cookbook* to learn different

recipes for bomb making [Criminal Complaint]. Hamilton told the undercover agent that he would provide him with pipe bombs for \$200.00 a piece and would call him that evening if he would be able to get the materials to make the bomb. The undercover agent provided Hamilton with \$300.00 to buy the materials and make pipe bombs for him. He informed Hamilton that he was going to use the pipe bombs for acts of violence which did not deter Hamilton from supplying the agent with the bombs. As such, Hamilton did enter into a conspiracy to commit the offense of making an explosive device and transferring the destructive device [Criminal Complaint]. Hamilton, who was already a felon, was arrested and indicted with one count of felon in possession of a firearm. He pleaded guilty to the charge on April 27, 2005, and was sentenced to 37 months imprisonment [Judgment].

06-CR-439 (MD) Subandi et al

A three year investigation conducted by ICE led to the apprehension of international arms traffickers. **Haji Subandi, Helmi Soedirdja, and Reinhard Rusli**, along with others, conspired to procure military weapons such as surface to air missiles and night vision goggles for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka [Docket]. The Liberation Tigers is a designated terrorist organization that seeks to take control of Sri Lanka from the ethnic Sinhalese majority and create an independent state for the Tamil people. Beginning in February 2006, the defendants acted as middlemen between weapons manufacturers and distributors and individuals who sought to purchase this technology [Indictment]. The defendants were introduced to an agent for an undercover business in Maryland that claimed to sell military

weapons (ICE 2010). Over the next couple months, the defendants negotiated with the undercover agent for military weapons. The conspiracy involved the Sea Tigers, the naval branch of the Liberation Tigers, collecting the weapons off the coast of Sri Lanka. The Liberation Tigers is, a now nonoperational, Sri Lanka terrorist organization that advocated for a separate homeland for the Tamils. On September 29, 2006, the defendants transferred \$450,000.00 to the undercover business' accounts and were arrested shortly thereafter.

All three defendants initially pleaded not guilty however later changed their pleas to guilty. Rusli, Soedirdja, and Subandi each pleaded guilty to money laundering and aiding and abetting; and attempted export of arms and munitions aiding and abetting. Rusli and Soedirdja were sentenced to 12 months and 1 day imprisonment. Subandi, who had a more substantive role in the conspiracy, was sentenced to 37 months imprisonment (Judgment).

04-CR-20229 (TN-W) Ibrahim et al

On December 19, 2002, **Wahib Ibrahim** and **Salameh Ibrahim** met with an undercover police officer in Olive Branch, Mississippi to look at what they thought was stolen merchandise. They agreed to purchase the stolen merchandise from the undercover police officer to sell in their discount stores. Over the next two years, the defendants, including **Jamal Ibrahim** and **Christopher Smith** purchased and transported what they thought to be stolen cases of Visine, Motrin, paper products, Coca-Cola drinks, and cellular telephones from the undercover police officer to resell at their discount stores.

On May 18, 2004, a 9-count indictment was filed against the defendants charging the individuals with violations of conspiring to steal goods, to receive goods they knew to be stolen, to transport stolen goods, and to receive stolen goods worth more than \$5,000.00; and aiding and abetting each other to transport stolen goods worth more than \$5,000.00. Wahib, Salameh, and Jamal were further charged with violations of conspiring to launder money. Additionally, Wahib and Jamal were charged with violations of aiding and abetting each other to conduct an illegal financial transaction affecting interstate commerce.

All four defendants agreed to a plea deal. Wahib pleaded guilty to conspiring to launder money and was sentenced to two years imprisonment. Salameh and Jamal pleaded guilty to conspiring to steal goods, to receive goods they knew to be stolen, to transport stolen goods, and to receive stolen goods worth more than \$5,000.00. Salameh was sentenced to three years of probation and fined \$2,000.00. Jamal was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. Smith pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting each other to transport stolen goods worth more than \$5,000.00. He received two years of probation. Wahib was required to pay \$500,000 forfeiture to the government for all the property involved in the money laundering offenses.

10-CR-240 (IL-N) Khan

On June 25, 2008, government agents in Chicago's O'Hara International Airport encountered **Raja Lahrasib Khan** returning from overseas. Khan had made several trips while overseas including a trip to Pakistan. Agents discovered and copied an address book in Khan's possession that listed "Alyas Kishmiri". Ilyas Kishmiri is a

former commander of the Afghan jihad and led a Sunni extremist group which had links to al-Qaeda [Criminal Complaint]. “Alyas” and “Ilyas” were later discovered to be the same person. Government agents encountered Khan again upon his return from international travel on October 9, 2009. Agents found the same address book they had previously found and copied it for a second time. “Alyas Kishmiri” was listed again but appeared to be crossed out [Criminal Complaint]. Agents also noted a telephone number linked to an individual (hereinafter Individual A). Agents recorded a phone conversation between Khan and Individual A on November 18, 2009. During the phone conversation, Khan discussed transferring money to Individual A and that Khan would later tell Individual A whom he needed to distribute the money to. Khan met with an undercover agent posing as someone interested in aiding Kishmiri [Criminal Complaint]. Khan admitted that one of the individuals he was transferring money to was Kishmiri. He also admitted that he had met with Kishmiri multiple times and that Kishmiri was working with al Qaeda to conduct attacks against U.S. forces. Khan was issued a 2-count indictment on April 1, 2010, on charges of knowingly providing material support and resources to terrorists. Khan pleaded guilty to count 2 and was sentenced to 90 months imprisonment. In addition to his imprisonment, Khan was ordered to repay the United States government \$1,000.00 which he took from undercover agents and tried to give to al Qaeda [Judgment].

10-CR-60 (AK) Rockwood 10-CR-61 (AK) Rockwood

Paul Rockwood converted to Islam in 2002. Soon after converting, Rockwood began following the teachings of cleric Anwar al-Awlaki who is notorious

for his emphasis of violent Jihad ideology. Rockwood became increasingly radicalized and in 2009, he shared his plans to blow up a building with another individual who happened to be an undercover FBI agent (FBI Stories 2012). Rockwood met with the undercover operative multiple times to discuss plans and equipment they would need to go operational. By 2010, Rockwood had created a hit list which included 15 targets. He gave the list to his wife **Nadia Rockwood** who was aware of his plans. In 2010, the Rockwoods were questioned by law enforcement regarding the hit list and terrorist plot to which they stated they had no involvement with (FBI Stories 2012). Paul Rockwood was issued 1-count indictment charging him with knowingly and willfully making false material statements to federal agents with respect to planned actions of domestic terrorism. He pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 96 months imprisonment. Nadia was also issued a 1-count indictment charging her with making false statements to federal agents. She pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 5 years of probation. Because Nadia had dual-citizenship with Great Britain and the United States, she was mandated to serve her probation in Great Britain (ATS Report).

11-CR-447 (CA-E) Mendoza

On December 9, 2011, **John Mendoza** left a voicemail on a FBI undercover agent's phone who was posing as an arms dealer [Criminal Complaint]. Mendoza told the agent that he was looking for grenades, mines, and "Stingers." He also mentioned that he was interested in RPG's that could penetrate a tank's armor. Mendoza told the undercover agent that he thought the feds were "spying" on him and that he was going

to take care of that right away. Mendoza bought two grenades from the undercover agent and placed an order for additional grenades at a later date. After the transaction was concluded, Mendoza was arrested. Officers searched his vehicle and found numerous weapons and boxes of ammunition [Criminal Complaint]. Mendoza was issued a 1-count indictment charging him with unlawful receipt of explosive material. He pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to a total term of 6 months imprisonment with credit for time served.

11-CR-90 (VA-E) Martinez-Guillen

Hector Antonio Martinez-Guillen, former Salvadoran army captain, was arrested on November 18, 2010, while trying to smuggle 20-kilos of cocaine into the country on behalf of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Pachico 2011). FARC is a large terrorist organization primarily in Colombia that claims to be the military wing of the Marxist party. FARC considers United States citizens as valid targets due the U.S. participation with the Colombian government. Earlier that year, Martinez-Guillen sold undercover DEA agents C-4 explosives, roughly 3,000 hand grenades, and numerous Russian-made Sam-7 shoulder-fired missiles (Johnson 2011). Two DEA agents arrested Martinez-Guillen in a parking lot near Dulles International Airport after he exchanged the cocaine with an undercover operative during a sting operation. He was issued a 5-count indictment charging him with violations of attempted material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization; carrying an explosive during the commission of a felony; transferring explosive materials knowing they will be used to commit a crime of violence; carrying a destructive device during

and in relation to a crime of violence; and possession with the intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine [Docket]. During the trial, Martinez-Guillen admitted he worked as an arms dealer for FARC and sold military weapons intended to kill American military personnel in Colombia (Alexandrian News 2011). Martinez-Guillen pleaded guilty to count 1 and count 4 and was sentenced to 372 months imprisonment.

86-CR-184 (MA) Murphy et al

On March 6, 1985, **John A. MacDonald Jr.**, contacted an individual who he thought was an arms dealer in order to introduce him to people looking to buy weapons. The individual was actually an undercover FBI agent. The undercover agent met with **Noel Murphy** in Braintree, Massachusetts, to discuss purchasing 500 automatic M-16 rifles [Indictment]. Murphy contacted the agent numerous times to discuss progress on the deal. The agent met with MacDonald on July 3, 1985, to show him three M-16 automatic rifles and to pay him for his services as an intermediary [Indictment]. The undercover agent met with MacDonald and Murphy several times as well as talked on the phone regarding the progress of the deal. Murphy indicated that after speaking with his IRA contacts in New York and Belfast, Ireland, that it was “just a matter of time” before the deal could be completed [Indictment]. On March 24, 1986, Murphy and **Cairan Hughes** met with the undercover agent in Boston, Massachusetts to discuss payment for the weapons and logistics of shipping the arms illegally to Ireland. On May 20, 1986, the undercover agent met with Murphy and Hughes as well as **James Boyle, John Fitzgerald, Steven M. MacDonald, Michael**

P. McLaughlin, and **Roy Paul Willey** in Bedford, Massachusetts to complete the deal. Murphy and Hughes inspected the weapons aboard a private jet aircraft. On that same day, the other men met with two other undercover FBI agents to examine more weapons and discuss the logistics of getting the rifles and missile to Ireland [Criminal Complaint]. After the inspection all the defendants were arrested.

A 4-count indictment was filed against the defendants charging them with conspiracy to violate Arms Export Control Act [Indictment]. Murphy and Hughes were also each charged with aiding and abetting unlawful dealing in firearms; and aliens in possession of firearms. Murphy was found guilty of counts 1, 2, and 3 and sentenced to nine year imprisonment. Hughes was found guilty of the same charges and sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Steven MacDonald pleaded guilty to count 1 and was sentenced to one year imprisonment. John MacDonald, Boyle, Fitzgerald, McLaughlin, and Willey were found guilty at trial of count 1. MacDonald was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment. Boyle, Fitzgerald, McLaughlin, and Willey were sentenced to six months imprisonment each (ATS Report).

86-CR-354 (CO) Gumaer

The Arizona Patriots drew substantial attention from the FBI in June 1984 when they issued an “indictment” against all elected officials in Arizona (Smith 1994). As a result, the FBI infiltrated the group with numerous undercover agents. **David Gumaer** made various statements regarding illegal weapons and as such, the undercover operatives heightened their investigation and surveillance of Gumaer (ATS Report). Gumaer claimed he had a source that could provide eight machineguns in

Colorado for \$4,500.00 [Criminal Complaint]. Gumaer, accompanied by an undercover FBI agents, met his contact, **Steven Christensen**, in Colorado who provided Gumaer with eight fully-functional Uzis. Gumaer and Christensen were arrested in December 1986 and issued an 8-count indictment charging him with the illegal transfer of firearms. Christensen pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 5 years of probation and fined \$6,000.00. Gumaer disappeared while out on bail and remained a fugitive until his death.

86-CR-572 (IL-N) Fort et al

From June 20, 1986, through August 1986, **Alan Knox**, **Tramell Davis**, and **Melvin Mayes** met with or spoke to undercover FBI agents to arrange the purchase of an anti-tank missile. These individuals were members of El Rukns, a radical Islamic group located in Chicago, Illinois. The group was led by **Jeff Fort**, who remained in a leadership position even after a 1983 drug conviction in Mississippi which resulted in a 13-year prison sentence.

Once the individuals bought the missile and moved it into the El Rukns armory, the FBI made arrests. A 50-count indictment was issued against Fort, Knox, Davis, and Mayes, along with **Reico Cranshaw**, and **Leon McAnderson**. Various members of the group had recently flown from Chicago to Tripoli, Libya to promote El Rukns and secure funding from the Libyan government to support acts of terrorism against the United States. The indictment charged the defendants with conspiracy to transport explosives; receiving and possessing firearms and weapons including hand grenades, fully automatic weapons, and anti-tank weapons; and to commit violent acts

in the United States at the direction of representatives of the Libyan government (ATS Report). The jury found all four defendants guilty (Moore 2011). Fort was convicted of conspiring with Libya to perform terrorism acts and sentenced to 80 years of imprisonment. Knox was sentenced to 54 years imprisonment. Cranshaw was sentenced to 63 years imprisonment. McAnderson was sentenced to 51 years imprisonment. Davis pleaded guilty to three counts and was placed on probation. The charges against Mays were dropped (ATS Report). The El Rukns convictions marked the first time in United States history in which American citizens have been found guilty of planning terrorist acts on behalf of a foreign government for profit.

90-CR-8005 (FL-S) McKinley 92-CR-587 (AZ) Maguire et al

On November 20, 1989, undercover agents from U.S. Customs Service and the ATF met **Kevin McKinley** in Lake Park, Florida. During the meeting McKinley told the undercover agents he wished to acquire two .50 caliber rifles to use against British soldiers at the border of the Irish Republic and Ulster [Criminal Complaint]. McKinley also stated his group was attempting to acquire weapons to support an attack against a military target in Ireland. He told the undercover agents he sought Stinger missiles and had a contact in Ireland who would negotiate the purchase. In another meeting with undercover agents, McKinley stated that he was a member of the IRA and the weapons would be used in Ireland. On December 6, 1989, McKinley met undercover agents in North Palm Beach, Florida, to finalize the plans to acquire the Stinger missile. He indicated **Seamus Moley** would travel from Canada to Florida to put a \$20,000.00 down payment for the Stinger missile. On January 8, 1990,

undercover agents met explosive “expert” **Joseph McColgan** in a restaurant in West Palm Beach, Florida. McColgan wanted to examine the missile and inquire about other weapons such as grenade launchers. Various meetings occurred between the men and the undercover agents to discuss a safe way to transfer payments. Once the transaction was completed, all three men were arrested. On January 4, 1990, a 5-count indictment was issued against the defendants charging them with conspiracy to export a Stinger Missile from the U.S.; knowingly attempted to receive interstate commerce; and conspiracy to destroy an aircraft with a Stinger missile (ATS Report). McKinley, Moley, and McColgan were all found guilty of count 1 and 2 and each was sentenced to 51 months imprisonment.

The above case led to the identification of several other individuals who were linked to the “Stinger” conspiracy. These individuals also attempted to obtain 2900 detonators in Tucson, Arizona in November 1989, and 2500 detonators in Tucson, Arizona in January 1990 [Affidavit]. Various indictments were filed naming **Thomas Oliver Maguire, Gerard Anthony Brannigan, Patrick Moley, Denis Leyne, Kevin Joseph McKinley, Seamus Moley, Randall L. Folgate, William F. Kelly, John Joseph Lynch, Phillip McCluskey, James Gerard Martin, Aidan Moley and Michael Martin** as participants in the conspiracy. Charges included: illegally obtaining weapons; transporting explosives on a motor vehicle; shipping explosives without a permit; transporting explosives with the intent to kill; willfully possessing explosives; and receipt of explosives by a felon (ATS Report). McKinley and Seamus Moley were convicted of transporting explosives on a motor vehicle and willfully possessing explosives. Each was sentenced to 19 months imprisonment. Michael

Martin was convicted of illegally obtaining weapons and sentenced to 16 months imprisonment. Folgate was also convicted of illegally obtaining weapons and sentenced to 36 months of probation. Patrick Moley, Brannigan, Maguire, Leyne, Kelly, and Lynch were acquitted by a jury of all charges. Charges against McCluskey James Martin, and Aidan Moley were dismissed by government motion (ATS Report).

97-CR- 10128 (KS) Glover **97-CR-112 (TX-W) Dorsett et al** **97-CR-252 (CO) Hobeck et al** **97-CR-270 (CO) Newman et al** **97-CR-59 (WI-W) Ligenfelter et al** **97-CR-10112 (KS) Mackey**

An anti-government group known as the 1st Mechanical Kansas Militia planned to attack various military installations in the United States (Thomas 1997). Eight individuals were implicated in the case, exposed by two Missouri undercover police officers whom infiltrated the group and learned of a plot to attack Fort Hood, Texas on the 4th of July. The officers learned of the conspiracy at the 3rd Continental Congress, a national meeting attended by a variety of militia groups (ATS Report). The FBI was contacted about the plot and a joint investigation ensued. **Bradley Glover**, a self-proclaimed militia Brigadier General, and **Michael Dorsett** were planning to massacre foreign troops stationed at Fort Hood (Bendavid 1997). The two men were arrested by FBI agents and Texas Department of Public Safety officers at Colorado Bend State Park. A search of Glover's car and Dorsett's home revealed an extensive array of weapons and militia-oriented literature (FBI 1997). An investigation revealed that **Kevin** and **Terry Hobeck** established a safe house for Glover and Dorsett which included a stockpile of weapons and ammunition. **Thomas**

and **Kimberly Newman**, also linked to the plot, unknowingly supplied undercover officers posing as militia with automatic assault rifles and ten homemade pipe bombs to be used against law enforcement officers (FBI 1997). **Michael Mackey** was noticed at the 3rd Continental Congress meeting and linked to the Fort Hood conspiracy. He was found to be in possession of a machine gun and arrested on November 17, 1997.

While out on bail, Glover and the Newman's travelled to **Merlon Lingenfelter's** farm near Mondovi, Wisconsin to "hunker down" from law enforcement. Glover and Lingenfelter were arrested on July 10 followed by the Hobecks and the Newmans the next day. Glover pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawful making of a firearm; carrying a firearm during a crime of violence; and aiding and abetting. He was sentenced to a total of 78 months imprisonment. Dorsett also pleaded guilty to carrying a firearm during a crime of violence; and aiding and abetting. He received 60 months imprisonment. The Newmans were indicted on 10 counts of possession of pipe bombs. Kimberly Newman pleaded guilty to one count and was sentenced to five months incarceration and five months home detention. Thomas Newman pleaded guilty to all ten counts and was sentenced to 36 months imprisonment [Judgment]. The Hobecks were indicted for possession of illegal firearms to which they both pleaded guilty. Kevin Hobeck was sentenced to 21 months imprisonment and Terry Hobeck was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment (ATS Report). Lingenfelter was charged with unlawful possession of unregistered firearms and unlawful possession of a machine gun. He pleaded guilty to the charges

and was sentenced to 27 months imprisonment. Mackey pleaded guilty to misprision of a felony. He was sentenced to 2 years of probation.

Appendix G: Confidential Informant Case Summaries

02-CR-60096 (FL-S) Jokhan et al

A Canadian Jew acting as an informant for the FBI uncovered a plot to bomb various electrical power stations and Jewish businesses in South Florida. Howard Gilbert infiltrated the Darul Uloom Institute for over a year during which time he encountered Pakistani immigrant **Imran Mandhai** (Weinberg and Shields 2002). Gilbert learned Mandhai along with **Shueyb Mossa Jokhan** acquired numerous firearms and explosives and had conducted surveillance on various targets. He notified the FBI who took the case over. Some have argued Gilbert's involvement in the case was entrapment as he led the defendants further along with the conspiracy and encouraged them to engage in violent jihad (Weinberg and Shields 2002). The FBI removed Gilbert from the case and used a new criminal informant to befriend Mandhai. On May 16, 2002, a two-count indictment was filed against Mandhai and Jokhan charging them violations of conspiring to destroy by means of fire or an explosive any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce; and solicit and commit a crime of violence [Judgment]. Mandhai pleaded guilty to conspiracy to destroy property affecting interstate commerce and was sentenced to 140 months imprisonment. Jokhan also pleaded guilty to conspiracy to destroy property affecting interstate commerce and was sentenced to 54 months imprisonment [Judgment].

02-CR-1019 (NY-E) Abdo

A cooperating witness (CW) in a separate investigation led Customs agents and the FBI to **Rasheed Abdo**. Customs and the FBI were conducting an investigation of a money remitting syndicate in Brooklyn, New York [Affidavit]. Sixteen defendants were indicted for conspiracy of an unlicensed money remitting business. Mohamed AlRiany was one of the defendants charged in that case. The CW in the investigation revealed AlRiany was cousins with Abdo. The CW also told investigators that Abdo owned several delis in New York and had some involvement with AlRiany's money remitting business. Bank records indicated that Abdo purposely evaded the United States reporting requirements fifteen times between May 30, 2001, and July 9, 2001 [Affidavit]. Specifically, Abdo knowingly structured transactions in amounts of less than \$10,000.00 in order to avoid filing Currency Transaction Reports (CTR). Abdo was charged with one count of structuring transactions to evade reporting requirements [Docket]. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 3 years of probation and fined \$5,000.00.

03-CR-202 (CA-E) Johnson

Information provided by a confidential witness (CW1) revealed an international conspiracy to defraud the United States. CW1 overstayed his valid U.S. visa in 1990 and attempted to gain asylum from the INS. He was denied asylum and scheduled for deportation. CW1 also had a criminal record and was involved in civil litigation with former business associates unrelated to this case. The CW1 hoped that his assistance would garner support to remain in the United States, even though the FBI informed CW1 that they could not provide any rewards or commitment regarding

his citizenship [Criminal Complaint]. The CW1 told the FBI he was acquainted with two individuals, **Minesh Prasad** and **Vinesh Prasad**, who were supposedly obtaining visas for aliens of Indian decent. The Prasads contact in the U.S. Embassy in Sri Lanka, **Narinder Singh Bhullar**, was involved in the conspiracy. A records check revealed a higher than average rate of U.S. visas were issued from the Fiji and Colombo Embassies to Sikhs of Indian Nationality and Vietnamese Nationals. **Acey R. Johnson** was serving as consular officer at both of these locations during the time of increased levels of visas issued [Criminal Complaint]. **Long N. Lee** was a Foreign Service Officer and married to Johnson. The investigation revealed Lee and Johnson were getting information of foreign nationals from **Phuong-Hein Lam Trinh**, **Rajwant S. Virk**, **Rachpal Singh**, **Ramesh Kumar Jaisingh**, and **Kim Chi Lam**, along with the others previously mentioned, in order to sell counterfeit visas. The smuggling ring occurred operated from 2000 to 2003 in Sri Lanka, Fiji, Vietnam, India, and the United States (ATS Report). Multiple indictments were filed against the defendants charging them with a magnitude of violations some of which included conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit bribery of public officials, wire fraud, visa fraud, and aiding and abetting public officials accepting bribes [Judgment]. Lee pleaded guilty to 3 counts and was sentenced to 60 months imprisonment. Jaisingh pleaded guilty to 1 count and was sentenced to 21 months imprisonment. Virk pleaded guilty to 1 count and was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment. Bhullar pleaded guilty to 1 count and was sentenced to 33 months imprisonment. Trinh pleaded guilty to 1 count and was sentenced to 36 months imprisonment. Rachhpal Singh pleaded guilty to 1 count and was sentenced to 20 months imprisonment.

Johnson pleaded guilty to 3 counts and was sentenced to 63 months imprisonment. Minesh Prasad pleaded guilty to 2 counts and was sentenced to 41 months imprisonment. Vinesh Prasad pleaded guilty to 2 counts and was sentenced to 57 months imprisonment. Lam pleaded guilty to 1 count and was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment (ATS Report).

03-CR-211 (WI-E) Abu-Shawish

On August 24, 2002, a confidential witness (CW) informed federal agents that ongoing visa fraud was occurring at the American Embassy in Amman, Jordan [Criminal Complaint]. The CW stated that individuals in the U.S. and Jordan were conspiring to obtain visas for ineligible applications by presenting false “formal letters of invitation” to attend Arabian Fest. Arabian Fest is an annual festival in the City of Milwaukee that celebrates the cultures of various Middle Eastern countries. Federal funds were provided to Arabian Fest from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development through the City of Milwaukee, Community Development Block Grant Administration Office [Criminal Complaint]. **Mhammad Abu-Shawish** was acting President and Executive Director of Arabian Fest at the times the funds were allocated. The investigation revealed that Abu-Shawish was involved in the illegal activity of assisting foreign nationals in receiving fraudulent visas. On December 5, 2002, federal agents identified twenty-three additional Jordanians who obtained visas from the American Embassy in Amman Jordan in order to attend Arabian Fest. Of those twenty-three individuals who attended Arabian Fest, twelve had not departed the United States. Abu-Shawish was indicted and charged with violations of conspiracy to

defraud the United States; conversion of the property of another; and aiding and abetting fraud and misuse of visas. He was found guilty of Federal Program Fraud and sentenced to 36 months imprisonment. Abu-Shawish was also ordered to pay \$75,000.00 in restitution [Judgment].

03-CR-664 (IL-N) Dumeisi

A Chicago man was arrested on charges of serving as an unregistered agent of Saddam Hussein's government, including spying on opposition leaders (Holguin 2003). Much of the information regarding **Khaled Abded-Latif Dumeisi's** activities with the Government of Iraq (GOI) were derived from four confidential witnesses who were cooperating with the FBI. Dumeisi was a contributor for the Al-Mahjar, an Arabic journal. Most of the cooperating witnesses contributed to Al-Mahjar at some point and were associated with Dumeisi through the journal (Holguin 2003). One of the sources told the FBI that Dumeisi had allegedly confided in the source that he received \$2,000.00 or \$3,000.00 from Iraqi intelligence to help gather information on opposition figures in the United States. Furthermore, Dumeisi gave Saddam Hussein's regime telephone records of opposition leaders in the United States and at one point, Iraqi Intelligence Service had considered putting him on a \$500-per-month stipend (Bebow 2004). Dumeisi was arrested on July 9, 2003. He was issued a 4-count indictment charging him with violations of conspiracy to commit an act against the United States; impersonating agents of foreign governments; perjury in an immigration proceeding; and false declarations before a grand jury/court. He was found guilty of the charges and sentenced to 46 months imprisonment.

03-CR-14053 (FL-S) Lemmons

Edwin Lorenzo Lemmons is a convicted felon. He was convicted for burglary in the third degree in 1993 (a class D felony) and attempted robbery in the second degree in 1996 [Criminal Complaint]. After serving a two year prison sentence, Lemmons was paroled from September 1998 to January 2000. On June 7, 2003, Lemmons was spotted firing a SKS-type assault rifle at the Indian River County Rifle Range in the Southern District of Florida by three Indian River County Rifle Range employees [Criminal Complaint]. Witness number one was working at the register at the rifle range when Lemmons and two other gentlemen of apparent Middle Eastern decent entered. Witness number one sold Lemmons and the other gentlemen passes to shoot and had them complete liability waivers. Witness number two, a Range Officer, also observed the men enter and fill out liability forms. Witness number three, also a Range Officer, saw Lemmons and the other men firing SKS-type assault rifles [Criminal Complaint]. Witness number three recognized the weapon because he owns the same type of gun. According to witness number three, once the men finished firing the weapons, they knelt in the parking lot and appeared to be praying [Criminal Complaint].

Lemmons did not surface on the radar due to the Indian River County Rifle Range employees. Lemmons first came to the attention of the Florida JTFF after learning of his racialization and tactical training from an individual who had recently been arrested (Dunleavy 2014). The information provided by the Indian River County Rifle Range employees followed as a result of the investigation from the arrestees tip.

Lemmons was charged with violations of felon in possession of a firearm. He pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 37 months imprisonment.

The arrest of Lemmons is used as an example of success of the counter-terrorism program and is pointed to as a successful case of thwarted terrorism using Muslim arrestees as informants. NYPD Commissioner William Bratton has stated the policy of recruiting Muslim arrestees as informants is an essential element of policing (Hartman 2014).

04-CR-2 (MT) Faherty

Keith Richard Faherty came to the attention of law enforcement with the help of multiple confidential informants. In September 2003, a confidential informant (C1) informed authorities that he had shot fully automatic weapons of Faherty's including a converted "Krinkov" and "RPK". C1 had also seen the weapons with Faherty multiple times [Criminal Complaint]. C1 stated Faherty had confided in him multiple times about his desire to go on a "killing spree" against the Great Falls community. Faherty specifically identified attacking the Great Falls Police Department, ATF, and military and high school students [Criminal Complaint]. A second confidential informant (C2) working with the United States Marshal's Service stated he/she had also shot one of Faherty's automatic weapons, specifically an AK47. In December 2003, a third confidential informant (C3) fired Faherty's fully automatic weapons and stated Faherty had shown him/her how he converts AK47's to fully automatic [Criminal Complaint]. Faherty told C3 in a recorded conversation that he had fifteen AK47 assault rifles and named a number of people who he wanted to kill,

including neighbors and police. A check of the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record confirmed that Faherty had not registered any firearms with them. Faherty was arrested on December 14, 2003. He was issued a 2-count indictment charging him with violations of possession of a machinegun; and making a machinegun [Indictment]. He pleaded guilty to count two of the indictment and sentenced to 60 months imprisonment. Faherty fled to Vietnam after he served his prison sentence, violating the terms of his supervised release. He was on the run for nearly four years before he was extradited from Vietnam back to the United States (Benoit 2010).

04-CR-134 (AR-E) Kahlil 05-CR-200 (AR-E) Kahlil

The investigation into an international money laundering scheme was initiated by the FBI's Little Rock Division based on information provided by reliable confidential witnesses. The case code named "Operation P Concert" began in August 2001, when **Ibrahim Hamdan** talked to a confidential witness (CW1) about finding clients who wished to launder large amounts of money (Cummins 2004). Hamdan told CW1 that **Naji Antoine Abi Khalil** would come to the United States and physically take the money that was to be laundered [Criminal Complaint]. The money would be returned to Bank Al-Madina located in Beirut, Lebanon and then returned to the clients. Hamdan told CW1 that Khalil had laundered money through Bank Al-Madina in the past for people all over the world including the United States. In the following months, Khalil, Hamdan, and **George Korbane** made multiple phone calls to CW1 regarding the logistics of laundering money. The conversations were recorded

by law enforcement. **Mike M. Mudallal** was identified as a point of contact for Khalil in Los Angeles. Khalil, CW1, and an undercover agent posing as a drug dealer met with **John Shahin** in London, England. The meeting was recorded by New Scotland Yard. Shahin and the undercover agent discussed laundering illegal drug money [Criminal Complaint]. During the course of the investigation, the FBI monitored various telephone conversations and conducted undercover meetings with the defendants. On May 19, 2004, an indictment was issued for the five defendants. Khalil was arrested in New York City and Mudallal was arrested in California that same day. Hamadan, Shahin, and Korbane were believed to be outside of the United States. The investigation generated separate charges for Khalil and another defendant, **Tomer Grinberg** in New York.

Mudallal pleaded guilty to 1 count of structuring transactions to evade reporting requirements [Judgment]. He was sentenced to time served and ordered to pay \$100,000.00 in restitution. Khalil was sentenced jointly with the New York case. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to launder money; attempting to provide material support to a terrorist organization; attempting to contribute goods to a specifically designated terrorist; and conspiracy against the United States. He was sentenced to a total of 177 months imprisonment. Khalil was also ordered to pay \$100,000.00 in restitution. Grinberg pleaded guilty in New York to conspiring to export sensitive military equipment without first obtaining the required licenses. He served a six month prison sentence in Pennsylvania before being deported back to Israel (Beno and Abramov 2007). Charges against Hamadan, Shahin, and Korbane were dismissed.

William C. Temple of the Arkansas FBI office stated in a press release that this type of investigation “will put a dent in worldwide terrorist activities” (Cummins 2004).

10-CR-183 (ID) Fairfax

On June 15, 2010, the Quick Lube contacted the Coeur d’Alene Police Department about a suspicious device located underneath a vehicle [Criminal Complaint]. According to the Spokane County Bomb Squad, the device appeared to be a galvanized pipe with two end caps and was a viable explosive device. However, the case began a week earlier when Larry Fairfax tipped off FBI agents that he had been hired by Mr. Steele to kill his wife and mother in-law (Cuniff 2010). Larry Fairfax, a handy man that worked for Edgar Steele and his wife, claimed he was hired as a hit man by Mr. Steele and was paid \$10,000 in silver coins as a down payment for the murder [Criminal Complaint]. Fairfax was not facing criminal investigation until the pipe bomb was discovered a week later under Mrs. Steele’s car (Cuniff 2010). Fairfax had failed to mention to the FBI he planted the pipe bomb under Mrs. Steele’s car but claimed he rigged the bomb to fail (Cuniff 2010; Bonner 2011). Fairfax pleaded guilty to possession of an unregistered firearms; and making a firearm in violation of the National Firearms Act. He was sentenced to 27 months in federal prison for the explosive device (Cuniff 2011). Mr. Steele was convicted on four felonies associated to the murder plot in which he faces a minimum of 30 years imprisonment.

93-CR-674 (CA-C) Boese 93-CR-697 (CA-C) Fisher

A confidential witness was introduced to members of the Church of the Creator (COTC). COTC is a white supremacist group that advocates the violent overthrow of the American government [Criminal Complaint]. The confidential witness left a message on a White Aryan Resistance (WAR) hotline and received a telephone call from **Christopher Fisher**. The confidential witness claimed to be a reverend in the COTC and wanted to meet with Fisher. An undercover agent and the confidential witness met with Fisher on April 20, 1993. Fisher told the men he had committed two pipe bomb attacks against an African American man and a biracial man. Fisher also told the undercover agent and confidential informant that he had thrown a Molotov cocktail at a Jewish Synagogue but it did not ignite [Criminal Complaint]. Fisher indicated he would introduce the undercover agent and confidential informant to members of the Fourth Reich Skinheads, a group under FBI's scrutiny. Fisher introduced the undercover agent and confidential informant to **Carl Daniel Boese**, another leader of the skinhead group, and the men discussed the previous bombing they had committed against the biracial man. They also discussed murdering several prominent African American figures and bombing the First African Methodist Episcopal Church in Los Angeles, California (ATS Report). While the skinheads plotted to attack against Orange County Rabbis, the FBI, ATF and Los Angeles Police officers arrested Fisher, Boese, and another individual (Meyer 1993). The indictment was issued charging the defendants with conspiracy to manufacture and use destructive devices; damage to property by means of an explosive device; and use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence [Docket]. Fisher and Boese pleaded guilty to conspiracy to bomb the church; and damage to property by means of

an explosive device. Boese was sentenced to 57 months imprisonment and Fisher was sentenced to 97 months imprisonment. The United States District Judge presiding over the case stated the men's sentence needed to be "severe" in order to send a message (Newton 1994).

96-CR-40 (WV-N) Looker et al 96-CR-41 (WV-N) Looker et al 96-CR-42 (WV-N) Looker et al 96-CR-43 (WV-N) Coon et al

The following cases involve a complex multi-state conspiracy to bomb various Federal buildings. Months of investigation came to an end on October 11, 1996, when seven members of the Mountaineer Militia were arrested. The investigation came to a head when Militia members attempted to sell blueprints of a FBI Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) facility in West Virginia to a representative thought to be an international terrorist. The individual was actually an undercover FBI agent.

The first indictment concerned information obtained from two individuals working in an undercover capacity, which led to the arrest of **Floyd Raymond Looker, James M. Johnson, and Imam A. Lewis**. One of these individuals was a confidential informant (CI) who acted as a trusted associate of Looker and recorded numerous incriminating conversations with Looker. The second individual was an undercover FBI agent posing as a broker for explosives [Affidavit]. On July 30, 1995, Looker informed the CI that he had received an explosive device from an Ohio militia member James M. Johnson. He stated that Johnson indicated more explosive devices could be obtained at a later date. On August 1, 1995, Looker showed the explosive device to the CI. On August 9, 1995, CI introduced Looker to the undercover FBI

agent. The agent posed as an explosive expert and determined the device was a functioning IED. Looker told the CI to contact Johnson and acquire more IED's to sell to the undercover agent [Affidavit]. The CI travelled to Cleveland, Ohio, and purchased 400 IED's from Johnson for \$5,600.00. The CI later travelled to Dallas and bought 600 more IED's from Johnson for \$8,400.00. On both occasions, Imam A. Lewis accompanied Johnson. Lewis was identified as the contact between Johnson and the IED manufacturer [Affidavit]. All of the IED's were "brokered" to the undercover FBI agent. Looker, Johnson, and Lewis were arrested and issued a 7-count indictment charging them with violations of conspiracy to defraud the United States; importing explosive material; and transporting, delivering, and receiving unregistered commerce. Looker pleaded guilty to one count and was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment. Johnson and Lewis were acquitted of all charges (ATS Report).

The second indictment implicated Looker as well as **Jack Arland Phillips** and **Edward F. Moore**. On March 24, 1996, the CI advised investigators that at a training session of the Mountaineer Militia, Moore provided instruction to the militia members on explosives and explosive manufacturing. On May 25 and 26, 1996, Looker introduced the CI to Phillips. Phillips was described as a chemical engineer who could produce C-4 plastic explosives. During a later meeting, Looker told Phillips he had a contact who could "broker" explosives. Looker was referring to the undercover FBI agent. Looker and the CI met with Moore on June 1, 1996, regarding the manufacture of C-4 plastic explosives. An agreement was made that Moore would provide Looker with explosives in exchange for monetary benefits. Looker and the CI met with Moore on July 21, 1996, during which prices of bomb components were discussed.

Moore also indicated during this meeting that he had been working on a grenade fired from a shotgun that could travel up to 100 yards. Looker told Moore he would receive 30 percent of the gross selling price from the explosives. The CI met with Phillips a number of times to deliver items necessary to create the explosive devices. On August 7, 1996, the ATF conducted an unannounced inspection of Moore's residence incidental to his explosives permit [Affidavit]. Following the inspection, Moore reported his contacts with Looker and the CI to the ATF; Moore included discussions about devices that he was asked to make for the Militia. On October 11, 1996, Looker was arrested. His property was raided by the FBI who recovered C-4 plastic explosives, chemicals used in the construction of bombs, detonator cord, blasting caps, 50,000 rounds of ammunition, a sniper rifle, and an Uzi-submachine gun (ATS Report). On November 8, 1996, Looker, Phillips, and Moore were named in a 2-count indictment charging the men with violations of conspiracy to defraud the United States; and transporting, delivering, and receiving unregistered commerce. Looker was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States and sentenced to 40 months imprisonment to run concurrent with his previous conviction. Phillips pleaded guilty to count one and was sentenced to 6 months imprisonment with credit for time served. Moore pleaded guilty to count one and was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment.

The third indictment was filed against Looker and **Terrell P. Coon**. Coon lived in Waynesburg, Pennsylvania, and provided Looker with 11 sticks of C-4 plastic explosives, six containers of TNT, detonator cord, blasting caps, fuses, and a shotgun with the serial number removed (The Militia Watchdog 1996). The men were issued a 5-count indictment with charges of violations of transporting, delivering, and

receiving unregistered commerce; and importing explosive material. Coon was found guilty of all 5 counts and sentenced to 51 months imprisonment. Looker pleaded guilty to count 5 and was sentenced to 120 months to run concurrently with his other sentences.

The final indictment involved Looker and **James R. Rogers**. Rogers was involved in identifying targets the Militia should confront. Looker put pressure on Rogers, who was a lieutenant in the Clarksburg Fire Department and had access to the CJIS blueprints, to retrieve this information for the Militia. While Rogers was hesitant, he provided Looker with information about the facility. Rogers broke into the fire department records and photographed twelve documents containing the CJIS facility's electrical lines, utilities, and underground facilities (The Militia Watchdog 1996). Looker and Rogers were issued a 3-count indictment charging the men with violations of conspiracy to defraud the United States; and providing material support to terrorist (ATS Report). Looker pleaded guilty to two counts and was sentenced to 56 months imprisonment to run concurrently with his other sentences. Rogers was convicted of one count and sentenced to 12 months and 1 day imprisonment.

98-CR-40011 (IL-C) Schave

A confidential informant working with the FBI went to **Karl Schave's** residence in Rock Island, Illinois on February 21, 1998 [Criminal Complaint]. Schave, a member of the New Order, gave the confidential informant two bags. The first bag contained a device with a fuse that Schave said was C-4 explosives. The second bag contained electric blast simulators, wires containing what appeared to be

igniters, hand grenade bodies and fuses, military timed blasting fuse igniters, and cannon fuse [Criminal Complaint]. Schave advised the confidential informant how to properly assemble the hand grenades to make them active. The confidential informant left Schave's residence and turned over the materials to the FBI. The FBI examined the materials and determined they were consistent with functioning destructive devices. On March 19, 1998, a 1-count indictment was filed against Schave charging him with violations of possession of an unregistered firearm. Schave pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 46 months imprisonment.

95-CR-63 (OK-E) Lampley et al

Willie Ray Lampley was a self-proclaimed "prophet" who operated the Universal Church of God and was a member of a militia organization called the Tri-State Militia. According to court documents, on August 16, 1995, a confidential informant (CI) working for the FBI advised law enforcement that Willie Lampley and **Larry Crow** stated in a militia meeting they planned to bomb various locations including gay bars, Anti-Defamation League buildings, Department of Health and Human Services buildings, and abortion clinics [Criminal Complaint]. Willie Lampley's wife, **Cecilia Lampley**, also discussed the plot with the CI. Crow provided Willie Lampley and the CI with instructions for homemade C-4 explosives. **John Dare Baird** offered to assist Willie Lampley in constructing the explosives. The Lampley's began stockpiling materials to make the bombs. The CI recorded multiple conversations with the Lampley's and Baird regarding the plot. Crow stated on one of the recordings that they needed to take out four or five buildings in order to create

problems for the government. He stated, “God won't be mad at us if we drop five buildings. He will probably reward us” [Criminal Complaint].

Federal agents arrested the Lampley's and Baird on November 11, 1995, at the Lampley's home. A search of the home revealed materials to make a homemade C-4 explosive. Crow turned himself in in New Mexico. Willie Lampley was convicted of conspiracy to use and carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence; use and carry of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence; and solicitation for a crime of violence. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment. Cecilia Lampley and Crow were convicted of conspiracy to use and carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. Each was sentenced to three years imprisonment. Baird was convicted of conspiracy to use and carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence; and use and carrying a firearm during and relation to a crime of violence. He was also sentenced to three years imprisonment.

10-CR-20094 (FL-S) Arteaga-Tapia et al

Beginning in November 2009, and continuing through March 2, 2010, **Carlos Alberto Arteaga-Tapia** met with a confidential source to discuss manufacturing and transporting 200 kilograms of cocaine into the United States from Peru [Factual Basis for Plea Agreement]. Arteaga-Tapia also planned to transport illegal aliens and weapons into the United States for al Qaeda. The drugs, illegal aliens, and weapons were to be moved by ship from Peru to Guatemala. Once in Guatemala the materials were to be moved by land to Mexico and into the United States [Factual Basis for Plea Agreement]. On December 9, 2009, Arteaga-Tapia contacted his associate in

Guatemala, **Osman Jose Tobias-Rodriguez**, to organize the transportation of the materials. Tobias-Rodriguez told the confidential source in a recorded phone conversation that he would charge \$19,000.00 per alien and transport them to Houston, Texas. The cost included the transportation of the weapons as well. Arteaga-Tapia and Tobias-Rodriguez were arrested on March 10, 2010. Arteaga-Tapia admitted in a post-Miranda interview to his involvement of conspiracy to transport cocaine, illegal aliens, and weapons into the United States on behalf of al Qaeda. Arteaga-Tapia and Tobias-Rodriguez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist origination; and conspiracy to manufacture and distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. Each man was sentenced to 135 months imprisonment [Judgment].

88-CR-168 (VA-E) Hawamda

The United States closed the Libyan Embassy in Washington D. C. on May 6, 1981, and banned travel to and from Libya because of its alleged involvement in international terrorism. This act was a formal severing of ties between the two countries and was followed by aggressive political actions from both sides. The Libyan government formed the People's Committee for Students of Libyan Jamahariya (PCLS) to financially assist roughly 200 Libyan students in the United States with various needs such as academics and housing. The Manara Travel Agency opened in Washington D.C. shortly after the creation of the PCLS. Both the PCLS and the Manara Travel Agency were operated by Libyan intelligence agents (Smith 1994).

Milad Shibani, Mahdi Mohammed Abousetta, Ramadan Belgasem, Salem

Zubeidy, and **Saleh Al-Rajhi** were Libyan agents who posed as students working in the PCLS. **Mousa Hawamda** and **Manhal Ben Mohammed** were also agents and part owners of the Manara Travel Agency. While in operation, these organizations collected information regarding foreign policy and intelligence data for Libya, plotted to kill a high-ranking U.S. official, and supported radical domestic groups in the United States (Smith 1994; The Philadelphia Inquirer 1988). Al-Rajhi used the PCLS to obtain the names and addresses of more than 1,000 federal employees working for the FBI, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, US Air Force, US Army, Department of Defense, and US Navy (ATS Report). The case was brought to light when informants who feared for their lives brought the attention to authorities. On July 28, 1988, an indictment was issued followed by a 41 count superseding indictment. The charges included violations of conspiracy to lander monetary instruments; aiding and abetting violation the International Emergency Economic Powers; and aiding and abetting violating the Libyan Sanctions Regulations (ATS Report). **Adel Sennosi** turned state's evidence and his case was sealed. The remaining defendants went to trial; however all but Hawamda changed their plea to guilty prior to the case going to jury. Al-Rajhi, Abousetta, Shibani, Belgasm, Mohamed, and Zuebidy pleaded guilty to conspiracy and were each fined \$100,000.00. They were also given suspended sentences and/or five years of probation (ATS Report). Hawamda was found guilty and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and fined \$100,000.00.

90-CR-33 (ID) Winslow et al

In March 1990, a FBI confidential informant (CI) reported **Robert John Winslow, Stephen E. Nelson, and Procter J. Baker**, all members of the Aryan Nations, plotted to detonate explosives at buildings that were frequented by ethnic and religious minorities in the Seattle-Tacoma area of Washington. The CI was present for numerous conversations regarding the manufacturing of the bomb and potential targets. The CI recorded Nelson stating “Nabors” as the Seattle bar the men intended to bomb. “Nabors” was in reference to a gay bar located in the Capitol Hill area of Seattle called “Neighbours [sic] Disco.” Winslow told the CI that he and Plummer would place the explosive charges in the bar and Nelson would telephone in a bomb threat to the bar. Once people attempted to leave the bar the charges would be detonated [Affidavit]. An indictment was issued on May 16, 1990, followed by a superseding indictment on July 12, 1990, with charges of violations of making, possessing, and detonating destructive devices; illegally obtaining weapons; interstates commerce with the intent to commit a crime of violence; and carrying firearms. (ATS Report). Winslow, Nelson, and Baker all pleaded not guilty. Winslow was found guilty at trial on all four counts and sentenced to 48 months imprisonment on count 1, 48 months on counts 2 and 3, and 60 months on count 4 to be served consecutively. He was given credit for 244 days already served [Judgment]. Baker was found guilty of counts 1 and 2. He was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment on count 1, and 24 months on count 2 to be served consecutively. He was given a credit for 244 days already served. Nelson was found guilty on all four counts. He was sentenced to 36 months imprisonment on count 1, 36 months on both counts 2 and 3, and 60 months on count 4 to all be served consecutively. Nelson was also given credit for 244 days

already served [Judgment]. All three men appealed their convictions on January 14, 1991. Nelson and Baker's appeals were denied but count 4 was vacated from Winslow's conviction (ATS Report).

93-CR-89 (MO-E) Musa et al

A confidential informant working with the FBI recorded conversations between Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) members **Tawfiq Musa, Luie Nijmeh, Saif Nijmeh, and Zein Isa** [Affidavit]. ANO is a highly structured Palestinian international terrorist group known for attacking Western, Israeli, and Arab targets. The ANO is compartmentalized with a hierarchy of power within sub-groups. The individuals involved in this case represented the St. Louis sub-group or "cell" [Affidavit]. The members of this cell reported to Musa who reported to their superior. During the investigation of the St. Louis cell, roughly 7,000 reels of tape were gathered by the FBI and used at the trial of the St. Louis cell.

Isa, Saif Nijmeh, and Luie Nijmeh travelled to Mexico City and met with ANO supervisors in April 1987. Recorded conversations revealed the main objective of the St. Louis cell was to identify and target Jewish and American interests for acts of terrorism; acquire light and heavy weaponry and select secret storage sites; to recruit new members for the ANO; collect and transfer secret information and monies for the ANO; acquire passports by any means possible for other ANO members; and work to discover the identity of informants providing evidence to law enforcement [Affidavit].

Electronic surveillance recorded the murder of Tina Isa, Zein Isa's daughter, on November 6, 1989. Tina Isa had rejected her father's association with the ANO. She

made statements to her father that on her 17th birthday she was going to leave home permanently. The group felt Tina Isa had too much information and that Zein Isa had lost control of Tina Isa. The St. Louis cell decided she needed to be killed. Following Tina Isa's murder, Zein Isa was arrested and convicted in October 1991. Her murder, while not included in the charges of this case, legitimized the use of electronic evidence (ATS Report). The recorded conversations revealed the St. Louis cell engaged in numerous acts of passport fraud, acquired and stored a variety of weapons, and conspired to murder suspected informants. The group was arrested and indicted on charges of racketeering that include conspiring to murder Jews and the potential of blowing up the Israeli Embassy in the United States (Ostrow 1993). Saif Nijmeh, Luie Nijmeh, and Tawfiq Musa all pleaded guilty to count one, racketeering conspiracy. Each was sentenced to 21 months imprisonment and two years' supervised release. As Zein Isa was already in prison on death row for the murder for his daughter, charges against him were dropped.

96-CR-500 (WA-W) Pitner et al

Founder of the Washington State Militia, **John Irvin Pitner**, was arrested along with eight others for conspiracy to make explosives (The New York Times 1996). The case began as a result of information provided by a paid undercover informant working with the FBI. The informant wore a wire and recorded conversations regarding strategizing a defense against government attacks (Smith et al. 2006). The individuals were accused of participating in a bomb-making conspiracy to protect themselves against what they perceived would be an eventual confrontation

with the United States Government. Those arrested included **Gary Kuehnoel, Marlin Mack, John Kirk, Richard Burton, Frederick Benjamin Fisher, Theodore R. Carter Jr., William Smith, and Tracey Lee Brown.** Kuehnoel, Mack, Fischer, and Carter were also members of the Washington State Militia while Kirk, Burton, and Brown were members of the Freeman group. The Freeman's believe they are "white sovereign" citizens who are exempt from all federal and some state laws (Snow 2002). A 9-count indictment was filed on August 7, 1996, followed by a 22-count superseding indictment on November 25, 1996, and a third 1-count superseding indictment on April 2, 1997. The charges included violations of conspiracy; possession and transfer of machine guns; possession of unregistered destructive devices; persuading another to withhold or destroy evidence; obstruction of justice; and false declarations under oath (ATS Report). Pitner was found guilty of possession and transfer of a machine gun. He was later retried and convicted of conspiracy to make pipe bombs. He received a four year sentence which amounted to time served as he was in jail since his arrest in 1996. Kuehnoel was found guilty of possession of a machine gun and pleaded guilty to possession and transfer of a machine gun. He was sentenced to 27 months imprisonment. Carter pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy and sentenced to five years of probation. Burton pleaded guilty to conspiracy to make destructive devices; two counts of possession of a destructive device; and persuading another to withhold or destroy evidence [Judgment]. He was sentenced to 46 months imprisonment. Kirk was found guilty of conspiracy and possession of a bomb. He was sentenced to 46 months imprisonment. Mack pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy and found guilty of seven counts of possession of

destructive devices. He was credited with time served. Fisher was found guilty of conspiracy and credited time served. Brown and Smith were found guilty of one count of conspiracy to make, possess, receive, and transfer destructive devices and each was sentenced to 52 months imprisonment.

97-CR-72 (TX-N) Taylor Jr. et al

Ku Klux Klan (KKK) members **Edward Taylor Jr., Shawn Dee Adams, Catherine Dee Adams, and Carl Jay Waskom Jr.**, planned to rob an armored truck and two Wise County drug dealers. The defendants planned to first bomb a gas refinery to create a diversion (ATS Report). A confidential informant working with the FBI's JTTF alerted authorities of the plot on March 26, 1997. He was informed of the plot by Taylor Jr and invited to a meeting being held at the Adams' residence on March 25, 1997. Taylor Jr., Shawn Dee Adams, Catherine Dee Adams met at the Adams' residence to review plans for the robberies and the detonations of Mitchell Energy Corporation [Indictment]. Taylor Jr. and the source drove to the Mitchell refinery and Taylor Jr. outlined the plot including that Shawn Adams and Carl Waskom Jr would plant the improvised explosive devices. Catherine Adams would place a call to the local authorities of where one of the bombs was left. While the police were responding to the threat, the devices were to be detonated at approximately the same time the armored car would be robbed [Transcription]. The source was wearing a monitoring recorder while on this trip and recorded the entire conversation between him and Taylor Jr. All four defendants and the source met later

that evening and again, Taylor Jr. outlined the plans for the robbery and detonation of the explosives. They also discussed robbing the drug traffickers at this meeting.

On May 20, 1997, an indictment was issued charging all four defendants with violations of conspiracy to obstruct and delay interstate commerce by robbery and physical violence. A 2-count superseding indictment was issued on September 17, 1997, charging Taylor Jr. and the Adams with violations of conspiracy to obstruct and delay interstate commerce by robbery and physical violence; and use of weapon of mass destruction. A second 7-count superseding indictment was filed on October 7, 1997, charging the Adams with violations of conspiracy to obstruct and delay interstate commerce by robbery and physical violence; and possession of a non-registered firearm; and aiding and abetting (ATS Report). Taylor Jr. pleaded guilty to conspiracy to obstruct and delay interstate commerce by robbery and physical violence; and possession of a nonregistered firearm. He was sentenced to over 21 year's imprisonment. The Adams both pleaded guilty to conspiracy to obstruct and delay interstate commerce by robbery and physical violence; and possession of a nonregistered firearm. Shawn Dee Adams was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment and Catherine Dee Adams was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Waskom Jr. pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to obstruct and delay interstate commerce by robbery and physical violence and was sentenced to 9 years imprisonment.

98-CR-40042 (IL-S) Rick

In the spring of 1997, the FBI received information from a confidential informant that a group of white supremacists were amassing weapons to commit acts

of violence in order to fund the white supremacists beliefs [Criminal Complaint]. The group decided to name their organization “The New Order”. **Daniel Rick** became known to authorities in July 1997, when he and a confidential informant traveled to the Aryan Nation’s “World Congress” in Hayden Lake, Idaho. During this meeting, it came to light that Rick had been reading books about contract killings to prepare for the imminent goals of the group. The Southern Poverty Law Center in Montgomery, Alabama was identified as the first target and that Rick would be part of this operation. On October 27, 1997, Rick told the confidential informant that he planned on robbing a bank to support the Aryan Nations church in New Vienna, Ohio. Rick stated he had two automatic weapons and had volunteered to kill a “government official”. He later gave the confidential informant a fully automatic MAC-10 firearm for \$750.00.

Rick was arrested on February 26, 1998, and issued a 3-count indictment. He was charged with violations of unlawful possession of a machine gun; illegal transfer of a firearm; and possession of a firearm not identified by a serial number. Rick pleaded guilty to all three counts and was sentenced to 2.5 years imprisonment.

99-CR-551 (CA-E) Patterson

On November 19, 1996, a confidential informant (CI) drove with **Kevin Ray Patterson, Charles Dennis Kiles, and Donald Rudolph** to the Reno Gun Show in Reno, Nevada [Criminal Complaint]. The CI was working with law enforcement in exchange for leniency for federal firearm charges he was facing at the time. During the drive, the defendants agreed to blow up the Suburban Propane tanks located near

Grant Line Road and Highway 99 [Superseding Indictment]. In the following months, Kiles conducted surveillance on the propane tanks while Patterson acquired materials to make an explosive device. Rudolph, Patterson, and Kiles met on numerous occasions to discuss the plan to blow up the Suburban Propane tanks. In January 1999, Patterson and Kiles attended a gun show in Las Vegas where they discussed purchasing an RPG7 rocket launcher with a gun dealer. The defendants wanted to use the rocket launcher to blow up the Suburban Propane tanks. In November 1999, Patterson, Kiles, and the CI attended a gun show in Reno, Nevada. The CI told investigators that Kiles was looking for a firearm part from a dealer at the gun show. The CI also witnessed Kiles give Patterson \$400.00 in cash for a FN/FAL semi-auto assault rifle [Indictment]. On December 3, 1999, Paterson acquired manuals on how to manufacture explosives and rifle grenades [Superseding Indictment].

On December 17, 1999, Patterson and Kiles were indicted on violations of conspiracy to violate federal firearms laws; and felon in possession of a firearm (ATS Report). A 5-count superseding indictment was filed against Patterson, Kiles, and Rudolph for violations of conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction; conspiracy to use a destructive device; possession of a destructive device; conspiracy to violate Federal Firearm Laws; and felon in possession of a firearm. Patterson was found guilty of 4 counts and sentenced to 293 months imprisonment. Kiles was found guilty of 4 counts and sentenced to 262 months imprisonment. Rudolph pleaded guilty to 1 count and was sentenced to 36 months imprisonment.

06-CR-427 (TX-S) Qazi

A cooperating witness (CW) and cooperating defendant (CD) alerted law enforcement to **Shiraz Syed Qazi**. On July 15-17, 2006, the CW, CD, and Qazi, along with other individuals, went camping in Willis, Texas. Qazi was observed shooting an Armalite M-15, .233 caliber semi-automatic rifle [Order of Detention Pending Trial]. Two photographs were taken of Qazi holding the rifle. Qazi was on a nonimmigrant visa pursuant to an F-1 student visa. With this particular visa, he was not permitted to possess a firearm. Qazi was charged with violations of possession of a firearm by an alien [Docket]. He was found guilty of count 1 and sentenced to 10 months imprisonment.

Appendix H: Self Case Summaries

02-CR-380 (CA-E) Hoganson

FBI Special Agent William F. Nicholson was entering the Sacramento FBI office on August 14, 2002, when a man approached him. The man, later identified as **Donald Eric Hoganson**, told Special Agent Nicholson “I’m going to have to start killing FBI agents.” [Criminal Complaint 1]. Hoganson then pointed his right hand towards Special Agent Nicholson, simulating a gun and said, “Pow”. Security guard, Rafael Cancino, at the FBI office also encountered Hoganson. Cancino told investigators Hoganson arrived at the FBI office and became distressed when he was not seen immediately by the duty FBI agent. Cancino overheard Hoganson mutter, “Where’s al Qaeda when you need them?” and “I’m just going to leave and I’ll be back with my troops.” (Criminal Complaint 2). Hoganson’s brother later told investigators Donald Hoganson is schizophrenic and was no longer taking his medication. A more thorough investigation revealed Hoganson had a history of paranoia and incidents involving law enforcement. He was indicted and charged with threats to murder a federal law enforcement officer, however Hoganson was determined not competent to stand trial. Hoganson’s prosecution was deferred and instead, he was issued 18 months of supervision if he met a number of criteria (ATS Report). Hoganson completed his 18 month supervision without incident and the indictment against him was dismissed.

02-CR-109 (TX-N) Jeanes

On September 16, 2003, self-appointed sheriff of the Republic of Texas, **Bob Jeanes**, mailed a threatening letter to Lubbock County Criminal Attorney Bill Sowder. In the letter, Jeanes threatened to kidnap and injure Sowder unless his criminal charges were dismissed (Langton 2003). The charges Jeanes was referring to stem from an incident that occurred earlier that month. Officers arrested Jeanes for unlawfully carrying a weapon into a Skillet's Restaurant, resisting arrest, and impersonating an officer (KCBD 2003). Jeanes was indicted with two counts of mailing threatening communications with intent to extort; and mailing threatening communications. Jeanes pleaded guilty to count one of the indictment that held a possible five year prison sentence; however, Jeanes health declined significantly and the charge against him was dismissed.

03-CR-20376 (TN-W) Butler

Kevin Butler contacted the FBI regarding a conversation he supposedly overheard at a restaurant in West Memphis, Arkansas. Butler claimed he overheard a group of people plotting a series of attacks that would resemble a Middle Eastern style attack (ATS Report). An investigation into Butler's claims revealed he had fabricated the incident and his intent in making the claims was to harass an individual he had a personal disagreement with. Butler was indicted with two counts of willfully making false statements. He pleaded guilty to one count and received a \$500.00 fine [Judgment].

03-CR-222 (OR Curtis) 03-CR-351 (OR) Curtis

In the early 1990's, **Robert Curtis** set up a part-time residence in the Northern Territory of Canada [Motion to Dismiss Indictment]. While he was there, Curtis staked mining claims; however, began having issues with these claims years later [Motion to Dismiss Indictment]. Curtis started communicating with the Director of the Mines for the North West Canadian territories, Ms. Kate Hearn, regarding his issues. He continued communication with Hearn by mail after her returned to the United States. In April 2003, Curtis sent a threatening letter to Hearn and was subsequently arrested [Motion to Dismiss Indictment]. Curtis was indicted on charges of threatening assault and interstate communications threats [Docket]. The charges against Curtis were dismissed.

The threatening letter to Hearn was not the only threats Curtis made. In April 1999, Curtis had the first of many disputes with employees from the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in Oregon State. Curtis made several threatening comments to BLM employees like saying in one confrontation that, "someone was going to get hurt," and "that it would be easy to kill someone" [Government bills of Particulars 2]. For six months, Curtis continued to use threats of violence against BLM employees and demanding thousands of dollars he believed BLM owed him. Curtis was indicted in May 2003 with violations of interference with commerce by threat or violence (ATS Report). Curtis entered a plea of not guilty and was acquitted of all charges at trial.

03-CR-39 (MS-S) Phillips

Larken B. Phillips placed two phone calls to Skytel Incorporated in reference to a lost pager [Pleadings General]. During both phone conversations, Phillips

requested Skytel replace an alpha-numeric pager he had lost [Pleadings General]. Annoyed that Skytel would not replace his lost pager, Phillips threatened Skytel employees with violence and stated he was going to mail Anthrax to the company. Phillips was asked for his Social Security Number and address for billing purposes and his information was turned over to the authorities [Pleadings General]. On December 19, 2002, Phillips was interviewed by FBI agents and admitted to calling Skytel regarding his pager. He was arrested and indicted with two counts of interstate communications threats [Docket]. Phillips pleaded guilty to count one of the indictment and sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment.

04-CR-626 (GA-N) Bartholomai

James Herman Bartholomai was incarcerated at the U.S. Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia for making threats against the President. While serving his time, he wrote three letters in which he threatened to kill the President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and three cabinet-level officials [Indictment]. Bartholomai wrote:

“I am the avenger...a terror and an act of treason shall begin. These five will [be] my targets of termination, with their death my quest to bring down the American government” (U.S. Department of Justice 2006: 1).

Bartholomai sent the letters to the White House which initiated an investigation conducted by the FBI and U.S. Secret Service. Bartholomai was indicted on six counts of issuing death threats against the President and other members of the cabinet. He pleaded guilty to all six counts and was sentenced to an additional three years

imprisonment. The judge also ordered Bartholomai to psychological treatment and alcohol abuse counseling (Mursch 2006).

05-CR-142 (OR) Nonneman

Kyle Gregory Nonneman purchased a laptop on an eBay auction for \$2300.00 from Tate Chesley. Nonneman sent a check to Chesley for the amount of the laptop and Chesley shipped the laptop to Nonneman. Chesley deposited the \$2300.00 into his personal account but was later informed by the bank that the check was from a closed account [Criminal Complaint]. Chesley contacted Nonneman multiple times by telephone and email but Nonneman refused to return the laptop or the money. Chesley flew to Portland, Oregon where Nonneman lives and went to his apartment to recover the laptop. Nonneman refused initially but ultimately gave Chesley the laptop. Chesley returned to the airport and waited for his flight. A call was made to the airport claiming Chesley was about to board a flight to Alaska and had a bomb in his laptop [Criminal Complaint]. The TSA and the Port of Portland Police Department were immediately contacted. Chesley was located by the TSA regarding the bomb threat. His laptop was examined and did not reveal any explosive residue. An investigation revealed the call was made at a telephone booth outside of Nonneman's apartment. Through the process of the investigation, it was discovered that Nonneman did in fact make the fraudulent phone call. Nonneman was indicted on charges of false information and hoaxes; and bank fraud. He pleaded guilty to both counts and received a sentence of one year and a day imprisonment.

05-CR-270 (GA-N) Fofana

Esmael Fofana called the FBI Atlanta Division on August 20, 2003, claiming to be a man by the name of Bangali Dosso [Indictment]. Fofana claimed a man by the name of Yusef Kenneth and his wife, Fatu Shariff were residing in the United States and were participating in criminal activity [Indictment]. Fofana claimed Kenneth and Shariff were manufacturing explosive devices and providing material support to terrorists. The FBI began an investigation which lead to Fofana. FBI agents interviewed Fofana about the phone call and he admitted to making the call and that not everything he stated was true [Indictment]. Fofana's wife was living at Kenneth and Shariff's house at the time (ATS Report). Fofana was indicted and charged with making false statements. Fofana was found guilty at trial and sentenced to one year probation [Judgment].

07-CR-185 (GA-N) Dejong

On April 16, 2007, **Michael Robert Dejong** deposited a letter in the mail addressed to President George W. Bush. The letter read:

"I'm gathering a few followers to kill the President of the United States and destroy what is so called America. If I have to I will kill anyone who gets in my way. I offer you a chance to change what this Country as (sic) done in the name of God. I need someone faithful and loyal to do Gods (sic) bidding. If you wish to join our force and have your life changed around contact me. The time is now to strike! Sincerely, Michael R. Dejong. P.S. I put a little surprise in and on this letter. Maybe you have heard of it. It's called Anthrax. Enjoy!!!! Ha Ha Ha Ha" [Indictment].

Dejong was indicted on charges for threats against the President and successors to President. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a year imprisonment (Melancon 2009).

07-CR-54 (CA-C) Kolupski

Dennis Leon Kolupski placed a phone call to the FBI three weeks before the anniversary of the September 11th attacks and stated he overheard an alarming cell phone conversation made by a co-worker regarding a potential terrorist attack (Mrozek 2007). According to Kolupski, his co-worker referenced the Madrid and London bombings and made statements involving planting bombs around Los Angeles. In a later interview with FBI agents, Kolupski admitted to making false statements about the potential terrorist plot (Mrozek 2007). Kolupski was indicted and pleaded guilty to one count of false information and hoaxes and sentenced to 60 months of probation.

10-CR-108 (DE) Knapp

Marc Knapp attracted government attention when he posted an ad to sell an F-14 ejection seat. The government destroys F-14's so the parts cannot be sold to Iran. Iranian arms smugglers are willing to pay a considerable amount of money for hard-to-get United States military gear (Strategy Page 2010). Knapp's friend, Paul Taylor, also aided in the government case against Knapp as he agreed to cooperate with federal authorities as part of his plea agreement for selling military items to foreign countries (Fox News 2011). Undercover FBI agents acted as Iranian purchasing agents and contacted Knapp regarding other military items. The agents warned Knapp that he would have to be careful because what he was doing was illegal but Knapp was not deterred. Knapp eventually offered to sell the undercover agents F-4 and F-14 maintenance manuals as well as an F-5 for a commission of \$500,000.00 (Strategy

Page 2010). Knapp was arrested and issued a 2-count indictment charging him with violations of international Emergency Economic Powers Act (EEPA); and unlawfully exporting defense articles. He pleaded guilty to both counts and was sentenced to 46 months imprisonment.

10-CR-395 (VA-E) Chesser

Shortly after **Zachary Chesser** graduated high school he became interested in Islam [Affidavit]. Chesser converted to Islam in the summer of 2008 and became increasingly radical in a very short period of time. Chesser appeared for the first time on an extremist Anwar al-Aulaqi's blog in November of 2008 (Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Report 2012). By late fall of 2008, Chesser had become a full-grown believer in the ideology of violent Islamist extremism and even created his own radical website *themujahidblog.com* to disseminate his beliefs. Furthermore, he participated regularly on pro-jihad forums. Chesser used the internet to find and communicate with like-minded individuals. In July 2009, Chesser was interviewed by FBI agents regarding his blog. He stated that he did operate the blog and would die in the name of Islam. Chesser told the agents that he had posted videos and comments online that promoted violent jihad [Affidavit]. In July 2010, Customs and Border Protection officials notified the FBI that Chesser was attempting to travel to Uganda but was not permitted as he is on a no-fly list. Chesser contacted the FBI with information about Al-Shabaab, a recognized terrorist group. He stated he had been in contact with Al-Shabaab and planned to travel to Somalia to join the group but changed his mind after learning about the bombings in Uganda. Moreover, Chesser

admitted to FBI agents he tried to travel to Kenya in 2009 and supported both Al-Shabaab and al Qaeda [Affidavit]. Chesser was indicted on charges of communicating threats; soliciting others to threaten violence; and providing material support to terrorists [Docket]. Chesser pleaded guilty to all three counts, each a felony, and was sentenced to 300 months imprisonment.

10-CR-407 (PA-E) Zangari

On April 3, 2010, the National Security Agency (NSA) received a telephone call and a subsequent voicemail message from a male caller claiming to have a van full of explosives to blow up the Philadelphia Police Headquarters. A Special Agent from the Baltimore FBI JTTF investigated the number and discovered the caller, identified as **Richard A. Zangari**, had called the NSA office roughly 50 times since February 2010. During these calls, Zangari threatened the assistant district attorney in Philadelphia and the Philadelphia Police [Affidavit]. He accused them of being evil and engaging in psychological warfare against him. He stated on multiple voicemails he was going to kill the assistant district attorney unless she was fired. Zangari was arrested and charged with two counts of use of a communication facility to make a threat; and one count of interstate communication of a threat to kill [Docket]. He pleaded guilty to all three counts and was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment at a medical prison where he could receive intensive mental-health treatment (Hinkelman 2011).

10-CR-44 (CA-E) Berumen

On October 29, 2009, **William Thomas Berumen**, who was incarcerated on arson charges, left three threatening phone messages at the Office of the Federal Public Defender in which he threatened to blow up the building. While being interviewed by law enforcement, Berumen admitted he made the phone calls because he was angry with the public defender's office and would not do it again [Plea Agreement]. On January 20, 2010, Berumen called the Federal Public Defender once more and claimed there was a bomb in the building. Law enforcement interviewed Berumen again and he stated he did make the threat to the Federal Public Defender Office because he was angry with the criminal justice system [Plea Agreement]. Berumen said if he was released from jail he would follow through with his plan to bomb the building. Berumen was indicted on two counts of willfully making a threat to use explosive materials. He pleaded guilty to count two and was sentenced to an additional 15 months imprisonment.

10-CR-696 (PA-E) Leboon

On March 26, 2010, the San Francisco FBI Office received a copy of a video that had been removed from the website YouTube [Affidavit]. The video showed **Norman Leboon** making threats against United States Congressman Eric Cantor. Leboon accused Cantor of being Lucifer and threatened to kill him and his family (Huffington Post 2010). In the profanity-laced video, Leboon stated, "You are a liar, you're a pig...you're an abomination" (Kumar 2010). FBI agents located and arrested Leboon on charges of threatening an official of the United States; and transmitting a threat to kill a United States Congressman in interstate commerce. During an

interview with FBI agents, Leboon stated he was the “son of the god Enoch” [Affidavit 6]. Leboon pleaded guilty to both counts and was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment. The court strongly recommended that Leboon receive mental health treatment.

10-CR-756 (PA-E) Brockman

Gregory Dale Brockman was incarcerated for burglary and other theft offenses when he handed a letter to the prison psychologist in which he made threats against President Obama, first lady Michelle Obama, and former President George W. Bush. In the letter he stated he would kill President Obama and eat his flesh, sexually assault first lady Michelle Obama and skin her alive (Huffington Post 2010; Gower 2010). Brockman was charged with making threats against the President; making threats against immediate family members of the President; and threats against former President [Docket]. Brockman initially pleaded not guilty to charges but later changed his plea to guilty. He was sentenced to 60 months imprisonment which would run consecutively with his other sentences.

10-CR-76 (TX-E) Berkley

While incarcerated in Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Rusk, Texas, **Robert Lee Berkley Jr.** wrote three letters addressed to the Capital in Austin, Texas. Berkley stated in these letters that upon his release he planned to travel to Washington D.C. to kill and eat President Barack Obama and the First Family [Factual Basis and Stipulation]. Berkley was indicted on counts of threats against the President; mailing

threatening communications; and threats against certain other persons [Docket]. He pleaded guilty to threats against the President and was sentenced to an additional 40 months imprisonment [Judgment in a Criminal Case].

11-CR-19 (MT) Hassan

On February 14, 2011, an Amtrak train conducted called local authorities to have **Hussein Abdi Hassan** removed from the train. The responding Sheriff's Deputy informed Hassan that he was being removed from the train and was being arrested for disorderly conduct. While in police custody Hassan stated that his bag was left on the train and that "some very dangerous [was] in it" [Exhibit 501]. The officer asked if there was "a bomb or something" inside Hassan's bag to which he stated, "Yes, do you even know who is on that train? Very Dangerous people, very dangerous" [Exhibit 501]. The FBI was informed of Hassan's claims and investigated the incident. The FBI did not find any explosives on the train. Hassan was indicted and charged with violations of false information and hoaxes. He pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment.

11-CR-185 (NV) Sudo

Las Vegas college student **Miki Victoria Sudo** called US Airways on September 11, 2010, and accused her boyfriend of trying to blow up a flight heading to Phoenix, Arizona. The flight took off as scheduled but approximately 10 minutes into the flight the pilot reported mechanical issues and turned the plane around (U.S. Department of Justice 2011). Both passengers and their baggage went through

additional screening revealing no explosive devices onboard. Sudo was interviewed by law enforcement officials and admitted she made the statement knowing it was untrue because she was mad at her boyfriend (Thevenot 2012). **Sudo** was indicted on one count of false information and hoaxes. She pleaded guilty to count one and was sentenced to four years of probation.

11-CR-361 (CO) Sanchez

On June 7, 2011, U.S. Capitol Police reported **Thomas Daniel Sanchez**, an inmate at the Larimer County Detention Center, had written a threatening letter to U.S. Senator Michael Bennet. In this letter, Sanchez claimed he was in contact with a “terrorist group” and was planning to kill the senator and suggested plans were in place against President Barack Obama as well (FBI 2013). Sanchez repeated these claims while being interviewed by FBI agents. Following the conclusion of the interview, Sanchez spit in the face of one of the FBI agents and threatened the agents. After the interview, Sanchez began repeatedly calling the FBI Fort Collins office making threats and claiming to be a terrorist (FBI 2013). Sanchez continued to write threatening letters to various government officials from June 2011 through September 2011 reaffirming his threats. Sanchez was indicted on multiple counts including mailing threatening communications; assaulting/resigning/impeding officer/employees; and threats against President and successors to President [Docket]. He pleaded guilty to the above three counts and was sentenced to a total of 84 months imprisonment [Judgment].

12-CR-288 (NC-W) Sims

Donte Jamar Sims made various threats against President Barack Obama via his Twitter account. Twitter is social-networking website that allows users to write messages called “tweets” up to 140-characters [Criminal Complaint 3]. Sims tweeted on September 3, 2012, he was planning on assassinating the President in five separate tweets. An investigation into Sims’s Twitter profile revealed he lived in Charlotte, North Carolina. During an interview with a U.S. Secret Service agent, Sims admitted he made the statements because he hated President Obama. He claimed he was high on marijuana at the time he made the statements but knew what he was saying was wrong [Criminal Complaint]. Sims was arrested and indicted with one count of making threats against the President. He pleaded guilty to count one and was sentenced to six months imprisonment [Judgment].

87-CR-31 (NC-E) Miller Jr.

On April 20, 1987, the Office of a federal official in North Carolina received a letter via the United States Postal Service titled, “Declaration of War” [Criminal Complaint]. The letter was addressed to “White Patriots” and contained various threats against “those who attempt to place us in ZOG’s dungeons” [Criminal Complaint 2]. The term “ZOG” is an abbreviation for the “Zionist Occupation Government,” and is a term used to describe the federal government by various anti-Semitic groups. The letter was signed by an individual later identified as **Frazier Glenn Miller Jr.** An investigation into Miller revealed that he stated on a radio show that if the federal government did not meet his demands he would start a race war.

Miller was apprehended by U.S. Marshal Service and FBI agents in Missouri. During a search of his trailer, agents found numerous illegal explosive devices and weapons as well as the original “Declaration of War” document [Criminal Complaint]. Miller was indicted on one count of mailing threatening communications. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

87-CR-3247 (MO-W) Jackson et al

On April 6, 1987, **Robert Eugene Jackson, Douglas Lawrence Sheets,** and **Frazier Glenn Miller Jr.**, all members of the White Patriot Party, prepared a “Declaration of War,” in which they established a point system for judges, African Americans, and Jews [Indictment]. The men were staying in an apartment together in Monroe, Louisiana and were heavily armed with rifles, hand grenades, cross bows, explosive devices, and ammunition. The men mailed out multiple copies of the “Declaration of War,” including one copy to a Springfield, Missouri newspaper. On November 16, 1987, an 8-count indictment was filed against Miller, Jackson, and Sheets with violations of conspiracy; possession of an unregistered firearm; and interstate transportation of firearms by a fugitive (ATS Report). Miller pleaded guilty to possession of an unregistered explosive/destructive device; and aiding and abetting. He was sentenced to 5 years of probation with a suspended 10 year prison sentence. Sheets and Jackson were convicted of all eight counts and both received 20 years imprisonment [Judgment].

95-CR-5058 (CA-E) Valencia

On March 11, 1995, an individual later identified as **Benjamin Ruiz Valencia**, called the Spanish line of the American Express Company. He demanded the president of First Data Corporation write a letter to the President of Mexico, ordering him to withdraw Mexican troops from Chiapas, Mexico [Affidavit]. He threatened to bomb the First Data Corporation, as well as INS and the U.S. Customs Service (USCS) facilities in Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas. Over the next three days, several more calls were placed by the same caller to the American Express Company. The Denver FBI office traced the phone number and was able to identify and arrest Valencia while he was on the phone with the American Express Company [Affidavit]. Valencia admitted to making the telephone calls to the American Express Company and stated it was his way to express his views on the current state of the indigenous people in Chiapas and Oaxaca, Mexico. Valencia was indicted and charged with one count of threats by interstate communication. He pleaded guilty and received a sentence of time served and deportation [Docket].

Appendix I: Other Case Summaries

01-CR-208 (PA-W) Al-Aboody 01-CR-209 (PA-W) Alazawi 01-CR-210 (PA-W) Sudani 01-CR-211 (PA-W) Al Tamimi 01-CR-216 (PA-W) Al-Atabi 01-CR-223 (PA-W) Al-Maleky 01-CR-224 (PA-W) Almazaal

The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation conducted an investigation into one of their PennDOT examiners. They found between July 1999 and February 2000 a PennDot examiner issued licenses without administering the required tests in exchange for bribes. Roughly twenty individuals were indicted as a result; all which happen to be Iraqi immigrants [Brief of Defendant Mustafa Al-Aboody in Support of Pretrial Motions]. Of the twenty individuals indicted, eighteen of them had fraudulent certifications to haul hazardous materials. **Mustafa Al-Aboody, Samir Almazaal, Raad Al-Maleky, Hatef AL-Atabi, Haider Al Tamini, Hussain Sudani, and Ali Alazawi** were all issued separate indictments. Each of the defendants initially pleaded innocent but after a number of motions were denied, each changed his plea to guilty. All the defendants were sentenced to three years of probation. Sudani and Al Tamini assisted law enforcement with finding other individuals involved in the unlawful driver's license scheme.

01-CR-10423 (MA) Hussein et al

Mohamed M. Hussein and his brother, **Liban M. Hussein** were indicted on charges of operating an illegal money transfer operation in Massachusetts (Ellement 2001). Without a license, the brother's transferred over \$2 million through their business Barakaat North America Inc., in and out of accounts in the EAU. Authorities

claim the Hussein's used the money to fund Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda. The Hussein's claim this was the only way to send money to relatives in civil war torn Somalia (Ellement 2001). The investigation first began when an individual from the Load Agency's Consumer Compliance Unit of the Division of Banks for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sent a letter to Liban indicating they were operating without a license and would need to fill out the necessary documents and information required by the Division of Banks [Affidavit]. When the appropriate paperwork was not filled out in a timely manner, the investigation ensued. The United States requested the arrest of Liban, a Canadian citizen. Mohamed was arrested in Boston, Massachusetts. Both men were indicted on two counts of operating an illegal money transaction business. Mohamed Hussein was found guilty at trial on both counts and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. Liban Hussein was a fugitive but his case was later dropped and the Canadian government paid Liban an undisclosed sum of compensation (The Ottawa Citizen 2008).

01-CR-191 (CA-C) Mousa

On September 26, 2001, Special Agent Michael Switlyk of the FBI was contacted by Geoffrey Bottenfield, Corporate Security at Bank of America regarding suspicious cash deposits. According to Bottenfield, **Tawfig Mousa** deposited checks in the amount of \$10,000.00 numerous times a day, sometimes thirty minutes apart [Affidavit]. Mousa did not transfer more than \$10,000.00 at a time in order to avoid filling out a Currency Transaction Report (CTRs). An investigation into Mousa revealed he was depositing large amounts of money at various Bank of America

locations. Mousa was indicted on 5-counts for depositing over \$100,000.00 in a twelve-month period and failing to file a report with the bank (ATS Report). Mousa pleaded guilty to causing or attempting to cause a financial institution to fail to file a CTR and was sentenced to 12 months and 1 day imprisonment.

01-CR-3240 (CA-E) Abdulah et al

On May 5, 2000, **Mohdar Mohamed Abdoulah** filed applications for asylum and registration as a permanent resident with INS in order to receive lawful citizenship. Birth place is very important for these applications in terms of determining an alien's eligibility for citizenship [Government's Response and Opposition to Defendant's Motions Online]. For example, an alien denied citizenship may be returned to a particular country in which he or she would be persecuted because of his or her religion, race, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group [Government's Response and Opposition to Defendant's Motions Online]. Abdoulah alleged he was a citizen of Somalia and would be persecuted if he was returned due to his membership with a minority group called Barwani. Abdoulah claimed he entered the United States illegally through New York, New York using an Italian passport. An investigation conducted by the FBI revealed Abdoulah entered the United States through the American Embassy in Ottawa, Canada on December 10, 1998. Abdoulah had presented a Yemeni passport and entered as a student visiting the United States. Abdoulah never revealed to INS agents that he was from Yemen or that he had resettled in Canada prior to entering the United States [Government's Response and Opposition to Defendant's Motions Online]. Through

the investigation, it was revealed Abdoulah requested **Abdullahi Jama Amir, Ali Said Dawaleh**, and **Ahmed Sharif Aliwe** provide him with fraudulent documents to support his story that he was a citizen of Somalia. Specifically, Amir wrote a letter using a Horn of Africa letterhead claiming Abdoulah was born in Somalia and fleeing the civil war (ATS Report). Aliwe and Dawaleh both claimed Abdoulah was born in Somalia on an INS “Affidavit of Birth Certificate” form. Abdoulah was indicted on two counts of false statements on an immigration application; and false statements. A four count superseding indictment was filed against Abdoulah, Amir, Dawaleh, and Aliwe with charges of conspiracy; false statements on immigration applications; false statements; and aiding and abetting. Abdoulah pleaded guilty to count three on the superseding indictment of making false statements and given credit for time served. Abdoulah was later deported to Yemen. Aliwe was convicted on one count of conspiring to make false statements and sentenced to 36 months of probation. Amir and Dawaleh were acquitted of all charges.

01-CR-393 (NC-M) Siddiqui

On August 15, 2001, **Imtiaz Ahmed Siddiqui**, applied for a North Carolina driver’s license and registered to vote [Factual Basis]. When Siddiqui registered to vote, he falsely represented that he was currently a citizen of the United States. Siddiqui came to the United States on an H-1B non-immigrant Visa. An H-1B Visa is typically available for foreigners with specialized skills or training [Motion to Set Conditions of Release and Incorporated Memorandum of Law]. This type of Visa is strictly limited to employment by a sponsoring employer and does not equate to

citizenship. Siddiqui was arrested and detained by INS and the FBI on September 22, 2001, in Michigan. He was charged with impersonating a United States citizen to obtain a voter registration card. Siddiqui initially pleaded not guilty but changed his plea to guilty later that day (ATS Report). During the course of the case, the FBI filed an affidavit alleging Siddiqui may have connections to the 9/11 terrorists. Siddiqui was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment.

01-CR-70082 (VA-W) Benu

Bilal Adulah ben Benu was arrested in connection to a federal terrorism dragnet (The Washington Times 2002). Benu was charged with illegally possessing firearms and ammunition and carrying them across state lines. Benu had purchased firearms and AK-47 ammunition in December 1998. Prior to purchasing the weapons and ammunition, Benu completed an ATF form regarding criminal history. Benu answered “No” to the question of whether he had ever been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. Benu was convicted in 1992 for possession of crack cocaine in Maryland which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment. He received a 90-day suspended sentence for the possession charge. The authorities argued that Benu lied on the ATF form and on September 18, 2001, he was issued a three count indictment charging Benu with felon in possession of a firearm. Benu issued a motion for change of venue as the local media in Virginia’s Roanoke Division were calling his Muslim community a terrorist organization; specifically, that Benu was a member of Al-Fuqra, a fundamentalist sect operating in the United States and Canada. Al-Fuqra is primarily comprised of

African American Muslims and is linked to a variety of terrorism incidents (Hosenball 1994). His motion was granted. On May 14, 2002, Benu filed a motion for dismissal indicating he was convicted of a misdemeanor in Maryland and consequently, had not lost his right to possess a firearm (The New York Times 2002). The judge ruled in favor of Benu on and the case was dismissed.

01-CR-910 (AZ) Al Salmi

Hani Hanjour was one of the Saudi Arabian hijackers who crashed American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Prior to the attacks, Hanjour registered for a flight simulator club at the Sawyer School of Aviation in Arizona [Motion *in Limine* to Preclude Polygraph Evidence]. An investigation revealed during that same period, other “Arabic looking” men registered for the simulator training, including **Faisal Al Salmi**. Salmi was interviewed by FBI agents regarding his relationship to Hanjour to which he stated he had no relationship. During a polygraph examination, Salmi admitted he had met Hanjour at a Tempe mosque but was not involved in the 9/11 attacks [Motion *in Limine* to Preclude Polygraph Evidence]. Salmi was returned home but was subsequently arrested on a material witness warrant. On October 9, 2001, Salmi was indicted on a two-count indictment for providing a false statement. Salmi was found guilty on February 15, 2002, and sentenced to six months imprisonment with credit for time served [Judgment].

01-CR-977 (AZ) Seif

Malek Mohamed Seif was detected by the FBI following the September 11, 2001, attacks. Seif was on the FBI's watch list as a result of his association with Hani Hanjour, one of the Saudi Arabian hijackers who crashed American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Seif and Hanjour attended the same mosque in Tempe, Arizona, and were present at the same dinner party celebrating completing flight training (Rense 2001). Seif was indicted on charges of lying on his Social Security and Federal Aviation Administration forms (Tucson Citizen 2001). Seif pleaded guilty to Social Security fraud and making false statements to INS during the interview associated with the Application of Asylum. He was sentenced to time served and deported from the United States with the condition that he never return.

02-CR-151 (MN) Oehler

From February 1999 to July 2000, **Roger Leigh Oehler** used fraudulent sight drafts in an effort to pay various debts [Position of the Government With Respect To Sentencing Factors]. Oehler wrote fictitious sight drafts to numerous credit card companies amounting to over \$200,000.00 and filed nine fraudulent payments for child support. The fraud was discovered and Oehler was subsequently indicted on 31 counts of presenting a fictitious sight draft and 4 counts of making false statements. He was found guilty of all counts and sentenced to 33 months imprisonment.

03-CR-117 (IA-N) Sial

On January 16, 2001, in Pleasant Hill, Iowa, **Amir Muslim Sial** opened a bank account in the name of his minor son at Wells Fargo Bank [Indictment]. Sial used his

son's name in order to escape his bad credit. He overdrew the account and it was closed. On April 24, 2002, Sial opened a bank account in the name of his company, Baj Exports at Commercial Federal Bank (ATS Report). Sail deposited two checks into his Commercial Federal Bank from the closed Wells Fargo bank account totaling \$21,300.00. Sail withdrew cash and checks on the Baj Exports account at Commercial Federal Bank knowing the account balance was falsely inflated [Indictment]. Sail was indicted on nine counts of bank fraud. Sail pleaded guilty to count two of bank fraud and was sentenced to one day imprisonment.

03-CR-180 (ID) Simmons

In late summer and fall of 1999, **Terry Alan Simmons** filed four Forms 8300 indicating he had made payments of either \$4 million or \$4 billion to various individuals. Each individual who Simmons had allegedly made a payments to was a State of Idaho or Ada County employee who had interacted with Simmons [Government's Motion *In Limine* to Prohibit Defendant from making Irrelevant Arguments or Presenting Irrelevant Evidence]. Due to the false Forms 8300s, the IRS examined the records of the individuals to determine why the tax returns did not match the amounts attributed by Simmons. On August 14, 2003, a 4-count indictment was filed against Simmons charging him with false statement in a written declaration under penalty of perjury. He pleaded guilty to 1 count and was sentenced to 45 days imprisonment (ATS Report).

03-CR-64 (NY-N) Dhafir et al.

The case against **Rafil Dhafir** and coconspirators is to some extent controversial. Dhafir is an Iraqi-born American citizen who created the charity Help the Needy Inc. According to Dhafir, the charity supplied medicine and food to sick and starving Iraqi civilians; however according to the government, Dhafir engaged in various types of fraud, tax evasion, and money laundering (Hughes 2012). On February 26, 2003, the day after Dhafir was arrested, Attorney General Ashcroft announced that supporters of terrorism had been captured (Hughes 2005). Dhafir was investigated by the FBI; the IRS, the Social Security Administration, Office of Inspector General; the Defense Criminal Investigative Service; the New York State Police; ICE; the United States Postal Inspection Service; and the Department of Health and Human Services for a total of five years (Suddaby 2005; Hughes 2005). The investigation revealed that the charity founded in 1994, was unlicensed and unregistered and was violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (Hughes 2005; Discover the Networks 2005). Federal investigators claimed Dhafir misled donors as he was secretly re-investing the money meant for needy Iraqi civilians into his own business. Dhafir along with **Ayman Jarwan, Osmeh Al Wahaidy, G. William Hatfield, Ahmed Ali, and Priscilla Dhafir** were indicted for numerous charges including money laundering, mail and wire fraud, tax evasion, Medicare fraud, and mishandling charity money (Van Bergen 2006). Jarwan pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the Iraqi sanctions and defraud the United States. Wahaidy pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the Iraqi sanctions. Hatfield pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting Rafil Dhafir's filing of a false IRS 1023 application. Priscilla Dhafir pleaded guilty to making a false statement to a Federal agency. Dhafir

pleaded not guilty. He was found guilty at trial of conspiracy to evade the Iraqi Sanctions; conspiracy to launder funds; money laundering; conspiracy to defraud the United States by obstructing the IRS in assessing and collecting income taxes; aiding in the preparation and presentation of a false document to the IRS; tax evasion; false material statement presented in an INS Visa application; health care fraud; false statements to a benefit integrity specialist for a Medicare carrier; and mail fraud [Judgment]. Dhafir was sentenced to 22 years imprisonment. Jarwan, the only other person to receive prison time, was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment. Upon release, Jarwan was deported to Jordan.

04-CR-164 (AR-E) Katkhordeh

According to court documents, **Amir Reza Katkhordeh** knowingly filed an immigrant visa with false information. Specifically, Katkhordeh stated on his visa application that he was not married and did not have any children. However, Katkhordeh had applied for benefits through the Army Reserve for his wife and children. Katkhordeh also applied for a student load while in the United States and claimed to be a United States citizen. He was charged with making false claims about his marital status and children to which he pleaded not guilty. Katkhordeh was found guilty and received 6 months imprisonment with credit for time served [Judgment].

84-CR-301 (AL-N) Droege

On November 29, 1984, the FBI received information that **Walter Wolfgang Droege** was arriving at the Huntsville, Alabama Airport and was probably carrying

cocaine [United States of America's Response to Motions of Defendant]. Droege had previously been convicted in Louisiana of violating the Neutrality Act and sentenced to prison for three years. He was deported to Germany after serving two years under the condition he would not return to the United States. When the plane landed, the FBI detained Droege at the airport. INS Agent Jerry Patton arrived and arrested Droege for illegally entering the United States. Agent Patton searched his luggage and found cocaine and a dagger. A 3-count indictment was issued for Droege on December 6, 1984, charging him with violations of knowingly possessing with intent to distribute a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance; an alien who had been arrested and deported from the United States was found in the United States without the express consent of the Attorney General to reapply for admission to the United States; and having a deadly or dangerous weapon aboard an aircraft [Indictment]. He was found guilty of all three counts and sentenced to 13 years imprisonment.