

THE EFFECT OF THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS
ON NORTH CAROLINA STATES'
RIGHTS SENTIMENTS

By

CASSADY B. CRAFT

Bachelor of Arts

Oklahoma City University

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma


1990

Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for
the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
July, 1992


Shesha
1992
C885e

THE EFFECT OF THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS
ON NORTH CAROLINA STATES'
RIGHTS SENTIMENTS

Thesis Approved:



Thesis Adviser







Dean of the Graduate College

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Richard C. Rohrs for directing my thesis. I would also like to thank Roger Biles and Alain Saint-Saens for serving on my graduate committee. I must express my appreciation to my family, particularly my wife Suzette, for giving me the time to complete this. Despite the marital difficulties arising from two people writing their theses on the same computer, we made it!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS	1
II. CALHOUN'S VIEWS ON NULLIFICATION AND THE ELECTION OF 1832	22
III. THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS IN NORTH CAROLINA	57
IV. CONCLUSION: AN APPRAISAL OF THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS IN NORTH CAROLINA	97
V. BIBLIOGRAPHY	113
VI. APPENDIX: THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE LEGISLATURE ON JANUARY 7, 1833	117

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Counties with Black Majorities	105

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Principle Towns in North Carolina	14
2. North Carolina Votes on the Tariff of 1832	38
3. Nay Votes to the Passage of the Fourth Resolution in the Senate on 29 December 1832	73
4. Final Vote on the Fourth Resolution in the House of Commons on 3 January 1833	75
5. North Carolina Votes on the Force Bill	89
6. Counties with a Higher Black to White Ratio	104

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS

"Our Federal Union: it must be preserved."
Andrew Jackson

"The Union: next to our liberty, most dear."
John C. Calhoun

Ominous ideological differences existed in the states' rights doctrines of the two highest officials in the United States. These differences had major consequences for the serenity of the Union during the early 1830s. South Carolina threatened to nullify a federal law, threatening the nation with civil war. Other southern states, however, did not support the South Carolinians. Her closest neighbor, North Carolina, exemplified the quandry those in the South faced: vocal support of states' rights in opposition to the tariff, maintenance of the right to secession (the ultimate empowerment of states' rights), and devotion to the Union, which denied the state that right. The Nullification Crisis defined the states' rights sentiments of North Carolina's politicians.

Because of its strategic location (in that any federal troops used to suppress South Carolina would have to move

through the state), North Carolina seems ideally situated to exhibit the diversity of states' rights thought in the South during the nullification crisis. While other scholars have written on the topics of nullification and North Carolina politics, none have explicitly studied the role of the state during the controversy. William Freehling's study of the South Carolina nullification movement postulates that there were several factors, a greater number of blacks than whites, cooperation between piedmont and tidewater planters, and recent economic failures, that made South Carolina unique and able to accept nullification. Richard Ellis contends that the crisis did not mark a conflict between nationalists and states' rightists, but between two states' rights groups. William Hoffman concludes that the nullification controversy affected North Carolina only by ridding the Jacksonians of undesirable elements of radicals in the party. Finally, Kermalene Brown stresses that the resolutions adopted by the North Carolina state legislature in January 1833 were a strong disavowal of nullification.¹

In November 1832, while most Americans were rallying to the campaign of Andrew Jackson, the state of South Carolina adopted the Ordinance of Nullification. This was not a spurious act; it was the culmination of measures that had been developing for many years. An important predecessor was the fermentation of anti-tariff sentiment. The reaction to the Tariff of Abominations, passed in 1828, was strong enough that by 1830, there was virtual consensus in South

Carolina as to the injustice of the protective system. Nevertheless, during the time preceding November 1832, there were large portions of the state divided on how to redress its grievances. Some had faith in the system as it existed and willingly left the question to the sense of fair play of the American people and Congress. These "Unionists" felt that the Supreme Court would eventually rule the tariff unconstitutional.² Above all, the Unionists relied on President Andrew Jackson to reduce the tariff if no other federal branch did. This support of Jackson increased as the ensuing crisis developed.

Likewise, there were those whose faith in the system languished. This group saw resistance as its only hope for successful redress. The most conservative of this group wanted to call a southern convention to discuss the tariff issue. The most radical promoted immediate disunion. In between, was a group that favored interposition by the state legislature between the federal government and the people of the state. This group formed the States Rights and Jackson Party in 1828. But later, after the Jefferson Day dinner in 1830 where Jackson proclaimed his true sentiments that above all it was necessary to preserve the Union, the party became the States Rights and Free Trade Party. George McDuffie was the leading spokesman for the party until John C. Calhoun, then the country's vice-president, went public with the ideas he had previously published anonymously as the South Carolina Exposition and Protest in 1828.³

The two parties showed great enthusiasm and vigor in denouncing each other and recruiting new members. South Carolina newspapers backed their sentiments, Union or Nullifier. The wording of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 (responses to the Alien and Sedition Laws, which posited that a state had the right to declare a law of Congress to be unconstitutional and "null and void" in that state), the opinions of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, and the discussion during the framing of the Constitution itself were scrutinized thoroughly in an attempt to credit or discredit the constitutionality of nullification. Unionists looked to the future, prophesizing disunion and civil war as the probable results of such a doctrine as nullification. States Rightists looked at the present, urging that it was better to take action and perhaps fail than to submit and face the consequences of oppression.⁴

In 1830, in an important test of strength, the States Rights Party proposed that a state convention be called by the state legislature. The purpose of the convention was ill-defined, but was based on the premise of vigorous action in protest of the tariff. When the legislature met there was a majority, but not the required two thirds in favor of the convention. Thus, the States Rightists settled for passing (by overwhelming majorities) strong resolutions based upon the states' rights program. The votes to call the convention showed that the States Rights Party was a

small majority, and that the Unionists were strongest in the western and northern counties where slavery was least prevalent.⁵

During the two years between legislative elections, both parties campaigned hard for their particular platform, both in South Carolina and in the rest of the South. The States Rights Party had a measure of success in South Carolina, but other states reacted with deliberate cool to the doctrine of nullification. As 1832 neared, South Carolinians waited to see if Congress would take any action to reduce the tariff. The reduction of the Tariff of 1828 was almost a certainty because the federal government was running a surplus of income over expenditures. Further, the federal debt, which was a major reason for the tariff initially, was almost liquidated by this time. When the debt was retired, which at the present rate would occur during the next presidential term, the surplus of revenue would become a major problem for the federal government.⁶

Congress considered a number of bills before agreeing on a new tariff in 1832. This tariff differed from the 1828 "Tariff of Abominations" by cutting non-protective duties by several millions of dollars per year. While average duties declined from 41 percent to 33 percent, the new tariff in a large sense left the protective features of the Tariff of 1828 alone. The congressional vote was similar in the adoption of the new tariff as to the previous votes on the issue (northern states for and southern states, minus

Louisiana, against) except for the votes from Virginia and North Carolina. Some Congressmen from these states voted for the tariff because it was a reduction, albeit less than desired.⁷

In South Carolina, both Unionists and the States Rights parties claimed vindication with the new tariff. The States Rightists claimed that the new tariff showed to all that Congress intended to make protection a permanent part of national policy. Unionists celebrated the reductions and looked forward to further reductions in the future.⁸

After an overwhelming victory in the South Carolina legislative elections of 1832, States Rightists called for a convention with the added confidence of numbers. This time, the issue was clear cut: the States Rights Party wanted a state convention expressly to nullify the tariff, while the Unionists wanted a southern convention by which they hoped to be able to coerce the northern protectionists to compromise further on the tariff issue. Things moved quickly. Pro-nullification Governor James Hamilton, Jr. called an extra session of the legislature, and by votes of ninety-six to twenty-five in the House and thirty-one to thirteen in the Senate, a convention was called to meet in November. After the legislative election, the Unionists put up only a weak fight to keep the convention from being called, and only a few were elected as delegates to it.⁹

The convention followed closely the theory of nullification outlined in the South Carolina Exposition and

Protest and further developed by Calhoun in his public letter to Governor Hamilton on July 28, 1831. In these works, Calhoun discussed what he thought were the greatest dangers to democratic government and proposed a plan to alleviate them. To save democracy, restraints must be placed on the will of the majority to maintain the rights of a large minority against the tyranny of numbers. He did not, however, proclaim the need for disunion or revolution, like many of the more radical nullifiers.¹⁰

Calhoun's plan began with the assertion that a state had the right to declare a federal law that it considered unconstitutional to be null and void within the borders of the state. If the federal government refused to recognize its iniquity and attempted to force the state into compliance, the state could legally and peacefully enforce its nullification. After maintaining the doctrine through the state courts by binding every citizen (including judges) to the right of interposition, Calhoun sought to keep the case out of federal court by having the state refuse to file the proper paperwork. Thus, the state could interpose itself between the oppressive federal government and the state's oppressed citizenry. Calhoun's ideal was not military confrontation, but a conflict of moral and constitutional views. Secession was not necessarily the end result of one state's stand against the federal government, because three-fourths of the states could agree to amend the

Constitution into compliance with the federal government's law, thus forcing the state into acquiescence.¹¹

Recent history showed that two states, South Carolina and Georgia, had already put the theory of nullification to practice and successfully thwarted the federal government. In both the South Carolina quarantine of Negro sailors in 1828 and the Georgia removal of Indians in 1832, states' rights arguments were effectively used to nullify federal laws. Neither violence nor civil war followed.¹²

The South Carolina convention in November 1832 adopted the Ordinance of Nullification by a vote on 136 to 26. In this document, the state proclaimed the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 to be null and void, disallowed the duties to be enforced by federal agents, and prohibited the appeal from state courts to federal court any case having to do with nullification. The Ordinance also forced state workers to take a loyalty oath to the state of South Carolina and its policies, and declared that the people of South Carolina would be absolved from relations with the other states of the Union if the federal government tried to enforce its laws by military force. Finally, in an appeal to the people of the state and the southern people in general, the convention drafted addresses that stressed the injustice of the tariff, the peaceful and constitutional nature of nullification, the strong ties of friendship between South Carolina and the Union, and indicated that the return to a solely revenue tariff with a 12 percent rate would meet the

state's demands. The Ordinance was to go into effect on February 1, 1833.¹³

Shortly after adopting the Ordinance of Nullification, the South Carolina convention passed supporting legislation. The Replevin Act sought to establish a means by which a merchant could retrieve his goods from abroad without paying duties, and it sought to block the means of appeal in such cases from state to federal court. The Militia Act was established so that the state could defend itself in the case of federal invasion. The Test Oath Act provided the state government insurance that all state employees would be loyal to the state by providing for their removal if they failed to take the oath. The Unionists, meanwhile, organized into military companies, while their leader, Joel Poinsett, corresponded with President Andrew Jackson. With both sides arming, South Carolina faced both civil war within and invasion from without.¹⁴

President Jackson responded to South Carolina's Ordinance by issuing his Nullification Proclamation to the people of South Carolina. This paper was a combination of "carrot and stick;" it was a persuasive appeal to public opinion and a clear statement that the president intended to carry out his duty to enforce the laws of the land. On December 20, the new governor, Robert Y. Hayne, and the South Carolina legislature defiantly replied to Jackson. Nullification would go into effect, as planned, on February

1, 1833. Military preparations moved ahead rapidly throughout the remainder of the year.¹⁵

As the day set for nullification became immanent, it was increasingly clear that President Jackson and the federal government intended to enforce the revenue laws in South Carolina either peacefully or otherwise. It was also obvious that other southern states, while disagreeing with the tariff and promoting states' rights, did not support South Carolina in nullifying a federal law. Further, it was apparent that there was a growing movement in Congress to reduce the tariff to alleviate discontent in the South. In the face of these facts, the South Carolina legislature voted a reprieve for the enforcement of nullification, evidently to see what Congress would do in regard to the tariff.¹⁶

With a reprieve granted, Congress worked out a compromise. When the Verplanck Bill, a tariff bill sponsored by the President, was introduced to the House, protectionists deemed its tariff reductions as too rapid, and then amended it into an unmanageable form. The bill was finally tabled when Kentucky Senator Henry Clay, seeking political plaudits again as the Great Compromiser, introduced a substitute measure that, with Calhoun's aid, passed both houses in two weeks. It provided for a more gradual reduction of duties over a ten-year period at the end of which the rate would remain at 20 percent.¹⁷

While debating the Verplanck Bill and the Compromise Tariff, Congress also considered a special bill submitted by the president that requested enlarged powers for dealing with the nullification crisis. Because of its request for increased executive authority to use the armed forces, this act became known as the Force Bill. It passed both houses on March 1, 1833. The next day, Jackson signed both the Force Bill and the Compromise Tariff into law, giving South Carolina the choice between compromise and invasion.¹⁸

The South Carolina convention reassembled on March 11, 1833 and under the influence of John C. Calhoun, accepted the compromise. On the same day, the convention rescinded the Ordinance of Nullification by a vote of 153 to 4. But all of the fire had not gone out of the nullifiers. Next, the South Carolinians, in an act of futile bravado, adopted a new ordinance nullifying the Force Bill. Jackson, somewhat uncharacteristically, chose to ignore this challenge to his authority, and the nullification crisis ended.¹⁹

In South Carolina's sister state to the north, North Carolina politics were so docile prior to the nullification controversy that it was referred to as the "Rip Van Winkle" state.²⁰ On the national level, North Carolina politicians were seen to be dominated by Virginia policies.²¹ Within the state, a strong adherence to states' rights -- no tariff, no Bank of the United States, and no internal improvements funded by the federal government -- typified

the east. Andrew Jackson was the national candidate of choice there. In the western, mountainous part of the state, a National Republican faction dominated. It generally supported Henry Clay against Jackson, and was pro-Bank, for internal improvements, and advocated the tariff. As the vast majority of the people lived in the east, Old Hickory was the overwhelming favorite of the people. He even enjoyed popularity in the west, where his frontier image made him acceptable to otherwise hostile National Republicans.²²

The quiet domesticity of North Carolina politics changed when Jackson dismissed the popular North Carolinian John Branch from his cabinet in April 1831 due to his involvement in the "Eaton Imbroglia." Branch, the Secretary of the Navy and one of Calhoun's cronies, saw John Eaton as a rival to Jackson's favors and, therefore, was very pointed in some of his remarks regarding the Eaton marriage.²³ Upon dismissal, Branch returned to North Carolina and went about prosecuting a campaign in the press stressing his indignation over the whole affair. The final result of the many public letters written by Branch, Jackson, Calhoun, and Eaton was that a split developed between Branch and his admirers and the regular Democrats in North Carolina who idolized Jackson. Branch wasted no time in returning to prominence in the state, being elected without opposition (other candidates dropped out of the race) to the United States House of Representatives in December 1832.²⁴

By the beginning of 1832, although no political parties had yet formed in North Carolina, there were three distinct factions in the state.²⁵ The regular Democrats, led by Romulus Saunders and Richard Dobbs Spaight, were the majority. They supported the traditional themes of states' rights and Andrew Jackson, even when his policies were not strictly states' rights. When Calhoun became obviously opposed to Old Hickory, they denounced the South Carolinian and praised Martin Van Buren, Jackson's choice for vice president in the 1832 election. Their major presses were the Fayetteville Journal, the New Bern Sentinel (edited by Thomas Watson), and the Raleigh Constitutionalist (edited by Charles Ramsey). In the House of Representatives, Lauchlin Bethune, Henry Connor, Thomas H. Hall, Micajah Hawkins, James McKay, Jesse Speight were Jacksonians, as was Bedford Brown in the Senate (see figure 1).²⁶

The Branch ring split off from the regular Democrats. This group was a loose coalition that included Old Federalists, Democrats (both pro-Jackson and pro-Calhoun), Independent Republicans (the voters in the western part of the state who agreed with the policies of the American System but liked Andrew Jackson as well), members of the National Republican faction, and nullifiers. Only the strong leadership of Democrats Branch; James Iredell, Jr.; National Republican Thomas Polk; and nullifier Samuel Sawyer held this widely disparate group together. Some of their faction supported Jackson. The Republican groups had




Figure 1. Principal Towns in North Carolina.

different views on the American System than the Democrats, pro-Calhounists (who did not admit Calhoun's authorship of nullification), and open nullifiers who all promoted states' rights in various forms. Until the election of 1832, only one thing united these fragments -- distaste for Martin Van Buren. The Branch group's main purpose in the election was to promote Phillip Barbour, a states' rights Democrat from Virginia, as Jackson's vice president. The underlying goal of Branch himself was to get John Calhoun elected president in 1836. The principle newspapers cooperating with the Branch faction were the Raleigh Star and the Fayetteville Observer (edited by Edward J. Hale). Members of this faction in the North Carolina congressional delegation were Branch, Samuel Carson, Abraham Rencher, and Senator Willie P. Mangum.²⁷

The third faction in North Carolina politics sympathized with Henry Clay and the National Republicans. At first, this faction allied with the Branch group in opposition to Jackson and Van Buren. They encouraged such a split in the Jackson ranks, because they saw that that was the only way in which their candidates, Henry Clay and John Sergeant, could win. By the summer of 1832, they split from the Branch coalition because of ideological differences. As a result, the Branch faction and the National Republican bloc evenly split the 29 percent of the North Carolina votes that the Jackson/Van Buren ticket did not get in November 1832. Their presses were the New Bern Spectator, and the

Raleigh Register. Augustine Shepperd, William Shepard, Lewis Williams, and Daniel Barringer can be loosely identified with this group, although they are more readily identified as "Independents" or "Anti-Jackson men."²⁸

By 1832, then, there were three distinct groups in North Carolina politics. Both the regular Democrats, who were moderate, and the more radical Branch group advocated states' rights. The National Republican faction promoted the nationalistic doctrines of the American System.

Further complicating this situation was the nullification controversy. No sooner had the election of 1832 ended than South Carolina posted its Ordinance of Nullification. While Branch and the other hard core pro-Calhounists stuck by South Carolina, more of the Branch fragments split off over the incident. The Branch group maintained a solid states' rights stand. Some were nullifiers, while some believed in a state's right to secede. All denounced the federal government's right to subdue a "sovereign state" militarily. At the same time, the National Republican ring and regular Democrats sang a duet of Jackson's praises and nullification blasphemies. The regular Democrats generally disapproved of nullification, but were equally anti-tariff. Furthermore, Jackson's Force Bill complicated the issue because they also professed a strong attachment to states' rights. The only way out for this group, which fragmented considerably under these contending pressures, was a compromise tariff.

Eventually, they got it, but from a man they found it hard to praise, the "Father of the American System," Henry Clay.²⁹

The National Republican faction did not escape the confusion. After a lopsided defeat by Jackson and the Democrats in the fall of 1832, they must have found it very difficult to sing Jackson's praises that winter. Because of the threat nullification posed to the tariff and the American System, Jackson's strong stand against South Carolina was lauded by National Republicans. Just when they and the regular Democrats reached a crescendo in their praise, Henry Clay, the party's hero, stepped in. Clay's compromise put the National Republicans in another embarrassing position. First, they had praised their nemesis, now they condemned their hero. Advocates of the protective system saw the Compromise Tariff as unnecessary. Why had Clay interceded just when South Carolina was over the barrel and Andrew Jackson was about to play into their hands twice over by squashing the nullification heresy and by making himself into an unpopular tyrant in the process?³⁰

The nullification crisis, along with the Compromise Tariff and Force Bill, proved to be an important event in North Carolina politics. Andrew Jackson's actions alienated many in the state and helped North Carolinians to define more precisely their feelings on things such as states' rights and the concept of Union. As a result, some of the most powerful leaders of the Branch group who identified

closely with Calhoun and nullification saw their political careers in North Carolina ended by the fallout from the controversy.

ENDNOTES

¹William Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); Richard Ellis, The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States' Rights, and the Nullification Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); William Hoffman, Andrew Jackson and North Carolina Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958); Kermalene K. Brown, "The South's Reaction to the Tariffs and the Force Bill, 1828-1833" (Ph.D. dissertation, Oklahoma State University, 1971).

²Charles Sydnor, The Development of Southern Sectionalism, 1819-1848 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948), 207.

³Chauncey S. Boucher, The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916), 61-67; 146-153.

⁴Ibid., 172-193.

⁵Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, 177-218.

⁶Ibid., 247-252.

⁷Brown, "The South's Reaction," 108-121.

⁸Freehling, Prelude, 252-259.

⁹Boucher, Nullification, 172-175, 196-203.

¹⁰Ibid., 208-212.

¹¹Freehling, Prelude, 159-173.

¹²Sydnor, Development, 209; Freehling, Prelude, 233.

¹³Ellis, The Union at Risk, 75-76.

¹⁴Freehling, Prelude, 211-212, 268-277.

¹⁵Ellis, Union, 84.

¹⁶Ibid., 98.

¹⁷Ibid., 99, 158-177.

¹⁸Ibid., 158-177.

¹⁹Freehling, Prelude, 295-297.

²⁰Robert M. Calhoun, "A Troubled Culture: North Carolina in the New Nation, 1790-1834," in Writing North Carolina History, eds. Jeffrey J. Crow and Larry E. Tise (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 76.

²¹Richard P. McCormick, The Second American Party System (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 199.

²²See Brown, The South's Reaction, 108-121.

²³Ellis, Union at Risk, 70.

²⁴See Hoffman, Andrew Jackson, Chapter 5 "The Dismissal of John Branch and its Political Repercussions in North Carolina," 37-46.

²⁵See McCormick, Second Party System, 199-208.

²⁶See Hoffman, Andrew Jackson, Chapters 5 and 6.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

CHAPTER II

CALHOUN'S VIEWS ON NULLIFICATION

AND THE ELECTION OF 1832

**"There is but little nullification in North Carolina."
Edward J. Hale**

Throughout 1831 and 1832, North Carolinians were consistently against both the tariff and South Carolina's doctrine of nullification. The real struggle within the state centered upon how and if such a precarious states' rights stance could be maintained. On the one hand, North Carolina legislators petitioned, begged, and threatened in regard to disestablishing or modifying the tariff. On the other, North Carolinians for the most part condemned nullification as subversive of the Union. Apparently, threatening disunion was one thing, actively taking a stand against "unconstitutional" laws another. Until South Carolina published the Ordinance of Nullification in November 1832, North Carolina "policy" was free to blow about in the breeze, searching for justification for all actions and words.

As early as 1828, North Carolina's legislative policy was against the tariff. In the vote for the "Tariff of

Abominations," its congressional delegation consistently and unanimously voted against it.¹ As South Carolina took the lead in protesting the tariff and called upon her sister states for aid, North Carolina Governor Hutchins Burton declared that "the dignity and interest of the State requires that North Carolina should not be silent."² The General Assembly acted on Burton's request by adopting a resolution that claimed Congress had no power to lay a protective duty, as opposed to a revenue duty, on imported goods under Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution.³ Throughout the next five years, North Carolina consistently upheld this view, but when given the chance to take direct action on the tariff during the nullification crisis, the state balked. Despite unanimity against the tariff, the Union was more important.

Before John C. Calhoun's letter admitting his authorship of the South Carolina Exposition and Protest, many North Carolinians believed that Calhoun was not the author of the doctrine of nullification. The Carolina Observer claimed that "it is yet to be proven that Mr. Calhoun is a Nullifier, and ... we do not believe he is." This statement was prompted by a letter to the editors from "An Original Clay Man" who claimed Calhoun's doctrine doomed his ambition to be president.⁴ The Roanoke Advocate became the principle Calhoun press and the only one in North Carolina to stay unabashedly with him through the nullification crisis. In August 1831, after Calhoun's

pronouncement, the Advocate claimed that Calhoun would be the heir to Jackson "if he proves faithful, worthy, and qualified."⁵ The editors did not go so far as to adopt the doctrine of nullification because of this rationalization:

After all, if properly considered apart from all prejudices, the doctrine of nullification ... is not so very objectionable.... Call it nullification, constitutional resistance, or revolution, there is a right somewhere to remedy the evil and to redress the grievance. That right we think undoubtedly belongs to the people, and can only be expressed through convention.... If nullification means the right of a single state to judge the constitutionality of a law, and put its veto thereon without a resort to the final appealing tribunal (which we conceive to be a convention of the people, and not the Supreme Court of the United States) then we object to it as altogether indefensible. However **unjust, unequal, and oppressive** we may regard the Tariff, that 'bill of abominations,' we have always thought it not strictly speaking **unconstitutional**. It is drawing a rather nice distinction to say a tax for **revenue** is constitutional, and one for **protection**, not so.⁶

According to their definition of nullification, the editors of the Advocate were not nullifiers -- yet. But not all held their narrow view of nullification.

It was not until the 13th of August 1831 that Calhoun's public announcement acknowledging himself as the author of the South Carolina Exposition and Protest reached North Carolina papers. In Rutherfordton, the Western Advertiser praised the "bold and able reasoning" of the document.⁷ The Fayetteville Observer also admired Calhoun's intellectual prowess but lamented that this event probably marked the end

of his hopes for the presidency. A week later, the Observer backtracked, stating that "it would be a singular coincidence, if Mr. Calhoun's Exposition should have the effect to place **him** in power and popularity" like the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions had done for Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. The Observer's editor, Edward J. Hale, went on to state that nullification was not a part of Calhoun's sentiments and that if the Exposition had come from Virginia, "it would doubtless[ly] be impossible to find anything amiss in it." Therefore, because "we think there is not just now any other individual combining all of the great requisites, so prominently before the public, as to ensure the defeat of both Jackson and Clay," the editor continued to give Calhoun his support for the 1832 presidential election.⁸ The Advocate in Halifax concurred that Calhoun's doctrine was the same as Jefferson's and Madison's, and claimed that "Mr. Calhoun had thus built his faith upon a solid basis.... The foundation is of rock, and the principle he avows must be desirable and eternal as the existence of freedom and our free institutions."⁹ Thus, some of the pro-Calhoun papers in the state continued to support the South Carolinian, although most explicitly denied that his views were different from Jefferson's and Madison's or that his views were indeed that of nullification as popularly understood (probably because of the unpopularity of the doctrine with the people).

The regular Democrat presses viewed Calhoun's publication with a somewhat different eye. The Raleigh Register printed all of Calhoun's letter except the conclusion, which dismissed the tariff and was, therefore, the most potentially popular part to most anti-tariff North Carolinians. The editors, Joseph Gales and son, proclaimed that Calhoun's views were "too refined and sublimated for us," and that his ideals would shake the confidence of citizens not belonging to South Carolina's States Rights and Free Trade Party.¹⁰ The North Carolina Journal in Fayetteville was surprised by Calhoun's "coming out." It exclaimed,

Public expectation has been on tiptoe for some weeks past, to see Mr. Calhoun's renunciation or disavowal of the doctrine of nullification.... Judge then our surprise upon opening a paper bearing his sign ... to find not only a frank avowal of the soundness of nullification principles, but a formal and elaborate argument in their defense.

The editors added a note to Calhoun's letter, describing his "palpable sophisms" and the "loose texture of reasoning."¹¹

Members of the National Republican faction throughout the state expressed their discontent with Calhoun as well. The New Bern Spectator raged against Calhoun by pointing out the "utter indefensibility" of the South Carolinian's argument that the states, not the people, were sovereign. John L. Pasteur, the editor, concluded that Calhoun's statement was fifty years late, that his ideas were applicable to the Articles of Confederation, not to the

present government.¹² Judge William Gaston, an old Federalist superior court judge, felt that Calhoun had cornered himself by "having formed a party of zealous and devoted nullifiers" and thus had to come out with a "doctrine which holds such glaring and practical absurdities." Gaston lamented: "What a pity that such a mind as his [Calhoun's] should be so warped from its rectitude by unholy passions."¹³

So the reaction to Calhoun's pronouncement as the "Father of Nullification" struck North Carolinians powerfully. Those who were inclined to praise Calhoun did so on a theoretical basis. They applauded the high-minded Calhoun's reliance on the widely accepted theories of Madison and Jefferson in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. Thus, they found Calhoun's "states' rights" sentiments in keeping with the early republican principles of 1798. The Jacksonian Democrats refuted the Vice President. They saw Calhoun's machinations as a run for the presidency against their idol, Andrew Jackson. They disagreed with the "radical" nature of Calhoun's states' rights, which held the federal government to a strict interpretation of the constitution and affirmed the precepts of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, but remained steadfast to the states' rights' doctrines of Andrew Jackson, who had at times wavered in his Jeffersonian principles in areas like internal improvements and the tariff. Finally, the National Republican bloc disagreed

with the letter and intent of Calhoun's doctrine, although they dared not attack the theories behind it. As supporters of Henry Clay's American System, they recognized the explicit threat that South Carolina nullifiers posed to the tariff. Gaston pointed out that nullification was not "practical," which was probably correct, but did not attack its theoretical basis. For the political ambitions of the National Republican faction, to attack the "Principles of '98" would be a disastrous move in popular politics. By September 1831, then, the controversy surrounding nullification and the tariff that was the immediate cause of nullification was in North Carolina entwined with the coming presidential election of 1832.

Until the end of the year, nullification as an issue died down and the tariff issue took its place in the forefront of discussion in North Carolina. In October, the Rutherfordton Western Advertiser printed a letter from a citizen in Spartanburgh that recounted the reaction of a group of "Nullies" to the passing in a town meeting of resolutions against nullification. The nullifiers reportedly "retired from the scene of action with the comfortable assurance that the doctrine supported by them so zealously, meets with nothing but contempt."¹⁵ On the other side of the state in New Bern, the Spectator took one last shot at Calhoun and the nullifiers. The editor of that paper saw more dangers in nullification than in the "old phantom of federalism."¹⁵

In September, an anti-tariff convention was proposed to be held the next month in Fayetteville. The Fayetteville Journal urged members who were to attend to debate the tariff only, "carefully abstaining from the introduction of any political matters" that may disturb the "force and unanimity" of the meeting.¹⁶ This almost certainly involved nullification. The Spectator justified the tariff as it existed in the United States at that time. The editors quoted Jefferson's speech to the House of Representatives in 1793 in which he advocated a protective tariff. John Pasteur, the editor, hoped that this would have weight with those "who pretend to belong to the Jefferson school of politics."¹⁷

By November, upon the meeting of the state legislature, it was decided that the tariff situation had not yet warranted North Carolina following South Carolina's threat of nullification with one of its own. North Carolina governor Montfort Stokes urged the legislature not to follow the lead of South Carolina, because he did not think that the people of North Carolina would be behind the move.¹⁸

On the national scene, important national figures from North Carolina were warned about the importance of the upcoming congressional wars over the revision of the tariff in 1832. Willie Mangum, the North Carolina Senator from Red Mountain, was told by a prominent lawyer and state politician from Hillsboro, John Scott, that North Carolina "will sustain you under any responsibility you may encounter

with a view to adjust the Tariff Question." Scott assured Mangum that there was a feeling "of the deepest horror" at the idea of the destruction of the Union popularly seen as nullification.¹⁹

From January to March 1832, the debates in Congress over the new tariff bill dominated North Carolina's political life. During this debate, almost all North Carolina Congressmen and Senators participated, and apparently the people and presses of the state heartily approved of their speeches and votes. In the Senate, Willie Mangum and Bedford Brown both gave major speeches in favor of modifying or eliminating the tariff. Likewise in the House, John Branch, Samuel Carson, Thomas H. Hall, and Jesse Speight all vocally opposed the tariff.

During the debates on the Tariff of 1832, the House of Representatives underwent such long, gruelling sessions that the official transcriber often attested to the passing of eleven or twelve hour days. Surely for those legislators involved, the debates must have seemed even longer. On 23 January, North Carolina House member Jesse Speight, a long-time House Democrat from Stantonsburg, arose to complain that the tariff bill, instead of being sent to the Committee on Ways and Means, which controlled the revenue of the country, was sent to the Committee on Manufactures. This seemed to give an unfair advantage to northern manufacturers. Speight, part of the Branch faction of ardent states' rights Democrats at this time (he later

switched to being a regular Jacksonian because he did not like being labelled a "nullifier" as one of the Branch group), complained for the entire South, saying:

when the planters of the South are down, and the Manufacturer of the North has his foot upon their necks, and his hand in their pocket ... Must the complaints of the oppressed be sent to a committee avowedly in favor of the policy that oppressed them?²⁰

Samuel Carson, another member of the Branch group from Pleasant Garden, added his condemnation of northern politicians by observing that "they seem to think it patriotic to drain away money from one part of the country to pour it into the pockets of another."²¹ John Branch believed that the tariff was designed to strip the South of its wealth, "day by day," and that eventually that section would either "sink into ruin" or "be compelled to take a step he shuddered to think of" -- disunion.²²

Yet North Carolina congressmen were not inflexible. They earnestly sought to reach a modification, not an absolute recall, of the tariff. Samuel Carson even voted for a tariff on iron implements, because it would help the farming interests. He saw this vote as a test of the northern manufacturers; were they taxing for the sake of protection or to line their own pockets and rob the South?²³ Thomas H. Hall, a Jackson Democrat from Tarboro, justified his votes for the tariff by stating that he had voted for any measure to reduce the present tariff rates, but

reaffirmed that "he had never in his life given a tariff vote; he never should."²⁴

Prior to Willie P. Mangum's speech against the tariff in the Senate on February 7, 1832, he had been advised by John Scott to work to modify the tariff. Priestly Mangum²⁵, Willie's younger brother, cautioned that "**now** is not the time for the public servants of this State to speak of **unconstitutional resistance**," because "our people are ripe for no such thing." Priestly asserted that nothing short of "tangible oppression" would drive North Carolina out of the Union.²⁶ The elder Mangum was, however, pessimistic about the effectiveness of his upcoming speech. On the 25 January he wrote "The Senate will take an obstinate stand, I fear, against any substantial modification of the Tariff -- The worst possible spirit is indicated."²⁷

Mangum's actual speech in the Senate was a strongly worded diatribe against the evils of the protective system. He began by stating that the tariff was no longer a question of "political economy," but a question of liberty -- or the South's deprivation thereof. Mangum believed that the national tensions caused by the tariff had become so acute that the tariff question had become the most important problem considered by any "deliberative assembly" in American History, "with the exception of the Declaration of Independence."²⁸

Mangum's argument against the tariff was well thought out and represented the feelings of many throughout the

South. Mangum traced the tariff controversy back to the Embargo of 1807, when the states gave the federal government the right to lay duties and regulate foreign commerce. But the two were not necessarily connected, and the states did not entirely give up their right to regulate and protect their industry. Quoting The Federalist Papers, Mangum asserted that the powers delegated to the states were clearly defined during the Constitutional Convention. By giving inventors the sole right to their inventions for a specified period of time, the framers of the Constitution gave "a decisive expression of the sense of the convention against conferring on Congress the power to give manufacturers any other encouragement" than they might receive from a system of revenue duties. The states, furthermore, were given the rights, in Article 1, Section 10 of the constitution, to lay duties on imports for revenue without consent of Congress; and with the consent of Congress, the states could establish protective duties. If Congress was to assume this power, then why was it originally retained for the states? According to Mangum, there was no reason except the greed of northern interests.²⁹

Mangum next accused northern manufacturers of having a vested interest in the tariff law. The first protective duties, according to the North Carolinian, ranged from 5 to 15 percent ad velorum to protect infant industries. The only legitimate federal tariff was to raise revenue and to

counteract other nations' policies. If that was how the system was set up, then why forty years later were manufacturers asking for 40 to 250 percent protection? Mangum claimed that the system, as it had been perverted from its constitutional roots, was "flagrantly unjust." It was, he said:

built up by selfish interests, associated together for selfish purposes, with no principle of cohesion but a mean, base passion for money.... Sir, it is money -- nothing but money -- and money extracted from others ... that holds together this system. These bandit interests have been rallied to its support by a thirst for rapine and they battle in its defense, with a vigor proportioned to the magnitude and enormity of its exactions.³⁰

Mangum also felt that it was not the people of the North, but the politicians and manufacturers who maintained the tariff system. The only way the people supported the system was by ignorance, and if honestly put before them, "Would they not, with honest indignation, hurl from their high places all the functionaries of this Government who had dared to participate in a scheme of such outrageous oppression?" Additionally, Mangum appealed to the ideals of Jefferson when he cried, "Agriculture, the great paramount interest, is taxed to exhaustion; he who toils in the earth, and he who plows the main, are plundered under the color of law of their legitimate profits to sustain a band of monopolists."³¹

The real reason behind the tariff uproar was clear-cut to Mangum. The prospect of ending the debt compiled in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the purchase of the Louisiana and Florida territories would deprive the North of millions of southern dollars. When the federal government took over the states' debts from the Revolution, it issued notes to private investors, who were paid interest. These notes accumulated in the North, because southerners sold theirs to obtain cash to buy land and slaves, which were more profitable than the interest rates on the notes. Then southern agriculture was taxed disproportionately, depriving farmers of their profits and providing the federal government money to pay northern note holders' interest. Thus, in Mangum's reasoning, the specter of ending the national debt meant that the North would lose "ten to twelve millions of dollars" annually. More importantly, this would be millions of dollars that would remain in the South.³²

Mangum ended his speech with a point that should have given the staunchest nullifier heart in the possibility of converting the North Carolina Senator to their cause.

Mangum observed:

To a superficial observer, ours seems to be, in fact, what it is in theory, a Government of the many for the benefit of the many. A closer investigation discloses the truth, that it is, practically, a Government of the smallest possible majority over the largest possible minority ... and that this majority ... is, in fact, wielded by a combination of monopolists, capitalists, and adventuring politicians, who divide among themselves the richest spoils of their triumphs, and throw

but a crumb ... to the mere serfs of the party.

Besides the obvious bitterness that Mangum expressed for the South as a part of the "largest possible minority," he also expressed more than idle bitterness when closing: "Sir, I feel a deep conviction that this system and this Union cannot exist permanently together."³³

Regular Democrat Bedford Brown, the other North Carolina Senator, followed Mangum in condemning the tariff. On March 30, 1832, Brown confirmed that "the principle of protection, as practiced by [the] government, he sincerely believed unconstitutional." Further, Brown threw even more serious charges at his peers; "this, or any other Government, which exerted its authority to take from one class of citizens the profits of their labor to bestow them on another class," was "essentially despotic."³⁴ But Brown was perhaps less emotional and more penetrating in his analysis of the situation than Mangum. He realized that Henry Clay did not really believe that a reduction in the tariff would doom the entire protective system and the manufacturing base of the country. This was the voice of an alarmist. Brown "did not wish to see the manufacturing establishments of [the] country destroyed," but he was "unwilling that they should be sustained by the destruction of other great interests."³⁵

Yet some in North Carolina were still worried about the state's relationship with nullification and the tariff. Robert Gilliam, an attorney from Oxford, wrote, "I feel well

satisfied, that if a bill, based upon the principle of Mr. Clay's resolutions ... becomes the law of the land, that **nullification**... will become the order of the day."³⁶ The New Bern Carolina Sentinel threatened: "Let the execrations of posterity rest on the heads of those who by persevering in a system of injustice and oppression, would drive the South to resistance."³⁷ Asa Biggs, a prominent Democrat, met with Willie Mangum in early April and came away with the impression that Mangum was despairing over obtaining any relief from "colonial vassalage ... more intolerable than the causes that led to our Revolution."³⁸ By the end of May, however, Mangum had seen enough of the debate to write that the tariff would be modified enough to "tranquilize, to a great extent, the excitement existing in the South."³⁹

North Carolina's congressional delegation split its vote evenly on the final vote on the Tariff of 1832 (see Figure 2). The Branch faction of Willie Mangum, Abraham Rencher, Samuel Carson, and John Branch all voted against the measure. They were joined by Jacksonians Thomas H. Hall and Bedford Brown. Those who voted against the tariff generally felt that it had not been reduced enough; some only considered complete repeal as acceptable. Seven others voted for the tariff: Augustine Shepperd, William Shepard, and Daniel Barringer were Independents, while Lauchlin Bethune, Henry Connor, Micajah Hawkins, and James McKay were Jackson Democrats. Jesse Speight, part of the Branch group,




Figure 2. North Carolina Votes on the Tariff of 1832.

broke ranks and voted for the tariff, while Lewis Williams, an Independent, did not vote (see map).⁴⁰

The vote for the Tariff of 1832 left many Congressmen in the unenviable position of voting for a tariff bill, but being against the tariff in principle. Jesse Speight was one of those who felt the potential for confusion among his constituents. He explained, "If I am asked for my reasons for voting for this bill, I answer that it affords a reduction of from five to ten millions of dollars of taxes, and as it affords **some** relief to the people" Speight considered "half a loaf better than no bread." He did not believe that the time had come for the South to take "that stand which is the only alternative of an oppressed people." He voted for the Tariff of 1832, because it was an improvement over the "Tariff of Abominations," and "in the hope of preserving the Union a little longer."⁴¹ Bedford Brown determined to vote for the tariff bill as it emerged from the House of Representatives for the same reasons. But the Senate had amended the bill to the extent that Brown considered the tariff as a re-enactment of the unpopular Tariff of 1828.⁴² He voted no. Mangum distanced himself and the state from the whole thing. The Congressional Debates record "He [Mangum] repudiated, for himself and his constituents, any thing in common with the American system, which originated in cupidity."⁴³

The reaction in the state's press was not critical of the congressmen, although dissatisfaction with the tariff in

general still abounded. Thomas Watson, editor of the pro-Jackson New Bern Sentinel, wrote that the tariff vote left the South with no choices. "Let a convention of the Southern States be called," he cried, to "offer to the North the terms upon which they are willing to remain in the Union." Yet the Sentinel denounced nullification and expressed hope that South Carolina would not put it into effect.⁴⁴ As was the typical North Carolina reaction to the times, threats were made, but no lines drawn in the sand. The other paper in town, the pro-National Republican Spectator, also reacted along factional lines. Its editor, John Pasteur, expressed satisfaction with the vote, writing "the Bill is such a one as must satisfy every reasonable man for the present." As for the nullifiers, he wrote, "rave as they may, [they] will find it difficult to stir the people up to rebellion."⁴⁵

Only around Halifax, in an area of the state notable only for counties with higher numbers of blacks than whites, did nullification seem to have grassroots support. On January 26, the Roanoke Advocate printed the first letter written to the editor by "A Nullifier." The reader claimed that "every States Rights man is, in principle, a nullifier" because there was no middle ground between consolidation and nullification. "A Nullifier" pointed out that those who opposed nullification did so because they felt that the tariff was constitutional. If the tariff was constitutional, although oppressive to certain areas, then

nullifiers would necessarily be rebels if they resisted the law. On the other hand, if the tariff was not constitutional, then nullifiers were not rebels, but the keepers of real republican values. Furthermore, only a convention of the states could determine the constitutionality of the tariff, because the Supreme Court, as a member of the same government as Congress, was an "incompetent tribunal."⁴⁶

On the 9 February, "A Friend of Old Hickory" tried to divert the nullificationist bent of the Advocate by writing an essay promoting the value of the Union and concluding that "in the end it [nullification] will lead to disunion."⁴⁷ But "A Nullifier" seemed to carry the day. On March 1, he had become more aggressive:

If the present Congress does not take off all protecting duties, and make the whole revenue law uniform, I will recommend to this state, that a convention be convened, the duty of which shall be, to declare the whole law null and inoperative.⁴⁸

After this essay was published, the editors of the Advocate became more and more openly pro-nullificationist, going beyond the strict states' rights stand that they had earlier taken. For three successive weeks, from July 26 to August 9, the Advocate was the forum for "Sydney," an outspoken nullificationist. "Sydney" claimed that "Nullification is not the monster its enemies would make it -- it is not sedition -- it is not disunion." Nullification

was likened to the medical practitioners of the day: "It is the mild and gentle means of the humane physician, and not the rough operation of the unfeeling surgeon."⁴⁹ "Sydney" did not advocate secession, but felt, like Calhoun, that nullification was a means of preserving the Union.⁵⁰ On the 17th of September, the editors of the Advocate lamented that the people as a whole had not come to a decision on nullification -- few understood it -- but many denounced it in their ignorance while paradoxically asserting that a state could declare a law unconstitutional. "But in denouncing Nullification," warned the editors, "let the people beware, lest they fall into Consolidation."⁵¹

The Branch press was caught in a difficult dilemma by the entire nullification controversy. They were somewhat typical of North Carolina as a state, in that they were more states' rightist in their constitutional beliefs than the regular Democrats, yet they refused to give their support to nullification. During the crisis they were often accused of being nullifiers, but they never adopted that position officially. As one author has noted, not all of the Branch group were nullifiers, but all of the nullifiers were a part of the Branch group.⁵² If this relationship seems complicated today, at the time keeping the doctrines straight must have been enormously frustrating. In Fayetteville, the Carolina Observer was one of the most vocal Branch presses in the state. On May 29, 1832, Edward Hale, the editor of that paper, faced a serious challenge

from a letter written by "Cape Fear." "Cape Fear" reminisced back to the previous year and Calhoun's letter on nullification. The writer recalled that "I could not reconcile the theory of Nullification to myself, and from a garbled, but imperfect knowledge of the principle, I considered it alarmingly dangerous." When in the late spring of 1832 a copy of the "newly discovered" Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions was placed in his hand, "Cape Fear" felt "convicted of moral ignorance as well as moral indignity to the Honorable John C. Calhoun." He continued:

I now believe that that philosophical veil ... is satisfactorily raised from my vision, and that the purity of his [Calhoun's] patriotism is now unfurled in radiant splendor! Who can read those resolutions and compare the same with Calhoun's address and say that he is only seeking to build up for himself, a political fabric for unwise and corrupt purposes? What higher authority would any man require (hungry partisans excepted) than the index of Thomas Jefferson, and who better knew the true spirit of the constitution was perverted, than he whom (we all believe) draughted that instrument?⁵³

That Hale felt keenly the threat of "Cape Fear" is evident in his unusual (in not keeping with factional lines) praise for the speech of William Gaston, an old Federalist who was a hero of the National Republican Party, and his comment that "we can not shut our eyes to the rapid strides that the doctrine of Nullification is making in our own State."⁵⁴

The editor of the Observer defended himself from the negative remarks made about nullification and the Branch faction by regular Democrats and National Republicans alike.

The Observer continued to support Calhoun for the presidency in August 1832 and regarded his letter of July 1831 as "setting forth the Southern or Virginia doctrine of States Rights, not the South Carolina doctrine of Nullification."⁵⁵ This assertion apparently did not set well with the paper's readers. A letter from "Union" condemned the aspirations of the States Rights and Free Trade Party in South Carolina and "the maddened politicians" of that state.⁵⁶ "Cumberland" wrote that "The advocates of Nullification are not the friends of liberty -- they are its enemies -- they are either ambitious demagogues or blind head-strong partisans."⁵⁷ By the November polling date, Hale could proclaim, if not triumphantly, then resolutely, "There is but little Nullification in North Carolina."⁵⁸ What remained to be reconciled was the relationship that the editor perceived existed between Calhoun and the doctrine.

The National Republican press criticized nullification throughout 1832. In April the New Bern Spectator addressed the new rage in the nullification debate. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions had long been attributed to James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, but no draft in their handwritings had ever been found. When a copy of the Resolutions was found in Jefferson's notes, nullifiers seemingly gained a very powerful sponsor. The Spectator acknowledged that Jefferson may have written the Kentucky Resolutions but reminded the nullifiers that they had no reason to rejoice. The editor, John Pasteur, claimed: "We

have always considered an unqualified devotion to the opinions of any statesman ... as ... dangerous to the commonwealth."⁵⁹ Jefferson was usually right and well respected by all, but this time, Pasteur declared, he was wrong. His true sentiments were not the radical states' rights' doctrines of '98, but were present in his inaugural address in 1801 when he said: "Absolute acquiescence in the decision of the majority is the vital principle of Republics."⁶⁰ The Spectator suggested that instead of relying on the duplicitous Jefferson, the country should take George Washington's words to heart that the basis of the government was that the people have a right to amend the Constitution.⁶¹ Based upon these precepts, the editor "would voluntarily step forward to extort that respect for the Constitution which the hardihood of folly would deny."⁶² The nullifiers of South Carolina were not patriots, as they claimed, but traitors.⁶³

The National Republican press often looked to the Old Federalist, William Gaston, for leadership and clear reasoning. In a widely reported speech to the graduating seniors of the University of North Carolina in June 1832, Gaston explained the dangers of disunion. "What can one [section] do without the other?" Gaston asked. The only results of disunion would be "They will present fields and occasions for border wars, leagues, and counter leagues." Only the Constitution could save the country from a terrible fate.⁶⁴ By the end of June, the editor of the Spectator

felt confident of the demise of nullification, calling its specter "amusingly ridiculous," and claiming that "There is glorious prospect ahead that Jacksonism and Nullification will sink together."⁶⁵

The Democratic press only grudgingly gave nullification precedent in the writings of Thomas Jefferson. While "the mantle of Jefferson" was thrown around the nullification doctrine by the discovery of the elusive manuscripts, the New Bern Carolina Sentinel hoped that its "chivalric brothers of the South" would refrain from implementing methods of recourse "so fraught with fearful consequences" as nullification.⁶⁶ If they did opt for radical measures, though, the editors claimed that "North Carolina would be loth indeed to send a man or musket for her [South Carolina's] subjugation -- **she would not -- No! she would not.**" Further, northern manufacturers were warned: "May the arm of him be palsied who would raise it against our brethren contending for their violated rights.... The manufacturers may jeer and gibe, but they should not pressure too far." The tariff, the Sentinel claimed, "is a system of plunder" and the manufacturing states "know it to be so." Finally, if the only recourse of the South, after four long years of oppression and argument for redress, was disunion, "let the curse of posterity rest on them, not on the heads of those who refused to submit to its withering influence."⁶⁷

Another Democratic paper, the North Carolina Journal, published in Fayetteville, also distanced itself further from the radicals to the south. The Journal claimed that the reason for the confusion concerning states' rights, the Virginia and Kentucky Resolves, and nullification was that the nullifiers blended pure doctrines with those of their own "which are not so."⁶⁸ The paper commented at length on the many meetings that occurred in the state in the fall of 1832 -- meetings that most often resolved that the Union was uppermost in the minds of the citizens. North Carolina, the Journal claimed, would,

resist these encroachments by means which are strictly constitutional, they will testify their disapprobation of these acts by an untiring resistance to them, they will exhaust all the means which reason and argument supply, ere they will resort to the dread alternative of force; nor will they resort to this, until their burdens become too heavy to be borne.⁶⁹

To the editors of the Journal, all arguments had not been exhausted, especially if one viewed the revisions in the tariff made by the Tariff Bill of 1832. And while Andrew Jackson was in the White House, the editors saw no reason for Democrats to fear. Old Hickory and "New York's gifted son" -- Martin Van Buren -- would avert the calamity of disunion.⁷⁰

As the presidential election of 1832 drew near, it was evident to all but the staunchest Clay supporters that there was very little pro-Clay sentiment in North Carolina. The

real battle lay not in the presidential election -- Jackson was locked in -- but in which ticket, Jackson-Van Buren or Jackson-Phillip Barbour (a Virginian seen as a "proper" states' rightists), would triumph.⁷¹ In North Carolina the Branch faction supported Jackson-Barbour, as did some of the regular Democrats. Most Democrats, and a vast majority of the people, voted for Jackson-Van Buren. Part of the "scare" against Van Buren's nomination (besides the fact that he was a Yankee) was the rumor, loudly developed by the Branch press and National Republicans, that Jackson's health had deteriorated seriously and the vice presidential appointment was, in fact, the appointment of Old Hickory's successor. James Iredell, Jr., one of the leaders of the Branch faction, predicted that "Van Buren **cannot** get the vote of North Carolina for Vice President."⁷² The Halifax Advocate joined the Branch group in denouncing Van Buren as "the **author and founder**" of the tariff.⁷³ The Observer claimed that "the enemies of the Tariff in this State, are not to be bamboozled into the support of an avowed friend of the system, by the bugbear of Nullification."⁷⁴ The Branch group supported Phillip Barbour of Virginia as the preferred running mate for Andrew Jackson. Barbour was seen as from the "old school of '98" politicians, in favor of a strict interpretation of the Constitution and opposed to internal improvements and the Bank of the United States.⁷⁵

Some of the regular Democrat press, such as the New Bern Carolina Sentinel, also supported Barbour, although

most of this faction's presses supported Jackson and whomever he named as his running mate. The National Republican faction tried to turn the Van Buren question to its advantage. John Pasteur of the New Bern Spectator wrote that if North Carolinians did deign to vote for the New York politician, "then ... forever shut your mouths on the subject of the Tariff," and should Congress refuse to modify it, "no murmuring, no **rebellion** -- for what faith, what credit can Congress or anyone else place in your complaints, when they find you supporting the author of the Tariff?"⁷⁶ The paper then lashed out at enemies inside and outside the state, declaring: "It would moreover, prove a most unkind cut" to the nullifiers of South Carolina: "with what face could they pursue their favorite project of disunion, if their brethren ... by taking Van Buren by the hand, proclaimed to the world ... that their complaints and outcries were all a sham."⁷⁷

On the eve of the election the three factions stood like this: The regular Democrats supported Andrew Jackson. If he wanted a New Yorker, Martin Van Buren, as vice president, well, that was fine too. Jacksonians professed an affection for states' rights and despised Henry Clay and his American System of tariffs, federal banks, and federally funded internal improvements. Regular Democrats despised John C. Calhoun, because of what some saw as his impertinent actions by writing the South Carolina Exposition and Protest while vice president. Nullification, to Jacksonians, was

not a constitutional view of states' rights, but a dangerous theory that threatened civil war if implemented.

The Branch coalition supported Jackson and Phillip Barbour, a southerner whom they felt exemplified better than Van Buren their states' rights ideal. This states' rights doctrine was based on the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. While this group never "officially" adopted nullification (this was too loose of a coalition to really have an official policy), they did support Calhoun and some of the group were nullifiers. Needless to say, Branchites loathed the tariff and all other aspects of the American System and its founder Henry Clay.

The third faction was the National Republican bloc. This group consisted of anti-Jackson men who supported Clay and his principles to varying degrees. Some were more anti-Jackson than they were pro-Clay, while others advocated the tariff, federally funded internal improvements, and especially the Bank of the United States. Politics did indeed make strange bedfellows when this group allied with the Branchites over the debunking of Martin Van Buren in the election of 1832. Nullification was, however, a double threat to these politicians. Besides threatening the Union, nullification struck at the very heart of the American System, the protective tariff. This faction unabidingly hated Calhoun and his followers.

Thus was the sometimes confusing state of affairs in North Carolina at the beginning of the nullification crisis.

The events of the next five months, from November 1832 to March 1833, would force the state into a more concrete stance on the nullification issue. With South Carolina's Ordinance of Nullification a line would be drawn, and decisions would have to be made and adhered to by North Carolina's politicians. In light of the upcoming crisis, the rift between the Democrats and the Branch group widened because of enflamed passions, and the stands of the nullifiers and National Republicans became more intolerant.

ENDNOTES

¹Kermalene K. Brown, "The South's Reaction to the Tariffs and the Force Bill, 1828-1833" (Ph.D. diss., Oklahoma State University, 1971), 108-9.

²Hugh Lefler, North Carolina History as Told by Contemporaries, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 146.

³Ibid.

⁴Observer (Fayetteville), 10 August 1831.

⁵Roanoke Advocate (Halifax), 11 August 1831.

⁶Ibid.

⁷North Carolina Spectator and Western Advertiser (Rutherfordton), 13 August 1831. Hereafter cited as Western Advertiser.

⁸Observer (Fayetteville), 17, 24 August 1831.

⁹Advocate (Halifax), 1 September 1831.

¹⁰Register (Raleigh), 18 August 1831.

¹¹Journal (Fayetteville), 24 August 1831.

¹²Spectator (New Bern), 26 August 1831

¹³William Gaston to Robert Donaldson, 3 September 1831, quoted in Joseph H. Schauinger, "William Gaston: Southern Statesman," North Carolina Historical Review 18 (1941): 121.

¹⁴Western Advertiser (Rutherfordton), 8 October 1831.

¹⁵Spectator (New Bern), 14 October 1831.

¹⁶Journal (Fayetteville), 7 September 1831.

¹⁷Spectator (New Bern), 11 November 1831.

¹⁸Star (Raleigh), 25 November 1831.

¹⁹John Scott to Willie P. Mangum, 18 December 1831, The Papers of Willie P. Mangum, 4 vols., ed. Henry T. Shanks (Raleigh: State Department of Archives and History, 1952), 1: 18.

²⁰Congressional Debates, 22nd Cong., 1st sess. (23 January 1832), 8, pt. 2, 1621.

²¹Ibid., 1623.

²²Ibid., 1622.

²³Ibid., (27 January 1832), 8, pt. 2, 3800.

²⁴Ibid., (29-30 January 1832), 8, pt. 2, 3831.

²⁵Priestly Mangum was educated at the University of North Carolina. He was interested in politics, but was usually too outspoken to get elected. He did serve in the state legislature in 1832. Shanks, Mangum Papers, 1: 14.

²⁶Priestly Mangum to Willie P. Mangum, 16 January 1832, Mangum Papers 1: 450.

²⁷W. Mangum to Jesse Person, 25 January 1832, Ibid., 465.

²⁸Congressional Debates, 22nd Cong., 1st sess. (7 February 1832), 8, pt. 1, 302-327.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid., (30 March 1832), 8, pt. 1, 675.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Robert Gilliam to W. Mangum, 5 April 1832, Mangum Papers 1: 529.

³⁷Sentinel (New Bern), 11 April 1832

³⁸Asa Biggs, Autobiography of Asa Biggs, (Raleigh: Edwards, 1958), 46.

³⁹W. Mangum to Duncan Cameron, 24 May 1832, Mangum Papers 1: 548.

⁴⁰Frank Taussig, State Papers and Speeches on the Tariff (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1893), 109-10.

⁴¹Sentinel (New Bern), 6 July 1832.

⁴²Congressional Debates, 22nd Cong., 1st sess. (9 July 1832), 8, pt. 1, 1218-1219.

⁴³Ibid., (12 July 1832), 8, pt. 1, 1282.

⁴⁴Sentinel (New Bern), 6 July 1832.

⁴⁵Spectator (New Bern), 6 July 1832.

⁴⁶Roanoke Advocate (Halifax), 26 January 1832.

⁴⁷Ibid., 7 February 1832.

⁴⁸Ibid., 1 March 1832.

⁴⁹Ibid., 2, 9 August 1832.

⁵⁰William Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: the Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836, (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 292. Freehling says, "the theory of nullification was a veritable

snarl of contradictions. Calhoun stopped constitutional revisions by the federal government and then permitted constitutional alterations by single states; he divided sovereignty after arguing for an absolute sovereign; he rigidly separated the unwittingly reunited sovereign and government; he protected national minority rights and then permitted state majority tyranny; he defended the consent of the governed at the expense of destroying the power to govern; he proposed conserving the Union with principles that would have destroyed it."; *ibid.*, 172.

⁵¹Roanoke Advocate (Halifax), 17 September 1832.

⁵²William S. Hoffman, Andrew Jackson and North Carolina Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958), 54.

⁵³Observer (Fayetteville), 29 May 1832.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 26 June 1832.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 14 August 1832.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 18 September 1832.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 2 October 1832.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 13 November 1832.

⁵⁹Spectator (New Bern), 6 April 1832.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*

⁶¹*Ibid.*

⁶²*Ibid.*, 4 May 1832.

⁶³Ibid., 25 May, 15 June 1832.

⁶⁴Quoted in Schauinger, "William Gaston: Southern Statesman," 122.

⁶⁵Spectator (New Bern), 29 June, 14 September 1832.

⁶⁶Sentinel (New Bern), 18 April 1832.

⁶⁷Ibid., 2 May 1832.

⁶⁸Journal (Fayetteville), 16 May 1832.

⁶⁹Ibid., 19 September 1832.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Richard P. McCormick, The Second American Party System, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 204-5.

⁷²James Iredell [Jr.] to W. Mangum, 4 February 1832, Mangum Papers 1: 472-3.

⁷³Roanoke Advocate (Halifax), 8 March 1832.

⁷⁴Observer (Fayetteville), 3 July 1832.

⁷⁵Sentinel (New Bern), 25 April 1832.

⁷⁶Spectator (New Bern), 3 February 1832.

⁷⁷Ibid., 4 May 1832.

CHAPTER III

THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS IN NORTH CAROLINA

**"Heaven avert us from the horrors of civil war."
Jesse Speight**

Almost immediately after the election of 1832, South Carolina posted its Ordinance of Nullification, targeting February 1, 1833 as the day it would go into effect. Then the Tariff of 1832 would be, in effect, null and void in South Carolina and the collection of duties in the state's ports prohibited. As the nullification crisis developed, the already factious nature of North Carolina politics underwent further upheaval. According to Richard Ellis, however, the threat of nullification did not pit nationalist against states' rightists. It was primarily a struggle between two groups of states' rightists.

The unrest surrounding the nullification movement affected the three factions in North Carolina politics variously. The fragile Branch ring, held together in 1832 only by opposition to Martin Van Buren, lost members because of the group's connections with John C. Calhoun. The National Republican bloc shifted from support of the Branchites against Van Buren to cooperation with the Jackson-Van Buren Democrats against the Branch forces.

Regular Democrats did not escape the divisiveness. When President Jackson asked Congress for the Force Bill to coerce South Carolina, destruction of states' rights as a doctrine stared the Democrats in the face. After the crisis ended, all three groups breathed a collective sigh of relief and went back to the regular routine. Deep rifts, however, had occurred. The differences of opinion evident during the nullification crisis started many of the state's most powerful politicians toward institutionalized protest of Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren with the formation of the Whig Party in the state in 1834.

North Carolina's reaction to the Ordinance of Nullification was characteristic of the feelings of the state toward Andrew Jackson, states' rights, the tariff, and the doctrine of nullification itself. John Branch and the other hard core pro-Calhounists remained faithful to the South Carolinian and took a solid states' rights stand. Some of Branch's group were nullifiers. Others were secessionists. All of the faction agreed that the federal government did not have the right to subdue South Carolina militarily. In Fayetteville, the Carolina Observer proclaimed that many people, even the most ardent Unionists in the South, felt that the South Carolina Ordinance may have expressed the fact that there "may be found a limit to the patience of the whole South" over the tariff.¹ In the northeast part of the state, in the counties surrounding the Roanoke River, there seemed to be a greater proportion of

radical states' rightists and even nullifiers. Besides the presence of a black majority (and the corresponding increase in racial fears associated with the imbalance), the area around Halifax County had some of the more radical of the state's politicians such as John Branch, of Enfield, and John Randolph, the former Virginia congressman noted for the radicalness of his states' rights views. The States Rights Party of Halifax expressed its jubilation at the receipt of South Carolina's Ordinance by "firing of Cannon and other demonstrations of public joy."² The Advocate proclaimed "the right of STATE INTERPOSITION [we] can never give up," and warned the federal government against the use of force in the crisis.³

Other parts of the Branch faction that had united against the Jackson-Van Buren ticket in 1832 splintered off from the group over the radical doctrine of nullification. The New Bern Spectator made its anti-nullification sentiments clear from the beginning -- it refused to print the "treasonous and unprecedented effusion" of the Ordinance. Furthermore, the editors, who were supporters of Henry Clay, were even willing to "rub off old scores" with Jackson if he squashed the South Carolina movement.⁴ Yet they feared that as "the President has always been confessedly latitudinarian in his loyal and constitutional opinions" the South Carolinians would presume that "he cannot consistently require a rigid conformity from them."⁵ The Spectator speculated that the nullifiers would be no

better citizens if their grievances were removed, and urged all readers to attend the Union meeting on December 8, 1832 in New Bern.⁶

At that meeting, Judge William Gaston, the Old Federalist judge from New Bern, actively protested the Ordinance by resolving that the people condemn nullification as "inconsistent" with a "just view of the rights and obligations of the State" and leading to a dissolution of the Union.⁷ Apparently, many North Carolinians agreed with Gaston. In January, men and women continued to gather to declare their devotion to the Union either as political parties, towns, individuals, or in at least one case, as military companies. Some meetings denounced the tariff, South Carolina, or specifically John C. Calhoun, but most echoed Jackson's statement that the Union "must be preserved."⁸

As the crisis evolved, fewer and fewer people throughout the state approved of the stand taken by South Carolina. Politicians who had been branded, justly or unjustly, as nullifiers sought to distance themselves from the doctrine (which was tricky to do and yet remain a states' rightist). Spivey McKissick noticed that Person County had "only one nullifier and he is trying to work out of his former opinion."⁹ Others recognized that states' rights and nullification were going to be hard to separate. William Polk, a regular Democrat, commented that "such is the fruits of the Jeffersonian doctrines of 1798" that that

"**Hydra** Democracy is about to devour all order here [Raleigh]." Polk looked to South Carolina as "proof positive" that the work of the Revolution was about to be broken and "the nation thrown into convulsion and misery under the government of small and impotent democracies."¹⁰

Old Hickory's reaction was of paramount importance to North Carolinians. In Jackson's annual message to the Twenty-second Congress, he seemed conciliatory and said little about the problems in South Carolina. This message contained nothing about using force to resist nullification. Furthermore, the president advocated tariff reductions. This message prompted mixed reactions in North Carolina: joy at the possible reduction of the tariff and anxiety about whether the president would take the necessary steps to "counteract the edict of nullification" and "maintain the supremacy of the laws of the Union."¹¹ Both the Jackson-Van Buren and National Republican groups expressed their support of Jackson's message. The Jackson-Van Buren paper in Fayetteville, the North Carolina Journal, declared that a policy of tariff reduction would avoid bloodshed while saving the Union.¹² The National Republican press in New Bern urged Jackson to enforce the law and not trifle with nullification.¹³

On December 10, 1832, Jackson explained how he would deal with South Carolina in his Nullification Proclamation. In what may very well have been the most complete and cogent explanation of Unionist sentiment yet produced by an

American statesman, Jackson strongly affirmed that the Union was perpetual. He also denied that a state had the right to secede, because that would destroy the nation. Finally, Jackson warned South Carolinians that nullification was treason and that he would unflinchingly enforce federal law.¹⁴

In North Carolina, response to the Proclamation varied according to sentiments. The pro-National Republican Spectator, which had been Jackson's harshest critic a few weeks earlier, declared that the Proclamation was "the noblest document that ever bore the name of Andrew Jackson" and it did "more to immortalize his name than even the victory in New Orleans." Editors John Pasteur and his new partner, Robert G. Moore, appealed to South Carolinians to rescind the Ordinance. If they did not, the newspapermen threatened, North Carolina must view her southern neighbor as an enemy.¹⁵ Pasteur and Moore further assured northerners of their loyalty by proclaiming: "The Union, the **whole** Union, and nothing but the Union, is our watchword."¹⁶

Members of the Branch faction were less than thrilled about the Proclamation and its inherent rebuff of the doctrine of their brand of states' rights. The Star claimed that only tariff men and consolidationists could approve of the president's message.¹⁷ It also promoted the enlistment of "individuals, or by companies, troops, battalions, squadrons, or regiments of artillery, cavalry, or riflemen"

as volunteers for the South Carolina militia.¹⁸ John Bailey, an influential lawyer from Pasquotank County, stated that "if the principles contained in General Jackson's proclamation" were that of Congress, then "the days of our Republic are numbered."¹⁹ Willie Mangum, a part of the Branch group in spirit (and within two years a fellow member of the Whig Party), felt that the document was violent and dangerous in principle.²⁰ Many saw the president's assertions as a threatening escalation toward civil war. The Carolina Observer stated its belief that the manner in which the laws were enforced in South Carolina would determine whether North Carolina would unite in support of the federal government. The editor, Edward Hale, trusted that "any unnecessary act of violence, any tyrannical act of oppression, would be apt to enlist North Carolina in the cause of her sister."²¹

Jacksonian Democrats also saw danger to Jeffersonian principles in the president's message, but they realized that the gravity of the situation called for stringent measures. At this time, Jesse Speight abandoned the Branch coalition for the ranks of Jacksonians, declaring that the people would "stand by Andrew Jackson and save the Union."²² Thomas Hall, another Jacksonian North Carolina congressman, wrote to Van Buren that "I concur with you entirely with regard to what the president has done, and what he is desirous to do." Hall was confident that Jackson would return the government to its proper principles and felt that

it was his duty to help the president in his "great work" of saving the Union.²³

With the posting of the Ordinance of Nullification and the Nullification Proclamation, the lines were finally drawn in what had been an ongoing ideological debate between two factions of states' rightsists and Unionists. Both the regular Democrats and the Branch faction claimed the states' rights' tradition as their own. The upcoming crisis would help both groups define what had been an uncertain group of concepts: states' rights, Union, secession, nullification, and consolidation. Because of South Carolina's attempt to nullify the Tariff of 1832, North Carolinians were forced to make a decision on states' rights and stand either on the side of state sovereignty or the Union.

When the state legislature, consisting of ninety regular Democrats, fifty-five Branch men, and ten National Republicans, convened, the legislators realized that they were in a precarious position.²⁴ If they took a stand against the use of coercion by the federal government, they would make it harder for force to be used against South Carolina. At the same time, North Carolinians felt that if they gave South Carolina any encouragement at all, nullification would go into effect and the Union would be shattered.

As the legislature moved its first orders of business and elected the unheralded David L. Swain as the new governor, the retiring governor, Montfort Stokes, addressed

his farewell speech to the new state government. Stokes commented on the difficulties threatening "the peace and harmony" of the nation and warned that persistence by "an excited portion of the Southern people" in their present course would "weaken the ties which have heretofore so happily united us together as a nation." He also praised North Carolinians for avoiding "any interference calculated to disturb the public tranquility" and urged that the people of the South not force upon the United States "hazardous experiments to change the terms of that connection" between the states. In his devotion to the Union, Stokes felt that he reflected the feelings of most of the people in North Carolina. They did not approve of states nullifying federal laws; they did not approve of federal troops being used to coerce a state (especially to enforce an unjust law like the tariff); and above all, they wanted to "cling to the Union of states as now connected."²⁵

With the departing governor's speech, the debate on nullification and North Carolina's response to South Carolina's stand began. On November 22, 1832, Robert Martin, a part of the National Republican faction from Rockingham, introduced a resolution designed to show both South Carolina and the federal government the views of his state. His resolution affirmed a "sacred attachment to the Constitution" and urged that the people "deprecate the doctrine of Nullification."²⁶ Martin proclaimed faith in the wisdom and integrity of the federal government. But due

to the "excitement and sectional feeling, which already pervades the country to a fearful extent," condemned the idea of a southern convention to discuss the tariff.²⁷ On the 24th, Walter F. Leake, a Jackson-Van Buren man from Richmond County, introduced a similar set of resolutions. Leake stressed the nature of the controversy in his preamble and asserted that while not in favor of nullification, "we are nevertheless alive to the cause which has given rise to it."²⁸ Leake also proclaimed that the powers ceded by the states to the national government, "were delegated in trust for the accomplishment of certain limited and defined objects" which did not include protection of manufacturers.²⁹ In fact, in Leake's mind, the tariff was more easily proven unconstitutional than the concept of nullification. He said that, "sooner than live in a government of unlimited powers, I would take Nullification, with all its attendants of revolution, internal commotion, and civil war." Leake continued, stating "that a State, has the right, in extreme cases to secede, I cannot believe otherwise."³⁰

These resolutions were not entirely satisfactory to most of the legislators. They did not show the feelings of North Carolina toward the tariff, South Carolina, nullification, and the Union coherently enough. Although they did capture some of the important feelings of the people, there was more involved. In the House of Commons, a motion was made to adopt a set of resolutions with a

slightly different emphasis. Archibald Monk from Sampson County introduced a set of resolutions that acknowledged that the construction of the Constitution on matters such as internal improvements, the bank, money appropriations, public lands, and tariffs was open to differing interpretations. Because of this, although Congress had passed laws concerning these issues "believing them to be in conformity with the true spirit and meaning of the Constitution," the nation was about to be split apart. So, "whereas many of the good citizens of this State do believe and entertain the opinion that there is no tribunal which can amicably and satisfactorily decide and adjust the foregoing contested articles," North Carolina's delegation to Congress was to be instructed to request a convention of all of the states to interpret the Constitution and "save the Union from anarchy." John Daniel from Halifax, added resolutions stating explicitly that the protective tariff was unconstitutional and unjust and that it "tended to weaken the union of these states by impairing the confidence of a large portion of the southern people in the justice of the General Government." Daniel pledged support to the tariff of 1832, despite the "painful anxiety and opposition" of the protectionists and asserted that "we have not yet lost all confidence in the justice of the General Government." His resolutions stated that "we sympathize with the people of South Carolina," but not in the theory of nullification.³¹

Samuel T. Sawyer, a nullifier from Edenton, was even more outspoken in his states' rights' leanings. He introduced resolutions in the House of Commons declaring that the states "are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to the General Government" but by a government of "special purposes" and of "certain definite powers." Further, to combat the rise to overbearing power of the government over the limitations imposed by the Constitution, a right of "nullification by those sovereignties [states] of unauthorized acts ... is the rightful remedy." Sawyer continued on this tack by stating that the state of North Carolina considered the tariff laws "palpable violations of the said Constitution," and that silence by the state would be acquiescence to oppression and domination of the states by the federal government. The state did not recognize the right of any authority "to appeal to the sword as an arbiter to settle such controversy" nor to the "arms of the U.S." to restrain any state "from the exercise of those legitimate powers which belong to her sovereign character [secession]." Finally, Sawyer's resolutions said that the state of North Carolina, not recognizing the right of the federal government to use force to keep a state in the Union, "will not tamely submit to the exercise of military coercion ... against her sister state."³²

The Jacksonians attacked the South Carolina Ordinance along different lines than did the National Republican

faction. They struck at the tariff. Richard Dobbs Spaight of New Bern, one of the leaders of the regular Democrats, proposed a preamble and resolution that stated that the national debt would be retired in 1833 and there were sufficient funds in the treasury to pay it. Therefore, on the president's recommendation, Congress would reduce the tariff "to a plain and economical system of revenue." If Congress did not, Spaight believed the president would himself end the tariff. This being the case, Spaight resolved that South Carolina be requested to suspend the Ordinance of Nullification until September 1, 1833 to give Congress and the president time to act.³³

Thus, there were five distinct proposals for ending the crisis. Martin's condemned both nullification and the idea of a southern convention. Leake's declared both nullification and the tariff unconstitutional. Archibald Monk pined for a convention of all the states to determine the constitutionality of the issue and, coupled with Daniel's resolutions, condemned the tariff and sympathized with South Carolina. Sawyer, the outspoken nullifier, stated that nullification was the correct remedy for a state to adopt when a federal law was oppressive and declared that secession was a constitutional right of a "sovereign" state. Spaight placed complete faith in Jackson to either persuade Congress to end the protective tariff, or to do it himself. As resolution after resolution was presented, the legislators decided to create a joint select committee to

draw up a single set of declarations that all could agree upon.

In late December 1832, the committee, headed by John D. Toomer of Fayetteville, reported to the Senate for the first time. Toomer drew up a new set of resolutions, which stated that the people of North Carolina "doth unequivocally express a warm attachment to the constitution." Second, they declared a devoted bond with the Union. Third, the resolutions affirmed the belief that the people of the state felt that the tariff was "unconstitutional ... impolitic, unjust, and oppressive." Fourth, Toomer's resolutions asserted that the doctrine of nullification was subversive to the Constitution. Finally, the statement instructed the state's congressional delegation to work to defuse the situation between South Carolina and the federal government.³⁴

Five days later, the legislature discussed and amended Toomer's resolutions. In the Senate, Louis Wilson of Edgecomb proposed to add a call for a convention of states to amend the Constitution with more precise wording "restraining and restricting the powers of Congress." The vote on this motion was evenly split, twenty-eight to twenty-eight, with the Speaker, William Mosely, a regular Democrat, casting the deciding vote for the pro-states' rights motion in the affirmative.³⁵

William Hall, of Brunswick, moved to amend the resolution further by striking out the third resolution and

substituting a much more aggressive condemnation of the tariff (by the legislature instead of by the people of the state). Hall's substitution was voted down.³⁶ Next, the Toomer report, with Wilson's amendment, was broken down and voted on by individual sections by the Senate. The first two resolutions expressing attachment to the Constitution and the Union, passed unanimously. The third, dealing with the tariff, passed by a vote of fifty-one to three. The fourth, regarding nullification, was adopted by a vote of forty-nine to nine (see Figure 3), and the fifth (added by Wilson) was rejected, twenty-seven to thirty. Finally, the sixth and seventh resolutions, to send instructions to the Congressmen and to print and send the resolutions to the governor of South Carolina and the president, passed fifty-eight to zero. Spaight's resolution was passed by a vote of fifty ayes against three nays. This measure provided that a separate letter to be sent from Governor Swain to the governor of South Carolina urging the withdrawal of the Ordinance of Nullification until Congress had time to reform the tariff.³⁷

In the House of Commons, legislators tried to amend the resolutions to reflect a stronger states' rights bias. When votes were taken on the Toomer resolutions individually, the first was passed unanimously. The second also was affirmed. John Bragg of Warren County moved to strike out the third resolution and replace it with a broader condemnation of the tariff and call for its speedy repeal, but the House voted

thirty-six to eighty-four to keep the original wording. Bragg next sought to strike out the fourth resolution and replace it with one that expressed sympathy for South Carolina and stated that "not considering the existing grievances great ... [and] intolerable as to justify a resort to any extreme and extraconstitutional remedy for relief," nullification was, at this time, unnecessary. Bragg's motion was once again voted down. The next day, Spencer O'Brien tried again to strike the fourth resolution and add one more sympathetic to South Carolina. The movement failed again, this time by a vote of thirty to ninety. Another motion to replace the fourth resolution with a more pacifistic message to South Carolina was defeated and the original wording of the fourth provision finally passed, ninety-eight to twenty-two (see Figure 4).³⁸

Once the debate on the resolution concerning nullification subsided, the House finished its voting. The fifth resolution was passed by the House in a vote of 111 to 1.³⁹ Henry Clark of Beaufort alone voted against the measure because he felt that the state legislature had no grounds to instruct congressmen or senators.⁴⁰ Joseph Townsend introduced a motion to "protest against the use of force by the General Government against the State of South Carolina" but it was rejected eighteen to eighty-two.⁴¹ The last resolution was read and adopted, and the resolutions were ordered to be sent back to the Senate.⁴²




Figure 3. Nay Votes on the Passage of the Fourth Resolution in the Senate on 29 December 1832. The Final Vote was 49 - 9.

Once back in the Senate, there was one final motion to amend the resolutions before the Toomer committee submitted its final report. Dr. John Potts, a regular Democrat from Edgecomb County, asked that the Senate adopt a resolution declaring that North Carolina "deprecates the resort to force, either by the General Government or the State of South Carolina." This motion was tabled.⁴³ On the 7th of January, the joint committee headed by Toomer submitted its final draft of the message to be sent to South Carolina and the president. Toomer emphasized that "the people of this State are ardently attached to the Constitution and sincerely devoted to the Union." But he also affirmed "the right of the oppressed to break asunder the ties which connect them to the oppressor." The committee was aware of the gravity of secession, seeing that it would "be accompanied by deeds of violence and scenes of blood" in civil war. They declared that the tariff was unconstitutional and thus urged a constitutional convention. The committee asserted that nullification was "revolutionary in character" and "subversive of the Constitution and leads to a dissolution of the Union." South Carolina's attitude filled the members "with the deepest solicitude and the most heart thrilling anxiety," because North Carolina was implicated in the existing controversy by being on the border of what could become a battleground. South Carolina was supplicated to refrain from pursuing its course by the outstretching of the "olive branch of peace, and with the







Figure 4. Final Vote on the Fourth Resolution in the House of Commons on 3 January 1832. Final Vote was 98 - 22.

-  = One Member from County Voted Nay.
-  = Both Members from County Voted Nay
-  = Both Members from County Voted Yea.

offerings of conciliation in our hearts."⁴⁴ Despite the heavy states' rights rhetoric, North Carolina politicians were neither ready to adopt nor advocate doctrines that could easily lead to civil war.

Following the Toomer report, a protest was read in the state legislature. Joseph W. Townsend presented a speech in which he justified his and his colleagues' votes against the resolutions based upon his beliefs that while "no one State can Nullify a law of the Union and still be a member thereof," a sovereign state did have a right to "peaceably withdraw from the compact" and in such case "the majority of the States would ... have no more right to coerce her into submission." Townsend felt that it was "uncalled for ... untimed and ungenerous toward a sister State" to pass resolutions against South Carolina when that state was exerting herself for the cause of the whole South to free itself from the protective system.⁴⁵ Townsend brought out a major point of discontent about the resolutions: despite Toomer's report to the legislature affirming the right of the oppressed to revolt, the finished copy (see Appendix) failed to deny or confirm the right of secession. That was the crux of the problem given South Carolina's intention of withdrawing from the Union if Jackson used military force against her. The resolutions said nothing about what North Carolina would do in this case. They also did not call for a southern convention. The only solution advocated by the resolution was to lower the tariff. This was a weak showing

for a state professing such a strong adherence to the states' rights doctrine.

The people of North Carolina received the Toomer resolutions with mixed feelings. The National Republicans proclaimed that the measure was too lenient towards South Carolina and denied that a majority of North Carolinians believed the tariff to be unconstitutional. The New Bern Spectator expressed disappointed that a resolution approving the use of military force against the nullifiers was not added.⁴⁶ The Branch presses also condemned the resolutions, declaring them an aid to the "tariffites."⁴⁷ Legislator James Whitaker, a member of the Branch faction from Macon County, wrote that the resolutions encouraged strife "by crying hurra one, well done the other" to the manufacturers and South Carolina. He also asked, "how many of us are willing to shoulder our knapsack and gun, and march against South Carolina? ... What! shoot his neighbor? Did I say his neighbor? His Brother! His Son! His Father!"⁴⁸ The regular Democrat press, the Raleigh Register gave high praise to the resolutions, "Thus has North Carolina **emphatically** spoken out, and by this one act, acquired additional claim to the character of a consistent, truly Republican and patriotic State."⁴⁹

One way Democrats could help the president was to support the Verplanck Bill, a compromise tariff supported by Jackson that was appealing to the South because it cut duties in half by 1834, but disliked by protectionists

because it reduced tariff rates too rapidly. North Carolina Democrats put considerable faith in this bill. Thomas Hall, a Jacksonian, proclaimed that "if Verplanck's Bill passes -- it will cure all."⁵⁰ William Haywood, Jr., a prominent politician from New Bern, wrote that the "madness of our more Southern brethren has ... perhaps destroyed the democratic ranks." But after the "cloud of fear" passed over, distinguished Democrats like Van Buren could "bring back this country to a recollection that Republican Democracy is a medium between the anarchy of Nullification and ... despotism."⁵¹

In Congress, North Carolinians began a campaign to get the Verplanck Bill passed. The same problems arose, however, as had during the vote on the Tariff of 1832. Most North Carolina congressmen were against the protective system in principle, and only some would vote for **any** tariff, even if reduced. Bedford Brown, a Jackson Democrat, took the floor in the Senate on Christmas Eve to urge that the Senate continue to debate the tariff when William King of Alabama moved that debate halt pending action by the House. Brown felt that the crisis at hand was of "such deep importance" that the Senate should act at once to restore the harmony, unity, and integrity of the Union.⁵²

In the House, North Carolinians had drastically differing views of the Verplanck Bill. Jacksonian Jesse Speight was for a compromise tariff if it provided for eventual reduction to the point of revenue. Speight wrote

to his constituents that they should have faith in Congress to further reduce the tariff but cautioned that the reduction may not happen during the spring session; there were too many congressmen opposed to compromise.⁵³ William Shepard, Congressman from Elizabeth City, had a far different view of the situation. Shepard questioned if passing a compromise tariff would satisfy South Carolina, or, if "she will not, in fact, make its passage the occasion of urging demands of a still more humiliating character?" The staunch National Republican condemned South Carolina for asking, "in a tone of proud and insulting defiance," Congress to abandon the protective system.⁵⁴

By February, frustration had mounted at the inability of Congress to make headway toward passing a compromise tariff to defuse the crisis. Charles Ransom, editor of the Raleigh Constitutionalist, despaired of Congress ever passing or repealing the tariff laws. He soundly condemned the "shylocks of the North" who could understand nothing but their "sordid passions" and the "jingling of dollars and cents" when the "Demon of discord" and sword of civil war dangled over the heads of the country. Ransom said that "tho the pillars of the constitution should one by one crumble to pieces and overwhelm our country in one common ruin, they would still cling with pertinacious grasp to their favorite idol and cry amidst desolation **Tariff! Tariff! no reduction! no reduction!**"⁵⁵ The Advocate blamed Jackson's Proclamation for the inability of Congress to

compromise.⁵⁶ The Star saw by early February that the Verplanck Bill had no hope of passing in acceptable form.⁵⁷ On February 12, 1833, the Star's prediction proved correct. The Verplanck Bill was withdrawn from debate. In its place Henry Clay substituted another bill.

Henry Clay's compromise tariff traded time, which was important to manufacturers as a guarantee of their profits, for principle which was most important to the South. While the northern interests would have nine and a half years to rewrite the tariff before it was reduced to revenue levels (and most of the reduction was in the last few years of that time), southerners would have the satisfaction of seeing the tariff thus reduced. Both sides did indeed sacrifice, and a true compromise was entered into in the interest of preserving the Union.⁵⁸

The introduction of Clay's compromise tariff gave North Carolinians hope for the peaceful end to the nullification crisis. While many of the state's newspapers denounced Clay as a presidential candidate and as the author of the odious American system, they nevertheless respected his reputation as the Great Compromiser gained as a result of his actions in the Missouri Compromise. The Raleigh Star likened Clay's intervention to a mariner long at sea seeing the first light of dawn after a storm-swept night. The editors saw in Clay's bill forbearance and concession worthy of the constitutional era and felt that the compromise would "ensure a just and wholesome administration of the

government," heal the various divisions in the Union, "silence the voice of discontent, and strengthen the ties which bind together."⁵⁹

The National Republican press at first responded with confusion to Clay's compromise. The Register immediately heaped praise on Clay: "Mr. Clay appeared, like the genius of patriotism and eloquence, strengthening the faint-hearted, encouraging the doubtful, animating the distrusting, and sternly and triumphantly rebuking the rebellious and disaffected."⁶⁰ The New Bern Spectator lamented the fact that the "traitors" were not going to be hung. Pasteur and company admitted that "we are truly astonished at Mr. Clay's new move," because it appeared that he had intervened with a compromise that would hurt the American System when no compromise was needed by the situation.⁶¹ President Jackson was going to enforce the laws, and the Verplanck tariff, which was very much a repeal of the protective system, was doomed. Thus, Clay's bill was unnecessary. Furthermore, Jackson was apparently ready to put South Carolina down by the sword. The unpopularity that this would cause the old general would surely aid the National Republicans in the election in 1836. By March, the editors returned to their old favorite from Kentucky. The compromise tariff gave them abundant reason to proclaim once again the merits of Henry Clay.⁶² The tariff also solved the dilemma of being of National Republican sentiment and

praising Andrew Jackson. The Spectator soon returned to its policy of bashing the moves of Old Hickory.⁶³

At least one Jacksonian press was skeptical of the efforts of Jackson's political rivals to heal the breach that they -- Clay as the "father of the American system" and Calhoun as the "father of nullification" -- had caused. The New Bern Sentinel editorialized:

After distracting and harassing the country, and creating jealousies and discontent among the people, Mr. Clay all at once assumes the character of **mediator** ... and holds out the olive branch to Mr. Calhoun, which that gentleman in his anxiety to escape the evils of Nullification seizes with an avidity such as the drowning man exhibits when catching at straws.

Further, the paper had faith that Congress could repair "in one or two years" what Clay's compromise proposed to do in ten.⁶⁴

At the same time as the drama of the Verplanck and Clay tariffs was being played out, there was another uproar when Jackson demanded an "enforcement bill" to use against the nullifiers in South Carolina. The Force Bill was the way in which Jackson planned to outmaneuver the nullifiers. He would establish floating customs houses outside South Carolina's harbors, collect all duties in cash, establish jails for those who did not pay, and protect custom officials' property by making crimes against them subject to trial in federal court. While Jackson already had the power, granted by the Constitution, to enforce the law, he

wanted Congress to pass the Force Bill to show solidarity in support of the federal government.⁶⁵ Because of the strong measures the Judiciary Committee on the Force Bill recommended, the debate in the Senate was prolonged and the passage of the bill delayed.⁶⁶

In North Carolina, the Branch press condemned the "bloody bill" heartily.⁶⁷ While Branch's group did not advocate nullification, they felt that the federal government had interpreted the principles of the Constitution too loosely in regard to the tariff, internal improvements, and the enumeration of powers.⁶⁸ The Star claimed that the president's request would give the tariffites enough confidence to refuse to compromise. Its editors waxed eloquent, if not jubilant:

the hope of the world will be blasted;
the sun of our national glory will go down
in blood; and the night of desolation and despair,

--sable goddess! from her ebon [sic] throne,
In rayden majesty will then stretch forth
Her leaden sceptre [sic] o'er --

"the deserted alters of Religion, the demolished temples of Liberty, the ashes of the Constitution, and the broken and disjointed fragments of a once glorious Union."⁶⁹ The Star awaited the "Fatal First" of February with "trembling anxiety."⁷⁰

The other party organs also responded to the Force Bill. The National Republicans approved of Jackson's request. The Register was sure that if civil war did come,

North Carolina would rally to the federal government.⁷¹ The Force Bill caused trouble for the Jacksonians in North Carolina, however. The Jackson-Van Buren faction was caught between their states' rights principles and their devotion to Old Hickory, who appeared to be ignoring these principles. The Constitutionalist did take an uncomfortable stand by warning that "blood can never cement our Union."⁷²

In the Senate, Bedford Brown apologized for speaking against the administration in denouncing the Force Bill. Brown stated that he had to follow his heart and also to respect the instructions of his state legislature. These two dictates pushed him towards finding a peaceful remedy. The Force Bill, he believed, "would be attended with violence, and perhaps lead to civil war." Brown objected to establishing a precedent for positioning the military over the civil authority, which he believed would essentially change the essence and spirit of republican institutions and open the way for a dictatorship. The North Carolina Senator affirmed his belief in states' rights while condemning nullification by blaming its rise on the "improper pressure of the Federal Government on the rights of the States." The principle of mutual deference and conciliation in which the Constitution had been formed needed to be administered in this crisis. Thus, the correct action for Congress was to eliminate the amount of tariff over the needs of the government.⁷³

In the House, the Force Bill fueled the fires started by partisan politics and the controversy over nullification itself. Samuel Carson also broke with Jackson. He proclaimed that Jackson's popularity gave him the opportunity to do great good for the country -- or to wreck it. Jackson appeared determined to do the latter. The injury that the president was apparently intent on inflicting on South Carolina would affect the entire country by throwing it into civil war. Thus, he voted against the Force Bill.⁷⁴ Others remained true Jacksonians. When George McDuffie of South Carolina rose to suggest changing the title of the revenue collection bill to "An Act to Subvert the Sovereignty of the States of this Union, to Establish a Consolidated Government without Limitation of Powers, and to make the Civil Subordinate to the Military Power," Jesse Speight delivered the **coup de grace** to the nullifiers by "demanding the previous question" and thus killing McDuffie's motion.⁷⁵

As it became apparent that Jackson was intent on forcing South Carolina to conform, that other southern states did not approve of its actions, and that Congress seemed willing to at least consider reducing the tariff, anxiety rose as to whether the nullifiers would grant the government a reprieve. The Register printed To the Infidel, a poetic injunction to South Carolina:

Oh! steal not thou my faith away,
 nor tempt to doubt the trusting mind;
 Let all that Earth can yield decay,

But leave this heavenly gift behind:

Our life is but a meteor gleam
 Lit up amid surrounding gloom, --
 A dying lamp, a fitful beam,
 Quenched in the cold and silent tomb.

Yet hush, thou troubled heart! be still;
 Renounce thy vain philosophy;
 Like mourning on the misty hill,
 The light of Truth will break on thee.

Go, search the prophet's deathless page;
 Go, question thou the radiant sky;
 And learn from them mistaken sage!
 The glorious words -- 'Thou shalt not die.'⁷⁶

Robert Hayne and other South Carolina nullifiers finally granted Congress the reprieve that many in North Carolina felt was necessary to alleviate the situation. The Raleigh Star expressed hope that a similar concession would come from Congress.⁷⁷ Until Clay's intervention, it looked as if there would be no compromise.

When the President lost interest in the Verplanck Bill and determined to pass the Force Bill through Congress, Clay saw an opportunity to raise his political stakes. He met with Calhoun and effected a compromise that both could accept. Clay introduced his Compromise Tariff before the Senate voted on the Force Bill. In the political wrangling that followed, an agreement was made in which southerners, including Brown and Mangum, would not vote on the Force Bill (which most were ardently against), while many northerners would not vote on the Compromise Tariff (which some strongly opposed). In this way, the Verplanck Tariff, which was much more favorable to the South but amended into unmanageable

form, was allowed to die.⁷⁸

Both the Force Bill and Compromise Tariff passed Congress, and within days were signed into law by the president. Brown did not vote on either measure, while Mangum voted only for the Compromise Tariff.⁷⁹ In the House, all congressmen from North Carolina voted for the final version of the Tariff of 1833, but the Force Bill vote was much more representative of their various sentiments. The Branch men (except Branch himself who did no vote), Abraham Rencher and Samuel Carson plus Jacksonians Thomas H. Hall, and Henry Connor all followed their states' rights leanings and voted against the Force Bill. Independents Daniel Barringer, William Shepard, Augustine Shepperd, and Lewis Williams all voted for the bill, as did Jacksonians Micajah Hawkins, Lauchlin Bethune, James McKay, and Jesse Speight. (see Figure 5)⁸⁰

The votes on these two bills were greeted in North Carolina by sighs of relief for the compromise tariff and languishing over the possibility of Jackson using the Force Bill. On March 1, 1833, the day the Force Bill and Compromise Tariff passed Congress, the Branch presses were already praising the consistency and principles of Mangum and Brown.⁸¹ The Star announced:

GLORIOUS NEWS!

Now is the Winter of our discontent
Made glorious summer.

The editors took great pleasure in proclaiming that Clay's bill "to reduce the tariff and save the Union" had passed both houses. However, the editors observed, the "Enforcing Bill" had also passed. The editors deemed it unnecessary, that "it is an act of supererogation and will stand on the pages of the statute book only as a memorial of folly and superfluous legislation."⁸² The National Republican press was not to be outdone. The Register was again poetic in spreading the news of the passage of Clay's bill:

Oh! waft the glad tidings, ye winds as ye blow,
Oh! hear it ye waves as ye roll!⁸³

With the passage of the compromise tariff and South Carolina's rescinding the Ordinance of Nullification in March 1833, the crisis that had raged for months -- years actually -- ended. Andrew Jackson stood out in his political rhetoric, his tough stand, and his ideological contribution to the concept of Union. Henry Clay cashed in on the political plaudits of seeing through another "great" compromise. South Carolina's protest brought about a favorable modification of the tariff. And North Carolinians actively participated in almost every aspect of the controversy. Most of them agreed that the important thing had occurred: the Union was peacefully preserved.

Throughout the crisis North Carolina politicians wrestled with their conflicting values of devotion to the Union and attachment to states' rights. As long as no




Figure 5. North Carolina Votes on the Force Bill of 1833.

8 Yeas
 4 Nays
 3 Not Voting

threat was made to the Union, they loudly proclaimed the doctrines of state sovereignty. When the lines were drawn, however, these same politicians performed as politicians always have -- they switched horses -- and announced eternal love for the Union. Part of this must have been due to the tremendous popularity of Andrew Jackson. Some may be credited to a sense of nationalism articulated in the Nullification Proclamation. Finally, one must consider that no man should ever be desirous of civil war. Whatever the cause, North Carolina spoke one way before the hardening of the crisis in November and December 1832, and acted another way afterward.

In the battle for political survival, those who allied too closely with the nullifiers were crippled in the elections in the fall of 1833. Samuel Carson, the only avowed North Carolinian nullifier in Congress, lost in his bid for reelection to James Graham of the National Republican faction. Carson posted the GTT sign (Gone To Texas) and a very short while later became the Secretary of State of the Republic of Texas (1836-8). John Branch did not run again, but his chosen successor was beaten badly. Branch remained in the state long enough (he later served as governor of Florida) to help create the Whig Party. For the time being, their political fortunes were destroyed by their association with Calhoun and his radical theory. Neither longstanding public servant (eighteen years between them in both houses of Congress, including Branch's stint as

Secretary of the Navy) held public office in the state again (and both were young men, in 1833 Carson was thirty-three and Branch fifty-one).⁸⁴

ENDNOTES

¹Observer (Fayetteville), 11 December 1833.

²Advocate (Halifax), 6 December 1833.

³Ibid., 13 December 1833.

⁴Spectator (New Bern), 8 December 1833.

⁵Ibid., 1 December 1833.

⁶Ibid., 8 December 1833.

⁷Ibid., 15 December 1833.

⁸Star (Raleigh), 11 January 1833.

⁹Spivey McKissick to James K. Polk, 18 January 1833, Correspondence of James K. Polk, 3 vols, ed. Herbert Weaver, (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969), 3: 565.

¹⁰William Polk to James K. Polk, 6 December 1833, ibid., 554-5.

¹¹Observer (Fayetteville), 11 December 1833.

¹²Journal (Fayetteville), 12 December 1833.

¹³Spectator (New Bern), 14 December 1833.

¹⁴See Richard Ellis, The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States' Rights and the Nullification Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), Chapter 4 "The Proclamation," 74-101; Kenneth Stamp, "The Concept of Perpetual Union," Journal of American History 65 (June 1978), 5-33.

¹⁵Spectator (New Bern), 21 December 1833.

¹⁶Ibid., 4 January 1833.

¹⁷Star (Raleigh), 11 January 1833.

¹⁸Ibid., 28 December 1833.

¹⁹John L. Bailey to Willie P. Mangum, 25 December 1832,
The Willie P. Mangum Papers 4 vols., ed. Henry T. Shanks
(Raleigh: State Department of Archives and History, 1952),
1: 590-1.

²⁰W. Mangum to Charity Mangum, 15 December 1832, ibid.,
589.

²¹Observer (Fayetteville), 24 December 1832.

²²Free Press (Tarboro), 22 January 1833.

²³Thomas H. Hall to Martin Van Buren, 2 January 1833,
"Unpublished Letters from North Carolina to Van Buren," ed.
Elizabeth McPherson, North Carolina Historical Review 15
(1938): 57.

²⁴William S. Hoffman, Andrew Jackson and North Carolina
Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1958), 60.

²⁵Journals of the Senate and House of Commons of the
State of North Carolina (Raleigh: Charles R. Ramsey, 1833),
133.

²⁶Ibid., 22 November 1832, 10.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid., 24 November 1832, 17.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Star (Raleigh), 25 January 1833.

³¹Journals of the Senate and House of Commons of the State of North Carolina, 3 December 1832, 164.

³²Ibid., 24 December 1832, 202-3.

³³Ibid., 26 December 1832, 87.

³⁴Ibid., 24 December 1832, 84.

³⁵Ibid., 29 December 1832, 98.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid., 98-104.

³⁸Ibid., 2-3 January 1833, 224-9.

³⁹Ibid., 229-30.

⁴⁰Ibid., 9 January 1833, 348-9.

⁴¹Ibid., 2-3 January 1833, 224-9.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., 4 January 1833, 230.

⁴⁴Ibid., 7 January 1833, 123-4.

⁴⁵Ibid., 10 January 1833, 250-1.

⁴⁶Spectator (New Bern), 4 January 1833.

⁴⁷Star (Raleigh), 22 February 1833.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Register (Raleigh), 11 January 1833.

⁵⁰Hall to Van Buren, 2 January 1833, "Unpublished Letters," ed. McPherson, 57.

⁵¹William H. Haywood to Van Buren, 10 January 1833, *ibid.*, 57-8.

⁵²Congressional Debates, 22nd Cong., 2nd sess. (24 December 1832), 9, pt. 1, 17.

⁵³Sentinel (New Bern), 7 January 1833.

- ⁵⁴Congressional Debates, 22nd Cong., 2nd sess. (30 January 1833), 9, pt. 2, 1476-7.
- ⁵⁵Constitutionalist (Raleigh), 5 February 1833.
- ⁵⁶Advocate (Halifax), 31 January 1833.
- ⁵⁷Star (Raleigh), 1, 15 February 1833.
- ⁵⁸Merrill D. Peterson, The Olive Branch and the Sword: The Compromise of 1833 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 66, 71.
- ⁵⁹Star (Raleigh), 22 February 1833.
- ⁶⁰Register (Raleigh), 22 February 1833.
- ⁶¹Spectator (New Bern), 22 February 1833.
- ⁶²*Ibid.*, 8 March 1833.
- ⁶³*Ibid.*, 15 March 1833.
- ⁶⁴Sentinel (New Bern), 22 February 1833.
- ⁶⁵William Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 285.
- ⁶⁶See Ellis, Union at Risk, 160-2.
- ⁶⁷Star (Raleigh), 25 January 1833.
- ⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 1 February 1833.
- ⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 25 January 1833.
- ⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 1 February 1833.
- ⁷¹Register (Raleigh), 1 February 1833.
- ⁷²Free Press (Tarboro), 1 January 1833, quoting Constitutionalist (Raleigh).
- ⁷³Congressional Debates, 22nd Cong., 2nd sess. (4 February 1833), 9, pt. 1, 333-45.

⁷⁴Ibid., (27 February 1833), 9, pt. 2, 1825-6.

⁷⁵Ibid., 1903.

⁷⁶Register (Raleigh), 1 February 1833.

⁷⁷Star (Raleigh), 8 February 1833.

⁷⁸See Ellis, Union at Risk, Chapter 8 "The Compromise," 158-177.

⁷⁹Congressional Debates, 22nd Cong., 2nd sess. (27 February 1833), 9, pt. 2, 1825-6.

⁸⁰Kermalene K. Brown, "The South's Reaction to the Tariffs and the Force Bill, 1828-1833" (Ph.D. diss., Oklahoma State University, 1971), 121.

⁸¹Star (Raleigh), 1 March 1833.

⁸²Ibid., 8 March 1833.

⁸³Register (Raleigh), 5 March 1833.

⁸⁴Concise Dictionary of American Biography (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1990), 293, 365.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION: AN APPRAISAL OF THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS IN NORTH CAROLINA

I would then address the people in their primary assemblies; and would tell them of the grievances under which they had long labored, and of their great forbearance... I would then talk to them about nullification; but it should be warlike, not peaceful; and then, and not till then, would I gird on my sword and proclaim liberty or death."

Walter F. Leake

The nullification crisis left a mixed legacy in North Carolina. On the one hand there was devotion to Andrew Jackson and the Union. On the other, was attachment to states' rights, in this case represented by John C. Calhoun. These conflicting ideals caused confusion and conflicts in the state that made it difficult for politicians to formulate policy in a state that had perhaps the most important location in the country in regard to the settlement of the crisis. If the state's politicians resisted Andrew Jackson's use of force to quell the disruption in South Carolina, civil war would likely result. Conversely, if the state's leaders did allow Jackson to march federal troops across North Carolina's borders, then South Carolina and its stand against the protective tariff

that was seen as oppressive to the entire South would be crushed.

Based upon the resolutions adopted by the state legislature, the nullification crisis showed several important priorities of North Carolina politicians. First, devotion to the Union was seemingly unanimous. This Unionist sentiment revolved around the idea that the Union, while perhaps not perpetual, was beneficial for the state at the time.

Second, attachment to the Constitution was apparently universal. This caused considerable confusion because of the states' rights view that the Constitution should be strictly interpreted. Strict interpretation was a means by which the South, as a minority in the legislative process, sought protection against such things as oppressive tariffs. Many in the new nation, and in North Carolina specifically, believed that if the majority did begin to oppress the minority, then a state had the sovereign power to withdraw from the Union if the people did not rise up to overthrow the government. Some saw this obligation as a right of violent rebellion in the fashion of the American Revolution. Jesse Speight maintained as early as May 1832 that while a state did not have the right to nullify a federal law, it always retained the right of revolution.¹ John C. Calhoun's doctrine of nullification did not fit this criteria, for it was proposed as a peaceful means of preserving the Union.² Others abhorred the thought of violence and proclaimed that

the right of secession should be granted by the other states peacefully. Nathaniel Macon, one of the patriarchs of North Carolina politics, wrote in March of 1833: "I am still for the Union, no nullifier, nor an approver of the [Nullification] Proclamation; [I] believe that a state may quit the Union when she pleases ... the right to quit, is the best and almost the only guard against oppression."³

The resolutions also condemned the tariff as being oppressive and unconstitutional. North Carolinians generally had no wish to destroy the manufacturing interests of the North, but only wanted to relieve the South of a share of the tariff burden that they thought had assumed unjust proportions. Throughout the crisis, North Carolinians were torn by conflicting views. Based upon their love of the Union, they sought compromise and a revision of protective duties. Their constitutional interpretation, however, consigned them to demanding the immediate repeal of the protective system. Henry Clay's Compromise Tariff worked, because it satisfied these demands while being acceptable to the North also.⁴

Finally, few thought that the doctrine of nullification had any constitutional basis. While both states' rights factions believed that an oppressed state could rebel, the idea of nullifying a federal law was not popular. The Branch group, the more radical of the two, followed the lead of Calhoun, although they denied that the South Carolinian promoted nullification, preferring to call it the "Virginia

Doctrine of States Rights" based upon the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. This faction held that secession was acceptable, especially if President Jackson tried to use force against South Carolina. The regular Democrats were more moderate, and denounced Calhoun's theory and nullification as one and the same (which they were). When Jackson asked for the Force Bill, however, regular Democrats asserted that secession was an acceptable means of redress. This seems to be intellectual dishonesty, because secession was a more radical action than nullification. Only with difficulty could one deny nullification and yet maintain secession theoretically.

When trying to pinpoint why North Carolinians reacted the way they did in regard to nullification one must consider the tremendous popularity of the president, Andrew Jackson. Jackson was elected in both 1828 and 1832 by landslides and was seen as the first "people's president." The seemingly people approved of Jackson's Nullification Proclamation and his advocacy of the Verplanck Bill to modify the tariff. He retained the loyalty of most of the people in the state until he advocated the Force Bill, which many saw as allowing the executive too much power and threatening states' rights doctrine. Yet, if states' rights was that important, why did the people not abandon Jackson altogether when he threatened to usurp them? One explanation could be that regular Democrats would not accept nullification because of its connection to John C. Calhoun.

Many saw Calhoun's change of heart from nationalist after the War of 1812 to states' rightist in the 1820s as political opportunism. Further, his "betrayal" of Jackson by writing the South Carolina Exposition and Protest while vice president did not sit well.⁵ Another reason why regular Democrats may have advocated secession while denying nullification was that secession was always regarded in "future" terms, whereas nullification was a present danger. As long as secession could be kept as a future option, it could be discussed in theoretically.

Finally, one must consider that while regular Democrats did not reject the idea of secession, they did not actively promote it, either. Only if Jackson used military force against South Carolina was there a chance the North Carolina would secede, and even this may well have been political rhetoric. One can say for sure only that the regular Democrats expressed attachment to the Union, but not a perpetual Union.

William Freehling hypothesizes that there were three overriding reasons why South Carolina adopted nullification, but no other state followed: a peculiar economic condition, heightened racial fears, and cooperation between piedmont and tidewater politicians. South Carolina experienced soil depletion later than did Virginia and North Carolina. By the 1820s and 1830s, these two states had adjusted to this condition. South Carolina had the misfortune of facing declining profits due to soil problems while confronting a

glut of the cotton market because of the production of virgin soil states such as Mississippi and Alabama. Declining profits caused disaffection among piedmont cotton growers.⁶

North Carolina also faced economic woes. The state had long been considered an economic backwater. In part, this was due to thin soil and the mountains in the western part of the state.⁷ Another factor, one that received a lot of attention in the state throughout the 1830s, was lack of roads and railroads. North Carolina farmers had no reason to grow surplus crops, because they could not get them to market. Coastal towns could not establish ports because of sandbars. Those that did were hampered by the Outer Banks, islands that flank almost the entire coast of the state, requiring a considerable detour to reach the open waters of the Atlantic. This problem was studied, and measures were taken to rectify it. The railroads that were built, however, were never very successful.⁸

Another factor peculiar to South Carolina was the black-to-white ratio. Blacks were almost a two-thirds majority in the state. This brought on fear of slave revolts and, more threateningly, the fear of being swamped in a sea of black if the slaves were ever freed. South Carolinians feared that if Congress could establish and enforce an "unconstitutional" law such as the protective tariff, then it could pass an emancipation law as well.⁹ Thus, any tolerance for a violation of a strict

interpretation of the Constitution led down a slippery slope to emancipation.

To the north, North Carolinians had a different situation in that only a few counties had a majority of negroes (see Figure 6). Further, North Carolina, because of its agricultural problems, was rapidly losing its slave population as they were sold, or moved with their owners, to the southwestern states.¹⁰ There exists an interesting correlation with Freehling's hypothesis: the county with the highest black to white ratio contained the Advocate, the only newspaper to adopt the doctrine of nullification (see Table I). A heavy concentration of those who voted against the resolution to condemn nullification came from these counties, also. Furthermore, the leader of the Branch faction, John Branch, resided in Edenton, Halifax County. While Branch was not a nullifier, he did support Calhoun and the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and his faction was the more radical states' rightist of the two Democratic factions in the state. Thus, Freehling's racial hypothesis seems to hold up when applied to North Carolina.

Freehling's last theory is that a unique cooperation existed between tidewater sugar cane and rice growers (who still received great profits) and upcountry cotton planters who faced economic woes due to the glut of the cotton market. Interestingly, the tidewater growers took the lead in the nullification movement. Most Unionists lived in the piedmont and western part of the state, and while the rice




Figure 6. Counties with a Black to White Ratio above 1:1.

TABLE I
COUNTIES WITH BLACK MAJORITIES

County	Ratio (B/W)
Bertie	1.37:1
Caswell	1.01:1
Chowan	1.34:1
Craven	1.03:1
Halifax	2.00:1
Hertford	1.21:1
Jones	1.54:1
Lenoir	1.06:1
New Hanover	1.09:1
Northampton	1.30:1
Warren	1.94:1

and sugar planters did not face the economic threat as the cotton growers did, the tidewater counties contained the greatest concentration of blacks in the country.¹¹ This solidarity allowed popular sectional politicians to unite behind Calhoun and his nullification stand.

North Carolina had little such cooperation. Factionalism reigned there as sectional leaders slandered each other.¹² Many in the west gave their support to the American System, realizing that without government funding for internal improvements (roads and railroads), they could never farm profitably. In the east, there were some who felt that the Bank of the United States was the key. If the Bank was maintained, North Carolina could establish banks under its protection and provide more money for the state. Others in the east realized that without government help, building railroads and dredging harbors would be out of the question.¹³ Opposing these pro-American System viewpoints was the majority of the people and politicians. They believed that the Constitution made no provision for the Bank of the United States and federally funded internal improvements. Furthermore, adding to their states' rights principles was an adoration for Andrew Jackson, who was generally against internal improvements and hated the Bank with vengeance.¹⁴ Freehling is right; North Carolina exhibited little of the sectional solidarity of her nullifying sister to the south.

Richard Ellis describes the effect of the nullification crisis on two other southern states: Georgia and Virginia. Georgia seemed similar to both of the Carolinas. Politics were confused in the absence of parties aligned with the "second party system," as in North Carolina. Georgia also professed a strong attachment to states' rights and had even gone so far as to ignore a Supreme Court order when the Court ordered the state and its people to stop persecuting the Cherokees. The state, however, did not rally to South Carolina's cause, although it contained a vocal minority of nullifiers. Again, as in North Carolina, the people seemed to feel that states' rights, in theoretical and rhetorical terms, was one thing, but taking action on these principles by nullifying a federal law by an act of the state legislature was another.¹⁵

Virginia also faced this dilemma. A state that was the home of both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, it was always looked upon as the leader of the southern states. Virginia politicians had always taken constitutional arguments seriously. Like North Carolina, Virginia was strategically located: if Jackson wished to subdue South Carolina militarily, federal troops would have to march through these two states. Thus, either, or both, by denying this transportation route, could effectively cut Jackson off from enforcing the law in South Carolina. Further, the two states did not have to adopt the doctrine of nullification to justify securing their borders. Very few people in

either state would grant the federal government the right to coerce militarily a "sovereign" state. Perhaps if any state should have gone to the rescue of South Carolina, it should have been Virginia. Although it did not have the concentration of blacks nor the acute economic problems of South Carolina, it did have some similarities. Most important was the nature of its states' rights tradition. As the home of the two founders of states' rights and the authors of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the state had a nullification background. Calhoun's doctrine was really not theoretically different from Jefferson's (the means of implementing nullification probably were -- Jefferson's views on this were incomplete). Furthermore, many in Virginia, as in North Carolina, condemned nullification while maintaining the state's right to secede. Thus, Virginia projected the same traits as North Carolina: confusion and inconclusiveness toward the doctrinal issues raised during the crisis.¹⁶

North Carolina was not different from its sister states of the South. Neither was it entirely negative toward South Carolina and nullification as some portray it based upon the resolutions adopted by the legislature.¹⁷ While the resolutions did proclaim attachment to the Union, they did not state that the Union was perpetual, for while nullification was condemned, it was not the only method by which a state could break away from the Union (indeed nullification did not even have this purpose). The right to

rebel was never doubted in any of the newspapers or by any political figure; only whether the time had come to rebel was debatable. Secession was not denounced by the legislature, and if a state maintained this right, then it tacitly denied that the Union was perpetual.

Thus, the question was not whether North Carolina truly maintained states' rights doctrines. Many in the state did, in one form or another. Nor was the question whether North Carolina would put these beliefs into effect. The question was over the proper means of implementing these doctrines. Nullification, peacefully denying federal law while a part of the Union, was not proper. In order to nullify, a state must be willing to rend the Union asunder by secession, and maintain its stand in winning a civil war.

ENDNOTES

¹Sentinel (New Bern), 9 May 1832.

²See Richard E. Ellis, The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States' Rights, and the Nullification Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), Chapters 1,2

³Nathaniel Macon to Martin Van Buren, 2 March 1833, "Unpublished Letters from North Carolina to Van Buren," ed. Elizabeth McPherson, North Carolina Historical Review 15 (1938): 57.

⁴Merrill D. Peterson, Olive Branch and Sword: The Compromise of 1833 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 66-7.

⁵See Ellis, Union at Risk, Chapter 9 "The Nullification Crisis and Jacksonian Democracy," 178-198.

⁶William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 203-4.

⁷Cornelius O. Cathey, Agricultural Developments in North Carolina, 1873-1860 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956), 194.

⁸See John F. Stover, The Railroads of the South: 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955); and George R. Taylor, The Transportation Revolution

(New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1951); and Hugh T. Lefler, North Carolina History as Told by Contemporaries (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 140-201 passim. Stover's introduction has some background information on railroads before the Civil War and Taylor gives a complete history of the development of canals, roads, and railroads. Lefler gives primary sources such as legislative reports on the need for roads, railroads, and the movement of the population due to economic forces.

⁹Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, 203-4.

¹⁰Lefler, Contemporaries, 205-6.

¹¹Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, 203-4.

¹²Hugh Lefler, North Carolina: The History of a Southern State (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973), 419.

¹³Lefler, Contemporaries, 205-6.

¹⁴See William S. Hoffman, Andrew Jackson and North Carolina Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958), Chapter 7 "North Carolina Politicians in the National Crisis of 1833," 58-68.

¹⁵See Ellis, Union at Risk, Chapter 5 "Georgia and the Nullification Crisis," 102-122.

¹⁶See *ibid.*, Chapter 6 "Virginia and the Nullification Crisis," 123-140.

¹⁷These authors are: Kermalene K. Brown, "The South's Reaction to the Tariffs and the Force Bill" (Ph.D. diss., Oklahoma State University, 1971); Herman Ames, ed., State

Documents on Federal Relations: The States and the United States (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1906);
and Hoffman, Andrew Jackson.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Newspapers

Constitutionalist, People's Advocate, and State Gazette
(Raleigh). 4 November 1831-1 May 1833.

Free Press (Tarboro). 1 July 1831-1 May 1833.

North Carolina Journal (Fayetteville). 1 July 1831-1 May
1833.

North Carolina Sentinel (New Bern). 1 July 1831-1 May 1833.

North Carolina Spectator and Western Advertiser
(Rutherfordton). 1 July 1831-1 May 1833.

Register and North Carolina Gazette (Raleigh). 1 July
1831-1 May 1833.

Roanoke Advocate (Halifax). 1 July 1831-7 February 1833.

Spectator (New Bern). 1 July 1831-1 May 1833.

Star and North Carolina Eastern Intelligencer (Elizabeth
City). 1 July 1831-1 May 1833.

Star and North Carolina State Gazette (Raleigh). 1 July
1831-1 May 1833.

Other Published Documents

Ames, Herman, ed. State Documents on Federal Relations:
The States and the United States. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania, 1906.

Bassett, John Spencer, ed. Correspondence of Andrew
Jackson. 4 vols. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Institute,
1935.

Biggs, Asa. Autobiography of Asa Biggs, Including a

Journal of a Trip from North Carolina to New York in 1832. Raleigh: Edwards, 1958.

Journals of the Senate and House of Commons of the General Assembly of the State of North Carolina at the Session of 1832-1833. Raleigh: Charles R. Ramsey, 1833.

McPherson, Elizabeth B. ed. "Unpublished Letters from North Carolina to Van Buren," in North Carolina Historical Review 15 (1938): 53-81.

Shanks, Henry T., ed. The Papers of Willie Person Mangum. 7 vols., Raleigh: State Department of Archives and History, 1952.

Weaver, Herbert. Correspondence of James K. Polk. 5 vols., Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969.

Secondary Sources

Books

Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-1989. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1989.

Boucher, Chauncey Samuel. The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916.

Boyd, William K. A Syllabus of North Carolina History, 1584-1876. Durham, NC: The Seeman Printery, 1913.

_____. History of North Carolina: The Federal Period, 1783-1860. Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1919.

Cathey, Cornelius O. Agricultural Developments in North Carolina, 1783-1860. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956.

Censur, Jane T. North Carolina Planters and their Children: 1800-1860. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984.

Concise Dictionary of American Biography. New York: Scribner's Sons, 1990.

Cooper, William. The South and the Politics of Slavery. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978.

- Crow, Jeffrey J. and Larry E. Tise, eds. Writing North Carolina History. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979.
- Cyclopedia of Eminent and Representative Men of the Carolinas of the Nineteenth Century. Madison, WI: Brant and Fuller, 1892.
- Ellis, Richard E. The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States' Rights, and the Nullification Crisis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Frehling, William W. Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836. New York: Harper and Row, 1966.
- Hoffman, William S. Andrew Jackson and North Carolina Politics. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958.
- Lefler, Hugh T. North Carolina History as Told by Contemporaries. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965.
- _____. North Carolina: The History of a Southern State. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973.
- McCormick, Richard P. The Second American Party System. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966.
- Martis, Kenneth C. The Congressional Atlas of United States Congressional Districts: 1789-1983. New York: The Free Press, 1982.
- Members of Congress Since 1879. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1985.
- Peterson, Merrill D. Olive Branch and Sword: The Compromise of 1833. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982.
- Phillips, Ulrich B. The Course of the South to Secession; An Interpretation by Ulrich Bonnell Phillips Merton Coulter, ed. New York: D. Appleton - Century Company, Inc., 1939.
- Powell, Edward P. Nullification and Secession in the United States; A History of the Six Attempts During the First Century of the Republic. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1897.
- Sellers, Charles D., ed. Andrew Jackson, Nullification, and the States Rights Tradition. Chicago: Rand McNally

and Company, 1963.

Stover, John F. The Railroads of the South: 1865-1900.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955.

Sydnor, Charles S. The Development of Southern
Sectionalism, 1819-1848. Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1948.

Taussig, Frank W. State Papers and Speeches on the Tariff.
Cambridge: Harvard University, 1893.

Taylor, George R. The Transportation Revolution. New York:
Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1951.

Warren, Charles. The Supreme Court and Sovereign States.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1924.

Articles

Calhoon, Robert M. "A Troubled Culture: North Carolina in
the New Nation, 1790-1834," Writing North Carolina
History, eds. Jeffrey J. Crow and Larry E. Tise,
76-110. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1979.

Hoffman, William. "John Branch and the Origins of the Whig
Party in North Carolina," North Carolina Historical
Review 35 (1958): 299-315.

Schauinger, Joseph H. "William Gaston: Southern
Statesman," North Carolina Historical Review 18
(1941): 99-132.

Stampp, Kenneth M. "The Concept of a Perpetual Union,"
Journal of American History 65 (June 1978), 5-33.

Wilson, Major. "Liberty and Union: An Analysis of Three
Concepts Involved in the Nullification Controversy,"
Journal of Southern History 33 (August 1962),
120-139.

Unpublished Material

Brown, Kermalene K. "The South's Reaction to the Tariffs
and the Force Bill, 1828-1833." Ph.D. dissertation,
Oklahoma State University, 1971.

APPENDIX

FINAL RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE
NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATURE

ON JANUARY 7, 1833

Resolved, That the General Assembly of the State of North Carolina doth entertain, and doth unequivocally express a warm attachment to the Constitution of the United States.

Resolved, That the General Assembly doth solemnly declare a devoted attachment to the Federal Union, believing that on its continuance depend the liberty, the peace and prosperity of these United States.

Resolved, That whereas diversity of opinion may prevail in this State as to the Constitutionality of the Acts of Congress imposing duties on imposts; yet it is believed, a large majority of the people think those acts unconstitutional; and they are all united in the sentiment that the existing Tariff is impolitic, unjust and oppressive; and they have urged, and will continue to urge its repeal.

Resolved, That the doctrine of Nullification avowed by the State of South Carolina, and lately promulgated in an Ordinance, is revolutionary in its character, subversive of

the Constitution of the United States, and leads to a dissolution of the Union.

Resolved, That our Senators in Congress be instructed and our Representatives be requested to use all constitutional means in their power, to procure an adjustment of the existing controversy between the State of South Carolina and the General Government.

VITA

Cassady B. Craft

Candidate for the Degree of

Master of Arts

Thesis: THE EFFECT OF THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS ON
NORTH CAROLINA STATES' RIGHTS SENTIMENTS

Major Field: History

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Fort Worth, Texas, November 22,
1966, the son of Robert G. and LaNese J. Craft

Education: Graduated from Jones High School,
Jones, Oklahoma, in May 1985; received Bachelor of
Arts Degree in History and Humanities from
Oklahoma City University in May 1990; completed
requirements for the Master of Arts degree at
Oklahoma State University in July 1992.

Professional Experience: Teaching Assistant,
Department of History, Oklahoma State University,
August, 1990 to May, 1992.