

**POLITICAL AMBITION THEORY: U.S. HOUSE
MEMBERS' COVERAGE IN NATIONAL
NEWSPAPERS DURING THE
100TH CONGRESS**

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
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
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
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Joseph Schlesinger, begins his groundbreaking book *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States* with the idea that political ambition is important to the study of politics because "ambition lies at the heart of politics. Politics thrive on the hope of preferment and the drive for office"(1966: 1).

Many scholars say political ambition, or the drive for higher position or office, is deeply rooted in Congress and all other areas of American government. As this is the case, we must take the concept of ambition seriously, because "by ensuring that eager rivals call each other to account, it is the primary incentive for public officials to be responsive to public demands" (Fowler and McClure 1989: xi).

Whiteman (1995:1) suggests communication is at the center of a representative democracy. "The success of Congress as a representative institution is dependent on the ability of members and staff to maintain substantial and varied channels of communication. . .". Thus, it is

important to study the nature of communication as it has an influence on public policy. It is also important to study different ambition types, since ambition can have an effect on communication (Cook 1986). Despite the voluminous research done in the area of political ambition, previous investigations have examined the opportunity structure surrounding a Congressional member's decision to run or have focused on the distinction between ambitious politicians, or higher office seekers, and their colleagues who do not exhibit this type of ambition. Also, few scholars have examined national news coverage and its connection to congress. Instead scholarly work has largely focused on how congress members cultivate local news media (see Robinson 1981; Fenno 1982; Clarke and Evans 1983; and Goldenburg and Traugott 1984). There is also little academic work on the connection between a House member's political ambition and his or her relationship with coverage in national newspapers. This study adds to the sparse research conducted on how House members' ambition influences their media coverage in national newspapers. This is important because local newspapers tend to be biased toward their individual representative (Robinson 1981). Also, as Cook (1986: 1206) states, "making news and making laws need not be incompatible at the national level, and media practices may serve not to undermine leadership within Congress but to reinforce it." This study

further tests political ambition theory and provides evidence that politicians use the mass media to further their ambition.

More specifically, this study examines how political ambition is expressed through a member's abilities to get legislation passed (legislative efficiency) and his or her concentration on legislation to a specific committee (legislative specialization) (Matthews 1960; Hibbing 1991). This study also examines how House members in the 100th Congress, exhibiting differing ambition types, have differing influences on the nation's two largest and most influential national newspapers - either directly or indirectly through legislative work.

The hypothesis of this work is that political ambition, or the House member's search for greater internal power or for higher office, affects the amount and type of coverage a member's receives in national news papers. Thus, it is expected that 1) members of Congress who seem to display progressive ambition (those members who have the ambition to seek higher office) are likely to appear more often in national newspapers than members who show no progressive ambition; and that 2) members of Congress who exhibit intrainstitutional ambition (those members who have the ambition to seek a committee chairmanship or party leadership post) are likely to appear in the national news less often than members with progressive ambition.¹ Also, it is hypothesized that; 3) coverage of members displaying intrainstitutional ambition will concentrate more on

legislation; that 4) members exhibiting intrainstitutional ambition will exhibit greater legislative specialization and legislative efficiency, as well as have less media coverage in national newspapers than members with progressive ambition.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Political Ambition Theory

Schlesinger (1966) wrote that in politics the relation between motive and action is more obvious than in most other professions. "Of all those who perform for their fellow men, the politician leaves the clearest tracks between his purpose and his behavior. Personal ambition sparks all men's efforts to do more than subsist" (p. 1). Ambition theory's central assumption is that a politician's behavior is a response to his/her office goals (Schlesinger 1966:10). "Or, to put it another way, the politician as office seeker engages in political acts and makes decisions appropriate to gaining office" (p. 6).

Ambition is defined as an "earnest desire for some type of achievement or distinction; to seek earnestly; aspire to" (*Random House Webster's College Dictionary* 1992: 48).

Political Scientists have identified a total of four career paths for members of the U.S. House of Representatives: truncated (a single term), extended service, higher office, and leadership (Barber 1965; Schlesinger 1966; Herrick and Moore 1993). These correspond, respectively, to Schlesinger's (1966: 10) three categories of ambitions, and Herrick and Moore's (1993) additional fourth: First, discrete ambition, means a politician wants an office for only a "specified term" and then "withdraws from public office." Barber called positions with this ambition type "Reluctants." Second, static ambition means the politician wants to "make a long career out of a particular office." Barber termed legislators showing this ambition type "Spectators." Finally, progressive ambition is shown by the public official who aspires to gain an office "more important than the one he now seeks or is holding." Barber (1965) called these officials "Advertisers." Herrick and Moore's (1993), additional classification is intrainstitutional ambition. Intrainstitutional ambition is shown by a politician that seeks a leadership position, such as a party leadership or chairmanship within congress.

Legislative activities of Congressional members may be a function of their ambition (Schlesinger, 1966; Cook, 1986; Hibbing; 1986). Members that seem to display progressive ambition are expected to be largely above average in legislative activity. Since these politicians tend to harbor the ambition to run for higher office, they have larger and a more

varied constituency, and therefore offer more legislation (Schlesinger 1966; Prewitt and Nowlin 1969; Van Der Slik and Pernaciaro 1969; Herrick and Moore; Moore and Herrick 1995). These members, too, become less specialized in an attempt to attract a larger-based constituency (Prewitt and Nowlin 1969; Moore and Herrick 1995). By contrast, a Congress member that harbors intrainstitutional ambition is more likely to comply to the Congressional norms. These members are expected to introduce fewer bills than their progressive counterparts and to be relatively inactive on the floor as freshmen, complying with what is called the "apprenticeship norm" (Peabody 1976; Calmes 1987). These Congress members are well respected since they assume the norm of the legislative work horse (Matthews, 1960).²

Since the 1970s, though, there has been an increase in the number of subcommittee chairmanships, which has allowed more members in the House to move quickly into positions of responsibility than ever before. This idea of increased opportunity is touched upon by a handful of scholars who consider political ambition as not the only factor in office seeking. Rhode (1979) and Schlesinger (1966) say ambition is a constant; House members enter office with progressive ambition. Rhode, however, also found that representatives have a better chance of obtaining office from lightly populated states – a function of opportunity, not necessarily ambition.

Hibbing (1993) says if the incumbent has a lot of money on hand and is from the same party, fewer competitors will run for office against the said incumbent. Hibbing concludes that those who run for higher office from the House are those that think they have a decent chance to win. "The decision to run for higher office can be seen as a function of the desirability of the higher office in question, the odds of successfully capturing the higher office, and the personal style of the representative contemplating the situation" (p. 115).

Hibbing (1993) criticizes Schlesinger's work, saying that he does not "provide a theory of ambition" (p. 130). He cites Schlesinger who wrote that "the central assumption of ambition theory is that a politician's behavior is a response to his office goals" (p. 130). Hibbing says there is a problem with equating office-seeking behavior exclusively with office goals. Because if Schlesinger's ambition theory holds, Hibbing argues, those members with progressive ambition would always run for office, but this, he says, is not the case, since many of "those running for reelection to the House would give their eye-teeth for a Senate seat but recognize they would lose" (p. 130). Accordingly, those members with discrete ambition retire voluntarily, but some "representatives who are retiring from public service have not lost all ambition but simply understand that their electoral situations have become untenable" (p. 130).

Hibbing suggests that office-seeking behavior is a better mode of study than merely ambition because it is a more realistic measure of a legislator's goals. Office-seeking behavior is still tainted, though, by many diverse opportunities facing politicians. Rhode(1979) and Schlesinger(1960) say all House members begin with progressive ambition, while Hibbing would suggest that opportunity goes hand in hand with ambition.

Legislative Specialization and Effectiveness

It is important to examine legislative specialization and effectiveness (also termed efficiency) because many scholars have made the connection between these two legislative characteristics and political ambition theory.

Hibbing (1991) says the measures of legislative specialization and legislative effectiveness have been largely ignored by all but a handful of scholars until recently. Legislative specialization is defined by Hibbing as the number of bills referred to the to most frequently involved committee by an individual Congress member – or a member's legislative focus. Hibbing also defines legislative efficiency as the representative's total bills reported out of committee and/ or passing the House. Matthews (1960) introduced the term "legislative specialization," referring to Senate

members. He asserts in his *U.S. Senators and Their World* that senators' higher political ambitions – a desire to become president or vice president – can lead to nonconformity. He says a senator does not gain a national audience by “being seen and not heard or through faithful service on the District of Columbia Committee” (p. 109). Further, a senator's legislative duties are often ignored in a quest for publicity and personal advancement. “His (Senator's) ears are likely to be attuned to noises outside the work-a-day drone of the senate chamber” (p. 109). Matthews found presidential aspirants gave more floor speeches than the average senator and pursued a wider range of legislative interests. This means a legislator that pursues higher office will not conform to norms and concomitantly not engage in legislative specialization. On the other hand, a legislator with any other ambition (it is not specified which type) will specialize or send legislation to only a few committees. He states that most senators do specialize due to the sheer amount of legislation, the many non-legislative tasks, desire to increase legislative influence, specific committee assignments, and numerous constituency interests.

When it comes to legislative effectiveness or the “ability to get one's bills passed,” Matthews (1960) says the narrower a senator's area of legislative interest and activity, the more his effectiveness. Conformity to Senate folkways does seem to “pay off in concrete legislative results” (p.115).

Hibbing (1991) renames Matthew's effectiveness variable the "efficiency variable," arguing the term effectiveness implies too simple of a variable. Moore and Thomas (1989; and also see Hibbing 1991) say in general patterns of partisanship, the efficiency scores are higher for majority-party members than minority-party members. Hibbing (1991), further, finds that although some scholars state that legislators have become "issue-hopping dilettante(s)," legislators in fact tend to become more specialized and efficient as time goes on during their respective Congressional tenures.

The reforms of the 1970s changed the House members' individual careers as they have become more able to gain greater influence in Congress.³ Many scholars found members seeking higher office were increasingly active over time in floor activity and the number of bills introduced (Schlesinger 1966; Prewitt and Nowlin 1969; Van Der Slik and Pernacciaro 1969; Moore and Herrick 1995). These members, too, become less specialized in an attempt to appeal to a wider constituency (Soule 1969; Prewitt and Nowlin 1969; Moore and Herrick 1995).

Thus, the literature seems to support that congress members tend to have greater legislative specialization and efficiency (effectiveness) with greater ambition for leadership or committee chair posts. It is important to have a knowledge of political ambition because a legislator's ambition

can effect his or her behavior, which influences his or her activities, in turn, creating differences in their national media coverage.

CHAPTER III

LITERATURE REVIEW

THE NATIONAL MEDIA AND CONGRESS

Scholars seem to agree that members do pay more attention to the mass media more than ever before, many still disagree though as to the member's mass media focus – national or local.

Cook (1986) found the institutionalization of House press secretaries attests to congressional members increased focus on the mass media. Kedrowski (1996) says House members have traditionally criticized ineffective legislators as "show horses" talented at creating sharp sound bites. Today, increasingly numbers of members enjoy and even court reporters to make statements. Kedrowski further says greater numbers of this "new breed of legislator" have turned to media cultivation, thus building national reputations without the benefit of a chairmanship or party-leadership position. In sum, Kedrowski finds that members use the mass media to influence the policy process in Washington and/or to seek

higher office, "but the public is not irrelevant." (p.5). The more salient an issue, the more the members themselves will read about the issue and the more likely they are to respond (Kingdon 1981). Cook contends that members of Congress are still highly concerned about local coverage. Hess (1986: 6) seems to agree since he found that more than 70 percent of House press secretaries, responding to his survey, said they "would rather get (coverage for my employer) in the front page of my hometown daily any day than the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post*".

It is important to look at the mass media-congress connection because political scientists have traditionally assumed House members gained an advantage in the reelection process through attention in national media (see Robinson 1981; Payne 1980). Hess (1991) contends that most press efforts made by members of Congress are designed to publicize the members' activities in their district. Hess also mentions that newspaper opinion-editorials are an important opportunity to reach the Washington community. He says most news is targeted at the legislative district's constituency. However, only a few actively pursue efforts to gain national coverage (Kedrowski 1996)

Kedrowski explains further that some legislators are more attuned in regards to the powerful effects and usefulness of mass media. These legislators are called media entrepreneurs, whose immediate goal is to influence the public debate on an issue facing the public agenda and/or

the legislative process. "It is designed to reach a small audience of public officials and attentive publics that follow an issue and its legislative progress" (p. 6). For example, Les Aspin (D-Wisconsin), who as the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, was successful in gaining media coverage (Cook 1989). Aspin said the purpose of his media efforts were to catch the eyes of the "serious followers of the subject . . . who read the *Times* and the *Post*. . . You're trying to influence the debate on the subject. You're trying to anticipate where the story is going, but you're also trying to push a story a certain way" (Evans 1981: 28-29). Squire (1988) says senators notice when issues receive an abundance of media attention. These legislators are conscious of the media attention they attain, and this in effect may influence the manner in which they execute their legislative work. Cook (1987) says congress members value the national media for two reasons: creating national constituencies for an issue, and the position given the national spokespersonship. He found these two goals only marginally significant in predicting or finding a relationship with progressive ambition.

The presentation of media has a distinct influence on policy makers. Cook et al. (1983) found that legislators who were exposed to the media about an issue were more likely to change their views about the issue compared to legislators not exposed to that same issue. The media can shape the views and the conduct of legislators and the public's views

about the government. So congressmen are sensitive to the media because it can affect their futures as legislators (Graber 1993; Katz 1993).

Graber (1993) says the media help senators because their use gives them an opportunity to voice their opinions on issues and, hence, gain public support. Support is also important from fellow legislators to pass legislation (Cook 1989). Davis (1992) states that the media can also serve as a vehicle to kill legislation. The media can strengthen members' advantages since the media promotes their behavior and interests on the issues (Graber 1993).

Legislators use the media to keep informed about the world inside and out of Washington D.C. (Matthews 1960). The most frequent Congressional coverage in Washington is that of committee action (Robinson and Appel 1979). Mackuen and Coombs (1981; Shaw and McCombs 1977) say the elite press is the most accessible to the legislator. The Congressional member's target audience is most likely small, highly educated, politically efficacious, and geographically located in the Washington D.C. area. This audience is most likely to learn about public issues through the media. This group's opinions on the daily public issues are likely shaped by editorials and the amount of coverage an issue receives.

There is a two-way causal effect between the media and Congress members. In other words, each can influence the other (Graber 1986).

Matthews says, on one hand, reporters need stories and, on the other, individual legislator needs to secure his or her reelection. So, it would follow that progressive ambition is partly manifested and fostered in an increased desire for media coverage.

Leadership in the House and the national press

Hibbing (1991) says formal positions, "whether they are party positions or committee positions, go a long way toward defining the career of a representative" (p. 62). Much of the discussion on congressional leadership has centered on area of gaining formal positions. Bullock and Loomis (1985) say in earlier Congresses, progression to quality formal positions was relatively slow but that in more recent Congresses advancement has come more quickly. Hibbing (1991) suggests this may be because of the larger number of formal positions after 1969 than before this period of time.

What is important, here, is the fact that some positions in the House are apt to gain more media attention than others. Peabody (1976) says the typical House member "is seldom asked to appear on the weekly televised talk shows, 'Meet the Press,' 'Face the Nation,' and similar network presentations. Such invitations usually are reserved for House leaders" (p. 44). Thus, many members do not gain much mass media

attention at all. Cook (1986: 207) supports Peabody as he states: "In short, if there is a built-in bias in news coverage of Congress, it need not be toward "mediagenic" show horses but toward members in official roles within the congressional hierarchy—for example, party leaders or committee chairs."

Some members, who are called work horses (also intrainstitutional) obtain media attention through their bully pulpit and credibility to comment on issues. Cook (1989; Hess 1986) say party leaders as well as committee chairmen have this ability. Miller (1978) says committee chairs often dramatize their meetings to gain media coverage marketability.

Scholars have traditionally termed "work horses" those members that tend to legislation (Matthew 1960; Mayhew 1974; Payne 1980; Cook 1986; Langbein and Sigleman 1989; Kedrowski 1996). These work horses are essentially the same as members that exhibit intrainstitutional ambition (Herrick and Moore 1993). Members that exhibit Intrainstitutional ambition tend to introduce more legislation; they are more active on the floor, and are more specialized.

Peabody (1976) finds that the Speaker and the minority leader serve as their respective Congressional parties' principal legislative strategists and prime external spokesmen.

Peabody, though, sees that the media have little impact on Congress. He says newspaper columns and editorials, magazine articles, and television commentaries are "rather fleeting and fragmentary in their impact" (p. 495). He says, further, Congress members are bombarded with the media and largely ignore it on the eve of a vote. Thus, he says, the media only leads to "reinforcement of existing preferences," rather than altered preferences.

Yet scholars like Davis (1992) say the media are a powerful influence. He states that it is a possible strategy to build coalitions between legislators through media use. These legislators will use sources such as the *Washington Post*, in hopes to "move colleagues to action" (p. 169). Kedrowski (1996) would agree with Davis as she says that leaders do calculatingly use the media to their advantage. For example, House Speaker Rep. Newt Gingrich (R- Georgia) has gained a great deal of media attention since his rise to a leadership position. Kedrowski classifies the elite press as: the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal*, and the

Washington Post. A Congress member who gains coverage in this elite press, he or she gains some prestige in Washington circles, she says.

It is important to note in this chapter that it is important to understand that the member's focus on national media attention is different than if they focused on the local media. It is important also to note that members with leadership positions within the House have different media coverage implications than those members without a leadership position.

CHAPTER IV

LITERATURE REVIEW

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE NATIONAL MEDIA AND POLITICAL AMBITION THEORY

Schlesinger (1966) offers a connection between the media and political ambition as he says: "With respect to elective offices, our ambitious politician must act today in terms of the electorate of the office which he hopes to win tomorrow" (1966:10). Matthews made this connection a few years earlier, in his examination of the mass media's ability to reach voters, but his duty was completed without the benefit of ambition theory. Matthews (1960: 94) says there are two types of Congress members: the "show horses," and "work horses." He says: "If you want to get your name in the papers, be a show horse. If you want to gain the respect of your colleagues, keep quiet and be a work horse" (p.94). Work horses work behind the scenes to get their legislative jobs done, while show horses try at every opportunity to become recognized (Langbein and Sigelman 1989; Payne 1980). Ornstein et al. (1985: 31) say

that senators who seek higher office attract national media attention, and that they (the senators) "tailor their behavior accordingly, . . . emphasizing media coverage over legislative craftsmanship." Mayhew (1974: 147) wrote: "The hero of the Hill is not the hero of the airwaves. The member who earns prestige among his peers is the lonely gnome who passes up news conferences. . . in order to devote his time to legislative 'homework.'" However, some political scientists say Gresham's law of legislative behavior, which says television has driven out the work horses in favor of more telegenic show horses (Easterbrook 1984), might ring true. Wolfstein (1985) however, contends show horses dominated long before television as these legislators neglected all but a few legislative causes to showcase themselves. Other political scientists say the media, instead, focus on work horses since they produce the most legislation. Hess (1986: 6) says, "Those who do the work get most of the publicity."

Veblen (1981) says politicians that gain the most media attention are liberal Democrats and the House Leadership. Other scholars agree with Veblen but add that such politicians are the most ambitious and anxious to influence the policy process (Hinkley 1988; Ehrenhalt 1991).

Members that exhibit progressive ambition seem to fit the show horse mentality as these legislators that are more inclined to be active on the floor. There, they can establish a record of concern and gain the media attention they need (Schlesinger 1966; Prewitt and Nowling 1969;

Thus, the literature review supports the thesis' four hypotheses, suggesting the following: 1) members who exhibit progressive ambition, or are higher-office seekers, should receive more coverage in national newspapers than those members without this type of ambition; 2) those who exhibit intrainstituional ambition (seeking a chairmanship or other leadership in the House), will gain less coverage than members who exhibit progressive ambition; and that members who are legislatively specialized and efficient, will gain more national coverage than members who are not. Further, 3)members who exhibit intrainstitutional ambition will concentrate on legislation. Also, 4)members who exhibit intrainstitutional ambition should exhibit greater legislative specialization and legislative efficiency than progressive members.

CHAPTER V

DATA AND METHODS

This thesis examines the relationships between progressive and intrainstitutional ambition and the number of times Congressional members were mentioned in both the *New York Times* and *The Washington Post*.⁴ This study measures the representatives that served in the 100th Congress. This Congress was chosen because this study can attempt to measure a member's ambition over the subsequent eight years. This study uses linear regression to examine the independent variables of progressive and intrainstitutional ambition.⁵ There are six variables to measure the dependent variables for media coverage. First, newspaper coverage, the dependent variable, is measured by the number of times a member was mentioned in both the newspapers' indexes between January 1987 to December 1989. Second, this study also counts the number of times an article is based on legislation. These simple criteria determined by basic news content will, hypothetically, measure a House member's influence on the mass media through

legislative work, instead of relying primarily on the other types of stories that a member might not have as much control over because of outside influences. The third through sixth variables examine placement. Each news article is coded as to whether it was on the front-page, in the first section,⁶ letter to the editor or column, or articles placed in other parts of the news paper. The total tabulated number of news stories is also recorded.⁷ Letters to the editor are accounted for since Hess (1991) suggests that members found them important. The *Washington Post* is considered an important tool in research (Robinson and Clancy 1983) as is the *Congressional Quarterly* (Hess 1986:111). The *New York Times* also seems to be an important variable to consider. Counting the number of articles pertaining to legislation is unique in scholarly literature, but it seems important since many articles are based on other factors, such as regional differences, popularity, scandal, election coverage, and others. This researcher's focus is limited exclusively to national newspapers. Further research could enhance this current study with an in-depth examination of local newspapers nationwide.

The effects of other characteristics are controlled to insure that the variables are well specified -- committee prestige, the liberal and conservative interest-group ratings, race, gender, and time in office are only utilized from the 100th Congress data. These control variables are used because they may actually influence the mass media as much or

even more than the independent variables under measurement in this study.⁸ Control variables will lead some credibility to the results by possibly eliminating or pinpointing other influences on the mass media other than a House member's political ambition.

Committee prestige is considered since some committees – for instance, the Ways and Means, Rules, Budget, and Appropriations – may gain more national exposure (Squire 1988). These committee assignments are coded 2, while Energy and Commerce are coded 1, and all others 0. This will help discern which members are on prestige committees or not. It might be expected that members on prestige committees will receive greater news coverage. Other controls are the ADA's score, which evaluates a member's liberal votes, while the ACU's score assesses a member's conservative votes (Ehrenhalt 1987). Only the ADA's score is used since the ACU's score is analogous to the ADA's. Both measures, taken together, give a good control measure of political ideology. Veblen (1981) found liberals in the House and Senate gained more national press coverage. Also, Hibbing (1991) says party leadership is most likely to come from ideological moderates. Hess (1986) suggests that party is important to consider since the majority party may have greater news coverage. Members of the 100th Congress had a Democratic majority, so Democrats are coded 1 and Republicans 0. Herrick and Moore (1993) say the two are differentiated since the Republicans may harbor higher office goals.

Race and gender are coded 1 when the members' status is female or minority, while all others are coded 0. Since there are fewer minority and women members in the House, these legislators might net greater coverage than their white-male counterparts. These measures are used since a majority of House members are white males. Theoretically, it might take more political ambition for a minority member or female to become a party leader committee chair in the House than it would for a white male. Time in office is measured since Hibbing (1991) found seniority is related to aspects of legislative behavior. Also, coverage of a minority, especially a minority female may fall under the news value of uniqueness or novelty, thus, more news worthiness.

A dummy variable is used for members from New York, who tend to gain more news coverage in the *New York Times* because of proximity. Members from New York are coded 1, while members not from that state are coded 0. A dummy variable is also used for members from either Virginia or Maryland because it is expected the *Washington Post* will also embrace the news value of proximity.

This thesis, additionally, considers the scholarship of Hibbing's (1991) article, which examines five measures of legislative activity; this thesis examines three of the five measures, which may be precursors to media coverage. These measures of legislative activity are important because they may be precursors to media coverage, thus, an increase in any one

type of legislative activity may mean greater media attention. The first is the number of legislative bills a member sponsors. The *Congressional Index* allows for the separation of the primary sponsor from the mass of cosponsors that often sign themselves up on a bill in today's Congress.⁹ The next two measures "attempt to tap more than raw activity levels" (Hibbing 1991: 416). The second measure is called legislative specialization, which is a dependent variable, computed through dividing bills referred to the most frequently involved committee by the total number of the representative's bills. The third measure is efficiency and is also a dependent variable. This measure considers the percentage of the representative's total bills reported out of committee and/or passing the House during the 100th Congress. Cosponsored bills, private bills and resolutions are ignored. Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin (1990) say the fact that more senior members are more active than junior members in offering bills seems to tolerate standardization for the large fluctuations in bill introduction. At the same time, Rohde (1988) and Schaefer (1988) say this relationship has changed because of the deterioration of the apprenticeship norm.

The independent variables are divided between the intrainstitutional and the progressive ambition types. Members who exhibit party leadership have attained a leadership position as either a speaker, majority leader, majority whip, deputy whip, caucus chair, or a

member of the steering and policy committee (Hibbing 1991). These positions are coded 1 if the member had attained a party leadership position in the 100th Congress 0, if not. Another variable measures leadership positions in the 101st through 105th Congress', members with a leadership position are coded 1, others are coded 0. Scholars such as Rhode (1978) contend that Congress members exhibit political ambition from the time they enter office, so it is important to identify these members that actually obtain leadership positions later in their careers and examine the news coverage they gained prior, in this case, in the 100th Congress. This thesis divides the independent variable of the political ambition variable further. House members that exhibit intrainstitutional ambition are divided between party leaders and committee chairs (Van Der Slik and Pernacciaro 1979). These authors found a difference in the two types of internal, office-seeking positions; they say the chairmanship "constitutes a distinct opportunity structure separate from and often rival to the party floor leadership" (p. 222). Therefore, it is important to keep the two intrainstitutional leadership types separate. Members who attained a committee chairmanship or a committee minority leadership in either the 100th Congress to today were coded 1, while those members that did not attain either of these positions were coded 0.

Schlesinger's (1966) progressive ambition is utilized in this thesis to measure those members who sought either a governorship or senatorship

in the 100th Congress to the present. Members who sought either a governorship or senatorship were coded 1, while those members that did not seek either office were coded 0. Progressive ambition is an independent variable. This measure might have a weaker significance since Rhode (1988); Ornstein, Peabody, and Rohde (1989); and Hibbing (1991) would say the apprenticeship norm no longer exists. Thus, these scholars contend that seniority in recent congresses is not as important today as it was in previous congresses.

It was necessary to separate the two intrainstitutional ambition variables – party leadership and committee chairmanship – between those that held positions in the 100th Congress from those members that held office in the 101st to the 105th Congress. Some members held positions in both the 100th Congress and those Congresses thereafter. It is important to determine if a member's ambition during the 100th Congress, has a relationship with media coverage separate from his or her position holding or perceived ambition during the future Congresses.

This analysis only includes 340 of the 435 House members because of exclusions. This thesis controls for what Hess (1986: 86) calls "originals," by excluding them from the analysis. Originals are basically politicians that, regardless of personality type, tend to seek or are sought out for more than average news coverage. Members that had excessive media coverage about activities outside what is expected for a Congress

member. For example, Fred Grandy, the representative from, who starred as "Gopher" on "The Love Boat," gained media coverage exclusively about his acting career. Other exclusions are freshmen, non-voting members, those who died before the end of the 100th Congress, and outliers.¹⁰ Forty-nine freshmen in the 100th Congress lack information in the categories of legislation, articles, and ideological score, thus, these members would not benefit this analysis. The five non-voting members called the "shadow" members are excluded because they are not exactly members of the House.¹¹ The remaining members gained too much coverage. Some ran for president in 1988, while others were involved in various scandals. For example, former House Speaker Jim Wright received royalty payments of more than 50 percent from his book, *Reflections of A Public Man*, which was a rate far higher than usual (*New York Times Index* 1988). Wright received more than 30 articles on this scandal alone. Another example is the publicity arising from allegations that Georgia Representative Patrick Swindall negotiated for nearly \$1 million in laundered money (*New York Times Index* 1988).

CHAPTER VI

FINDINGS

NONMEDIA

The findings for legislative activity were lacking and contradict this thesis' third and fourth hypotheses. These findings are important to determine what effects legislative activity have on a member's national news coverage during while in Congress.

Neither Table I nor Table II supports this thesis' hypothesis that members who exhibit political ambition, either progressively or intrainstitutionally, are more legislatively specialized or efficient. The dependent variable of legislative effectiveness (efficiency) reveals significance only with prestige committee membership in the 100th Congress and the total number of bills introduced. Meanwhile, the dependent variable of legislative specialization only seems to significantly affect the total number of bills introduced.

The same significant relationships are found when both leadership variables – committee chairmanship and party leadership – are separated between members' positions held in the 100th Congress and those who held memberships in Congress between and including the 101st and the 105th.

The findings for both legislative specialization and efficiency seem to contradict this thesis' third and fourth hypotheses. It was expected that members displaying intrainstitutional ambition would also exhibit greater legislative specialization and efficiency and also gain more media coverage. The findings did not find a significant relationship between legislation and political ambition.

CHAPTER VII

FINDINGS

MEDIA COVERAGE

The findings are nearly opposite the first two hypotheses presented in the thesis. This thesis suggests that progressive members do not gain as much coverage as members with intrainstitutional ambition. It is important to discover if a member's ambition will effect his or her media coverage. This thesis suggests this is only true for party leaders during the 100th Congress.

Table III, which describes political ambition's effect on total news coverage, reveals some significant relationships. The most important is that House members, who were party leaders anytime between the 100th and 105th Congresses, have a significant relationship with the dependent variable of total news coverage, or the number of times they were mentioned in either the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post* during the 100th Congress. Other independent variables with significant relationships

when examining total new coverage were: proximity (if a member's residence was in either New York, Virginia, or Maryland), party (coded 1 for Democrat and 0 for Republican), race (coded 1 for white and 0 for minorities), and the number of terms served by the 100th Congress.

Table IV takes out the leadership variable to examine if there was a correlation between the independent variables of party leadership and committee chairmanship. Table IV reveals that the committee chair variable still does not reach significance with the party leadership variable taken out.

Table V examines political ambition's affect on page-one stories. This table reveals a highly significant relationship between page-one stories and the independent variable of party leadership. Other significant relationships between the table's independent variables and the dependent variable of page-one stories include: if whether a member was a majority leader in the 100th Congress, his or her party, membership in a prestige committee, and the number of terms a member was in congress.

Table VI examines political ambition's effect on first-section stories. This table also finds a highly significant relationship between House members who served as party leaders and the dependent variable of first-section stories. Other significant relationships are those of proximity, party, race, and number of terms served.

The dependent variable for articles that mention legislation, in Table VII, only reveal a significant relationship with prestige in the 100th Congress, race, and the number of terms a representative is in office.¹²

Table X once again examines total news coverage as the dependent variable. The difference between this table and table III is that each independent variable for leadership – committee chairmanship and party leadership – are separated into two different variables. One variable denotes members holding positions in the 100th Congress and the other applies to those who held positions in those Congresses between the 100th and the 105th.¹³ This examination of member's leadership separated between the 100th Congress and future congresses is also true for table XI through table XV. This procedure examines whether current position-holding or future position-holding reveals a significant relationship with the total number of times a member was mentioned in national newspapers. A significant relationship is revealed with the independent variables of committee chairmanship and party leader. Other variables that reached significance are: membership in prestige committees for the 100th Congress, party, race, and the proximity variables.

Table XI examines if there is a correlation between the findings for political ambition in the 100th Congress and total news coverage when the latter congresses are taken out.

Table XII examines total news coverage when the independent variables for intrainstitutional ambition for the 100th Congress are taken out, significant relationships are not evidenced in the independent variables for intranstitutional ambition in those congresses after the 100th.

Table XIII reveals that the dependent variable for page one news is significant with party leadership in the 100th Congress and the number of terms a member has been in office.

Table XIV exhibits a significant relationship between the dependent variable of news coverage in parts of the paper other than in the first section. This dependent variable has a significant relationship with members who are chairs in the 100th Congress, proximity and race -- while only nearing significance with the party variable. News coverage in this variable is negatively related to prestige committee membership.

Table XV reveals the dependent variable for news coverage in the first section is significant with committee chairmanships and party leadership in the 100th Congress, race, and the proximity variable.

In sum, five of the six dependent variables examined for media in this thesis -- total news coverage, page-one stories, first-section stories, sections other than the first, legislative stories, and legislatively-based stories -- reveal significant results in each of the analyses examined. Only the independent variable for editorials and columns did not reveal significant results. Linear regression is used to examine if any of the

dependent variables for media coverage are significantly related to political ambition or any of the control variables.

These findings seem contrary to the first hypothesis that House members revealing progressive ambition will gain more coverage than all other ambition types. Furthermore, these findings do not support the second hypothesis that House members who exhibit intrainstitutional ambition will likely appear in national newspapers less than members who exhibit progressive ambition. However, House members with intrainstitutional ambition (more specifically, a party leadership during the 100th Congress) have more coverage than progressive ambition types.¹⁴

CHAPTER VIII

DISCUSSION

At first blush, this thesis' findings seem to support Schlesinger's (1966: 10) words: "With respect to elective offices, our ambitious politician must act today in terms of the electorate of the office which he hopes to win tomorrow" (p. 10). A significant relationship between members who gained party leadership positions and total news coverage is found on first inspection of the results of this thesis and seems to confirm Schlesinger's connection between congressional members' current mass media coverage and political ambition in future Congresses.

Conversely, this thesis also suggests Schlesinger's connection may *not* hold true. The variables for committee chairs and party leadership between members who gained leadership and committee chair positions in the 100th Congress were separated from their counterparts in the 101st through the 105th Congresses. This procedure was performed to discover whether members displaying current ambition

(ambition in the 100th Congress) and ambition in future Congresses (101st through the 105th) have differing influences on the dependent variables.

The findings suggest that intrainstitutional ambition (more specifically party leadership) in the 100th Congress does significantly relate to greater coverage in national newspapers in that same Congress. On the other hand, this thesis finds the relationship between national coverage in the 100th Congress and the variable for party leadership exhibited in future Congresses is not significant. The other intrainstitutional variable (committee chairmanship) does not reveal significant results at all. This might seem to make sense considering that members do choose to climb the party leadership ladder but are appointed to a chairmanship. This finding seems to support Van Der Slik and Pernacciaro's (1979) rationale, which suggests the two intrainstitutional variables -- House party leadership positions and committee chairmanship positions -- have different opportunity structures. Thus, these relationships might result from the fact that it takes ambition to gain a leadership post, but it only takes seniority to gain a committee chairmanship.

This thesis also suggests that House members exhibiting intrainstitutional ambition receive greater national newspaper coverage than their fellow progressive lawmakers, regardless of their legislative activity. This might be explained by Kedrowski's (1996) findings. She says members that want to influence their fellow legislators use the national

media, whereas members seeking state-wide office seek the local media. This is probably why members who sought national office did not net more coverage than party leaders. Progressive members sought more local coverage.

This is contrary to much of the literature contending that the workhorses or progressively ambitious members gain more mass media attention than members exhibiting other sorts of ambitions (see Matthews 1960; Mayhew 1974; Easterbrook 1984). Instead, these findings might reinforce what some scholars say: the advent of TV news and floor coverage has blurred the old distinction between workhorses (progressive ambition) and show horses (intrainstitutional ambition) and the old divisions are no longer true (Cook 1986; Langbien and Sigelman 1989). Also, these findings allude to Hess' (1986: 6) statement that: "Those who do the work get most of the publicity."

Although this study's results seems to support Hess' assumption that workhorses get the most publicity through their introduction and passing of legislation, this might not hold true. Instead, it might be that these members are trying, as Kedrowski (1996) suggests, to actively court media attention to influence policy. Therefore, it might be true that it is more important for House members to *try to* pass legislation than to actually pass it. Plus, as Cook (1989; Hess 1986) say, it helps that committee

members and party leaders have a bully pulpit and a level of credibility to comment on issues in the search for mass media attention.

This thesis' findings support Kedrowski's idea that House members work hard to gain mass media coverage. Also, these findings might suggest that it does not matter what a House member's legislative activity consists of if he or she does not gain coverage. This might be why this study found that the dependent variables of legislative efficiency and specialization did not have significant results.

These findings also contradict Hess' (1986) assumption that it is those members who do the most work indeed receive the greatest publicity. Conversely, it seems it's the legislator's greater agenda-setting abilities in pursuit of influencing policy and their credible position that gets the greatest national newspaper attention.

Hibbing (1993) would say that if political ambition theory holds true, members with progressive ambition will run for office, but that this is not always the case, as many members in the House would "give their eye-teeth for a Senate seat," but realize that they would not win (p. 130). This thesis seems to suggest Hibbing's theory regarding opportunity might hold true, too, with members who seem to exhibit intrainstitutional ambition. Meanwhile, those members who seem to exhibit discrete ambition, by Schlesinger's definition, are retiring, not out of lacking political ambition for

higher office, but because they have simply come to the realization that they cannot reach that office.

Also, this thesis supports Cook's (1986) findings that suggest leadership and seniority impacted visibility in the *New York Times* because individuals with such characteristics have the credibility and the bully pulpit to get their message across to the national press.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Political ambition theory seems to lack an ingredient in examining the legislative behavior of Congress members and their connection with national newspapers – opportunity. A House member can exhibit a strong sense of ambition, but if he or she does not have the opportunity to ascend to the next level, the member's ambition type might in the end amount to little and become an irrelevant factor.

Additionally, choice might have some bearing in measuring ambition. The structure of Congress might create barriers for some members to gain a party leadership position, which could cause a member to try to position himself or herself to gain national coverage. However, some legislators are appointed as a committee chairs without being given a choice. The former legislators must try to seek media coverage since they choose to seek the position, whereas the latter do not need to seek media attention since there is no choice involved. This

might help explain why party leaders gain more national newspaper attention than committee chairs.

It also seems that work horses, or members with the Intrainstitutional ambition (as a party leader) who climb the internal ladder of the chamber, tend to gain more media coverage if they, themselves, currently have some kind of leadership position, this is supported by Cook (1986). A member with a position of credibility seems to gain more mass media attention than someone with political ambition and no position. This might seem obvious because journalists with less time these days have to seek credible sources quickly without seeking alternative lawmakers. What's less obvious is that political ambition theory lacks the aspect of opportunity, not only in gaining positions but media exposure.

Political ambition theorists must incorporate a methodology that includes all the mass media outlets: television, broadcast, and advertising. Plus, it is important to examine local as well as national coverage simultaneously because progressive members are more apt to seek local coverage for a state-wide election. It seems scholars must combine political ambition theory and opportunity to gain greater insight into legislative behavior.

Therefore, this study suggests that Schlesinger's often quoted conjecture that an "ambitious politician must act today in terms of electorate of the office which he hopes to win tomorrow" is no longer the

case at least when it comes to national newspapers. National newspaper coverage is not an indicator of future position holding or ambition. Finally, in today's world of immediacy, position- and office-seekers must act today to gain national newspaper coverage today.

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TABLE I

Political Ambition's Effect on Legislative Effectiveness

Independent variables	Legislative effectiveness (efficiency)
ADA scores	1.488E-03 (.002)
Gender	-.339 (.433)
Proximity (Ny., Va., Md.)	.216 (.490)
Party	-.287 (.273)
Prestige committee 100 th	2.227* (.985)
Prestige committee 101 st +	.433 (.675)
Race	-.114 (.451)
Term number	3.267E-03 (.037)
Total legislation	5.097E-03* (.002)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	-.123 (.363)
Party leader 100 th to the 105 th	
Intrainstitutional Ambition	-.312 (.385)
Chairs 100 th to the 105 th	
Progressive ambition	1.2022E-02 (.351)

* = significant at .05; * = significant at .01

Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors.
R2 = .973; N = 311

TABLE II

Political Ambition's Effect on Legislative Specialization

Independent variables	Legislative Specialization
ADA scores	-2.423E-03 (.009)
Gender	-.161 (1.897)
Proximity (Ny., Va., Md.)	2.833 (2.141)
Party	.451 (1.198)
Prestige committee 100 th	2.718 (4.312)
Prestige committee 101+	-1.132 (2.957)
Race	-1.606 (1.973)
Term number	-.182 (.161)
Total legislation	.110* (.007)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	-1.600 (1.586)
Party leader 100 th	
Intrainstitutional Ambition	-1.157 (1.685)
Chair 100 th	
Progressive ambition	-1.526 (1.973)

*= significant at .05; * = significant at .01

Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors.

R² = .492; N = 311

TABLE III

Political Ambition's Effect on Total News Coverage

Independent variables	Total news stories
ADA scores	4.968E-03 (.004)
Gender	-.206 (.938)
Proximity (Ny., Va., Md.)	7.158** (1.061)
Party	1.410* (.593)
Prestige committee 100 th	-1.968 (2.151)
Prestige committee 101 st +	.701 (1.462)
Race	2.457* (.976)
Term number	.193* (.080)
Total legislation	-3.137E-03 (.005)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	2.018*
Party leader 100 th to the 105 th	(.785)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	.877
Chair 100 th to the 105 th	(.834)
Progressive ambition	1.157 (.760)

* = significant at .05; * = significant at .01

Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors; and in the brackets are the standardized regression coefficients. R2 = .225; N = 311

TABLE IV

Political Ambition's Effect on Total News Coverage
Without the Party Leadership Variable

Independent variables	Total news stories
ADA scores	4.566E-03 (.004)
Gender	-.583 (.936)
Proximity (Ny., Va., Md.)	7.029** (1.070)
Party	1.380* (.599)
Prestige committee 100 th	-1.362 (2.158)
Prestige committee 101 st +	.600 (1.476)
Race	2.458* (.985)
Term number	.174* (.080)
Total legislation	-7.915E-03 (.005)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	.845
Chair 100 th to the 105 th	(.842)
Progressive ambition	1.120 (.768)

* = significant at .05; * = significant at .01

Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors; and in the brackets are the standardized regression coefficients. R2 = .208; N = 311

TABLE V

Political Ambition's Effect on Page-One Stories

Independent variables	Page-one stories
ADA scores	3.830E-05 (.000)
Gender	-2.248E-03 (.055)
Proximity (Ny., Va., Md.)	1.984E-03 (.062)
Party	1.898E-02 (.035)
Prestige committee 100 th	.329** (.126)
Prestige committee 101+	-.236** (.085)
Race	-1.446E-02 (.005)
Term number	1.333E-03* (.005)
Total legislation	-7.785E-04 (.000)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	.126**
Party leader 100 th to the 105th	(.046)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	3.806E-06
Chair 100 th to the 105th	(.049)
Progressive ambition	4.117E-02 (.044)

* = significant at .05; * = significant at .01

Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors.

R² = .095; N = 311

TABLE VI

Political Ambition's Effect on First-Section Stories

Independent variables	First section stories
ADA scores	2.281E-03 (.003)
Gender	-.151 (.594)
Proximity (Ny., Va., Md.)	3.780** (.672)
Party	.933* (.376)
Prestige committee 100 th	.609 (1.361)
Prestige committee 101st+	.220 (.925)
Race	1.368* (.618)
Term number	.130* (.051)
Total legislation	-2.194E-03 (.003)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	1.752** (.497)
Party leader 100 th	
Intrainstitutional Ambition	.582 (.528)
Chair 100 th	
Progressive ambition	.505 (.486)

* = significant at .05; * = significant at .01

Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors.

R2 = .209; N = 311.

TABLE VII

Political Ambition's Effect on Legislatively-Oriented Stories

Independent variables	Legislatively-oriented stories
ADA scores	2.147E-03 (.002)
Gender	.319 (.329)
Proximity (Ny., Va., Md.)	2.008** (.371)
Party	.463* (.207)
Prestige committee 100 th	-1.640 (.824)
Prestige committee 101 st +	.781 (.516)
Race	.920** (.340)
Term number	5.787E-02* (.028)
Total legislation	-8.541E-05 (.002)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	.416
Party leader 100 th	(.358)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	.215
Party leader 101 st +	(.355)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	.932
Chair 100 th	(.512)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	-.569
Chair 101 st +	(.334)
Progressive ambition	3.494E-02 (.266)

* = significant at .05; * = significant at .01

Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors.

R² = .207; N = 311.

TABLE VIII

Political Ambition's Effect on Legislative Effectiveness With
the Party Leadership and Committee Chair Variables in the 100th
Congress are Separated from Future Congresses

Independent variables	Legislative effectiveness (efficiency)
ADA scores	1.297E-03 (.002)
Gender	-.367 (.439)
Proximity (Ny., Va., Md.)	.275 (.495)
Party	-.270 (.276)
Prestige committee 100 th	2.500* (1.092)
Prestige committee 101+	.374 (.689)
Race	-.154 (.454)
Term number	5.655E-03 (.038)
Total legislation	4.968E-03 (.002)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	-.134 (.479)
Party leader 100 th Intrainstitutional Ambition	-8.195E-02 (.475)
Party leader 101st+ Intrainstitutional Ambition	-.518 (.683)
Chair 100 th Intrainstitutional Ambition	-8.015E-02 (.446)
Chair 101 st + Progressive ambition	7.171E-02 (.356)

* = significant at .05; * = significant at .01

Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors. R2 = .973; N = 311.

TABLE IX

Political Ambition's Effect on Legislative Specialization With the Party
Leadership and Committee Chairs Variables of the 100th Congress
Separated from the Future Congresses

Independent variables	Legislative specialization
ADA scores	-2.262E-03 (.009)
Gender	-.300 (1.956)
Proximity (Ny., Va., Md.)	2.880 (2.164)
Party	.569 (1.212)
Prestige committee 100 th	3.079 (4.785)
Prestige committee 101+	-1.086 (3.020)
Race	-1.734 (1.988)
Term number	-.174 (.166)
Total legislation	.110* (.007)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	-.394 (2.100)
Party leader 100 th Intrainstitutional Ambition	-1.863 (2.080)
Party leader 101 st + Intrainstitutional Ambition	-1.338 (2.996)
Chair 100 th Intrainstitutional Ambition	-.756 (1.956)
Chair 101 st + Progressive ambition	-1.636 (1.558)

* = significant at .05; * = significant at .01

Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors.

R² = .492; N = 311

TABLE X

Political Ambition's Effect on Total News Coverage With the Party
Leadership and Committee Chair Variables Separated

Independent variables	Total news stories
ADA scores	5.563E-03 (.004)
Gender	7.298E-02 (.931)
Proximity (Ny., Va., Md.)	6.863 (1.049)
Party	1.262** (.587)
Prestige committee 100 th	-5.087** (2.335)
Prestige committee 101 st +	1.357 (1.461)
Race	2.657** (.962)
Term number	.141 (.080)
Total legislation	-1.350E-03 (.005)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	3.091** (1.015)
Party leader 100 th	
Intrainstitutional Ambition	.234 (1.007)
Party leader 101 st +	
Intrainstitutional Ambition	4.422** (1.450)
Chair 100 th	
Intrainstitutional Ambition	-.887 (.946)
Chair 101 st +	
Progressive ambition	1.045 (.754)

* = significant at .05; * = significant at .01

Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors; and in the brackets are the standardized regression coefficients. R2 = .257 ; N = 311.

TABLE XI

Political Ambition's Effect on Total News Coverage
Without Committee Chair and Leadership Variables from the 101st
Congress to the 105th

Independent variables	Total news stories
ADA scores	5.561E-03 (.004)
Gender	1.357E-02 (.920)
Proximity (Ny., Va., Md.)	6.863** (1.047)
Party	1.305** (.584)
Prestige committee 100 th	-4.573** (2.268)
Prestige committee 101st+	1.108 (1.428)
Race	2.554** (.954)
Term number	.131 (.079)
Total legislation	-1.340E-03 (.005)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	3.255**
Party leader 100 th	(.952)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	3.798**
Chair 100 th	(1.288)
Progressive ambition	1.056 (.746)

* = significant at .05; * = significant at .01

Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors; and in the brackets are the standardized regression coefficients. R2 = .257; N = 311

TABLE XII

Political Ambition's Effect on Total News Coverage
Without Committee Chair and Leadership Variables
from the 100th Congress

Independent variables	Total news stories
ADA scores	4.925E-03 (.004)
Gender	-.369 (.950)
Proximity (Ny., Va., Md.)	6.863** (1.077)
Party	1.363** (.598)
Prestige committee 100 th	-1.328 (2.156)
Prestige committee 101 st +	.613 (1.484)
Race	2.604** (.986)
Term number	.208* (.081)
Total legislation	-1.635E-03 (.005)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	1.222 (.975)
Party leader 100 th	
Intrainstitutional Ambition	.196 (.862)
Chair 100 th	
Progressive ambition	1.182 (.771)

* = significant at .05; * = significant at .01

Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors; and in the brackets are the standardized regression coefficients. R2 = .211; N = 311

TABLE XIII

Political Ambition's Effect on Page-One Stories

Independent variables	Page-one stories
ADA scores	5.566E-05 (.000)
Gender	-7.073E-03 (.055)
Proximity (Ny., Va., Md.)	1.209E-03 (.062)
Party	1.773E-02 (.035)
Prestige committee 100 th	.245 (.138)
Prestige committee 101+	-.205* (.086)
Race	-9.520E-03 (.057)
Term number	9.396E-03 (.005)
Total legislation	2.315-04 (.000)
Intrainstitutional Ambition Party leader 100 th	.194** (.060)
Intrainstitutional Ambition Party leader 101 st +	-8.121E-02 (.060)
Intrainstitutional Ambition Chair 100 th	.118 (.086)
Intrainstitutional Ambition Chair 101 st +	-5.217E-02 (.056)
Progressive ambition	2.221E-02 (.045)

* = significant at .05; * = significant at .01

Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors.

R2 = .113; N = 311

TABLE XIV

Political Ambition's Effect on Articles
Other Than in the First Section

Independent variables	Articles other than first section
ADA scores	2.819E-03 (.002)
Gender	2.319E-02 (.417)
Proximity (Ny., Va., Md.)	3.353** (.470)
Party	.509 * (.263)
Prestige committee 100 th	-2.904 ** (1.046)
Prestige committee 101 st +	1.008 (.654)
Race	.919* (.431)
Term number	3.696E-02 (.036)
Total legislation	-6.626E-04 (.002)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	.467 (.455)
Party leader 100 th	
Intrainstitutional Ambition	.125 (.451)
Party leader 101 st +	
Intrainstitutional Ambition	1.942** (.649)
Chair 100 th	
Intrainstitutional Ambition	-.497 (.424)
Chair 101 st +	
Progressive ambition	.469 (.338)

* = significant at .05; ** = significant at .01

Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors.
R² = .240; N = 311.

TABLE XV

Political Ambition's Effect on First-Section Stories

Independent variables	First-section stories
ADA scores	2.727E-03 (.003)
Gender	4.892E-02 (.587)
Proximity (Ny., Va., Md.)	3.550** (.662)
Party	.837* (.371)
Prestige committee 100 th	-1.387 (1.472)
Prestige committee 101 st +	.601 (.921)
Race	1.510* (.607)
Term number	9.737E-02 (.051)
Total legislation	-7.914E-04 (.003)
Intrainstitutional Ambition	2.452** (.640)
Party leader 100 th	
Intrainstitutional Ambition	.415 (.635)
Party leader 101 st +	
Intrainstitutional Ambition	2.782** (.914)
Chair 100 th	
Intrainstitutional Ambition	-.555 (.596)
Chair 101 st +	
Progressive ambition	.432 (.481)

* = significant at .05; * = significant at .01

Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors.
R2 = .250; N = 311.

END NOTES

1. House members who exhibit progressive ambition strive for either a senatorship or a governorship. A members who exhibit intrainstitutional ambition strive for a position within the U.S. House of Representatives as a party leader or a committee chair.
2. Conversely, scholars have questioned the existence of an apprenticeship norm (Rhode 1988; Ornstein, Peabody, and Rohde 1989; Hibbing 1991). Ornstein et al. (1989) say that a junior Democratic senator once stated, "... We're all equals so you should act accordingly" (p. 20). There is further contention among scholars as to how norms are even measured (Schneider 1988 and Rohde 1988). The disagreement centers on three methodologies of whether a norm can be detected by asking people involved of its existence, observation of member's behaviors as to its existence, or whether certain behaviors are related to reputation, sanction, or rewards within Congress.
3. The reforms of the 1970s is argued to have increased the opportunity for freshmen members to gain leadership, become less specialized, and increased floor activity (?).
4. Using the New York Times and Washington Post Indexes, House members were indexed between Jan. 1987 to Dec. 1989 were counted for the total number of times each member was mentioned in an article in either of the aforementioned newspapers. Only national newspapers are examined because of the researchers lack of resources. Additionally, there are legitimate reasons to explore the national media. For one, Kedrowski (1996) found that House members use the national media in order gain salience for an issue and to influence their fellow members.
5. Regression is used to estimate the value of a variable Y corresponding to a given value of a variable x. X is the dependent variable and Y is the independent variable. In this case, regression is used to examine the correlation between the dependent variable and the entire set of independent variables.
6. In the case of the *Washington Post*, this means section A; in the case of the *New York Times* this means section I.
7. The total number of times a House member was mentioned in either the New York Times or the Washington Post during the 100th Congress.
8. control variables in this thesis -- race, gender, ADA scores, if a majority leader, proximity, if on a prestige committee, term number, and total legislation -- help determine if the relationship between the independent variables and dependent variables examined have a spurious relationship.
9. *Congressional Index* lists primary and secondary sponsors of a bill and its referring committee. The 100th Congresses bills were examined, which numbered 1650.
10. Outliers were House members with excessive media coverage because of scandal, running for office, and previous fame. For example, Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.), who ran for president, had more than 100 stories between the two national newspapers examined.
11. Shadow members are members that "are not exactly members" of the House. They have all the privileges of members, but can not vote. They are members from Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa (Ehrenhalt 1987).

12. Table for Ambition's affect on legislation for the separated intrainstitutional variables were not added because the same relationships were found. Meanwhile, the dependent variable for editorial and opinion columns was not included because no significant relationships were found.

13. Each intrainstitutional independent variable - party leadership and committee chairmanship - were divided between members who held either of these positions in the 100th and those members who held positions in any of the Congresses between the 101st and the 105th. This was to determine whether current position-holding or future position-holding reveals a significant relationship with the dependent variables examined.

14. The ACU's score, measuring the member's conservative ideological scores were taken out since they are nearly opposite the ADA's score, which measures liberal votes, and since both scores were not needed, the ACU's score was taken out. Future research might look at local newspaper and television coverage of House members to gain greater insight on the connection between the a member's ambition coverage and coverage in national newspapers.

2
VITA

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