

PRIMARY METAPHOR:
A CROSS-CULTURAL
STUDY

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1978


Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for
the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
December, 2000

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Thesis Approved:



Thesis Advisor



Dean of the Graduate College

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my boundless gratitude to Dr. Carol Lynn Moder, my thesis advisor and mentor, first for competently guiding me throughout this academic journey and secondly for sharing with me her deep interest in metaphor. The time she spent with me made me perceive each and every step I took in writing my thesis as an enjoyable and extremely rewarding experience. Her professional example was, and still is, a formidable motivation for me to carry on. I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. Gene Halleck and Dr. Susan Garzon, for their suggestions and encouraging assistance.

In addition, I would like to take this opportunity to thank my family and friends for the support they gave me. I am grateful to the small group of Romanian students at Oklahoma State University who readily allowed me to test on them different hypotheses and helped me confirm some of my native speaker's intuitions that needed confirming. I must thank my husband for his angelic patience in attempting to explain to me the intricate readings of statistics – a nonmetaphorical language of figures whose hidden meanings were not always easy to decipher. Special thanks go to my son, Eduard, who put his computer skills at my disposal and whose existence uplifted me and encouraged me to follow my path.

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INTRODUCTION

The present thesis is meant to be a cross-cultural study of the instances of primary metaphor that appear in English and Romanian literary discourse. The rationale behind this endeavor is to shed more light on the cognitive studies of metaphor, the majority of which have mainly focused on English, by also investigating phenomena going on in another language, namely Romanian. My study is also motivated by the wish to break away from researcher-generated examples, which give a certain degree of subjectivity to the research as such.

The main issues discussed refer to the frequency of the overall use of primary metaphor in English and in Romanian literary texts, and whether this frequency is comparable, to the identification of the specific primary metaphors, as given in the list provided by Grady (1997), and to the identification of primary metaphors that might not appear in Grady's list. Other important issues refer to the identification of the factors which contribute to the differences and similarities found across the languages under study.

The thesis consists of four chapters and a section of conclusions. Chapter I (*Metaphor, Language, and Mind*) is concerned with the three-dimensional relationship between metaphor, language, and mind as analyzed in recent studies in cognitive linguistics, with special emphasis on the Lakoffian theory of conceptual metaphor. The presentation of the main points of the theory is followed by the discussion of the responses Lakoff's theory stirred, as well as the integrative character of the most recent realization of the theory.

Chapter II (*Methods*) is a detailed presentation of the methods and the strategies I used throughout the study.

Chapter III (*Textual Analysis*) analyzes the primary metaphors that appear in the three short stories by J.C. Oates and the two short stories by M. Eliade I decided to focus upon. The primary metaphors are discussed in terms of frequency of appearance, of linguistic structure, of cultural background, and of whether they are or not included in Grady's (1997) list.

Chapter IV (*Cross-cultural Analysis*) is a comparative study of the instances of primary metaphor found in the English and Romanian texts insofar as their frequency of use, linguistic structure, and cross-cultural significance are concerned.

The conclusions display the results of the present study in the light of the cognitive theory of metaphor. Special emphasis is laid on the aspects of this theory that are confirmed by my findings and also on the problems these results raise.

CHAPTER I

1. Metaphor, language, and mind

Recent work in the theory of metaphor within linguistics and the cognitive sciences has had a huge impact on our increasing understanding of the interdependency relations between mind and language. As Dirven and Paprotté show,

today metaphor is no longer deemed illicit and a violation of the scientific discourse principle of clarity, precision, and verifiability. [...] Rather, it is recognized as one of the deepest and most persistent phenomena of theory building and thinking (Dirven & Paprotté, 1985, p.VIII).

Metaphor is not merely a matter of words; it is, rather, a fundamental mode of cognition, having a serious impact on human thought, action, and language – whether everyday or poetic (Dirven & Paprotté, 1985; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b; Lakoff, 1993; Levin, 1993; Reddy, 1993; Ricoeur, 1994; Turner, 1990).

In Lakoff and Johnson's opinion (1980b), metaphor's 'imaginative rationality' is crucial to our understanding. Moreover, Lakoff (1993) emphasizes the fact that metaphors are rooted in thought, rather than in language, and that language is 'secondary'. What is of primary importance is the conceptual mapping, which refers to the understanding of one domain of experience (called 'source domain') in terms of a very different one (called 'target domain').

The terms source domain and target domain will be used throughout my thesis.

1.1. The Lakoffian Theory

1.1.1. Definition of conceptual metaphor

Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) claim that metaphor is essential to our conceptual system, which is responsible for how we think and act. Since interhuman communication is based on this conceptual system, language mirrors both how the system is structured and how it works. Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) and Lakoff (1993) define metaphor as the perception of one thing as another. This process is called mapping. Lakoff (1993) overtly asserts that, “metaphor can be understood as a mapping (in the mathematical sense) from a source domain to a target domain” (p.207). He refers to such a mapping as being “a set of ontological correspondences” which are responsible for the mapping of the ontology of source domain onto the ontology of target domain (Lakoff, 1993, pp.207-208).

Lakoff (1993) emphasizes the fact that a conceptual mapping can occasionally have quite numerous linguistic realizations (‘linguistic expressions’, as he calls them) and that it is important to properly differentiate between these realizations and the mappings as such. The linguistic realizations of conceptual mappings do not make use of a special kind of language; it is, rather, everyday language that is employed (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b, p.4).

One of the examples Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) use to support this idea is the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. Here are some of the linguistic realizations of this metaphor that they give:

Your claims are *indefensible*.

He *attacked every weak point* in my argument.

His criticisms were *right on target*.

I *demolished* his argument.

I've never *won* an argument with him.

You disagree? Okay, *shoot!*

(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b, p.4).

Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) make it clear that arguments should not be interpreted as subspecies of wars. Arguments represent verbal discourse, whereas wars are armed conflicts. Consequently, the actions performed are different. Nevertheless, when having an argument, some people plan and use strategies – just like when they are at war. In other words, they understand and experience argument as a kind of event during which they attack, demolish, shoot, lose/win, etc.

Lakoff (1993) opposes what he calls 'the classical theory of metaphor', whose most famous forerunner was, in his opinion, Aristotle. Lakoff (1993) argues that the classical theory of metaphor perceived metaphor as a mere matter of special language, with no reference to either thought or everyday language. Moreover, Lakoff (1993) says that the classical theory of metaphor saw no connection between reasoning and metaphor. In contrast, he adds, the cognitive theory of metaphor sees metaphor as a matter of thought, as a way of reasoning about one mental concept in terms of another, and not as a mere exercise of using language in a new, poetic way.

It is true that metaphor was extensively studied in ancient times. In fact, it has been being studied for over two thousand years. Nevertheless, one can hardly use a single label for all the diverse contributions made by the numerous schools of thought that dominated the field of metaphor before the cognitive school emerged.

Aristotle was no doubt one of the greatest philosophers and linguists the human race has been blessed with. However, his opinions on metaphor do not represent a summation of the beliefs of all the scholars who took an interest in the study of metaphor. If one reads only Aristotle's *Poetics*, one may be tempted to conclude that he was not very sensitive to the connection between reasoning and metaphor, in spite of the fact that Aristotle remarked that "making good metaphors depends on perceiving the likenesses in things" (Aristotle, Else Trans., 1970, p.61). Perceiving these 'likenesses' is impossible without the contribution of our mind.

Aristotle's opinion concerning the involvement of thought in producing and processing metaphor becomes clear in *On Rhetoric*, where he explicitly states that "the more there is in the thought, the more it seems an instance of urbanity" (Aristotle, Kennedy, Trans., 1991, p.252). Aristotle saw metaphor as a form of urbanity. Metaphor also "brings about learning" (Aristotle, Kennedy, Trans., 1991, p.244), which in its turn cannot take place without thought and reasoning. In conclusion, Aristotle, just like Lakoff (1993), emphasizes the contribution of thought in the production of metaphor. Unlike Lakoff (1993), however, Aristotle seems to be interested in the involvement of thought in the processing of metaphor, as well.

A much celebrated Lakoffian example meant to illustrate the way two quite different domains are thought of in terms of each other is LOVE IS A JOURNEY. The two domains are love and journey. Lakoff (1993) claims that people use everyday, ordinary language (i.e., ordinary expressions) to render this mapping. These expressions "are not poetic, nor are they necessarily used for special rhetorical effect" (Lakoff, 1993, p.206).

Here are some realizations meant to illustrate this claim:

Look *how far we've come*.
It's been *a long, bumpy road*.
We may have *to go our separate ways*.
The marriage is *on the rocks*.

(Lakoff, 1993, p.206)

Lakoff (1993) gives more examples than the ones cited above, and I have no doubts that there are many more such instances of this kind of metaphorical language in the real world. Nevertheless, a problem arises: most of the examples given by the analysts of metaphor are generated *ad-hoc*, rather than taken from real discourse; hence the jeopardy of language manipulation, i.e., usage of language for pre-established purposes. In my opinion, instances of spontaneously occurring language are more eloquent and more likely to yield valid conclusions.

Furthermore, the existence of such a variety of linguistic realizations of one and the same conceptual metaphor leads one to wonder whether language is really secondary, as Lakoff (1993) suggests. Speakers have a tremendous capacity to use language imaginatively, in such a way as to go beyond the limits of existing knowledge – and thus reach new understanding (Shepherd, 1994, p.2). From this perspective, language is the locus of concepts. At the same time, nevertheless, language is a “set of remembered concepts” (Hudson, 1991, p.83). This seems to hold true for metaphor, as well. Some metaphors (except for novel ones) are stored in memory, as part of a socio-cultural heritage, and expressed in a certain context. The speaker's thought, in this case, is not responsible for the mapping, for the concept. If the above-mentioned phenomenon is also taken into consideration, the supremacy of thought over language should be approached with caution.

1.1.2. Characteristics of conceptual metaphor

Conceptual metaphors share several characteristics (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b; Lakoff, 1993). They represent mappings across conceptual domains; they are asymmetric, systematic, and partial; they are grounded in the body, in everyday experience, and/or in knowledge; and they obey the Invariance Principle. Let us overview briefly each of these features.

As mentioned earlier, conceptual metaphors are sets of ontological correspondences between two conceptual domains (called source domain and target domain, respectively). One domain (X) is thought of in terms of another (Y). The example that Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) give is ARGUMENT IS WAR, where arguing is seen in terms of fighting, i.e., of war. During an argument, people attack, demolish, shoot, lose/win. The correspondences are oriented toward the target domain only, and not vice versa; hence the asymmetric nature of metaphor.

The systematicity of metaphorical concepts refers to the fact that metaphorical expressions are tied to metaphorical concepts in a systematic way. In other words, they follow the same patterns. Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) claim that expressions belonging to the vocabulary of war constitute a systematic way of talking about the fighting character of arguing (p.4). Systematicity does not mean that ALL the aspects of a concept will be tied to correspondent aspects of the other concepts. Such a correspondence may prove inconsistent in the case of some aspects; therefore, it is not used. Of course, the focus will be placed on those aspects that are consistent with the metaphor, which will be 'highlighted', whereas the inconsistent aspects will be ignored, remaining 'hidden'. One of the 'hidden' aspects of arguing is the cooperative aspect, in terms of which, when arguing,

people are in fact giving each other their time in a desire to reach understanding (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b, p.10).

The partial nature of metaphoric concepts, as defined by Lakoff and Johnson (1980b), refers to the fact that these concepts have 'used' parts and parts that generally remain 'unused'. The 'used' parts are 'alive', i.e., they are used in the metaphoric correspondence between two conceptual domains on an everyday basis. In contrast, the 'unused' parts are not part of our normal conceptual system. An example Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) refer to in this respect is related to THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, wherein the parts of the concept BUILDING normally employed to structure the concept THEORY are the foundation and the outer shell. These will correspond to the 'used' parts; in contrast, the rooms and the staircases will correspond to the normally 'unused' ones and will only occur in instances of novel metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b, p.53). As shown later in this thesis, Grady, Taub, and Morgan (1996) further examine and elaborate the relation between certain aspects of the source domain and the target domain.

An important characteristic among those enumerated above is what Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) call 'the grounding' of our conventional mappings. Our mappings are rooted in the body and its interaction with the physical world around us. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999), the locus of reason and bodily functions is the same. Therefore, concepts "are shaped by our bodies and brains, especially by our sensorimotor system" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p.22). Our mappings can also be rooted in our mental knowledge of the world. The concepts related to our body and bodily experiences are "more sharply delineated than others" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b, p.57) because most of what we know about the world comes to us through our senses, being perceived via our

body. We have to see, hear, touch, and/or smell the world around us in order to become aware of its existence. Even though emotional, mental, and cultural experiences are also crucial to our understanding of the world around us, our tendency is to “conceptualize the nonphysical *in terms of* the physical” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b, p.59).

Last, but not least, among the characteristics of metaphorical mappings is that they obey the Invariance Principle (Lakoff, 1993), which hypothesizes that “metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image – schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain” (Lakoff, 1993, p.215). This ‘consistent way’ refers to the fact that interiors, for instance, will be mapped onto interiors, exteriors onto exteriors, sources onto sources, and so on. There are no instances where a source domain interior is mapped onto a target domain exterior, because the Invariance Principle imposes “constraints on fixed correspondences”, in that “inherent target domain structure automatically limits what can be mapped” (Lakoff, 1993, pp.215-216). A crucial consequence of the Invariance Principle is that it helps us realize that “abstract reasoning is a special case of image-based reasoning” (Lakoff, 1993, p.229). Lakoff helps us realize that we need image-based reasoning in order to envisage abstract domains.

1.1.3. Types of conceptual metaphor

In their discussion of the types of metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) identify three basic domains of conceptual structure (physical, cultural, and intellectual, respectively), which can display significant interaction among them. They also identify three types of metaphor, namely: structural, physical (or ontological), and orientational.

Structural metaphors involve using a concept from one domain (WAR as a physical or cultural phenomenon) to structure a concept from another domain (ARGUMENT as primarily an intellectual concept, but one bearing cultural content). Physical metaphors involve the use of a concept from the physical domain to structure a concept from the cultural or intellectual domains. Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) state that we understand our experiences in terms of physical objects and substances, i.e., we view events, activities, emotions, and/or ideas as entities and substances. Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) illustrate this by a series of examples in which the human experience of rising prices is metaphorically viewed as an entity, as is the case in *Inflation is backing us into a corner* (p.26). Orientational metaphors have as their basis our physical and cultural experience. They organize a whole system of concepts with respect to one another, structuring them linearly, in terms of the nonmetaphorical orientations UP – DOWN, IN – OUT, FRONT – BACK, CENTRAL – PERIPHERAL, ON – OFF, DEEP – SHALLOW; hence the name of this type of metaphor.

Lakoff (1993) no longer draws such distinctions. What he emphasizes is the fact that metaphors are “grounded in experience” (p.240) and that we use our plain, everyday experiences as a starting point for the correspondences we make: “in ‘prices rose’ there is no correspondence in real experience between quantity and verticality, but understanding quantity in terms of verticality makes sense because of a regular correspondence in so many other cases” (Lakoff, 1993, p.240). Therefore, human experience (used in its larger sense, so as to include knowledge) constitutes the basis for metaphor.

Scholars attempting to classify metaphors also mention such categories as image metaphor, novel metaphor, and primary metaphor. Given the focus of this thesis, the issue of primary metaphor will be discussed in full detail later.

As its name suggests, image metaphor maps “conventional mental images onto other conventional images by virtue of their internal structure” (Lakoff, 1987, p.219). Lakoff (1987) explains the concept ‘conventional image’ as an image acquired unconsciously and automatically by people belonging to the same cultural community. The example he gives in this respect is a line taken from Breton’s poem ‘Free union,’ namely “My wife... whose waist is an hourglass,” where the mental image of an hourglass is mapped onto the wife’s waist. Lakoff (1987) also points out the characteristics of image metaphor, which he occasionally refers to as ‘one-shot mapping.’ Thus, this metaphor is not conventionalized; it is not present in ordinary reasoning; there is no linguistic meaning relying on this type of metaphor; it does not help people to reach abstractions starting from the concrete; and the way the mapping is done has nothing to do with experience and commonplace knowledge when determining what gets mapped onto what. It has, rather, to do with the imagination of the reader (Lakoff, 1987, p.221).

Another type of metaphor discussed quite thoroughly is novel metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a, 1980b; Lakoff & Turner, 1989; Lakoff, 1993). Novel metaphor is defined as “instances of the extensions of a conventional metaphor drawn from ordinary language” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a, p.481). Conventional metaphors are metaphors that structure our ordinary conceptual system and are omnipresent in our everyday language. When metaphors reach beyond our conventional conceptual systems, they are labeled as novel, new, imaginative, or creative. Novel metaphors constitute new ways of under-

standing our experience, which help us create a new reality – and thus perceive the world differently.

The attributes of novel metaphors are similar to those of conventional metaphors: they provide coherent structure, highlight some things and hide others, and have entailments that may encompass both other novel metaphors and literal (i.e., nonmetaphoric) statements. To illustrate this idea, Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) analyze the entailments of the metaphor LOVE IS A COLLABORATIVE WORK OF ART. These entailments arise from our knowledge of, and experience with, collaborative works of art. Here are some of the entailments mentioned:

Love is work.

Love requires patience.

Love is active.

Love is an aesthetic experience.

Love requires helping.

Love is valuable in itself.

Love requires compromise.

Love is an expression of deepest emotion.

(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b, p.140)

Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) explain that some of these entailments can be characterized as literal, i.e., nonmetaphoric (for example, LOVE REQUIRES PATIENCE). In a love relationship, the partners need to have a lot of patience with each other: patience in listening to each other's ideas, beliefs, concerns, and needs, as well as patience in finding solutions for mutual understanding. Some other entailments are themselves novel metaphors (for example, LOVE IS AN AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE). This metaphor reaches beyond our conventional conceptual system. It is a new way of understanding the experience of love, which is no longer a journey or a war but an aesthetic experience which enables the partners to become familiar with the beauty and ugliness of romantic involvement. The

reasoning behind these new metaphors is creative, poetic. It uses “the mechanisms of everyday thought, but it extends them in ways that go beyond the ordinary” (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, p.67). The characteristics of poetic thinking, as outlined by Lakoff and Turner (1989), are: extending, elaborating, and composing.

Extending refers to the extension of conventional metaphor. Lakoff and Turner (1989) illustrate extending by two lines taken from Hamlet’s soliloquy, where Shakespeare “extends the ordinary conventional metaphor of death as sleep to include the possibility of dreaming” (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, p.67).

Elaborating is defined as a nonconventional, unusual way of adding conceptual content to a metaphor (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, p.69). Lines from Horace and Emily Dickinson are used with a view to illustrating this characteristic of poetic thinking. An important difference between the two poets lies, Lakoff and Turner (1989) point out, in the way the notion of death is envisaged. According to the conventional metaphor of death as departure, we refer to death as a journey which allows no return. Separation from one’s familiar things is inevitable and perpetual. For Horace, death is eternal exile; for Dickinson, it is the most alluring of all destinations – home.

The most powerful characteristic of poetic thinking, Lakoff and Turner (1989) claim, is composing, which they define as “the formation of composite metaphors” (p.70). Composing consists of two or more conventional metaphors utilized in one and the same sentence or context. Lines from Shakespeare are resorted to again to illustrate composing. In Shakespeare’s verses, Lakoff and Turner (1989) explain, night is seen as something that takes away light (the metaphoric expression of life) and thus deprives one of a precious endowment. They point out that the metaphoric combination takes place at

the conceptual level, bringing together (in Shakespeare's case) such metaphors as LIGHT IS A SUBSTANCE, LIFETIME IS A DAY, LIFE IS A PRECIOUS POSSESSION, and EVENTS ARE ACTIONS.

In order to be successful in interpreting novel metaphor, we have to turn to the system of conventional metaphor, which we use to understand basic concepts such as TIME, STATE, CHANGE, CAUSATION, PURPOSE, etc (Lakoff, 1993, pp.237-238). I think Lakoff is right in his claim that conventional metaphors enable us to understand novel metaphors. Indeed, we do need our old experiences when interpreting the new ones. To put it metaphorically, we need our experience with the shores in order to understand what it is like to be in the middle of the ocean.

Grady (1999), who is actively engaged in elaborating on the Lakoffian theory, suggests a classification of metaphors based on a careful consideration of "the motivations for these metaphors" (p.98). Having this criterion in mind, Grady (1999) identifies, besides correlation-based metaphors (including primary metaphors), another type of metaphor, namely 'resemblance metaphors', which maps an entity onto another entity sharing "salient perceived features" (p.92). Grady (1999), like Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff and Turner (1989), points out the importance of the shared structure of the entities involved in the mapping. One of Grady's (1999) examples illustrative of the latter type of metaphor is *Achilles is a lion*, which is motivated by 'perceived resemblance' between the behavior of Achilles, the ancient hero renowned for his bravery, and "the stereotypical behavior of a lion" (Grady, 1999, p.92).

1.1.4. Conclusions concerning conceptual metaphor theory

Lakoff (1993) draws the conclusions concerning the contemporary theory of metaphor himself. Metaphor is fundamentally conceptual in nature and is present in our everyday conventional language. Metaphorical language is nothing but a surface realization of conceptual metaphor, its role being secondary. Crucial to this issue is the role held by the mapping, i.e., the understanding of one kind of experience in terms of another. This process involves understanding less concrete experiences in terms of more concrete and more structured ones. Concrete experiences, especially bodily experiences, are far more easily comprehensible than abstract ones. The system of conceptual metaphor is used unconsciously and automatically by every speaker of the language on an everyday basis, which makes the system very much 'alive'. The mappings are systematic, partial, and asymmetric, relying on a fixed set of ontological correspondences between source domain and target domain. The projection of the image-schema structure of the source domain must be consistent with the structure of the target domain (Lakoff, 1993, pp.244-247).

The contemporary theory of metaphor offers us, humans, a chance to scrutinize how we came to handle abstractions by making use of what we had at hand: the physical world around us, our bodies, and our mind. It seems that our body generally provides the literal, which is taken over by the mind which, in its turn, creates the metaphoric system – whether conventional or novel.

1.2. Attitudes towards the conceptual metaphor theory

The major endeavor of metaphor theory has been to use linguistic evidence to support the idea of systematic sets of correspondences (i.e., *mappings*) which exist be-

tween two domains of thought (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b; Lakoff, 1993). Many a scholar fascinated with this challenging idea plunged into research, trying to explore the idiosyncracies that the metaphor theory in its initial form failed to address and to suggest new ways of elaborating on the theory. Some of these suggestions refer to specific parts of the theory of conceptual metaphor only, while some others refer to the theory as a whole.

Considerable interest has been shown in specific areas of cognitive studies of metaphor, namely in providing evidence for a few new metaphorical correspondences that could be added to the STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor (Murphy, 1996), in inferring folk theories using methods developed by Lakoff and Johnson (Kempton, 1993), in further analyzing analogy (Collins & Gentner, 1993), in studying the convergence of both linguistic and conceptual systematicity in the conceptual metaphor WOMAN AS DESSERT (Hines, 1996), in providing more details on the study of argument as metaphor (Voth, 1998) or on the extended senses of 'over' as a spatial metaphor (Radden, 1985), in studying the semiotic aspects of metaphors by treating them as experience based mental facts (Nöth, 1985), and in refining our sense of the different types of metaphor by considering the motivations for these metaphors (Grady, 1997, b), to only mention a few contributions. Mere mention of these studies is meant to give a glimpse of the dimensions of the impact the Lakoffian theory has had on linguistic research. Nevertheless, I will analyze only the research that has helped me in my own study, which is meant to be a cross-cultural study of primary metaphor. I will particularly study the research oriented towards metaphor and cognition as well towards a possible classification of metaphors.

Some approaches have used a theoretical perspective other than that of Lakoff. In fact, the perspective has occasionally been altogether opposed to that of Lakoff. In con-

trast, some other studies support Lakoff's theory, offering ways of elaborating it or directions of expanding it. That is why I have classified these studies into two categories, namely: critiques of the Lakoffian theory and contributions to the Lakoffian theory.

1.2.1. Critiques of the Lakoffian theory

Some studies focus on the psychological reality of conceptual metaphor (Murphy, 1996; McGlone, 1996). Murphy (1996) takes a real interest in the question of mental representation as well as in whether items are detectable in the lexicon of speakers. He perceives the Lakoffian theory as a 'monolithic view,' as no plausible alternative hypothesis can be found in it. Murphy (1996) proposes an alternative hypothesis (the so-called 'structural similarity view') where all concepts are represented directly, unlike in Lakoff and Johnson's hypothesis, according to which some concepts are not understood via their own representations but rather by metaphoric reference to a different domain. The structural similarity view states that Lakoff's 'conceptual metaphors' can be accounted for by conceptual similarity without any help from underlying metaphoric concepts or mental relations.

McGlone (1996) deals with the role a conceptual metaphor might have in language processing. The questions he tries to find answers to refer to whether speakers have conceptual metaphors represented in their lexicons and whether they are able to activate these representations when they come across linguistic realizations of conceptual metaphors.

The systematicity of correspondences between two domains (the target domain and the source domain, respectively) as presented in Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) is seen as 'illusory' in Keysar and Glucksberg (1992), who disagree with the claim, to be found

in Lakoff and Johnson (1980b; 1980c) and Gibbs (1992), that abstract concepts, such as LOVE, are understood in terms of conceptual mappings, such as LOVE IS A JOURNEY. If it is true, Keysar and Glucksberg (1992) speculate, that such metaphors derive their meaning from the pre-existing conceptual mapping X IS A JOURNEY, then the meaning of *our trip to Europe was a bumpy roller coaster ride* is that our trip to Europe was a journey. Keysar and Glucksberg (1992) state that people are unlikely to make this kind of inference. What people do is attribute properties (such as 'bumpy') typical of the vehicle 'roller coaster ride' to the metaphor's topic 'our trip to Europe;' similarly, people attribute properties of roughness, changing moods and emotions, and/or pleasant ups and uncomfortable downs to 'our love.' Keysar and Glucksberg (1992) conclude that the metaphors *our love is a bumpy roller coaster ride* and *our trip to Europe was a bumpy roller coaster ride* seem to be similar through the properties of the roller coaster rides and of journeys. They argue that the truth-value of the pre-existing conceptual mapping approach is questionable because this approach overlooks the specific properties that metaphor vehicles attribute to their topics.

Another reason for which Keysar and Glucksberg (1992) criticize the pre-existing conceptual metaphor view has to do with its misleading nature. The theory is seen as misleading because it "is silent on the specific properties attributed to metaphor topics by specific metaphor vehicles" (Keysar & Glucksberg, 1992, p.653). Keysar and Glucksberg verified their claim empirically, asking some people to interpret the following apparent instantiations of the LOVE IS A CONTAINER conceptual metaphor:

We're trapped in a rotten marriage.

Our relationship has become a prison.

Our relationship is nothing but *a filing cabinet*.

(Keysar & Glucksberg, 1992, p.652)

Although there are container-like properties in each of these metaphors, the majority of the subjects failed to mention any such properties at all, for example, in *Our relationship is nothing but a filing cabinet*, insisting on the organized, business-like, unemotionlike features associated with the vehicle 'filing cabinet.'

Keysar and Glucksberg (1992) overlook two things that Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) repeatedly emphasize, namely that one domain is only partially structured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of another and that the very systematicity that allows us to understand one aspect of a concept in terms of another will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept, which are inconsistent with the metaphor. The main inferences are systematically relational because they have a well-established socio-cultural basis. In my opinion, Keysar and Glucksberg's (1992) subjects, in fact, did the same thing: they pointed out that *Our relationship is nothing but a filing cabinet* has organized, business-like, unemotionlike features which are inconsistent with the metaphor LOVE IS A CONTAINER because generally love is associated with an emotion of some kind.

I do not consider that the source domain attributes any properties to the target domain, as the conceptual mapping does not rely on property transfer but, rather, on "potential correspondences across inference patterns" (Lakoff, 1993, p.210). Lakoff (1993) does not explain how we can predict what these correspondences will be. My assumption is that they will very much depend on the socio-cultural heritage as well as on individual variables. I agree with Lakoff's (1993) remark that Keysar and Glucksberg's

(1992) claim that metaphor is simply a matter of categorization has little in common with the main concerns of the contemporary theory of metaphor and consequently fails to indicate “how metaphor works” (Lakoff, 1993, p.237).

The studies mentioned above approach metaphor from perspectives that differ from Lakoff’s. Lakoff (1993) himself reacted against some of the studies, pointing out the significant differences between his approach and other approaches.

As I mentioned earlier, there is another category of studies on metaphor, which in fact elaborate on Lakoff’s theory.

1.2.2. Contributions to the Lakoffian theory

Grady, Taub, and Morgan (1996) offer “a significant refinement of metaphor theory [and] a shift of thinking in the direction of close attention to the details of the data and the experiential motivations which underlie metaphors” (p.185). Following in the footsteps of Lakoff and Johnson (1980b), they agree that metaphors are systematic correspondences between one conceptual domain and another. Also, they acknowledge that mappings are responsible for the use of particular language from the source domain and for the inferences applied to the target domain. Grady *et al.* (1996) notice, however, that important aspects of the source domain fail to map the target domain. Illustrative in this respect is that important aspects of buildings (such as the floors, the walls, or the ceiling), their occupants, and/or their functions (such as shelters, homes, workplaces, locations, etc.) fail to map. Lakoff’s (1993) mention of the mechanism of ‘target-domain override’, which intervenes in cases where there is a clear contradiction between the source and target domains, is considered inefficient by Grady *et al.* (1996). They point out that this ‘target-domain override’ is not applicable to the THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS metaphor

since there seems to be no contradiction in stating that theories have windows and yet the conventional mapping does not account for a meaningful interpretation of the statement (Grady *et al.*, 1996, p.178).

Another criticism addressed to the metaphor theory by Grady *et al.* (1996) is that there are numerous metaphors that involve pairs of domains for which no plausible correlation can be found. This contradicts the Lakoffian claim that metaphor is grounded in experience. While it is quite easy to distinguish the correlations in experience between having *more* of objects or substances and seeing the level of those objects or substances *rise* (as in the much celebrated example MORE IS UP), it is nevertheless quite difficult to grasp such correlations in THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS or LOVE IS A JOURNEY (Grady *et al.*, 1996, p.179). Our experience with actual travel does not help us much in understanding the progress of our romantic involvement. Travel does not only imply a certain destination, travel partners, or visiting places; it also implies tiredness and eagerness to put an end to it – which is definitely not the case when love accompanies us along the journey. In fact, as pointed out in Grady *et al.* (1996), discussions of experiential basis have been scarce and insufficiently consistent. As a result, there is no solid awareness of what an experiential basis consists of and whether or not it could be subcategorized.

Grady *et al.* (1996) also point to the fact that quite large metaphorical complexes are involved in the description of basic correspondences, emphasizing that this could be done using fewer words. Moreover, almost all complex metaphors show multiple variations of some of their main correspondences. In the current theory, such variations are either called ‘branches’ and/or ‘duals’ (being considered versions of the same metaphor) or treated as unrelated metaphors which happen to share much of their content and struc-

ture, e.g., STATES ARE LOCATIONS and PROPERTIES ARE OBJECTS are branches of the EVENT STRUCTURE METAPHOR (Grady *et al.*, 1996, p.181). No explanation is given to the relationship between these metaphors, which appear to be very closely related. The solution offered by Grady *et al.* (1996) is to consider complex metaphors as compositional in nature ('compounds'), the simpler submappings of which are the primitive metaphors (or 'primitives'). Primitives and compounds are defined as follows:

- a. A primitive is a metaphorical mapping for which there is an independent and direct experiential basis and independent linguistic evidence.
- b. A compound is a self-consistent metaphorical complex composed of more than one primitive.

(Grady *et al.*, 1996, p.181)

In his later work, Grady (1997) adopts a different terminology, replacing the name 'primitive metaphor' with the name 'primary metaphor' and the name 'compound metaphor' with the name 'complex metaphor.' Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) Integrated Theory of Primary Metaphor also embraces this terminology. In my turn, I will be using the terms 'primary metaphor' and 'complex metaphor', as well.

Primary metaphors exist independently of any complex metaphor which they might help to build. The constraints working on this building process have to do with the logical compatibility of the primitive mappings (Grady *et al.*, 1996, p.181).


In order to illustrate how decomposition of complex metaphors into primary metaphors works and how this new approach solves the problem of 'poverty of mapping' and the lack of experiential basis, Grady *et al.* (1996) use the complex metaphor THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, which they decompose into two primary metaphors: (a) LOGICAL

STRUCTURE IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE, and (b) PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT (Grady *et al.*, 1996, p.182).

Once we have established the correspondences, Grady *et al.* (1996) claim, the complex metaphor we obtain can be labeled (VIABLE) LOGICAL STRUCTURES ARE ERECT PHYSICAL STRUCTURES. This metaphor accounts for all the data of THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS. It is important to remark that the concepts involved do not refer particularly to buildings, but to erect physical structures in general. This, in Grady's (1997) opinion, solves the 'poverty of mapping' problem since references to floor, décor, occupants, and other details of buildings would be out of place, as they are not expected.

Moreover, this analysis solves, according to Grady (1997), another important problem: that of the lack of experiential bases for the metaphor. Both primary metaphors mentioned above have something to do with our experience. Our experience with physical structure allows us to manipulate abstractions. Likewise, we know that many things around us are upright while functioning and fall down when they are not. Therefore, we are carriers of the experience of PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT.

The inconsistency of relations among metaphors highly criticized by Grady *et al.* (1996) is tentatively solved by claiming that complex metaphors are related by the primary metaphors they have in common and are made distinct by the primary metaphors they do not share. The following figure is used to illustrate this claim:



THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS

“support”, “collapse”

THEORIES ARE FABRICS

“unravel”, “weave”

(Grady *et al.*, 1996, p.183).

What the complex metaphors THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS and THEORIES ARE FABRICS share is the primary metaphor (LOGICAL) STRUCTURE IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE. The two metaphors are related by this primary metaphor and are differentiated by PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT and INTERRELATED IS INTERWOVEN, respectively.

Grady (1997) points out an important feature of primary metaphors, namely that they are not decomposable into smaller, more local mappings. This fact constitutes an important feature of the decomposition approach in general, whose goals are to find metaphors which are well supported by linguistic evidence, to show how they are grounded in experience, and to reveal the relation between them.

In short, what Grady's (1997) primary metaphor theory tells us is that abstractions are born out of our responses to the physical, material world around us. The basic level of our cognitive struggle is primary metaphor, a conceptual mapping having its own direct experiential basis and its own linguistic realization. Being a basic-level mapping, primary metaphor cannot be further divided into smaller compositional elements. Primary metaphors can, and very often do, combine to yield complex metaphors.

Grady's (1997) examples, like those of Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) and Lakoff (1993), are 'researcher-generated.' In other words, they are what Quinn (1991) calls "idealized cases, disconnected from the context of actual use in natural discourse" (p.91). I am of the opinion that this practice is quite a dangerous one, in that researchers use language in the direction of producing evidence, instead of allowing language to furnish the evidence they need. The examples they use are the product of their mind engaged consciously in the process of speculating about language. Strong desire to prove something can sometimes produce subjective evidence. In contrast, illustrating a theory with data reaped from live discourse increases the validity of the theory, in that these samples of language are produced unconsciously, effortlessly, and automatically. This entitles one to consider them objective evidence for the ways in which language works.

Steen (1999) is of the opinion that cognitive linguists should start from linguistic metaphors encountered in real speech situations and get to conceptual metaphor via a series of analytical steps. These steps, in his opinion, could constitute "the beginning of a procedure for conceptual metaphor identification in discourse" (Steen, 1999, p.57). The five steps he suggests are the following: metaphor focus identification (i.e., identification of the linguistic realization of metaphor in discourse); metaphorical identification (i.e., the identification of the concept, also called metaphorical proposition, the metaphor carries); nonliteral comparison identification; nonliteral analogy identification; and nonliteral mapping identification. Nonliteral comparison identification refers to distinguishing the nonliteral similarity present in the correspondences between conceptual (literal as well as nonliteral) domains characteristic of metaphors (Steen, 1999, p.66). The last but one step, namely nonliteral analogy identification, refers to the process of reaching "the

complete nonliteral comparison statement by inferring the implied concepts (Steen, 1999, p.68). The last step, namely nonliteral mapping identification, consists of identifying the nonliteral mapping by distinguishing the two domains of the nonliteral analogy, the source and target domains, respectively. These are generally the analytical steps I myself took in my analysis of the instances of primary metaphor in English and Romanian literary discourse.

1.2.3. Lakoff and Johnson's Integrated Theory of Primary Metaphor

An interesting perspective on conceptualization *per se* is the one offered by Lakoff and Johnson (1999), who bring to the fore philosophical issues meant to further clarify their theory of conceptual metaphor, especially primary metaphor. They are concerned with our very responsibilities for conceptualization and categorization and point out the inseparability of categories, concepts, and experience.

The age-old dichotomy between **perception** (use of senses) and **conception** (mental activity responsible for the formation and use of concepts) is considered false by Lakoff and Johnson (1999). Traditionally, the formation and use of concepts has been considered a mental activity completely distinct from our abilities to perceive and move. Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) embodied-mind hypothesis states that the neural system involved in **perception** also plays a central role in **conception**. In other words, the mechanisms responsible for perception, movements, and object manipulation could be considered responsible for conceptualization and reasoning as well (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p.38).

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) admit that they do not have strong neurophysiological evidence, i.e., evidence obtained from scan tests on the brain or from functional results of

the brain, to back up their hypothesis. What they do have is 'an existence proof' that comes from the field of neural modeling. These models show that neural structures could potentially control both our sensorimotor and our conceptualizing activities.

The complex questions raised by the Theory of Conceptual Metaphor seem to have found, in Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) opinion, preliminary answers in the Integrated Theory of Primary Metaphor. This theory has four parts, namely: C. Johnson's theory of conflation, Grady's theory of primary metaphor, Narayanan's neural theory of metaphor, and Fauconnier and Turner's theory of conceptual blending.

Johnson's *theory of conflation*, as explained in Lakoff and Johnson (1999), refers to young children's inability to differentiate between sensorimotor experiences and non-sensorimotor experiences when the two occur together. This is due to the 'automatic associations' that develop between the two kinds of experiences. As a result of the process of growing up, children become aware of the distinction between the two domains. However, the associations do not disappear.

Narayanan's *neural theory of metaphor* is also part of the Integrated Theory of Primary Metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) explain Narayanan's claim that the 'associations' occurring during the conflation period are accompanied by 'neural activation' of domains. This activation is responsible for the 'permanent neural connections' between conceptual domains and represents "the anatomical basis of source-to-target activations that constitute metaphorical entailments" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, pp.46-47).

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) also include in their Integrated Theory of Primary Metaphor the findings of the *theory of conceptual blending*, outlined by Fauconnier and Turner. The main point of Fauconnier and Turner's theory is that "distinct conceptual

domains can be co-activated, and under certain conditions connections across the domains can be formed, leading to new inferences” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p.47).

Although Grady’s *theory of primary metaphor* has already been focused upon in this thesis, I think discussing it from Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) point of view will be of much help, as their approach seems to be very complex. They broaden the perspective on primary metaphor by supplying information and details from different fields: linguistics, philosophy, and neurology. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) opine that Johnson’s theory of conflation constitutes the basis for Grady’s (1997) theory of primary metaphor, arguing that early conflations in everyday experience are expected to lead to the automatic formation of hundreds of primary metaphors that connect subjective experience and judgment (target domain) to sensorimotor experience (source domain). They support Grady’s (1997) hypothesis in terms of which each primary metaphor structure in a complex metaphor is no more than an atomic component of the molecular structure of the complex metaphor at issue. On the other hand, complex metaphors are formed from primary metaphors through conceptual blending. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) define conceptual blending as “the fitting together of small metaphorical ‘pieces’ into larger wholes” (p.49).

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) give a short list of primary metaphors inspired by Grady (1997), who also provides such a list. The two lists differ not only in length (Grady’s is longer) but also in the way they supply information. Grady only provides ‘the motivation’ of each metaphor (by naming the two domains that are correlated), whereas Lakoff and Johnson distinguish between the subjective judgment, the sensorimotor do-

main, and the primary experience underlying each primary metaphor, thus indicating the close relationship between **perception** and **conception**.

Although there are no significant differences between the two lists (they in fact provide the same information), Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) way of giving information is clearer, in that explicit reference to the two domains helps us better grasp that it is our sensorimotor experiences that represent the starting point of our absolute thinking.

Here is an example taken from the two lists mentioned above:

Metaphor: HAPPY IS UP

Happy Is Up

Motivation: The correlation between happiness and erect body posture.

Subjective judgment: Happiness

Sensorimotor Domain: Bodily orientation

And/or correlation between being in a higher position (e.g., on a hill) and feeling safe, in control, etc.

Example: "I'm feeling *up* today."

Primary experience: Feeling happy and energetic and having an upright posture (correlation between affection state and posture).

Examples: I was feeling *low* yesterday but the good weather has really *picked me up*.

(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p.50)

My spirits *soared* when they announced the winners of the competition.

(Grady, 1997, p.295)

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) warn us that the reverse of the above-mentioned process is not true: we do use reasoning about vertical motion in the spatial domain to reason about quantity, but we do not reason about verticality in terms of quantity. Inferences

flow in only one direction, from the sensorimotor domain to the domain of subjective judgment; hence the asymmetry of primary conceptual metaphor.

Another important point Lakoff and Johnson (1999) make is that the connections between the domains of the metaphorical mapping are not always activated. It is only when these connections are activated that source-domain inferences start flowing to the target domain.

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) do not want to give the impression that the pervasiveness of conceptual metaphor denies the existence of nonmetaphorical concepts. On the contrary, they signal the existence of a vast system of literal concepts, i.e., concepts of subjective experience and judgment that are not structured metaphorically – for instance, basic-level concepts and spatial-relations concepts. Other than that, we can hardly think about subjective experience and judgment without having metaphor in mind, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) assert, explaining that nonmetaphorical reasoning “would never capture the full inferential capacity of complex metaphorical thought (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p.59).

In my opinion, the Integrated Theory of Primary Metaphor is, first and foremost, a recognition of the outstanding work of several linguists, philosophers, and neurologists whose work offers more scientific and empirical support for the contemporary theory of metaphor. Emphasis is put on the inseparability between our senses and our mind or, to use Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) terminology, between ‘**p**erception’ and ‘**c**onception’, or between ‘sensorimotor’ and ‘nonsensorimotor’ domains. We cannot think about the world if we do not first see it, touch it, hear it, or smell it. First, we **p**erceive; only then do we **c**onceive.

The Integrated Theory of Primary Metaphor does not only refer to what is happening on an abstract level (i.e., in our mind), but also to what is happening on a concrete level (i.e., in the neurological circuits of our brain). This helps us better understand that we are rational beings, not **in spite of** but, rather, **due to** the fact that we are made of flesh and blood.

The Integrated Theory of Primary Metaphor also shows how early and inevitably we resort to conceptual mappings, and why. We, humans, are shaped in such a way as to feed on and be kept alive by metaphors. The process costs us no effort, in that metaphors invade our brains via our senses and it is almost beyond our power to overlook the call of our flesh and brains.

1.3. Romanian contributions

Metaphor is also at the core of quite a number of Romanian linguistic studies. Some of these analyze metaphor from a semiotic point of view, while others do it from a semantic point of view, and still others (rather few, in fact) from a cognitive point of view.

As mentioned above, Romanian studies concerning metaphor do not primarily focus on metaphor's cognitive aspect but, rather, on metaphor as an image or figure used in discourse strategies. Special emphasis is laid on the effect of metaphor on the text. Metaphor's illocutionary force is at the core of quite a number of studies, metaphor *per se* being considered a 'textual figure' having two distinct functions, namely that of orienting the semantics of the text and that of expressing the meaning of the text (Dragoş, 1973; Dragoş, 1989; Neţ, 1987; Neţ, 1988).

Another tendency in the Romanian study of metaphor is the orientation towards semiotics. Present-day Romanian linguistic studies perceive metaphor, sign, and symbol as the fundamental elements of semiotics. Metaphor is situated in the proximity of symbol in terms of both content and mechanism of production, where symbol can be accounted for by means of a metaphorical behavior, by a glide (*'glissement'*) between two domains (*'champs'*) – a glide based on similitude (Tănase, 1991, p.46).

In addition, metaphor is defined as a shift in sense based on a clipped comparison (Slave, 1991; Vianu, 1965). Structurally speaking, metaphor entails the existence of two paradigmatically distinct units that oppose each other (Slave, 1991). This opposition is, under certain circumstances, neutralized. New relationships are thus born, insofar as the content is concerned, between the literal term and the figurative one. By saying about an overly talkative person that he is barking, we neutralize the opposition between talking and barking. Therefore, the metaphoric process is based on the breaking of the semantic and syntagmatic relationships of implication (*to bark* → *dog*, *to talk* → *man*). These relationships are also referred to as 'lexical solidarities' or 'semantic solidarities' (Slave, 1991, p.9).

From a semantic point of view, metaphors are categorized into two distinct groups: explicit metaphors and implicit metaphors (Slave, 1991; Tănase, 1991). Explicit metaphors consist of both 'the term of departure' (*le terme de départ*) and 'the term of arrival' (*le terme d'arrivée*). An example in this respect is *înger de copil* ('angel of a child'), where the two terms (of departure and of arrival, respectively) are both overtly present.

There is considerable disagreement among Romanian linguists in terms of how implicit metaphor is defined. Slave (1991) only tackles the issue tangentially. In her description, implicit metaphor exhibits the term of departure only; however, she gives no example of what she understands by implicit metaphor. In contrast, Tănase (1991) claims that implicit metaphor contains only the term of arrival. She states that implicit metaphor can be defined by using the traditional definition of metaphor, which presupposes an analogy *in absentia*: “the receiver perceives only the signifié of arrival, it itself establishing the relationships with the term of departure” (1991, p.49). Tănase (1991) admits that decoding such a metaphor can be a difficult enterprise. She emphasizes the importance of the context in which such linguistic expressions currently occur as well as the role of the context in which they originally appeared, showing that one needs to be properly acquainted with, say, ‘les farces diableries’ in order to see the implicit metaphor in expressions such as *faire le diable à quatre*, *fare il diavolo a quattro*, or *a face pe dracul în patru* – to be met with in French, Italian, and Romanian, respectively (Tănase, 1991, p.49).

The cognitive value of metaphor has not been neglected altogether. However, it seems to have raised the interest of philosophers and aestheticians, rather than that of linguists. It should be noted, nevertheless, that my research is mainly based on Romanian studies available in the U.S. and that not all the studies within my reach are recent.

Șăineanu (1891) defines metaphor as the instrument fertilizing the domain of language and creating the world of abstractions. Resorting to an etymological explanation, where *meta* means ‘beyond’ and *pharos* – ‘carrier’, Wald (1974) explains the term ‘metaphor’ as meaning ‘transport’. Metaphor becomes, in his opinion, a *signifiant* carry-

ing a certain meaning beyond its previous *signifié*, a verbal expression whose significance generalizes a less general meaning. This feature enables metaphor to lead to the building of notions and helps man rise “from nature into culture” (Wald, 1974, p.122). Wald (1974) also remarks that by uttering *similar words* whenever having in mind *similar things*, people in fact transfer the same meaning from one thing to another, thus leaving aside the individual properties and reflecting the general ones only. This, in my opinion, somewhat anticipates Lakoff’s partial mapping.

Metaphor, mystery, and myth are all brought together by philosophers and aestheticians. Blaga (1937) states that man is “a metaphorizing animal” and that “the genesis of metaphor coincides with that of man” (p.40). Likewise, he claims that one needs metaphor in order to compensate for the difficulties encountered in one’s efforts to rebuild concrete fact through language. Thus, one brings together facts, transfers terms from one domain into another – whether taken from the given world, the imagined world, the experienced world, or the conceived world – with a view to plasticizing one of the terms. This is how ‘plasticizing metaphor’ (i.e., expressive metaphor) is born. Consequently, plasticizing metaphor emerges out of the incongruity between the concrete world and the world of abstract notions, out of man’s spiritual need to express the concrete world through abstractions. Plasticizing metaphor is an indirect, instantaneous rendition of the concrete world (Blaga, 1937, p.32). This idea can be found in Vianu (1965) as well, for whom “to know a thing is to be able to produce it out of your own spontaneity” (p.31). Another similarity with Lakoff can be identified here, in that concrete, sensorial facts are seen as the source of metaphor, of abstract notions. Blaga’s example in this respect is a

flock of swallows on the wires between telegraph posts, which he depicts as “notes on a stave” (1937, p.31).

However, it is ‘revealing metaphor’ that is fundamental in Blaga’s philosophy. Revealing metaphor tries to reveal a mystery using means offered by the concrete world, the sensible experience, and the imaginary world. While plasticizing metaphors do not increase the significance of the facts they are referring to but, rather, complete their direct expression, revealing metaphor is meant to bring to light something hidden about the facts they refer to: “revealing metaphors result from the specifically human way of existing, from existence in the horizon of mystery and revelation” (Blaga, 1937, p.38). Here are a revealed mystery of snowfall (*ninsoarea*)

Cenușa îngerilor arși în ceruri
ne cade fulguind pe umeri și pe case
[‘The ashes of the angels burned in Heaven
are falling down in flakes onto our shoulders and our houses’]

and one of sleep (*somnul*)

În somn sângele meu ca un val
se trage din mine
înapoi în părinți
[‘In my sleep my blood like a wave
withdraws from within me
back into my parents’]

(Blaga, 1937, p.39).

An almost unanimously accepted idea is that metaphor contributes both to the establishing of notions and to the increasing of their expressiveness (Blaga, 1937; Vianu, 1965; Wald, 1974): “The cognitive metaphor participates in *the cognition of the object* by the subject, while the expressive metaphor expresses *the attitude of the subject* to the object. The metaphor ensures the continuous circuit between feeling and intellect, between living and thinking, between affection and reason” (Wald, 1974, p.124).

Another widely accepted idea is that people reach explanations through myth (Eliade, 1963; Wald, 1974). Myth explains to us the origin of the world and of all the values related to this world and to man. For Eliade (1963), “to know myths is to learn the secret of the origin of values” (p.25), while for Wald (1974) a myth generally relates a genesis. Events that occurred *a long time ago* and *far away* can be thought of as the cause of things: they are equally imperceptible. The predilection of myth to envisage things that occurred *ab origine* makes it resemble “the causes inaccessible to immediate experience” (Wald, 1974, p.124). Myths go hand in hand with metaphors. Whereas metaphors help people reach notions, myths help them reach explanations. Both myths and metaphors are inevitable (Wald, 1974, p.127).

Metaphor is not only a means of capturing reality but also a means of hiding it or even understanding it erroneously (Vianu, 1965). Such a metaphor is the well-known *tabula rasa* metaphor, in terms of which human consciousness was considered a clean board onto which impressions of the outer world were engraved. Thus, the active character of consciousness, its ability to process impressions, and its spontaneous functions were denied. Vianu (1965) opines that if metaphor can help the spirit in the activity of cognition, its achievements in this domain may as well bring about the need of not only

replacing one metaphor with another but also of giving up on any metaphor and trying to get to know things by genuinely notional means, especially when metaphor has reached false understanding (Vianu, 1965, p.45). However, he explains neither what these notional means are, nor the causes of the false cognitive premises, nor the role of metaphor in this faulty cognitive process.

Even though the Romanian scholars' efforts in studying metaphor do not always go in the directions established by cognitive linguistics, they do at least confirm one crucial fact: that human cognition is metaphorical in nature, that metaphors are inevitable and essential tools toward knowing the world, ourselves, and those around us, and that metaphors are concepts 'we live by'.

1.4. Metaphor and culture

Given the fact that the present thesis is meant to be a transcultural study of primary metaphor, an insight into the relationship between metaphor and cultural models might prove beneficial. Cultural models are defined as "presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world (Quinn & Holland, 1993, p.4) or as "cultural schemas that function to interpret experience and guide action in a wide variety of domains" (Gibbs, 1999, p.153).

The question, "Do metaphors constitute, or merely reflect, cultural models?" is apparently answered differently by different scholars. Quinn (1991) claims that her position is altogether different from that of cognitive linguists in general, and Lakoff and Johnson in particular, in that she sees metaphor as having a minor role in our understanding of the world, the major role being "played by our cultural models of that world" (Quinn, 1991, p.91).

Quinn (1991) complains that “culturally constituted meaning has no place of its own beside embodied meaning in Johnson’s analysis and no systematically developed or well-articulated place in that of Lakoff” and tries to systematically demolish what “Johnson and Lakoff seem to be saying” (p.65). I myself cannot see such a big discrepancy between the two points of view. I agree with Quinn (1991) that culture is only tangentially mentioned in the work of cognitive linguists in general and that of Johnson and Lakoff in particular. However, when they do make reference to culture they do it in ways quite similar to hers. Thus, Quinn (1991) considers that certain metaphors are more frequently used because they “provide satisfying mappings onto already existing cultural understandings” (p.65). She fails to see, nevertheless, that Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) also overtly admit the fact that “each culture or subculture will make its own choices in terms of giving priority to certain values” (p.24). For me, ‘giving priority to certain values’ is making use of the specific cultural models. In other words, the views of Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) and Quinn (1991), respectively, overlap. Furthermore, Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) argue that people may experience the same things but conceptualize them differently. The same idea is found in Quinn and Holland (1993), who uphold that we acquire our knowledge of the world “in our daily negotiations with it”, which makes cultural meanings “adapt to the contingencies and complexities of everyday life” (pp.4-5). This accounts, in my mind, for the reason why the ‘negotiations’ the Romanians have with severe weather differ from those the Americans have. The weather in Romania is much milder than the weather in America, so that what a Romanian will call ‘severe weather’ will go by the name ‘good old thunderstorm’ in America.

I am of the opinion that conceptual metaphors are not only outcomes of our reasoning but also outcomes of our cultural heritage. In this respect, I think Gibbs (1999) is right when he claims that conceptual metaphors have their roots in social and cultural experience. I also totally agree with Gibbs' (1999) opinion that "there might be fewer differences between cognitive and cultural models than often suggested by cognitive linguists and anthropologists" (p.156). Finally, I support Gibbs (1999) in his urge, addressed to cognitive linguists, anthropologists, and other scholars, to admit that cognition and cultural models are inseparable.

During my research, I noticed that although quite a few researchers are interested in studying metaphor in relation to culture (and some even speculate about cross-cultural metaphoric mechanisms), very few studies tackle metaphor cross-linguistically. Most of the studies concentrate on English, with only occasional (and even then, brief) references to other languages. Most of the linguistic realizations of conceptual metaphor are, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, researcher-generated – which makes one wonder how 'real' they are, i.e., how often they are met with in the real world, where metaphor is not a purpose in and of itself. In spite of being the linguistic outputs of a real speaker, researcher-generated examples lack spontaneity as well as the 'automatic' nature that cognitive linguists emphasize when analyzing conceptual metaphor. This is a shortcoming which might have a negative impact on the validity of conclusions.

One option to avoid using such 'unreal', speculative examples is relying on literary texts. Literary discourse *can* serve as data bases for linguistic studies. It is, in my opinion, closer to real discourse than are researcher-generated examples, in that it has a

context of its own, both linguistic and cultural. That is why my study focuses on literary discourse, rather than discourse made up *ad-hoc*.

Another reason why I undertook the present cross-linguistic study is that, to the best of my knowledge, there is no comparative analysis of the ways speakers of English and speakers of Romanian, respectively, conceptualize primary metaphor and the ways they pour such metaphor into discourse.

The starting point of my thesis is the claim appearing in Grady *et al.* (1996) in terms of which “primitives are taken to be the metaphors with the most direct motivation and the least arbitrary structure and should therefore be the most common cross-linguistically” (p.186). My endeavor is to do a cross-linguistic analysis meant to prove empirically, by using data found in English and Romanian literary texts, that primary metaphor is prevalent in the two languages. The specific issues I raise in this thesis are related to the possibility of organizing metaphors found in the English and Romanian literary texts into the categories offered by Grady (1997) and to the identification of cultural differences (if there are any) in the way primary metaphors are used in the two languages at issue.

The following chapter outlines the specific research questions and provides a detailed description of the methods and strategies I used in each and every step of my study.

CHAPTER II

2. Methods

The research goals of the present thesis spin around the transcultural analysis of the form primary metaphor (in the acceptance of the term offered by Grady, 1997, and Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) takes in English and Romanian, the specific linguistic realization of the instances of primary metaphor, and the cultural pattern underlying the use of primary metaphor. I tried to find answers to the following research questions:

- (1) How frequent is the overall use of primary metaphor in English and Romanian literary texts? Is the frequency comparable?
- (2) Which specific primary metaphors identified by Grady (1997) occur in English and Romanian literary texts? How frequently is each of the specific primary metaphors used? Are there any primary metaphors occurring in the texts that are not on Grady's (1997) list? Is the frequency of specific primary metaphors comparable across languages?
- (3) What factors might contribute to the differences and similarities found across the texts in the two languages in terms of linguistic structure, content of texts, and specific cultural variables?
- (4) What impact does translation have on the use of primary metaphor, in general? What are the factors responsible for the way a Romanian primary metaphor is rendered in English?

Literary texts belonging to two authors (an English one and a Romanian one) were analyzed. A fairly legitimate question may arise: Why literary texts? This choice can be accounted for by my belief that literature, the art of words, makes us become not only more sensitive to language but also more aware of the dimensions of human knowledge. Turner (1996) claims that good literature is powerful because it masterfully evokes and manipulates our cognitive apparatus. He considers that “literature and cognition are doors into each other: literature leads us to questions about human understanding, and the study of the human mind turns wisely for clues to the oldest and most abiding arts” (Turner, 1996, p.11). Therefore, one of the possible reasons why we study literature might be to understand how the human mind works. We study the writer’s reasons and ways to address and influence, not only the readers’ conceptual system and linguistic knowledge but also their response to these challenges. One such challenge could be the understanding of the writer’s reasons to use a certain kind of figure of speech and thought. Another reason why I used literary texts in my study was that I wanted to avoid using examples made up by myself, so as not to run the risk of manipulating language. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, use of researcher-made examples is a tendency typical of cognitive studies of metaphor, constituting the main object of critiques directed against such studies.

From the multitude of literary genres, I chose the short story. My choice was determined by the fact that short stories generally present events in great fullness as well as by the fact that short-story tellers prove skillful at rendering a scene (i.e., a vivid or dramatic moment) in enough details to create the illusion that the reader is practically in its midst. This gave me the impression that I was ‘collecting’ the linguistic evidence myself.

First, I decided to use texts produced by the Romanian writer Mircea Eliade. There were two reasons behind my choice, namely that he is an outstanding figure in the context of Romanian short-story writing and that he is extensively translated into English. The latter reason provided me with an 'official' English version, which was indispensable to my analysis of the way Romanian primary metaphors are rendered in English.

Next, I had to decide upon an American or British author as close to Eliade's formation and style as possible. I chose the American Joyce Carol Oates because of the several similarities with Eliade she displays. Indeed, like Eliade, Oates is a prominent scholar and educator writing (short, but not only) fiction dealing with mystery, imagery, and myth.

The stories I selected are also quite similar, in that they all tell of an epiphany, i.e., an event, moment of insight, discovery, or revelation because of which a character's life (or view thereof) is greatly altered. Insofar as Eliade is concerned, I decided to analyze two of his most celebrated (by readers and by critics alike) short stories, namely *La Țigănci* ('With the Gypsy Girls') and *Pe Strada Mântuleasa* ('The Old Man and the Bureaucrats'). In the selection of Oates' stories, I took the liberty of using an exclusively subjective criterion, namely the emotional impact her stories had upon me. Thus, my interest in the inner feelings of women, in general, and mothers, in particular, made me choose *Phase Change* and *The Hand-puppet*, while my interest in childhood emotions and the repercussions they have on adult behavior determined me to pick *Schroeder's Stepfather*. Another criterion used in selecting the objects of my analysis was that they should be 3rd person narratives.

Here is a table providing some useful information concerning the five short stories under discussion:

Author	Title	Synopsis of the plot	No. Words	Total Words
Mircea Eliade	<i>La Țigănci</i>	A music teacher, Gavrilesco, accidentally walking past a brothel called <i>The Gypsy Girls</i> is tempted in by a young Gypsy girl. After a series of strange happenings during which Gavrilesco projects on the retina of his mind the story of his life, he leaves the establishment only to find himself in a different temporal dimension, namely the future.	13,860	43,380
Mircea Eliade	<i>Pe Strada Mântuleasa</i>	While being interrogated by the Secret Police, a retired school teacher, Zaharia Fărâmă, has the revelation of a gift he has: that of catching up with times past by the power of his memory, thus grasping the 'real' meaning of what he experienced 30 years before.	29,520	
Joyce Carol Oates	<i>Phase Change</i>	Julia Matterling, a woman "past the bloom of her youth", the wife of a reputed astronomer, experiences a series of nightmares (which she can hardly tell from reality) in which she is the victim of a sexual assault. These nightmares constitute a phase change in her life, as she wins her husband's attention.	7,752	20,820
Joyce Carol Oates	<i>The Hand-puppet</i>	Lorraine Lake painfully experiences "how strangeness enters our lives". One and the same day, she finds out that she has a tumor and that her daughter, Tippi, is 'strangely' different from other children.	5,148	
Joyce Carol Oates	<i>Schroeder's Stepfather</i>	During a post-storm tour of his stepfather's seashore estate, John Schroeder avails himself of the opportunity to avenge all the sufferings of his childhood caused by his drunkard and pitiless stepfather. He practically kills his stepfather but feels no remorse, considering that "Revenge is secret justice yes, but it is justice."	7,920	

Table 1. Content and length of texts analyzed.

The total number of words used in the two languages is, as seen in the table above, quite unbalanced. However, I did not regard total number of words as a relevant issue, as I directed my analysis towards the number of occurrences of primary metaphors per one thousand words, rather than towards the total number of primary metaphors.

Let us go back to the research questions again and explain how I answered them. The first two questions refer to the frequency of the overall use of primary metaphor in

Romanian and English literary texts and to whether this frequency is comparable, on the one hand, and to the specific primary metaphors found in the texts, to their frequency of occurrence, and to whether they appear on Grady's (1997) list, on the other.

My first endeavor was to identify primary metaphor realizations in the texts and determine to which specific metaphor the expression belonged. I carried this out in three steps. First, I read the texts with the only aim to feel the pleasure fiction-reading gives to 'ordinary mortals', i.e., to learn about the plot, to try and interpret events, and to analyze feelings – whether the characters' or my own. Second, I re-read the texts in search of conceptual metaphors, whether primary or complex. In doing so, I had in mind not only the definition of conceptual metaphor in the light of cognitive linguistics but also the list provided in Grady (1997). Whenever I came across a linguistic realization of a correlation between a source domain and a target domain, I highlighted it. Third, I tried to establish the nature of the two domains at issue (source and target, respectively) and went to Grady's (1997) list to look up the name of the primary metaphor expressing that correlation. For example, coming across the metaphor

ci l-a privit multă vreme pe gânduri (Pe Strada Mântuleasa, p.135)

but him-watched-3rd-sg much time on thoughts

'... but [the rabbi] regarded the boy thoughtfully for a long time' (*The Old Man and the Bureacrats*, p.50),

I concluded that it was based on a correlation between a state of mind (*pe gânduri* 'on thoughts') and a course of action (*l-a privit* 'him-watched'). Checking Grady's list, I noticed that the correlation between two such domains is expressed by the primary metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS.

As is customary in the literature of the field, I used small capitals to refer to the name of the mapping, i.e., the conceptual metaphor. I used the term ‘metaphorical expression’ to refer to the linguistic expression used to convey the conceptual mapping in actual speech situations – in other words, the linguistic realization of the mapping.

Mention should be made that whenever I used Romanian examples I gave the original expressions in the context in which they appeared, followed by glosses and the ‘official’ English translations. Mention should be made also that when the Romanian text had no overtly expressed grammatical subject (Romanian is rich in inflections, and pronoun subjects are, more often than not, felt redundant, and are ellipted), I indicated in the glosses the implicit information (person and number, respectively) carried by the subjectless verb form. Thus, *l-a privit* above shows that the action of ‘watching’ was performed by a 3rd person singular subject. The information carried by *a privit* is glossed as ‘watched-3rd-sg’, where 3rd and *sg* express the person and the number of the implied subject, respectively. The hyphens in ‘watched-3rd-sg’ are meant to indicate the richness of the morphological information (tense, person, number) carried by the verb form.

Inflections do not only occur with verb forms, though; they are present in nouns, as well. Romanian nouns also have a rich inflectional system, which not only tells singular from plural but also distinguishes between different cases and even marks definiteness. Thus, both the singular noun *dogoarea* and the plural noun *trupurilor* in the phrase *dogoarea trupurilor tinere* ‘the heat of the young bodies’ (*La Țigănci*, p.4) have the definite article suffixed to them. In addition, *trupurilor* is (as indicated by the inflection *-lor*) in the genitive case. Hence the glosses ‘heat-the’ and ‘bodies-the-of’, respectively. It should be emphasized, at the same time, that there is a tendency for Romanian

to use contracted forms for pronouns in object position. In this respect, *l-* in *l-a privit* refers to an object in the 3rd person singular masculine Accusative (cf. French [*il/elle*] *l'a regardé*). Last, but not least, it should be noted that Romanian uses the hyphen, rather than the apostrophe (as do English and French, for instance), with contractions. Whenever contractions occur in the Romanian text, my glosses display a hyphen between the equivalent of the Romanian contracted form and the word it is attached to; hence the first hyphen in the gloss 'him-watched-3rd-sg' in the example above.

Determining to which primary metaphor a particular expression belonged sometimes proved a difficult undertaking. This was especially the case when an expression was a combination of two or more primary metaphors, as in

... if *madness* might *pass through* a human being (*Phase Change*, p.199),

which is made up of three primary metaphors, namely: EVENTS ARE ACTIONS, CHANGE IS MOTION, and INANIMATE PHENOMENA ARE HUMAN AGENTS. I coded this metaphor as EVENTS ARE ACTIONS.

Another type of difficulty encountered was when two primary metaphors, for instance A SITUATION IS A LOCATION and STATES ARE LOCATIONS, have descriptions that look very much alike. Here are Grady's (1997) descriptions of the two metaphors:

A SITUATION IS A LOCATION

Motivation: The association between our location and the circumstances that affect us (See CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SURROUNDINGS).

And/or the correlation between our location and the courses of
action available to us.

(Grady, 1997, p.284)

STATES ARE (TEMPORARY) LOCATIONS

Motivation: (Corollary of CHANGE IS MOTION)

The correlation between our location and how we feel.

And/or the correlation between perceiving motion and being
aware of a change in the world-state around us.

(Grady, 1997, p.286)

It is occasionally difficult to tell 'the situation' we are in from 'the state' we are in. Thus, in the example *I'm in a pretty good position at work* (Grady, 1997, p.284), being in a good position can refer either to an important role one has at work or to a particular feeling caused by professional success. Therefore, one and the same linguistic expression could belong with two primary metaphors. That is why, following in Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) footsteps, I placed such expressions under the umbrella of STATES ARE LOCATIONS.

Some other times, the difficulty related to the classification of primary metaphors was due to the fact that the real linguistic situation proved more complex than it was expected to be in theory. Grady's (1997) list sometimes proved of little help. When faced with such difficulties, I resorted to considering the domains involved in the correlation I detected, upon which I tried to define the conceptual mapping involved. If the mapping did not quite match any of Grady's (1997) categories, I tried to define and label it myself. Such was the case with the newly labeled metaphors BEING IN CONTROL IS HOLDING

TIGHT and CONSIDERING IS MEASURING, instantiated respectively by *the unleashed anger* (*The Hand-puppet*, p.41) and by *le măsură din nou cu privirile* ‘them measured-3rd-sg again with glances-the’ (*La Țigănci*, p.13).

Likewise, there was an instance where I felt the need to enlarge the sphere of one of Grady’s (1997) categories – namely the category INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT, which I renamed INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE, thus hoping to make the metaphor better capture the correlation between emotion and fire – a correlation met in both languages, but especially in Romanian.

In answering the question referring to the frequency of the overall use of primary metaphor in English texts and Romanian texts, I followed three steps again. First, I did a manual computation of the words and the primary metaphors in each of the five short stories under discussion. Second, I determined the frequency of primary metaphors per one thousand words. Third, I determined the ratio between the number of primary metaphors and the total number of words in each of the short stories. In *La Țigănci*, for example, I identified 45 metaphorical expressions. Given that the total number of words is 13,860, it follows that there are approximately 3.25 metaphorical expressions per one thousand words ($45 \div 13.86 = 3.2467$). Or, alternatively, there is an average of one metaphorical expression every 308 words ($13,860 \div 45 = 308$). My findings in this respect are included in Chapter 3, Tables 2 and 4. Mention should be made that, just like Lakoff and Johnson (1980b), I used the word ‘metaphor’ to refer to conceptual mappings, and the word ‘metaphorical expression’ to refer to the actual linguistic realization of such mappings.

Another issue I was interested in had to do with whether primary metaphors operate cross-linguistically and, if so, whether the frequency of occurrence of such metaphors

is comparable. Table 6, Chapter 4, summarizes my findings in this respect, providing the name of the primary metaphor, the number of its occurrences in each of the short stories under analysis, and the total number of the metaphor's occurrences across texts and languages, respectively.

I decided to narrow down my analysis of specific primary metaphors to those that had a frequency rate of more than one per ten thousand words. Given the discrepancy between the word-totals I operated with in the two languages, that meant metaphors having 3 or more occurrences ($3 \div 2.082 = 1.44$) in Oates and metaphors occurring 5 or more times ($5 \div 4.338 = 1.15$) in Eliade.

In order to answer research question number 3 (“What factors might contribute to the differences and similarities found across the texts in the two languages?”), I examined the content of the texts and the linguistic structure of the metaphors encountered, trying to determine some specific cultural variables. I paid particular attention to the linguistic structure by means of which metaphors are realized. The reason why I did so was that, even though the two languages under discussion are both Western languages, I knew that there are countless differences between them, so I expected linguistic structure to be relevant to my study. English has lost most of its inflections and heavily relies on word order and function words (prepositions) as means of expressing relations between parts of speech. In contrast, Romanian has preserved a vast number of inflections; hence word order is much more flexible, and the use of prepositions less extensive.

In an endeavor to study the linguistic structure of metaphors, I classified them in terms of the parts of speech used for the vehicle. The term vehicle is used here to denote the ‘carrier’ of the metaphor; for instance, in the metaphor “it would *remain in memory*”

(*The Hand-puppet*, p.37), it is the prepositional phrase *in memory* that fulfills the role of carrier. My findings in this respect are presented in Tables 7, 8, and 9, Chapter 4.

When nouns, verbs, adjectives, or adverbs were used to express metaphors, these metaphors were labeled 'nominal', 'verbal', and 'adjectival/adverbial', respectively. I decided not to differentiate between adjectives and adverbs; as a result, adjectives and adverbs all went under one label. Here are two examples (one per language) for each of these categories:

➤ nominal metaphor

... the very *erasure* of the human soul (*Schroeder's Stepfather*, p.56)

[Gavrilescu] simțea în nări *dogoarea* trupurilor tinere (*La Țigănci*, p.14)

[Gavrilescu] felt in nostrils *heat-the* bodies-the-of young

'His nostrils were filled with the emanation of their young bodies' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.76)

➤ verbal metaphor

How strangeness *enters* our lives (*The Hand-puppet*, p.35).

... cu ochii *fugindu-i* peste stânci (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.143)

... with eyes-the *running-to-her* over rocks

'... glancing over the cliffs' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.64)

➤ adjectival/adverbial metaphor

Had his *terror-filled* eyes risen to lock themselves to his? (*Schroeder's Stepfather*, p.52)

... deși era cel mai neodihnit și mai *înflăcărat* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.136)

... although was-3rd-sg the most unrested and most *inflamed*

'... although he was the most restless and high-spirited of all' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.52)

Metaphors were labeled 'prepositional' when they appeared in a prepositional phrase, and 'phrasal' when they were expressed simultaneously by a verb and another part of speech, which was – in most of the cases – either a noun, with or without the definite article, or a prepositional phrase made up of a preposition and a noun. As I mentioned earlier, the metaphor is carried by the verb and the noun (whether with or without a preposition), so confusion between prepositional metaphors (i.e., metaphors carried by prepositions) and phrasal metaphors is quite unlikely to occur. Here are some examples of prepositional metaphors and phrasal metaphors that have been found in Oates and in Eliade, respectively:

➤ prepositional metaphors

She was certainly *in no danger* (*Phase Change*, p.188)

Gavrilescu rămase multă vreme *pe gânduri* (*La Țigănci*, p.24)

Gavrilescu remained much time *on thoughts*

'Gavrilesco remained lost in thought for some time' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.89)

➤ phrasal metaphors

...it fell to Lorraine, the mother, to *take note of the time* (*The Hand-puppet*, p.41)

... că mi-am pierdut mințile după Leana (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.159)

... that to-me *lost-Ist-sg minds-the* after Leana

'...that I'd lost my mind over her' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.89)

... am căzut și eu în *patima* cârciumii din Popa Soare (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.158)

... *fell* also I *in passion-the* of tavern-the in Popa Soare

'I, too, took a great liking to the café in Popa Soare' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.89);

The last example contains the phrasal metaphor *a cădea în patima* 'to fall into the passion (of)', a metaphor carried both by the verb *a cădea* 'to fall' and by the noun *patima* 'the passion (of)' occurring after the preposition *în* 'in'.

The way the metaphors found in the Romanian texts were translated into English was of interest, as well (see research question 4). My analysis focused mostly on whether the Romanian metaphors were translated by metaphors or, rather, were rendered non-metaphorically. When the English translation was rendered metaphorically, I was also

interested in whether or not the metaphors in the two languages were instantiations of the same category. My findings in this respect are presented in Table 10, Chapter 4.

In quite a number of instances, the 'official' English translation displays the same metaphor as the Romanian original does. For instance, ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS appears both in the Romanian text and the English translation:

... *ți-ai pierdut memoria* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.123)

... to-yourself *have-2nd-sg lost memory-the*

'You've lost your memory' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.30).

When the Romanian original and the English translation do not rely on the same metaphor, I tried to study the kind of relation existing between the two different primary metaphors and thus to establish whether the choice was determined culturally or it was rooted in the individuality of the translator. For instance, the Romanian INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE in the example below is rendered in the English translation by the complex metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS and HAPPY IS UP:

... *deși el era cel mai neodihnit și mai înflăcărat* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.136)

... although was-3rd-sg the most unrested and most *inflamed*

'... although he was the most restless and *high-spirited* of all' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.52).

In other instances, a metaphor in the Romanian text was not rendered by means of a metaphor in the English text. Here is such an instance:

... *îți faci iluzii* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.161)

... *to-yourself make-2nd-sg illusions*

'... you delude yourself' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.93)

For Romanians, deluding oneself means making/fabricating illusions, i.e., false ideas or beliefs.

When confronted with such instances, I tried to assess how much 'blame' to put on cultural and linguistic differences, on the one hand, and the extent to which the translator was 'guilty' for the missing metaphors, on the other.

Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the English texts, followed by an analysis of the Romanian texts. In each of the two languages under discussion, the most frequently occurring metaphors are focused upon.

CHAPTER III

3. Textual analysis

Three English and two Romanian texts were analyzed separately with a view to determining: how frequent the overall use of primary metaphor in these texts was (section 3.1.1, for Oates; section 3.2.1, for Eliade), which specific primary metaphors identified by Grady (1997) were employed by the two writers and how frequently they occurred (section 3.1.2, for Oates; section 3.2.2, for Eliade), and whether there were any primary metaphors occurring in the texts that did not appear on Grady's (1997) list (section 3.1.3, for Oates; section 3.2.3, for Eliade). Some of the most frequently used metaphors were analyzed in greater detail, with insistency on the correspondences they rely upon (section 3.1.4, for Oates; section 3.2.4, for Eliade).

I started the textual analysis with Oates' short stories (section 3.2) and continued with Eliade's (section 3.3). The cross-cultural interpretation of the data obtained here is given in Chapter 4.

3.1. Textual analysis – Joyce Carol Oates

Three short stories by Joyce Carol Oates were analyzed. The three short stories are as follows: *Phase Change*, *The Hand-puppet*, and *Schroeder's Stepfather*.

3.1.1. Frequency of overall use of primary metaphor in Oates' texts

The primary metaphors occurring in the above-mentioned short stories were identified. I resorted to a manual computation of metaphors in Oates' texts in order to get an

idea of the frequency with which primary metaphors appeared in English texts. Frequency was established per thousand words. I was not interested in studying the frequency *per se*; that is why I was not concerned by the approximative character of manual computation. Rather, I was interested in getting data to be compared with the findings obtained through the analysis of the Romanian texts under study. I considered that this data comparison might help me to draw some general cross-cultural conclusions concerning the use of primary metaphor.

Here is a table with the data I obtained:

Text	No. of words	No. of metaphors	Metaphors per 1000 words	Metaphor to words ratio
<i>Phase Change</i>	7,752	25	3.2249	1÷310.08
<i>The Hand-puppet</i>	5,148	33	6.4102	1÷156
<i>Schroeder's Stepfather</i>	7,920	34	4.2929	1÷232.94
Overall	20,820	92	4.4188	1÷227.39

Table 2. Frequency of occurrence of primary metaphors in Oates' texts.

My first endeavor was to find the total number of words in each of the three stories as well as the sum-total of my English corpus. Then I counted the primary metaphors in each short story, thus establishing the total number of primary metaphors Oates used in the texts under analysis. This helped me find both Oates' number of metaphors per one thousand words (crucial to my cross-cultural analysis) and her metaphor to words ratio.

3.1.2. Specific primary metaphors in Oates' texts

The metaphors encountered in Oates' discourse almost entirely belong to the categories of primary metaphor mentioned in Grady's (1997) list. I ordered them in the following table, starting with the least frequently appearing ones and ending with the most frequently used ones. There is one category, namely BEING IN CONTROL IS HOLD-

ING TIGHT, which I myself created in an attempt to classify a metaphor which seemed not to fit any of Grady's (1997) categories.

Here is a table summarizing my findings:

Metaphor	No. of occurrences			
	<i>Phase Change</i>	<i>The Hand-puppet</i>	<i>Schroeder's Stepfather</i>	Total
PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES	1	-	-	1
EXISTENCE IS VISIBILITY	-	-	1	1
DIFFICULTY/HARDSHIP IS HEAVINESS	-	-	1	1
KNOWING IS SEEING	-	-	1	1
CAUSES ARE RESOURCES	-	-	1	1
HAPPY IS UP	-	-	1	1
ANALYZING IS CUTTING	-	-	1	1
SYMPATHY IS SOFTNESS	-	-	1	1
BEING IN CONTROL IS HOLDING TIGHT	-	1	-	1
CHANGE IS MOTION	2	-	-	2
INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE	-	-	3	3
INTERRELATEDNESS IS PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS	-	2	1	3
MOMENTS IN TIME ARE OBJECTS IN MOTION ALONG A PATH	2	3	-	5
ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS	4	6	1	11
STATES ARE LOCATIONS	1	13	13	27
EVENTS ARE ACTIONS	17	11	9	37
TOTAL	27	36	34	97

Table 3. Specific primary metaphors in Oates' texts.

As one can easily see, the metaphors most frequently occurring in Oates' discourse are EVENTS ARE ACTIONS (37 occurrences) and STATES ARE LOCATIONS (27 oc-

currences). These metaphors, as well as all the other metaphors occurring at least three times in Oates' texts (thus meeting the requirement of a rate of frequency of more than one per ten thousand words mentioned in Chapter 2) are analyzed in detail in 3.1.4.

3.1.3. Newly labeled primary metaphors in Oates

In my analysis of Oates' texts, I came across an instance of primary metaphor which seems to fall under none of Grady's categories. It is the primary metaphor *the unleashed anger* (*The Hand-puppet*, p.41). This metaphor has to do with control, namely control over a feeling. Going through Grady's (1997) list of primary metaphors, in search of a correlation involving control, one will find the primary metaphor BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE, which is motivated by "the correlation between being in a higher physical position and having greater control over objects, people, or situations" (Grady, 1997, p.290). Clearly, no higher physical position is involved in *the unleashed anger*.

Generally, having things at hand and holding them tight seems very important when control is at stake. When an object is at hand, we can use it according to our will. We are in control over it. When there is no physical contact between us and the object, our control over it generally diminishes, sometimes even vanishes. These were the considerations that led me to label this primary metaphor BEING IN CONTROL IS HOLDING TIGHT, whose underlying motivation is the correlation between control over objects/people/situations and physical contact.

3.1.4. Frequently occurring metaphors in Oates' texts

As mentioned earlier, the most frequently met with primary metaphors in Oates' texts are EVENTS ARE ACTIONS and STATES ARE LOCATIONS (37 and 27 occurrences, respectively). The high frequency of these two metaphors is indicative of how important

our presence in the world is, on the one hand, and of how important our actions and our mental states are to us, on the other.

The primary metaphor EVENTS ARE ACTIONS is motivated by “the correlation between observable events in our environment and the presence of human agents” (Grady, 1997, p.288).

Here are some instantiations of this metaphor found in Oates:

The sensation of dread and excitement was beginning *to lift* (*Phase Change*, p.193);

How strangeness *enters* our lives (*The Hand-puppet*, p.35).

Actions such as lifting and entering are typically associated with human agents and/or living creatures.

The STATES ARE LOCATIONS primary metaphor is born out of “the correlation between our location and how we feel and/or the correlation between perceiving motion and being aware of a change in the world-state around us” (Grady, 1997, p.286).

Here are some realizations of this metaphor identified in Oates:

The puppet squirmed *in exaggerated delight* (*The Hand-puppet*, p.36);

Lorraine stared *in disbelief* (*The Hand-puppet*, p.46),

where states such as extreme happiness and doubt, respectively, are expressed by means of locations.

As already mentioned (see Chapter 2), I found it difficult to determine whether some metaphors belonged to STATES ARE LOCATIONS or A SITUATION IS A LOCATION.

Grady's (1997) descriptions of the mappings involved in these metaphors are very much alike. In my opinion, the correlation "between our location and the circumstances that affect us" (Grady, 1997, p.284) is similar to the one "between our location and how we feel" (Grady, 1997, p.286). I consider that the circumstances that affect us make us feel in a certain way and that when we describe a situation we are in we actually refer to a state or state of mind. As a matter of fact, Grady (1997) may have noticed this similarity himself, as in the examples he gives under STATES ARE LOCATIONS he introduces the word 'state,' in an attempt perhaps to differentiate between the two similar metaphors:

He was *in* a state of shock after the accident.

The bridge is still *in* a state of disrepair.

(Grady, 1997, p.286)

Consequently, like Lakoff and Johnson (1999), I decided to collapse the categories A SITUATION IS A LOCATION and STATES ARE LOCATIONS into one, namely STATES ARE LOCATIONS.

The next most frequent primary metaphor in Oates' texts is ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS (11 instances). Possession has always played an important role in human life. We still have the tendency to characterize people based on what they possess. We correlate our physical relationships associated with possession with cognitive 'reference point' relations and we obtain the primary metaphor ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS (Grady, 1997, p.281).

Here are some linguistic realizations of this metaphor that have been found in Oates's texts:

Tippi *had had an interest...* (*The Hand-puppet*, p.35);

If Lorraine Lake *had had a life...* (*The Hand-puppet*, p.38);

... but she *had a dislike* of sharing (*The Hand-puppet*, p.42);

... or *lose his temper* (*Schroeder's Stepfather*, p.38);

Doctor, I *have such dreams...* (*Phase Change*, p.202);

I'm so frightened of *losing my mind...* (*Phase Change*, p.202).

As suggested by the examples above, we possess not only physical, material things but also abstractions such as interest, life, dislike, temper, dreams, etc.

MOMENTS IN TIME ARE OBJECTS IN MOTION ALONG A PATH occurs 5 times in Oates' texts. Although her short stories under analysis deal with a particular moment in time, this moment is presented in the context of other moments that are responsible for, or have some connection with, that particular moment. This accounts for the fact that people are aware that their existence unfolds under the signs of time and change. MOMENTS IN TIME ARE OBJECTS IN MOTION ALONG A PATH expresses "the correlation between the perception of motion and the awareness that the world-state has changed from one moment to the next" (Grady, 1997, p.287).

Here are some instantiations of this primary metaphor occurring in Oates' texts:

It was the night *following* the day of embarrassment at the art museum (*Phase Change*, p.206);

... the *time moved* dangerously beyond 8 A.M. (*The Hand-puppet*, p.41);

... ten years *before*, most of this area had been farmland (*The Hand-puppet*, p.42).

As the examples above show, moments in time are conceived as being in perpetual motion. They either precede, or follow, or move along with other moments in time.

INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT has 3 occurrences in Oates' texts. This metaphor is rooted in the fact that what we feel with our souls is closely correlated with what we feel with our bodies. "The correlation between skin temperature and agitation and/or the correlation between the heat of objects and the agitation it causes us to touch/be near them" (Grady, 1997, p.295) will lead to the primary metaphor INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT.

Here are two linguistic realizations of this metaphor found in Oates' short stories under analysis:

In his imagination, which had been, since earliest childhood, a *fevered imagination*, it had seemed that his mother... (*Schroeder's Stepfather*, p.53);

Certainly he was, of all men and women of his acquaintance, [...] the most *icy-calm* (*Schroeder's Stepfather*, p.63).

A 'fevered imagination' is hot, agitated, and restless – just like our body is, when overcome with fever or when touching hot things. On the other hand, less heat brings about less 'agitation', engendering coldness and thus a more static condition. It is this attribute of ice that is correlated with the static condition brought about by calmness.

The third realization of this metaphor is somewhat different from the first two, in that the correlation is made, not with heat, but with fire:

... [Jack Schroeder's] small bright eyes *lit* with merriment or malice...

(*Schroeder's Stepfather*, p.53).

Given the fact that heat and fire are very closely interrelated, I decided not to create a new category INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS FIRE but, rather, to enlarge the sphere of Grady's (1997) INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT by renaming it INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE.

INTERRELATEDNESS IS PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS also has 3 occurrences in Oates' texts. The very existence of this metaphor is supportive of the idea that physical structure (i.e., the structure we have the closest at hand) represents a raw model for the logical structure in the human mind. INTERRELATEDNESS IS PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS is motivated by "the correlation between intricate physical structure and complex logical interdependence" (Grady, 1997, p.283).

Here is an instance of this primary metaphor identified in Oates' discourse:

His nerves, *severed*, needed *knitting-up* again (*Schroeder's Stepfather*, p.66).

In order to become strong and to function successfully again, Schroeder's nerves needed to be made to work closely together.

Although I found only one instance of the metaphor PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES (and even that single instance occurred as part of a complex metaphor), I consider this presence very valuable for my cross-cultural study – and consequently worth mentioning here. This primary metaphor is motivated by "the correlation between ani-

macy and activity” (Grady, 1997, p.289). In Oates’ discourse, it is combined with STATES ARE LOCATIONS:

... an attractive woman past *the bloom* of her youth (*Phase Change*, p.192).

When people are ‘in the bloom’ of their life, they experience the time of being ‘in flower’, i.e., a time of vigor, freshness, and beauty. Their vigorous physical condition, along with the positive attitude vis-à-vis the model it brings about, will make them become very animated and active.

3.2. Textual analysis – Mircea Eliade

Two short stories by Mircea Eliade were analyzed, namely *La Țigănci* (translated into English as ‘With the Gypsy Girls’) and *Pe Strada Mântuleasa* (translated as ‘The Old Man and the Bureaucrats’). The approach to Eliade’s texts follows the pattern of study used in Oates. The comparison of the two authors’ texts will be done in Chapter 4.

3.2.1. Frequency of overall use of primary metaphor in Eliade’s texts

I undertook a manual computation of the metaphors encountered in the Romanian texts as well. I included the data I obtained in the following table:

Text	No. of words	No. of metaphors	Frequency per 1000 words	Metaphor to words ratio
<i>La Țigănci</i>	13,860	45	3.2467	1:308
<i>Pe Strada Mântuleasa</i>	29,520	82	2.7777	1:360
Overall	43,380	127	2.9276	1:341.57

Table 4. Frequency of occurrence of primary metaphors in Eliade’s texts.

3.2.2. Specific primary metaphors in Eliade's texts

The specific metaphors that have been identified in Eliade's texts are included in the following table. The order in which the metaphors are displayed is, like in Oates' case, from the least frequent to the most frequent. There is a category in the table which does not appear on Grady's (1997) list. It is the category CONSIDERING IS MEASURING. I labeled this category in an attempt to classify a metaphor which seemed not to exactly fit into Grady's (1997) categories.

Metaphor	No. of occurrences		
	<i>La Țigănci</i>	<i>Pe Strada Mântuleasa</i>	Total
TIME PERIODS ARE CONTAINERS	1	-	1
BAD IS FOUL-SMELLING	1	-	1
APPEALING IS TASTY	-	1	1
CONSIDERING IS LOOKING AT	-	1	1
CONSIDERING IS WEIGHING	1	-	1
CONSIDERING IS MEASURING	1	-	1
ANALYZING IS CUTTING	-	1	1
ACTIVITY IS LIFE	-	1	1
INACTIVITY IS DEATH	-	1	1
SYMPATHY IS SOFTNESS	-	2	2
AFFECTION IS WARMTH	2	-	2
GOOD IS BRIGHT	1	1	2
QUANTITY IS SIZE	1	1	2
MEANS ARE PATHS	-	3	3

IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL	-	3	3
DEGREE TO WHICH AN ATTRIBUTE DEFINES AN ENTITY IS DEPTH	1	2	3
CHANGE IS MOTION	-	4	4
BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE	1	3	4
INTERRELATEDNESS IS PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS	-	5	5
AN EVENT IS THE MOTION OF AN OBJECT	2	3	5
VISION IS PHYSICAL CONTACT	2	3	5
TIME IS A RESOURCE	2	3	5
EFFECTS ARE TRANSFERRED OBJECTS	4	2	6
ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE	-	6	6
MOMENTS IN TIME ARE OBJECTS IN MOTION ALONG A PATH	1	6	7
INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE	2	8	10
ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS	6	6	12
PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES	6	8	14
STATES ARE LOCATIONS	9	15	24
EVENTS ARE ACTIONS	11	15	26
TOTAL	55	104	159

Table 5. Specific primary metaphors in Eliade's texts.

As noticeable in *Table 5*, the primary metaphors most frequently met with in Eliade are EVENTS ARE ACTIONS (26 occurrences), STATES ARE LOCATIONS (24 occurrences), PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES (14 occurrences), ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS

(12 occurrences), and INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE (10 occurrences). These metaphors, along with the other metaphors that have at least 5 occurrences in Eliade's texts, are analyzed in detail in section 3.2.4. How these numbers of occurrences have been arrived at is accounted for in Chapter 2.

3.2.3. Newly labeled primary metaphors in Eliade

I found in Eliade's discourse a metaphor which, even though closely related to Grady's (1997) CONSIDERING IS WEIGHING, could nevertheless not be included into that category. I labeled this metaphor CONSIDERING IS MEASURING. While Grady's CONSIDERING IS WEIGHING is motivated by "the correlation between weight and other salient properties such as value" (1997, p.297), the Eliade metaphor I have in mind is motivated by the correlation between the measuring dimensions (not weight) of an object and other salient properties such as value.

Here is the context in which this primary metaphor appears in Eliade:

... le măsură din nou *cu privirile* (*La Țigănci*, p.13)

... them *measured-3rd-sg* again *with glances-the*

'... [he smiled and] looked at them *searchingly*' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.75).

We do not measure objects and people only to determine their physical dimensions but also to become aware of their intrinsic qualities, especially their worth.

3.2.4. Frequently occurring metaphors in Eliade's texts

As explained in Chapter 2, only those metaphors became the object of detailed analysis which displayed an occurrence ratio of more than one per ten thousand words. In

Eliade's texts, this ratio encompasses metaphors whose total number of occurrences is equal with (or exceeds) five.

In Eliade, like in Oates, the most numerous primary metaphors are EVENTS ARE ACTIONS (26 instances) and STATES ARE LOCATIONS (24 instances). This suggests that for Eliade, like for Oates, human presence in the world and the states humans are in are of utmost importance.

The primary metaphor EVENTS ARE ACTIONS is motivated by "the correlation between observable events in our environment and the presence of human agents" (Grady, 1997, p.288).

Here are some realizations of this metaphor found in Eliade's texts:

... *îți aduci aminte (Pe Strada Mântuleasa, p.123)*

... *to-yourself bring-2nd-sg memory*

'... you remember' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats, p.31*);

... *îți faci iluzii (Pe Strada Mântuleasa, p.93)*

... *to-yourself make-2nd-sg illusions*

'... you delude yourself' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats, p.93*);

... *arșița care [...] l-a lovit în creștet (La Țigănci, p.5)*

... *heat-the which [...] him-hit in head-top*

'... the intense heat [...] which smote him on the top of his head' (*With the Gypsy Girls, p.64*);

... *s-a oprit să-și tragă răsuflarea (La Țigănci, p.16)*

... *himself-halted-3rd-sg to-himself pull breath-the*

‘... he stopped to catch his breath’ (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.78).

Humans can act not only on the physical world (e.g., they can ‘catch’ their breath) but also on abstractions, being able ‘to bring’ memories, ‘to make’ illusions. The physical world, in its turn, has its own power over humans. For example, heat can ‘smite/hit’ them.

The primary metaphor STATES ARE (TEMPORARY) LOCATIONS relies on “the correlation between our location and how we feel” (Grady, 1997, p.286).

Here are some instances of this metaphor found in Eliade’s stories:

Când eram în dragoste cu Hildegard (La Țigănci, p.15)

When was-1st-sg in love with Hildegard

‘When I was in love with Hildegard’ (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.77);

... rămase multă vreme pe gânduri (La Țigănci, p.24)

... remained-3rd-sg much time on thoughts

‘... remained lost in thought’ (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.89).

Humans can build themselves a special world, where their feelings and emotions can be displayed, nourished, and shared. Thus, people can find themselves in the realm of love or that of thought, which keeps their feelings and minds alive.

Oftentimes, in Eliade’s discourse STATES ARE LOCATIONS and EVENTS ARE ACTIONS are combined. Such is the case in the examples to follow:

... am căzut și eu în patima cârciumii din Popa Soare (Pe Strada Mântuleasa, p.158)

... *fell* also I *in passion-the* of tavern-the in Popa Soare

'I, too, took a great liking to the café in Popa Soare' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.89);

Asta *v-a pus pe gânduri* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.123)

This you-*set on thoughts*

'This set you thinking' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.31).

Fărâmă found himself 'in the passion' of the tavern in Popa Soare street as a consequence of the action of *falling*. Likewise, he was 'on thoughts' as a result of being *set* there.

PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES appears quite frequently as well (14 occurrences), which is illustrative of the fact that Eliade's short stories swarm with life. Man and man's busy life are the essence of Eliade's stories. No wonder that one of the most generously represented primary metaphors is PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES, whose underlying motivation is "the correlation between animacy and activity" (Grady, 1997, p.289).

Here is a realization of this primary metaphor detected in Eliade's discourse:

... începu Borza *îmbujorându-se* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.121)

... began Borza *making-himself-peony-like*

'... began Borza *blushing*' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.31).

This linguistic realization in Romanian of the primary metaphor PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES deserves special attention not only because it is met with fairly frequently in Eliade's short stories (5 occurrences) but also because it represents a genuinely Romanian linguistic association. Thus, *îmbujorându-se* is a non-finite form of the reflexive verb

a se îmbujora. The verb came into being through a process of conversion-plus-suffixation from the noun *bujor* ‘peony’, “a medium-sized garden plant which has large round flowers, usually pink, red, or white” (COBUILD, p.1223). It is the pink/red flower that Romanians have in mind when associating the peony with the blush occasionally appearing in people’s cheeks. *A se îmbujora* is therefore a noun-based verb suggesting that pink/red peonies can sometimes be seen in people’s cheeks as a mirror of certain feelings (e.g., embarrassment, pleasure, shyness). People having peonies in their cheeks can, also, be considered healthy; after all, a flower (i.e., a symbol of life) shines in their cheeks.

Here is another linguistic realization of PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES that has been found in Eliade’s short stories:

... Darvari, scieți, se făcuse palid și *împietrise* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.178)

... Darvari, write-2nd-sg polite form, himself-had-made pale and *had petrified*
‘Darvari, you write, was dumbfounded and turned pale’ (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.120).

When something petrifies, it ceases to change and develop (COBUILD, pp.1234-1235); in other words, it ceases to live (be it for a short period of time only, as in our example). For a short while, Darvari turned into stone. He was overwhelmed by emotion and became motionless, helpless, almost dead.

Although the following instance of the primary metaphor PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES is, together with STATES ARE LOCATIONS and TIME PERIODS ARE CONTAINERS, part of another complex metaphor, I think it is worth mentioning it, since its linguistic realization is quite similar to one found in Oates. I will discuss the significance of this similarity in Chapter Four.

La patruzeci și nouă de ani bărbatul e în floarea vârstei (*La Țigănci*, p.7)

At forty and nine of years man-the is in bloom-the age-the-of

'At forty-nine a man is in the prime of life' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.67).

Let us consider a last realization of the primary metaphor PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES. It also points out how important plant life is for Romanians. Indeed, green life (plant life) is often seen as a symbol of Life itself.

... cu obrazul palid și veștejit (*La Țigănci*, p.26)

... with cheek-the pale and *withered*

'...with a pale and withered face' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.92).

As the examples above show, faces are sometimes subject to change: they bloom, they glow with peonies, they petrify, they fade, they wither.

Like in Oates, the primary metaphor ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS is a frequent presence in Eliade's texts under analysis, where it occurs 12 times. Such a frequency of occurrence is suggestive of the fact that speakers of English and speakers of Romanian alike take a real interest in possessions and anything related to them. ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS is motivated by "the correlation between cognitive 'reference point' relations and the physical relationships associated with possession and/or the tendency to categorize people based on objects they possess" (Grady, 1997, p.281).

Here are some linguistic realizations of this primary metaphor found in Eliade:

... ți-ai pierdut memoria (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.123)

... to-yourself have-2nd-sg lost memory-the

‘You’ve lost your memory’ (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.30);

... valoarea literară a declarațiilor dumitale n-are nici o importanță (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.160)

... value-the literary declarations-the-of your not-have-3rd-sg nor an importance

‘... the literary value of your statements is not important’ (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.92);

...n-am nici atâta imaginație (*La Țigănci*, p.14)

... not-have-1st-sg nor that much imagination

‘... I don’t have sufficient imagination’ (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.75);

... cu privirile pierdute (*La Țigănci*, p.20)

... with glances-the lost

‘... with a far away look in his eyes’ (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.83);

... avea dreptate (*La Țigănci*, p.28)

... had-3rd-sg justice

‘... she was right’ (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.95).

These examples illustrate how ‘rich’ we are and how diverse our possessions are. We can possess imagination, memory, importance, glances, justice, and many other abstract things the way we possess material objects.

INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE, represented in Eliade by 10 linguistic realizations, is a primary metaphor relying on our direct bodily experience. As mentioned

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Dar el *se aprindea* repede (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.157)

But he *himself lit* quickly

'... he'd get excited' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.88);

...deși era cel mai neodihnit și mai *înflăcărat* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.136)

...although was-3rd-sg the most unrested and most *inflamed*

'...although he was the most restless and high-spirited of all' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.52).

The frequency of occurrence of MOMENTS IN TIME ARE OBJECTS IN MOTION ALONG A PATH (7 linguistic realizations, in Eliade's texts) is indicative of the fact that Romanians are aware that life is governed by change, motion, and time. The underlying motivation of MOMENTS IN TIME ARE OBJECTS IN MOTION ALONG A PATH is "the correlation between the perception of motion and the awareness that the world-state has changed between one moment and the next" (Grady, 1997, p.287).

Here are some instantiations of this primary metaphor that were found in Eliade's texts:

... câteva clipe *în urmă* (*La Țigănci*, p.26)

... a few moments *behind*

'A few moments later' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.92);

... cu puține *săptămâni înainte* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.173)

... with few *weeks before*

'... a few weeks ago' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.113);

Au trecut de mult cele câteva secunde (Pe Strada Mântuleasa, p.164)

Passed-3rd-pl for long those few seconds

'Those few seconds are long gone' (The Old Man and the Bureaucrats, p.98).

As the examples above indicate, moments, weeks, and seconds can move. They can be before us or behind us, or they can simply go past us regardless of our location in time.

EFFECTS ARE TRANSFERRED OBJECTS has 6 occurrences in Eliade's texts. This metaphor is motivated by the correlation existing "between receiving a transferred object and being affected by this transfer in some way" (Grady, 1997, p. 289).

Here is a linguistic realization of this metaphor found in Eliade:

Să începem cu complexul numărul 1, a cărui cheie ne este dată prin analiza diferitelor variante (Pe Strada Mântuleasa, p.175)

Let's begin with complex-the number-the 1, whose key to us is given through analysis-the different-the-of variants

'Let's consider Complex Number One, to which an analysis of the different variants of Oana's wedding gives us a clue' (The Old Man and the Bureaucrats, p.117).

In the example above, an object is transferred: a key is provided, which is helpful in decoding some important things through careful analysis.

(LOGICAL) ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE has 6 occurrences in the Eliade texts. This primary metaphor is motivated by the correlation existing between "ob-

serving the part – whole structure of objects and forming cognitive representation of the logical relationships holding within them” (Grady, 1997, p.282).

Here is an instantiation of this metaphor found in Eliade:

Cred că pe aici trebuie căutat *firul* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.123)

Think-1st-sg that on here must sought *thread-the*

‘Here’s where I think we ought to look for the clue’ (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.30).

In other words, what happens to us can be associated with a fabric the understanding of which relies on our figuring out what the main thread (i.e., the clue) is.

The two Eliade texts under analysis display 5 occurrences of the primary metaphor AN EVENT IS THE MOTION OF AN OBJECT. As pointed out by Grady (1997), this metaphor is closely related to MOMENTS IN TIME ARE OBJECTS IN MOTION ALONG A PATH, thus being motivated by the “correlation between the perception of motion and the awareness that the world state has changed between one moment and the next” (Grady, 1997, p.287).

Here are some linguistic realizations of AN EVENT IS THE MOTION OF AN OBJECT found in Eliade, in which glances, voice, and veracity are presented as objects that can be moved, manipulated, or handled like any physical object:

... neîndrăznind să-și *ridice privirile* (*La Țigănci*, p.30)

... undaring to-himself *raise glances-the*

‘... not daring to raise his eyes’ (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.97);

... *coborînd* brusc *glasul* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.124)

... *lowering* brusquely *voice-the*

'[Dumitrescu] lowered his voice abruptly' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.32);

... [ea] nu dăduse nici un semn că *pune la îndoială* veracitatea povestirii (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.167)

... [she] not had given nor a sign that *puts to doubt* veracity-the of story-the

'she hadn't shown a sign of doubting the truth of the story' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.104).

TIME IS A RESOURCE is also instantiated 5 times in Eliade. Romanians, like the English-speaking people, have realized that time moves imperturbably, disregarding people's ability to keep the pace. In spite of time's 'indifference' towards people, the latter have always considered it a valuable and "limited resource", "a valuable commodity" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b). Time is a valuable resource, a thing we must handle with care if we want to achieve something in our lives. This correlation between "material possession and chances of achieving goals" represents the underlying motivation of the primary metaphor TIME IS A RESOURCE, which is a corollary of OPPORTUNITIES ARE RESOURCES (Grady, 1997, p.287). Romanians have made the same correlations, and thus the primary metaphor is present in the Romanian language as well, as the following examples from Eliade will show:

... *să-mi pierd timpul* prin cafenele (*La Țigănci*, p.16)

... to-myself *lose time-the* in cafés

'... to waste my time in cafés' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.79);

Toate poveștile astea cu Școala Mântuleasa le spune ca să câștige timp (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.12)

All stories-the these with School Mântuleasa them tells so as to gain time

'All these stories about Mântuleasa School he's telling to gain time' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.29);

... eu nu prea am timp de citit (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.139)

... I not too much have-Ist-sg time for read

'I don't have much time to read' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.57);

... cer numai câteva secunde (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.164)

... ask-Ist-sg only a few seconds

'... I'll just ask for a few more seconds' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.98).

The examples above suggest that we can 'gain' time, 'possess' time, 'waste' time, and even 'beg for' time from those who seem to have enough of it to be able to grant some.

VISION IS PHYSICAL CONTACT also has five linguistic realizations in the Romanian texts under study. Vision is one of the most important sensorimotor experiences we have, one of the most important 'contacts' we have with the outside world. This 'contact' is responsible for a considerable amount of our world knowledge. VISION IS PHYSICAL CONTACT is motivated by "the correlation between seeing and touching objects as we interact with them" (Grady, 1997, p.298).

Here is an instance of the primary metaphor VISION IS PHYSICAL CONTACT found in Eliade's discourse:

... cu ochii fugindu-i peste stânci (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.143)

... with eyes-the running to him over cliffs

'... glancing over the cliffs' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.64).

In this example, the primary metaphor VISION IS PHYSICAL CONTACT is part of a complex metaphor and is combined with EVENTS ARE ACTIONS. The eyes run over the cliffs. Direct contact is thus inevitable, and the eyes touch the cliffs.

Here is another instance of VISION IS PHYSICAL CONTACT occurring in Eliade:

Darvari, scrieți, se făcuse palid și împietrise cu *privirile pironite* asupra ei (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.178)

Darvari, write-2nd-sg polite form, himself-had made pale and had petrified with *glances-the nailed down* upon her

'Darvari, you write, was dumbfounded and turned pale, his glance fixed upon her' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.120).

Like in the previous example, the directness and the physical nature of the contact is emphasized. The man's glances are nailed upon the girl, i.e., firmly attached to her.

INTERRELATEDNESS IS PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS has a frequency of 5 occurrences, as well. It is motivated by "the correlation between existing intricate physical structure and complex logical interdependence" (Grady, 1997, p. 283).

Here are some instances of this metaphor found in Eliade:

Băieții se leagă între ei ca frații. (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.168)

Boys-the *themselves bind* among themselves like brothers-the

'The boys bind themselves to each other like brothers.' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.105).

Brothers exhibit strong family ties. They are the same flesh and blood; therefore, they are tied forever. This gives them strength and confidence. Likewise, boys establish a close relationship among themselves because they want to be strong, to reach and preserve a leading position in a hierarchical system of gender in which they are culturally predestined to have the upper hand.

Și toate câte i s-au întâmplat ei, Oanei, se datorau, *s-au legat* și *s-au urzit* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.140)

And all how-many to-her happened to her, to Oana, owed-3rd-pl to, *themselves-tied-3rd-pl* and *themselves-wove-3rd-pl*

'... and everything that happened to her, to Oana, was due to, related to and fated...' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.58).

Therefore, all that happens in one's life is tied, woven, interconnected. This may be so in order to enable people to make out the meaning of their life.

Even though complex metaphors are not the object of my study, I think a particular instance of complex metaphor identified in Eliade's discourse, namely (LOGICAL) ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and INTERRELATEDNESS IS PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS will help us understand how strongly influenced our minds are by our direct physical experiences with the material world.

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which is beyond the scope of the present thesis. However, I consider that an analysis of literary texts entitles the analyst to draw some valid general conclusions concerning the ways the human mind and language work, as I espouse Turner's view that "literature and cognition are doors into each other" (1996, p.11), both opening onto language.

4.2. Specific primary metaphors

4.2.1. Categorization

Significant for the present study is the fact that primary metaphor is omnipresent in all the texts chosen for study. The fact that almost all the encountered metaphors fell under Grady's (1997) categories is also important. It validates Grady *et al.*'s (1996) claim that primitives (i.e., primary metaphors) are metaphors with the most direct motivation and the least arbitrary structure and that they should be the most common cross-linguistically. Thus, for English people and Romanian people, the same sensorimotor experiences are the starting point for the same subjective experiences and judgments and implicitly the same primary metaphors. Our common experience with heat and hot objects leads us to the metaphor INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE.

In his imagination, which had been, since earliest childhood, a *fevered imagination*, it had seemed that his mother... (*Schroeder's Stepfather*, p.53);

... îi simți în spate *respirația fierbinte* (*La Țigănci*, p.20)

...of her felt-3rd-sg in back *breath-the hot*

' he felt her ardent breath on the back of his neck' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.83).

Let us study the similarities and the dissimilarities between the use of specific primary metaphors in the English and Romanian texts being discussed. The following table, which presents the listings of primary metaphors in both languages, is meant to be a starting point in this endeavor.

Metaphor	Nr. of occurrences					Total
	<i>La Țigănci</i>	<i>Pe Strada Mântuleasa</i>	<i>Phase Change</i>	<i>The Hand-puppet</i>	<i>Schroeder's Stepfather</i>	
EXISTENCE IS VISIBILITY	-	-	-	-	1	1
DIFFICULTY/HARDSHIP IS HEAVINESS	-	-	-	-	1	1
KNOWING IS SEEING	-	-	-	-	1	1
CAUSES ARE RESOURCES	-	-	-	-	1	1
BEING IN CONTROL IS HOLDING TIGHT	-	-	-	1	-	1
HAPPY IS UP	-	-	-	-	1	1
TIME PERIODS ARE CONTAINERS	1	-	-	-	-	1
BAD IS FOUL-SMELLING	1	-	-	-	-	1
APPEALING IS TASTY	-	1	-	-	-	1
CONSIDERING IS LOOKING AT	-	1	-	-	-	1
CONSIDERING IS WEIGHING	1	-	-	-	-	1
CONSIDERING IS MEASURING	1	-	-	-	-	1
ACTIVITY IS LIFE	-	1	-	-	-	1
INACTIVITY IS DEATH	-	1	-	-	-	1
AFFECTION IS WARMTH	2	-	-	-	-	2
GOOD IS BRIGHT	1	1	-	-	-	2
QUANTITY IS SIZE	1	1	-	-	-	2
ANALYZING IS CUTTING	-	1	-	-	1	2
MEANS ARE PATHS	-	3	-	-	-	3
IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL	-	3	-	-	-	3

SYMPATHY IS SOFTNESS	-	2	-	-	1	3
DEGREE TO WHICH AN ATTRIBUTE DEFINES AN ENTITY IS DEPTH	1	2	-	-	-	3
BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE	1	3	-	-	-	4
AN EVENT IS THE MOTION OF AN OBJECT	2	3	-	-	-	5
VISION IS PHYSICAL CONTACT	2	3	-	-	-	5
TIME IS A RESOURCE	2	3	-	-	-	5
EFFECTS ARE TRANSFERRED OBJECTS	4	2	-	-	-	6
CHANGE IS MOTION	-	4	2	-	-	6
ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE	-	6	-	-	-	6
INTERRELATEDNESS IS PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS	-	5	-	2	1	8
MOMENTS IN TIME ARE OBJECTS IN MOTION ALONG A PATH	1	6	2	3	-	12
INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE	2	8	-	-	3	13
PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES	6	8	1	-	-	15
ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS	6	6	4	6	1	23
STATES ARE LOCATIONS	9	15	1	13	13	51
EVENTS ARE ACTIONS	11	15	17	11	9	63
TOTAL	55	104	27	36	34	256

Table 6. Specific primary metaphors in Oates' and Eliade's texts.

As I mentioned earlier, there are linguistic realizations of primary metaphors that can go under two or even more labels. Hence the discrepancy between my initial computation of metaphors, in terms of which there were 219 metaphors (92 in Oates and 127 in Eliade) and the labeled instances of metaphor, in terms of which there seem to be 256 (97 in Oates and 159 in Eliade).

As one can notice, most of the primary metaphors (26 out of 36) occur either only in Oates (e.g., EXISTENCE IS VISIBILITY, DIFFICULTY/HARDSHIP IS HEAVINESS, KNOWING IS SEEING, etc.) or only in Eliade (e.g., TIME PERIODS ARE CONTAINERS, BAD IS FOUL-SMELLING, APPEALING IS TASTY, ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE, etc.). Use of different primary metaphors could be explained by the very content of the short stories and by the writer's perspective on the topic. One can choose to approach things in a non-metaphoric way at a particular moment. Absence of some categories of primary metaphors in the texts under analysis does not mean that these categories do not exist in the respective language. I can think of numerous linguistic realizations of the 'missing' primary metaphors in the two languages. I will, nevertheless, restrain myself from supplying researcher-made examples as support to my point.

There are ten categories of primary metaphors that occur in both the English and the Romanian texts. Three of them (ANALYZING IS CUTTING, CHANGE IS MOTION, and SYMPATHY IS SOFTNESS) have less than one occurrence per ten thousand words in both the authors under discussion. Another one (PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES) occurs more than once per ten thousand words in Eliade, but not in Oates. The remaining six primary metaphors occur at least once in ten thousand words with both authors. Of these, the two best represented transculturally (EVENTS ARE ACTIONS, which has 63 occurrences, and STATES ARE LOCATIONS, which has 51) are also the best represented in each of the authors taken separately. These findings suggest that what we do in this world (i.e., the actions we take, the events that we bring about, and/or the events that affect us) and the states we find ourselves in seem to be of utmost importance for the two authors. By way

of generalization, these events and states seem to be of utmost importance for both speakers of English and speakers of Romanian.

Sometimes, the linguistic realizations of the primary metaphors met with in the two languages are quite different; on other occasions, they are identical. This has to do not only with the formal differences between English and Romanian but also with what Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) call “giving priority to certain values” (p.24), to certain source domains in the correlations people make.

The following examples illustrate the fact that speakers of the two languages use the same source domain *bloom/floare* ‘flower’ for an instantiation of the metaphor PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES.

... an attractive woman past *the bloom of her youth* (*Phase Change*, p.192);

La patruzeci și nouă de ani bărbatul e în *floarea vârstei* (*La Țigănci*, p.7)

At forty and nine of years man-the is *in flower-the of age-the*

‘At forty-nine a man is in the prime of life’ (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.67).

Differences appear when a certain flower is picked as source domain. As we have already seen, Romanians see peonies in people’s cheeks, whereas speakers of English see roses, as in *rosy cheeks*. However, the English metaphor refers only to health, whereas the Romanian is two-pronged, referring to either health or shyness.

Another example meant to illustrate how close our conceptualizations of bodily experiences can sometimes be is an instantiation of INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE, where intensity of emotion is associated in both languages with fire, rather than heat per se. Fire is seen as burning in someone’s eyes, as in:

... [Jack Schroeder's] small bright eyes *lit* with merriment or malice...

(*Schroeder's Stepfather*, p.53);

Avea părul bălai-roșcat... și ochii negri, *arzători*... (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.140)

Had-3rd-sg hair-the blond-reddish... and eyes-the black, *burning*

'Her face was gentle... with intense black eyes...' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.57).

One and the same metaphor, INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE, can rely in Romanian on quite different associations, which constitutes an interesting cultural dissimilarity. Thus, while Romanians feel the heat with their noses, with speakers of English, the association of heat and the nose is unusual:

... simțea în nări dogoarea trupurilor tinere (*La Țigănci*, p.14)

... felt-3rd sg in nostrils heat-the of bodies-the young

'... his nostrils were filled with the emanation of their young bodies' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.76).

Another specific source domain used in Romanian and not used in English has to do with the primary metaphor INTERRELATEDNESS IS PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS, like in the following example:

Chestia cu confuzia mi se pare *cusută cu ață albă* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.112)

Question-the with confusion-the to me seems *sewn with thread white*

'The question if confusion of names is obviously false (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.13).

The issue here is the color of the thread used in sewing. As explained earlier in this thesis (Chapter 3), Romanians are famous for the beautiful colors used in sewing and embroidering their garments. They have a specific sense of harmony among colors. The thread used for joining different pieces of garments must have the same color as the cloth; otherwise, the combination is unsightly, and the arrangement is unnatural and false. It is this specific experience with colors and sewing garments that the Romanians use as a source domain in the primary metaphor INTERRELATEDNESS IS PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS. They correlate it with complex logical interdependence, as in the example above.

Remaining in the sphere of dissimilarity between the two languages, I would like to point out that although the things that principally characterize what is GOOD for a person are UP for Romanians as well, I found an example in Eliade that contradicts Lakoff and Johnson's (1980b) orientational metaphor GOOD IS UP. This relates to the contrast between GOOD IS UP and MORE IS UP, which Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) mention. Thus, when people raise their voice in Romania, they can be imperious and in control, i.e., UP, but also dissatisfied, scared, agitated, and angry, i.e., DOWN. Similarly, when people lower their voice, they can be seen as being either uncertain, vacillating, and humble, i.e., DOWN, or friendly and accommodating others, i.e., UP. Here is such an instance found in Eliade:

... îl întrebă fata, coborând și mai mult glasul (*La Țigănci*, p.9)

... him asked girl-the, *lowering even more voice-the*

'... the girl asked him again, in still softer voice' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.69).

The action of raising or lowering one's voice is dictated by feeling either dissatisfied and agitated or safe, friendly, and intimate. In our example, by lowering her voice, the girl, who is luring Gavrilesco into the brothel, wants to make sure that she is friendly and intimate enough to make him feel safe and welcome. Analyzing this metaphor from Grady's (1997) perspective, it should be mentioned that in Romanian it is a complex metaphor made up of the following primary metaphors: AN EVENT IS THE MOTION OF AN OBJECT ALONG A PATH and QUANTITY IS SIZE, respectively. The girl is able to change the position, i.e., the 'location' of her voice, which she can place higher or lower on a scale ranging emotions and intimacy. The concept 'size' is suitable for our example if its meaning is extended to indicate 'extent'.

Another instance related to orientation which I find interesting in Eliade is the fact that he faces the past when describing the passing of time, rather than the future, as is usual in Romanian as well as English. That is why what he has behind is the future, not the past. I must admit that even though I am a native speaker of Romanian, I had a hard time understanding at first the way Eliade uses such forms as *puțin timp în urmă* ('little time behind'), which usually indicate the fact that the past is behind us, *în urmă* meaning 'behind/ago'. Careful reading and the context help us realize that we should face the past, rather than the future, to understand the message. The translator gave the correct interpretation to this orientation and rendered it in English accordingly:

Puțin timp în urmă, ieși un tânăr cu ochelari (Pe Strada Mântuleasa, p.114)

Little time behind, came-out-3rd sg a youth-masc-sg with eyeglasses

'A short time later a young man wearing glasses came out' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats, p.16*).

4.2.2. Linguistic structure of primary metaphors

The analysis concerning the linguistic structure of the primary metaphors met with in Oates and Eliade consisted, first, in classifying them in terms of the parts of speech used for the vehicle, i.e., the ‘carrier’ of metaphor. I used five categories, namely: verbal, nominal, adjectival/adverbial, prepositional, and phrasal.

The first three categories seem pretty straightforward. Special attention needs to be given to the distinction between prepositional metaphors and phrasal metaphors. Thus, I labeled a primary metaphor ‘prepositional’ if the metaphor was carried by the prepositional phrase. In contrast, if the metaphor was expressed simultaneously by a verb and another part of speech (most typically, a noun), I labeled it ‘phrasal’.

Here are samples of prepositional and phrasal metaphors, respectively, in the discourse of the two writers:

➤ Prepositional:

John’s mother said ... *in reproach* (*Shroeder’s Stepfather*, p.12);

Pătru, ăsta pot spune că era *în miezul lucrurilor* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.115)

Pătru this can-1st-sg say that was-3rd-sg *in core-the things-the-of*

‘Darvari Patru – this one I can tell you was right in the thick of things’ (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.18).

➤ Phrasal:

It fell to Lorraine, the mother, *to take note of* the time... (*The Hand-puppet*, p.41);

... că mi-am pierdut mințile după Leana (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.159)

... that to-me *lost-1st-sg minds-the* after Leana

‘... that I’d lost my mind over her’ (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.89).

Tables 7 and 8 show how often each of the structural categories presented above occur in Oates and Eliade, respectively.

Title	Verbal metaphor	Nominal metaphor	Adj/Adverbial metaphor	Prepositional Metaphor	Phrasal Metaphor	Total
<i>Phase Change</i>	20	1	2	2	2	27
<i>The Hand-puppet</i>	20	-	2	12	2	36
<i>Schroeder's Stepfather</i>	12	2	8	11	1	34
Total	52	3	12	25	5	97

Table 7. Linguistic structure of primary metaphors in Oates.

Title	Verbal metaphor	Nominal metaphor	Adj/Adverbial metaphor	Prepositional Metaphor	Phrasal Metaphor	Total
<i>La Țigănci</i>	19	1	5	5	15	45
<i>Pe Strada Mântuleasa</i>	35	2	14	7	24	82
Total	54	3	19	12	39	127

Table 8. Linguistic structure of primary metaphors in Eliade.

As shown in the two tables, verbal metaphors are numerically by far the best represented in both English and Romanian (52 and 54 occurrences, respectively). A possible reason accounting for this high frequency is that the primary metaphor most frequently occurring in both Oates and Eliade is EVENTS ARE ACTIONS – a metaphor typically carried by verbs. The verbs the two authors use are mostly motion verbs, the ground for metaphor being given by the manner in which actions or events take place. For example,

one can find a liquid metaphor in Oates expressed by different verbs having different meanings because of the manner associated with them, as in the following examples:

...as the horror of it *washed* over him (*Schroeder's Stepfather*, p.35);

... masculine arrogance *drained* from his face (*Phase Change*, p.201);

And now they're *spilling* over into real life (*Phase Change*, p.202);

... and consciousness *floods* back (*Phase Change*, p.203).

Here are some verbal metaphors found in Eliade:

... *arșița* care [...] *l-a lovit* în creștet (*La Țigănci*, p.5)

... *heat-the* which [...] *him-hit* in head-top

'... the intense heat [...] which smote him on the top of his head' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.64);

... cu *ochii fugindu-i peste stânci* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.143)

... with *eyes-the running to him over cliffs*

'... glancing over the cliffs' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.64);

Dar e curios că nu pot *sări peste amănunte* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.164)

But is curious that not can-1st-sg *jump over details*

'... but it's curious that I can't skip certain details' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.98).

These verbs (*hit*, *run*, *jump*) are more general motion/action verbs.

The two tables also display a remarkable balance across languages between adjectival/adverbial metaphors (ranked third, in terms of frequency, in both languages) and nominal metaphors (the least frequent in both Oates and Eliade). This scarcity of instances of nominal metaphors may have to do with the fact that nouns form a less flexible category, when compared to that of verbs. The meanings of nouns are more 'settled'. That is why nouns are more likely to appear in novel metaphors, and hence their less frequent occurrence.

What seems surprising, at first sight, is the discrepancy existing between the two languages insofar as the prepositional metaphors and the phrasal metaphors are concerned, respectively. Indeed, in Oates there are 25 instances of prepositional metaphor, while in Eliade there are but 12. This state of affairs becomes less surprising, however, when one considers the basic structural differences between the two languages. Thus, present-day English, which has lost its once vastly represented inflectional system, very much relies on prepositions as carriers of meaning; hence the high frequency of prepositional phrases, many of which are loaded with metaphor, as in the examples to come:

Tippi had been working *in secret* (*The Hand-puppet*, p.35);

Poised *on the brink* of sleep he hears it... (*Schroeder's Stepfather*, p.54).

In contrast, Romanian has preserved a quite complex system of inflections, which makes prepositions less fundamental – and hence less frequently resorted to as carriers of meaning, metaphorical meaning included, as the following examples indicate:

... rămase multă vreme *pe gânduri* (*La Țigănci*, p.24)

... remained-3rd-sg much time *on thoughts*

'[Gavrilescu] remained lost in thought for some time (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.89);

E în interesul dumitale... (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.161)

Is in interest-the your

'It's in your own interest' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.93).

As for phrasal metaphors, the fact that they are far better represented in Eliade than in Oates (39 occurrences vs. 5) could be accounted for by at least two reasons. The first reason may have to do with the idea found in Slobin (1996) that some languages make use of more general motion/action verbs. Some of Eliade's verbs are not evocative manner verbs. Moreover, they are not metaphorical by themselves. In order to bring out the sense of richness of manner, Eliade resorts to 'helping' vehicles for his metaphors, especially prepositions and nouns. Together, these vehicles (i.e., verbs, nouns, and prepositions) build up the metaphor which I labeled 'phrasal.'

The second reason may be related to the belief, common with many speakers of Romanian, that phrasal metaphor is a more effective stylistic device. Let us analyze the following examples:

Gavrilescu... vru să se oprească o clipă să-și tragă răsuflarea (*La Țigănci*, p.16)

Gavrilescu... wanted to himself stop a moment *to-himself drag breath-the*

'He wanted to stop a moment to catch his breath' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.78);

... de când *și-a călcat el legământul* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.140)

... since *to-himself trod he promise-the*

'... by the breaking of her grandfather's agreement' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.18).

The phrase *a-și trage răsuflarea* 'to-oneself drag breath-the', meaning 'to catch one's breath', in the example above could have been replaced by either of the verbs *a se odihni* 'to rest' or *a-și reveni* 'to recover', had the writer decided to render the idea nonmetaphorically. The phrasal metaphor builds up the image of the breath that is lagging behind and of its being dragged so that Gavrilescu can get hold of it again. 'To tread on a promise' or 'to step on a promise' means to destroy it under your feet, i.e., to betray. The phrase almost visualizes the action of betraying.

It would perhaps be interesting to study the most frequently occurring primary metaphors from the perspective of their linguistic structure. Table 9 displays my findings in this respect.

Categories of primary metaphor	Linguistic structure									
	Verbal		Nominal		Adj/Adv		Prepositional		Phrasal	
	Oates	Eliade	Oates	Eliade	Oates	Eliade	Oates	Eliade	Oates	Eliade
INTERRELATEDNESS IS PHYSICAL INTER-CONNECTEDNESS	3	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
MOMENTS IN TIME ARE OBJECTS IN MOTION ALONG A PATH	4	1	-	-	1	6	-	-	-	-
INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE	1	4	-	1	2	5	-	-	-	-
PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES	-	8	1	1	-	5	-	-	-	-
ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS	11	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
STATES ARE LOCATIONS	-	-	-	-	-	2	25	12	2	10
EVENTS ARE ACTIONS	33	15	-	-	1	-	-	-	3	11

Table 9. Linguistic structure of the most frequently occurring primary metaphors in Oates and Eliade.

Let us analyze what Table 9 shows, starting from the bottom. The most frequently met with primary metaphor, *EVENTS ARE ACTIONS*, has an almost exclusively verbal linguistic structure in Oates – there are but four exceptions, of which three are carried by phrases and one by an adjective. As I have already pointed out, a possible explanation of the predominance of *EVENTS ARE ACTIONS* carried by verbal means might be that events and actions are typically expressed by verbs. We express our experiences concerning the ways we act on the material world around us and the way it acts upon us by using special words called ‘verbs’. Things differ in Eliade’s case, where the instances of *EVENTS ARE ACTIONS* rendered by verbal means are very much counter-balanced by those rendered by phrasal means. This equilibrium might be determined, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, by the degree to which Romanian verbs express manner.

An almost similar situation can be noticed insofar as the primary metaphor *STATES ARE LOCATIONS* is concerned. The instances of this metaphor found in Oates also have a predominant structure, namely prepositional, whereas in Eliade prepositional and phrasal structures are almost similar in terms of numbers of instantiations. As explained in Chapter 2, phrasal metaphors can include prepositional phrases, so long as the metaphor is carried simultaneously by the verb and the respective prepositional phrases. On the other hand, if the metaphor is carried solely by the prepositional phrase, the metaphor in question was labeled ‘prepositional.’

It is worth mentioning that, with both authors, all prepositional metaphors appear under *STATES ARE LOCATIONS*. Both languages have a pretty well developed prepositional system (English relying much more on this system than does Romanian). Both languages make use of their prepositions, which prove to be a very effective way of saying

more about a thing or action in a quite easy manner, as one can choose any appropriate noun group after prepositions. The most basic use of most prepositions is to indicate position and direction, i.e., where we are and where we stand, whether physically or emotionally.

An interesting question arises: What happens in the languages where the prepositional system is not so well represented, or is even non-existent? What linguistic structure is used in its stead, and why?

Verbs come into power in both languages again with ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS. Verbs are preferred in order to indicate that a thing belongs to someone or that it is connected in some way with someone.

PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES is less present in Oates' texts. Its only instantiation is represented by a nominal metaphor. Eliade also has an instance of PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES expressed by a nominal metaphor. His other instantiations of this primary metaphor are verbal and adjectival (8 and 5 instances, respectively).

INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE is rendered by verbal or adjectival means in Oates and by verbal, adjectival, and nominal means in Eliade. As with EVENTS ARE ACTIONS and STATES ARE LOCATIONS, the two authors have two categories of linguistic structure in common here, namely verbal and adjectival.

MOMENTS IN TIME ARE OBJECTS IN MOTION ALONG A PATH is also rendered by two categories: verbal and adjectival, whereas INTERRELATEDNESS IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE is expressed only by verbs in Oates and either by verbs or phrases in Eliade.

As the table shows, the most frequently occurring primary metaphors found in the texts under study share at least one category of linguistic structure, as is the case with IN-

TERRELATEDNESS IS PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS, PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES, and ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS, if not even two, as is the case with MOMENTS IN TIME ARE OBJECTS IN MOTION ALONG A PATH, INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE, STATES ARE LOCATIONS, and EVENTS ARE ACTIONS.

The least represented linguistic structure in both authors under study is the nominal one. Preference for verbs, phrases, and prepositions might be indicative of the dynamic nature of the English and Romanian primary metaphors met with in the texts under analysis, of the desire of the speakers of the two languages to be specific in terms of position and/or direction, and (as mentioned earlier in this thesis) of the special kinds of metaphors nouns usually carry. Also, it might be indicative of the nature of primary metaphors and the way humans map from the physical to the abstract.

The data analyzed show that, with a few exceptions, English and Romanian share not only the types of the most frequently occurring primary metaphors but also the vehicles carrying these metaphors. Is this due to the fact that speakers of the of the two languages at issue use the same paths to arrive at conceptualizations, as they belong to the Western culture and consequently have inherited a similar pattern of thought, or – rather – to the fact that there is a common human way to conceptualize? Speakers of English and speakers of Romanian resort to the same vehicles because they find them available in their languages. What happens when some of the above-mentioned types of vehicles are not available? What choices will the speakers of such languages have? What will the crucial factor in making a decision be? The answers to these questions might be found in an analysis of data provided by some non-Western languages.

4.3. Newly labeled primary metaphors

Grady's (1997) list of primary metaphors can be considered a good starting point as well as a reference point in the study of actual linguistic realizations of primary metaphors. However, as he himself points out, the metaphors included in the list require "further investigation and analysis" and the list as such should be considered "suggestive rather definitive" (Grady, 1997, p.281).

Use of researcher-made examples proves, once again, less effective, because the linguistic reality is far from being black and white. Linguistic subtleties very often met with when studying real data make it hard to use the list *ad literam*. Not only will researchers find it difficult to classify certain metaphors; they may even find it altogether impossible to assign a given metaphor to one of Grady's (1997) categories.

An example illustrating the difficulty in classifying primary metaphor is the following:

... veneam de câte ori puteam s-o ascult pe Leana de începuse *să-mi umble vorbele* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.159)

... came-1st-sg how many times could-1st-sg to listen to Leana so-that had-started-3rd-sg *to-me to walk words-the*

'I... went there whenever I could to listen to Leana until rumors began to circulate...' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.89).

The fact that Fărâmbă was often seen in the pub where Leana sang caused 'words' (i.e., rumors) about his behavior to circulate.

My dilemma whether the metaphor above fell under EVENTS ARE ACTIONS, IN-ANIMATE PHENOMENA ARE HUMAN AGENTS, or AN EVENT IS THE MOTION OF AN OBJECT was solved the moment I realized it was a phrasal metaphor, in that the metaphor was expressed by a verb (*să-mi umble*, 'to-me to walk') and a noun (*vorbele* 'words-the'). Indeed, one could have in mind the correlation between events and the presence of human agents. Words about myself could not 'walk', i.e., spread without the presence of human agents. On the other hand, we can consider 'the words' about myself as objects in motion. I finally decided to consider this metaphor as an instantiation of AN EVENT IS THE MOTION OF AN OBJECT.

Solving such dilemmas proved very difficult at times. Under such circumstances, I either included the same metaphor into two categories (hence the discrepancy between the initial total of metaphors and the total obtained after classification) or, as mentioned earlier in my thesis, found new labels for the respective metaphors. Thus, the metaphor

... umbla abătut, cu umerii căzuți, *cu privirile risipite* înaintea lui (La Țigănci, p.25)

... was-walking-3rd-sg downcast, with shoulders-the fallen, *with glances-the scattered* before him

'... he walked dejectedly, with drooping shoulders, staring straight ahead of him' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.91)

could be thought of as an instantiation of the metaphor ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS as well as an instantiation of the metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS. When people cannot focus their visual attention on anything, their glances are 'scattered' all over the place, they lose the sense of direction and, of course, they feel uncertain about their location.

They are in a state of confusion, unhappiness, and even despair. These reasons made me consider the metaphor under discussion a linguistic realization of both ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS and of STATES ARE LOCATIONS.

Whenever I was unable to find any bridge between Grady's (1997) types of metaphor and the linguistic realization found in my data, I resorted to new categories, which I labeled myself, and tried to explain their underlying motivation. This is the case with BEING IN CONTROL IS HOLDING TIGHT and CONSIDERING IS WEIGHING, which I discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

The fact that new categories can be found is essential, in my opinion, in that it proves two important things. First, it shows that Grady (1997) was right in assuming that the metaphors appearing on his list required "further investigation and analysis" (p.281). I did this investigation, only to notice that some categories can easily overlap, while some are too general and evasive, and thus realized that, as foreseen by Grady (1997), the list should not be considered 'definitive'. Second, it shows how complex and diverse these two languages are – yet how close to each other – when it comes to how primary metaphor works.

There are categories on Grady's (1997) list for which I found no examples in the texts I analyzed. The rather limited nature of the data I based my study on prevents me from drawing any valid conclusion in this direction. I assume that the absence in the data I analyzed of some primary metaphors does not entitle me to conclude that they are not to be found in one language or another.

4.4. Translation of Romanian metaphors

I considered that studying the English translation of the Romanian short stories under discussion would help me better interpret the similarities and discrepancies between the two languages in terms of usage of primary metaphor. I was particularly interested in the impact translation had on usage of primary metaphor and tried to figure out the factors responsible for the way a Romanian metaphor was rendered in English. The table below shows the results of my study:

Metaphor	<i>La Țigănci</i>	<i>Pe Strada Mântuleasa</i>	Total
Romanian metaphors rendered with the same primary metaphor in English	29	37	66 (51.96%)
Romanian metaphor translated into English by means of another primary metaphor	4	9	13 (10.23%)
Romanian metaphor rendered non-metaphorically	12	36	48 (37.79%)
Total	45	82	127 (100%)

Table 10. Ways of rendering the Romanian primary metaphors in the English translation.

As Table 10 shows, in more than half of the instances (66 out of 127) a primary metaphor in Romanian was translated by the same primary metaphor into English. The number of instances where Romanian metaphors were rendered non-metaphorically in the English texts is a little lower than that of the instances where they were translated with the same metaphor. The instances where a Romanian metaphor was translated by means of another metaphor have the lowest numerical value in the table.

This tendency is also noticeable with all the frequently occurring metaphors in the texts under analysis (EVENTS ARE ACTIONS, STATES ARE LOCATIONS, ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS, PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES, INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE,

MOMENTS IN TIME ARE OBJECTS IN MOTION ALONG A PATH, and INTERRELATEDNESS IS PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS). These primary metaphors tend to be mostly translated into English by means of the same primary metaphors. On fewer occasions, they are translated non-metaphorically, and on still fewer ones by means of another primary metaphor.

This is further evidence supporting the idea that the two cultures have in common most of the image schemas and that they share the conceptual metaphors corresponding to those schemas. The English and the Romanians use the same basic experiences to motivate and constrain conceptual metaphors. In other words, they make use of the same starting points to build up the content and structure of abstract concepts.

Let us analyze some examples of each of the ways Romanian metaphors were rendered in the English text. For example, the primary metaphor PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES is, at times, translated by the same metaphor; there is even an instance where the lexical realization is similar:

... cu obrazul palid și veștejit (*La Țigănci*, p.26)

...with cheek-the pale and *withered*

'... with a pale and *withered* face' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.92).

Here are some examples of other Romanian metaphors translated by means of the same primary metaphors and similar linguistic realization:

TIME IS A RESOURCE

... să-mi pierd timpul prin cafenele (*La Țigănci*, p.116)

... to-me lose time-the through cafés

'... to waste my time in cafés' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.79);

EFFECTS ARE TRANSFERRED OBJECTS

Doamna Voitinovici nu voia să-și *dea* *consimțământul* (*La Țigănci*, p.28)

Mrs Voitinovici not wanted *to-herself* *give consent-the*

'Mrs Voitinovici wouldn't *give* her *consent*' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.95);

INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE

Spiritul pentru voi *pâlpâie* exclusiv în preajma formelor tinere (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.179)

Spirit-the for you *flickers* exclusively in vicinity-the of forms-the young

'The spirit for you *glows* only around youthful forms' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.120).

The primary metaphors that are translated, at least once, by the same metaphors are the following: EVENTS ARE ACTIONS, STATES ARE LOCATIONS, ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS, PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES, INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE, MOMENTS IN TIME ARE OBJECTS IN MOTION ALONG A PATH, AN EVENT IS THE MOTION OF AN OBJECT, ACTIVITY IS LIFE, CHANGE IS MOTION, ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE, VISION IS PHYSICAL CONTACT, TIME IS A RESOURCE, APPEALING IS TASTY, and EFFECTS ARE TRANSFERRED OBJECTS.

I also found some instances in which a primary metaphor in Romanian is rendered by a different primary metaphor in English, as illustrated by the following examples:

(Romanian) GOOD IS BRIGHT → (English) EVENTS ARE ACTIONS

... fața *i se lumineă* de un mare zâmbet (*La Țigănci*, p.12)

... face-the *to-him itself brightened* of a big smile

'... a broad smile *crept over* his face' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.73);

(Romanian) CONSIDERING IS MEASURING → (English) CONSIDERING IS LOOKING AT

... le *măsură* din nou *cu privirile* (*La Țigănci*, p.13)

... them *measured-3rd sg* again *glances-the*

'[he smiled and] *looked at* them *searchingly*' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.75);

(Romanian) INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE → (English) STATES ARE LOCATIONS
and HAPPY IS UP

... deși el era cel mai neodihnit și mai *înflăcărat* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*,
p.136)

... although he was the most tired and the most *inflamed*

'... although he was the most restless and *high-spirited*' (*The Old Man and
the Bureaucrats*, p.52).

Other Romanian primary metaphors for which the translator used different English primary metaphors are as follows:

Romanian	→	English
SYMPATHY IS SOFTNESS	→	ANALYZING IS CUTTING
PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES	→	STATES ARE LOCATIONS
EVENTS ARE ACTIONS	→	SYMPATHY IS SOFTNESS
STATES ARE LOCATIONS	→	CHANGE IS MOTION

INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE → EVENTS ARE ACTIONS

Some of these primary metaphors shift in specificity. For instance, there is a shift from specific to general in INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE → EVENTS ARE ACTIONS.

The instances where a metaphor is translated into English by means of a different metaphor can be accounted for by the different way speakers of the two languages adopt in their 'negotiating' with the material reality around them. Let us consider the following example:

... deși era cel mai neodihnit și mai *înflăcărat* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.136)

... although was-3rd-sg the most unrested and most *inflamed*

'... although he was the most restless and *high-spirited* of all' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.52).

Romanians correlate someone's lively and easily-excitabile behavior with fire, the energy of its flames, and its amazing power to grow and spread. That is why, for Romanians, that particular person is *înflăcărat* ('inflamed'). The primary metaphor Romanians use is INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE. The same lively and easily-excitabile person is 'high-spirited' for speakers of English, who use a complex metaphor, namely STATES ARE LOCATIONS and HAPPY IS UP. Both Romanian and English speakers start from the same reality. However, the way they conceptualize this reality may be different; hence the different correlations and the different metaphors. Speakers of the two languages at issue can see things from different perspectives. For instance, in the Romanian example below, a smile appearing on somebody's face is seen as bringing light to that face and making it shine. It is the effect of the smile that is emphasized. In the English translation,

it seems that it is the way the smile invades the face that is more important. That is why the Romanian primary metaphor GOOD IS BRIGHT is translated into English as EVENTS ARE ACTIONS:

... fața i se lumină de un mare zâmbet (*La Țigănci*, p.12)

... face-the to-him *itself brightened* of a big smile

'... a broad smile *crept over* his face' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.73).

I was unable to identify any pattern in relating Romanian primary metaphors and the English primary metaphors used in the translation. A possible explanation might be that there is no such pattern. Another one could be that, in order to be able to notice one, one needs more data.

Table 10 also shows that there are instances where the translator used no metaphor in rendering the Romanian primary metaphor. The following instantiation of ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS, for example, was translated non-metaphorically into English in

Doamna Voitinovici [...] *avea dreptate* (*La Țigănci*, p.28)

Doamna Voitinovici [...] *had justice*

'... she *was right*' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p95).

The same happens to the Romanian linguistic realization of INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE in the following example:

... un băiat frumos, ras în cap, *focos* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.116)

... a boy handsome, shaved in head, *fiery*

'... a handsome, impetuous boy with his head shaved' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.18).

I think that there are at least three factors that might be responsible for the instances where the Romanian metaphor was not translated into English by means of a metaphor. The first one has to do with the fact that English has a non-metaphorical expression more frequently used in similar contexts, therefore also preferred by the translator, as in

Dar el se *aprindea* repede... (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.157)

But he himself *lit* quickly...

'He'd get excited...' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.88).

It should be noted that this particular metaphor (INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE) has more elaborated and extended meanings in Romanian, among which 'to quarrel', 'to fight', 'to get angry', 'to become passionate', 'to slap', 'to feel like', etc.

The second of the factors mentioned above is related to the specificity of the Romanian metaphor, which makes it hard to render it by means of a metaphor. Such seems to have been the case with

Chestia cu confuzia mi se pare *cusută cu ață albă* (*Pe Strada Mântuleasa*, p.112)

Question-the with confusion-the to me seems *sewn with thread white*

'The question of confusion of names *is obviously false*' (*The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*, p.13).

Also, that a metaphor in a language is not rendered by a metaphor in another language can be explained by subjective factors, such as the translator's own individuality, his/her mastery of the source language (in our case, Romanian), and his/her sensitivity to the metaphor in general.

In the end, I would like to refer to a special instance, which has in a way to do with translation – but one that involves the author himself, not the translator. Eliade used a metaphor in Romanian which seems to be a word-for-word translation of the English metaphor 'to be in love'. Here is Eliade's example:

Când *eram în dragoste* cu Hildegard (*La Țigănci*, p.15)

When *was-Ist-sg in love* with Hildegard

'When I was in love with Hildegard' (*With the Gypsy Girls*, p.77).

It is extremely unlikely for speakers of Romanian to use the phrase *a fi în dragoste cu* 'to be in love with' when referring to people who are romantically involved. The phrase commonly used is *a fi îndrăgostit de* 'to be enamored of'. Eliade, who taught quite a number of years in an American university, must have translated this particular phrase into Romanian unawares. I consider this an instance of linguistic calque.

The cross-cultural analysis I focused on in this chapter shows that speakers of English and speakers of Romanian generally conceptualize their experiences with the world in the same way. Although the linguistic realizations of these conceptualizations are usually very diverse, they can at times be very much alike. A piece of evidence in this respect is that the most frequently occurring primary metaphors in both languages are the same, i.e., EVENTS ARE ACTIONS, STATES ARE LOCATIONS, and STATES ARE LOCATIONS. That experiences are conceptualized similarly makes it likely for a translator to render a

primary metaphor by means of the same primary metaphor. This tendency can be noticed in the translation of the two Eliade stories under discussion, wherein 66 out of the 127 primary metaphors (i.e., 51.96%) are rendered by the very same primary metaphor.

My endeavor to find an explanation for the resemblances between speakers of English and speakers of Romanian insofar as the use of primary metaphor is concerned, having as starting point literary texts produced by two 20th century authors, proved to be a very difficult one. Whether these resemblances are due to common roots (both English and Romanian are Western languages) or should be attributed to human thought *per se* is hard to assess. Studies in non-Western languages would prove of much help.

CONCLUSIONS

The cross-cultural study presented in this thesis focused on the analysis of the instances of primary metaphor as they appear in English and Romanian literary discourse. My endeavor was to prove empirically that primary metaphor was omnipresent, not only in English, a language most cognitive studies focus upon, but also in other languages – in our case, Romanian.

My findings support the idea, found in cognitive studies, that primary metaphors are conceptual mappings arising from the basic aspects of human experience. The most important facets of this experience have to do with the perception of our bodies and of the world around us, with our actions in the world, with our own motion through space and time, with our experience with objects, and with other people. In the texts I studied, I found instances of primary metaphors having to do with our bodily perception, such as EXISTENCE IS VISIBILITY, KNOWING IS SEEING, BAD IS FOUL-SMELLING, APPEALING IS TASTY, CONSIDERING IS WEIGHING, CONSIDERING IS LOOKING AT, AFFECTION IS WARMTH, ANALYZING IS CUTTING, VISION IS PHYSICAL CONTACT, ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE, INTERRELATEDNESS IS PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS, INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE, PROCESSES ARE LIVING FORCES, BEING IN CONTROL IS HOLDING TIGHT, and DIFFICULTY/HARDSHIP IS HEAVINESS.

I also found metaphors that rely on our experience with what we do in this world, with how we cope with the people and the objects around us, with their permanent

change and motion, as well as with our own change, with our experience with time, such as EVENTS ARE ACTIONS, STATES ARE LOCATIONS, ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS, MOMENTS IN TIME ARE OBJECTS IN MOTION ALONG A PATH, CHANGE IS MOTION, EFFECTS ARE TRANSFERRED OBJECTS, TIME IS A RESOURCE, AN EVENT IS THE MOTION OF AN OBJECT, IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL, MEANS ARE PATHS, GOOD IS BRIGHT, TIME PERIODS ARE CONTAINERS, HAPPY IS UP, and CAUSES ARE RESOURCES.

The fact that some of the primary metaphors enumerated above are to be found in both texts shows that the responses to bodily experience, the feelings this experience brings about, the judgments speakers of English and of Romanian pass, the inferences they draw, and the correlations they make are similar, irrespective of their belonging to different cultures. This is so because these experiences and judgments are basic. They represent the foundation of the edifice called *life* as perceived by speakers of English and speakers of Romanian.

The speakers of the two languages under study are also very much alike in terms of the frequency with which they resort to certain primary metaphors, such as EVENTS ARE ACTIONS, STATES ARE LOCATIONS, and ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS. This use proves that they share the same egocentric outlook on the world: What humans do, what they feel, and what they possess are always central.

What surprised me was that the primary metaphors based on bodily perceptions are not the 'absolute champions' in terms of frequency of occurrence, as some studies in the field suggest. They are, nevertheless, among the most frequently occurring ones. An explanation might lie in the lack of specificity of these metaphors. They have neither fixed source and target domains nor fixed entities conceptualized in the mapping (Lakoff

& Turner, 1989, p.81). Thus, speakers have a vast choice of making the correspondences underlying these metaphors.

The similarities between speakers of English and speakers of Romanian could be accounted for by their capacity as representatives of the Western culture. This is why I restrain myself from generalizing my findings and considering them valid for human language as such. In order to be able to refer to humans in general, one needs to study data belonging to cultures other than the Western one, as well.

Differences and preferences do appear between English-speaking people and Romanians, especially when emphasis is put on local, immediate purposes, or when there is a very specific way of negotiating with external reality – for instance, Romanians perceive heat, not only with their skin, but also with their nostrils; also, with them, false things are sewn with white thread. Generally speaking, the similarities outweigh the dissimilarities.

Similarities and dissimilarities can also be noticed when studying the structure of the linguistic realizations each language has for certain primary metaphors. There is at least one common category of linguistic structure for the shared primary metaphors in Oates' and Eliade's texts, two representing the average number. The two languages seem to have similar basic linguistic structure, and they seem to use this structure in a generally similar way, in order to render the equally similar way of conceptualizing. Thus, verbal metaphors are predominant in both the English and the Romanian texts under study. While in Oates' texts the second most frequent linguistic structure is prepositional, in Eliade's texts it is phrasal – this accounting for some dissimilarities between the two languages. The least frequent linguistic structure, with both authors, is the nominal one. The

criteria used by Oates and Eliade in choosing the vehicle for their metaphors might have to do with their preference for dynamism (expressed by verbs and phrases) and explicitness in terms of position or direction (expressed by prepositions).

Insofar as the 'tool' of my research is concerned, the list of primary metaphors found in Grady (1997) proved to be a useful starting point – or, rather, a reference point. This was, in my opinion, Grady's (1997) very intention. Nevertheless, the fact that the list can, given the complexity of language and thought, be adjusted, and even expanded – an expansion the limits of which are hard to foresee – makes the worth of such a list questionable. After all, an exhaustive listing of metaphors is quite impossible to make when one studies real data and realizes how complex and subtle language and thought can be.

When I say 'real data', I have in mind real language, that is language produced 'out there' by real people confronted with real life situations. Their language is authentic. It is this kind of language that linguists should use in their studies, lest they should be accused of using language with a pre-established purpose other than genuine communication among people. The study of literary texts generally offers, as we have seen in this thesis, the possibility of getting in touch with real language, the study of which proves to be a rewarding enterprise.

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