CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS AND DIPLOMATIC LIFE ABROAD DURING THE FEDERALIST ERA, 1790-1801

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Chapter One

Foreign Relations in the Federalist Era: A Brief Historiographical Review

Historians of Early National American foreign diplomacy (1789-1828) have continually addressed broad themes dealing with the foundations of diplomatic policy, growing commercialism within the republic, and the turbulent relationship between the United States and Europe.[1] Recently, a crisis within the field of American foreign relations has caused historiographical debates to center around the need for its rejuvenation.[2] But Early American foreign relations has still failed to generate a renewed interest. Historians such as Emily Rosenberg and Bradford Perkins have called for a fresh look at the period as "foreign policy was perhaps more important for the union's future than at any other time until the twentieth century."[3]

An important but seldom addressed issue relevant to the conduct of American foreign relations is appropriations for the diplomatic corps. None of the important works in Early American foreign policy directly discuss such questions as how Congress decided diplomatic funding or consider the impact of those decisions abroad. The purpose of this thesis is to illustrate why debates concerning congressional appropriations were important to the conduct of American foreign policy while assessing the impact of those appropriations on American ministers who served in Great Britain, France, and Spain.

An important introduction to the foundations of American diplomacy is Felix Gilbert's To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy (1961).

Gilbert concludes that both idealistic and realistic goals were motivations for American foreign policy during the Early Republic; both utopian hopes and economic motives characterized the foreign policy of the American government.[4] Moreover, as Early American foreign policy developed there was an inherent relationship between it and commerce. Unlike Alexander Hamilton who recognized that "power politics" was an essential part of international relations, many governmental officials took longer to overcome their idealistic beliefs about conducting foreign relations. Once the American government accepted the power realities it became apparent that the nation would no longer "transform the face of the political world," but rather adopt the old styles to exert power within an international world.[5]

Gilbert's analysis succinctly summarizes the tensions that the American government faced in the late eighteenth century. The struggle between the idealistic notions of republicanism and the realities of international politics that emerged during the 1790s challenged contemporaries to reconcile the two. For example, as Gilbert stresses, Hamilton adopted a more international outlook and, as this thesis will show, American ministers did the same because of their experiences in foreign capitals.

Recently, Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, a collection of essays gathered by Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, addresses various concepts that link political, social, ideological, and power issues to diplomatic history. Though traditionally some of these factors are not usually considered part of the field foreign policy, these theories have wide application in diplomatic history because of new source material. On both domestic and international levels, the United States and its ministers abroad dealt with important issues linked to power in an international system.

But experience and power within the international realm does not alone explain the tensions which wrought divisions within the American government. Partisan Divisions within Congress were exasperated by the conflicting ideas of republicanism and commercialism. Republican government, classically defined as "the idea that government exists for the common good of the people," was subject to various interpretations by the American people in the late eighteenth century.[6] Though somewhat dated, Robert Shalhope's article, "Republicanism and Early American Historiography," is indispensable to understanding republicanism. Shalhope defines republicanism as a people practicing public virtue and characterized by "frugality, industry, temperance, and simplicity."[7] Shalhope argues that a shift in republican historiography occurred in the mid-1970s, revealing that republicanism was not monolithic and that contemporaries accepted various interpretations of it.[8] This shift proffered the "secular faith" of republicanism, but simultaneously recognized that "the clarity and simplicity of the 'republican synthesis'" was gone.[9] This point is integral to this study because it demonstrates that while Americans adopted aspects of republicanism, the practice of republican values was not always the same.

Drew McCoy's The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America, ties together the conflicting interpretations of republicanism and commercialism in late eighteenth-century American thought. He explains the interdependence of the essential parts of political economy: politics, society, and economy. McCoy's broad thesis, that Republicans initially rejected, but finally came to accept, the importance of a commercial economy to the United States, gets to the center of some of the congressional debates during the Federalist Era. The expanding

commercial prosperity of the United States during the last decade of the eighteenth century challenged the American people to overcome their fears of "the fragility of republics."[10] Republicans, like James Madison, were afraid commercialization would lead to inequality, luxury, and corruption that would overtake American society and government, exactly as it had in Great Britain; congressional frugality stemmed from fears of growing commercialism within the United States. The Federalists accepted a commercial society and many, like Alexander Hamilton, strove to promote manufacturing. Republicans eventually reconciled the fact that "relatively self-sufficient producers" would "succeed in staving off the dangers of an overly advanced, commercial existence."[11] McCoy's analysis, while not directly discussing salaries or duties of diplomats abroad, addresses the key issues that Congress debated throughout its early years. For example, commercial expansion necessitated international cooperation and foreign relationships that contributed to heated debates over entanglement with Europe. McCoy's portrayal of Republican reluctance to expand commercially and uncertainty concerning what would happen to American society once it became more commercial, matches the uneasiness during the Federalist Era over growing foreign relations and the resistance to appointing ministers at foreign posts.

The historians and political scientists discussed above illustrate important underlying themes of the formation of American foreign policy. Historiographically, nevertheless, only two articles, which appeared in the 1960s, relate specifically to the topic of this thesis. "Republican Simplicity: The Diplomatic Costume Question, 1789-1867," and "Diplomatic Plumage: American Court Dress in the Early National Period" both emerged from Robert Ralph Davis's dissertation.[12] Davis documents the differences

in etiquette and perception between European and American governments and societies. Specifically, he argues that contemporaries saw two worlds when they viewed European and American societies; he contends that "the image of two worlds soon became a dominant American idea . . . [and] the development of American diplomatic etiquette and protocol during the early national period, for example, was distinctly imbued with such notions."[13] He concludes that the United States "set out to create a new order - a society and culture consistent with republican principles and American ideology."[14]

These two articles examine the attitudes of each society towards dress and etiquette but includes little discussion of the funding for those necessities. In both articles, Davis assumes that George Washington's opinion that "'a plain genteel dress is more admired and obtains more credit than lace and embroidery in the Eyes of the judicious and sensible, . . . prevailed throughout the early national period,'" including the Federalist Era.[15] But, Davis's arguments are not a sufficient explanation of the dress or funding of American diplomats during this period because he tends to focus on the Jeffersonian era and only uses minimal sources and information from the 1790s. Again this thesis fills that omission by discussing the late-eighteenth century American diplomatic experience.

Historians have never fully examined the topic of American funding of its diplomats in the Federalist Era. This thesis seeks to remedy that by analyzing how issues of funding relate to both the larger context of republicanism and growing commercialism within American society. Considerations of funding were important because appropriations played an integral part in establishing an American diplomatic corps that would represent the United States abroad. Funding was inherently related to American

involvement in international affairs and was a debate to which Congress applied republican concerns. This thesis will show that Davis's "two worlds" concept applies to the Federalist Era; Congress and American ministers both linked republican values to their political decisions, but environment and experience affected each group differently. American ministers adopted European styles of diplomacy because their situation abroad demanded it.

Notes

[1]Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas in Early American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); William Nesbit Chamber, Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience, 1776-1809 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York: New York University Press, 1984).

[2]Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[3]Bradford Perkins, "Early American Foreign Relations: Opportunities and Challenges," Diplomatic History 22 (Winter 1998) : 115; Emily S. Rosenberg, "A Call to Revolution: A Roundtable on Early U. S. Foreign Relations," Diplomatic History 22 (Winter 1998) : 63.

[4]Gilbert, To the Farewell Address, 14, 16. Historians continued to debate whether the United States practiced a realistic or idealistic foreign policy; see James Hutson, "Intellectual Foundations of Early American Diplomacy," Diplomatic History 1 (Winter 1977) : 1-19.

[5]Gilbert, To the Farewell Address, 112, 114.

[6]M. N. S. Sellers, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: Republicanism, Liberalism, and the Law (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 99.

[7]Robert Shalhope, "Republicanism and Early American Historiography," William and Mary Quarterly 39 (April 1982) : 335.

[8]Ibid., 335, 338.

[9]Ibid., 335.

[10]McCoy, The Elusive Republic, 5; Gordon S. Wood, Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Random House, 1991), 313.

[11]McCoy, The Elusive Republic, 66, 154-55.

[12]Robert Ralph Davis, "Republican Simplicity: The Diplomatic Costume Question, 1789-1867," Civil War History 15 (March 1969) : 19-29; Robert Ralph Davis, Diplomatic Plumage: American Court Dress in the Early National Era," American Quarterly 20 (Summer 1968) : 164-179; Robert Ralph Davis, "Manners and Diplomacy: A History of American Diplomatic Etiquette and Protocol During the Early National Period." Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1967.

[13]Davis, "Diplomatic Plumage," 164.

[14]Davis, "Republican Simplicity," 19.

[15]Ibid., 19-20.

Chapter Two

Congressional Appropriations for Foreign Relations

Throughout the 1790s, debates between the Federalists and Republicans over the funding and extension of the diplomatic corps were integral to the formation of lasting policies of the new American nation. The question many of the debates had to answer was the necessity of appropriating funds for diplomatic use, but the core of some of the debates was the power of the executive versus that of Congress. Furthermore, the dichotomy between European and American societies maximized the already divergent views of American parties and divided the Federalists and the Republicans such that, by the late 1790s, the parties had turned against each other over accusations that one was too pro-British and the other too pro-French. Congress debated appropriations cognizant of the corruption and luxury within European society but simultaneously unaware of the needs of American diplomats abroad.[1]

Representatives in the House knew that foreign relations were necessary to conduct commercial business abroad but without an established diplomatic corps were unsure of whether to place ministers or consuls, where to place them, or even how many the United States would need. Some congressmen further complicated matters by asserting that "foreign commercial intercourse and foreign political intercourse" were separate subjects.[2] This required Congress to send both ministers and consuls to foreign countries. Furthermore, Congressman Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania declared that he "did not believe that it was the opinion of any gentleman in the House that commerce

ought to be left to shift for itself, unattended."[3] Congress did not try to restrict American commerce, and focused on establishing foreign relations without tying the United States to the sphere of international relations.[4] Again these commercial debates were exacerbated by inherent republican beliefs in agrarian industry and public virtue which could be compromised by commercialization of American society.

To conduct diplomatic relations, the United States needed to set up positions abroad with appropriate ranks and salaries. During the 1790s, the United States consistently used three ranks of diplomatic representatives, Minister Plenipotentiary, Minister Resident, and chargé d'affaires. Appointed by the President, each diplomat received a salary corresponding to his rank.

In the 1790s the rank of diplomats was a significant determinant at foreign courts and the perception of rank was equally important in eyes of Americans. European courts perceived each of the three American ranks, Minister Plenipotentiary, Minister Resident, and chargè d'affaires, differently. For example, the courts of Great Britain, France, and Spain labeled the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary as second-class because all of these courts sent and received Ambassadors -- the highest level of diplomatic representative. While some American officials believed that the government should base the foreign policy of the United States largely on the model of Great Britain by using Ambassadors, establishing proper salaries, and developing an advantageous position relative to the countries of Europe, others were determined to abolish all designations of rank and forms of monarchical customs.[5] Some Americans believed that the English title of Ambassador was "too exalted for the representatives of a democratic nation" and "did not like its connotation."[6] They believed the word ambassador implied "the representative of a

sovereign," and thought that "minister" was a more appropriate term for the new republic to use.[7] Therefore, Minister Plenipotentiary was the highest rank sent by the United States.

Congress used precedent established in the Confederation period to determine the ranks sent to Great Britain, France, and Spain, as well as recognizing comparable duties and the possible need for the rank of Envoy Extraordinary. The rank of the initial representatives sent to Great Britain, France, and Spain during the 1790s carried over from the Confederation years; Great Britain had no minister from the United States after John Adams left the country in 1788; William Short represented the United States in France as chargé d'affaires; and William Carmichael was an acting chargé d'affaires in Spain. The duties of the diplomats who held any of the three ranks varied, but in general the extent and importance of those responsibilities increased with a higher rank. When an important negotiation or treaty was pending, the United States sent an Envoy Extraordinary, which was a rank designed to emphasize the special significance of the negotiations because an Envoy Extraordinary overshadowed the permanent minister. While the Envoy Extraordinary usually received sole recognition for any treaty he concluded or tensions lessened by his arrival, the government tried to reassure the permanent minister that respect for him had not diminished.[8]

The ranks used by the United States for ministers abroad caused many problems and embarrassments. For example, David Humphreys' appointment as a chargé d'affaires to Portugal threatened the cordial relationship between the United States and that country because the Portuguese had already appointed a Minister Resident to the United States. Humphreys requested that the government raise his rank to meet the status

of the Portuguese minister to avoid offending Portugal. In another instance, William Short, at The Hague, asked the United States to insert the word plenipotentiary into his commission to conform to court etiquette and appear friendlier to the Dutch. In general the American representatives "chafed at being accorded a lower precedence in foreign courts than the representatives of many smaller states who bore the title of ambassador."[9] The American ministers complained that "they were often humiliated and their usefulness sometimes impaired by the lower rank" because Ambassadors were given preference at court functions.[10] Some of the American representatives even believed that their inferiority at foreign courts marred the dignity and prestige of their country.[11]

Each minister received a specific annual salary determined by his rank he held with a separate amount to return home. Congress stipulated on 1 July 1790 that the salary for a Minister Plenipotentiary be $9,000 a year. Congress also set the salary of a chargé d'affaires at $4,500. President Washington created the rank of Minister Resident between that of Minister Plenipotentiary and chargé d'affaires with a salary of $4,500, on the recommendation of David Humphreys. All the salaries were "a compensation for all . . . personal services, and other expences" and could not exceed the specified amounts unless the representative petitioned for specific funds.[12] These "other expences [sic]" did not include the cost of newspapers, pamphlets, stationery, ink, or postage, which were contingencies that Congress reimbursed. Congress allocated a quarter of the annual salary for the minister's return; therefore, Ministers Plenipotentiary received $2,250 and the other ranks received $1,125 for that trip. Each Minister Plenipotentiary also received $1,350 a year extra to hire a secretary. All ministers abroad submitted their expenses to

the Secretary of State annually because Congress required that he present those records to the House of Representatives.[13]

The ministers also received an outfit, a monetary compensation scaled according to rank and used at the outset of the mission. As the minister needed to secure passage to Europe, including sufficient provisions to sustain him and his family for the journey, as well as setting up a permanent diplomatic establishment upon his arrival at a foreign court, an outfit was a necessity. Each American minister sent abroad received an outfit equal to one year's salary. If he was already serving abroad and merely transferring to another court, Congress allotted half that amount. Men sent on special missions, such as an Envoy Extraordinary, received no outfit because their position was, by definition, temporary.[14]

Congress's decision to issue outfits was problematic; there were many petitions that highlighted the merits of outfits in spite of fears that Congress would incur large expenses. While serving in France, Thomas Jefferson noted that ministers' outfits historically were "a service of plate and a fixed sum for all other articles."[15] Jefferson expressed no desire for the splendor of plateware and was adamant that his more immediate needs, such as furniture, a carriage, and clothing, were plain but cost him more than a year's salary. An outfit was "indispensably necessary . . . under all circumstances, at the beginning" to defray some of these pressing expenses.[16] In 1790, William Temple Franklin, who gained experience abroad as secretary to his grandfather, Benjamin Franklin, while he served in France, commented that "some additional allowance ought to be made [to ministers] . . . to commence their establishment" because the immediate expenses were taxing on their salary.[17] While an outfit was usual for other countries'

diplomats, Congress feared outfits because of the obvious extra appropriation that was necessary.[18] As illustrated previously the frugality demonstrated by Congress was yet another characteristic of the overwhelming acceptance of republican ideals.

In 1790, the House of Representatives debated a bill concerning foreign relations that set the precedent for appropriations for the remainder of the decade. This bill stated that the president had the right to draw from an account of $40,000 to direct foreign policy. The bill also established the salaries for all ranks of American ministers and instituted outfits. While Congress affirmed that this act was to continue in force for two years, it remained the foundation of diplomatic appropriations for the entire decade as each subsequent Congress upheld it with only minor changes.[19]

An important part of the debate in 1790 in the House of Representatives concerned salaries and whether or not the bill should be an annual appropriation. John Lawrence, a congressman from New York, stated that the "Union might require a less sum perhaps than was contemplated" because Gouverneur Morris, an informal diplomat in Great Britain, had confessed that "a gentleman can be suitably placed . . . for less than two thousand five hundred pounds sterling [the equivalent of nine thousand dollars]."[20] William L. Smith of South Carolina questioned the salaries of American diplomats because the president did not send them just to negotiate treaties, but to conduct conventional matters of foreign policy; in fact, ministers stationed abroad for twenty years might never sign a treaty but would still receive a salary. A Pennsylvania congressman, Thomas Scott, added that all ministers should not receive the same pay, but instead their salaries should reflect what they did. While the House eventually passed the bill, it distinguished between salaries for the posts of Minister Plenipotentiary and chargé

d'affaires.[21] The congressmen raised two interesting points: should the United States have ministers abroad and, if so, how could the House determine an adequate salary?

The answers to these two questions were not easily resolved, but after contentious debate concerning the constitutional question on whether the president had the authority to appoint ministers and draw funds, Congress reaffirmed its faith in the Constitution by setting the limits of congressional power and establishing the basis for the administration of foreign affairs. Some members of the House believed that the Senate should affirm the president's proposals to appropriate funds just as that body had to confirm presidential appointees. House members Michael J. Stone of Maryland and Richard H. Lee of Virginia wanted to link the powers of the President and Senate on this issue. Stone stated that if the President was to have all the power to draw funds "he will have five times the influence that the other will."[22] Others, like Benjamin Huntington of Connecticut and Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts, asserted that the President should not need the approval of the Senate to draw funds allocated by the bill. They were especially concerned about the Senate not being in session when a minister abroad needed funds. The bill that resulted from this debate fixed the limits of congressional and executive power giving the President the power not only to appoint ministers but also to draw funds, which the House set, for continuing representatives' establishments abroad.[23]

The debate continued over whether or not the $40,000 general annual appropriation was too large a sum. Roger Sherman of Connecticut argued that if Congress passed the bill it was "disposing of so large a sum of money" for "uses with the propriety of which no gentlemen seemed to be well acquainted."[24] This statement demonstrated how uninformed Congress was about the activities of ministers abroad as

well as the wariness with which it approached foreign relations. Moreover, isolation from Europe appealed to the American public, so much so that the New York Journal declared that $40,000 would allow ministers "to be maintained at splendid courts, by a nation which has recently . . . felt herself barren in ways and means." It was "a folly for a young republican country . . . to get entangled in the intrigues of European courts."[25] This observation showed the apprehension Americans had in establishing foreign relations with European countries; but, more importantly, it demonstrated the frugality of Congress. As the House argued over the bill, it became apparent that Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson recognized that there was a need for the United States to be represented abroad that prompted maintaining adequate salaries. Jefferson, entrusted with the confidence of the American government and people on matters of foreign affairs because of his experience abroad, pushed for the general appropriation and believed, unlike President George Washington, that the government should raise appropriations and purchase things such as stationery for diplomatic use. The bill, with the $40,000 appropriation, passed on 1 July 1790. A few days later, Gouverneur Morris remarked that "the present idea in America is unfavorable to the establishment of many Foreign ministers, but this idea will change when the pressure of American debts shall have been a little relieved."[26] What Morris did not suspect was that for the rest of the decade, the frugality of Congress would continue and it would fail to recognize the needs of the American ministers abroad.

As the United States matured, President Washington appointed higher-ranked representatives to the courts of Europe -- representatives who amidst the royal pomp and ceremony would need financial resources for the success of their missions.[27] Thomas

Pinckney and Gouverneur Morris, appointed to the courts of London and Paris respectively, were Ministers Plenipotentiary. William Short became Minister Resident at The Hague, while William Carmichael continued as chargé d'affaires in Spain. Even with Washington's new commissions, the Second Congress did not consider the possibility that it would have to raise the salaries of ministers and settled on the same $9,000 salary appropriation that the Continental Congress had originally established in 1784. The Second Congress did not even debate the foreign appropriations bill in 1793; it simply reaffirmed the 1790 appropriation. The struggling financial condition of the United States in 1793 presumably silenced any debate.[28]

Another important consideration during this decade emerged full force in 1793. The political situation in Europe during the 1790s was turbulent and the strife between Great Britain and France played a large role. Many of the congressional debates during the Federalist Era addressed issues of American sympathy, particularly that of the congressmen, towards Great Britain or France. Because of the tensions within France and the subsequent execution of the King Louis XVI in 1793, Great Britain joined other European nations in a war against France to prevent the Revolution from spreading across the continent. For twenty-two years Great Britain and France would be at war and the United States had to consider its role because of the 1778 treaty with France and its commercial ties to the continent. The Washington administration declared neutrality, but the French and British causes continued to polarize American opinion throughout the decade.[29]

Congress failed to provide more funds for its ministers through 1794, and in that year it again renewed the general appropriation, while granting raises to domestic

personnel. Although it seems as if Congress allotted a greater sum for foreign relations in 1794 -- because it appropriated $1,000,000 for extra foreign expenses -- the United States used this money to pay tribute to the Barbary pirates. Congressman Thomas Claiborne of Virginia stated that although exorbitant salaries were "not consistent with" a republican government, the price of rent and necessities of life had increased. Even the doorkeeper of the House received a $400 raise.[30] Congressmen recognized the impact of inflation at home but never acknowledged that foreign ministers were subject to similar financial problems.[31]

In 1795, President Washington presented Jay's Treaty to the Senate, which caused an uproar over more than just the proposed commercial connection between the United States and Great Britain. The treaty established commissioners who were to execute articles five through seven of the treaty and reside in either the United States or Great Britain. Two prominent Republicans, Albert Gallatin and James Madison, tried to block the funding for the treaty and for the commissioners not only for partisan reasons but also because Republicans were upset with the direction in which Jay's Treaty forced American foreign policy "vis-à-vis Great Britain's."[32] Although unsuccessful at blocking appropriations for the treaty, the Republicans persuaded Congress to require extensive reports from the Treasury Department on the implementation of the treaty. Congress set the salaries for commissioners at $6,667.50 if stationed in Britain and $4,445 if they served in the United States. Secretary of State Timothy Pickering informed the American Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain Thomas Pinckney, who controlled all diplomatic accounts in Europe, that Congress would also provide other small appropriations to the commissioners serving in Great Britain because of the trouble and

expense of the trans-Atlantic voyage.[33] But Congress never specified these other appropriations and the promise remained vague.

Jay's Treaty also contained a provision that arranged the joint payment of American and British commissioners, to which Americans objected because it was thought that the British paid their ministers too much. Even though Jay voiced his concern to the Secretary of State about these objections, stating that he had "always doubted the policy of being penny wise," Congress continued to restrict the funding of American representatives abroad.[34] Unfortunately for ministers, Congress recognized that salaries should be higher for commissioners serving in Great Britain but failed to see the necessity of appropriating more funds for foreign relations.[35]

Perhaps the most important result of the Jay Treaty was the solidification of the Federalist and Republican parties; congressmen of both parties recognized that the treaty projected an anti-French and pro-British appearance. Substantial commercial ties with Great Britain were a major point of contention as many Republican members of Congress distrusted the British government and its power. Moreover, the Federalist representatives acknowledged that the United States was not prepared for economic warfare with Great Britain and were also suspicious of the Republicans' political organization in the United States. If not for Fisher Ames's "appeal to national honor," in which he stated that the treaty was not "intolerably and fatally pernicious" to the United States, the House of Representatives might not have approved the appropriations for the Jay Treaty.[36]

In 1798, the battle between the Federalists and Republicans over the extension of American foreign relations climaxed in the House of Representatives as Congressman John Nicholas, a Republican from Virginia, proposed an amendment to the foreign

appropriations bill that would have decreased appropriations and salaries of ministers by reducing the number and rank of ministers. The proposed amendment would "bring back the establishment of the diplomatic corps to the footing on which it was settled at the commencement of the Government [1789], and continued down till the year 1796."[37] Content with relations as they had been before the appointment of three Ministers Plenipotentiary to the courts of Prussia, Spain, and Holland, these mostly Republican congressmen fought against expanding the ranks of the diplomatic corps. They wanted to retain the Ministers Plenipotentiary in England and France along with the Minister Residents serving in Spain and Holland while eliminating the post in Prussia. Some even contended that the United States needed no ministers abroad at all.[38] While considerations of economy were a significant part of the debate, the development of the Federalist and Republican parties, the battle over congressional and executive power, and ignorance about foreign missions characterized the 1798 debate as well. The main question facing Congress was whether to increase the diplomatic corps by stationing a Minister Plenipotentiary in Berlin and The Hague. Nicholas asserted that the "present extension of foreign intercourse was far too great" and he "knew of no possible use that a Minister to Berlin could be."[39]

Nicholas was not alone in his skepticism of foreign relations as he had a large following of Republicans in Congress.[40] Joseph McDowell of North Carolina agreed with restricting the foreign establishment stating that "he could see no reason at present for entering into treaties with nations with whom we neither had, nor could have any considerable connexion [sic]."[41] Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania was vocal in support of Nicholas's amendment.[42] Gallatin contended that he was in favor of reducing diplomatic

appropriations because it was unnecessary to appropriate funds for ministers who did not yet exist, an idea supported by fellow Republican Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina. The Republicans again revealed their frugality because they did not want to appropriate more funds than were necessary. But, the Republicans lost and Congress made an additional appropriation of $60,500 for general diplomatic expenses in July.[43]

In 1798, as the foreign relations general appropriations and salary act of 1 July 1790 was about to expire, Republicans insisted that Congress prevent further extension of the diplomatic corps and additional appropriations. In support of his amendment to restrict foreign relations, Nicholas stated that "if we are totally incapable of enforcing the execution of the stipulations made by other nations by any offensive measures" then American foreign policy "only tended to entangle ourselves."[44] Even Thomas Pinckney, now a congressman from South Carolina and late Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain, agreed with the proposal to curtail the diplomatic establishment to "thereby put our business in the best train for securing the neutral standing which we have taken," but he argued that the timing was wrong.[45] Gallatin also supported immediate cutbacks in the foreign establishment and made it clear that "if now is not the time, it will be with this reform, as with all others, it will never be the time." He continued asserting, "we wish not to mix in their [European countries] political sphere of action; that we are not desirous of forming political connexions [sic]."[46] A few congressmen, from both parties, wanted no part in the affairs of Europe, especially the ongoing war between Great Britain and France. Furthermore, a powerful faction in the House, led by Jonathan Havens and Albert Gallatin, thought that Congress could suspend diplomatic relations immediately by canceling all appropriations previously agreed to and refusing to allot any more money.

Havens demonstrated the ignorance of some congressmen concerning the duties of diplomats, asserting, "if we were to have any serious difference with France, he knew of no use our Ambassadors could be."[47]

Federalist congressmen, who did not all agree upon the necessity of foreign intercourse, observed that Congress could not terminate American foreign relations or repeal presidential appointments without injuring the nation's status abroad. Robert Harper of South Carolina was the most vehement spokesman for the Federalists, declaring that there were "gentlemen who wish to disgrace this government. . . [and] confess that we have been wrong, and [to] tread back our steps." He argued that retracting or even reducing the rank of the foreign appointments would "disappoint and disgust" the powers to which the United States had already sent ministers.[48] Congressman John Williams of New York also asserted his belief that foreign relations benefited the country. As an example, he referred to Rufus King, who, as Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain, represented Americans in the British Court of Admiralty and had saved "the citizens of this country more than all of the diplomatic expense to which it had been put."[49] The final vote was close; fifty-two congressmen opposed Nicholas's amendment to restrict foreign appropriations while only forty-eight supported the measure.[50]

This debate was important for a number of reasons. The final vote divided almost perfectly along party lines; all but two Federalists opposed Nicholas's amendment to restrict the foreign diplomatic establishment and all but two Republicans supported it. This division was because Republican congressmen questioned the legitimacy of executive authority and patronage, while Federalists supported executive power.[51] As in

prior debates over appropriations, constitutional questions arose over the president's authority to conduct foreign policy. By early 1798 rigid party lines had developed in the House.[52] As George Thatcher, a Federalist from Massachusetts stated, "if it was the opinion of the President . . . that it was proper to have ministers in every Court in Europe, he ought to send them," without an objection from the House, as "It would be usurpation to do so."[53] James Bayard, a Federalist from Delaware, affirmed the president's power to appoint those of a similar opinion to his own, because "Did . . . [anyone] ever choose Representatives of a different opinion from themselves?"[54]

Conversely, the majority of Republicans agreed with Nicholas, who contended that the executive branch had extraordinary power through foreign policy decisions that excluded Congress; the Republicans also resented the majority that the Federalists held in both houses of Congress. Gallatin believed that although the Constitution granted Congress the power to appropriate money it did not necessarily require it to do so for foreign affairs. Though adamantly against the extension of diplomatic appropriations, Republican Samuel Smith of Maryland believed that the president "was better informed with respect to his duty" and although the president had the power of patronage, the House could monitor this by curtailing appropriations. After all, Smith assured the Federalists "men who differed from them in opinion were equally . . . friends and supporters [of the government]."[55]

Party development due to sympathy for either Great Britain or France, combined with the desire to restrict or extend relations with these countries, were both reasons for the division along party lines. One reason for the formation of American parties was the competing influence of France and Great Britain on American politics. Both the

Federalists and the Republicans argued that the other favored the British or the French.[56] For example, William Claiborne, a Republican from Tennessee, despised all foreign influence because he believed some men were "willing to entwine the fate of America with the destinies of [Great Britain] that tottering and corrupted monarchy."[57] Republicans considered Great Britain more of a threat than France just as they had while debating the Jay Treaty. Federalists, such as Robert Harper of South Carolina, denounced the French as "worthless scoundrels [who] . . . have introduced more calamities into the world then ages of governments will be able to cure."[58] The Federalists' arguments prevailed, and with a slight majority in the House they effectively stopped the movement to curtail American foreign relations.[59]

After the debate on Nicholas's amendment, the resulting foreign appropriations and salary act of 19 March 1798 repealed the act of 1 July 1790. Yet Congress made no major modifications. The changes Congress made did not incorporate the restrictions advocated by the Republican House members, but instead retained the $9,000 salary for Ministers Plenipotentiary, $4,500 for chargé d'affaires, and the same annual apppropriation. The major alteration was more intensive congressional review of the Treasury and State Department records of expenditures for foreign affairs. Congress also made a one-time disbursement of $28,650 for "defraying the expenses of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations," in addition to the normal $40,000 appropriation.[60] Though the 1798 debate was a victory for those who wanted to expand foreign relations, the resulting act changed little and instituted "a slavish adherence" to "principles upon which the diplomatic service was conducted for many years."[61]

The initial debate (1797) in Congress concerning foreign appropriations demonstrated that questions over domestic politics and the frugality of the new government were major areas of contention. While much of the debates revolved around issues of party politics and the competing congressional and presidential powers, Congress also had to deal with past precedent in appropriating funding for international relations. But always present within the debates was a continued discussion of corruption and luxury within European societies. The safety of the American republic, within congressional minds, depended on continued faith in republican ideals and a continued separation from European ways. Furthermore, frugality and a continued ignorance of the American diplomatic experiences abroad hampered additional appropriations for foreign policy.

By the middle of the 1790s, the split between the Federalists and Republicans had extended to the American public. Tributes to the Barbary pirates and the appointment of American representatives to Great Britain, France, and Spain grabbed the attention of Americans, while domestic political and economic issues simmered at home. Moreover, most Americans were inclined to side with either the British or the French because of economic interests or cultural backgrounds; as one historian states "Anglophilia and Francophilia were the source of divisive passions which marked the 1790s."[62]

Notes

[1]Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers, 10. See also ibid., vii, 10, 305; Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order, 57-58.

[2]U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 856. See also Lawrence S. Kaplan, Entangling Alliances with None: American Foreign Policy in the Age of Jefferson (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1987), 69.

[3]U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 857. See also Thomas Jefferson to Consuls, 13 May 1791, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions of the Department of State, 1789-1801, National Archives, Washington D. C.

[4]James H. Hutson, John Adams and the Diplomacy of the American Revolution (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1980), 150; Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers, 3; Stuart Gerry Brown, The First Republicans: Political Philosophy and Public Policy in the Party of Jefferson and Madison (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1954), 95.

[5]John W. Foster, The Practice of Diplomacy as Illustrated in the Foreign Relations of the United States (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1906), 26; William Short to Jefferson, 15 September 1792, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

[6]William Barnes and John Heath Morgan, eds., The Foreign Service of the United States of the United States: Origins, Development, and Functions (Washington, D. C.: Historical Office, Department of State, 1961), 146; Frances Leigh Williams, A Founding

Family: The Pinckneys of South Carolina (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), 449. It was not until 1893, when the growth of imperialism demanded "diplomatic parity," that the United States named its first Ambassador; Warren Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States in the United States, 1779-1939 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 72; Williams, A Founding Family, 449.

[7]Williams, A Founding Family, 449.

[8]Foster, The Practice of Diplomacy, 21; Timothy Pickering to Rufus King, 8 June 1796, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; "Opinion of the Attorney General (W. Wirt) on Allowances of Salaries and Outfits to Public Ministers of the United States to Foreign Countries," 8 March 1825, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, 6 vols. (Washington, D. C.: Gales and Seaton, 1832-1861), 5: 757; Edmund Randolph to Short, 3 December 1794, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions.

[9]Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service of the United States, 146. See also Edward M. Cifelli, David Humphreys (Boston: Twayne, 1982), 82; Short to Jefferson, 20 July 1792, Despatches From United States Ministers to France, 1789-1906, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

[10]Foster, Practice of Diplomacy, 21.

[11]Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service of the United States, 146.

[12]U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 2nd Sess., 2292. According to Humphreys, the government of Portugal "applauded the system of severe economy in which we were laying the foundations of our new government" but attested that there was no need to make the salary of a Minister Resident higher than that of a chargé d'affaires because there was no "difference of expense in the

grades"; David Humphreys to Jefferson, 30 November, 1790, Life and Times of David Humphreys: soldier, statesman, poet, "belov'd of Washington," ed. Frank Landon Humphreys, 2 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1917), 2: 63.

[13]Pickering to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 14 September 1796, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 2nd Sess., 2292.

[14]When Congress sent Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry to France, they received outfits because their titles were Ministers Plenipotentiary and Envoys Extraordinary. Therefore, they were an exception to Congress's standard that special envoys receive no outfit; "Opinion of the Attorney General (W. Wirt) on Allowances of Salaries and Outfits to Public Ministers of the United States to Foreign Countries," 8 March 1825, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, 5: 757; Williams, A Founding Family, 297

[15]Foster, Practice of Diplomacy, 92.

[16]David Humphreys to Washington, 30 November 1790, The Papers of George Washington: Presidential Series, ed. Dorothy Twohig, 6 vols. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1987-1996), 6: 700. See also Foster, Practice of Diplomacy, 92-93; Editor's comments, The Republic of Letters: The Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, 1776-1826, ed. James Morton Smith, 3 vols. (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1995), 1: 541.

[17]William Temple Franklin to Jefferson, 27 April 1790, Thomas Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D. C. (microfilm).

[18]Franklin to Jefferson, 27 April 1790, Jefferson Papers; Madison to Jefferson, 21 September 1788, 17 October 1788, Republic of Letters, 1: 553, 562-62. By the mid-nineteenth century, Congress abolished outfits because the appointed representatives abused the allocation; Foster, Practice of Diplomacy, 52.

[19]U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 2nd Sess., 2292; ibid., 2nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1411-12; ibid., 4th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2932-33; ibid., 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 3710-11.

[20]Ibid., 1st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1122; Gouverneur Morris to Robert Morris, 31 July 1790, The Life of Gouverneur Morris, ed. Jared Sparks, 3 vols. (Boston: Gray and Bowen, 1832), 3:10. See also Thomas Pinckney to Thomas Jefferson 19 December 1792, Despatches from United States Ministers to Great Britain, 1790-1906, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

[21]U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1123, 1124, 2292.

[22]Ibid., 1119.

[23]Ibid., 1120-21. William Short, serving as the American chargé d'affaires in France, agreed with the result of the debate over constitutional powers, stating that he thought "Congress should only appropriate the sum they judge proper for the intercourse with foreign nations -- + that the number, grade, + appointments of the persons employed should be arranged by the president as he sh[d] think proper"; William Short to Jefferson, 15 September 1792, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain.

[24]U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1130

[25]Editor's comments, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Julian Boyd, 27 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950-), 17:216-217.

[26]Gouverneur Morris to William Carmichael, 13 July 1790, Life of Gouverneur Morris, 3:9. See also Editor's comments, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 17: 217, 221; Short to Jefferson, 29 June 1790, Jefferson Papers.

[27]Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 16.

[28]U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 2nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1411-1412; Editor's comments, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 17: 227; Paul A. Varg, New England and Foreign Relations, 1789-1850 (Hanover, MA: University Press of New England, 1983), 24.

[29]George Brown Tindall and David E. Shi, America: A Narrative History, vol. 1, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1992), 308-309.

[30]Davis, "Manners and Diplomacy," 2. See also U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 3rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1136, 1137; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service of the United States, 40; U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 3rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1314-1315, 92, 823, 852. A little less than two years later, Congress authorized a $600 raise for the secretaries of State, Treasury, and War, as well as the Attorney General. The President received a $500 raise and the Vice President a $2000 increase; U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 4th Cong., 1st Sess., 1383; ibid., 4th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1539.

[31]Foster, Practice of Diplomacy, 102; Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., James Monroe: Public Claimant (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1960), 127.

[32]Jerald A. Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 172. See also Timothy Pickering to Thomas Pinckney, 23 May 1796, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; Robert John Nelson, Jr., "Hamilton and Gallatin: Political Economy and Policymaking in the New Nation, 1789-1812" (Ph.D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 1979), 157; Eric J. Gruber, "American Relations with Great Britain and France from the Jay Treaty to the Convention of 1800" (B. A. Thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1992), 19.

[33]Combs, The Jay Treaty, 186-87; Nelson, "Hamilton and Gallatin," 157; Timothy Pickering to Pinckney, 23 May 1796, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 4th Cong., 1st Sess., 2898.

[34]John Jay to Secretary of State, 19 November 1794, Rufus King Papers (New York: Recordak Corporation, 1966), microfilm.

[35]David Humphreys to Secretary of State, 28 September 1795, Despatches From United States Ministers in Spain; Sharp, American Politics in the Early Republic, 117; Arthur Preston Whitaker, "New Light on the Treaty of San Lorenzo: An Essay in Historical Criticism," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 15 (March 1929) : 448.

[36]Varg, New England and Foreign Relations, 28. See also ibid., 27, 29-30; Alfred F. Young, The Democratic Republicans of New York, The Origins, 1763-1797 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), 345.

[37]U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 849.

[38]Ibid., 851. Some congressmen still believed as John Adams once stated, "the Luxuries we import from Europe, instead of promoting our prosperity, only enfeeble our race of men"; quoted in Hutson, John Adams, 150.

[39]U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 1st Sess., 435. See also ibid., 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1084.

[40]The Federalist newspaper, The Gazette of the United States, declared that Nicholas showed his friendship to the American public "by zealous labors to prostrate their wishes," because of his efforts to restrict the diplomatic corps; Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), 16 January 1798.

[41]U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 1st Sess., 435. See also John C. Miller, The Federalist Era, (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), 197.

[42]Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of Party Organization, 1789-1801 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957), 123.

[43]U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1111, 1127, 1123; Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, 123; U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 1st Sess., 440, 437.

[44]U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 851.

[45]Ibid., 856.

[46]Ibid., 1127.

[47]Ibid., 1088. See also ibid., 1084-1088, 1118-1143.

[48]Ibid., 872, 879. William Vans Murray, Minister Resident at The Hague during the debate, wrote "if we draw in all our foreign corps except from London & Paris how will that strike all Europe? –and reputation is inestimable!"; Alexander DeConde, "Foreclosure of a Peacemaker's Career: A Criticism of Thomas Jefferson's Diplomatic Isolation," Huntington Library Quarterly 15 (May 1952) : 302.

[49]U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1094. Murray again agreed "that a public Minister may be useful, and even save to Individuals a greater Expense than his Salary"; DeConde, "Foreclosure of a Peacemaker's Career," 303.

[50]U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1233-1234.

[51]Ibid., 1234; Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, 123; Columbian Centinel (Boston), 17 March 1798; Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 249-51. For all party identifications of congressmen, see Manning Dauer, The Adams Federalists (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1953).

[52]According to Dauer the split in the Federalist Party occurred toward the end of Fifth Congress; Dauer, Adams Federalists, 230.

[53]U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1115. In 1797, William Smith, a prominent South Carolina Federalist, was confident that the power of the President to appoint ministers had strong support; William Smith to Ralph Izard, 23 May 1797, Ulrich B. Phillips, "The South Carolina

Federalist Correspondence, 1789-1797," American Historical Review 14 (July 1909) : 787-88.

[54]U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 896. See also ibid., 895. The Gazette of the United States criticized the Republicans for believing the president was snatching away their power through patronage just because he did not nominate "themselves or their particular friends"; Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), 24 January 1798.

[55]U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1104-1105. See also ibid., 1084, 1123, 1111, 1127, 1123; Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, 123.

[56]See Lawrence S. Kaplan, Colonies into Nation: American Diplomacy, 1763-1801 (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 183, 182; Alfred F. Young, The Democratic Republicans of New York: The Origins, 1763-1979 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), 345; Varg, New England and Foreign Relations, 33.

[57]U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1208.

[58]Ulrich B. Phillips, "The South Carolina Federalists II," American Historical Review 14 (July 1909) : 733. See also Pickering to William Vans Murray, 3 February 1798, Pickering to Rufus King, 5 February 1798, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions.

[59]Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, 122-123; Editor's comments, Republic of Letters, 2: 978; "Madison's Aurora General Advertiser Essays 23 January-23 February 1799," The Papers of James Madison, ed. David B. Mattern, 17 vols. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1962-1991) 17: 213, 216.

[60]U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 848.

[61]Editor's comments, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 2: 95-96. See also U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 3710-3711.

[62]Kaplan, Entangling Alliances with None, 73; U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 3rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1314-1315; Young, The Democratic-Republicans of New York, 345; Wood, Radicalism of the American Revolution, 313.

Chapter Three

Salaries and Expenditures of United States Ministers to Great Britain

For most governmental officials during the Federalist Era pursuing "a political career also meant financial ruin" and American foreign diplomats were no exception; often, they attended missions abroad "at the cost" of private fortunes.[1] Ministers in Great Britain needed to use private monies to supplement their salaries. Furthermore, court practices commonly controlled by the nobility required American ministers to adopt the extravagant obligations of the members of the diplomatic circle. Throughout the Federalist Era, American ministers complained to the State Department and Congress about their inability to live comfortably at the British court.[2]

Social obligations and appearances were very important in court life and American ministers had to conform, spending money not only on necessities, but also on entertainment to present themselves at foreign courts. The salary and outfit were insufficient to meet these obligations. While great displays of splendor embarrassed many of the American ministers abroad, they recognized the necessity to display "outward dignity and importance" whether it be through their dress, homes, or functions they hosted. Other countries typically compensated their diplomats through salaries as well as reimbursements for travel, house rent, public festivities, and loss incurred due to the exchange rate.[3] Conversely, the United States only reimbursed its ministers with a salary and an outfit but they needed to petition Congress for reimbursement of all other

expenses. Therefore, it was necessary for the American representatives to supplement their public funds with private fortunes.

In 1789, President George Washington asked Gouverneur Morris to serve as an informal foreign liaison to the British monarchy to explore the possibilities of forming diplomatic connections between the two countries. Morris, a long-time friend of Washington's, accepted the post immediately. Although already very busy in Europe conducting affairs for Robert Morris, negotiating shipments of flour and tobacco to the French, obtaining furnishings for Washington, and visiting members of London and Paris society, Morris arrived in London in March 1790. Because he was an informal diplomat, sent at the personal request of the president, Morris was only to reside in London for a short time and had no official powers. He stayed in a hotel during the six months he was in London and his expenses totaled approximately £500.[4]

Morris's appointment was significant because of the administration's general apathy toward developing relations with Great Britain, as there had not been an American minister in London since John Adams abandoned his mission in March 1788.[5] Washington appointed Morris to "avoid errors in our system of policy respecting Great Britain," and justified the appointment to the Senate stating, "we should stand less committed should it [the appointment] be made to a private rather than a public person."[6] Even though the United States had had a minister in Great Britain during the Confederation period, Washington sent Morris in an unofficial capacity knowing that the appointment did not commit the United States to any formal diplomatic arrangement. Although Washington was adamant that Morris's commission was informal, influential members of Congress, including James Madison, believed that the appointment was a

commitment to employing Morris as a minister at a later date. Upon leaving London, Morris believed that the "unsatisfactory conversations" with the British government failed to change the American relationship with Great Britain and that communication had not improved enough to appoint a permanent minister.[7]

In July 1791 Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson sent Morris $1,000 as an "indemnification for the interference of [private] business" while he stayed in London.[8] The Washington administration recognized that some compensation was necessary; Morris had never thought to ask for any payment because he perceived the mission as an act of public service. Furthermore, he was a rich, well-bred man who believed that if his salary was insufficient he should supplement it with private funds. Morris thought that salaries were necessary, though, and asserted that "to curtail salaries is a false economy, because it brings men into office, who are incapable of the duties, or unworth[y] of confidence."[9] Morris's dignity and character would not allow him to represent the United States in a less than proper fashion; he was willing to expend his own money even in his unofficial capacity to present a suitable image to the British court to enhance and ultimately benefit American foreign and commercial relations. He perceived that although the British were hesitant to establish formal relations because of instability in Europe, the status and reputation of the United States was rising compelling him to conform to the extravagance and stiffness of "London society manners."[10]

In 1791, Washington appointed Thomas Pinckney, a South Carolinian known for "incorruptible integrity . . . love of country and family . . . as well as proper modesty," to be Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain.[11] Congress held a lengthy debate on the appointment because those members who opposed sending any representatives abroad

joined with others who opposed Gouverneur Morris[12] (nominated Minister Plenipotentiary to France at the same time) to try and block both appointments. Secretary of State Jefferson made a speech before the Senate committee, convincing it of the need for foreign relations and recommending that the United States have at least two ministers and two chargé d'affaires abroad. Congress subsequently confirmed the commissions.

As stipulated by the act of July 1, 1790, Congress provided an outfit -- "preparatory equipment . . . to cover the extra expense which every one must necessarily encounter who goes as a minister to a foreign court" -- to Pinckney equal to that of his salary for one year.[13] Pinckney's $9,000 outfit, typically used by ministers for the immediate expense of travelling and setting up their residence upon arrival at their post, was inadequate. His family was large and to maintain the health of his six children on the voyage overseas he purchased a milk cow and a substantial amount of foodstuffs.[14] But Pinckney was wealthy, and like Gouverneur Morris, he spent his own money so he could proceed with his mission and represent the United States in a dignified manner.[15]

Upon his arrival in Great Britain, Pinckney received a letter from Secretary of State Jefferson outlining the purpose of the mission and the expenses for which Congress would pay. Pinckney was to give letters of appointment to the consul for Algiers, secure artists and workman for the United States Mint, observe and report on British events, protect American commerce and seamen, coordinate all the activities of American consuls in Britain, and handle all American diplomatic accounts in Europe. Jefferson notified Pinckney that his salary did not extend "to the cost of gazettes and pamphlets[,] . . . the printing of necessary papers, postage, or couriers" and that Congress would pay for "no other [expense] of any description; unless where they are expressly directed to be

incurred."[16] Jefferson, considering the idea of "personal services and other expenses" vague, had urged Congress to approve an extra appropriation for newspapers and postage.[17] Congress agreed to reimburse ministers for other "contingencies" as well, such as engraving ciphers, diplomatic trunks, and treaty boxes.[18] But it failed to make the statements clearer and throughout the decade expected ministers to conform to its guidelines while they spent their own money to live at foreign courts.

Even though there was a pervasive "spirit of economy, republican simplicity, [and] antipathy towards courts and courtiers" throughout the United States, American ministers abroad had to conform and cope with frugal appropriations.[19] Pinckney was no exception. He "did not feel that republican principles were involved in the color of his coat, but adapted his costume to the style considered most respectful to the court to which he was accredited."[20] Pinckney believed that if he showed respect to the customs and manners of court life, European countries would reciprocate that respect for the United States, a principle to which many American ministers adhered. Ministers projected republican virtue and simplicity through their thoughts, actions, and "tone of courtesy which diplomacy employs," not solely because of their dress or furnishings.[21] More importantly, many of them believed, as Pinckney asserted, "the glory of our country is at stake; individual sufferings must not be regarded."[22] While the American ministers spent their own funds to acquire the respect they considered their country deserved, they anticipated reimbursement from Congress for those items necessary to continue their establishment abroad, such as homes, flatware, and furniture.

While in London, Pinckney conformed to the precedent and style of life set by other ministers from around the world (at the British court). At court, social affairs and

obligations were very important to the reputation of the minister and his country. Pinckney faced many political and social embarrassments in London. For example, Lord Grenville met only very briefly with Pinckney because Grenville was anxious to leave for his honeymoon. This did not stop Pinckney from attending social affairs and making an admirable impression for the United States, even though he was "by no means in favor in any of the apartments of St. James," because the other foreign ministers considered Americans "united in principles with the French."[23] An important acquisition for the American minister was a house, as he needed a place to live and entertain. Unfortunately, Pinckney's wife was in poor health and was unable to assist her husband in his social obligations. In fact, her death in London prompted another social dilemma for Pinckney because he had to petition the court to find out whether it required his attendance at the weekly levees while he was mourning.[24]

Historically, European countries provided a liberal salary for their foreign ministers for meeting social obligations allowing them to promote the interests of their respective countries. At court, material culture was important and the minister's place of residence, type of furnishings, and ability to entertain were all determinants of the image that the minister established for the country he represented. Members of European courts accustomed to entertaining, dining out, and mingling with other foreign emissaries expected that everyone knew society was expensive. Social engagements, especially dinners, were important to the career of a diplomat because he could exchange letters of introduction and meet other diplomats.[25] There were even scholarships established by the British government at Oxford and Cambridge to teach the art of diplomacy, including "favorite topics" of etiquette and "the external forms of diplomatic life."[26] Moreover

ministers were meeting persons from other countries at these social events and, therefore, wanted to show "great splendour . . . [and] outward dignity and importance."[27] The "court niceties" embarrassed American ministers, but they still had to conform.[28] For example, John Adams in 1785, while Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain, complained to Congress about the extravagant dinners he attended but could not reciprocate without extra expense; "we are to be invited to dine . . . at a table with three thousand pounds sterling upon it, and the next day we are to return this civility by inviting the same company to dine with us upon earthenware."[29] During his service, Pinckney spent an average of £500 annually more than his salary to participate in London court society. Pinckney's background as a wealthy South Carolina planter use to participating in the "social element . . . [with] relations, friends, and neighbors," only enhanced his reputation and that of the United States within London society.[30]

As an Envoy Extraordinary of the United States, John Jay, who arrived in Great Britain in 1794 to draft a treaty of commerce, resolve outstanding issues, and "advance on all occasions the interest and happiness of the two nations," was as conscious of his expenditures as other American ministers.[31] His negotiations emphasized commercial considerations and even Jay was wary of foreign entanglements, stating that "the absolute monarchies of Europe were to be guarded against because there 'the prince, his ministers, his women, or his favorites,' guided only by temporary views and fashions dictated policy."[32] Jay's rank was an Envoy Extraordinary, a special representative sent to handle important negotiations between the United States and another country; therefore, he received no outfit. The law permitted only reimbursement of his actual expenses. For his mission, Congress allotted $18,000 but Jay was frugal and "without degrading himself or

his country, he . . . [lived] in a hotel."[33] Still, expenses were high. Jay evaluated the living options and though he chose to live in a hotel it was the most expensive one in London. He justified this by alleging that living in a hotel was not unusual for a foreign minister and also that his expenses would be simple; he retained only three servants and avoided the financial loss of selling a house and furnishings at auction. Jay spent about $12,000 of his allotted sum in eleven months, putting the remainder toward the defense of American citizens abroad.[34] Obviously, the administration was content that Jay had not spent his entire appropriation, supposing that if it was not necessary for him to use it, salaries for other ministers were sufficient. But Jay spent $3,000 more than a minister's salary in less than a year, proving that salaries were insufficient. Furthermore, Jay did not have to expend money for a house, furniture, dinnerware, and other provisions that were customary purchases for resident ministers.

After Jay left Great Britain, Pinckney received his recall and in 1796, President Washington appointed Rufus King, who possessed a quality of growing importance -- "the ability to supplement one's salary from private resources" -- as Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain.[35] King's instructions were to discuss and rework some of the articles of Jay's Treaty, specifically those that dealt with trade with the West Indies and the impressment of American seamen, while remaining aloof from the strife between France and Great Britain. Like his predecessor, King was also in charge of diplomatic accounts in Europe. Twice, he found the diplomatic fund insufficient and had to rely on bankers to extend credit until the remittances arrived from home.[36] King obtained a house in London, and when furnishing it with Parisian china, vases, and mirrors, soon realized his salary was insufficient. He specified that the articles be "'chaste and pretty,'"

because he did not care to participate in the competition of British manufactures, but still he spent a large amount of his salary on his house and furnishings. His wife proved an valuable asset, as she understood that social prestige was important in diplomacy.[37] King "lived comfortably," but to maintain that status had to draw on his personal wealth, "which . . . [was] ample for all his wishes."[38] While in London, King hoped to make his residence a model of the United States "to raise the new country to a position of respect in the eyes of Europe."[39] What King set out to do was what every other American minister to Great Britain wanted as well. The natural tendency of foreign ministers was to avoid embarrassment and strive to present an impeccable image regardless of the amount of money they needed to spend, whether from government appropriations or personal wealth.

The American ministers to Great Britain valued the status and reputation of their position and the United States and, even though they received inadequate salaries, their determination to present a favorable image of their country abroad necessitated spending their own funds. The ministers during the Federalist Era, Morris, Pinckney, Jay, and King, endured financial difficulties in Great Britain. This meant personal sacrifice, though they hoped their government would reimburse them especially if their actions met with approval at home and recognition from abroad.

During the Federalist Era, American representatives to the British court faced a system of "aristocratic claims for leadership . . . based on lavish display and consumption."[40] Though the English nobility was small compared to that of France, they still thought they were "special beings" entitled to deference and respect. American ministers encountered court circles with "a code of behavior," where even Edmund Burke

commented that though the nobility had few privileges, their titles "minister much more to the pomp than the power of the possessor."[41] Participation in the pomp of the court circles became essential to the American diplomats because as John Adams asserted "luxury and effeminacy" dominated England.[42]

Notes

[1]James Sterling Young, The Washington Community, 1800-1828 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 52-53.

[2]Jeremy Black, Eighteenth Century Europe, 1700-1789 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 103; Foster, Practice of Diplomacy, 94.

[3]Eustace Clare Murray (The Roving Englishman), Embassies and Foreign Courts: A History of Diplomacy (New York: Routledge and Co, 1855), 146; Chase, "Keeping Up Appearances," 2.

[4]Editor's comments and Gouverneur Morris's diary 14 August 1790, The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, ed. Anne Cary Morris, 2 vols. (New York: Scribner, 1888), 1: 342-343; Gouverneur Morris to Thomas Jefferson, 26 February 1791, Life of Gouverneur Morris, 2: 124; Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co, 1895), 97; Life of Gouverneur Morris, 1: 340, 2: 124.

[5]Alexander Lane, "A Diplomatic History of the Federalist Party" (MA Thesis, Claremont College, 1932), 87-88. See also Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service of the United States, 25. Thomas Jefferson alleged that the reason Adams insisted on his recall was "the impossibility of living on the sum allowed"; Jefferson to James Madison, 25 May 1788, The Republic of Letters, 1: 540.

[6]Arthur Burr Darling, Our Rising Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), 130; U.S., Congress, Senate, Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 3rd Sess., 1801.

[7]Editor's comments and Gouverneur Morris's diary, 18 December 1790, Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, 1: 369-370. See also Harold Swiggett, The Extraordinary Mr. Morris (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc, 1952), 186; Morris to George Washington, 12 November 1788, in Life of Gouverneur Morris, 1: 291.

[8]Jefferson to Morris, 26 July 1791, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions. The American government sent Morris only $1,000 because it was "without the aid of any facts which could enable the govt. to judge what sum might be" satisfactory; ibid.

[9]Morris to Robert Morris, [1781?], Life of Gouverneur Morris, 1: 234. See also Morris to Robert Morris, [1781?], ibid., 2: 122-23; Theodore Roosevelt, Gouverneur Morris (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1898), 145; Swiggett, Extraordinary Mr. Morris, 180; Editor's comments, Sparks, Life of Gouverneur Morris, 2: 172.

[10]Editor's comments, Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, 1: 369-70. See also Morris to Jefferson, 24 December 1790, The Papers of Gouverneur Morris, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. (microfilm).

[11]Williams, A Founding Family, 361. See also ibid., 297; Judge Iredell to his wife, 19 April 1792, Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney, 101-2,

[12]Some members of the administration believed Morris's mission to Great Britain was a failure and accused him of being undiplomatic because he fraternized with the French minister to Great Britain and revealed "weapons" that the United States could have used to bargain with the British. Others defended Morris, declaring that the British ministers were at fault for the mission's failure because they did not want to negotiate for fear of losing their commercial advantage; Kaplan, Colonies into Nation, 197, 204; Ford, United States and Spain, 40-41

[13]"Opinion of the Attorney General (W. Wirt) on Allowances of Salaries and Outfits to Public Ministers of the United States to Foreign Countries," 8 March 1825, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, 5: 756-757.

[14]Jack L. Cross, London Mission: The First Critical Years (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), 24-25.

[15]Ibid., 27. Pinckney, known for his agricultural pursuits, generated great wealth through his property and crops. A staircase in one of his homes cost $14,000; Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney, 219, 221.

[16]Jefferson to Pinckney, 11 June 1792, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions. See also Cross, London Mission, 23-24; Jefferson to Pinckney, 11 June 1792, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions.

[17]Congressional observations on the diplomatic establishment, 17 July 1790, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 17: 224. John Adams and John Jay, both of whom were once ministers abroad, also agreed on appropriating funds for extra expenses. One of the three actually wanted to include "ceremonies; such as diplomatic and public dinners," as an extra appropriation; ibid., 225.

[18]"Expenditures in the Department of State," American State Papers, Finance, 5 vols. (Washington, D. C.: Gales and Seaton Publishers, 1832-1861), 5: 997-1013.

[19]Editor's comments, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 17: 217. See also Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service of the United States, 41.

[20]Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney, 144. As R. R. Davis emphasizes in his article, "Republican Simplicity: The Diplomatic Costume Question, 1789-1867,"

concerns over the dress of diplomats were debated from the founding of the United States; Davis, "Republican Simplicity," 19-29.

[21]Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney, 112. See also Davis, "Republican Simplicity," 19.

[22]Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney, 182.

[23]Pinckney to Secretary of State, 12 December 1792, Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney, 104. See also Foster, Practice of Diplomacy, 93; Chase, "Keeping Up Appearances," 2-4; Williams, A Founding Family, 297-98, 301; Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney, 102-103; Beckles Willson, America's Ambassadors to England, 1785-1928 (London: John Murray, 1928), 38; Pinckney to Secretary of State, 3 December 1792, King Papers.

[24]Williams, A Founding Family, 300; Willson, America's Ambassadors to England, 38; Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney, 144.

[25]Murray, Embassies and Foreign Courts, 146.

[26]Gilbert, To the Farewell Address, 93-94.

[27]Murray, Embassies and Foreign Courts 146, 148; Chase, "Keeping Up Appearances," 2-4.

[28] Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service of the United States, 40

[29]Foster, Practice of Diplomacy, 93-94.

[30]Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney, 223. See also Williams, A Founding Family, 450.

[31]George Washington to King of Great Britain, 5 May 1794, King Papers.

[32]Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers, 4. See also Gilbert, To the Farewell Address, 72.

[33]"Opinion of the Attorney General (W. Wirt) on Allowances of Salaries and Outfits to Public Ministers of the United States to Foreign Countries," 8 March 1825, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, 5: 757. See also Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service of the United States, 49. Jay's status as Envoy Extraordinary did not please Pinckney, but he gave Jay the support he needed; Samuel Flagg Bemis, "The London Mission of Thomas Pinckney, 1792-1796," American Historical Review 28 (January 1923) : 243; Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty, 282; John Jay to Secretary of State, 19 November 1794, King Papers.

[34]"Opinion of the Attorney General (W. Wirt) on Allowances of Salaries and Outfits to Public Ministers of the United States to Foreign Countries," 8 March 1825, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, 5: 756; Jay to Edmund Randolph, 5 March 1797, Despatches from United States Ministers in Great Britain; Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty, 287.

[35]Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 12.

[36]Timothy Pickering to Rufus King, 8 June 1796, 31 October 1797, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; King to Secretary of State, 10 December 1800, Despatches from United States Ministers in Great Britain.

[37]Robert Ernst, Rufus King: American Federalist (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), 220; Edward Hale Brush, Rufus King and His Times (New York: Nicholas L. Brown, 1926), 43; Gerard H. Clarfield, Timothy Pickering and the American Republic (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980), 188.

[38]Editor's comments, The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, ed. Charles R. King, 6 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1897; reprint, New York: De Capo Press, 1971), 2: 73.

[39]Ibid., 72. In fact, King judged ministers from other countries on a similar principle. He observed the "disrespectful magnanimity" shown by the diplomatic circle upon President Washington's death and commented that it "was a concerted neglect." The disrespect offended King who attended three court events in mourning without an acknowledgement from the British King and Queen; King to Pickering, 28 February 1800, Despatches From United States Ministers to Great Britain.

[40] Lenore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780-1850 (London: Hutchinson, 1987), 21. See also Black, Eighteenth Century Europe, 103.

[41]Jerome Blum, The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 11. See also ibid., 12.

[42]Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1967), 135.

Chapter Four

Salaries and Expenditures of United States Ministers to France

In 1825, James Monroe wrote to Senator Andrew Jackson to elicit support for a petition before the House of Representatives for reimbursement of money spent while Monroe was Minister Plenipotentiary to France.[1] Monroe had served the United States in Paris from 1794 to 1796, some thirty years earlier, and had failed to receive full reimbursement of his expenses. During the Federalist Era, Congress was frugal; furthermore, its ignorance of ministerial experiences abroad and its division over issues of domestic political power intensified the debates over appropriations for foreign relations.[2]

In France, as in Great Britain, salaries of American ministers and general appropriations for foreign relations were minimal. Often the president based the choice of a minister not only on his ability and character, but also on "their inclination towards France and their wealth and social advantages."[3] Therefore, the government expected ministers, like Monroe, to supplement their salaries with the private fortunes that many of them possessed. Subjected to the same $9,000 salary that American diplomats of the Confederation period received, the United States' representatives to France during the Federalist Era soon realized that their salaries were too small to function adequately in diplomatic circles. In fact, with the necessary materials and subsequent expenses of living abroad, such as purchasing a home or entertaining, ministers sometimes found it difficult to fit in court society. When Robert R. Livingston was Secretary of Foreign

Affairs from 1781-1783 he declared that all ministers serving abroad should be free from embarrassment.[4] The United States would also be free from the same embarrassment as long as Congress properly funded its diplomats. The American ministers to France confronted a politically unstable situation, with a constantly changing government. Those ministers who went to France in the turbulent decade of the 1790s realized, as did the French government, that the most effective way to conduct politics "was in co-operation with those who wielded social power and with the institutions which had local authority."[5] That meant having the means to participate in Parisian society.

When Thomas Jefferson left Paris in 1789 to take the position of Secretary of State he left behind his secretary, William Short, who received the appointment as chargé d'affaires to France in April 1790. Short, educated at William and Mary and fluent in French, had earned the respect of Jefferson; Jefferson even claimed him as an "adoptive son."[6] The confirmation of the position as chargé d'affaires pleased Short and he recognized the "honor conferred on me by this trust."[7] As Short had "learned diplomacy at the feet of Franklin, Adams, and Jefferson," he was well qualified for the position and had already been performing many of the same duties as Jefferson's secretary.[8] Short's position as chargé d'affaires was temporary; he was only to hold it until November 1790, because President Washington was searching for a permanent appointee. But Jefferson soon informed Short that the president was "extremely puzzled to find characters fit for the offices which need them."[9] Washington postponed appointing a representative to France with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary and Short remained chargé d'affaires for two more years.[10]

During Short's two-year tenure in France, as chargè, he pressed issues of Franco-American trade and witnessed many of the great changes taking place in France due to the French Revolution While Short was chargé d'affaires he could do little to strengthen the commercial bond between France and the United States, as Great Britain still dominated trade with the United States. Short, used the same plan Jefferson had used while in France; he tried to stimulate American business through a "liberalization of French domestic and colonial commerce."[11] His rank was not sufficient to represent the United States effectively and he was out of the country often, procuring loans from Holland. Due to the domestic strife in France, the United States gained little during Short's tenure.[12]

Short's wealth and skill, along with Jefferson's patronage, helped Short establish himself within French society even without the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. His charm and mannerisms made him an "asset" in the salons of Paris. Short "moved within a fashionable milieu" while maintaining "appropriate precedence in class-consciousness" which made him well known at court.[13] As a chargé d'affaires, Short's salary was $4,500, hardly enough to live in French society.[14] Moreover, almost all of the ministers of Louis XVI were from aristocratic families and played a significant role in government. Even many of the intendants, officials who served the French government in the provinces, were of noble birth. Jefferson, recalling his own experience, had warned, "even the best of diplomatic appointments . . . afforded no savings," despite the fact that custom allowed Short to charge his expenses on trips to Amsterdam.[15] Although it was cheaper to live in the Hotel d'Orleans in Paris, than rent a house[16] and furnishings, Short still had to pay for the lifestyle which society dictated and to which he had become

accustomed. For example, the extravagance of the court grew as Marie Antoinette's influence increased. Short also acquainted himself with prominent members of French high society, who were called les Américains, because they supported the ideals of the American republic. Short was not a poor man, but he knew that he could not pursue a diplomatic career, because his fortune was insufficient.[17]

Short managed to live and represent his country well in France despite his spending and problems receiving funds from the United States. The money sent from the United States did not always arrive because of the dishonesty of some French couriers. One such incident occurred when Short sent a Mr. Nomeny to pick up fifteen hundred livres for diplomatic expenses. Nomeny stole the money and Short demanded indemnity from Congress, stating that he "should suppose justice would induce them to prevent a person in their service from suffering in a case where he has not benefited."[18] As other diplomats of the era, Short, forced by the circumstance of living so far from the United States, many times had to use his own money to purchase items ordered at the request of Congress, such as boxes of medals Short commissioned from French merchants. But Jefferson monitored Short's accounts, promising to "[model] . . . it so as to preserve to you every interest which justice and usage will admit."[19]

The Senate's approval of Gouverneur Morris's appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary to France in January 1792 was controversial.[20] Some senators voted against him, claiming that he was too conservative and aristocratic while others thought that he was "notoriously ungodly."[21] Still others disapproved of Morris's "levity of conversation."[22] Senators opposed to his appointment also questioned his experience and stated that he was obnoxious. Most importantly, for some of the opposition, was the fact

that Morris was hostile to the goals of the French Revolution. As in the case of Short's appointment to The Hague, some senators wanted to restrict "all permanent foreign establishments" and because they did not have the votes to accomplish that goal, they joined with others opposed to Morris to try and prevent his appointment.[23]

The supporters of Morris were strong as well; they cited his ability, previous service, and understanding of public affairs to secure his confirmation. President Washington was a good friend of Morris. Washington expressed his confidence in the nomination and the ability of Morris to silence the opposition. Another one of Morris's supporters was Rufus King, a Federalist from New York. King, opposed to the mob violence of the French Revolution, wanted to avoid having a devoutly pro-French minister in Paris. Alexander Hamilton was another supporter of Morris, and Hamilton's influence with Washington's foreign appointments was evident as Hamilton believed sending Pinckney to Great Britain and Morris to France was the "proper placement of the ministers" in 1792.[24]

Morris was an extravagant spender, never complaining about the $9,000 that he received from Congress; as a representative of the United States, he was determined to show the French his dedication to his post and country. Traveling to Paris from London he received an outfit and rented his first house in Paris. He quickly ordered porcelain and silver and purchased a carriage, four horses, and "all the trappings thereunto appertaining."[25] Although the French government charged him duties, from which ministers were usually exempt, on the newly-purchased carriage and other items, Morris was determined to abide by the customary policies and applied for reimbursement. By applying for a reimbursement, and receiving it, Morris showed the French government

that he was an able and persistent diplomat, while establishing his dedication to the United States and the preservation of his country's dignity. A wealthy man who enjoyed fine living in the United States, Morris lived comfortably in France. He was also aware that the French viewed him as a representative of his country in behavior and attire; Morris stocked his wine cellar with good wines, purchased high-quality furniture, and arranged a beautiful garden that suited the hospitality he showed guests.[26]

Morris spent personal funds knowing that the French would judge the character of the United States through his participation in court functions. He accepted the fact that he would have to use private funds to supplement his salary. Morris related to Jefferson, "If it [the salary] proves insufficient I will supply the want from my own funds, as far as they will permit, and the Ballance [sic] must be made up by retrenchment."[27] Morris was also prepared to pay for contingencies, which he paid for out of necessity, sometimes without the approval of Congress. Two examples of this were a loan he gave to the LaFayette family and the purchase of a house on the outskirts of Paris to protect himself from the violence of the revolutionaries. Though he expected compensation for certain articles requested by individual states, such as a statue of George Washington that Virginia had ordered, his dedication to the post extended even through the personal economic sacrifices he made.[28]

After the Genêt affair, and the subsequent recall of both Morris from France and Genêt from the United States, it was important for the United States to reestablish a favorable standing with France.[29] Furthermore, in 1794 Washington appointed John Jay to a special mission to Great Britain; the president thought that would anger the French so he quickly looked for a pro-French Republican to replace Morris. Concurrently, the

new French minister to the United States wanted a person with French sympathies appointed to the Parisian post in hopes of frustrating Jay's mission to Great Britain. After offering the post to Robert Livingston and James Madison, who both declined, Washington turned to James Monroe. Monroe, a senator from Virginia, thought he was the last man that the administration would consider because of his persistence at obstructing Federalist policies. His fellow Republicans advised him to accept. Although Monroe thought this appointment was an attempt to get him out of the country, he soon recognized and agreed with Washington's motives to appease the French.[30]

Monroe hastily arranged his departure, obtained his instructions from Secretary of State Edmund Randolph, and left for France. Monroe did take time to use his outfit and purchased provisions because he knew that foodstuffs were scarce in Paris.[31] Secretary of State Randolph's instructions Monroe stated that he was to promote affinity with France, highlight the commercial benefits of trade with the United States, and petition the French government for compensation for American ships captured in Bordeaux under the French embargo of 1793. Randolph warned Monroe to be careful not to let his private views cloud his public statements and most importantly to preserve the status quo. Monroe asserted that he would "employ his utmost endeavors to promote the honor and credit of the administration."[32] He paid the "substantial sum" of about $700, for the ship's cabin and was soon on his way to "strengthen our friendship with" France.[33]

Upon his arrival in France in July 1794, Monroe's presentation to the government restored amicable relations between the two countries. Monroe soon learned that the French wanted assistance from the United States but he knew the monetary aid they desired violated his instructions to avoid involvement in the European war. Monroe's

first mistake was showing his overt French sympathies in a speech to the National Convention. Though the revolution of Thermidor eventually led to the collapse of the Convention, it remained in power for fifteen more months and, therefore, was still in power when Monroe presented himself to the French government. Instead of the "absurd ceremonial [presentations] of the monarchy," the Convention allowed the American minister to speak openly to its members.[34] Monroe's speech professed the virtues the two republics shared and he even presented the Convention with an American flag that the French government proudly hung next to the tricolor. The French were ecstatic at the affection shown by Monroe; they soon returned possessions officials had confiscated upon his arrival and offered him a house -- which he declined -- and the use of a carriage and horses -- which he accepted -- until he could purchase his own. But when news of his speech reached the United States the Federalists were horrified. Jay, Envoy Extraordinary in Great Britain, commented that Monroe had not considered the effect such a speech would have on the British. Monroe's speech put the United States in an awkward position with respect to the negotiations in Great Britain.[35]

Monroe believed the success of his mission was dependent upon fostering amicable relations with France and living how society dictated. While an appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary was an honor for anyone who received it, the salary, though seemingly enticing at $9,000 a year, was insufficient for Monroe. He purchased a house in a style which "should satisfy those accustomed to good society."[36] Monroe entertained lavishly, in one instance throwing a large party on the Fourth of July 1795, which required spending a considerable amount of his private funds. Failing to heed Jefferson's warnings about extravagant spending, Monroe, drawn into the most expensive social

circles, desired to match the "civilities" shown to him to preserve the character of the United States. If this meant spending more than his salary, he did not mind and stated that if he were richer he would have spent more. Many European courts knew the expense of presentations at foreign courts; custom dictated that ministers purchase expensive presents, "the most costly, though the most useless" things, for their families. As the United States did not participate in this custom, Monroe purchased these for his own family, further demonstrating his extravagance.[37] His purchase of furniture, which would later adorn the White House, and authorization of extra funds spent on couriers between London to Paris, were perhaps two of Monroe's most intelligent expenditures. In 1798 when Monroe tried to claim reimbursement for "contingencies," which he described as "unusual expenditures to assist Americans in France," Secretary of State Timothy Pickering delayed and subsequently denied settlement.[38] Collectively, from September 1794 to February 1797, Monroe spent $45,323.71, substantially more than the approximately $29,000 allotted for his outfit and his salary for that period.[39]

Monroe's commitment to the mission in France nearly ruined his career as he faced recall for both expressing his private views and directly going against the wishes of the administration. Although he had expressed his beliefs frankly while he was a member of the Senate and left no doubt as to his affinity with France, Monroe still received the appointment. Washington recalled Monroe because the president believed that Monroe's partisanship exceeded his concern for national interests. Monroe's failure to support the Jay Treaty was also a factor in his recall as was his attempt to represent the American people rather than the administration.[40]

In the 1820s, Monroe brought his claims before the House of Representatives to justify his expenditures and alleged that the Federalist administrations of the 1790s had mistreated him.[41] Accusations abounded about everything from his ostentatious living in France to the fact that he charged his wife's court dress to the American government. Monroe wanted to respond to these criticisms.[42] The failure to sell some of his property in Virginia at market value put him in a desperate financial situation and necessitated his appeal to Congress. After a long process of committee recommendations, Monroe received two separate reimbursements, one of $29,513 and another of $30,000, which included other claims besides what he had spent in France.[43] After thirty years of public service, some government officials derided Monroe because he received more reimbursements than any other public officer. He never recovered financially.[44] The financial impact of Monroe's appointment to France, along with his lifetime of public service, destroyed his estate. Congress had awarded his claims but not because it "was convinced about the validity of Monroe's case."[45] For example, it considered but was not sympathetic towards Monroe's claim that he lost $10,000 when he auctioned his house in France. Congress granted Monroe's claims "simply because of public pressure to relieve the distress of a distinguished public servant."[46]

The appointment of a successor for James Monroe in 1796 needed to be carefully considered; the man found to fill the post of Minister Plenipotentiary to France was Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. Perhaps the most influential factor in his appointment was that while Pinckney was sympathetic to France, he voiced no disapproval of Great Britain. His instructions were "to restore that mutual confidence which has been so unfortunately and injuriously impaired," "to remove jealousies and obviate complaints,"

and "to obtain such information of the French commerce . . . to render our intercourse permanently extensive."[47] But France recalled its minister to the United States without designating a successor and the French government, irritated at the signing of Jay's Treaty, prompted Pinckney to believe it would extend him a cool reception. More importantly, the Republicans in Congress told the president that Pinckney's rank was not high enough. The Republicans predicted his rejection by the French Directory, because with the defeat of the popular movement in France, a more formal environment emerged where "the wealthier classes reverted to elegant, sometimes extravagant costumes that emphasized their special status."[48]

Though all of Pinckney's affairs were not in order at the time of his appointment, he accepted the mission to serve his country. Before he left the United States, he specified that his attorneys handle his affairs in South Carolina by providing for his daughters' expenses and allowing his slaves to plant only enough for subsistence, "[revealing] . . . a prosperous yet prudent man."[49] Pinckney assured the administration that "what talent I have shall be diligently exercised in performing the objects of my mission, and in promoting, as far as I can, the honour and interest of our country."[50] Although Pinckney conformed to etiquette when he arrived in France in 1796 by attending the theater at the request of the mayor of Bordeaux and paying the standard gift to the fishwives, the "social and official coldness" he would experience had just begun.[51]

When Pinckney reached Paris, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs received him, but relations between the United States and France eroded. The French Directory would not receive Pinckney because of the American neutrality proclamations, the ratification of Jay's Treaty, and the recall of Monroe.[52] Moreover, the Directory headed a

"shaky political structure" and was more concerned with events in Europe than relations with the United States.[53] The Pinckneys stayed in Paris hoping to receive further instructions or information from the Americans or the French. All the family encountered was social ostracism, as even shopping was uncomfortable for them, and their living quarters were disagreeable as well as expensive. Finally, in February 1797, the Directory ordered Pinckney to leave the country.[54]

Upon his expulsion, Pinckney went to Amsterdam and awaited instructions from Congress and the new American President John Adams on how to proceed. Amsterdam, called "the European listening post," was an apt location for Pinckney to wait for instructions due to its convenience for communicating with France, but his stay there was not very enjoyable because of his constant worry about expenditures.[55] From the beginning of his mission, he expressed concerned that he might "overdraw what I am entitled."[56] The Pinckneys' apartment in Amsterdam was too small to entertain, and as he was still upset about the amount of money his family had spent in Paris, they lived very frugally. During his five-month stay in Amsterdam, he frequently wrote to the Secretary of State regretting that his mission was unproductive and that he was an economic burden. Pinckney was powerless to fulfill his mission and believed that until the Adams administration decided how to handle the French situation, his position was futile. Adams knew he could not offend France by sending Pinckney back to Paris at the same rank, so he considered sending him as an Envoy Extraordinary. Adams concluded that a commission would appease France and he appointed John Marshall, a Federalist, and Elbridge Gerry, a Republican, as Ministers Plenipotentiary and Envoys Extraordinary. They quickly departed for Amsterdam to join Pinckney.[57] Though the

Republicans pushed for the appointment of James Madison and objected to Pinckney's continuance, the president was adamant that Pinckney should head the commission.[58]

Though geographically balanced, hence appeasing the sectional differences which had arisen in the United States, and sent with the support of the American people, the commission was doomed because it faced internal differences and encountered external foreign intrigues and conspiracy. Money issues caused discord from the beginning. Pinckney rented adjoining apartments for the three commissioners that were expensive; the cost appalled Gerry and Marshall. Although the appointment paid the customary $9,000 salary, Gerry was worried about finances, while Marshall had hoped to profit from the mission. The expensive rent, therefore, did not help either man save money. Furthermore, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, knew there were problems within the commission because of partisan loyalties. He set out to exploit those differences in hopes of embarrassing the Federalists and ultimately putting friends of France into power in the United States. Talleyrand knew from the outset that he would ask for the bribe, "a simple and familiar way of dealing with minor diplomats," that resulted in the XYZ affair.[59]

President Adams found out about the XYZ affair on 4 March 1798 and at the request of Republicans, he informed Congress. Problems for the commission continued into the summer of 1798. The evidence that the French had conspired to obtain a bribe to support them in their war effort was too hard to disprove. The American public and the Federalists were angered at the affront to the nation's honor. Moreover, the Republicans were embarrassed because they had called for the opening of the XYZ documents and the Federalists celebrated their embarrassment by printing ten thousand copies of the

correspondence. The Adams administration instructed the envoys that "in no event is a treaty to be purchased" and presumed that the three had left France.[60] Elbridge Gerry did not abandon the mission but instead attempted to reach an agreement with the French independently. Pinckney and Marshall left France, warning Gerry that he would be an embarrassment to his nation if he stayed. Gerry was willing to negotiate on much less favorable terms than his colleagues. He continued to confer with the French at their request hoping to prevent an "immediate rupture" with the French Directory.[61]

In February 1799, President Adams appointed William Vans Murray, the Minister Resident at The Hague, to head a second commission to negotiate with the French; Oliver Ellsworth and William Davie joined him as Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary.[62] Talleyrand had indirectly approached Murray seeking a settlement of the differences between France and the United States. Adams approved of the attempt at rapprochement as long as the ministers "will be received, respected, and honoured" as the representatives "of a great, free, powerful and independent nation" and that the French respected "American national honour and prestige."[63] While Murray, appointed to placate the Republicans, admired his colleagues, he believed their reputations as stalwart Federalists produced a strong bias against the French. Davie had earlier described the French as, "madmen, [who] possess nothing upon which you can certainly calculate; no moral principle . . . no plan but plunder and military tyranny."[64] Congress provided a $9,000 outfit and salary for Murray, Davie, and Ellsworth. Unlike the first commission, when monetary concerns contributed to its ineffectiveness, none of these three commissioners spent extravagantly; for example, Ellsworth had "neither the inclination nor the strength for social distractions."[65] While Ellsworth commented to a friend that

the "country pays badly," he did not experience financial problems while abroad, and added, the United States "is the only one [country] in the world worth working for" because it affords happiness and honor.[66]

This new mission to France and the subsequent treaty that emerged from the negotiations was one of the most fortunate peace settlements for the United States because it not only secured peace with France, but it also formally ended the Franco-American Alliance of 1778. The Adams administration authorized the three commissioners to solve the existing problems with France and make a new commercial agreement. The Convention of 1800 was mutually beneficial to both nations. It affirmed the American policy of free trade, embodied in the principle "free ships, make free goods," and France received payments for claims of its citizens against the United States. The Convention bilaterally abrogated the treaties made in 1778, detaching the United States from any military alliances with France and widened the gap "between the American path of foreign policy and Europe's."[67] The French, wanting to avoid any displeasure on the part of the British or the Americans, published the treaty in Great Britain so no one could question their respect of neutral rights.[68]

The growth of the nobility in France through the sale of offices in the 1780s, the "gigantic rationalization and reform of France" in the early 1790s, and the constantly changing face of the French government throughout the rest of the decade presented challenges to the American ministers sent to Paris.[69] The instability of the new regimes in their acceptance or rejection of American ministers and their programs directly affected Franco-American relations. Moreover, while the aftermath of the French

Revolution contributed to political divisions within the United States, Congress failed to appreciate the Revolution's impact on the experiences of American ministers abroad.

Throughout the decade, appropriations for American representatives to France were insufficient for them to perform their functions. Congressional frugality forced the ministers to supplement their salaries with personal funds, and while they expected some compensation, Congress only reimbursed them for some contingencies related to their missions, such as couriers and stationery. Hence, Monroe waited years for Congress to consider his claims, and even then, the reimbursement he received was not due to the validity of the claims but his desperate financial situation. Most of the ministers to France complained about the lack of funding that they received, and all of them knew the salaries and appropriations were inadequate to live in France, whether participating in society or providing for their families. Moreover, while desperate financial conditions only affected some of them in their later years, many were forced to make heavy outlays of their private fortunes to perform their duties abroad.

Notes

[1] James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, 3 July 1825, The Writings of James Monroe, ed. Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, 7 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1898-1903), 7: 57; Monroe needed to gain support for his petitions from "leaders hostile to the administration, for President Adams was unable to command a majority in Congress." Monroe decided Jackson's influence in Congress would benefit his claims; Harry Ammon, James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1971), 555.

[2]Ammon, James Monroe, 554.

[3]Beckles Willson, America's Ambassadors to France, 1777-1927 (London: John Murray, 1928), vii-viii.

[4]Stuart, American Diplomatic and Consular Practice, 165. During the three years Robert R. Livingston was in France (1801 to 1803) he spent, in addition to his government salaries, enough to "[sink] . . . an estate of $100,000"; Wilmerding, James Monroe, 127.

[5]Black, Eighteenth Century Europe, 329. See also Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848 (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 64.

[6]George Green Shackelford, "William Short: Diplomat in Revolutionary France, 1785-1793," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 102 (December 1958) : 596. See also Caroline Pierce Martin, "William Short: American Diplomat at Paris" (Master's Thesis, University of Virginia, 1934), 1; Williams, A Founding Family, 443; Shackelford, "William Short," 597. Jefferson and Short had a very close relationship and

their correspondence reveals much about politics and foreign relations during the Federalist Era. In a letter to Jefferson, Short wrote that "with you [Jefferson] I have been so long accustomed to open every fold of my heart, that I felt no difficulty in speaking to you . . . as I would speak to myself" on any matter; William Short to Thomas Jefferson, 15 September 1792, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain. See also Williams, A Founding Family, 298.

[7]Short to John Jay, 30 September 1790, Despatches From United States Ministers to France.

[8]Shackelford, "William Short," 597.

[9] Jefferson to Short, 26 July 1790, Jefferson Papers. See also Jefferson to Washington, 19 July 1790, ibid.

[10]Short to Jefferson, 25 March 1790, 29 December 1790, Jefferson to Short, 25 August 1790, ibid.

[11]Shackelford, "William Short," 598-99. See also Martin, "William Short," 39, 1, 2; Shackelford, "William Short," 601-2.

[12]Shackelford, "William Short," 598-99.

[13]Ibid., 599, 596-97.

[14]In a letter to Washington, Jefferson commented that Short's salary was $1,500. This may have been the salary Short received in his temporary position once Jefferson departed. Though Short was only supposed to be in France until November 1790, Congress set the salary for a chargé d'affaires at $4,500 in July 1790; Jefferson to Washington, 19 July 1790, Jefferson Papers; U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 2nd Sess., 2292; Williams, A Founding Family, 443.

[15]Yvon Bizardel and Howard C. Rice, Jr., "Poor in Love Mr. Short," William and Mary Quarterly 21 (October 1964) : 528-29. See also Black, Eighteenth Century Europe, 101, 329; Elinor G. Barber, The Bourgeoisie in 18th Century France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), 115. For general information about royal intendants see Vivian A. Gruder, The Royal Provincial Intendants: A Governing Elite in Eighteenth Century France (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1968).

[16]In June 1790 William Short petitioned Jefferson to request that Congress retain Jefferson's old house in France as the permanent residence for the American minister because of the inconvenience and expense all diplomatic representatives encountered while obtaining a residence abroad; Short to Jefferson, 29 June 1790, Jefferson Papers.

[17]Short even saved money by sending packages without letters because they were free from postal charges; Short to Jefferson, 22 September 1791, Despatches From United States Ministers to France; Jefferson to Short, 28 July 1791, "Letters of Thomas Jefferson to William Short," William and Mary Quarterly 13 (April 1933) : 105; Short to Jefferson, 15 August 1790, Jefferson Papers; R. W. Harris, Absolutism and Enlightenment (London: Blandford Press, 1964), 353; Chastenay Maussion to Madame de Maussion, 15 August 1790, Ekaterina Radziwill, They Knew the Washingtons: Letters from a French Soldier with Lafayette and from His Family in Virginia (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1926), 188; Shackelford, "William Short," 599; Bizardel and Rice, "Poor Mr. Short," 523-26; Myrna Boyce, "The Diplomatic Career of William Short," Journal of Modern History 15 (June 1943) : 108.

[18]Short to Jefferson, 4 March 1790, 29 December 1790, Jefferson Papers. Short was not the only American representative who met with dishonesty in economic

transactions. While Thomas Jefferson was Minister Plenipotentiary to France, a house owner overcharged him for rent. John Jay, while Envoy Extraordinary to Great Britain, asserted that he would employ the "utmost care and fidelity" with accounts "to guard against the suspicions and imputations, which certain characters (common to all countries) may find it convenient to germinate & encourage"; Jay to Edmund Randolph, 5 March 1795, Despatches From United States Ministers to Great Britain; Edward Dumbauld, "Where Did Jefferson Live in Paris?," William and Mary Quarterly 23 (January 1943) : 65-66;

[19]Jefferson to Short, 28 July 1791, "Letters of Thomas Jefferson to William Short," 105.

[20]Concurrently, Short was appointed as Minister Resident to The Hague. He faced the frugality of Congress even on his trip there from Paris. He noted the obvious discrepancies between allotting a smaller outfit for a Minister Resident than a Minister Plenipotentiary although they both encountered the same expenses while traveling; Short to Jefferson, 20 July 1792, Despatches From United States Ministers to France.

[21]Whitridge, "Gouverneur Morris in France," 764. See also editor's comments, Life of Gouverneur Morris, 1: 369; Ernst, Rufus King, 182.

[22]Linda May Bell Brison, "Gouverneur Morris," (Master's Thesis, Stanford University, 1961), 34. See also Washington to Morris, 28 January 1792, The Writings of George Washington, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, 39 vols. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1931-1944), 31: 468.

[23]Jefferson to Short, 3 January 1792, "Letters of Thomas Jefferson to William Short," 109. See also Jefferson to Short, 28 January 1792, ibid., 111; Brison,

"Gouverneur Morris," 34; Robert McColley, ed., Federalists, Republicans, and Foreign Entanglements, 1789-1815 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969), 8-9.

[24]Kaplan, Colonies into Nation, 207-8. See also Washington to Morris, 28 January 1792, Writings of George Washington, 31: 468, 470; Brison, "Gouverneur Morris," 34; Ernst, Rufus King, 182; Charles Erwin Gray, "The Political Philosophy of Gouverneur Morris," (Master's Thesis, University of Arkansas, 1950), 63; Morris to Alexander Hamilton, 21 March 1792, Morris Papers.

[25]Editor's comments and Gouverneur Morris's diary, 12 May 1792, The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, 1: 514, 530. See also Morris to Jefferson, 1 July 1792, Despatches From United States Ministers to France.

[26]Editor's comments, Life of Gouverneur Morris, 1: 396; Brison, "Gouverneur Morris," 46; Childs, American Foreign Service, 20; Willson, America's Ambassadors to France, 51; Editor's comments, The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, 1: 554. Morris purchased a country house at Sainport as well, which had "a pretty little garden"; Willson, American's Ambassadors to France, 51.

[27]Morris to Jefferson, 6 April 1792, Morris Papers.

[28]Morris had little concern about the possibility of bankruptcy and, in fact, was so well off that he contributed a portion of his salary in 1796 to the Catholic Seminary of Boston and purchased some of the debt of the United States to profit from the interest; Timothy Pickering to Morris, 26 October 1796, 24 November 1796, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; Morris to Jefferson, 13 February 1793, 19 October 1793, 6 January 1793, Despatches From United States Minister to France.

[29]For further information on the Genêt affair (an incident occurring in the United States in 1793 when French minister Edmund Genêt cohorted with land speculators by planning an attack on Spanish Florida and appealed directly to the American people for support once censured) and the recalls of Morris and Genêt see Morris to Jefferson, 19 October 1793, Morris to Randolph, 18 August 1794, Despatches From United States Ministers to France; Eugene R. Sheridan, "The Recall of Edmond Charles Genêt: A Study in Transatlantic Politics and Diplomacy." Diplomatic History 18 (Fall 1994) : 463-488. Morris's return home confirmed his lavish spending because after so many years abroad, his estates were in a wretched condition. He spent fifty to sixty thousand dollars renovating buildings at Morrisania as well as furnishing his house with expensive glass plate and French furniture, much of which he had obtained from friends who went to the guillotine despite his efforts to protect them; Whitridge, "Gouverneur Morris in France," 767; Rufus King to Christopher Gore, 20 November 1803, The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, 4: 326; Brison, "Gouverneur Morris," 43, 46.

[30]James Alton James, "French Diplomacy and American Politics, 1794-1795," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911 1 (1913) : 159; Beverly W. Bond, The Monroe Mission to France, 1794-1797 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1907), 9-10; Willson, America's Ambassadors to France, 63; Brown, First Republicans, 106; Ammon, James Monroe, 113-14, 598; Arthur Styron, The Last of the Cocked Hats: James Monroe and the Virginia Dynasty (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1945), 170.

[31]Monroe, with a household of fourteen people, suffered with the shortages of bread that plagued many people of Paris. The family procured two pounds of bread a

day, "an unavoidable diminution of the ordinary allowance"; Monroe to Secretary of State, 14 April 1795, 17 May 1795, Despatches From United States Ministers to France.

[32]Bond, Monroe Mission, 10. See also Ammon, James Monroe, 115, 116-17, 122.

[33]Ammon, James Monroe, 116, 117.

[34]Willson, America's Ambassadors to France, 66. See also Monroe to Jefferson, 25 August 1794, Monroe to Secretary of State, 20 November 1794, Despatches From United States Ministers to France; Ammon, James Monroe, 117; Jeremy Popkin, A Short History of the French Revolution (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), 84.

[35]Brown, First Republicans, 110; Bond, Monroe Mission, 16, 28-29; Ammon, James Monroe, 121, 122; Monroe to Jefferson, 25 August 1794, Despatches From United States Ministers to France.

[36]Wilmerding, James Monroe, 28. See also ibid., 27; Bond, Monroe Mission, 72. Criticism of Monroe was rampant after the failure of his mission and many suspected that he was speculating in land in France. He contended that the house was his only investment; Wilmerding, James Monroe, 86. Ultimately, critics of the expenses of ministers led to the establishment of embassies, permanent residences for many American diplomats abroad, which eased much of the financial burden; Foster, The Practice of Diplomacy, 100-101.

[37]Wilmerding, James Monroe, 28, 38, 41, 127. The cost of some of these presents was two to three times an American minister's outfit; ibid., 38.

[38]Ammon, James Monroe, 554.

[39]Monroe to Secretary of State, 1 February 1795, 31 July 1797, Despatches From United States Ministers to France; Wilmerding, James Monroe, 29, 62-63, 134; Bond, Monroe Mission, 85.

[40]Ammon, James Monroe, 114; Pickering to Monroe, 22 August 1796, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions. Historians have debated whether Monroe's "diplomatic naivete," the constant censure of the Federalist administration, or the Republican Party's parochial views of France were more at fault for the failure of his mission; Bond, Monroe Mission, 22, 21, 47; Wilmerding, James Monroe, 130-31; Willson, America's Ambassadors to France, 65; Richard Norton Smith, Patriarch: George Washington and the New American Nation (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1993), 270.

[41]Although Monroe had a chance to assess his own claims while he was Secretary of State, he chose not to, but would not allow the frugal judgment of John Quincy Adams to decide them either; Wilmerding, James Monroe, 70-71.

[42]With the advice of Thomas Jefferson, Monroe responded to criticism of his mission in 1797 by publishing his account of relations with France while he was minister; Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, 122.

[43]Wilmerding, James Monroe, 124, 131-32; Ammon, James Monroe, 556, 570. Monroe's expenditures while he was Minister Plenipotentiary to France were $45,323. The reimbursements were large because they covered interest as well as outstanding claims from Monroe's cabinet positions and presidency; Wilmerding, James Monroe, 29.

[44]Wilmerding, James Monroe, 130. See also Ammon, James Monroe, 553; Monroe to Secretary of State, 19 July 1797, Despatches From United States Ministers to France; Wilmerding, James Monroe, 6, 29, 125, 131; Bond, Monroe Mission, 10.

[45]Ammon, James Monroe, 553, 556-57, 569, 573.

[46]Ibid., 569.

[47]Pickering to Pinckney, 14 September 1796, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions. See also Williams, A Founding Family, 314; Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 139.

[48]Jeremy Popkin, A Short History of the French Revolution, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), 87. See also Monroe to Secretary of State, 27 August 1796, Pinckney to Secretary of State, 17 November 1796, Despatches From United States Ministers to France; Marvin Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney: Founding Father, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967), 139; Foster, Practice of Diplomacy, 19.

[49]Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 138. See also Pinckney to John Adams, 27 July 1796, Despatches From United States Ministers to France; Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 137.

[50]Pinckney to Adams, 27 July 1796, Despatches From United States Ministers to France See also Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 137.

[51]Willson, America's Ambassadors to France, 78. See also Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 140, 141.

[52]Pinckney believed that the Directory had already accepted him through the Minister of Foreign Affairs and was confused as to why the Directory did not want to

negotiate the differences between the two nations. From Spain, David Humphreys informed the administration of Pinckney's rejection which was "not on a personal, but a public account"; Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney, 148; David Humphreys to Secretary of State, 14 January 1797, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain.

[53]Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers, 118, 133.

[54]Pinckney wanted that request to be in writing because leaving the country was "something which no prudent minister would do" on his own; Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 144-45, 141-42, 147; Willson, America's Ambassadors to France, 79; Williams, A Founding Family, 314.

[55]Alexander DeConde, "The Role of William Vans Murray in the Peace Negotiations Between France and the United States, 1800," Huntington Library Quarterly 15 (February 1952) : 186; Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney, 149

[56]Pinckney to Secretary of State, 26 September 1796, Despatches From United States Ministers to France. See also Pickering to Pinckney, 4 April 1797, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions. Pinckney worried about his personal debts as well. For example, in mid-1796 Pickering paid for a portrait of George Washington, made at Pinckney's request, and Pinckney wanted to be sure he reimbursed Pickering; Pinckney to Secretary of State, 26 September 1796, Despatches From United States Ministers to France; Pickering to Pinckney, 22 July 1979, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions.

[57]Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney, 149; Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 157; Pinckney to Secretary of State, 18 February 1797, 8 March 1797, Despatches From United States Ministers to France; Pickering to King, 6 April

1797, Pickering to Pinckney, 12 June 1797, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; Kaplan, Colonies into Nation, 262; Willson, America's Ambassadors to France, 80. Adams originally appointed Francis Dana who declined for health reasons; Pickering to King, 20 June 1797, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions.

[58]William Smith to Ralph Izard, 23 May 1797, Ulrich B. Phillips, "The South Carolina Federalist Correspondence, 1789-1797," American Historical Review 14 (July 1909) : 787; Pinckney to Secretary of State, 15 July 1797, Despatches From United States Ministers to France.

[59]Kaplan, Colonies into Nation, 274. See also Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers, 10; Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, 122; Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 154-55, 165; Kaplan, Colonies into Nation, 266; Pickering to Elbridge Gerry, 17 July 1797, Pickering to Pinckney, 16 January 1797, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; Gerry to Pickering, 29 July 1797, Despatches From United States Ministers to France; Williams, A Founding Family, 316-17; Lane, "Diplomatic History," 224. For an in-depth explanation and analysis of the XYZ affair (an incident which occurred in France in late 1797 when three Frenchmen accosted the American diplomats asking for bribes in order to begin negotiations with the French government) see William Stinchcombe, The XYZ Affair (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980).

[60]Pickering to Pinckney, John Marshall, and Gerry, [March 1798?], Diplomatic and Consular Instructions. See also Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 185, 186-87; Lane, "Diplomatic History," 232, 233; Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry to Pickering, 8 November 1797, Despatches From United States Ministers to France; Jefferson to Madison, 6 April 1798, The Republic of Letters, 2: 1034-35; Williams, A Founding

Family, 462; Lisle A. Rose, Prologue to Democracy: The Federalists in the South, 1789-1800 (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1968), 198-99.

[61]Gerry to Catharine Gerry, 24 April 1798, Elbridge Gerry's Letterbook, ed. Russell W. Knight, (Salem, MA: Essex Institute, 1966), 39. See also Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 154, 161, 168, 183, 186-87, 189; Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, 126; John William Kuehl, "The Quest for Identity in an Age of Insecurity the XYZ Affair and American Nationalism," (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1968), 59; Gerry to Adams, 16 April 1798, Despatches From United States Ministers to France; Gerry to [Ann?] Gerry, 16 April 1798, Elbridge Gerry's Letterbook, 36. Although Gerry experienced the animosity of many Federalists at home, he not only helped to preserve peace with France, but also made it possible for another commission to negotiate a treaty with France; Pickering to King, 12 June 1798, Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, 2: 347; Gerry to Adams, 16 April 1798, Despatches From United States Ministers to France.

[62]DeConde, "The Role of William Vans Murray," 186; Harold E. Davis, "Franco-American Convention of 1800" (Master's Thesis, University of Kansas City, 1962), 21-22; William Garrott Brown, The Life of Oliver Ellsworth (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1905), 292. Originally Adams offered Patrick Henry a place on the commission, but he declined for age and health reasons and William Davie received the appointment instead; Willson, America's Ambassadors to France, 83.

[63]Willson, America's Ambassadors to France, 81, 82. See also DeConde, "The Role of William Vans Murray," 187.

[64]Rose, Prologue to Democracy, 158. See also Kaplan, Colonies into Nation, 262; Pickering to William Vans Murray, 6 March 1799, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; DeConde, "The Role of William Vans Murray," 191, 192; Lane, "Diplomatic History," 278

[65]Brown, Oliver Ellsworth, 285. Congress also gave the commissioners permission to draw on Dutch bankers if they needed more funds, perhaps as a way to insure the success of the mission; Pickering to William Vans Murray, 6 March 1799, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions.

[66]Brown, Oliver Ellsworth, 304. See also Oliver Ellsworth to Pickering, 2 October 1799, Despatches From United States Ministers to France; Pickering to Ellsworth and William Davie, 21 October 1799, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; Brown, Oliver Ellsworth, 285.

[67]Kaplan, Colonies into Nation, 297. See also Pickering to Ellsworth, Davie, and Murray, 14 February 1800, 9 April 1800, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; Albert Hall Bowman, The Struggle for Neutrality: Franco-American Diplomacy During the Federalist Era (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1974), 434; Kaplan, Colonies into Nation, 260, 298; Pickering to Ellsworth and Davie, 26 October 1799, Despatches From United States Ministers to France.

[68]Bowman, Struggle for Neutrality, 417; Lane, "Diplomatic History," 277; Brown, Oliver Ellsworth, 315; DeConde, "The Role of William Vans Murray," 193, 194.

[69] Hobsbawm, Age of Revolution, 64. See also Black, Eighteenth Century Europe, 101; Harris, Absolutism and Enlightenment, 354, 362; Varg, New England and Foreign Relations, 31.

Chapter Five

Salaries and Expenditures of United States Ministers to Spain

In 1791, David Humphreys, Minister Resident to Portugal, observed "that the United States are daily gaining political consideration in Europe"; the Spanish government recognized the growing status of the United States and "[feared] . . . the consequences of our increasing strength and resources."[1] On the eve of American independence, Spain had not been friendly. Unlike France, there was no popular sentiment or sympathy in Spain for the American cause. Fearful that the consequences of a successful colonial revolt that might spread throughout the New World, Spain postponed negotiating a treaty with the United States on the Mississippi River, the major issue between the two countries. Another reason to delay, interrelated with the first, was the Spanish desire to retain commercial control over the trade between their colonies; they feared that the United States would interfere.[2]

While Humphreys's observation about Spain was accurate; there were two other influential factors which delayed negotiation of a treaty on the Mississippi River: the importance of diplomatic rank to the Spanish court and the salaries of American diplomats. Both factors hindered American ministers in Madrid and influenced Spanish-American relations during the era. During the Federalist decade, Spain sent two chargé d'affaires to the United States which it replaced with a Minister Plenipotentiary in 1797. The United States reciprocated, continuing the post of chargé d'affaires in Spain from the Confederation era. Due to the constraints of the Spanish court, the United States sent

Commissioners Plenipotentiary in 1792 and then an Envoy Extraordinary in 1795. Finally in 1796, President Washington appointed an American Minister Plenipotentiary to serve in Spain. All of these appointments were necessary because of the restrictions on, and stratification of, rank at European courts. Liberal diplomatic appropriations to American representatives were necessary for them to conform to the order of the Spanish court. Humphreys commented, "that the embarrassment of the government of the United States would not probably be occasioned so much by the article of expense in the present instance, as by a deviation from the system to which they [the American ministers] had wished to adhere."[3] The United States could avoid embarrassment by providing sufficient funds for its ministers to insure their acceptance at court. Furthermore, there would be less embarrassment and difficulty in negotiations if the ministers conformed to the court system rather than fighting against it. Recognizing court procedures, such as the importance of rank and attendance at court functions, was essential to maintaining cordial relations and successfully negotiating with the Spanish. The Spanish court was mobile, extravagant, and formal, and the King and Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs expected the United States to give their country the respect they believed it deserved.

When Minister Plenipotentiary John Jay left Spain in 1782, his secretary, William Carmichael, remained behind as acting chargé d'affaires because the United States did not want it to appear as if it was abandoning the Spanish court. Under the Confederation government, Carmichael executed numerous duties. He took care of public accounts, negotiated the payment of outstanding American bills, collected intelligence, and assisted individual Americans with grievances against the Spanish government. His service to his country was admirable. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Robert R. Livingston, even

remarked to Carmichael, "your conduct is perfectly agreeable to Congress, and I doubt not that you will continue to pursue such a line as will render you most acceptable to the Court of Madrid."[4]

Carmichael's long service abroad and ability to converse with members of the diplomatic corps at the Spanish court helped him attain the appointment as chargé d' affaires to Spain in April 1790, a post in which he proved incapable of furthering the interest of the United States. In 1791, Secretary of State Jefferson wrote Carmichael urging him to expedite settlement of the Mississippi River problem; the United States wanted rights to navigate the entire length of the river. Jefferson spoke of Carmichael in high esteem but many others viewed him as "an intriguer" trained in the style of "Franklinesque diplomacy," which allowed him to charm foreign diplomats.[5] But Carmichael's personal prestige gradually diminished over the years, accelerated by poor health and an addiction to drinking, which, combined with his low rank, hindered his negotiations with Spain.[6]

While Minister Plenipotentiary, Jay had reasoned that it was best to leave Carmichael in Spain to placate the court; Jay did not realize the awkward position that it put Carmichael in and how the post of chargé d'affaires complicated Spanish-American relations. Though committed to the interests of the United States, Carmichael could achieve little in that diplomatic rank. Beginning in 1783, he held an uncertain position because his country had no treaty with Spain, hence no regular means to send or receive information from the United States. Furthermore, the Spanish government became hostile toward Carmichael when in 1790, the British sent false reports of a rapprochement between the United States and Great Britain. Perhaps the most trying of Carmichael's

circumstances was his rank. Although he exerted constant pressure on the Spanish to consider the interests of the United States, he could not get a "full hearing at the Spanish court."[7] The Spanish court did not hold the rank of chargé d'affaires in high regard. Not only were the opportunities of meeting with representatives of foreign governments limited for those of lesser rank, but rank also restricted access to information about the foreign policies of those governments. For example, the grade of ministers was so stratified that a chargé d'affaires faced many difficulties, such as not receiving invitations to court functions and inadequate presentations to the king; the order of presentation to the king placed Carmichael last.[8] As early as 1789, Carmichael requested that the president raise his rank to that of a Minister because of the "etiquette of the Spanish Court where precedence for purposes of audience was thus decided."[9]

Many American diplomats agreed that the United States was missing an opportunity to negotiate its grievances with the Spanish because Carmichael lacked sufficient authority. From Paris, Gouverneur Morris wrote to Carmichael about the frustration he experienced in Madrid. Morris believed that the president should have given Carmichael the proper rank and sufficient powers and lamented that Carmichael's position was insufficient to reach a settlement. After attending the French court, Morris understood the fundamental forms of European diplomacy that impeded Carmichael's progress. Furthermore, Morris concluded that the United States did not recognize "the value of the moment."[10] David Humphreys, whom the president sent to Madrid to carry instructions to Carmichael, was also aware of the problems. In instances when court procedure allowed Carmichael to meet with the king, all the ministers of higher grades, such as Ambassadors and Ministers Plenipotentiary, attended the king first, and many

times Carmichael did not receive an audience or the opportunity to voice American concerns. Other events, such as the king's levees, which he held weekly with his ministers and all the foreign representatives, excluded chargé d'affaires.[11]

After years of service, Carmichael accomplished little and Spain refused to give special consideration to the United States by relaxing court etiquette. William Short related some of the troubles that Carmichael encountered to Jefferson, which in many ways were similar to the treatment Jefferson had received when he was in Paris. Even though Jefferson had been of the second grade, a Minister Plenipotentiary, Short reminded him of some of his frequent complaints about the French court. For example, lesser grade representatives met last with the Minister of Foreign Affairs at all European courts, "after he is so impatient to be gone in order to be with the king . . . with his watch in hand" leaving little time for those representatives to address their concerns.[12] Humphreys commented, that "as a new nation in a manner disserved from the rest of the world; the system which had been established by us, [and] the policy and propriety there might be for European nations to dispense with forms in regard to us, " the Spanish court ignored.[13] The republican system of government established by the United States was inherently different from the monarchies of Europe. Humphreys believed the European courts should have disregarded their court policies and formalities because the American ministers were not predisposed toward a monarchical system. But Spain expected acceptance of the functions of its court. Carmichael was so frustrated with the problems and etiquette that he was even willing to accept an appointment at higher rank without a higher salary.[14]

With that request, Carmichael was sacrificing a great deal, as his salary had never been substantial. During the Confederation period, he received the salary of a secretary of legation: £1,000 a year. After 1785, Carmichael supported himself from private funds while serving in the position of acting chargé d'affaires, a position he held in the absence of an appointed diplomat. Congress never compensated him because it did not recognize Carmichael's position in Spain as vital to the United States. Carmichael finally applied to Thomas Jefferson, the new Minister Plenipotentiary in Paris, for three years of back salary and received enough to pay his debts and support himself for three months. After 1788, Congress, through bankers in Amsterdam, paid Carmichael's salary, but it was "meager" and "insufficient" for his needs; Congress still did not recognize him as a chargé d'affaires, which put Carmichael in considerable "financial distress."[15]

The frugality of Congress and the extravagance of the Spanish court forced Carmichael to supplement his income with his own funds even after President Washington appointed him chargé d'affaires in 1790. There were many reasons Carmichael had to augment his salary but the most pressing was the mobility of the Spanish court. The court moved four or five times a year to different Spanish cities where foreign representatives were "under the necessity of hiring a house."[16] Carmichael's other significant expenses were the high rents, the lack of reimbursement for stationery and postage, and the expectation to give liberally to the servants and attendants of the Spanish court. Carmichael never demanded funds from Congress, and it did not consider any recompense, even though he complained often about his financial situation as "he grew 'every year poorer.'"[17] Determined to succeed in his mission at the Spanish court, present a creditable image to the Spanish government, gain recognition

from it, and atone for past differences between the two nations, Carmichael gradually exhausted his finances. His salary was insufficient to cover "the expense of living decently in Spain" or "to maintain respect for himself or his country."[18]

In January 1792, President Washington appointed Carmichael and William Short, who had just been appointed as Minister Resident to The Hague, to be joint Commissioners Plenipotentiary to Spain to settle the issue of the navigation of the Mississippi River and negotiate a commercial agreement. Short was wary of the negotiations but wasted no time in heading to Madrid, though he still "appeared to be indecisive, and apprehensive."[19]

Once Short reached Madrid, he immediately recognized that the discrepancy between diplomatic grades that had hindered negotiations with the Spanish. As Commissioners Plenipotentiary, the Spanish court still considered Carmichael and Short as part of the lower ranks classified with the chargé d'affaires, Minister Residents, and "inferior characters."[20] This subordinate position subjected the two men to humiliating distinctions, thus negatively affecting their ability to negotiate. The European ministers tended to exclude the lower ranks of diplomats from functions such as weekly engagements and even dinner parties. Short believed that as long as that attitude persisted, the United States could not expect positive results. The rank of Minister Plenipotentiary was most common among all of the European courts and in Spain the lower ranks were outmoded unless, as Short commented, held by "the most insignificant or for the most insignificant courts . . . scarcely to be classed among diplomatic characters."[21] Carmichael believed he could have settled the Mississippi River question in 1790 if he had had the proper powers because even as Commissioners Plenipotentiary

the president did not give the two men any "standing plenipotentiary powers" which were necessary to negotiate on the issue.[22] Short notified the American government that it appeared that the Spanish were stalling due to the grade of the American representatives. Finally, in May 1794, two years later, the Spanish informed the American commissioners that they did not have the power "sufficient for the negotiations desired."[23]

Short documented his expenses for his travel to and time spent in Spain from November 1792 to July 1794 while he was Commissioner Plenipotentiary (see Appendix). Short's account, broken down by type of expenditure, showed that there were four categories of expenses: travel, food and lodging, servants, and postage. Short's expenditures in these two years were typical of the expenses of American minister to Spain.[24]

As Short's account dates from the beginning of his appointment to Spain a large part of it contains expenses for travel to Spain; moreover, as the Spanish court was not stationary, travel expenses within Spain were a large part of the expenditures for all American representatives assigned there From Holland, Short traveled in a "yacht" and purchased a new carriage because his old one was too worn to make the journey. He was responsible for the costs of drivers, attendants, and "road expenses," which ranged from replacing carriage wheels to hiring an extra horse "in consequence of the state of the roads."[25] The roads were treacherous and constant repairs to the carriage were necessary. Moreover, along his journey, he encountered duties on his carriage and horses. Short passed through France on his way to Madrid and in Paris stayed at the Hotel d'Orleans, the most expensive in the city. The Spanish roads were worse than France's and the carriage's springs needed binding and more repairs were necessary. Once in Spain, Short

chased the court throughout the country, hiring coaches that took him to the various cities, as well as paying tavern expenses and lodging en route. Short and Carmichael retained a personal carriage while they were in Madrid, Aranjuez, and St. Ildefonso, three of the court's locations, attending functions of the court and diplomatic corps.[26]

Short included his food and lodging expenses, noting various tavern expenses that probably covered the cost of both food and rent. His only explicit references to food expenses were a dinner at Rotterdam and three months of "breakfast dinner &c" while he was in Madrid.[27] Short more often noted his rent payments, recording lodging expenses in Madrid and Aranjuez. In February 1794, he stayed in private lodgings while in Madrid but after three months he left for Aranjuez and again reported tavern expenses, presumably for lodging.[28]

Another of Short's large expenses was paying people for services rendered. Traveling required hiring drivers, attendants, and repairmen for the carriage; Short also hired a traveling servant to accompany him from The Hague to Spain. As the court moved, it was necessary for all ministers to retain servants in all of the four residences; in February 1793, for example, Short recorded paying "board wages to my servants at Madrid and Aranjuez."[29] He employed two servants who traveled with him to the other court residences, St. Ildefonso and Escurial. Instead of paying the servants directly, Short compensated them through board wages which covered the cost of their food and lodging. He also hired a translator and a notary to enable the bankers in Amsterdam to continue to process the American loans.[30]

The last category, postage, included gazettes, stationery, and couriers as well. Congress deemed these four expenses as governmental and not to be covered by

minister's salary because Short had to subscribe to newspapers for the government, use the foreign mails to send diplomatic letters, and many times hire couriers to transport the mail quickly and safely. Short noted an instance of each of these expenses and perhaps incurred more governmental charges because his mission to Spain was extraordinary.[31]

Congress eventually reimbursed all Short's expenses because as Commissioner Plenipotentiary he received "his actual expenses."[32] But Short's financial survival in Spain was also because he continued to receive his salary as Minister Resident to The Hague during the two years of his special mission. Furthermore, at times he shared expenses with Carmichael so they could both save money by traveling and lodging together.[33]

In December 1793, President Washington informed the House of Representatives that relations between the United States and Spain were in jeopardy unless Americans increased their efforts to improve the relationship; the United States needed to appoint a higher ranked official to the Spanish court. Less than six months later, in May 1794, Washington took the initiative and appointed Short Minister Resident, but predictably the rank was still inadequate in the eyes of the Spanish. Morose and gloomy, Carmichael rejoiced at his recall. The Spanish court then delayed his departure because it failed to define the proper etiquette for the presentation of a recall for a Commissioner Plenipotentiary or chargé d'affaires. Short, determined to earn the president's approbation, pressed for his presentation to the Spanish court. Though less impressed by court affairs and forms than other American ministers, Short recognized that " the way to suffer the least inconvenience by these forms" was to conform to them because "over and above the personal embarrassment to which the agent is exposed where they are deviated

from, it becomes also a ground for delay" of negotiations.[34] To conform, Short stressed that a change in his rank was necessary. For example, the Spanish court wanted the word plenipotentiary inserted into his title and Short wrote to the Secretary of State asserting that this was essential to avoid continued embarrassment as Spain had no precedent of dealing with the rank of Minister Resident.[35]

In February 1795, before Carmichael left Spain, he died; two years later his widow applied to the House of Representatives for reimbursement of private funds her husband had spent for the public good. Congress examined Carmichael's accounts and listed the things it believed merited reimbursement, such as presents to servants of the court of Spain, expenses for presentation at court, expenses for paper, ink, and copying services, and rent for various residences. As his wife had to mortgage Carmichael's land, "for the want of money which was now allowed to be justly their due," a few members of the House recognized that "they [the Carmichaels] should receive an interest equal to that which they had been obliged to pay."[36] Because Congress had failed to compensate Carmichael for money he rightfully earned, many members of Congress believed the payment of interest was necessary. Others thought that it would set a dangerous precedent. Those members also stated that the exact amount spent by Carmichael was uncertain; they believed Congress should not overestimate and make too large a reimbursement. One member "touched at the necessity there was of curtailing the expenses of our diplomatic establishment."[37] There was also the question of whether or not to compensate Carmichael's widow for an outfit. Congress denied that claim, because Carmichael had arrived in Spain as a secretary which did not require an outfit. The recommendation of the House committee was to pay $8258.76, "for, and in full of

his extraordinary expenses."[38] The House approved the final reimbursement in March 1798 which the Treasury Department, on examination of Carmichael's accounts, increased to $9664.14.[39]

In Short's new position as Minister Resident, he received an outfit and $4,500 a year as his salary; both proved to be inadequate. Short was pleased that the House of Representatives allowed a new outfit for his appointment as governments sometimes expected diplomats to carry over what remained of their original outfit. Although Short agreed that Congress should "only appropriate the sum they judge proper for the intercourse with foreign nations" and acknowledged that the members of Congress would be prudent because the American diplomatic establishment was young, he believed the salary was insufficient for residing at the Spanish court.[40] Moving with the Spanish court on the "annual chase" of the king was vital to all nations as the court conducted business at all four locations.[41]

While at court, Short observed, inquired, and compared the salaries given to other foreign representatives. He was shocked at how little England paid its Ministers Plenipotentiary, even though it was £500 more than the United States. Many foreign governments paid their representatives to Spain well above what they compensated other diplomats; those governments paid the house rents, as well as moving and travelling expenses. The Dutch minister in Spain received $16 a day whenever the Spanish court was not in Madrid; in 1793, the court was only in Madrid for two months. Moreover, when Short compared his salary to the expenditures he had incurred in The Hague, he concluded that his expenses there were only three-fourths what they were in Spain. Short reasoned that to live at the Spanish court, one either lived on necessities alone or spent

more than the government allotted. In fact, many foreign ministers left Spain "indebted heavily" because of the financial demands at court.[42] He also pointed out that while he may have been a Minister Resident, and most of the other foreign representatives were Ministers Plenipotentiary, things still cost the same. Short came to "rely on the justice of Government from a consideration of all the circumstances to prevent my suffering injury in this case," and hoped Congress would eventually reimburse all his expenditures, as it was "absolutely impossible to exist as a foreign Minister of any kind here for 4500 dollars a year."[43]

Short still lacked the power to negotiate; because of his rank and lack of prestige, Spain continued to procrastinate thus compelling President Washington to appoint Thomas Pinckney as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in May 1795 to settle the differences with Spain. Pinckney was to secure rights to the Mississippi River and negotiate a commercial treaty. Fortunately for the United States, Pinckney's mission coincided with a peace treaty between Spain and France; moreover, Spain was seeking to secure the friendship of the United States to prevent a possible Anglo-American alliance that may have resulted from Jay's Treaty. Pinckney's mission to Spain was successful, and in 1796 the United States Senate ratified the Treaty of San Lorenzo (Pinckney's Treaty) securing access to the Mississippi River for the United States and defining the commercial rights of neutrals. The treaty extended the possibilities of American trade and it also defined the southernmost border of the United States.[44]

As Envoy Extraordinary, Pinckney assumed that he was on "the same footing with Mr. Jay [Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain]," who had just left Great Britain after negotiating Jay's Treaty. Pinckney received no outfit and

the Secretary of State reported that a general fund of $18,000 was available.[45] Interestingly, even after knowing Jay's expenses while in Great Britain, Congress chose not to appropriate more money for Pinckney. Pinckney quickly completed his mission in eight months and spent $7,737.49.[46] Commenting on why his mission was so expensive, Pinckney remarked on the cost of travelling between and within countries as well as the expense of changing residences while he was in Spain. He believed that he limited himself financially to the "general custom of persons in a similar situation" at the Spanish court and "scarcely expended more than at the rate of the usual salary of a minister plenipotentiary of the United States without a customary outfit."[47] If Pinckney had resided for a year in Spain at the same rate of expenditure he would have spent more than the allotted salary of $9,000.

After the Treaty of San Lorenzo, relations between Spain and the United States improved; the culmination of cordial relations occurred upon the exchange of Ministers Plenipotentiary in 1797. President John Adams appointed David Humphreys, a "cultured and enterprising patriot" and the Minister Resident to Portugal, to the position based on his past diplomatic experience and Adams's personal familiarity with Humpreys's sense of duty and diligence.[48] While in Spain, Humphreys continued his efforts at negotiating with the Barbary pirates and expanded American trade with Spain. He also addressed the claims of American citizens against the Spanish government.[49]

Humphreys experienced fewer problems at the Spanish court and, in fact, his rank satisfied the custom and etiquette of court and foreign representatives welcomed him into the diplomatic circle. He earned the "esteem and confidence of the Spanish Court" and with the recent treaty settlement succeeded where other American representatives had

failed.[50] Although Humphreys commented that the Spanish court was devious, "the grandees [noblemen] of the court" judged Humphreys to be an equal and he charmed social circles and warmly entertained them.[51] Problems at court were for the most part non-existent and the Spanish government even presented him with gifts, such as a saber and a belt embellished with gold.[52]

As the first Minister Plenipotentiary to Spain, Humphreys received an outfit and a salary of $9,000. When Humphreys arrived in Madrid, the Spanish court was in San Ildefonso so he quickly joined in the chase, again subject to all the expenses of past American diplomats. At times he had trouble obtaining his funds. Once Dutch bankers denied Humphreys his salary because the United States was behind in its payments. Humphreys possessed a strong belief that a man in public office should never spend more than he made or he would disgrace himself and his country. This applied to the diplomatic posts as well, and he preached "that a man must be possessed of morals, talents, information, discretion, secrecy, and a good disposition . . . and lastly that he must be, from habit, perfectly arranged in his pecuniary affairs."[53] Humphreys had all these qualities. Still, President Jefferson, motivated by party division, recalled Humphreys in May 1801, failing to reward Humphreys for his efforts.[54]

In the early 1790s, the American diplomatic representatives to Spain spent their salaries and outfits chasing the Spanish monarch across the countryside trying to facilitate treaty negotiations that would settle the Mississippi River question. Specific court forms and etiquette mandated that diplomats follow the royal court to each of the four cities; moreover, it was necessary to do so because the royal government conducted business at each place. Unfortunately, Congress conformed to its precedent and failed to raise

appropriations for American diplomats in Spain. Because of the diligence of American representatives abroad and the willingness to spend more than their appropriations, the United States was able to improve relations with Spain during this decade.

Furthermore, the differences in rank in Spain were detrimental to the negotiations of the United States because it was difficult for many of the American representatives to meet with the king. Slowly, over the course of the decade Congress raised the rank of the representative to Spain recognizing the need to resolve the Mississippi River question. While the timing of Thomas Pinckney's mission was fortunate, his rank and American recognition of the significance of negotiating with Spain, afforded the United States a beneficial treaty which opened the Mississippi River, helped to define the boundaries of the United States, and established cordial relations with Spain.

Notes

[1]David Humphreys to Thomas Jefferson, 3 January 1791, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 18: 473.

[2]G. L. Rives, "Spain and the United States in 1795," American Historical Review 4 (October 1898) : 63; Henry Knox to George Washington, 29 August 1790, Worthington Chauncey Ford, The United States and Spain in 1790 (Brooklyn, NY: Historical Printing Club, 1890), 104; William Short to Secretary of State, 8 December 1792, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain.

[3]Humphreys to Jefferson, 30 November 1790, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 2: 64. See also Foster, Practice of Diplomacy, 19; Introductory note, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain.

[4]Samuel Gwynn Coe, The Mission of William Carmichael to Spain (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1928), 47. See also Bendiner, Virgin Diplomats, 220-21; Editor's comments, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 2: 21; U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 648. In fact, the Confederation government had confidence in Carmichael and from 1783 to 1789 he received only fifteen letters and scattered packets of newspapers; Lane, "Diplomatic History," 163-64; Coe, Mission of William Carmichael, 60.

[5]Bendiner, Virgin Diplomats, 163; Coe, Mission of William Carmichael, 105. See also Coe, Mission of William Carmichael, 49, 83; Short to Jefferson, 25 March 1790, Jefferson Papers; Worthington Chauncey Ford, The United States and Spain in 1790 (Brooklyn, NY: Historical Printing Club, 1890), 17; Jefferson to William

Carmichael, 12 March 1791, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; Thomas Jefferson to Carmichael, 2 August 1790, Humphreys to Jefferson, 3 January 1791, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 17: 111-116, 18: 474; Jefferson to Washington, 8 August 1790, Papers of George Washington, 6: 217-18.

[6]Humphreys to Secretary of State, 6 February 1791, Humphreys to Washington, 23 July 1792, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 2: 78, 147-48; John J. Clancy, "David Humphreys: A Forgotten American." (Ph.D. diss., St. John's University, 1970), 201; Carmichael to Jefferson, 24 January 1791, Ford, United States and Spain, 23.

[7]Edward M. Cifelli, David Humphreys (Boston: Twayne, 1982), 83. See also Bendiner, Virgin Diplomats, 220-21; Coe, Mission of William Carmichael, 84-85, 111; Editor's comments, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 2: 162; Humphreys to Jefferson, 15 January 1791, Ford, United States and Spain, 35.

[8]Carmichael to Jefferson, 19 August 1791, Ford, United States and Spain, 39; Clancy, "David Humphreys," 167.

[9]Coe, Mission of William Carmichael, 81.

[10]Gouverneur Morris to Carmichael, 5 November 1792, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 2: 179-80.

[11]Cifelli, David Humphreys, 81; Humphreys to Secretary of State, 6 February 1791, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 2: 76; Humphreys to Jefferson, 3 January 1791, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 18: 474.

[12]Short to Secretary of State, 16 October 1793, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain.

[13]Humphreys to Jefferson, 30 November 1790, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 2: 63. See also Humphreys to Secretary of State, 6 February 1791, ibid., 76.

[14]Lane, "Diplomatic History," 171.

[15]Coe, Mission of William Carmichael, 60, 79; Lane, Diplomatic History," 165. See also Coe, Mission of William Carmichael, 21, 77-79.

[16]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 648. See also E. N. Williams, The Ancien Regime in Europe: Government and Society in the Major States, 1648-1789 (London: The Bodley Head, 1970), 57; Coe, Mission of William Carmichael, 60.

[17]Coe, Mission of William Carmichael, 81. See also ibid., 60; Short to Secretary of State, 5 March 1794, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain. Perhaps Carmichael tried to offset any damage to his finances by using his public accounts after he was no longer an American diplomatic representative; Short to Secretary of State, 24 February 1795, ibid.

[18]Coe, Mission of William Carmichael, 112.

[19]Morris to Carmichael, 5 November 1792, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 2: 179-80. See also Jefferson to Short, 23 January 1792, Jefferson to Carmichael and Short, 18 March 1792, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; Bond, Monroe Mission, 24; Jefferson to Short, 28 January 1792, "Letters of Thomas Jefferson to William Short," William and Mary Quarterly, 111. Short was concerned about the appointment especially because of the information he received from the Spanish representatives to The Hague. One of the Spanish representatives was the brother of Gardoqui, who had negotiated with the United States earlier; the Spaniard was "vague" about the possibility of success the

United States would have in negotiations with Spain; Short to Secretary of State, 30 November 1792, 8 December 1792, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain.

[20]Short to Secretary of State, 6 March 1793, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain. Short experienced some of the same problems with court etiquette at The Hague. Not only was there an objection to the form of his letter of presentation because it omitted the title of "High Mightinesses" which the States General insisted upon, but Short also petitioned the Secretary of State to have the word plenipotentiary added to his commission without a raise in salary to appear even more friendly to the court; Short to Jefferson, 20 July 1792, Despatches From United States Ministers to France. See also Short to Jefferson, 15 September 1792, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain

[21]Short to Jefferson, 15 September 1792, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain. See also Short to Secretary of State, 6 March 1793, ibid.

[22]Short to Secretary of State, 6 March 1793, ibid. See also Short to Secretary of State, 29 April 1794, 6 March 1793, ibid.

[23]Coe, Mission of William Carmichael, 96. See also ibid., 81; Short to Secretary of State, 15 July 1794, 29 April 1794, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain.

[24]In 1790, Congress required all American ministers to submit detailed accounts to the Secretary of State; U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 2nd Sess., 2292. See the Appendix for Short's account.

[25]Short to Jefferson, 20 July 1792, Despatches From United States Ministers to France; William Short to Secretary of State, 1 July 1794, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain. See the Appendix.

[26]See the Appendix; Short to Jefferson, 22 September 1791, Despatches From United States Ministers to France.

[27]Short to Jefferson, 20 July 1792, Despatches From United States Ministers to France; Short to Secretary of State, 1 July 1794, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain. See the Appendix.

[28]See the Appendix.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid. In July 1790, at the insistence of Thomas Jefferson, Congress allotted an extra allowance for this category; Editor's comments, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 17: 217, 221.

[32]"Opinion of the Attorney General (W. Wirt) in allowances of Salaries and Outfits to Public Ministers of the United States to Foreign Countries," 8 March 1825, American State Papers, Foreign Policy, 5: 58.

[33]See the Appendix.

[34]Short to Secretary of State, 4 September 1794, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain. See also U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 3rd Cong., 1st Sess., 20; Editor's comments, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 2. 211, 179; Coe, Mission of William Carmichael, 97; Short to Secretary of State, 12 August 1794, 16 September 1794, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain; Edmund Randolph to Short, 28 May 1794, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; Williams, A Founding Family, 453; Editor's note on letter, Humphreys to Jefferson, 8 April 1791, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 20: 169.

[35]Short to Secretary of State, 16 September 1794, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain; Kaplan, Colonies into Nation, 253; Edmund Randolph to Short, 9 November 1794, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions.

[36]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 690. See also Short to Secretary of State, 13 February 1795, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain; Coe, Mission of William Carmichael, 98; U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 648-49.

[37]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 690.

[38]Gazette of the United States, (Philadelphia) 16 January 1798. See also U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 716-717, 2249.

[39]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1276.

[40]Short to Jefferson, 15 September 1792, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain. See also Randolph to Short, 11 June 1794, 31 December 1794, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; Short to Secretary of State, 15 September 1792, 16 January 1795, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain.

[41]Coe, Mission of William Carmichael, 17. See also Short to Secretary of State, 16 September 1794, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain.

[42]Short to Secretary of State, 10 September 1794, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain. See also Short to Jefferson, 15 September 1792, ibid.

[43]Short to Secretary of State, 10 December, 1795, 16 September 1794, ibid. See also Short to Secretary of State, 16 September 1794, ibid.

[44]Randolph to Pinckney, 3 December 1794, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; Arthur Preston Whitaker, "New Light on the Treaty of San Lorenzo: An Essay in Historical Criticism," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 15 (March 1929) : 436, 448-49; James W. Cortada, ed. Spain in the Nineteenth-Century World: Essays on Spanish Diplomacy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 6; Rives, "Spain and the United States," 76; Smith, Patriarch, 258.

[45]Pinckney to Secretary of State, 23 February 1795, Despatches from United States Ministers in Great Britain. See also Randolph to Pinckney, 3 December 1794, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions.

[46]"Opinion of the Attorney General (W. Wirt) on Allowances of Salaries and Outfits to Public Ministers of the United States to Foreign Countries," 8 March 1825, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, 5: 758. Jay spent $12,000, $3,000 more than a minister's salary in less than a year; ibid., 756. Pinckney estimated that his expenditures totaled £3000 to £4000 sterling. This amount was approximately the equivalent of $10,000 to $11,000. He encountered a delay in receiving his final accounts though and seems to have only received $7,737.49 as reimbursement; Pinckney to Secretary of State, 14 March 1796, 30 July 1796, Despatches From United States Ministers to Great Britain.

[47]Pinckney to Secretary of State, 4 May 1796, Despatches From United States Ministers to Great Britain. See also Pinckney to Secretary of State, 14 March 1796, 30 July 1796, ibid.

[48]A. R. Marble, "David Humphreys: His Service to American Freedom and Industry," New England Magazine 29 (February 1904) : 690. Congress unanimously approved Humphreys's nomination. Editor's comments, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 2: 242. See also Adams to Jay, 9 February 1786, Jefferson to Jay, 5 March 1786, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 1: 345, 348, 300; Clancy, "David Humphreys," 119, 126; Timothy Pickering to Humphreys, 11 June 1796, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions.

[49]Pickering to Humphreys, 1 February 1797, 17 February 1797, Pickering to King, 15 February 1797, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions.

[50]Clancy, "David Humphreys," 189. See also Pickering to Humphreys, 11 June 1796, 1 February 1797, 17 February 1797, Pickering to King, 15 February 1797, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions. Humphreys's only concern at court seemed to be the remoteness of his situation, as Madrid was far from any port city; Humphreys to King, 21 March 1798, Humphreys to Secretary of State, 5 September 1797, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain.

[51]Editor's comments, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 2: 270-71. See also Humphreys to Secretary of State, 15 August 1797, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain.

[52]Humphreys declined these gifts; Humphreys to Jefferson, 28 June 1802, Life and Times of David Humphreys, 2: 305-306; Humphreys's wife even received diamonds as a gift from the Queen which she petitioned the Secretary of State to keep; Ann Francis Humphreys to Secretary of State, 26 April 1806, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain

[53]Clancy, "David Humphreys," 203. See also John and Francis Baring and Co. to Humphreys, 9 May 1797, Humphreys to Secretary of State, 15 August 1797, 16 June 1797, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain.

[54]Cifelli, David Humphreys, 101-102.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

Robert Ralph Davis's contention that the United States and Europe represented "two worlds" is an accurate assessment of the congressional concerns over the diplomatic establishment during the Federalist Era. This thesis has expanded upon Davis's argument illustrating that in the late-eighteenth century Congress consistently limited funding for the American diplomatic corps because of its faith in republican values. Congress could protect republican society at home by restricting American international involvement. American diplomats used their experiences, not to reject republicanism, but rather to reorient those beliefs. American ministers throughout the Federalist Era consistently asked for higher salaries, rank, and appropriations believing that to be the best way to preserve republicanism within the existing international order.

Republicanism and the preservation of republican government were the most important reasons for limiting salaries and appropriations for the diplomatic corps. Many Americans desired to remain separate from Europe, because it believed European society would have a corrupting influence on Americans; congressmen, specifically Republicans, with some exceptions, as voting records indicate, continued to opposed extending American international relations. Republicanism was accepted by American ministers abroad, they believed in its precepts; but what was most important to them was the success of their missions. American diplomats asserted republicanism and defended their country's respectability.[1] Even Benjamin Franklin, the stereotypical republican,

was aware of his role and yet accepted European society in all its luxury.[2] As historians, such as Joyce Appleby, have shown, cultural environment and experience at European capitals did affect Americans' republican views.[3]

The evidence presented here illustrates that diplomacy at European courts required hosting dinners, reciprocating social events, and attending court functions. The fact that American ministers endured lower ranks and salaries than other foreign officers at European posts adversely affected the Americans ability to participate in these necessary social functions. For example, custom barred Short and Carmichael from attending various court functions in Spain because of their rank, and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney could not reciprocate invitations in France because he could not afford a larger apartment. The American diplomats recognized that their international function was more important than congressional funding. For example, Short, Carmichael, and Humphreys all asked for upgrades in their titles (such as the word plenipotentiary or minister, without a raise in pay) to enhance their respectability, and virtually all American diplomats sent during the Federalist Era supplemented their salary with their own funds. American representatives were not necessarily frugal, rather they lived handsomely at the capitals of Europe. They believed, as Short's expense account demonstrated, in reimbursement for such necessary expenses, as housing and travelling, but they were willing to serve at their own expense.

While domestic and international issues, and fundamental questions concerning the Constitution, were important to the early congresses, underlying all the debates was a dedication to republican ideas and a growing tension between those ideas and the growing commercialism. Partisan politics, solidified by the ratification of the Jay Treaty

in 1795, were continually an issue, as events such as the European wars, the Genêt mission, and the XYZ affair caused sharp political divisions within Congress and witnessed Federalists and Republicans attacking one another as representatives of a foreign power. As the congressional debates over foreign appropriations illustrate, constitutional questions were also a consideration, because Congress addressed issues of power within the new American government. For example, the Congress was concerned about the president's power because of his ability to control the application of appropriations. In 1798, the most important debate of the decade regarding funding for foreign relations was a mainly partisan contest that again brought to the fore issues of executive power. But all of these questions were laden with republicanism. International issues, the extent of executive power, and even partisan conflict were debated in battles over how best to fund the American diplomatic service.

Congressmen noted the fragility of the republic and the desire to remain disconnected from the political affairs of Europe; they espoused a theory of "two worlds," one virtuous and one corrupt. This thesis illustrates that congressional debates centered on those ultimately republican concerns. The evidence presented suggests that the preservation of the republic directly affected congressional decisions to limit funding for American diplomats abroad, while those diplomats recognized, based on their experiences, that republicanism could be preserved even with American participation in international affairs.

Notes

[1]The idea of "respectability" comes from Felix Gilbert; Gilbert, To the Farewell Address, 112.

[2]Davis, "Republican Simplicity," 19-29; For further analysis of this argument see Gerald Stourzh, Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

[3]Joyce Appleby, Liberalism *and* Republicanism *in the* Historical Imagination (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), see specifically her chapter titled, "John Adams and the New Republican Synthesis," 188-209.

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Appendix

Account of William Short – 28 November 1792 to 1 July 1794
Commissioner Plenipotentiary in Spain[1]

1792

Nov. 28. To p^{d}. For an express sent to Amsterdam to receive five packets of the Sec. of State for Mr. Carmichael and myself rel. to the mission in Spain, from Mess^{rs}. Van Staphorst & Hubbard.

Dec. 11. To stationary furnished me at the Hague to this date as per receipt and account annexed

13. To p^{d}. For Leyden Gazette as p^{r}. Rec^{t}., sent to the Sec. of State

12. To hire of Reaf in the banque Marchande to go from the Hague to Amsterdam on the buiness of the loans previous to setting out for Spain as p^{r}. receipt

15. To expences in the tavern at Amsterdam from the 13th. to this date as per receipt

To hire hire of a carriage with two horses called a savogarde and expences on the road (the driver included) as pr. rect. 23.11

17. To fitting the wheels of travelling carriage, Imperial & bunk for the journey to Spain as pr. receipts of the three workmen annexed for 16.5 f8.15 and f23

19. To postage of letters at the Hague from June 15 to this date as per extracts of Servants accounts annexed

To p^{d}. for horses from the Hague to Rotterdam on the journey to Spain. Viz. Four for the carriage and one for travelling servant (including barriers)

To dinner at Rotterdam

To p^{d}. for duty on carriage & cocket from Rotterdam to the Moerdyk as per receipt

& for Yacht from Rotterdam to Moerdyk

p^{d}. for post horses from Moerdyk to Cauystraat 21 flo. postillon

21. Tavern bill at Antwerp including also post horses from Cauystraat to Antwerp as per rec^{t}. annexed

22. From Antwerp to Valenciennes 141/2 posts at 15 escalins p. post. with road expences as per acc^{t}. annexed make 270 escalins equal to 81 florins as charged in the note subjoined

22.24 From Valenciennes to Paris for post horses, & road expences as per acc^{t}. annexed. Viz. 26 1/2 posts (the price of horses being raised to 30 sols each and postillion p^{d}. according to usage as an horse at 7.50 p. post 196.18—and road expenses = 64.2 pd.= 261. p^{d}. in Assignats which were rec^{d}. by me at Antwerp as pr. note above mentioned at 57 Stuyras for 3.

1793

Jany. 7. Expences at Paris in the hotel d' Orleans as p^{r}. acc^{t}. & rec^{t}. of same.
Repairs to travelling carriage at d. as p^{r}. rect. of the Charon.
For les memoires des Commissaires 4. vols. 4 purchased by direction of the Sec. of State for the negotiation at Madrid as p^{r}. receipt

7.19. From Paris to Bordeaux & from thence to Bayonne for post. horses & road expences as p^{r}. acc^{t}. annexed - 588.15 -- 11 ½ posts at 9. & 15 posts at 9.10. p. post. 246 (in these two cases the addition being on account of the Postmasters between Bordeaux & Bayonne, forcing me as they are authorized to do, to put an additional horse with a second postillion to my carriage in consequence of the state of the roads) –All other road expences, repairs to carriage 405.

19. To travelling servant hired at the Hague for the journey to Spain & to be paid by agreement at the rate of 3. A day in lieu of his expences in the taverns on the road – Viz. From Decem^{r}. 10 to this date

1590.15 paid in Assignats for which I draw from Paris on the 7th of Jany. 1793 – Viz – for 2700 livres amounting to f675:13:8 and accordingly 1590.15 at that rate make f395.13 to which should be added the agio at that time but not knowing it here I take only 395.

20. To p^{d}. at Bayonne for fitting the carriage for the roads in Spain according to their usage, binding the springs & sabot &, as pr. account and receipt annexed in specie

To p^{d}. tavern acc^{t}. at d. & for provisions for the road as p^{r}. acc^{t}. & rec^{t}. annexed. 96.10 for the road expences at St. Jean de Luz to the frontier of Spain 41.6 in specie; as p^{r}. acc^{t}. making together 137.16 in Louis d'or as purchased at the Hague at 55 florins each make 113.13

Jan. 2 Feb. 2. To p^{d}. for expences on the road from the frontier of Spain to Madrid as per acco^{t}. And for tavern at Madrid for one day as p^{r}. acc^{t}. & rec^{t}. making in the whole

To p^{d}. the Vorturier from Bayonne to Madrid as p^{r}. written agreement annexed 35 dollars at 60 reals of vellen each

To p^{d}. to the drivers for their personal hire according to usage

8. To p^{d}. for board wages to my servants at Madrid & at Aranjuez from Feb. 2 to this date at the rate of 12 reals pr. day to each, in lieu of tavern expences, being six days

To p^{d}. my half of expences with Mr. Carmichael for two days at Aranjuez as p^{r}. his servants account annexed

June 27. To p^{d}. tavern expences at Aranjuez for lodging & from Feb. 8 to this date as p^{r}. acc^{t}. and receipts of the same from N^{o}. 1 to N^{o}. 19 inclusive

To p^{d}. board wages to two servants in lieu of their expences in the tavern at the rate of 12 reals a day each from Feb. 15 to this date being 133 days

To p^{d}. my proportion of a carriage kept at Aranjuez as per receipts N^{o}. 1 to N^{o}. 5

To p^{d}. for the Coach de Colleras to go from Aranjuez to Madrid 320. and to drivers 40.

July 1. To one years salary as Minister Resident at the Hague, as per letter of Sec. of State

Aug. 18. To p^{d} tavern expences at Madrid for lodging &^{c}. from June 27 to this date as p^{r}. acc^{t}. and receipts of the same from N^{o}. 20 to N^{o}. 26 both inclusive

To p^{d}. board wages to two servants in lieu of their expences in the tavern at the rate of 12 reals a day each from June 27 to this date being 52 days

19. To p^{d} my proportion of Coach de Colleras & expences on the road from Madrid to St. Ildefonso in C^{o}. with Mr. Carmichael

Sep. 22. To p^{d}. tavern expences at S^{t}. Ildefonso from Aug. 19 to this date as p^{r}. acc^{t}. & rec^{t}. of the same from N^{o}. 27 to N^{o}. 31 both inclusive

To p^{d}. board wages to two servants in lieu of their expences in the tavern at the rate of 12 reals a day each from Aug. 18 to this date being 35 days

To p^{d}. for carriage kept at Madrid & St. Ildefonso to this date as p^{r}. acc^{t}. & receipts N^{o}. 6. 7. 8. 9.

23. To p^{d}. for Coach de Colleras to go alone from St. Ildefonso to the Escurial as p^{r}. rec^{t}. 650 reals & to drivers 40 reals

Nov. 17. To p^{d}. tavern expences at the Escurial from Sept. 23 to this date as p^{r}. acc^{t}. & rec^{t}. of the same from No. 32 to No. 40 both inclusive

To p^{d}. board wages to two servants in lieu of their expences in the tavern at the rate of 12 reals a day each from Sep. 23 to this date being 56 days

To p^{d}. for Coach de Colleras to go alone from the Escurial to Madrid 320 reals and to drivers 40 reals

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Feb. 20. To p^{d}. to Samaniego the interpreter for translating into Spanish, the power of attorney sent by the bankers of the U. S. at Amsterdam to be pass^{d} by me before a Notary, authorizing them in my absence to sign the loan

26. To p^{d}. to Notary for two copies of the power of attorney abovementioned passed before him & sent to the bankers of the U. S. at Amsterdam

To p^{d}. expences in private lodgings at Madrid from Nov. 17 to this date, viz. for an appartment furnished by Frigoity breakfast dinner &^{c}. for myself, as per accounts and receipts from N^{o}. 41 to N^{o}. 54 both inclusive

To p^{d}. board wages to two servants in lieu of their expences at the rate of 12 reals a day each from Nov. 17 to this date being 101 days

To p^{d}. for carriage kept at Madrid from Nov. 27 to this date as p^{r}. acc^{t}. & rec^{t}. N^{o}. 10. 11. 12. 13.

To p^{d}. for a Coach de Colleras to go alone from Madrid to Aranjuez as p^{r}. rec^{t}. 320 reals and to drivers 40 reals

To p^{d}. tavern expences at Aranjuez from Feb. 26 to this date as p^{r}. acc^{t}. & rec^{t}. of the same from N^{o}. 55 to N^{o}. 75 both inclusive

To p^{d}. board wages to servants in lieu of their expences from Feb. 26 to this date as follows. viz. from Feb 26 to April 21. 55 daya. To two at 12 reals p. day each 320 reals from April 21 to May 14. 21 days to one at 12 reals a day 252 reals. & from May 14 to June 23. 41 days to two—of whom one received 12 reals per day & the other 10 reals per day – 820 reals

To p^{d}. for a Coach de Colleras to go alone from Aranjuez to Madrid. 320 reals & to drivers 40 reals

July 1. To paid for postage of letters from July 1 1793 to this date, as p^{r}. note subjoined being for such as were addressed directly to me, & exclusive of those sent under the cover of my banker at Madrid.

To one years Salary as Min. Res^{t}. at the Hague due this day

Notes

[1]William Short to Secretary of State, 1 July 1794, Despatches From United States Ministers to Spain.

VITA

Dianna DiIllio

Candidate for the Degree of

Master of Arts

Thesis: CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS AND DIPLOMATIC LIFE ABROAD DURING THE FEDERALIST ERA, 1790-1801

Major Field: History

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Media, Pennsylvania, on March 7, 1974.

Education: Graduated from Stroudsburg High School, Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania in June, 1992; received Bachelor of Arts degree in History from Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana in May 1996. Completed the requirements for the Master of Arts degree with a major in History at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma in July, 2000.

Experience: Employed by Oklahoma State University, Department of History as a graduate teaching assistant from 1996 to 1998.

Professional Memberships: Phi Beta Kappa, Phi Alpha Theta, SHEAR