A STUDY OF U.S. NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF

VIETNAM, GRENADA AND THE

PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT

By

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
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
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The truth is incontrovertible. Panic may resent it;
ignorance may deride it; malice may distort it,
but there it is.

--Winston Churchill

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history of the United States, many of the most important and

widely covered news stories have dealt with the nation's many wars. Lande (1995)

points out that because of their unique capacity to encompass a wide range of human

emotions, wars have long been important journalistic events:

> Whether the nation turned to armed conflict to gain independence, to fight off
> invasion, to protect national unity, or to further democracy, the hostilities
> characterized Americans in a way no other events have done. It could hardly be
> otherwise, for no other events were so critical in shaping the destiny of a nation.
> Nothing touched directly or indirectly the lives of so many people. In no other
> circumstances were the lines between good and evil, friend or foe, so clearly
> drawn.

Because the media plays such an important role in providing the public with

information about U.S. military conflicts, there has often been tension between the

military and media concerning what information should be reported and what should be

withheld from the public. The military and government argue that certain restrictions

should be placed on the media to control the reporting of information that could threaten

the lives of military personnel, along with national security. The press, on the other hand,

argues that the military and government should not be given free reign during wartime,

and should be held accountable for providing misleading information to the U.S. public.

As a result of the tensions that have evolved between the press and military throughout

the history of the United States, the types of news stories that have been reported during different conflicts have varied greatly in content.

Background

The content of news stories dealing with U.S. military conflicts has been shaped by many different factors, including current social, economic and political climates of the nation. Another significant factor in determining the differences in the content of news stories dealing with different military conflicts is the technological capability of the press at the time. As news gathering and reporting technology increases, so does the timeliness of news reports. However, as advancements in news reporting technology have increased, the military has responded with increases in information restriction and censorship. Because of technological changes in the way the press was able to report news during different wars, the relations between the military and press, along with the content of resulting news reports, have differed greatly in each conflict.

In the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, during the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War, military censorship of news was virtually non-existent (Gannett, 1991). However, with the rapidly increasing use of the telegraph in the 1850s, the press gained the ability to report news in a much more timely manner, allowing reporting of military conflicts almost "as they happened" (Mermin, 1999). As a result of the technological advances that allowed the media to report news more quickly, the military quickly established information restriction guidelines for the press during wartime.

During World War I, government censorship of the press was more restrictive than it had ever been throughout U.S. history. Two Congressional Acts characterized the increasing power of the government to control news coverage of U.S. military conflicts: the Espionage Act of 1917, and the Sedition Act of 1918.

The Espionage Act of 1917 prohibited the publication of any information that might offer aid to the enemy. It also prohibited publication of information that might interfere with U.S. military operations or war production (Fox, 1995). The Sedition Act of 1918 prohibited criticism or negative remarks about the U.S. military or government. It also prohibited negative comments about the U.S. flag, military uniforms, or other military symbols. Offenders of either Act could be sentenced to 20 years in prison or given a $10,000 fine (Fox, 1995). Both the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 were declared constitutional by the Supreme Court.

As the U.S. became involved in World War II, the legal and scholarly debate regarding the restrictions imposed on the press during World War I caused the government to take a more subtle approach to press censorship (Carrigan, 1997). However, the first restrictions were placed on the media on December 31, 1940, nearly one year before the attack on Pearl Harbor, when Navy Secretary Frank Knox asked the media not to report on topics such as troop movements or the construction of new ships without prior authorization (Carrigan, 1997).

After the U.S. entered the war, the Office of Censorship issued the *Code of Wartime Practices*, a set of guidelines for journalists to observe voluntarily (Carrigan, 1997). The censorship of military information was ultimately left to individual field commanders, though, and most sought to strictly control the information available to

reporters along with the resulting news reports (Crabtree, 1995). The censorship policies in World War II were made more cumbersome for reporters due to the large volume of information transmitted by "official" military sources. While censors often delayed publication of reporters' news stories, the military's official press releases were made available more quickly, thereby making the correspondents' reports essentially "old news" (Faulkner, 1981).

Unlike the censorship policies of World War II, the press acted in the early stages of the Korean War under an entirely voluntary censorship agreement with the military. However, with the entry of China into the war, along with the resulting retreat of United Nations forces, the military soon abandoned the voluntary censorship policy toward the press in favor of increased control of the news content being sent to the United States. Under the military's new policies, journalists were required to submit all news reports to Army censors before publication or airing in the United States (Gannett, 1991).

During the years between the Korean War and American involvement in Vietnam, the military planned continuously in the area of censorship for future conflicts. After the Tonkin Gulf resolution in 1964, which authorized the large-scale deployment of U.S. military forces in Vietnam, the military decided against the implementation of a censorship policy toward the press (Hammond, 1988). Military leaders rationalized that the alienation of the press corps in Vietnam would weaken public support for American military involvement in the region (Gannett, 1991). Instead, the military developed an entirely voluntary system of censorship for the press, asking reporters to follow similar guidelines as those used during World War II. Throughout the Vietnam War, the U.S. military never imposed an official censorship policy upon the press (Hammond, 1988).

The invasion of Grenada by U.S. military forces in 1983 marked the end of the voluntary censorship policies of the press used during Vietnam. The military's total ban on press access during the brief conflict was due in large part to the perceived failures of the voluntary censorship policies used during Vietnam. The press ban succeeded in allowing the military to operate in the combat zone free of media criticism. It also brought about a compromise between the military and press regarding censorship practices for future conflicts. In 1984 the Sidle Report was released, which laid out general guidelines for press coverage of future conflicts (Gannett, 1991).

After Grenada, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey, convened the Sidle Panel to review the actions of the military in dealing with the press during the U.S. military action in Grenada. The panel concluded that military operations should have open media coverage whenever possible. For operational security, though, it suggested establishing a small pool of members of the media to cover any future operation until open coverage could be arranged. As a result of the panel's recommendations, the Department of Defense (DOD) National Media Pool (DNMP) was established in 1985 (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995).

The National Media Pool, which consists of up to 16 members of the media and three military escort officers, was structured by the military to provide media coverage of military activities until a situation has been stabilized to enable open media coverage. Once open coverage has been achieved, the pools were to be disbanded (Powell, 1990).

When U.S. troops were sent to the Persian Gulf in 1990, they were eventually accompanied by a press pool consisting of 17 members of the press, along with six public information officers (Baroody, 1998). The press pool system consisted of small groups

of media professionals who were allowed limited access to combat areas and military personnel while accompanied by military information officers, and became the dominant form of press restriction during Desert Storm.

Following Desert Storm, members of the media again criticized the military's methods of controlling and filtering news information. As a result of the media's dissatisfaction with the news coverage of Desert Storm, representatives of the media and the Pentagon worked together to develop the Department of Defense (DOD) Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations, which were published in 1992. The document highlighted existing concepts and procedures used by the military in dealing with the press during conflicts, but also emphasized to military commanders the importance of their personal involvement in planning for news coverage of combat operations (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995).

Statement of the Problem

Journalists in the United States have an obligation, whether during peacetime or war, to provide the public with objective, unbiased reporting of each day's news. Certainly, though, the obligations of the news media become more complex during times of U.S. military conflict. Issues of national security and the safety of both civilians and members of the military call for more careful consideration by the press regarding what information should be published and what should be withheld from public record. News reports that are published, however, must be held to the same professional and ethical journalistic standards as any other reports. Information gained from government or

military sources should be scrutinized and evaluated for accuracy, but no more or less than professional journalism standards call for regarding other types of sources. In other words, a tendency by the press to have predetermined expectations toward the validity of information disseminated from military or government sources, whether positive or negative, creates a potential for bias in news reporting.

This study will examine the content of news stories printed in selected publications during Vietnam, post-Vietnam U.S. military involvements, and the Persian Gulf War for the influence of the changing nature of the military's philosophy of information control.

<div style="text-align:center">Objectives</div>

The overall objective of this study is to determine the extent to which the selected publications: The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, and The Chicago Tribune fulfilled their roles as un-biased, objective reporters of news. This study is intended to answer the following general research questions: 1) What effects, if any, did the news gathering and reporting guidelines imposed by the military on the press during Vietnam have on the news reports dealing with that conflict? 2) What effects, if any, did the news information gathering and reporting guidelines imposed by the military on the press in the conflicts between Vietnam and Desert Storm have on the news reports dealing with those conflicts? 3) What effects, if any, did the news information gathering and reporting guidelines imposed by the military on the press during Desert Storm have on the news reports dealing with that conflict?

Significance of the Study

Much has been written and studied about the media coverage of both the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War, along with the lower-scale military conflicts that took place between the two wars. There have been both qualitative and quantitative studies conducted that discuss the relationships between the military and press in each war, along with the news reports that were published. However, a gap in the current research exists concerning a directly comparative quantitative content analysis of the news reports dealing with U.S. military conflict from Vietnam to the Persian Gulf War. Through direct comparison of the news coverage of the conflicts, this study will attempt to show the possible correlations between the types of news reports published and the evolution of the military's guidelines dealing with the press during wartime.

Study Limitations

This study looks only at newspaper coverage of U.S. military involvements, and does not take into account television, magazine, or other types of news coverage. Although television has played a vital role in the evolution of news coverage during wartime, the amount and variety of television news reports dealing with the conflicts studied was beyond the scope of this study.

Also, the sample size used for this study may not accurately represent the most common types of news reports published during each conflict because of the relatively brief period of conflict during the Persian Gulf War compared to the Vietnam War.

This study can be related only to newspaper coverage and cannot be generalized or extended to include other types of media. Also, only news stories were used in this study. Advertisements, letters to the editor, and other non news-related items were not used in this study.

The newspapers selected for this study are large, urban-based newspapers, each with circulation numbers over 2 million. As a result, the results of the study cannot be generalized to smaller, more rural newspapers.

Outline of Study

The remainder of this study follows the general outline below.

Chapter II reviews the past research dealing with the news coverage of the Vietnam War, the post-Vietnam U.S. military involvements, and the Persian Gulf War. Also included is a brief review of the studies dealing with Agenda Setting theory and Framing theory.

Chapter III provides an explanation of the methodology used in this study.

Chapter IV presents the research findings and discusses the results in detail.

Chapter V summarizes the study, offers conclusions and recommends further research in areas related to this study.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Since the American Revolution, the United States press and military have shared a constantly evolving, often adversarial relationship. During the Revolutionary War, the military paid little attention to the content of news reports regarding its activities. With the development of the telegraph in the 1850s, though, the Civil War was the first example in U.S. history of systemized government-sanctioned censorship of the press during wartime (Gannett, 1991). Censorship policies by the government in later U.S. conflicts mostly followed the same pattern: *as news gathering and reporting technologies evolved, so did the government's policies of information filtering and restriction.* In Vietnam, though, the press was given much more freedom to report than ever before. Regardless of whether the media, or the government and military were "to blame" in the decrease of public support in Vietnam, the tensions that developed between the two parties directly resulted in radical changes in the way the press was allowed to cover later conflicts.

Following Vietnam, the military immediately began making preparations for dealing with the press in future conflicts. Because many military leaders believed that the conduct of the Vietnam War was impaired by negative media coverage, there was a

concentrated effort to create effective guidelines for the press in future wars. Sessions were held at the Pentagon, along with the war and naval colleges, on how to effectively "handle" the media in future conflicts (Gannett, 1991). In other words, fostering positive public opinion during future conflicts was nearly as high a priority as effective military strategy. The press, on the other hand, seemed caught off guard in the conflicts following Vietnam.

This thesis will apply *Agenda-Setting theory*, and *Framing theory* to the questions surrounding the differences and similarities of news coverage of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam and Desert Storm.

Agenda Setting Theory

According to McCombs and Shaw (1972), the mass media plays an important role in shaping the public's perceptions of reality. Through the press, readers and viewers not only learn about a particular issue, but also how important that particular issue is based on the amount of attention given to that topic by the press (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). In their study of the 1968 presidential campaign, McCombs and Shaw (1972) hypothesized that "the mass media set the agenda for each political campaign, influencing the salience of attitudes toward the political issues (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). In other words, the media set the agenda for the public regarding the campaigns, telling them what was newsworthy, and, therefore, most important. The results of their study included the introduction of a new media theory that illustrated the power of the mass media in shaping the beliefs of many people regarding popular issues: Agenda Setting theory.

In a follow-up study to the original study of the 1968 presidential campaigns conducted by McCombs and Shaw, McCombs and Martin (1992) used poll and content analysis data to compare agenda agreement and media use for particular reference groups: men vs. women, non-whites vs. whites, young vs. old, higher vs. lower-formally educated and rich vs. poor.

The results of the study showed correlations among similar groups when newspaper readership, along with television viewing time, was high (McCombs & Martin, 1992). The study concludes that a major function of mass media is to enhance group consensus among otherwise diverse social groups, by providing issue agenda options that are more attractive than issues that are more specific to a person's race, age, level of education, or financial status (McCombs & Martin, 1992). More simply put, the media can reach larger, more diverse audiences by providing "agenda options" that reach more diverse levels of the social system.

Iyengar and Simon (1994) examined the role of the military and media in agenda-setting during the Gulf War. They found that as coverage of the war increased, its perceived importance by the public also increased. Most other major issues were displaced from the public agenda to allow for greater war coverage.

Agenda Setting theory can be applied to the question of whether differences exist in the types of news coverage that occurred during Vietnam compared to the Persian Gulf Conflict. Because mass media coverage was the only way most Americans received information about both conflicts, the media played an important role in shaping public opinion during both wars. In other words, the press mostly set the agenda of information presented to the American public during both conflicts. This study is important because

it examines where the media obtained the information presented to the public. In other words, censorship of news ultimately results in the military and government setting the agenda for the press, who in turn sets the agenda for what information is presented to the public.

Framing Theory

Framing theory was developed as a further dimension of Agenda Setting theory. Framing essentially involves salience and selection. Frames call attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to have different reactions. While Agenda Setting theory deals with the transmission of issues from the media to the public, framing theory looks at how the media can alter the public's perceptions of the meanings of particular issues being reported on.

Gitlin (1980) introduced the concept of "framing" as it relates to mass media in his study of how the press reported on a major political movement among students in the 1960s. The study found that the news coverage of a social movement or event can shape public opinion about that particular issue though a variety of framing strategies.

Entman (1993) defines the concept of framing by the media as essentially involving salience and selection. According to Entman, "frames call attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to have different reactions."

Many researchers have found further evidence of framing in media content while studying agenda-setting. Weaver et al. (1981) examined the images that voters held of

presidential candidates during the 1976 presidential campaign. In their study, they found a high degree of correspondence between the agenda of attributes most commonly portrayed in the news media and the attributes most important in voters' minds.

Much like agenda-setting theory, the concept of framing is relevant to the question of how both Vietnam and Desert Storm were covered by the media.

Vietnam

Much has been written about the possible effects of the media coverage of the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. A divide exists, however, among those who believe that negative media coverage of the Vietnam war contributed to the eventual failure of the government's policies, and those who believe that the press only told what was really happening, eventually exposing the mistakes and misleading acts of the government and military. A consensus seems to exist among all studies, however, that the relationship between the press and the military in Vietnam, along with the news coverage that resulted, had a great impact, both positively and negatively, on the government's policies in Vietnam (Tallman & McKerns, 2000). The tensions between the press and military in Vietnam were important in determining not only the outcome of that conflict, but in shaping the way news was collected and reported in later U.S. military involvements.

In 1971, Russo conducted a study of the possible bias in the television coverage of the Vietnam war from 1969 to 1970. Five students, each with differing political viewpoints, were given a series of questions regarding the nightly newscasts of NBC and

CBS from 1969 to 1970. These two networks were chosen because they had drawn over 80 percent of television viewers for that type of show for the years being studied. A stratified random sample of two broadcasts per month was eventually chosen for analysis, making 48 broadcasts per network, or a total of 98. The results of the study showed no bias against the Nixon Administration's policies in Vietnam in the 1969 and 1970 broadcasts of either network (Russo, 1971).

Another study conducted by Patterson (1984) involved the content analysis of three publications: *Time, Life,* and *Newsweek.* Each publication was studied in order to determine whether the Vietnam war was the dominant topic from August 5, 1968 to August 15, 1973. A representative sample was obtained by using a table of random numbers to establish the publication dates to be sampled. The sample analyzed included 55 issues of *Time,* 55 issues of *Newsweek* and 50 issues of *Life.* For each issue, 48 major topic categories were established for the coding of all stories. The topic "Vietnam" was one of the 48 topic categories. For stories that qualified under the topic "Vietnam," each was analyzed to determine if they dealt with combat or non-combat, and whether they dealt with the anti-war movement or not. Stories were also divided among those with pictures, and those without pictures. For those with pictures, each was coded as showing dead or not showing dead, and showing wounded or not.

The analysis of the stratified random sample of 160 news magazine issues provided 6871 individual stories for study. Of those, 436 or 6.4 percent were classified as Vietnam-related. The author concluded that the specific topic "Vietnam" received near proportional coverage compared to the other 47 possible topics. While this study shows that the Vietnam war did not dominate the content of the magazines studied, it also

does not account for the reported negative shift in public opinion toward the war. This study shows that the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam was not the dominant topic of news magazines during the time studied.

A study by Sherer (1989) performed content analysis on Vietnam war photos that appeared in three publications: *Time, Life* and *Newsweek*. 286 photographs were chosen for the study, and each was assigned to one of four major groups, each with more specific sub-groups:

1) Scene: the moment captured in the photograph was coded as: (a) an actual combat situation with troops under fire and/or military equipment in action, (b) a combat related situation in an area of potential combat but not actually under fire, or (c) a non-combat situation in an area of relative safety such as headquarters, cities, or other locations.

2) Subject: The primary subject of the photograph was coded as being either: (a) Americans, (b) allies, (c) enemies, or (d) weapons/equipment.

3) Portrayal: The way in which the primary subject was portrayed was coded as (a) in an immediate life threatening situation, (b) in a situation of discomfort or fatigue related to a combat experience but not an immediate life threatening situation, (c) a situation of relative safety without a sense of combat related discomfort or fatigue, (d) weapons, equipment, or military targets in a state of destruction, or (e) weapons, equipment, or military targets not in a state of destruction.

4) Perspective: the way in which the photograph captured the situation was coded as: (a) close-up view with emphasis on small numbers of people or objects shown in tightly cropped photographs, (b) normal view with emphasis on full body shots or objects viewed in their entirety, (c) distant views where backgrounds are highly visible and people or objects occupy relatively small parts of the entire image (Sherer, 1989).

The photographs used in the study were placed into one of three time groups: Group one included photographs that were published during the time period when public opinion toward the war was favorable, from January 1965 to July 1967; Group two included photographs from a "transition" period, when public support for the war was divided, in October and December of 1967; Group three included photographs from the

time period when public support for the war was limited, from February 1968 to January 1973.

The results of Sherer's study showed that of the photographs published during the time period when public support for the war was relatively high, the majority of photos from all three magazines were non-combat photos. During the second time group, when public support for the war was divided, a greater percentage of combat and combat-related photos was published. For the time period when public opinion of the war was low, the representative photographs tended to be equally combat and combat-related versus non-combat related, much the same as the period when public support for the war was at its highest (Sherer, 1989).

In addition to different percentages of particular types of scenes being depicted during the different time periods, Sherer's study also showed that the magazines studied tended to use different subjects in their photos as the war progressed. During the time period when public support for the war was at its highest, the magazines mostly showed images of American forces and military weapons and equipment (Sherer, 1989). During the transition period of public support for the war, photographs of American forces were the main subjects in the photographs of all three publications. Once the public became mostly opposed to the war, though, most of the photographs focused more on allied forces, and less on American forces and equipment.

Sherer concludes in his study that as public opinion of the Vietnam war shifted over time, so did the images of the magazines studied. When public support for the war was at its highest, the images in the magazines mostly showed American forces and military equipment in combat and non-combat related situations, with very few actual

combat situations shown (Sherer, 1989). When public support for the war was nearly

divided, the images changed from mostly non-combat related to mostly combat and

combat related situations. The images from the time period when public support for the

war was at its lowest included mostly images were of combat and combat related

situations.

A study by Miller (1995) examines the question of whether the media lost the war

in Vietnam, along with the implications of this idea in later news coverage. This study

emphasizes the importance of the notion of many that the media was mostly to blame for

the failures of Vietnam. The author states that the idea of the press as the cause of the

U.S. military failure in Vietnam is primarily responsible for determining how subsequent

U.S. military involvements have been covered by the media (Miller, 1995).

This study involved in-depth interviews with military and media representatives,

along with a qualitative analysis of literature dealing with media and military relations.

The study concludes that the evolution of restrictions imposed by the military onto the

media has negatively affected the mainstream media's capacity to provide effective

checks and balances on government and military activities (Miller, 1995).

A study by Louis Camponmenosi (1994) examines the *New York Times* editorial

coverage of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1965, and examines whether

or not the U.S. press should be considered an "oppositional press."

The study focused on the editorial position of the newspaper when government

decisions on whether to escalate the U.S. military involvement in the war were being

made (Campomenosi, 1994). The study states that the *New York Times* recommended to

President Kennedy that the U.S. should seek negotiations and neutralization, thereby

limiting the U.S. commitment in the conflict. This study concludes that after President Johnson took office, the *Times* began to display characteristics of an oppositional press, questioning Johnson's Vietnam policies.

Flowers (1996) conducted a content analysis of photographs dealing with the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam that appeared in *Life* magazine from 1962 to 1972. During that time, the magazine published over 1200 photographs that dealt with the U.S. military presence in Vietnam, with nearly 600 photographs published that dealt with the war on the "homefront" (Flowers, 1996).

The study analyzes the general tone, characteristics, and trends of *Life*'s coverage of the war, the homefront, and the antiwar movement (Flowers, 1996). All photographs that were published between 1962 and 1972 in the magazine were analyzed in this study. Content analysis shows that *Life* published a mixture of photographs that can be classified as "positive," "neutral," or "negative" based on the degree to which they supported U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. Flowers concludes that *Life* presented a positive view of the war until 1969, nearly a year after the Tet Offensive. After 1969, the photographs analyzed showed a steady increase in negativity (Flowers, 1996).

Francis Faulkner's study of the American News Media in Vietnam from 1960 to 1975 provides a chronological examination of the problems encountered by the press in Vietnam, along with the reasons for the increasing tensions between the military and media during that time. According to Faulkner, the press that was sent to cover the war was not well educated in either the history of Vietnam, or military tactics. As a result, most of the news reports were superficial, and mostly followed the general information provided by military reports. Faulkner also states that there was a general failure of the

professional journalistic organizations in the U.S. to support reporters in Vietnam in holding the government accountable for its actions (Faulkner, 1981).

Post Vietnam

The reporters who sought to cover the U.S. military actions following the withdrawal from Vietnam encountered levels of censorship and restrictions never before experienced. After the tensions experienced between the press and military in Vietnam, the military sought to limit press access in later involvements as a means to more effectively control public opinion (Baroody, 1998). As a result, most of the news coverage of U.S. military involvements between the end of Vietnam and the beginning of Desert storm was strictly controlled by the government.

Mermin (1996) examined the impact of politics on the news coverage of military interventions in Vietnam, Grenada, Libya, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti. According to this study, there is a direct correlation between conflicts in Washington DC and critical viewpoints in political news reports. According to Mermin, when there is conflict in Washington, critical viewpoints are more frequent in the news (Mermin, 1996). On the other hand, if there is bipartisan consensus in the government, little critical analysis of government policies is reported. According to Mermin:

> The evidence shows that journalists could have found ample critical viewpoints to report in the Washington consensus cases, if they had consulted foreign policy experts operating outside of Washington, and citizens in some way mobilized to influence foreign policy. In reporting the news inside the terms and boundaries of debate in Washington, the media enable a Washington consensus to dominate foreign policy debate in the public sphere, instead of reporting the news from a vantage point independent of government as the First Amendment holds

(Mermin, 1996).

The cases examined in this study were U.S. intervention in Grenada, Libya, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti. The news media used in this study were the *New York Times, ABC World News Tonight,* and the *MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour* (Mermin, 1996).

This study is limited because it does not address the evolving military guidelines restricting press access during the post-Vietnam U.S. military conflicts.

A 1996 study by Trevor Thrall looks at war in the "media age," along with the conflicts between the government and press in Vietnam, the Persian Gulf war, the invasion of Grenada, and the invasion of Panama.

According to this study, the increasing importance of the media in U.S. politics has changed the way in which the U.S. wages war, and, particularly, the way in which the government deals with the press during war. The study examines the rise in the government's use of press restrictions and public relations since Vietnam as essential elements of America's "new way of war" (Thrall, 1996).

Thrall uses four case studies: the Vietnam war, the invasion of Grenada, the invasion of Panama, and the Persian Gulf war, to show the government's efforts to foster positive public support for military actions using the media as a public relations tool (Thrall, 1996).

The results of this study show that following Vietnam, the government and military began to reevaluate how they should deal with the media during times of war. The evolution of press restrictions from Vietnam to Desert Storm shows that the military realized, through various degrees of press restriction in brief conflicts such as Panama

and Grenada, that the media could ultimately be used as a public relations tool to foster support from the U.S. public during times of military conflict (Thrall, 1996).

Thrall's research is relevant the current study because it illustrates the changes in the Government's employment of press restrictions following Vietnam. However, because the study is qualitative in nature, it leaves a need for direct comparison of news stories dealing with different military conflicts using quantitative methods. A quantitative content analysis of the news stories dealing with the relevant conflicts will lend further significance to the effects of the military's guidelines dealing with the press.

Fox (1995) looks at the evolution of press guidelines for coverage of U.S. conflicts following Vietnam. According to this study, the military guidelines restricting the press are an example of sociologist William F. Ogburn's theory of cultural lag. Cultural lag is: "when one of two parts of a culture which are correlated change before or in greater degree than the other part does, thereby causing less adjustment between the two parts than existed previously" (Fox, 1995).

According to Fox, advances in newsgathering technology constitute the independent variable which causes the change in the lagging culture: media/military guidelines (Fox, 1995). This study demonstrates that the revisions in the guidelines for the coverage of U.S. forces in combat are driven by technological advances in newsgathering and reporting techniques. Most significantly, the use of communication satellites by news agencies in the Persian Gulf War induced the 1992 revision of press guidelines in wartime, since the previous coverage guidelines did not envision that capability (Fox, 1995).

This study concluded by stating that information management in the Gulf War by the military inspired the media to later seek new standards for coverage guidelines during U.S. military conflict. The author criticizes the coverage guidelines for the media during times of conflict because they deal only with existing technology, and do not take into account future technological advancements (Fox, 1995).

A study by Hiromi Otsuki (1995) looks at the role of the media in American foreign policy from 1980 to 1994. The author states that increasingly, government policy-makers are taking into account the potential impact of the media on U.S. foreign policy (Otsuki, 1995).

According to this study, one of the top priorities for the government in times of foreign policy crisis is to secure and maintain public support. Since most American citizens obtain information about current events from the media, the government handles the media carefully. This study points out two events of the last two decades that have seemingly brought government and press relations to a new phase: the invasion of Grenada, and the Persian Gulf War. During those crises, the media acted mostly as "cheerleaders" of the government largely because of their uncritical and passive coverage of events (Otsuki, 1995).

In a study by Shannon Crabtree (1995), the guidelines for journalists in past military conflicts are examined, along with proposals for guidelines for future conflicts. According to this study, the debate over what rules journalists should be required to follow while covering a military conflict began after Vietnam, when the media was blamed by the military for significantly contributing to its lack of success in Vietnam (Crabtree, 1995).

The author states that after Vietnam, media access to combat zones went from complete exclusion to limited access (Crabtree, 1995). The study examines in-depth the evolution of the guidelines journalists have followed since Vietnam. The author also proposes guidelines for future conflicts (Crabtree, 1995).

Although this study looks at the military's guidelines dealing with the press during times of U.S. military conflict, it does not involve a quantitative analysis of news stories dealing those conflicts.

The Persian Gulf Conflict

As Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in 1990, a new era of U.S. military and press relations began. Since the withdrawal from Vietnam, the military had been preparing for the next major conflict not only in military strategy, but also in dealing with the press. By the time the crisis in the Persian Gulf began, the military already had in place intricate guidelines and rules to control press access to restricted information and combat zones.

Morlan (1992) examines the news coverage of the Persian Gulf conflict as reported in the *New York Times,* using a content analysis of sample issues. The content analysis examined the use of sources before, during, and after the Persian Gulf crisis to determine whether the media's reliance on Bush administration officials increased during three successive periods: (1) February 1 to August 1, 1990; (2) August 2, 1990 to January 16, 1991; and (3) January 17 to March 14, 1991. The study also examined descriptions of allied and Iraqi officials and whether editorial and opinion pieces reflected administration policy on the use of military force (Morlan, 1992).

The results of the study showed that the newspaper used government administration sources significantly more often during Desert Storm than during Desert Shield (Morlan, 1992). The newspaper's descriptions of Saddam Hussein also increased significantly once the war began. Also, negative descriptions of Saddam Hussein significantly increased after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (Morlan, 1992).

A study by John Newhagen (1994) examines the relationship between censorship and the emotional and critical tone of television news coverage of the Persian Gulf War. The study was conducted using a content analysis of television war news coverage of the Persian Gulf from January 31, 1991, to March 3, 1991. The unit of analysis for the study was story topic, which consisted of sounds and pictures dealing with one event (Newhagen, 1994). A total of 424 stories of "breaking news," especially those showing combat and its effects, were used in this study.

The results of the study show that overall, stories with Iraqi sources were more negative, more intense, and more critical than stories with U.S. sources, regardless of the presence or absence of censorship disclaimers (Newhagen, 1994).

A study by Griffin and Lee (1995) examined photographs of the Persian Gulf War that appeared in *Time, Newsweek,* and *U.S. News & World Report.* A total of 1,104 Gulf War-related photographs were examined that appeared in the selected publications between January 21, 1991, and March 18, 1991. The photographs were divided into the following 12 major categories for analysis, then divided again into 24 "low-frequency," categories.

According to the authors, the three most numerous genres of pictures were: (1) pictures of military hardware; (2) noncombatant scenes of troops; and (3) photos of

political leaders. These categories of pictures comprised more than half of the 1,104 pictures used in the study (Griffin & Lee, 1995).

The authors conclude by stating that in the case of the Persian Gulf War, the newsmagazines seemed to emphasize military technology and hardware at the expense of the "human side of war" (Griffin & Lee, 1995).

Summary

Much has been written concerning the news media's role in covering both the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War. The majority of studies dealing with both conflicts are qualitative, and usually support either the military or media, while often blaming the other party for perceived failures in each war. There are significantly fewer studies, however, that compare the content of news stories of either war using quantitative methods, specifically content analysis.

Of those studies that involve content analysis of media content, most examine television news coverage. Because of its wider audience, studies dealing with the content of television news can be generalized to a much wider audience than studies concerning print media.

The studies that examine the content of print media look mostly at news stories from a particular conflict; others examine photographs associated with a particular conflict.

Of the studies reviewed, none involved a direct comparison of print news stories from each conflict using content analysis. A quantitative content analysis directly

comparing news stories from Vietnam and Desert Storm is needed to help illustrate the

effects of evolving war coverage guidelines on print news content.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

This thesis uses a content analysis to examine selected news stories in *The New York Times, The Washington Post,* and *The Los Angeles Times.* The basis for the coding procedures and definitions is borrowed from Rodgers' study of the coverage of the 1992 Presidential campaign by *Newsweek, People, Time,* and *U.S. News and World Report.*

Research Questions

The previous chapters have outlined the evolution of the relations between the U.S. military and media from Vietnam to the Persian Gulf conflict. The viewpoints of both the military and press have been addressed, along with examples of tensions that sometimes resulted from differing beliefs regarding news coverage of military conflicts.

This study will attempt to determine the effects of the military's evolving guidelines regarding media coverage of U.S. military conflicts from Vietnam to Desert Storm on the content of the resulting news reports. Specifically, the sources of stories will be examined.

This thesis will address the following research questions:

1.   Do news articles dealing with the Vietnam War rely more or less on official government and military sources than stories dealing with later U.S. military conflicts?

2.   Do news articles dealing with the U.S. military conflict in Grenada rely more or less on official government and military sources than stories dealing with the Vietnam War?

3.   Do news articles dealing with the Persian Gulf War rely more or less on official government and military sources than stories dealing with the Vietnam War?

Selection of the Media Chosen for Analysis

This thesis analyzes three newspapers: *The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times* and *The Washington Post.* All the selected newspapers are large, urban-based daily newspapers. All three newspapers have circulations of more than two million, including Sunday editions. The 2000 daily circulation figures for the selected newspapers were: *The New York Times,* 2,436,436; *The Los Angeles Times,* 1,111,785; *The Washington Post,* 783,000. These newspapers were selected for this study because unlike smaller, local newspapers, which rely heavily on the Associated Press for stories dealing with international issues, these newspapers almost always had reporters on the scene.

Sampling Plan

In order to study the news coverage of Vietnam, Grenada, and the Persian Gulf War, the three conflicts were first divided into five separate time periods for study.

The Vietnam War was divided into two separate time periods: 1964-1968, and 1969-1973. According to Dr. Joseph Stout, professor of history at Oklahoma State University, the first time period, 1964-1968, represents a time when U.S. intervention in Vietnam was generally supported by the U.S. public. The second time period, on the other hand, involved less public support for the war, and included the eventual withdrawal of most U.S. troops from Vietnam.

Because the U.S. military invasion of Grenada took place over such a short period of time, the news coverage of the conflict used in this study involves only a three-month period: October, 1983-December, 1983.

The final two time periods are Desert Shield: August, 1990-December, 1990; and Desert Storm: January, 1991-March, 1991.

For each year included in this study, random sampling was used to determine the issues to be analyzed. For each of the 12 years studied (Desert Shield and Desert Storm are counted as one year) 14 issues were randomly selected, with the exception of 1966, which included 10 issues studied. The sample size for this study was based on Guido Stemple's 1952 study. The results of Stemple's study indicate that for content analysis of newspapers, a sample size of five issues for a year would be adequate, and that increasing

the sample size beyond 12 issues for a year does not produce significant differences in the results (Stemple, 1952).

The Web site www.researchrandomizer.org was used to generate a set of random numbers for selecting the issues to be studied. Using the random numbers generated, the following issues of the three newspapers were selected.

TABLE 1

RANDOMLY SELECTED SAMPLE FOR EACH YEAR STUDIED

1964
Thursday, Feb 6
Monday, March 2
Sunday, March 29
Thursday, April 2
Friday, June 12
Saturday, June 20
Saturday, August 1
Thursday, August 13
Saturday, August 15
Tuesday, September 29
Monday, October 26
Tuesday, November 3
Friday, November 13
Wednesday, November 25

1965
Wednesday, January 13
Wednesday, January 27
Tuesday, March 16
Monday, April 5
Sunday, May 30
Wednesday, August 4
Tuesday, August 17
Saturday, September 18
Wednesday, September 29
Monday, October 4
Monday, October 18
Thursday, November 4
Monday, November 15
Wednesday, November 24

1966
Friday, February 25
Thursday, March 3
Wednesday, April 6
Sunday, April 10
Wednesday, May 4
Monday, July 4
Tuesday, September 6
Sunday, November 20
Wednesday, December 7
Wednesday, December 28

1967
Sunday, January 1
Sunday, January 8
Monday, March 6
Saturday, March 18
Friday, March 24
Monday, April 10
Friday, May 19
Friday, June 9
Saturday, July 1
Sunday, July 30
Friday, October 20
Sunday, October 22
Monday, November 20
Friday, December 22

TABLE 1 (Continued)

1968
Sunday, April 7
Thursday, April 11
Tuesday, April 30
Monday, May 13
Tuesday, July 9
Thursday, August 22
Friday, September 6
Thursday, September 26
Sunday, September 29
Monday, October 21
Wednesday, October 30
Thursday, October 31
Tuesday, November 5
Tuesday, November 26

1969
Friday, January 10
Tuesday, January 28
Saturday, February 15
Monday, March 3
Monday, April 21
Thursday, May 1
Tuesday, May 27
Friday, July 11
Friday, July 18
Monday, July 21
Tuesday, September 16
Sunday, October 19
Thursday, November 20
Wednesday, December 10

1970
Saturday, March 28
Sunday, March 29
Thursday, May 14
Tuesday, July 7
Saturday, July 11
Friday, July 24
Tuesday, August 11
Monday, August 24
Thursday, September 24
Tuesday, October 27
Wednesday, November 11
Tuesday, November 17
Tuesday, December 1
Tuesday, December 22

1971
Friday, January 29
Friday, February 19
Monday, March 1
Sunday, April 4
Tuesday, April 6
Sunday, May 16
Tuesday, June 15
Monday, June 28
Sunday, July 11
Saturday, July 24
Wednesday, August 11
Tuesday, August 17
Monday, August 23
Thursday, October 7

TABLE 1 (Continued)

1972
Thursday, February 10
Wednesday, February 16
Thursday, March 23
Saturday, April 22
Saturday, June 10
Tuesday, July 18
Friday, September 1
Thursday, September 28
Tuesday, October 3
Thursday, October 5
Friday, October 6
Sunday, October 8
Wednesday, November 1
Monday, December 11

1983
Monday, October 3
Tuesday, October 4
Wednesday, October 5
Thursday, October 13
Saturday, October 15
Thursday, October 27
Monday, October 31
Thursday, November 4
Thursday, November 10
Friday, November 18
Monday, November 28
Tuesday, December 20
Saturday, December 24
Friday, December 30

1991
Thursday, January 10
Saturday, February 2
Wednesday, February 6
Tuesday, February 12
Saturday, February 16
Sunday, February 24
Tuesday, March 19

1973
Wednesday, January 24
Saturday, February 24
Wednesday, February 28
Wednesday, March 7
Wednesday, March 28
Saturday, May 19
Thursday, June 14
Friday, June 15
Tuesday, July 31
Monday, August 13
Tuesday, August 28
Wednesday, September 5
Saturday, September 8
Sunday, November 11

1990
Tuesday, August 28
Saturday, October 6
Thursday, November 1
Tuesday, November 13
Friday, November 16
Tuesday, December 4
Thursday, December 6

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis in this study is each news story. For each newspaper, news briefs are considered individual stories. The study will not include paid advertisements, opinion columns, editorial cartoons, letters to the editor, graphics, photographs, captions or copy on the front page that merely previews a full story printed later in the issue (Rodgers, 1993).

Coding Procedures and Definitions

Each unit included in this study was coded for the following variables: publication, topic, source, and length.

The publication category refers to each newspaper selected for this study. Topic is what each story is about. The source category is important for this study to determine whether military conflicts with more press restrictions had more stories with "official" government or military sources. In order to determine the source of each news article, the beginning paragraphs were read to determine who the source might be. Also, several key phrases were looked for in deciding if a story had "official" sources. Some of the most frequent "key" phrases were: "According to official U.S. sources"; "According to U.S. military spokesmen"; "According to government sources"; and "According U.S. officials".

For this study, 36 topic categories were used.

The topic categories are:

1. US. Military Strategy.

2. U.S. military statistics. Equipment, troop movements, etc.

3. Ally military statistics.

4. Other military statistics.

5. U.S. and Ally military technology. Focused on the capabilities or development of U.S. and Ally military machinery or weapons.

6. Other Military Technology.

7. Peace Talks.

8. Criticism of Peace Talks.

9. U.S. Political. Focused on the words, actions or opinions of U.S. politicians.

10. Ally Political.

11. Other Political.

12. Economy. Focused on the effects of military conflict on a nation's economy.

13. U.S. Public.

14. U.S. Military Victories.

15. Ally Military Victories.

16. U.S. Military Defeats, or deaths.

17. Ally Military Defeats, or deaths.

18. Military Human Interest.

19. Civilian Human Interest. Focused on civilians who are present or near to fighting.

20. Enemy attacks on U.S. or Ally.

21. U.S. military attack.

22. Ally military attack.

23. Alleged war crimes.

24. U.S. non-military aid to civilians.

25. Warnings of U.S. military attacks.

26. War Protest (U.S.).

27. War Protest (Ally).

28. War Protest (Other).

29. Criticism of U.S. policy.

30. Support of U.S. policy.

31. Criticism of Ally policy.

32. Criticism of Draft.

33. Support of Draft.

34. Support of Defense Spending.

35. Criticism of Defense Spending.

36. Criticism of Media Censorship.

Each story used in this study was also coded to determine its source. The source is an important element of the stories coded because it shows where journalists obtained their information. A high number of stories from official government and military sources might be the result of more government and military control of information, or a tendency of journalists to rely on the government and military for information.

The following 15 source categories were developed for this study:

1. Official Military (U.S.). Information obtained from public affairs officers or other military spokespeople who are authorized to provide such information.

2. Unofficial Military (U.S.). Information obtained from U.S. military personnel who are not considered official spokespersons by the military.

3. Official Military (Other). Information obtained from military personnel of opposing forces who are official spokespersons.

4. Unofficial Military (Other). Information obtained from military personnel of opposing forces who are not official spokespersons.

5. Official Military (Ally). Information obtained from military personnel of nations who are allies of the United States. They are official spokespersons of their military.

6. Unofficial Military (Ally). Information obtained from military personnel of nations who are allies of the United States. These are military sources who are not considered official spokespersons by their military.

7. U.S. Civilian. U.S. citizens not employed by the military or government.

8. Allied Civilian. Information obtained from citizens of Allied nations who are not employed by their military or government.

9. Other Civilian. Information obtained from civilian citizens of nations at war with the United States.

10. U.S. Government Non-Military. Information obtained from government officials who are not members of the military. (Secretary of State, President, etc.).

11. Allied Government Non-Military. Information obtained from Allied government officials who are not members of their military.

12. Other Government Non-Military. Information obtained from government officials of nations at war with the United States.

13. United Nations. Information obtained from United Nations officials.

14. Other Neutral International Group. Information obtained from non-government sponsored groups like The Red Cross.

15. Un-attributed. The source of information in a news story is not cited.

Each story used in this study was coded for length in square inches. Unlike the "column inches" method of measurement, this type of measurement makes adjustments for variations in column width (Rodgers, 1993). The stories were measured from the top of the story to the bottom of the last line on the page. If necessary, measurements were rounded up to the nearest inch. The rounding of measurements was used to simplify the coding procedure. After measuring each unit of copy, the dimensions were figured to obtain the total story length in square inches.

Statistical Analysis

This study will use Chi Square as a statistical test. The chi square test is used to determine if the obtained results of research differed significantly from those expected. The chi square test measures the deviation of obtained results compared with those expected to determine the probability that the results could have occurred due to chance.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF DATA

Intercoder Reliability

The author was the only coder for this study; because the coding categories are

not subjective, a single coder does not affect the validity of this study's results. However,

to better ensure that the findings are accurate, a test for intercoder reliability was

performed approximately one month after the initial coding. A random sample of 15

issues was selected from the 164 issues used in this study. For each newspaper used in

the study, five issues were tested. For each coding category, reliability was assessed at

greater than .91, indicating that the initial coding was accurate and reliable. The overall

reliability score for all issues in this test was .96.

Findings

This study involved the coding of relevant stories in the three newspapers over a

total of 12 years (Vietnam=10 years; Grenada=1 year; The Persian Gulf War=1 year).

For each year, a random sample of 14 issues was examined. The year 1964 was the only

exception; 10 issues were randomly selected. For each newspaper, 164 total issues were examined.

Table II presents the total number of articles examined over the 12 years for each newspaper. Table III shows the total number of articles for each of the five time periods studied (Vietnam, 1964-1968; Vietnam, 1969-1973; Grenada; Desert Shield; and Desert Storm).

TABLE II

TOTAL NUMBERS OF ARTICLES EXAMINED FOR EACH NEWSPAPER

	New York Times	Los Angeles Times	Washington Post	Total
No. of Articles	594 (36.6%)	543 (33.4%)	487 (30%)	1624

TABLE III

TOTAL NUMBERS OF ARTICLES EXAMINED FOR EACH CONFLICT

Time Period	Frequency	Percent
Vietnam, 1964-1968	594	36.6
Vietnam, 1969-1973	492	30.3
Grenada	72	4.4
Desert Shield	192	11.8
Desert Storm	274	16.9
Total	1624	100%

Table IV shows the frequency with which each topic occurred among the 1624 articles examined.

TABLE IV

FREQUENCIES OF EACH TOPIC AMONG THE ARTICLES EXAMINED

Topic	Frequency	Percent
U.S. Military Statistics	30	1.8
U.S. Military Strategy	137	8.4
Ally Military Statistics	30	1.8
Other Military Statistics	59	3.6
U.S./Ally Military Technology	52	3.2
Peace Talks	150	9.2
Other Military Technology	10	.6
U.S. Political	28	1.7
Ally Political	17	1.0
Other Political	40	2.5
Economy	47	2.9
Criticism of Peace Talks	12	.7
U.S. Public	11	.7
U.S. Military Victories	50	3.1
U.S. Military Defeats/Deaths	23	1.4
Military Human Interest	114	7.0
Civilian Human Interest	61	3.8

TABLE IV (Continued)

Topic	Frequency	Percent
Enemy Attacks	105	6.5
Ally Defeat	23	1.4
Alleged War Crimes	54	3.3
Ally Attack	46	2.8
U.S. Non-Military Aid	6	.4
Warning of U.S. Attack	21	1.3
Ally Victory	6	.4
War Protest (U.S.)	149	9.2
War Protest (Ally)	18	1.1
War Protest (Other)	3	.2
Criticism of U.S. Policy	69	4.2
Support of U.S. Policy	79	4.9
U.S. Attacks	116	7.1
Criticism of Draft	16	1.0
Support of Draft	1	.1
Support of Defense Spending	1	.1
Criticism of Defense Spending	3	.2
Criticism of Ally Policy	10	.6
Censorship Complaints	27	1.7
Total	1624	100%

A chi square test conducted shows a significant difference in the occurrences of different topics in the articles examined (chi square=1466.901, df=35, p <.001). The two

topics that occurred most frequently were "Peace Talks" (150=9.2%), and "U.S. War Protests" (149=9.2%).

Table V shows the frequency with which each source was used among the 1624 articles examined.

TABLE V

FREQUENCIES OF EACH SOURCH AMONG THE ARTICLES EXAMINED

Source	Frequency	Percent
Official Military (U.S.)	480	29.6
Unofficial U.S. Military	142	8.7
Official Military (Ally)	56	3.4
Unofficial Military (Ally)	10	.6
Official Military (Other)	11	.7
Civilian (U.S.)	214	13.2
Civilian (Ally)	61	3.8
Civilian (Other)	19	1.2
Foreign Government (Ally)	77	4.7
Foreign Government (Other)	81	5.0
U.S. Government (Non-Military)	383	23.6
United Nations	15	.9
Other Neutral International Group	14	.9
Un-attributed	61	3.8
Total	1624	100

A chi square test conducted shows that the differences in the occurrences of each source are significant (chi square=2402.897, df=13, p< .001). The most frequently used source was "Official U.S. Military" (480=29.6%), followed by "U.S. Government Non-Military" (383=23.6%). The two other sources used significantly more than others were "Civilian (U.S.)" (214=13.2%), and "Unofficial U.S. Military" (142=8.7%).

Table VI shows the frequencies with which each source was used during each time period studied.

TABLE VI

FREQUENCIES OF EACH SOURCE AMONG EACH CONFLICT

Source	V1	V2	G	DS	DST	Total
Official U.S. Military	164	134	20	73	89	480
Unofficial U.S. Military	57	51	3	5	26	142
Official Military (Ally)	8	36	1	2	9	56
Unofficial Military (Ally)	4	5			1	10
Official Military (Other)	4	6		1		11
Civilian (U.S.)	79	55	15	29	36	214
Civilian (Ally)	25	28		1	7	61
Civilian (Other)	8	7			4	19
Foreign Govt. (Ally)	26	27	5	8	11	77
Foreign Govt. (Other)	24	25	3	13	16	81
U.S. Govt. Non-Military	131	107	22	55	68	383

TABLE VI (Continued)

Source	V1	V2	G	DS	DST	Total
United Nations	6	1	3	2	3	15
Other Neutral Int. Group	8	2		3	1	14
Un-attributed	50	8			3	61
Total	594	492	72	192	274	1624

V1=Vietnam (1964-1968); V2=Vietnam (1969-1973); G=Grenada; DS=Desert Shield; DST=Desert Storm.

A chi square test conducted shows that the differences in the occurrences of each source during each conflict are significant (chi square=165.059, df =52, p <.001). In each conflict the most frequently used source was "Official Military", followed closely by "U.S. Government Non-Military". Combined, the two source categories were used in 49.6 percent of Vietnam (1964-1968) stories; 48.9 percent of Vietnam (1969-1973) stories; 58.3 percent of Grenada stories; 66.6 percent of Desert Shield stories; and 57.2 percent of Desert Storm stories. Other than "Official U.S. Military" and "U.S Government", the most frequently used source was "U.S. Civilian". The results show that as the use of "official" sources increased, the number of stories with "U.S. Civilian sources also increased; the time period with the highest percentage of "U.S. Civilian" sources is Grenada (20.8%).

Table VII shows the frequencies of each source used during both Vietnam time periods compared to the later conflicts (Grenada and the Persian Gulf War).

TABLE VII

FREQUENCIES OF VIETNAM ARTICLE SOURCES COMPARED TO LATER
CONFLICTS (GRENADA AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR)

Source	Grenada/Persian Gulf War	Vietnam (1964-1973)	Total
Official U.S. Military	182	298	480
Unofficial U.S. Military	34	108	142
Official Military (Ally)	12	44	56
Unofficial Military (Ally)	1	9	10
Official Military (Other)	1	10	11
Civilian (U.S.)	80	134	214
Civilian (Ally)	8	53	61
Civilian (Other)	4	15	19
Foreign Govt. (Ally)	24	53	77
Foreign Govt. (Other)	32	49	81
U.S. Govt. Non-Military	145	238	383
United Nations	8	7	15
Other Neutral International Group	4	10	14
Un-attributed	3	58	61
Totals	538	1086	1624

A chi square test conducted shows that the differences in the occurrences of the
sources used during Vietnam compared to the two later conflicts are significant (chi
square=63.446, df=13, p <.001).

Table VIII shows the frequencies of each source used during Grenada compared to the other conflicts.

TABLE VIII

FREQUENCIES OF GRENADA ARTICLE SOURCES COMPARED TO THOSE OF VIETNAM AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

Source	Vietnam/Persian Gulf War	Grenada	Total
Official U.S. Military	460	20	480
Unofficial U.S. Military	139	3	142
Official Military (Ally)	55	1	56
Unofficial Military (Ally)	10		10
Official Military (Other)	11		11
Civilian (U.S.)	199	15	214
Civilian (Ally)	61		61
Civilian (Other)	19		19
Foreign Govt. (Ally)	72	5	77
Foreign Govt. (Other)	78	3	81
U.S. Govt. Non-Military	361	22	383
United Nations	12	3	15
Other Neutral International Group	14		14
Un-attributed	61		61
Totals	1552	72	1624

A chi square test conducted shows that the differences in the occurrences of the sources used in reports dealing with U.S. military conflict in Grenada compared to Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War are significant (chi square=25.333, df=13, p <.05).

Table IX shows the frequencies of each source used during the Persian Gulf War compared to the two earlier conflicts (Vietnam and Grenada).

TABLE IX

FREQUENCIES OF PERSIAN GULF WAR ARTICLE SOURCES COMPARED TO THOSE OF VIETNAM AND GRENADA

Source	Vietnam/Grenada	Persian Gulf War	Total
Official U.S. Military	318	162	480
Unofficial U.S. Military	111	31	142
Official Military (Ally)	45	11	56
Unofficial Military (Ally)	9	1	10
Official Military (Other)	10	1	11
Civilian (U.S.)	149	65	214
Civilian (Ally)	53	8	61
Civilian (Other)	15	4	19
Foreign Govt. (Ally)	58	19	77
Foreign Govt. (Other)	52	29	81
U.S. Govt. Non-Military	260	123	383
United Nations	10	5	15
Other Neutral Int. Group	10	4	14

TABLE IX (Continued)

Source	Vietnam/Grenada	Persian Gulf War	Total
Un-attributed	58	3	61
Totals	1158	466	1624

A chi square test conducted shows that the differences in the occurrences of the sources used in reports dealing with the Persian Gulf War compared to the previous conflicts (Vietnam and Grenada) are significant (chi square=45.165, df=13, p <.001).

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

This study used content analysis to examine randomly selected articles about Vietnam, Grenada and The Persian Gulf War. The newspapers examined were *The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times,* and *The Washington Post.* The purpose of the study was to show if there are differences in the types of news stories written about each conflict. Since each conflict involved different guidelines for reporting issued by the government and military, this study was conducted to determine whether different guidelines in different conflicts resulted in significantly different types of news reports. For each article selected, each was coded for "Topic", "Source", and "Length in Square Inches". Specifically, the use of sources was examined to show possible correlations between the number of articles that used "official" sources (Government, Official Military) and the time period in which the stories were written.

A random sample was selected after determining the five specific time periods to be studied: Vietnam (1964-1968); Vietnam (1969-1973); Grenada (October-December, 1983); Desert Shield (August-December, 1990); and Desert Storm (January-March, 1991). For each year, a random sample of 14 issues was examined, with the exception of 1966, which had 10. A total of 1624 individual stories were coded.

Conclusions

The findings of the content analysis conducted enable each of the research questions of this study to be answered. A summary of the research questions and findings follows:

Research Question 1: Do news articles dealing with the Vietnam War rely more or less on official government and military sources than stories dealing with later U.S. military conflicts (Grenada and The Persian Gulf War)?

To answer this question, the articles dealing with Vietnam were compared to those of Grenada and The Persian Gulf War. A chi square test determined that the sources used in the Vietnam articles are significantly different that those used in articles dealing with Grenada and The Persian Gulf War. For Vietnam (1964-1968), 49.6 percent of the stories analyzed had "Official U.S. Military" or "U.S. Government" sources. For the stories dealing with Vietnam (1969-1973) the number of "official" sources decreased slightly to 48.9 percent. However, the number of "official" sources used grew significantly during Grenada (58.3%), Desert Shield (66.6%), and Desert Storm (57.2%). The findings are consistent with the evolution of the military's guidelines for the media regarding news coverage of U.S. military conflicts. In Vietnam, there was no official censorship of the media by the military; as a result, there were fewer stories during Vietnam that had "Official U.S. Military" or "U.S. Government" sources. Members of the press did not depend as completely on the military for information about the war.

Research Question 2: Do news articles dealing with the U.S. military conflict in Grenada rely more or less on official government and military sources than stories dealing with the Vietnam War?

To answer this question, the news reports dealing with Grenada were compared to those dealing with Vietnam. A chi square test determined that the sources used during Grenada are significantly different than those used in stories dealing with Vietnam. 58.3 percent of the stories dealing with Grenada had either "Official U.S. Military" or "U.S. Government sources, compared to 49.6 percent during Vietnam (1964-1968), and 48.9 percent during Vietnam (1969-1973). Prior to the U.S. invasion of Grenada, the military developed guidelines and restrictions to control reporting of future conflicts. The increase in the number of stories with "official" sources during the Grenada conflict reflects the censorship of news coverage enacted by the military. Because the press was completely banned from any battle zones during most of the conflict, reporters relied on the military and government for information.

Research Question 3: Do news articles dealing with the Persian Gulf War rely more or less on official government and military sources than stories dealing with the Vietnam War?

To answer this question, the news articles dealing with the Persian Gulf War were compared to those dealing with Vietnam. A chi square test showed that the differences in the types of sources used in the two wars are significant. During Desert Shield 66.6 percent of the articles coded had "official" sources, compared to 57.2 percent during Desert Storm. During Vietnam, only 49.6 percent of the stories from 1964-1968 had "official" sources, compared to 48.9 percent during 1969-1973. The articles written

during Desert Shield and Desert Storm had the highest percentage of stories with "official" sources. The increase in stories with "official" sources reflects the development of press "pools" by the military following the invasion of Grenada. The press pools restricted information available to members of the media, resulting in a high percentage of sources with "Official U.S. Military" and "U.S. Government" sources.

Another significant finding of this study is that as the number of stories with "official" sources increased, the number of stories with "U.S. Civilian" sources also grew.

This study shows that the military's views toward media coverage during wartime evolved between Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War, resulting in press restrictions based on different media research "models" in the different conflicts. Models are defined as "shorthand attempts to capture the essence of a conceptual issue or question of interest (Greenberg & Salwen, 1996). Before World War II, the dominant model to explain mass media effects was the hypodermic-needle model, which involved "direct-effects" by the media, and claimed that the media had unmitigated effects on the public. During the 1960s, the "limited-effects" model was developed by Klapper as an alternative to the hypodermic-needle model. The limited-effects model rejects the hypodermic-needle model and states that human perceptions are highly selective, resulting in most media messages being ignored.

The limited-effects model seems to have been the model used during Vietnam by the military, resulting in no press restrictions. Following Vietnam, the military implemented media guidelines based more on the direct-effects model, especially during Grenada, where the media was considered to be powerful enough to affect public

opinion. During the Persian Gulf War, the military used the "moderate-effects" model in determining media guidelines for coverage of the conflict. Moderate-effects models include: agenda setting, framing and gatekeeping. Moderate-effects models acknowledge the power of media messages in influencing actions and opinions, but also consider outside factors, including political, social and economic influences.

Recommendations

Despite the vast amount of studies conducted on the news coverage of Vietnam and later U.S. military conflicts, there has not been a quantitative study directly comparing newspaper coverage of Vietnam and Desert Storm that this researcher could find. As a result, every effort was made to keep this study focused; and, therefore, very limited in its scope. Unlike other studies which might "blame" either the media or military for perceived mistakes made in reporting on U.S. wars, this study does not expand far beyond the realm of quantitative study. Because of its limited scope, this study could be used as a basis for further study on the topic of how the news media has covered U.S. military conflicts.

One area for possible future study might be the issue of how media guidelines for war reporting were developed by the U.S. Government and military. Through interviews and the study of government documents, a historical study could be conducted to show the evolution of the relationship between the media and military.

Another area for future study might be a direct comparison of mainstream newspaper coverage of U.S. military conflicts with the coverage in government publications such as *Stars and Stripes*.

Other areas for further study might be other types of media, including television, magazines, and radio. A direct comparison of television coverage with newspaper coverage would be important because of television's unique ability to show a war almost as it happens.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

CODING SHEET

Newspaper: __New York Times __Los Angeles Times __Washington Post

Time Period Studied: __Vietnam (1964-1968) __Vietnam (1969-1973) __Grenada __Desert Shield __Desert Storm

Topic __U.S. Military Strategy
__U.S. Military Statistics
__Ally Military Statistics
__Other Military Statistics
__U.S. and Ally Military Technology
__Peace Talks (U.S.)
__Other Military Technology
__U.S. Political
__Ally Political
__Other Political
__Economy
__Criticism of Peace Talks
__U.S. Public
__Focused on U.S. Military Victories
__Focused on U.S. Military Defeats, or deaths
__Military Human Interest
__Civilian Human Interest
__Enemy Attacks
__Ally Defeat
__Alleged War Crimes
__Ally Attack
__U.S. Non-Military Aid
__Warnings of U.S. Attacks
__Ally Victory
__War Protest (U.S.)
__War Protest (Ally)
__War Protest (Other)
__Criticism of U.S. Policy
__Support of U.S. Policy
__U.S. Attacks
__Criticism of Draft
__Support of Draft
__Support of Defense Spending
__Criticism of Defense Spending
__Criticism of Ally Policy
__Complaints about Media Censorship

Source __Official Military (U.S.)
__Unofficial Military (U.S.)

__Official Military (Allied)
__Unofficial Military (Allied)
__Official Military (Other)
__Unofficial Military (Other)
__Civilian (American)
__Civilian (Allied)
__Civilian (Other)
__Foreign Government (Allied)
__Foreign Government (Other)
__U.S. Government Non-Military Official
__United Nations
__Other Neutral International Group
__Un-attributed

_____Length (Square Inches)

APPENDIX B

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD GROUNDRULES

Included in the memorandum "Ground Rules and Guidelines for Correspondents in the Event of Hostilities in the Persian Gulf" issued to Washington Bureau Chiefs of the Pentagon Press Corps by Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

Smith, H. (Ed.). (1992). Ground Rules and Guidelines for Desert Shield. The Media and the Gulf War: The Press and Democracy in Wartime. Washington, DC: Seven Locks Press.

Operation Desert Shield Ground Rules (January, 1991)

The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

1. For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g., artillery tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as "company-size," "multibattalion," "multidivision," "naval task force," and "carrier battle group." Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."

2. Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or canceled operations.

3. Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Locations may be described as follows: all navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming from the "Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwaiti border," etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged its participation.

4. Rules of engagement details.

5. Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.

6. During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives. This would include unit designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.

7. Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.

8. Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.

9. Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

10. Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment, or tactics.

11. Specific operating methods and tactics (e.g., air angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.

12. Information on operational support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."

APPENDIX C

GUIDELINES FOR NEWS MEDIA

Included in the memorandum "Ground Rules and Guidelines for Correspondents in the Event of Hostilities in the Persian Gulf" issued to Washington Bureau Chiefs of the Pentagon Press Corps by Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

Smith, H. (Ed.). (1992). Ground Rules and Guidelines for Desert Shield. The Media and the Gulf War: The Press and Democracy in Wartime. Washington, DC: Seven Locks Press.

Guidelines for News Media (January, 1991)

News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear
they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries,
cables, converters, etc.

Night Operations—Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only
approved light source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including
flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless
specifically approved by the on-scene commander.

Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with your public affairs escort
while on Saudi bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public
affairs escort may be required because of security, safety, and mission requirements as
determined by the host commander.

Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is
extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be
notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been
instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved
one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media.
Casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature
or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that
sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value of the photograph,
film, or videotape. News coverage of casualties in medical centers will be in strict
compliance with the instructions of doctors and medical officials.

To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of operation, the following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities, media pools will be established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S. news media personnel present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join CENTCOM media pools, providing they agree to pool their products. News media personnel who are not members of the official CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals.

For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM media pools:

1. Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool coordinator for an explanation of pool operations.

2. In the event of hostilities, pool products will be subject to review before release to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities, operation, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would jeopardize the outcome of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be examined solely for its conformace to the attached ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a reporter about disputed materials, immediately send the disputed materials to JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director and the appropriate news media representative. If no agreement can be reached,

the issue will be immediately forwarded to OASD(PA) for review with the appropriate

bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication will be made by the originating

reporter's news organization.

3. Correspondents may not carry a personal weapon.

APPENDIX D

CENTCOM POOL MEMBERSHIP AND OPERATING PROCEDURES

Included in the memorandum "Ground Rules and Guidelines for Correspondents in the Event of Hostilities in the Persian Gulf" issued to Washington Bureau Chiefs of the Pentagon Press Corps by Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

Smith, H. (Ed.). (1992). Ground Rules and Guidelines for Desert Shield. The Media and the Gulf War: The Press and Democracy in Wartime. Washington, DC: Seven Locks Press.

CENTCOM Pool Membership and Operating Procedures (January, 1991)

General. The following procedures pertain to the CENTCOM news media pool concept for providing news to the widest possible American audience during the initial stages of U.S. military activities in the Arabian Gulf area. The CENTCOM pools will be drawn from news media within Saudi Arabia. Their composition and operation should not be confused with that of the Department of Defense National Media Pool. The pools are a cooperative arrangement designed to balance the media's desire for unilateral coverage with the logistics realities of the military operation, which make it impossible for every media representative to cover every activity of his or her choice, and with CENTCOM's responsibility to maintain operational security, protect the safety of the troops, and prevent interference with military operations. There is no intention to discriminate among media representatives on the basis of reporting content or viewpoint. Favoritism or disparate treatment of the media in pool operations by pool coordinators will not be tolerated. The purpose and intention of the pool concept is to get media representatives to and from the scene of military action, to get their reports back to the Joint Information Bureau-Dhahran for filing—rapidly and safely, and to permit unilateral media coverage of combat and combat-related activity as soon as possible. There will be two types of pools: 18-member pools for ground combat operations and smaller, 7-member pools for ground combat and other coverage. Pools will be formed and governed by the media organizations that are qualified to participate and will be administered through pool-appointed coordinators working in conjunction with the JIB-

Dhahran. The media will operate under the ground rules issued by CENTCOM on January 15, 1991.

Pool participation. Due to logistics and space limitations, participation in the pools will be limited to media that principally serve the American public and that have had a long-term presence covering Department of Defense military operations, except for pool positions specifically designated as "Saudi" or "international." Pool positions will be divided among the following categories of media: television, radio, wire service, news magazine, newspaper, pencil, photo, Saudi, and international. Media that do not principally serve the American public are qualified to participate in the CENTCOM media pool in the international category.

Pool procedures. Because of the extensive media presence in the Arabian Gulf, the fact that some media organizations are represented by many individuals, and the likelihood that more organizations and individuals will arrive in the future, membership in all categories except pencil will be by organization rather then specific individual. An organization will be eligible to participate in pool activities only after being a member of the appropriate media pool category for three continuous weeks. Members of a single-medium pool may use their discretion to allow participation by organizations which have had a significant stay in country, but which have had breaks in their stay that would otherwise cause them to be ineligible to participate under the three-continuous-weeks rule.

The single-medium pools will be formed and governed by the members. The members of each category will appoint a pool coordinator who will serve as the spokesperson and single point of contact for that medium. The print media will select a

coordinator who will serve as the point of contact for the pencil category. Any disputes about membership in or operation of the pool shall be resolved by the pool coordinator.

Each single-medium pool coordinator will maintain a current list of members and a waiting list prioritized in the order in which they should be placed on the pools. The same order will be used to replace pool members during normal rotations and those individual members who return from the field prematurely and who do not have another individual in Dhahran from their organization to replace them.

Membership of standing pools will rotate approximately every two to three weeks as the situation permits.

APPENDIX E

POOL CATEGORIES AND COMPOSITION

Included in the memorandum "Ground Rules and Guidelines for Correspondents in the Event of Hostilities in the Persian Gulf" issued to Washington Bureau Chiefs of the Pentagon Press Corps by Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

Smith, H. (Ed.). (1992). Ground Rules and Guidelines for Desert Shield. The Media and the Gulf War: The Press and Democracy in Wartime. Washington, DC: Seven Locks Press.

Pool Categories and Composition (January, 1991)

Television: The television category will be open to the major television networks.

Radio: The radio category will be open to shoes radio networks that serve a general (nonprivate) listening audience.

Wire Service: The wire service category will be open to the major wire services.

News Magazine: The news magazine category will be open to those major national news magazines that serve a general news function.

Newspaper: The newspaper category will be divided into two subcategories for participation in the 18-member pools. One will be open to those major papers and newspaper groups that have made a commitment since the early stages of Operation Desert Shield to cover U.S. military activities in Saudi Arabia and which have had a continuous or near-continuous presence in Saudi Arabia since the early stages of the operation, such as *The New York Times,* Cox, Knight Ridder, *The Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune,* the *Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post, USA Today* and *Boston Globe.* The second category will include all other newspapers.

Pencil: The general category of "pencil" (print reporter) may be used by the print media pool coordinator in assigning print reporters to the smaller pools. All eligible print reporters may participate.

Photo: The photography category will be divided into the four subcategories of wire, newspaper, magazine, and photo agency. Participants may take part in only one subcategory.

Saudi: The Saudi category will be open to Saudi reporters as determined by the Saudi Ministry of Information liaison in the JIB-Dhahran. They must speak and write English and must file their reports in English.

International: The International category will be open to reporters from organizations which do not principally serve the American public from any news medium. They must speak and write English and must file their reports in English.

APPENDIX F

SHARING OF MEDIA PRODUCTS WITHIN THE CENTCOM POOLS

Included in the memorandum "Ground Rules and Guidelines for Correspondents

in the Event of Hostilities in the Persian Gulf" issued to Washington Bureau Chiefs of the

Pentagon Press Corps by Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

Smith, H. (Ed.). (1992). Ground Rules and Guidelines for Desert Shield. The

Media and the Gulf War: The Press and Democracy in Wartime. Washington, DC: Seven

Locks Press.

Sharing of Media Products Within the CENTCOM Pools (January, 1991)

Pool participants and media organizations eligible to participate in the pools will share all media products within their medium; e.g., television products will be shared by all other television pool members and photo products will be shared with other photo pool members. The procedures for sharing those products and the operating expenses of the pool will be determined by the participants of each medium.

Alert Procedures for Combat Correspondent Pool Activation (January, 1991)

When the pools are to be activated, the JIB-Dhahran director or his designated representative will call each of the pool coordinators and announce the activation of the pools. The pool coordinators will be told when and where the pool members are to report (the reporting time will be within—but not later than—two hours of alert notification).

Operational security (OPSEC) considerations are of the utmost concern. JIB personnel, pool coordinators, and pool members need to be especially cognizant of OPSEC. All involved with the activation of the pools need to remain calm and unexcited. Voice inflection, nervous behavior, etc., are all indicators that something extraordinary is underway and could signal that operations are imminent.

Neither pool coordinators nor pool members will be told of the activation is an "exercise" or actual "alert."

Pool members should report to the predesignated assembly area dressed for deployment, with the appropriate equipment and supplies.

Recommendations for changes to pool membership or other procedures will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

APPENDIX H

DOD PRINCIPLES FOR NEWS COVERAGE OF DOD OPERATIONS (1992)

Developed in May, 1992 by Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Public Affairs) and members of the media, following complaints by the media of the

pool system used during the Persian Gulf War.

DOD Principles for News Coverage of DOD Operations (1992)

The following principles have been adopted by representatives of major American news media and the Pentagon to be followed in any future combat situation involving American troops.

Principles that should govern future arrangements for news coverage from the battlefield of the United States military in combat:

1. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.

2. Pools are not to serve as the standard of covering U.S. military operations. but pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity-within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early-access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.

3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.

4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspensions of the credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.

5. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special

Operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.

6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.

7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders will permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever possible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.

8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

9. These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DOD National Media Pool System.

Accompanying Statement on Security Review

Note: The news organizations originally proposed 10 principles. One dealt with security review and said: "News material—words and pictures—will not be subject to security review." The Pentagon proposed instead a principal that said: "Military operational security may require review of news material for conformance to reporting ground rules." This fundamental disagreement could not be bridged, and representatives of the press and the military issued their separate views on this matter, as follows.

News Media Statement

The news organizations are convinced that journalists covering U.S. forces in combat must be mindful at all times of operational security and the safety of American lives. News organizations strongly believe that journalists will abide by clear operational security ground rules. Prior security review is unwarranted and unnecessary.

We believe that the record in Operation Desert Storm, Vietnam and other wars supports the conclusion that journalists in the battlefield can be trusted to act responsibly. We will challenge prior security review in the event that the Pentagon attempts to impose it in some future military operation.

Department of Defense Statement

The military believes that it must retain the option to review news material, to avoid the inadvertent inclusion in news reports of information that could endanger troop safety or the success of a mission. Any review system would be imposed only when operational security is a consideration—for example, the very early stages of a contingency operation or sensitive periods in combat. If security review were imposed, it would be used for one very limited purpose: to prevent disclosure of information which, if published, would jeopardize troop safety or the success of a military operation. Such a review system would not be used to seek alterations in any other aspect of content or to delay timely transmission of news material.

Security review would be performed by the military in the field, giving the commander's representative the opportunity to address potential ground rule violations.

The reporter would either change the story to meet ground rule concerns and file it, or file it and flag for the editor whatever passages were in dispute. The editor would then call the Pentagon to give the military one last chance to talk about potential ground rule violations.

The Defense Department believes that the advantage of this system is that the news organization would retain control of the material throughout the review and filing process. The Pentagon would have two chances to address potential operational security violations, but the news organization would make the final decision about whether to publish the disputed information. Under Principle Four, violations of the ground rules could result in expulsion of the journalist involved from the combat zone.

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