


THE AL QAEDA TERRORIST NETWORK:
PRE 9/11 CONDITIONS, POST
9/11 RESPONSES

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
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
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Chapter 1

Introduction

It has become overwhelmingly apparent that a shift in terrorism organization has occurred. While terrorism has plagued countries around the world for years, the evolution of terrorism has resulted in the transformation of organizations into stronger, more adaptive, "super-terrorist" groups (Emerson, 1998). The increased resiliency of terrorist organizations is a troubling factor to the anti-terrorism community. Al Qaeda is a case in point of an effective network organizational structure that has proved adaptive and difficult to destroy. For more than ten years, Al Qaeda built an invisible network that spans across all continents. However, the attacks of 9/11 exist as a unique point in time for the events exposed group factors such as its operational tactics, linkages between members, and associations to the radical Islamic belief system that Al Qaeda is founded upon. It is around the events of 9/11 that a conceptual framework for this research is constructed. Within this analysis, the evaluation of two parts – the cause and the effect – are synthesized to understand how they interact within the model. First, a clearer understanding of the Al Qaeda network is unfolded, as well as, an understanding of the more daunting questions of how Al Qaeda accomplished the attacks. Second, the research conducted extends to how these attacks affected a society and how attacks of such magnitude are being deterred now.

How rapid have been new threat developments? How much have the anti-terrorist tactics changed? Significantly. In *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vetter and Perlstein (1991), argued that the continental United States would remain relatively unaffected by much of the violence that seems indigenous in other areas of the world. Unfortunately,

the attacks of 9/11 gave the United States, as well as other Western democracies no choice but to take the enemy seriously. Military strategists have labeled the new threat "fourth generation warfare". Fourth generation warfare is characterized by the decreased emphasis of military action in times of conflict, and the lack of at least one side having a nationally controlled military force. One of the first papers written on the subject came from within the military community. The authors vividly describe fourth generation warfare by stating "The distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between 'civilian' and 'military' may disappear (Lind, Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton, and Wilson, 1989, p. 25). The description of fourth generation warfare, although it is not limited in scope to terrorism, significantly resembles the war on terrorism.

After the attacks of 9/11, opposing forces to terrorism found themselves grappling with how to deal with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups evolving in the same pattern. The strategies of the past do little to guarantee future success. Modern government and military methods had to initiate change and must continue to change if the "war on terrorism" is going to be won. High-tech intelligence equipment will have some success, yet it cannot be the main method of attack. New tactics used by students of terrorism are harder to combat because they are able to produce active terror with a wide variety of readily available and less sophisticated weapons (Kushner, 1998). It is crucial that the U.S. is on the same playing field as Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. They must innovate just as the terrorist organizations do in order to be successful. This effort begins with understanding the complex organization of Al Qaeda.

Organizational Network of Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda's organization represents a network hybrid that lies on a spectrum between that of traditional military hierarchy and a full-fledged autonomous cell network (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). Hierarchies are most commonly associated with governments in which there is a central command that holds the decision-making power over all of the procedures and missions. On the other end of the spectrum is the concept of completely autonomous cells that work together for a goal. The idea of networked organizations is not a recent development. In the 1960's Burns and Stalker suggested that organic networks displayed structure of control, authority, and communication along horizontal lines. However, in the 1970's William Potter Gale and the Posse Comitatus initiated the "leaderless resistance" in which bands of resistance armies would cooperate on anti-tax demonstrations. The leaderless resistance structure depicts small groups of independent cells that carry out their own acts of violence with no central leader (Garfinkel, 2003).

Al Qaeda learned from the structural mistakes of other terrorist groups in order to create a resilient network. Cutting off the head of central command could destroy terrorist groups that adhered to a military hierarchy, while autonomous cells in the leaderless resistance lacked leadership, which could result in in fighting and a loss of focus on the objectives sought. Innovation and the will to survive fostered the formation of a networked organization that governments find difficult to destroy. Al Qaeda's adherence to some structure is evident in its establishment of different committees that head up the finances, military, and other areas. Yet there are also autonomous cells, each carrying out its own mission with no knowledge of other members or their assignments.

This is a picture of Al Qaeda's complex organization that until 9/11 was not fully understood or acknowledged.

Force Field Analysis


This study is a two-step process. The first step of analysis is to use Lewin's (1936) force field theoretical model to analyze the Al Qaeda organization and explain the social settings prior to 9/11. Next, using Lewin's model, analysis of the effects caused by 9/11 and the resulting actions taken is conducted. The particular change model comes from the work of Kurt Lewin who wanted to show how groups make decisions and how events unfold as forces of change. In developing his model he assumed that broad social trends and biographical data influence people's attitudes and beliefs about expressions of social change. Lewin used the term "forces" to label the influencing elements of social change, and described the forces as occurring in two directions--those that propel change and those that restrain change.

Although the model appears simple enough, it has great theoretical import. It explains, on the one hand, what propels events and, on the other hand, what prevents them. These form the equilibrium of opposing forces that move along a line of action or inaction. Often the change model allows practitioners to decide both a course of action and its implementation. In this case, though, the researcher takes a macro analysis of broad historical patterns that balance the extent to which decisions are fully implemented and the opinions people have about them. This analysis involves elaboration on that model from a broader, historical perspective, one that attempts to look at the transformation of the organizational structure and the social impact of these events.

The protocol of a pre and post design allows for comparisons between the propelling and restraining forces surrounding 9/11. Figure 1 provides a simple example of the dynamic relationship between propelling and restraining forces in Lewin's model. Propelling and restraining forces, like those found in a severe hurricane create chaos because certain extreme climatic conditions exist simultaneously. In this example, the propelling forces are those social factors that would prompt action of UN involvement in the world process, and restraining forces indicate actions that would deter such action. Between the two forces there is what is referred to as a "threshold" or "critical incident" point. This point acts as a monitor between propelling and restraining forces. Certain social conditions are necessary for creating action before this threshold is met. The equal size of the arrows in Figure 1 indicates a steady balance between the forces. If, for instance, the arrows representing the propelling forces were greater than the restraining forces, it would indicate that the propelling forces had passed the threshold point and actions being taken by the UN would clearly favor more involvement in the world process. To bring it back to a more equal balance, the restraining forces--social conditions enacted to restrain the UN's involvement in the world process--would have to become more influential.

Additionally, this study uses an historical framework, one that synthesizes the propelling and restraining forces as they apply to the organizational network of Al Qaeda. In other words, the researcher is looking at the Al Qaeda network through the window of opportunity that 9/11 prompted. From that point, it is necessary to look back in time to first understand how and why Al Qaeda came into being, and then determine the factors that affected the networks continued path all of the way up to the events of 9/11.

Figure 1.1
Example of Lewin's Force Field Analysis



Then, the researcher takes the analysis one step further to evaluate the effects of 9/11 as they pertain to the U.S. public that the attacks affected and how these effects evolved into restraining forces to deter terrorism. The following section is a review of literature intended to assist in the discussion of the propelling and restraining forces. The researcher has included an introduction of Muslim culture, ideologies, and religion as well as the Al Qaeda organization. This information provides a foundation for understanding and sets the stage for subsequent research in this study.

Review of Literature

Muslim Culture

Contrasting Ideologies from those of Western Thought

The thought of Muslims brings the Middle East to most people's minds. While ninety percent of the Arabs in the Middle East are Muslims, they make up only one-fifth

of the total Muslim population (Brown, 2000). Yet, the Middle East is the birthplace of Islam, the religion of the Muslims, and the hub of everything important to the Muslim people. When discussing differences among cultures, it is important to note that the majority of Middle Eastern Arabs identify with collectivity and the Muslim culture more so than individual state cultures. The institution of state was placed upon the Middle East by French and English colonialism rather than being adopted through choice. For this reason, Muslim identity has remained stronger than secular identity. The opposite is true for the U.S., in which a high sense of nationality outweighs other identification. In the U.S., emphasis on individuality has given way to a wide diversity of religious choice, which makes it easier to disjoin the facet of "American culture" from that of religion in a general perspective. For Muslims, the daily way of life, like gender roles, cuisine, and child rearing, are all wrapped up in the teachings of Islam (Kramer, 1996).

Samuel Huntington (1996), in his book *Clash of Civilizations*, believes that this is one reason why the Western societies and the Islamic Muslims continue to clash. Huntington suggests that these antithetical civilizations will only continue their historical struggle as globalization allows the expansion of Western ideologies to continue and Muslims fight against it. As the centerpiece of Muslim life, religion is to be treated as sacred, not as an obstacle to overcome. Muslim tension has been generated in the belief that the West sees religion as an obstacle that must be dealt with in order for modernization to occur (Ajami, 1992). This, however, is not the only culprit of the tension between the Muslim ideologies and the West.

Many factors have helped to further the divide and strengthen the resolute of Muslim people. The idea of secular nationalism, brought on by the Europeans, mystified

the Arabs and transformed the idea of the Muslim community into states pitted against one another (Schneider & Silverstein, 2000). Some rulers hungry for power became servants of the European rulers or corrupt dictators, and weakened Islamic Law by adding components of European legal systems (Cooley, 2002). Some Muslims blame the intrusion of Europe and its ability to keep the Islamic believers separated as the reason why Muslims have been unable to rise up and recreate the Middle East as the center for civilization and progress they once had (Ajami, 1981).

Another reason is the creation of the state of Israel and its support from the West. Not only did the Jewish invaders push Palestinians from their homes, the defeat of Egypt by the Israeli army was a humiliating blow for all Muslims. In addition, Wallerstein (1999) suggests the sentiments of many Arab Muslims when he states that Israel is merely an outpost of the United States. The intrusion of the West, and especially the United States, in the Middle East is a very resented fact. The West has also made oil, which some say is being stolen from its rightful owners, another priority and reason to stay in the Middle East. Muslims find the occupation of everything from Western ideologies to U.S. military troops an everlasting sign of the imperialistic attitudes being prescribed on their beliefs and way of life (Hubbell, 1998). Muhammad Jalal Kishk sums it up by saying

“What we are witnessing now is the third crusade against the Arab people. The first crusade, using the sword and the cross, realized some victories but was eventually overwhelmed. The second crusade- -the Age of Imperialism- began with Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798 and succeeded in destroying the self-confidence of the Muslim world. Now the third crusade picks up where the second left off: It accommodates itself to political independence instead of using armies, it seeks to penetrate the mind of the Muslim and to rearrange it” (Kishk, 1965; as cited in Amaji, 1992, p.41).

Throughout the changes and troubles in the twentieth century affecting the Muslim people, the Muslim Brotherhood has attempted to be a watchdog and leader in keeping outside influences away. According to the Deputy General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood (2000), the brotherhood has two primary goals. The first is to institute an Islamic Shari'a (law) to control the all Middle Eastern states. The second goal is to help liberate Muslim countries from foreign imperialism and achieve unity among them. The Muslim Brotherhood has used terrorism--such as the assassination of judges in 1949, attempted to assassinate President Nasser in 1954, and assassinated President Sadat in 1981--to promote such liberation (Williams, 2002). In its footsteps many other "Islamic fundamentalist" groups have sprouted up and in the 1970's all Muslim societies had an Islamist wing (Ansari, 1996).

Muslims everywhere have focused on purifying their communities of the taint of westernization and encouraged a *nizam*, or Islamic system, against the materially based systems of the West since the 1970's (Ansari, 1996). But Western influence has still been able to seep through. In countries like Egypt there are American movie posters, Barbie dolls, an Arabic language version of *Sesame Street*, high-rises, and McDonald's (Schneider & Silverstein, 2000). While some have given in to the idea of a western way of life, others hold their beliefs and hatred of the West even stronger. Many Muslims looking for an alternative are finding it with Islamist movements. Islam is a powerful religion that can feed those feelings of hatred if translated to look as such. This combination has been a strategic tool that has allowed many Islamist movements, including Al Qaeda, to recruit, instill strong beliefs, and even use terror in the pursuit of keeping the Muslim culture safe from outside predators.

Islam Religion

Splintering of thoughts and beliefs into different sects of the Islamic religion

Islam is the religion of Muslims. It is based on the life of the prophet Muhammad and the teachings of the Koran. There are seven basic tenets of Islam: monotheism, angels and demons, Allah's holy books, prophet, accountability, resurrection, and judgment (Farah, 1994). These tenets are the basic outline of the beliefs in which every Islamist adheres. In addition, there are five pillars that Muslims must perform everyday. The *Shahadah* is a creed that Muslims recite everyday to profess their faith, as well as a prayer called the *Salat* is carefully orchestrated several times a day (Farah). Almsgiving, which is a holy tax, fasting, and a pilgrimage to Mecca are the other three pillars in which Muslim followers of Islam submit to throughout their lives (Armstrong, 2001).

The translations of the Koran vary widely, which is somewhat responsible for the ideological extremes and creation of different sects within the Islamic faith. The Sufis are dedicated to the preaching of pacifism and asceticism, and reside in monasteries. On the other end of the extreme is Al Qaeda, a group of terrorists that believe in militant action and bloodshed as a way of purifying the world (Williams, 2002). The word *Islam* means to "submit" or "surrender" to Allah. The Muslim world can be divided up into those who do submit and those who do not (Cragg & Speight, 1980). There are also divisions that have survived thousands of years. After Muhammad died, battles over the next leader, or *Caliph*, of the people caused deep rifts that continue to this day. The most prominent of those divisions are the Sunnis, Shi'as, and Sufis.

The majority of the Muslim people are members of the Sunni branch, which maintain that leadership should be contained within the Quraish, Muhammad's tribe

(Armstrong, 2001). About twenty percent of Muslims are Shi'as who believe that leadership should reside in a direct descendant of Muhammad's son-in-law (Armstrong). Finally, the Sufis make up one percent of the Muslim population and do not join in on the political arguments that drive the other two groups. Rather, Sufis see the Koran as a mystical book that praises withdrawal from the world (Williams, 2002). The internal conflicts that were created between the Sunnis and Shi'as some 1,300 years ago have caused great bloodshed on both sides. However, for all of the turmoil on the inside, both groups do have some similar goals held towards the external world.

There is resentment in the Arab world against Israel, which occupied Palestine and took control of the Al Aqsa mosque, one of the holiest shrines of Islam (Yusuf, 1998). And there is a deep hatred towards Western powers, especially the United States. They harbor such grievances as U.S. support for Israel, being an imperialist government of selfishness and greed in the attempt of controlling the world, and for the stationing troops in the Middle East that defile the holy shrines and guard the oil that does not rightfully belong to them (Hubbell, 1998). Islamic extremists are driven by these hatreds and adopt radical views of the teachings of Islam in their plights to change the current world.

Al Qaeda members mainly fall into the Sunni branch of Islam. They have been deeply opposed to Shi'as and their beliefs. Still, they have found commitment to one common goal. Both bin Laden and Ayatollah Khomeini preach unbridled hatred towards the U.S., Jews, and a modern secular state, and have embraced and mastered the necessary functions to pursue their goals (Ledeem, 2002). Within the Sunni branch, bin Laden falls into another splinter of the religion called Wahhabism. Abdul Wahhab

founded this Islamic movement during the American Revolution in Saudi Arabia (Williams, 2002). During the Revolution, the Islamic faith fell into a deep crisis due to its isolation with the outside world. This crisis further accentuated the divisions in the Islamic world. There were those who argued for an Islamic Enlightenment that would reform and modernize the values of Islam. And there were those that believed Islamic Fundamentalism and the traditional views must be upheld to stay true to the word of Allah (Saghiyeh, 2001; as cited in Beaumont, 2001). Wahhabism opposed Islamic Reformation. Wahhabists adhere to a purist lifestyle that prohibits any other name in prayer except Allah, any other object of worship except Allah, smoking of tobacco, abusive language, and ornamentation in mosques (Farah, 1994). The movement had tapered off, but gained momentum again in 1947 following the United Nations mandate to allow the creation of a Jewish Palestinian state (Williams, 2002). Bin Laden has used much of Wahhabism in his leadership.

The training manual for Al Qaeda members uses excessive quotes from the Koran to express the mission of holy warriors against infidels. Al Qaeda uses its own interpretations of the Islamic faith to make the arguments for these missions and maintains that following the Koran and doing the work of Allah will lead believers to Paradise (Williams, 2002). Al Qaeda's mission is to create one truly holy Islamic state through the rejoining of all Muslims. Once the Islamic state is recreated, the Arab world can rise and conquer the infidels of the Western world and reclaim the power bestowed upon it by Allah (Williams). Osama Bin Laden and the rest of the Al Qaeda members believe this goal must be achieved in any fashion necessary: they will stop at nothing to see this mission successful.

Al Qaeda

The Reach of the Terrorist Group

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, there is no doubt in anyone's mind that Al Qaeda is a global operation. Terrorist cells have been located in numerous countries; some have been successfully broken up, yet others remain hidden throughout the world amongst everyone (Gunaratne, 2003). How a terrorist group could span the globe and create a stable organizational networking structure is still trying to be understood. In late 2001 George Tenet, Director of the CIA, and the rest of the organization argued that Al Qaeda did not constitute a well-organized terrorist network. Instead, it was believed that various groups, with the help of some national intelligence services, made up a very loose organization that cooperated on some operations (Ledeem, 2002).

Today, that tone is starting to change as more and more information and networks are uncovered. The intelligence and leadership abilities of Osama bin Laden are evident when one looks at the way he has expanded this terrorist group to what it is today. He methodically chose Khomeini as a spiritual model and the Hizbollah group as an organizational model (Ledeem, 2002). Similarities include organization along paramilitary lines, a governing Shura (council), and a supreme leader (Ledeem). The group acts as an umbrella organization of numerous terrorist groups just like Hizbollah (Ranstorp, 1994). Yet with changing times, there is evidence that Al Qaeda is still transforming. There are suggestions that the organization is becoming more decentralized, with decision making being delegated to well trained autonomous cells that are financed by private sources that form the web of the international terrorist network (Ledeem, 2002). With large amounts of funding going to radical mosques, Al Qaeda is

able to recruit Muslims throughout the world that stretch from the Middle East, numerous countries in Europe, across the Atlantic to New York, Detroit, and California, over the Pacific to Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore, and even China and Central Asia. A much more specific list will be presented in the subsequent chapters. Such places serve as both recruitment areas as well as cell locations (Kushner, 1998).

Bin Laden's goal was to produce "surrogates" all over the world that can carry out numerous missions of their own (al-Qa'ida(The Base), 2001). The recruitment process is meticulous as well. Al Qaeda recruiters that travel to mosques and universities all over the world spotted potential recruits. Recruiters look mainly for young men with an intense interest in Islam. Then once interest has been established, they are indoctrinated, basically creating a new personality. Bin Laden effectively created an Islamist fundamentalist mass movement by feeding Muslim rage of vulnerable young men and emphasizing hatred for the West (Ledeem, 2002).

Egypt

A clear example of this is through the examination of the role conflict of young Egyptian men. Egypt as a whole is struggling with many conflicts today. The Islamic faith is central to most Egyptians lives. Yet one of the problems is how to define the attitudes toward western culture. Influences of western culture are evident in the cities of Egypt. Most Egyptians are caught between choosing a culture of Islam or an imported secular culture (Schneider & Silverstein, 2000). What makes it even worse is that Egyptians feel humiliated both personally and nationally because of the defeat experienced by Israel in the Six-Day War and the dependence of U.S. foreign aid (Ajami, 1992).

Globalization and the American culture have had other effects on Egyptians. Foreign corporations have moved into the area and effected the economy of Egypt, which has been hurt by the global economic downturn in 2000 and 2001 (Cooley, 2002). This has made it increasingly hard for young Egyptian men to find jobs and have money, which is needed before they get married. Many have had to migrate into the cities where their lives have been transformed. No longer are the men united together as in rural settings, nor are they the sole providers and protectors of their families (Schneider & Silverstein, 2000). Women are now working in cities in jobs that were once designated for men only. These young men have essentially lost all sense of what they have been taught growing up. This is deeply embarrassing for them, they see themselves as failures.

All Egyptians, feeling the confusion of how to deal with an ever-present American culture and the stress of economic stagnation, are becoming more and more attracted to the Islamic movement. Islamists give Egyptians a picture of the glory days when Islam dominated the world and illustrate how it can one day return if all Muslims unite under Islamic rule. The middle class and the poor of Egypt are the biggest sympathizers of the Islamist movement, which gives them hope that equality may one day return (Weaver, 1993; 1995; as cited in Schneider & Silverstein, 2000). The Islamist movement also points out that many of Egypt's hardships come from the American economic domination. They paint a picture of America as being the enemy since it continuously supports Israel, holds military bases in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states (Barber, 1998).

The situation in Egypt gives Al Qaeda the perfect grounds in which to recruit disgruntled young men who are confused, have no where to turn, and ready to release

their anger and humiliation. Numerous Egyptian men have been linked to Al Qaeda such as Mohammed Atta, a lead terrorist on September 11. Muhammed Atef who was thought to be next in line to Bin Laden until he was killed in November 2001, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of Egypt's Islamic Jihad terrorist group and bin Laden's number two man (Williams, 2002). Even more Egyptians joined under the umbrella of the al Qaeda organization when the Egyptian Islamic Jihad created a partnership with Al Qaeda that was completed in 1998 (Ledeem, 2002).

The example of Egypt is only one of many Middle Eastern countries in which men are unable to adjust to the changing environment brought on by globalization and American influence. Al Qaeda has already expanded its reach to all corners of the world. Yet, this is only one step in the ultimate goal for Al Qaeda. In order for the world to become once again a land ruled by Islam. Al Qaeda needs all Muslims to rise up and help destroy those that defy the word of Allah and reject Islamic rule (al-Qa'ida (The Base), 2001). Al Qaeda's mission will not be over until this transformation of the world is complete, no matter how long it takes and how many lives are lost. However, this war has only just begun, for those who see a world of democracy like the United States and the rest of the Western world will not sit idly by while this terrorist network wrecks havoc on the world.

Propelling Forces

Using the Lewin Model identified the propelling forces that led up to the events of 9/11. As discussed earlier, the propelling forces were the conditions that affected the organization and served as a means to successfully execute the 9/11 terrorist mission. Discussion of the propelling forces must also include the importance of necessary and

sufficient conditions. Within this construct, both necessary and sufficient conditions are essential for action to occur. In other words, the necessary conditions are the components of a stick of dynamite whereas the sufficient condition is the fuse. It is the fuse that ignites the other components. The propelling forces include: 1) rapid globalization of the world; 2) financial stability of the terrorist organization; 3) strategic leadership; 4) new support for Islamic Law; and the sufficient condition of 5) "true believer" status.

Globalization

The term globalization is utilized in two distinct ways in the discussion of propelling forces. The first operational definition of globalization stems from its social effects. Globalization is the result of the mobility of goods, services, and labor driven by the economic market, which affect the monetary, environmental and social conditions of people within different countries. In other words, how it affects First World countries versus Third World countries. The second definition of globalization is characterized by the widespread use of information technology that spans the world. Operationally defined, globalization constitutes the world's connectivity and interdependence of communication and information technology advances. It was necessary that the distinction be made for both represent aspects of globalization, yet are used in two separate ways for understanding the propelling forces of Al Qaeda.

What do 9/11, the Middle East terrorists, Saudi Arabia, and the Pentagon have in common? A linking condition from a global system. Said (1984) has stated that like peoples and institutions, ideas and theories travel from one person to another, through the course of situation to situation, and from a specific time period to another. Translocality theory suggests that politics can be situated not within boundaries of territorial space, but

rather flow across spaces (Mandaville, 2001). This idea of translocality overlaps with the idea of globalization. Globalization has paradoxically contributed both to the pulling together and separating of these factors. Globalization has been agitating a rift between the Western and Eastern culture as it increases. Zerubavel's (1997) dynamic theory on cognitive sociology describes three sectors of the mind: an individual mind; a human mind; and a social mind. Cognitive sociologists remind us that we think not only as individuals and human beings but also as social creatures. The social environment affects people more than they realize. These tensions of culture are increased by the flow of ideas through boundaries that grab onto the environment and hence, affects the thoughts of a society.

Globalization has two faces. One is seen from above, one from below. Richard Faulk in *Predatory Globalization* (1999) sees that globalization represents those forces where decisions are made from the top by bureaucratic organizations such as the World Trade Organization. By contrast those made from below represent people with an alternative ideology and political movement. The protests in Seattle in 1999 highlighted these two distinct groups where protestors opposed environmental degradation, the economic gap, and wanted greater participation. Those looking from below are focused less on market drive issues and give attention to environmental and social concerns.

The concepts of Edward Luttwak and Benjamin Barber, like puzzle box tops, show the connection between the two faces of globalization conceptually. Luttwak (1999) defined "turbo-capitalism" as a description of current global economics where some countries gain and others either stay the same or get worse. Turbo-capitalism defines economies that are somewhat free of government control, unrestricted by unions,

customs and traditions. Even more profound is the fact that more governments have relinquished their own operations. This suggests an increase in private sectors running the world and the governments of the world. Like an airplane without pilots, the process seems obvious. Not everyone lands safely. Some do— those prescribing from globalization from above, which are entrepreneurs in American, Western Europe and Japan. Thus the term “creative destruction” can be tacked onto the one of “turbo capitalism”, for in the wake of such entrepreneurial creativity are the destructive effects left behind for others.

Barber (1992) coined the term “McWorld vs. Jihad” to describe the reactions to these global conditions. Globalization has a good and bad quality. It has both a negative and disintegrative effect internally (Jihad) and somewhat positive economic effect externally and transnationally (McWorld). This means that technology, cultural diffusions and global economies have linked the world. It is interconnected as a McWorld.

Explained this way the fracturing of the “turbo capitalism” impacts the governments and creates cohesion among tribes. The new ethnic worlds seem divided, resulting in extreme violence. Emotions of resentment and anger propel this conflict, as well as violence and dogmatism. It's us versus them, the “outsiders.” The growth of McWorld levels cultures and customs. It also brings about resentments and hostile actions. Understanding the concepts makes it easier to understand the historical developments of the Muslims. The Muslim world feels a threat to its traditional and theocratic way of life as it is being infiltrated by the so-called McWorld dominating the globe in the rise of globalization.

Al Qaeda can be seen as reacting with “other” protestors from below but in a more violent fashion. The increase in globalization has caused a majority of the Middle East, including Al Qaeda to take measures to defend the survival of their way of life. However, in the fight against globalization, the increase in globalization has allowed for the Al Qaeda organization to recruit, communicate, and thrive around the world with greater ease. Globalization, through the use of connective information technology brings down the barriers between countries, which promotes movement of the members at a high speed and a low rate of detection. Anonymity, mobility, and communication are all technological aspect of globalization that Al Qaeda effectively utilized. Al Qaeda exploited both the negative and positive effects of globalization to build its network and make it strong and resilient.

Financial Assets

Another crucial element to the success of Al Qaeda is the financial stability accrued from several sources. In addition to the personal fortune of Bin Laden, mosques, other individual contributions, front operations, and illegal trafficking operations have built up the monetary strength that has been applied to chemical, biological and possibly nuclear endeavors, training sites, rogue state cooperation, and to support cells and their missions around the world (Williams, 2002).

Strategic Leadership

The increase of contact with people around the world led Bin Laden and the rest of the Al Qaeda leadership to strategically exploit negative effects of globalization. Bin Laden emphasized a disconnect between the West and the rest by feeding the emotions of marginalized people. Bin Laden used actions of the U.S. to gain followers as well. In his

1998 fatwa. Bin Laden stated "For more than seven years, the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors and turning its bases in the peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples" (An Interview with Osama bin Laden, 1998). Al Qaeda depicted the U.S. in unflattering ways to mobilize and propel the members of the organization, fuel hatred towards the U.S., and subsequently carry out terrorist attacks (Wallerstein, 1999). Al Qaeda leadership also used new organizational strategies not employed in traditional terrorist activity.

After creating a following, bin Laden and his former partner Azzam, sought to define the Al Qaeda organization from other groups by creating a structure that would be resilient to destruction by powerful armies and able to reach the population at large. Al Qaeda represents an organizational network of individual cells whose members are encouraged to create their own missions and look to leaders of Al Qaeda for logistical support. The cellular structure allows many missions to be planned for and carried out simultaneously. This strays from the traditional structure, in which all missions are created at the top levels and lower members take orders. The organizational network is difficult to effectively interrupt and halt because eliminating one cell only stops one mission and other missions are still able to occur (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, & Zanini, 1999).

Re-emergence of Islam

The final necessary condition needed to propel the terrorist actions was the increasing attraction among Muslims in the Arab world to revert back to an Islamic law. Many Muslims, especially men, are increasingly disgruntled by the lack of options

afforded to them in society today. A deep sense of humiliation among Muslim men has allowed Islamists to successfully persuade and illustrate how a land guided by Islamic rule would produce prosperous citizens (Schneider & Silverstein, 2003). Human rights activists argue that re-opening the gate to Islamic Law in some ways impedes a societies growth. An example is the recently overturned Islamic Law ruling of Amina Lawal, the Nigerian woman sentenced to be stoned to death for having a child out of wedlock. Activists argue that some Islamic laws are outdated and the punishment barbaric (Soulas, 2003). Still others such as Christoph Luxenberg, a scholar of ancient Semitic languages in Germany, argue that misinterpretations of the Koran may easily indoctrinate ideas of anti-democracy, and coerce citizens under Islamic Law into taking up arms against democracies (Stille, 2002). Before the attacks of 9/11, the re-emergence of Muslims in favor of returning to Islamic Law was a propelling force that indirectly supported the anti-U.S. message Al Qaeda was sending by widening the rift between U.S. and Middle Eastern ideologies.

True Believer Status

The sufficient driving condition is the "true believer" status. Hoffer (1951) coined the term "true believer" to describe those members of a group whose belief in the founding concept of the organization is so profound that they are able to look beyond the present situation to the future and are ready to take all actions to see that ending goal through. The true believer status was not an element unique only to Al Qaeda. True believers were present among Hitler's Nazis and plague many terrorist groups throughout the world. True believer status in the case of Al Qaeda was generated from the roots of Islamic fundamentalism and it is the goal of these true believers to create a world ruled

by the Islamic law as interpreted by Al Qaeda. Laqueur (1996) warns that religiously-motivated terrorists, such as Al Qaeda, are connected to "postmodern" terrorism in which the driving force is sustained by visions of a coming apocalypse, or new world order.

There were two types of true believers in Al Qaeda: leaders and followers. True believer leaders and followers play important and distinctive roles from creating the ideology and having the skills to draw followers, to holding the success of the mission over one's own life. True believer status was the key element that maintained the Al Qaeda organization and drove some to successfully execute attacks regardless of danger and death.

Restraining Forces

On the other hand, necessary restraining forces become the interdependent conditions that halt those propelling forces that have gained momentum. Such restraining forces push the former propelling forces back across the critical threshold into inaction. Visually, one may think of a pendulum swing in that a certain force must be involved to push the pendulum one direction and an opposite force must be created to push back in the original direction. As long as one force is greater than the other, the pendulum would hypothetically stay in the position with the greatest amount of force pushing it. The restraining forces include: 1) homeland security; 2) use of military force; 3) the freezing of assets; 4) popular opinion; and the sufficient restraining condition, 5) strong alliances with other countries. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, millions of dollars and manpower has been unanimously accepted in the plight to rid the world of terrorism. There is a "War on Terrorism" currently underway in an effort to deter further terrorist actions that would bring about the destruction and casualty volume that was experienced on 9/11 in the U.S.

Protecting the Homeland

The attacks of 9/11 displayed the vulnerabilities and weaknesses within the U.S. government's investigative and security agencies. An investigation into the agencies revealed systemic and physical weaknesses that plagued the FBI, CIA, and NSA. Investigatory oversights and a lack of cooperation between agencies were found only after the attacks occurred and questions were raised as to whether or not these attacks could have been prevented. Yet, the overarching component was the disbelief in an attack occurring on U.S. soil. Illusions of invulnerability ended with the attacks. Since 9/11, investigatory agencies have been reorganized; communication and cooperation increased; and outdated technology upgraded. The Department of Homeland Security was established to ensure all weaknesses are caught so attacks as catastrophic as 9/11 will never again occur on U.S. soil.

Military Operations

Operation Enduring Freedom began on October 7, 2001. Objectives included liberating Afghans from the Taliban regime, destroying Al Qaeda training camps, and rooting out Al Qaeda members (President George W. Bush, 2001). The use of military operations forcibly removed Al Qaeda's central hub, which took the control away from Al Qaeda officials to plan and prepare operations as they had in the past. Al Qaeda members lost technical equipment, chemical and biological weapons data, facilities, training camps, and could no longer use Afghanistan as a safe haven. Military operations in the War on Terrorism, although destructive, can only be used selectively. Al Qaeda organized itself in a network that spans the globe to be resilient and unable to be

destroyed by military might alone. Still, the military option will continue to be used as one of five fronts because of its destructive power.

Freezing Financial Assets

Freezing terrorist finances and enacting tougher anti-money laundering regulations is the third front the U.S. government is using to restrain terrorist action. Modern terrorist do not live on enthusiasm alone (Laqueur, 1977). Bin Laden's terrorist organization has similarities to legitimate corporations. Al Qaeda has a business and finance committee with the responsibility of diversifying investments, obtaining money from charities and supporters, and tracking operational financing to and from cells (Gunaratna, 2003). Financial stability is a critical component to Al Qaeda's capabilities. By establishing tools and task forces dedicated to finding and freezing the assets of both terrorists and their supporters, Al Qaeda's ability to orchestrate highly destructive terrorist plots will be crippled.

Cooperation Among Countries

Cooperation among countries sends a strong message to terrorists everywhere. The attacks of 9/11 did not isolate the U.S. from the rest of the world; it was embraced by a world not willing to be imprisoned by fear of terrorism. Not only were established alliances reinforced, but also new alliances were created by the numerous countries ready to support actions taken to rid the world of terrorism. The message is strong and clear and the actions are similar. Flow of intelligence, militaristic contributions, freezing assets, and denying safe housing of terrorist members creates the most crucial force to combating terrorism. A coalition of countries can do so much more than one country alone.

Popular Opinion

Since the attacks of 9/11, citizens all over the world have spoken out against terrorism. The terrorists find it more difficult to legitimize their goals, gain sympathizers, and hide as a result of the backlash that ensued after the attacks. Insecurity and fear over the attacks against a superpower were met with a resounding denouncement of terrorism. Al Qaeda succeeded in its goal of immediate fear; however, it was unsuccessful in bringing its illusion of the U.S. as a "paper tiger" to reality. Rather, as a collective society, emotional responses translated into support for rapid and swift action. It was this undercurrent of collective emotional response that was the sufficient condition to creating a force of change, one that would deter future acts of terrorism. The attacks reinforced the resolve of U.S. citizens to support aggressive actions against Al Qaeda and build a united front against terrorism.

Research Hypotheses

Based on this background information, the researcher formulated these hypotheses:

1) *Prior to September 11, 2001 driving forces exceeded restraining forces.*

The necessary and sufficient conditions listed above, which are categorized as driving forces, were more compelling leading up to the attacks. The momentum behind such driving forces was so strong that the ability to carry out the attacks of September 11, 2001 was possible.

2) *After September 11, 2001 restraining forces exceeded driving forces.*

Responding to the most destructive international terrorist attacks on U.S. soil caused the

necessary and sufficient restraining conditions to emerge with such force to push back the driving forces in an attempt to keep such attacks from occurring again.

3) *Both necessary and sufficient conditions were critical for a terrorist act to have occurred.* The combination of certain critical factors had to be at an optimal level. These conditions acting alone could not have produced a successful attack. For instance, although Al Qaeda had staggering financial stability, money could not be the only factor relied upon. Likewise, the strategic thinking and organization of the Al Qaeda group could only take the mission so far. Money had to be part of the equation. Globalization and “true believer” status were both glue in holding all the elements together. Because of the danger and difficulty involved in such acts, there was very little room for anything less than the perfect mobilizing factors presented here.

Methodology

The methodology for this study will use many techniques to form what is known as triangulation. Triangulation takes up multiple methodologies in order to create a three dimensional study with a thorough and well-rounded examination of the topic. A multi-faceted, triangular approach can be both from a research and researcher standpoint. The assumption is that more people and approaches one takes to a social phenomenon, the better the approximation and three-dimensional understanding will be created. Here the methods of historical narrative analysis and ethnomethodology are combined to analyze the Al Qaeda terrorist organization. With such methods an in depth understanding of Al Qaeda can be understood. This analysis is conducted through data sources in the form of academic literature from experts on the subjects of terrorism and Al Qaeda, governmental

information both before and after 9/11, and from media output on current situations regarding terrorism.

Current media is defined as newspapers, television, and Internet sources. As for the newspaper sources, purposive sampling will be conducted. That is, the researcher will sample sources that are more likely to display the information pertaining to Al Qaeda. The selection of such sources is set by three criteria: 1) pragmatically the U.S. media is more accessible, 2) since the events occurred in the U.S., it is intentional to filter the information through the eyes and public policy views of Americans to gain the perspective of where the events took place, 3) only large, elite papers carry international news daily. Under these criteria the researcher chose to draw material from USA Today, Time Magazine, Los Angeles Times, The Economist, Washington Post, Washington Times and the New York Times. This will be a compilation of any and all information concerning the topic in order to paint a detailed picture.

The final component of triangulation comes from secondary quantitative data analysis, which will be used to examine how Americans viewed the attacks of 9/11. ABC News and the Washington Post conducted a telephone survey in the U.S. to determine feelings of U.S. citizens. With select raw data from the telephone survey, the researcher will conduct independent chi-square tests.

Limitations to Study

With each study there will be limitations of the research. The first limitation of this study is that an ex-post facto study is being conducted, which is common for case study events. Here, the attacks of September 11, 2001 were the occurrences that spurred research on the Al Qaeda terrorist network. It is possible to study first hand what has

happened since the attacks. however. in studying the events leading up to the attacks one must rely on the historical point of view. Assumptions have to be made when filling in gaps where data from the past does not exist. Al Qaeda was only a new phenomenon to United States public--not to governments--when the attacks occurred. The Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other intelligence services around the world were aware of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. In fact, Osama Bin Laden was one on Americas Ten Most Wanted list for attacks against the U.S. abroad he allegedly masterminded. However, the amount of damage Al Qaeda could do was unpredictable. Therefore, part of the research conducted here is to go back and try to identify what enabled the terrorist group to successfully pull off the attacks.

A second limitation to the research is the recency of the event. The attacks of September 11 occurred only two years ago. Governmental agencies, experts and researchers are still in the midst of gathering data, and putting it together. Therefore, data accumulation for this study came from any and all possible sources. Academic sources, governmental documents, and journalistic pieces were all used in an attempt to present a well-rounded and thorough study of Al Qaeda.

Third, while some quantitative data has obviously been gathered, it is very limited. Because the data used in this study will be secondary, there was no way to control for any confounding variables. Again, the recency of this event makes it very hard to present quantitative data. Future research should include more quantitative data once more research becomes available. In addition, the war on terrorism is still very new. There is no doubt that as this battle continues more and more information will be

revealed. With this in mind, future research should update the studies that are now considered the most current.

Chapter 2

Precipitants for the Creation of a Terrorist Organization

The rise of Al Qaeda did not happen over night. It has actually been building over the past few decades. Eckstein (1965) created a framework useful for analyzing the creation of terrorism. In this framework, Eckstein used the term *precipitants* to describe those factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run. Precipitants are the direct actions that motivate and produce a terror campaign. Precipitants are not the same as preconditions which make up the propelling conditions of Lewin's Force Field Analysis. The propelling conditions are labeled preconditions for they were conditions in place to propel the attacks prior to 9/11. Rather, the precipitants are the underlying historical changes and events over long periods of time that resulted in the manifestation of the Al Qaeda network. The precipitants explain *why* Al Qaeda formed; knowledge that facilitates an understanding of the groups motivations and goals. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the precipitants that led to the inception of Al Qaeda.

Contrasting ways of life

Culture and Modernization

The general conflicts that underlie the tensions between Western and Muslim civilizations can be expressed through an imaginary two-by-two matrix. The first tension concerns culture and modernization, or more specifically it is the Western domination of the world. Of the tensions this is the most recent, yet is still considered a precondition because it has been building for nearly a century'. According to Kishk (as cited in Ajami,1992), the Third Crusade is currently upon the world. Under the false pretense of globalization, Westernization is subjugating other civilizations. Kishk also suggests there

is a “Darwinian” understanding by the West that a culture must survive and have preeminence. American hegemony in the twentieth century expanded Western culture to the farthest reaches of the world. Power and culture go hand in hand. The flowering of a culture has usually involved power to bestow its values, practices, and institutions to other societies (Huntington, 1996). When the culture has grabbed hold of a society it furthers the power of the dominant. Nye (1990) agrees that when the “soft power” of culture and ideology becomes attractive others are more willing to follow. The culture spreads the message into a society that “to be successful you must be like us; our way is the only way” p. 47 (Pfaff, 1978). This suggests European languages and Western educational systems cannot be avoided by Muslims. Only when the Western model is accepted will Muslim societies be in a position to develop (Pipes, 1983).

Muslim’s have met this cultural assimilation in different ways. Esposito (1992) points out three ways in which Muslim countries have chosen to deal with this: reject both, accept both, or accept modernization and reject (at least in part) Westernization. This rejection has become exceedingly apparent in recent decades. As modernization increases, indigenous cultures have gone through a revival in response to Westernization. Hence, an alteration of the civilizational balance of power between the West and Muslim societies is occurring, as well as, an increased strength in commitment to the indigenous culture (Huntington, 1996).

Religion and Modernization

One major reason that the Western culture has not been able to push through Muslim societies is the religion factor. Relations between Islam and Christianity have been volatile throughout history. Both religions are monotheistic, universalistic, and

missionary in nature (Huntington, 1996). In addition, the terms "jihad" and "crusade" are parallel concepts that distinguish these religions from others in the world (Huntington, 1996). Such similarities have caused conflict because they lead to important questions of power and culture. Who will rule and who will be ruled? Who is right and who is wrong? This fourteen-century conflict will remain as tensions heat up.

Differences in the institution of religion exist as well. In the West, religion is valued as an individual concept that is somewhat disconnected from daily life issues, political engagement, and cultural traits. The Western Christian concept was born out of separate realms of "God and Caesar" (Huntington, 1996). On the other hand, in Muslim societies Islam is not only a religion but it is a way of life (Lapidus, 1988). The level of violence between Islam and Christianity has continued due to elements of modernization such as demographic growth and decline, economic developments, technological change, and intensity of religious commitment (Ahmed, 1999).

The Western version of modernization points to religion as an obstacle to social change. The message sent is that people must discard their faith if they are to make any progress (Ajami, 1992). The suggestion is that Islam does not offer an alternative way to modernize. Modern science and technology requires an adaptation of Western institutions and secularism (Pipes, 1983). Muslims reject this idea. After what Kishk called a "mysticism" with secularism, Muslims have aimed at no longer modernizing Islam, but Islamizing modernity (Ajami, 1992; Huntington, 1996). Jealousy of Western power and comparisons between the accomplishments of Islamic and Western civilizations in the last two centuries remains a very tender point for many Muslims in the Middle East. (Lewis, 1990).

Culture and Political Structure

The structure of political loyalty among Muslims has been the opposite of the West. Westerners are unlike many other societies in that individualism and nationalism are highly valued. This is not the case with Muslims. Community has historically been the most important element besides religion. Secular nationalism has been a very disruptive consequence. Ottoman Turks were the first to be convinced of the power of nationalism, and set out to pursue a nationalist dream. The concept of nationality shattered the basis of community (Ajami, 1992). Where once there stood a vast empire in which Muslims ruled non-Muslims, there now exists a patchwork of separate states trying to eliminate the confusion of what has happened.

Religion and Politics

Finally, there is a tension that exists in which religion and politics play important roles. Nationalism and socialism have not prospered within the Islamic world because religion is the motor of development. Just as the Protestant religion helped the West rise, so too will Islam play that role in the contemporary era (Al-Turabi, 1992). Historically the fundamental structure has been family, clan, and tribe on the one hand; and culture, religion, and empire on the other (Lapidus, 1988). Throughout Islam, the small group and the big faith have been the foci of loyalty and commitment, and not the nation state. (Huntington, 1996). Western loyalties have tended to be much more nationalist. As the revolutionary fundamentalist movement grows, Islamists have rejected the nation state in favor of the unity of Islam. This seems similar to Marx' rejection of the nation state in favor of the unity of the international proletariat (Huntington, 1996). These differences

have contributed to the build up of tensions, yet cannot be singled out as the only precipitants. The following precipitant concerns the U.S. policy in the Middle East.

U.S. Presence in the Middle East

U.S.-Saudi Oil Relationship

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have had a constant, yet precarious relationship since its inception. In the early 1930's, hydrocarbon wealth was discovered and dominated by European oil companies. Saudi Arabia, however, had suspicions about the forming relationships of the European companies and other Middle East countries due to the history of colonialism in the area. For this reason, Saudi Arabia sought a different buyer for its oil. Similarly the U.S. was looking to establish itself within the oil sector of the Middle East. In 1943, the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia was forged, and the two countries have since had a long-standing and informal alliance (Bahgat, 2003). This seemed to be a perfect match for both sides. Saudi Arabia needed a large consumer base, which the U.S. provided; and with most of the world's spare production located in Saudi Arabia the U.S. benefited from being practically the only country to carry out exploration and development in Saudi Arabia (Bahgat, 2003).

The beginning of the relationship started rather well. Aramco (Arabian-American Oil Company) and the Saudi government agreed to a 50-50 profit sharing program between the host country and the concessionaire in 1950 (Bahgat, 2003). As the years have progressed the relationship has been met with pressures all the way up the attacks in the U.S. For instance, the situation concerning Israel was a challenge in the late 1960s and early 1970s. After the Six Day war, Henry Kissinger, former U.S. secretary of state, stated that the U.S. would use military force if needed in order to secure its oil supplies

from the Persian Gulf region (Baghat, 2003). Again in 1973, the U.S. was kicked out of Saudi Arabia during the 1973 oil embargo (Banerjee, 2001). Neither side could afford to cut off the relations with the other. The U.S. is the highest consumer of oil, and has continually been angling for influence in the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia is dependent upon the revenues of oil and has made the U.S. its top consumer. Each side reconciled rather quickly, yet the threat of military force did leave a bad taste in some Saudi's mouths (Williams, 2002).

Foreign policy in the Middle East

U.S. foreign policy continued to cause problems on many fronts in the Middle East. Disagreements between the countries in the Middle East have been complex in nature and founded upon historical events. European colonialism added to the struggles of the area by dividing it up into a patchwork of separate states. When the U.S. came into the region the problems had already begun. It was in the nature of the U.S. to try and settle disputes and create a stable, peaceful Middle East, especially after the conflict with Israel began. This proved to be more idealist than first thought, and American policymakers did not heed the warnings of experts on the region. John Badeau (1968), former ambassador to Egypt, stated that foreign-inspired political and military systems would fail in the Arab world. Likewise, Malcolm Kerr (1969), suggested that the dynamics of local instability were beyond the great powers control.

The Cold War was responsible for some of the policy created towards the Middle East. Each side was essentially using the Middle East as its middle man in the broader war. For that reason, the superpowers perceived peace and stability in the Middle East through a prism of global concerns rather than in the context of the region (Gerges,

1991). The lack of specificity was the problem. The U.S. policy did not take into account the hopes and fears of the regional Arab actors. The policies were based on foreign requirements created outside of the region (Polk, 1986). The simple fact was, and still is, Arab states-- despite the conflicts-- want the final say in their own destinies and internal affairs (Cremins, 1963).

Despite the voices of many the U.S. policy has made its own path concerning policy in the Middle East. It has been the goal, as mentioned above, to establish a system from the outside to try to superimpose in the area. The U.S. has also specialized in establishing strategic alliances with individual countries. In the 1970s, a security system in the Middle East was thought to be needed by the U.S. in response to the Soviet Union. Iran was the country of choice for the U.S. According to Kissinger, the Shah of Iran and his country were the best qualified to serve as "policeman" and protector of American friends and interests in the Gulf (Lenczowski, 1990). Kissinger himself claimed that Iran was one of the U.S.'s "most loyal friends in the world" (Kissinger, 1979). Yet in 1979, the overthrow of the Shah came as a big shock to the Carter Administration. The "policeman" had turned revolutionary with the abdication from the Shah to Ayatollah Khomeini and the Mullahs (Gerges, 1991). The Carter Doctrine of January 1980 stated that force, attempting to gain control of the Gulf region, brought on by an outsider would be regarded as an assault on the interests of the U.S. (Lenczowski, 1990).

Iran became a laboratory and breeding ground for testing Islamic revolutionary ideas into the Arab world (Ledein, 2002). Bin Laden himself, stated that the overthrow of the Shah of Iran proved to be a critical event influencing his ideologies (Corbin, 2002).

Also going on at this time was the invasion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, which subsequently had an effect on bin Laden as well.

The Gulf War

By the time the Gulf War erupted in 1990, the Iraq-Iran war had come and gone-- which some dubbed a clash between secular nationalism and religious fundamentalism (Gerges, 1990)-- Islamist ideology had been stirring within the region. As Islamists had gained more power, the consequences after the Gulf War contributed to even more tension in the region. The Gulf War was a product of Iraq's invasion on Kuwait. It was thought, as the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq stated, that Iraq's debt would be paid off in less than five years; oil production and income would increase; private sector would expand; and development projects would be started again (Alnasrawi, 1992). This turned out not to be the case. After a swift military campaign from the U.S. and allies, Iraq was devastated. Saddam, however, was not taken out of power. The invasion on Kuwait raised fears both in the U.S. and in the Middle East.

The American policymakers decided once again that a regional security structure needed to be established in order to stabilize the Middle East, protect the Gulf allies, and to secure the oil supplies. The vision the U.S. had imagined was to play the leading role in both sponsoring and defending a "network of alliances", which would be made up of bilateral security treaties with individual Arab countries rather than one single structure (Gerges, 1991). Again this was to be a system created by outsiders to the region that would be imposed upon the people. The Gulf War was also a unique situation because it was the first time in which superpowers were on the same side.

The Islamists had grown stronger and did not sit idly by when this security system was brought to the table. Instead of successfully doing what the security structure was meant to do, it created a difficult position for pro-Western regimes such as Saudi Arabia. Close alliances with external powers exacerbated the radicalization of the Arab people (Gerges). Nevertheless the U.S. installed military troops in Saudi Arabia. Islamic fundamentalists, which included the Al Qaeda organization, distrusted the West. Islamic militants joined with Arab nationalists to denounce the “Great Satan”, and demand the withdrawal of “infidel” military troops from the holy lands in Saudi Arabia (Gerges). This situation proved to be another challenge to the U.S.- Saudi relationship. Under pressure from the people, Saudi rulers began to question the U.S. policies in the region and asked that the troops be removed. Bin Laden, a former citizen of Saudi Arabia, enjoyed the spoils of wealth that came from the relationship between the oil rich Saudi Arabia and the oil consuming U.S., however, bin Laden’s approval of both the Saudi rulers and the U.S. began to change dramatically for, among other reasons, the installment of military troops in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War.

Bin Laden turned violently anti-American in 1990 after King Fahd invited the U.S. and its allies to station troops in Saudi Arabia to help defend the oil-producing kingdom against the invasion by Iraq. The presence of American soldiers in Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of the prophet Muhammad and the home of the two holiest Muslim shrines, enraged bin Laden (Miller, 2001). To the Islamists and pan-Arabists, the actors might have changed, the situation was still the same. Imperialism and the “Zionist entity” were still working together to exploit inter-Arab disputes to divide up the land and

resources of the Arab world. They saw it as a new era of Western colonization (Gerges, 1991).

The relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia concerning oil, policies exhibited towards the Middle East by the U.S., and the Gulf War display more preconditions that have led to the attacks of 9/11. It is important to point out the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia presently. Fifteen of the nineteen hijackers on 9/11 have been identified as Saudi citizens. While the Saudi regime has shared its condolences about the attacks, it has been very passive in its cooperation with the war on terrorism. The U.S. has made no secret about its intentions to find oil in other areas of the world like Russia. Despite these two facts the relationship between U.S. and Saudi remains. Western oil companies have no intentions of veering away from the Middle East, and Saudi officials have stated that because most of the oil and gas in the world is in the Middle East they feel confident that the U.S. will continue to do business with Saudi Arabia (Banerjee, 2002). The U.S. burns approximately twenty-five percent of the world's global daily consumption, while Saudi Arabia is still about ninety percent reliant on oil revenues (Baghat, 2003). The match still seems to be a reflexive and complementary one, if only on the issue of oil.

The Saudi regime does consider itself to be an ally of the U.S., but the kingdom is predominately characterized as by Wahhabi Islam, a very pure form of the religion (Banerjee, 2001). Therefore the ruling family must be very careful about its decisions in order to appease its citizens and not have to live in fear of being overthrown. The resilience of this alliance could prove to aggravate Al Qaeda forces even more in the coming future.

U.S. Support of Israel

Arab-Israeli Conflict

“Defeat goes deeper into the human soul than victory.”
 --Albert Hourani, 1991, p.300

One of the theories created as to why the attacks of 9/11 occurred suggests it was because of an Israeli-connection (Gelemter, 2001). Under this theory, the U.S. was hit because it is Israel's only friend. The United States' role in the Arab-Israeli conflict has been a very sore issue among Arabs. The conflict that originally began between Israel and Palestine grew into what today is a source of heavy turmoil and tension within the Middle East. Israel and Palestine are the major players, but the Arabs and the United States have vested interests on their respective sides. The accuracy of this theory will not be discussed here, but, to what extent the Arab-Israeli conflict has played as a precipitating role does need further discussion.

The Jewish people dreamed of a new Zion which led to the “invasion” of Palestine. Palestine was the target because this is considered the ancient Jewish homeland (Williams, 2002). The first wave of Jewish immigrants, known as the Aliyah, to this land was in 1880. Since then, there has been three more Aliyah, which lasted up to the World War II. In 1948, Israel fought and defeated the countries of Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon, and Iraq in order to establish its own state (Williams, 2002). This state went beyond the boundaries of the partition plan set up by the United Nations. It was this event which triggered the transformation to that between the Arabs and Israel (Bruzonsky, 1986).

During the first two decades, the United States did not intercede into the matter because it felt that a close military alliance would alienate Arab regimes and jeopardize

control of Middle Eastern oil (Stork, 1982). Even in the 1950s, Egypt showed signs of wanting to make peace as long as a reasonable settlement could be agreed upon for the Palestinians (Jackson, 1983). This did not happen and another war broke out in 1956. With the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, more tension was created and some scholars say that it was at this time that the Palestinian occupation became not just an Arab cause, but a Muslim cause (Williams, 2002). The Israeli feared a Palestinian nation state even more because the nation state would fall under the sway of the PLO causing a situation just like that of the Nazi Era (Tillman, 1979).

The June War in 1967 (also known as the Six Day War), was an important war for many reasons. The civil war of Palestine became a war under the larger heading of pan-Arabism (Bruzonsky, 1986). The quick defeat by Israel was deeply humiliating to the Arab world. A small foreign state that so swiftly beat Egypt's large power was devastating to the Palestinians, who believed they would be returned to their homeland (Bruzonsky, 1986). After the 1967 war, a change was made in Arab thinking. The Arabs had to come to terms with the reality that Israel was going to be permanent state, and that at very best they may get only a part of Palestine back (Mahmood, 1985).

Another very significant point in this war was the interest that the United States began to take in Israel. This war gave the first sight of evidence to the United States participation (Bruzonsky, 1984). The alignment of radical Arab nationalists with the Soviet Union during the 1950's had pushed the relationship between the United States and Israel closer (Stork, 1982). yet it was not until 1967 that it became overtly acknowledged. The United States shifted from an evenhandedness policy between Israel

and the Arab world to an openly supportive ally to Israel (Green, 1983). Israel's decisive defeat of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan restructured the military and political balance in the region (Stork, 1982). The Israeli army was combat ready and experienced in the Middle East which the United States saw as a strategic asset. If Israel would not have been there, the United States would have had to provide its own (Stork, 1982). The Israeli-United States relationship was seen as the key to combating the Soviet influence within the Middle Eastern region (Quandt, 1977). In a study conducted by the RAND corporation, it was concluded that Israel's geographic location was worth \$10 billion to the United States in any race to the Gulf. It would save over two months and a mechanized division. This was a reasonable answer to America's strategic problem (Stork, 1982).

During this time, the Gulf States became influential in the Arab world. Their concerns about the Israeli situation were conflicted. On the one hand, Israel's force against Egypt's military served the oil rich states well (Quandt, 1971). Yet, on the other hand, there was a measure of responsibility to Palestine that nations such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait confronted (Halliday, 1980). The inability of these countries to coerce the United States or Israel of an acceptable settlement led to the subsequent war in October 1973 (Stork, 1978). This also brought about the oil embargo. After both of these events, the United States shifted its policy towards alliance building between both sides (Stork, 1982).

In 1978, the Camp David accords were created in which Egypt and Israel were to acknowledge a peaceful relationship (Tillman, 1979). According to the agreement reached by the United States, Israel, and Egypt, a self-governing authority would be set up in the West Bank and Gaza to replace the Israeli military government in those areas

(Sayegh, 1979). This agreement was not the cure-all solution. According to Stork (1982), while Tzipori was calling on a strategic cooperation between all parties, Haig and Allen were encouraging the Israelis to destroy the Palestinian military in Lebanon. This was partly due to the Iranian Revolution going on at the same time, which took the United States administration by surprise. This again shifted the United States policy away from settlement of the Palestinian question and back to "rapid deployment" as a way of securing the Persian Gulf region (Stork, 1982). Israel was given a free reign to suppress the Palestinian movement as long as it did not compromise the political and military ties with important Arab regimes (Stork, 1982). This led again to the invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982 (Mahmood, 1985).

It is important to note that the Arab states have stood in opposition to a truly independent Palestine. In the eyes of those who hold power in the Arab world, Palestinian nationalism is looked upon as a cancerous problem to be both used and controlled (Bruzonsky, 1986). Yet within the psyches of Arabs lies the belief that the occupiers of Palestine would go the way of the Crusaders in a matter of time (Bruzonsky, 1986). With the relationship between Israel and the United States, this belief was solidified even more, therefore, under the idea of pan-Arabism Palestine had to be protected from the invader.

Today the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to be a point to arouse dissension against both Israel and the United States. Al Qaeda most likely does not particularly care about the Palestinians per se, but does realize the production of anger the idea carries with it.

"My Muslim Brothers of the World:
"Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two

Holy Places are calling upon your help and asking you to
 Take part in fighting against the enemy—your enemy
 And their enemy—the Americans and the Israelis. They
 Are asking you to do whatever you can, with your own
 Means and ability, to expel the enemy, humiliated and
 defeated, out of the sanctities of Islam....”

-Excerpt from fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden, August 23, 1996

The Afghan War

During bin Laden’s last year of college, two events occurred that changed his life forever: the Shah of Iran was overthrown during the Islamic Revolution, and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan (Corbin, 2002). Bin Laden had become fascinated with the teachings of Sayyid Qutb, who was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and the so-called “father of modern Islamic fundamentalism” (Williams, 2002). When the invasion occurred bin Laden was recruited by another member of the Brotherhood, Abdullah Azzam (Williams, 2002). According to Abdullah Anas, an Algerian scholar who was recruited with bin Laden,

He was one of the guys who came to the jihad in Afghanistan. But, unlike the others, what he had was lots of money. He’s not very sophisticated politically and organizationally. But he’s an activist with a greater imagination.”

--Engelberg & Risen, 2001

Bin Laden helped raise money for the effort as well as recruited many Muslims for the training camps. Within a year, thousands of volunteers came from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Pakistan, and Sudan to train for the war (Williams, 2002). Ironically, at the beginning of this war the United States and the Mujahedeen had the same goals and worked alongside each other to tackle the Soviet Union in what would be the last stand-off of the Cold War (Miller, 2001). The CIA provided millions of dollars, weapons, and

training to the guerrilla army for the purpose of driving out the Russians (Williams, 2002).

Bin Laden fell under the influence of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization in the mid-1980s (Miller, 2001). Specifically, it was al-Zawahiri ("The Doctor" as he became known) that courted bin Laden in hopes of securing financial support from him (Williams, 2002). Soon the friendship between Azzam and bin Laden dissolved because of differing opinions in the next step after the soviet invasion. Azzam was opposed to terrorism against the United States while bin Laden and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad were not (Williams, 2002). The euphoria experienced due to the coming defeat of the Soviets led bin Laden and his allies to believe that no secular state could defeat holy warriors (Miller, 2001). In 1988, Al Qaeda ("The Base") was established by bin Laden and the Egyptian terrorists (Williams, 2002). Bin Laden set up his new camps called Al Masaha ("The Lion's Den") to train terrorists that would be sent back to their countries to set up new cells (Williams, 2002). From the start Al Qaeda had money, training, weapons, and belief. After Saudi Arabia allowed the United States to station troops in the holy land for the invasion of the Gulf War, Al Qaeda turned violently against America and came to blame all of Muslims woes on the United States (Miller, 2001).

The Al Qaeda Network

History of Attacks

In Al Qaeda's fifteen year history, it has grown into the world's largest, most infamous terrorist group. The successful terrorist attacks of Al Qaeda have killed thousands of people despite the fact that many plots have been foiled by the intelligence

community before they were ever carried out. The following is a list of terrorist attacks attributable to Al Qaeda before 9/11:

1992: conducted three bombings that targeted U.S. troops in Aden, Yemen.

1993: shot down helicopters and killed U.S. servicemen in Somalia.

1998: simultaneous bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Killed 301 and injured more than 5,000.

2000: attack on the U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen. Killed 17 and injured 39.

2001: hijacked and crashed four U.S. commercial jets, two into the World Trade Center New York City, one into the Pentagon near Washington, D.C., and the fourth in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Number dead or missing is around 3,000 and unknown number injured.

--Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001

While these attacks are not large in number, they are great in destruction, injury, killing, and spreading the message of hatred for America. Al Qaeda has reached a level of terror mastery that is hard to match and even harder to terminate. It is of the utmost importance that those combating the network understand it from the inside out. Just as it has been long in the making, it will take some time to successfully destroy the terrorist group at the forefront of Americas list of targets.

Organizational Network

In their book, *Countering the New Terrorism*, experts Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini (1999) discuss the shift of terrorist groups away from traditional hierarchies to a more flexible organizational design. While the notion of organizational structure is not a

recent development, the overall evolution in the realm of terrorist structure to a more decentralized organization has been slowly gaining momentum since the late 1980's. This move toward network designs has been largely facilitated by the advanced information technologies which allow groups to conspire and coordinate across long distances. Besides the ability to disperse information quickly and reach actors across long distances, the effectiveness of a networked organization results from its inherent flexibility, adaptiveness, and its ability to capitalize on the talents of all members (Lipnack & Stamps, 1994).

Beginning in the 1990's, terrorism experts began to recognize the growing role of networked organizations and warned of future outcomes and challenges that would have to be met at some time. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) coined the term netwar in 1992 to depict the rise of network forms of organization, doctrine, and strategy that occur at a low-intensity, less military, and more social spectrum. Three main characteristics of a netwar include small, dispersed groups, the use of communication technologies, and action taking place across long distances. These three requisites produce a dynamic relationship in two ways. On the one hand, the dispersed nodes enhance secrecy and conspiratorial resilience by decreased communication going through all nodes. However, on the other hand, when communication is needed dispersion, far-reaching distance, and communicative technology provide rapid dissemination to a broad audience.

Organizational designs vary by groups depending on personalities, operational requirements, organizational history, motivations and strategies. Three of the most common types of networks include: the chain network; the star; and the all-channel network (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, & Zanini, 1999). Of all three, the all-channel network has


been difficult to sustain, however, it is gaining strength in the information revolution. A wide range of structural details is available to groups as well. For example, choices range from inclusive or exclusive membership; segmented or specialized units; and well-defined or blurred boundaries. Hybrids among organizational networks also exist. Al Qaeda represents a hybrid network.


At the time that Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini (1999) wrote *Countering the New Terrorism*, the authors suggested that “Middle Eastern groups offer some evidence to support the claim that terrorists are preparing to wage netwar” (p.57). Two years later, in the wake of 9/11, that supposition was considered valid. Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini state that Al Qaeda has come to the forefront as an active terrorist group. Al Qaeda’s complex network comprises both a flat hierarchy and decentralized nodes. In the center of the organization is Bin Laden and his shura council. The next level includes committee heads and operational leaders. Finally, members make up numerous autonomous cells.

Although it has been suggested that bin Laden had little control over operatives and logistics and posed more as a figurehead, Gunaratna (2003) states that bin Laden and his top leaders had much input into several of the attacks conducted by Al Qaeda operatives. Bin Laden urged operatives to create and execute attacks on their own whenever possible, but bin Laden also decided which plans would be financed by Al Qaeda funds. A significant part of this network is that it has successfully combined its network into a wider network that includes other radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Egypt’s Islamic Group and the Algerian GIA. The creation of the new alliance of terrorist organizations was announced in February 1997 as the World Islamic Front Jihad

Against Jews and Crusaders (Williams, 2001). The purpose of creating a larger umbrella network was to focus on the larger, overarching goals of re-establishing rule of Islam through a united effort and destroying the power of infidels such as the U.S. and other coalition countries. Most terrorist groups within the alliance still maintain their own structure and cooperate only on select attacks. Just like alliances such as NATO and ANZUS—alliances between certain Western hemisphere states—these organizations have come together to support common initiatives and come to each others aid when necessary.

Figure 2.1
Organization of the Al Qaeda Network





While it is known that Al Qaeda does adhere to a hybrid network form, the researcher was unable to recreate an illustration of exact linkages between members because much of that information is not available to the public. Instead, Figure 2.1 demonstrates a general form of how the network is organized. The researcher does include some specific members and their place within the organization in Table 2.1, which was gathered from information on known Al Qaeda members that are at large, captured, or dead.

Table 2.1
Known Al Qaeda Members and Placement in Organization

| | |
|---|---|
| <p>Financial Committee Shaikh Saïid Mohammed Jamal Khalifa Mustafa Ahmed al-Hisawi Hamza al-Qatari Ø Ahmad Said Al-Kadr Ramzi Bin al-Shibh∞ Khalid Shaikh Mohammed∞</p> | <p>Military Committee *Mohammed Atef Ø *Abu Ubaidahal *Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah Abu Musab Zarqawi Mahofouz Ould Walid Zaid Khayr Mohammed Saleh Ø Tariq Anwar al-Sayyid Ahmad Ø Abu Zubaydah∞ Abu Salah al-Yemeni Ø Abu Jafar al-Jaziri Ø</p> <p>Training Ops. *Anas al-Liby∞ Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi∞ Mohammed Omar Abdel-Rahman</p> |
| <p>Islamic Study Committee *Ayman al-Zawahiri *Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah</p> | |
| <p>Advice and Reform Council Ahmed Khalifa Ghailani</p> | |

| | |
|---|---|
| Southeast Division Ridwuan Isamuddin Omar al-Farouq∞ | Communications Committee Zein-al-Abideen Hussein |
| London Cell Adel Abdel Bary ∞ Ibrahaim Eidrrouse∞ Khalid al-Fawwaz | USS Cole Affiliates Tawfiq Attash Khallad Abdurrahman Husain Mohamed al-Saafani Abu al-Rashim al-Nashiri Abu Ali Harthi Ø |
| African Embassy Bombing Affiliates | |
| Khalfan Khamis Mohamed∞ Ahmed Mohammed Hamed Ali Mushim Musa Matawali Atwah *Ibrahaim Eidarouse∞ Mustafa Mohamed Fadhil Ali Abdelseoud Mohamed∞ | *Shaikh Saiid Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam Mohammed Saddiq Odeh∞ Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-'Owhali∞ Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan *Tawfiq Attash Khallad |
| Hijackers of 9/11 | |
| Mohamed AttaØ Abdulaziz AlomariØ Satam M.A. al-SuqamiØ Waleed M. AlshehriØ Majed Moqed Ø Khalid AlmihdharØ Salem AlhamziØ Nawaf Alhazmi Ø Ziad Samir JarrahØ Ahmed Ibrahim al-HaznawiØ | Ahmed AlnamiØ Saeed AlghamdiØ Fayez Rashid Ahmed HassanØ Wail M. AlshehriØ Mohand AlsherhiØ Ahmed AlghamdiØ Marwan al-Shehhi Ø Hani HanjourØ Hamza AlghamdiØ Zacarias Moussaoui∞ |

Key: Captured members = ∞; Dead members = Ø; and at large members have symbol. Also members whose names are repeated more than once are indicated by *.

Chapter Summary

The separation of precipitants and preconditions is made because each term carried with it two separate items of research. Precipitants are the events and the establishment of ideologies that have occurred over a long period of time. In addition, the precipitants are the components that supported the creation of the organization itself. Pre conditions, on the other hand, are the social forces that supported Al Qaeda in its

ability to successfully accomplish the attacks of 9/11. Understanding the precipitants allows for a more adequate analysis of Al Qaeda's organization. One must first determine what the foundation of any item being studied is before they can move forward. This is exactly the case here. The focus of this chapter was to uncover the reasons why the Al Qaeda organization initially started and the grievances that it holds. At the end of the chapter, the researcher moved ahead to where the organization is today. While only segments of information were available for organizational analysis, the information gathered allows one to see how the organization has grown into a network structure and other descriptive components of that structure (i.e. whether or not members are at large, captured, or dead). The following chapter contains methodology for how the researcher went about this study, and subsequent chapter focus specifically on Lewin's model and the causes and effects of the events of 9/11.

Chapter 3

Overview of Theory and Model

There are a number of ways to approach the study of organizations today. One way is through the open-systems theories. Open-systems theories concentrate on the *process* of organization, complexity of individual parts, and the strong influence of environmental factors (Scott, 2000). Social network analysis exists as one of four open-systems theories, and is useful in explaining the relationships between agents within a network (Scott). Since Al Qaeda is organized as a network, social network theory seems to be the most appropriate theory for interpreting Al Qaeda. While the theory explains the organizational make-up of Al Qaeda, it is the theoretical model that serves as the backdrop to examine the conditions surrounding 9/11. This research uses Lewin's force field analysis serves as a model to explain the broad social conditions that affected the Al Qaeda network leading up to 9/11 and those that affect the organization post 9/11.

In Lewin's view, the *field* of social forces in which the group was located molded the behaviors and actions of the group (Lewin, 1951). He argued, that this field is a social 'space' that comprises both the group and its surrounding environment. The environment of the group is not seen as something purely external to and independent of the group. The groups *perceived* environment is an interconnecting part of the social space that also has its effects on the group's behaviors. Broad trends of environmental and biographical factors make up the social forces at the macro-level. The meso-level of analysis consists of the Al Qaeda organization itself; and the events of 9/11 comprise the micro level analysis, for it is this "critical incident" that created an opportunity to see Al Qaeda within its true structure. This representation serves not as a categorical process.

but describes the dynamic relationship between organization, environment, and events. The research conducted here presents a novel approach to studying both Al Qaeda and future terrorist groups as they coalesce with social conditions.

To date, the majority of data collected in the field of terrorism has been from data sets of separate terrorist organizations in an effort to draw general conclusions about patterns of behaviors and actions across rather than within a terrorist group (Enders and Sandler, 1993). Largely, terrorism research efforts have been driven by and helpful to counterterrorism goals, and are not intended to provide insight into the actions of any one specific terrorist organization. Past studies have combined the attacks and actions from many known terrorist groups. In some cases of contemporary terrorist groups, the limited number of activities and information prohibit an accurate quantitative study (Bell 1977). The research here is concerned with a single terrorist group--Al Qaeda.

This study constitutes a largely qualitative endeavor for practical reasons. Accurate tracking of Al Qaeda did not occur simultaneously to its inception and subsequent time line. Certain bits of information were obtained along the way only when actions produced by Al Qaeda terrorists spurred interest. The process by which Al Qaeda was organizing itself and the conditions that manifested its growing strength went unnoticed. The lack of uncovering all information concerning Al Qaeda and the misinterpretation of how the organization was operating generated from what information was available yielded a false sense of success in restraining Al Qaeda's terrorist activities. It was not until the events of 9/11 exposed the organization more clearly that a comparison between a hypothesized assessment of the group and the reality of the organization could be made.

Under such circumstances, research about Al Qaeda leading up to its successful execution of the attacks on 9/11 must be conducted in a step-by-step approach. Just as if one were building a house, groundwork and laying the foundation must be the first step. The same is true in this case. Ground work and foundation building is much more suitable for a qualitative analysis. Specifically, the methods utilized prove capable of identifying and explaining the dynamic relationships and conditions that exist to form a thorough picture. On the opposite side is the immediate response to the organization, which can be accurately tracked from its inception and follows parallel to the counter response time line. Again, such analysis is best conducted through a qualitative methodology, one that will support further analysis as future events unfold.

Research Methodology

A pre and post 9/11 case study of Al Qaeda was conducted using methods of analysis designed to interpret the organizational make-up and discern causes of organizational change. In looking at this case, it was necessary to use a multi-method approach, called triangulation. Triangulation is the use of several methods to achieve a broader and more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question (Denzin, 1989). Flick (1992) suggests that a combination of multiple methods in a single study is a strategy that adds rigor, breadth, and depth to any investigation. Historical narrative, ethnomethodology, and secondary data analysis are combined in triangulation to present a thorough, three-dimensional case of Al Qaeda.

Part of creating the picture of Al Qaeda is to address the foundations upon which the organization was built. Gall, Borg, and Gall (1996, p.644) define historical research in education, for example, "as the process of systematically searching for data to answer

questions about a past phenomenon for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of present institutions, practices, trends, and issues in education." The general objective is to make sense of people's past to understand current problems and relationships. Levi-Strauss (1963) argues that a story unfolds paradigmatically in terms of oppositions, rather than linearly in terms of functions. Strauss' argument is compatible with Lewin's force field analysis, where opposing forces affect the course of action. In an attempt to understand the situation, it is necessary to uncover organizational information, including the oppositions that supported the formation of the network.

Content analysis was used as a technique to gather historical information about Al Qaeda. A traditional methodological problem with content analysis has been the inability to seize the *context* within which a literary text has meaning (Denzin, 1994). However, by picking one event of analysis, the researcher solves this contextual problem. Content analysis allowed the researcher to obtain information concerning only the emergence and response to 9/11. Articles were selected that specifically dealt with Al Qaeda, therefore value was placed on the actual context of the articles rather than comparative value between articles. The events of 9/11 created a heightened awareness of Al Qaeda. Through historical narrative analysis, a re-creation of the interconnected network of actors and leadership structure is achieved. In addition to the network, Al Qaeda's history of terrorist activity was a prologue to the attacks of 9/11. Such events add to the understanding of the organization and the environment, leading up to and directly following 9/11.


Ethnomethodology--the method of studying culture and how social cues are selected from a culture and translated into action--is the second component of

triangulation. Garfinkel (1967) describes ethnomethodology as the way individuals or groups bring order to, or make sense of their social world. The focus is on describing how order—causal ties between motivations and patterns of behavior—is constructed by the participant (Zimmerman & Weider, 1970). The term "the documentary method" was coined by Garfinkel (1967) to explain how certain facts are selected from a social situation, which seem to conform to a pattern. The documentary method serves as a technique to outline how Al Qaeda members chose cues from the culture that led to the interpretation of Islam in fundamentally radical views; views not held by the majority of Muslims.

Until the events of 9/11, Al Qaeda's network was invisible to the rest of the world. When the events of 9/11 occurred, it created a momentary visible depiction of the organization and the radical beliefs that the members adhere to. It is this picture created by the attacks that allows the researcher to gather information and make conclusions about the organization and the depth of such radical beliefs and the limits that Islamists were willing to go to for their beliefs. The events of 9/11 were a "disruption" to the current system of understanding radical Islamists, one that initiated new research into how Al Qaeda members came to the conclusions they did. On the other end of the spectrum are the ideas and effects experienced by U.S. citizens. 9/11 also reflected the way in which American citizens interpret their own social and cultural cues and the responses enacted. Again, the disruption led to a clearer picture, one that not only caught the physical emotions as they were being experienced by the U.S. public, but also one that illustrated the invisible undercurrent of collective emotions that effectively created change and enacted restraining conditions. Figure 1 is an illustrative example of the

nexus between Al Qaeda and the U.S. both before and after 9/11. Each circle is numbered in a specific order to represent the dynamic workings of the whole process. Starting in the upper left hand corner is the invisible Al Qaeda network before 9/11. Once the attacks of 9/11 occurred, the physical shock and flood of emotions of the U.S. public were witnessed. Almost simultaneously the events led to a brief x-ray of the internal components of Al Qaeda and the belief system that endorsed the catastrophic events. Finally, out of the events of 9/11 it is possible to see how the emotional responses of a society work together as a collective unit to support actions of change. This is evident through the swift and unanimous support to pass policies and initiate military action as restraining forces against terrorism.

Figure 3.1
Nexus between Al Qaeda and U.S. Both Before And After 9/11



The final element of triangulation is quantitative secondary data analysis. The secondary data analysis was utilized to explain the how Western cultural cues affected the views of Americans in the wake of 9/11. The Washington Post and ABC conducted a telephone survey to determine the effects that the events of 9/11 had on people within the U.S. Numerous surveys were conducted on different dates including: the day of the attacks, two days after the attacks, six months later and a year later. The researcher used

select questions from the survey taken one year later to identify the extent to which people still had emotions about the attacks and the magnitude of those emotions after the longest period of time had passed. The researcher operationally defined the response of the attacks through the question: "Thinking back to right after the attacks last September 11th, at the time did you personally feel frightened?" The researcher conducted a chi square test using three variables—gender, class and religion-- to determine whether or not significant differences occurred.

Gender was operationally defined by categories of male and female. Because socio-economic status—which commonly measures class-- was not a specific variable within the original study, the researcher used demographics of both geographic region within the U.S. and whether or not the respondent lived in a large city or rural area defined class. The East and West coasts are the biggest financial centers within the U.S. and also have the highest standard of living than regions in the Midwest and South. In addition, people living in large cities are tend to be more affluent that those living inn rural areas, hence the researcher used these demographics to represent class. Finally, religion was defined by the presence or non-presence of religious belief. These variables were chosen to be acquiescent with variables used by ethnomethodologists when studying culture. The researcher used the data sources to determine whether or not the culture affected responses by using these three variables, as well as determining the extent to which there was a collective emotional response to the events of 9/11.

Data

All of the data for this study consisted of secondary data that was collected from three different categorical sources. The first type of data came from experts in the field

of terrorism and specifically on the Al Qaeda organization. Sources of expertise came in the form of academic literature, think tanks, Oklahoma City National Memorial Center for the Prevention of Terrorism, and the United Nations. In addition, the researcher also used data sources from four government agencies: Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of State, and the Department of Homeland Security. Information used from these sources was in the form of briefings on the current status of the War on Terrorism and declassified documents both before and after 9/11. Finally, the last category of data was in the form of current media sources, defined as newspapers and magazines.

Purposive Sampling

Purposive Sampling is defined as collecting a sample with a specific purpose in mind. Certain characteristics are pre-determined and only those sample groups exhibiting those characteristics will be chosen. In this case, reasons for conducting a purposive sample included time and efficiency- information gathered from numerous newspapers would likely be very similar and redundant. The pre-determined characteristics consisted of four criteria: 1) pragmatically the U.S. media is more accessible, 2) since the events occurred in the U.S., the intention is to filter the information through the eyes and public policy views of Americans to gain the perspectives of where the events took place, 3) only large, elite papers are going to constantly carry and headline international news, 4) Since the majority of media outlets are slanted towards one political view or the other, a mixture of both were needed in order to be as objective as possible. Under the above criteria, the researcher chose select media sources to draw data from: USA Today, Time

Magazine, Los Angeles Times, The Economist, Washington Post, Washington Times, The New York Times, and NEWSWEEK.

The following two chapters discuss the findings for this study. The findings were divided into two chapters for reasons of organizational parsimony. Chapter 4 includes analysis of the propelling forces leading up to the events of 9/11. These findings include the necessary and sufficient conditions briefly discussed in chapter 1. In addition, chapter 5 analyses involve restraining responses initiated after the attacks of 9/11.

Chapter 4

“September 11, 2001 was a wake up call. Before the devastating events, we, as Americans, considered ourselves relatively immune to a massive physical attack on our homeland. Our victory in the Cold War left us with few significant conventional military threats, and the world of terrorism seemed more the concern of troubled regions like the Middle East than Middle America. As a Nation, we were generally unfamiliar with the motivations of terrorists and the deep hatred behind their agendas. Furthermore, we underestimated the depth and scope of their capabilities and did not fully appreciate the extent to which they would go to carry out their destructive acts. The September 11, 2001 attacks changed these misconceptions” (Department of Homeland Security, 2003, p. 5).


Pre 9/11 Propelling Forces

Propelling forces, according to the Lewin's force field theory, are actions or elements to the environment that drive a change to occur. Using Lewin's theory in the context of the 9/11 case study, the propelling forces serve as interdependent conditions that supported Al Qaeda on an optimal track to organize and execute the 9/11 attacks. As noted in Chapter 2, the preconditions are not to be confused with precipitants--factors that led to the inception of Al Qaeda--rather they were the factors that propelled Al Qaeda to the actions it took on 9/11. This chapter's focus is on the propelling forces that led up to the attacks of 9/11, and exhibits findings based on the first hypothesis that prior to 9/11 propelling forces exceeded restraining forces. This is not to suggest that nothing was being done before 9/11 to prohibit the abilities of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups from building forces, plotting, or doing harm. Quite to the contrary, there were efforts being made to deter the use of terrorism both domestically and internationally. However, in hindsight of the attacks many have advocated that relevant parties in the United States knew that the threat of terrorism was a serious issue for American interests at large, but did not deem it a serious problem to be faced on U.S. soil. The focus of the argument is

the extent to which Al Qaeda out performed the United States government and achieved, at least temporarily, its goal to become the most powerful terrorist group in the world.

This chapter includes findings on the conditions that were both necessary and sufficient in driving Al Qaeda to become an integrated network--both resilient and flexible—that was capable of successfully planning and performing the largest terrorist attack on U.S. soil. Following explanation of the terms necessary and sufficient conditions, the researcher discusses the necessary conditions of globalization; financial assets; strategic leadership; and support of Islamic law as they pertain to Al Qaeda. Next, the sufficient condition of true believers is analyzed, followed by the summary of results for the propelling conditions. To illustrate, Figure 1 highlights the hypothesized dominant role of propelling forces over restraining forces before 9/11 in adherence to Lewin's model.

Figure 4.1
Pre 9/11 Conditions



According to a definition by Swartz (1997), A condition *A* is said to be *necessary* for a condition *B*, if (and only if) the speciousness or non-existence of *A* brings about the speciousness of *B*. Just as air is necessary for sustained human life, the necessary

conditions examined in this research were obligatory to establish a force in Al Qaeda that would create successful attacks. The criteria in determining the necessary conditions for Al Qaeda to complete the attacks and subsequently create change were established after a review of literature was complete. The research analysis was an original conception by the author, and therefore there was no guide for which to follow. Starting with detailed requirements of the terrorists' needs, items were then grouped into larger categories that captured similarities in a general manner. For example, starting the list with numerous items the terrorists had to spend money on and then moving to the simpler concept that terrorists needed financial support. Conducting a content analysis on which categories had the most discourse then validated the list of necessary and sufficient conditions. Finally, verification of the magnitude and value of this research came subsequent to the establishment of the criteria set for this research. That certification has come from experts in the field of terrorism, such as Gunaratna, Hoffman, and Williams, which have acknowledged the importance of each necessary condition through their own research on the topic.

Necessary Conditions

The four necessary conditions that acted as propelling forces for Al Qaeda and led to the subsequent achievement of the attacks on United States soil include: Globalization, financial assets, strategic leadership, and support for Islamic Law. These conditions were interdependent parts of a whole. No one item could have provided the impetus for the implementation process. Al Qaeda needed each condition equally. These four conditions coupled with the sufficient condition—true believer status-- serve a functional purpose in explaining the successful attacks.

Globalization

Globalization serves as an umbrella term to explain so many different features of today's world. Like terrorism, no definition of globalization can fully disclose the nature of its existence due to the sheer broadness of the topic. While the debate on globalization hinges on "for" or "against" positions, the matter of whether or not globalization exists needs no debate. Globalization has fundamentally changed the system of the world. Mittelman (2000) points to an increase in interconnections, a rise of transnational flows, and a deepening pressure on the world becoming a single place. Global trends of deregulation; open borders; and freer movement of people, money, goods, and services increasingly affect the world. In this connected world time, distance and spatial barriers are broken down by advanced technology (Perl, 2000). But while globalization is often spoken of in terms of cohesion and harmony of all people, the reality is that this is not the view of globalization that all people see. In countries with weak infrastructures and corrupt governments, globalization has brought pictures of American luxury and grandiosity and a reminder of dissimilarity. One consequence of globalization is its facilitation for terrorist groups and other international crime to operate in relatively unregulated environments (Perl).

The Age of Information Technology

In the age of information technology, communication flows instantly and without a trace; money is transferred around the world in a matter of minutes; and international terrorism plots can be orchestrated by cell members in different countries simultaneously. Kenneth Lieberthal (2001), former special assistant to the President and senior director of Asian affairs, stated that globalization facilitated terrorism due to the creation of porous

borders making information and communication technology more accessible and less expensive, and by allowing the movement of funds to be considerably easier. Shelley (2001), a professor at American University and director of Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) agrees, the ease of communication in this modern era means there is less significance on actor's locations than previously. Language barriers, as well as, border security are broken down by constant migration of people from one country to another. Finding the flaws in the system allowed Al Qaeda terrorists to smuggle people and weapons into countries striving to keep them out (Perl, 2000).

The "Munich Massacre" as it was so named after eleven Israelis were taken hostage and then killed by Palestinian terrorists is considered the birthplace of modern terrorism (Amdur, 2001). Television media brought terrorist exposure to a new level during the Munich Olympics. Those terrorists wanting their grievances to reach a large audience learned that television was the portal with which to do so. Bin Laden continues to use this technique by making strategically timed appearances that reach all ends of the world within a day. To Bin Laden, television serves as a medium for gaining support in condemning America and its allies, maintain his status of a charismatic leader, and most importantly sending symbolic messages to other Al Qaeda members (Johnston, 2003).

Television is not the only outlet for communication. As the idea of globalization has grown, so too has the innovation of hyper-speed communication and information technology. In a market initiated by the United States, but adopted by others, information technology is continuously being updated and improved upon. The task at hand for the last several decades has been to create smaller, better, faster, and more interesting ways of communicating for the greater good of an intimate and more globalized world. Before

the advent of widespread information technology the pace of international interaction was much slower. All actions across borders were completed with twice as much time as in the present (Shelley, 2001). Not surprisingly, technology meant to ease the challenge of keeping up with the times has also fallen in to the hands of those interested in exploiting it for their own purposes.

Bin Laden's vast fortune has enabled Al Qaeda to obtain some of the most advanced technology in the world. After evading missile strikes, it was believed that Bin Laden possesses a CODAN radio (Cohen, 2001). The CODAN radio network was set up with the help of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nations. The network is intended to allow the Afghan president to have contact from Kabul with all other areas of Afghanistan. The CODAN radio sets are advanced radio systems enhanced with sophisticated computer digital signals and additional handset hardware to make it operate similar to a telephone. The sets can also send voice messages, e-mails, and scanned documents (USAID, 2003). Also hidden inside Al Qaeda's safe houses are sophisticated satellites, cell phones, and computer technology. Encryption software used by Al Qaeda to code messages is commercially available (Soloway, Nordland, & Nadeau, 2002). The use and sophistication of encryption along with the introduction of other technology has been increasing exponentially because the cells are organized as a large network (Shelley, 2001).

Another source widely used to communicate and gather information is the Internet. Bin Laden's organization is Internet savvy and there are numerous ways in which Al Qaeda exploits the capabilities of the information superhighway (Cohen, 2001). Al Qaeda has used the Web to recruit, do fund raising, learn, and gather ideas (Shelley,

2001). The Web is a vast system of knowledge open to the public. It was discovered from captured terrorists that cell members went online to research the chemical dispersing of crop dusters (Cohen, 2001). The most beneficial way that the Internet has served Al Qaeda is through means of communication. The Internet offers the option of anonymity for those seeking to remain hidden. Yahoo email accounts are free so no background verification is necessary. A person can make up an email address and change it whenever needed. Al Qaeda members have been known to use Internet cafes and places that offer computer time by the hour such as Kinko's (Shelley, 2001). The Internet also offers less interpersonal communication with other people. Mohamed Atta made his reservations on www.americanairlines.com (Cohen, 2001). It is much more difficult for a machine to sense the falsity of a situation than it is for a real person.

One of the most advanced techniques being used by Al Qaeda is something called steganography. Steganography-- Greek for hidden writing—is the way to produce secret messages. There is both high tech and low-tech ways in which to use stenography. High-tech methods include messages being transferred into pictures or music files that are so small they cannot be seen by the naked eye. The operative in the field is told what to look for, clicks on it, and is given anything from bank account numbers to instructions on how to blow up a nuclear reactor (Cohen, 2001). According to terrorists arrested in the alleged bombing of the U.S. embassy in Paris, they were waiting for instructions through an online photo (Hedges, 2001). Terrorist experts believe that Al Qaeda may be hiding messages within pictures on porn sites because there are so many of them and it would be the last place fundamentalist Muslims are expected to go (Cohen, 2001).

Low-tech steganography is much more difficult to uncover. Messages could be Sayyed Qutbhidden amongst the mass of unrelated “chatter” on websites (Soloway, Nordland, & Nadeau, 2002), or the message could simply be a photo with messages entangled in the landscape. According to Cohen (2001), the crossing of arms could mean to hit an East coast target while the color blue could detail the destruction of a West coast bridge. Such messages were virtually impossible to catch from the outside because they were hiding in plain site. The majority of Internet providers did not realize that they were providing service to terrorist members. The security checks were just not that extensive (Cohen). There is evidence to suggest that terrorist members were among the owners of some U.S. companies involved in sophisticated computer activity (Hosenball, Hirsh, Soloway, & Flynn, 2002). Al Qaeda’s technological know-how provided them an ability to reach audiences around the world, maximize effectiveness, and communicate on a level unavailable a few decades ago.

Globalization From Below

Global terrorism and globalization are closely intertwined according to Mittleman (2002), an international relations professor at American University. Mittleman (2002) asserts that the similarities between the trans-border phenomena lie in their challenge to state sovereignty, reliance on modern technology and worldwide financial networks, and their nature to feed upon the marginalized. Discourse on the topic of globalization reached an all time high in the 1990’s. The 1999 protest of the WTO conference in Seattle was hailed as a triumph for the “other side” of globalization. Experts have gone to great lengths in trying to explain the friction culminating between the two views of globalization. The term “globalization from below” has become a popular phrase that

expresses a historical transformation and a loss in the degree of control at local levels. Such effects result in low wages and unemployment, impoverished communities, environmental degradation, and other social destruction such as the extinction of rural communities. Explained this way, concerns arise as to the ability of a singular system that is able to cope with transnational problems.

Other experts including Friedman (2001) suggest that globalization does not fall into categories of above or below but rather beyond. The concept of globalization from beyond suggests a lateral move across states as a syndrome of processes, activities, and ideas (Friedman). States like China have made efforts to fend off the globalization wave with little success. Those more sensitive to the effects of globalization have witnessed cultural preservation, tradition, and moral and spiritual seriousness have given way to trivialization and homogenization. Rather than experiencing globalization as an "equal opportunity" the have-nots find no sign of improvement of life.

Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization used not only the technological side of globalization to their advantage, but also this negative side, which created victims of marginalization. Al Qaeda cunningly manipulated the conflicting views of globalization into a recruiting opportunity. High unemployment and rises in crime and poverty raise the fears of the disenfranchised. Other frustrations such as repressive governments like those seen in some Middle Eastern countries only complimented the message that Al Qaeda was sending. Al Qaeda thrived on supporting the idea of McWorld vs. Jihad. Targeted emphasis was put on the concept of the clash of the civilizations; warning Muslims of the United States' plan to steam roll any and all cultural differences in the

world. Multiple campaigns were spread to these areas in an attempt to recruit men for suicide missions, as well as, to create overall hatred toward the United States.

Al Qaeda strategically used globalization from both a technological and motivational aspect. On the one hand Al Qaeda produced vigor and passion in the disenchanted out of contempt of globalization; yet on the other hand it benefited from the gifts brought about by the technological connectivity of globalization. Al Qaeda was extraordinary in playing both ends against the middle. The exploitation of globalization facilitated the growth of members and supporters worldwide, ready and willing to immerse themselves into bin Laden's vision of a new world order.

Financial Assets

The financial network was a critical part of Al Qaeda's organization. The financial set-up for the 9/11 attacks went unnoticed by security agencies except on one occasion. The SunTrust Bank in Florida made a suspicious transaction report to the U.S. Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network after Mohamed Atta received a wire transfer of \$ 69,985 from the Gulf. This report, along with 125,000 others were not investigated until after the attacks occurred (William, 2001). According to William F. Wechsler (2001) who served on Clinton's National Security Council, bin Laden rose to prominence by building "a financial architecture that supported the mujaheddin against the Russians" (p. 137). This financial architecture was carried over into the creation of Al Qaeda and was at the center of Al Qaeda's ability to gain finances. Al Qaeda relied on money to fund terrorists; operations; acquire needed materials; and buy support from states, regimes, and other terrorist groups. A contribution of \$100 million was given to

the Taliban when Al Qaeda moved its base of operation to Afghanistan after being forced out of Sudan (Williams, 2002).

Gunaratna (2002), one of the foremost experts on Al Qaeda's organization, explains, "Intelligence and security services worldwide, including the CIA and MI6, have never before encountered a global terrorist financial network as sophisticated as Al Qaeda's. Comparisons with other such networks reveal that Al Qaeda has built the most complex, robust and resilient money-generating and money-moving network yet seen" (p.81). This was a carefully constructed unit that amassed a large fortune as if it were in fact a global corporation. Gunaratna (2001) has conducted extensive research on Al Qaeda's financial structure. He computed an approximation of Al Qaeda's annual budget by comparing it to the budgets of other terrorist groups with similar financial resources, geographic distribution, organizational structure, member count, and other factors. The annual budget was thought to be under \$50 million a year; of that, \$36 million was spent on maintaining the 3,000 members in Afghanistan and members abroad. \$50 million was also thought to be the start-up cost for the organization, which included weapons, offices, vehicles, houses, training sites, infrastructure, and technology (Gunaratna, 2002).

The finance and business committee was in charge of all financial aspects of Al Qaeda. This committee was headed by Sheikh Muhammad Hussein al-Almadi, an exiled Saudi businessman based in Ethiopia. His two main constituents included Zein-al-Abideen (a.k.a. Abu Zubaydah), a Palestinian located in Afghanistan; and the Karachi-UAE based, Saudi Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi (a.k.a. Mustafa Ahmed) (McCoy & Cauchon, 2001; Gunaratna, 2002). Their job was to oversee all funding of terrorists and their operations. Mustafa Ahmed was directly involved in funding the attacks of 9/11 via

Dubai money exchanges through Citibank in New York and on to Florida (Williams, 2001).

There are five financial security principles included in the training manual.

Declaration of Jihad Against the Country's Tyrants:

“funds should be divided between those invested for financial return and the balance—operational funds—that should be saved and spent only on operations; operational funds should not all be put in one place; only a few of the organization’s members should know the location of its funds; while carrying large amounts of money precautions should be taken; and money should be left with nonmembers and spent only when needed” (as cited in Gunaratna, 2001, p. 8).

These precautions had to be adhered to by both the providing and receiving ends of the funds. Operational commanders chose those members that were frugal with Al Qaeda’s funds for tactical missions. The hijackers of 9/11 spent nights in cheap motels, rented budget cars, and ate in pizza parlors. The total financial costs for Al Qaeda was estimated to be \$500,000, a very inexpensive price for the destruction it generated. Looked at in a different way, the cost of this mission was cheaper than buying some apartments in New York City (Carbonara, 2001). In the days leading up to the attacks, excess money was transferred back to Al Qaeda’s financial committee. A total of \$16,300 was deposited into Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi’s bank account in Dubai on September 11 (Miller, Stone & Mitchell, 2002). On the other hand, when it came to specific operation costs, frugality was not an issue. Gunaratna (2002) explains that Al Qaeda operatives would spend \$4500.00 on business class plane tickets in order to be as close to the cockpit as possible.

Four facets exist through which Al Qaeda acquired its funds—contribution, crime, investments, and legitimate business. Contributions were made up of charity funds and

individual donations. According to Gunaratna (2002) Osama bin Laden's own fortune, which has benefited Al Qaeda, totaled only \$25 to 30 million rather than higher speculations of \$300 million. A majority of donations came from wealthy businessmen from the Gulf States like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar (Simpson, 2003; Gunaratna, 2002; Morgenthau, 2001). One of the most widely known Al Qaeda supporters was Khalid bin Mahfouz, a former director of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International. The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) was the only institute that closely resembled Al Qaeda's financial network (Gunaratna, 2002; Farah, 2002). Pakistanis founded the bank with financing from leaders of the UAE. Among the banks many operations were the buying of illegal weapons, laundering money, harboring terrorist funds, and allowing the CIA to funnel money to support those fighting against the Soviets (Breaking the Bank, 2001). The bank's collapse in 1991, brought about a large financial scandal; however, none of the banks backers went to jail. Many of these people went on to work in other banks and charities, and many were identified as supporting bin Laden's terrorist activities. Interestingly, Khalid also has a sister married to bin Laden (Farah, 2002). Until 1999, bin Mahfouz was director of National Commerce Bank (NCB) in Saudi Arabia (Saudi executives give funds to Osama bin Laden, 1999). After pressure from the U.S., Saudi officials put him under house arrest after an audit of his bank turned up payments to bin Laden. Yet, bin Mahfouz was still able to support Al Qaeda through a charity organization. Muwafaq, or Blessed Relief, was designated by the U.S. Treasury Department (2001) as an Al Qaeda front. This was a European based charity organized by the families of bin Mahfouz, Al-Rajhi, and Saleh Kamel (Simpson, 2003). Similar links have continued to be unearthed. Also,

on the list of Al Qaeda financial supporters was Ghaleb Himmat, the Tunisian-born executive and Ahmed Idris Nasreddin, both of al-Taqwa, a Swiss-based financial services company (Hosenball, 2001). Himmat also served as a board member of the Kuwait-based International Islamic Charitable Organization (IICO) (Huband, 2001).

Other charities have also contributed to Al Qaeda's terrorist activities. Some have knowingly been front operations while others were unaware. Documents obtained by the Bosnian government found Al Qaeda used charities such as the Muslim World League and the Islamic Relief Organization to move money and supplies, and to provide logistical support (Simpson, 2003). Al Qaeda accumulated significant sums through the infiltration of operatives into charity organizations such as the Kuwait based Mercy International in Kenya and Help Africa People. Officials found that neither of the parent charities were aware of the terrorist infiltration (Gunaratna, 2002). Before 9/11, Islamic charities proved to be a convenient system through which to receive funds. The Islamic tenet zakat requires every Muslim to contribute to a charitable cause each year. The world's richest Muslim nation, Saudi Arabia is also the largest backer of Islamic charities. With so many Muslims donating money to a charity it has made it very difficult to assess whether or not the donation is legitimate (Gerth & Miller, 2002).

Al Qaeda utilized criminal activity as another means to gain financial assets. The flagship of criminal activity was credit card fraud, and was used mainly by Algerian members based in Europe. Almost \$1 million a month was made through the use of credit card fraud. A special camp was established to train European members in financial crimes such as credit card counterfeiting. Credit card manufacturing machines were

purchased, and the members were taught how to assess information from the magnetic strip in order to replicate credit cards for use (Gunaratna, 2002).

Al Qaeda used money laundering as a mainstay of its operations as well. Laundering institutions consist of bank fronts controlled by launderers, non-bank financial institutions, and informal financial networks such as hawalas (Weintraub, 2002). Many banks and businesses in the Gulf were used as fronts. Dubai was the financial hub for most of the Islamic militant groups largely because it was convenient, and they were willing to turn a blind eye (Farah, 2002). At least half of the \$500,000 used for the attacks of 9/11 came from Dubai. U.S. banks ranging from Key Bank to Chase Manhattan routinely conducted transactions from the U.S. to Dubai without realizing they were wiring terrorist funds (William, 2001). Al Qaeda's financial transactions have been made up largely of gold because it was a currency familiar around the world, available around the world, could be converted into cash when needed, and exempt from international reporting requirements for financial transactions (Farah, 2002). This was another reason that Dubai was a haven for terrorist transactions. Dubai has one of the world's largest and least regulated gold markets in the world. In July of 1999 and January of 2000, U.S. officials went to Dubai to ask that these financial transactions be monitored more closely. The U.S. received little cooperation (Farah).

Hawalas, or informal banking systems, made up the largest part of Al Qaeda's financial transactions. The hawala system allows money to be submitted at an office in one place and payment to be handed over in another location without the money having to actually be taken to the destination. In some places such as Afghanistan and Somalia, there were no formal banking systems; therefore, hawalas were the only way of

conducting business. Hawalas also leave behind no traceable paper work making it extremely hard for investigators to follow (William, 2001). Hand couriers played a part in the financial system by smuggling money and gold from destination to destination. Pakistani authorities estimated that \$2 to \$3 million a day was hand carried from Karachi to Pakistan to Dubai (Farah, 2002). In an Al Qaeda manual found by British forces in Afghanistan, there were chapters on how to smuggle gold on small boats and conceal it on the body (Farah).

Perhaps the most disputed topic among experts about Al Qaeda's financial network is whether or not Al Qaeda conducted and profited from narcotics. Gunaratna (2002) widely disputes the idea that Al Qaeda participated in any part of a drug ring. He states that there are no hard facts to support this claim. Others such as Zakaria (2001) suggest that from drug trade alone Al Qaeda was able to raise over \$1 billion. Williams book, *Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror*, provides details from an FBI interview with Ali Abul Nazzar for his affiliation with Al Qaeda. In the interview Nazzar states that:

'The emir [bin Laden] controls it. He is the world's largest supplier. Everyone knows this. His laboratories in Afghanistan produce between 4,000 and 5,000 metric tons of heroin a year. How are you going to touch him? He gets richer with every drug deal made on every street corner. And heroin, as we all know, is the United States drug of choice. It's ironic, isn't it? The emir is fueled by Western decadence.' (2002, p. 164).

Yet in documents released by the U.S. government and the United Nations, only indirect connections between Al Qaeda and drugs were made. The direct source of the Afghan narcotics ring was the Taliban whose involvement in the drug trade has been confirmed for some time. Reeves, a London journalist and experienced writer on terrorism, suggests that by 1999 bin Laden was taking a ten percent cut of the Taliban's drug trade to

produce an income of \$1 billion (Reeve, 1999). Officials around the world insist that terrorism, organized crime, and the illegal drug trade have become one interrelated problem (Shelley, 2001) so there exists an assumption that Al Qaeda directly took part in drug trades, however, there is still disagreement.

Regional financial officers were responsible for managing the investments side of the network. Two known investment officers were Muhammad Jamal Khalifa and Yazid Suffat (Klaidman & Liu, 2002). These regional officers looked for profit turning businesses and stocks to invest Al Qaeda funds in order to hide and accumulate more money. Known investments include the African diamond trade (Farah, 2001), a fishing business in Mombasa, hospital equipment in Sweden, Denmark dairy products, and paper mills in Norway (Jacquard, 2002).

With the help of Abu Fadhl al-Makkee, Al Qaeda launched several of its own commercial enterprises. Al-Makkee is credited with setting up Zirquani, Laden International, Althamar al Mubarak, Quadrat Transportation, Quadrat Construction, and Bareba Commission. Other Al Qaeda business members expanded this list to include: Blessed Fruits; Al Hijra Construction; International al-Ikhlās (sweetmeat manufacturers); Bank of Zoological Resources (genes for cattle hybrids); Kasalla (corn hybrids); Happ Tannery; and other food processing and furniture stores. Al Qaeda also ran import and export businesses which included purchasing bikes from Azerbaijan; Maz trucks from Russia; Zetor tractors from Slovakia; cars from Dubai; fertilizer; sugar; iron; insecticide; and machine tools as imports. Exports include ostriches from Kenya; wood from Turkey; lemons, olives and raisins from Tajikistan; lapis lazuli from Afghanistan; precious stones from Uganda; and camels from Sudan (Jacquard, 2002; Gunaratna, 2002).

The U.S. government and other government agencies around the world were much aware of Al Qaeda's financial structure before 9/11. Activities were underway before 9/11 to suppress Al Qaeda's financial efforts, but much evidence exists to suggest that it was not a high priority of the U.S. Treasury Department or the U.S. Congress to enact such measures. In 2000, Senator Phil Gramm (R.-TX) helped to stall legislation aimed at fighting money laundering because he was opposed to issues concerning the privacy of the banking industry. Likewise, Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill intervened at the last hour on a decision being made by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to examine tax havens (Weintraub, 2002). Efforts were also hampered by the lack of international support, especially from Canada and Western Europe. According to Weintraub (2002), the attacks of 9/11 made it incredibly apparent that efforts to obstruct financing for terrorist activities prior to 9/11 were inadequate and unsuccessful.

Strategic Leadership

Leadership Techniques

Al Qaeda was the creation of Abdullah Azzam, a theologian, who inspired Osama bin Laden to help build the organization. Ironically, in the early days, those who knew both Azzam and bin Laden found the former to be eloquent and charismatic and the latter to be sincere and honest but not a potential leader (Bergen, 2001). Despite early critics, bin Laden learned enough from his predecessor to be characterized as a charismatic and inspirational leader to Al Qaeda members. According to Lewis (2002), Osama was the ideal Islamist; someone whose leadership is charismatic and authoritarian. Bin Laden was a popular figure to radicals, but also for a wider Muslim audience because he

responded with words and actions to the seething resentment that was heating up in recent years. Yet Lewis (2002) explains that others in the past had fed upon this same frustration and not succeeded where bin Laden did. Three very important aspects that made bin Laden unique are: expression of eloquence which has been an admirable quality amongst Arabs for centuries, he was not a ruler—rulers were seen in many Arabs eyes as corrupt, and bin Laden had by his own choice forsaken all of his riches to live a simple life devoted to the divine wishes of Allah. These points, argues Lewis (2002), allowed bin Laden to succeed where others had failed.

Bin Laden was like any successful businessman when it came to maintaining his organization. He built a network containing cells that spanned the world and was able to manipulate the Muslim world into believing that there were only two options: a person was to be known as a believer with Al Qaeda or a non-believer with the U.S. He was keen enough to realize that employing the expertise of others into leadership roles would increase the success of the organization. This is evident through the placement history of some of Al Qaeda's top ranked officials. Several former Middle Eastern, especially Egyptian, Pakistani, and Central Asian police officers and military personnel, as well as, several former European military, and at least one U.S. military personnel have served in top rank leadership positions for Al Qaeda (Gunaratna, 2002). Bin Laden listened carefully to and took advice from his top officials because he understood the value of other people's expertise. Even with a loosely organized network, bin Laden and his leadership team maintained direct communication on strategic operations. According to Gunaratna (2002), bin Laden reviewed every phase of plans and provided strategic leadership for the bombings of the African Embassy and the USS Cole.

Before Azzam and bin Laden split—for disagreements on the use of terrorism—Osama gained an important piece of advice. Azzam was the one who envisioned a multinational organization based on uniting all believers. With the exception of Aum Shinrikyo, since 1968, Al Qaeda has been the only terrorist group to be multiethnic (Gunaratna, 2002). Bin Laden was credited with bringing together like-minded radical groups from Algeria; Egypt; Yemen; Chechnya; Pakistan; the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and numerous other countries, and also for creating a structure of cooperation between them (Gunaratna). Even creating tactical relationships with Sh'ia Muslim groups such as Hezbollah and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eealm (LTTE) (Gunaratna, 2002). Almost as if taking a lesson from one of the greatest historical titans of evil, bin Laden used Hitler's model of concentrating all hatred on a single foe to join far removed groups under one banner (Hoffer, 1951). Bin Laden successfully copied this design by presenting the United States as enemy number one. Anti-West and anti-Israeli rhetoric only fueled the hatred poised at the United States. This was a key tactic to transforming local radical groups into one pan-Islamic association. In February 1997, bin Laden announced the creation of new alliance of terrorist organizations as the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders (Williams, 2002). The new organization was evidence of his accomplishment and symbolic for the even more widespread success of recruitment.

Recruitment

As Director of External Affairs Abu Zubaydah, the sole Palestinian within bin Laden's inner circle, was in charge of recruitment (Bin Laden's Martyrs for the Cause, 2001). Al Qaeda had one paramount qualification for every member—they must be

Muslim. Bin Laden and his constituents do not believe that one can protect Islam and Muslims, and defend the goals and secrets without being a believing Muslim (Declaration of Jihad Against the Country's Tyrants, Military Series, 2002). Bin Laden dispatched thousands of Al Qaeda training camp "graduates" to infiltrate other radical groups, universities, mosques, and communities all over the world to gain support for Al Qaeda's mission (Gunaratna, 2002). In Germany, Al Qaeda members used amateur videos of fighting in Chechnya to win over recruits (Bin Laden's Martyrs for the Cause, 2001).

These efforts attracted a wide range of individuals from middle class professionals to petty criminals political firebrands, and economic opportunists (Stern, 2003). Al Qaeda particularly recruited young Muslim men and teenagers who possessed nothing but despair. The Middle East was a breeding ground for Islamist radicals due to harsh and restrictive governments, frustration from high unemployment rates, and poverty. Al Qaeda recruiters lectured the young disenchanting men as to the problems created by America through Westernization and spoke of a better life that would come after the Western giant was brought to its knees. In other parts of the world, recruiters targeted ideal prospects by using persuasive tactics that suggested these men "wake up" from their "sleep" and return to "Allah, regretting and repenting" (Howlett & Moniz, 2002). Before being admitted as a member, there were fourteen qualifications required: knowledge of Islam; ideological commitment; maturity; self-sacrifice; discipline; secrecy and concealment of information; good health; patience; unflappability; intelligence and insight; caution and prudence; truthfulness and wisdom; the ability to observe and analyze; and the ability to act (Gunaratna, 2002). Al Qaeda's goals and beliefs were easily indoctrinated in young disgruntled Muslim men through training.

Training

Unknown thousands have gone through Al Qaeda's training camps, most of which went back to other radical groups to spread the knowledge or become lone wolves. Only a few thousand were invited to join Al Qaeda. These training camps began with the help of and the enlistment of the original mujahidan from the Afghan War with the Soviets (Miller, Stone, & Mitchell, 2002). Before his death, Abu Hafs al-Misri (A.K.A. Muhammad Atef) controlled the military training for Al Qaeda (Bin Laden's Martyrs for the Cause, 2001). Primary training camps were located in Afghanistan. Three courses were taught in Al Qaeda's training camps: basic, advanced, and specialized. Basic curriculum included guerrilla warfare and Islamic Law; advanced included learning techniques of the use of explosives, assassination techniques, and heavy weapons; and specialized training included surveillance, counter-surveillance, forging and adapting identity documents, and conducting maritime and vehicle suicide attacks (Gunaratna, 2002). The most extensive information regarding Al Qaeda's training comes from actual manuals obtained by government officials. Secret service police in Belgium recovered the first copy of the manual in 1997. That same year the CIA received a copy from the secret service of Jordan (Gunaratna, 2002).

The most widely used manual Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad, a multi-volume 7,000 page manual. The first ten volumes include tactics; security intelligence; handguns; first aid; explosives; grenades and mines; tanks; manufacturing of arms and explosives; topography and land surveys; and weapons. An eleventh chapter was added later which includes chemical and biological warfare and is only given to select members. The Encyclopedia was modeled off of British and U.S. military manuals, especially the

American F-M (Field Manual) (Guanaratna, 2002). The manual was written so that people who are not well educated can understand. The Encyclopedia goes into great specifics covering urban, non-urban, mountain, and jungle terrains. Volumes are broken down even further for example, a section on tactics entitled "The effect of desert conditions on operations" is sub-divided to include sections on: advance, attack, defense, withdrawal, movement and transport, shortage of water, and supplies and maintenance (Islamic Radicalism: the financial and European network of Osama bin Laden, p.1; as cited in Gunaratna, 2002). The manual also moves up in scale from tiny objects to how to bomb buildings, statues, and bridges, and then to how to shoot down aircrafts carrying Stinger missiles.

The Declaration of Jihad against the Country's Tyrants, Military Series is another manual used in Al Qaeda's training. An experienced instructor of the Islamic Group of Egypt between 1993 and 1994 wrote this manual. The eighteen chapters in this manual include: general introduction; necessary qualifications and characteristics of the organizations members; counterfeit currency and forged documents; organization of military bases, apartments and other places; concealment, means of communication, and transportation; training; weapons; measures related to buying and transporting them; member safety; security plans; definition of special operations; and espionage.

Religious training included Islamic Law; Islamic history and contemporary Islamic policy; how to preserve one's faith when interacting with non-believers; Islamic jurisprudence; how to wage jihad; the history of the Prophet Muhammad; and other information on Islam to be used to defend one's beliefs (Gunaratna, 2002). Parts of the Koran had to be memorized.

While a great deal of Al Qaeda's training was dedicated to physical and intelligence skills, Al Qaeda put great emphasis on the psychological side of training. This training was the most potent force bin Laden conducted (Bin Laden's Martyrs for the Cause, 2001). Members endured interrogation and torture in order to be ready for what awaited them if they were caught. Still the main reason for the psychological programming was to create reliable members who would commit to action once called upon. Mental preparedness was critical when it came to executing strategically planned operations such as that of 9/11. Martyrdom was distinguished as the ultimate sacrifice to Allah: a sacrifice that would be rewarded in the after life.

Every tactical and strategic piece of education became routine from intensive training; every idea and belief provided by bin Laden and the Koran; and every action—from communication to plotting a terrorist attack—breathed life by the dreams and goals of the group. Al Qaeda did not leave out the smallest detail.

Support of Islamic Law

One of the goals of Al Qaeda was to argue that Islamic Law was the only divinely entitled rule of the land; a structure that was taken away from Muslims when the British and French powers forced secularism on the Middle East. The people of the Middle East divided themselves into for and against sides of secularism. Those in favor of a secular state insist that Islam and nationalism can coexist together. Opponents to a secular state argue that secularism gradually develops anti-religious tendencies, erosion of morality, and rampant corruption. They suggest that Islamic states, or Khilafah state as it used to be known, adhere only to Islamic Law. (Engineer, 2000) Al Qaeda encouraged those who oppose a secular state by focusing in on the United States as the root of evil. Al

Qaeda claimed that the United States number one goal was to be the only superpower and have complete and total domination of the world well into the future. Corrupt and power hungry non-believers, who had embraced secularism, claimed Al Qaeda, constructed this goal.

To gain support of Muslims all over the world, Al Qaeda assigned a high priority to special operations in the belief that they boosted Islamic morale (Gunaratna, 2002). By constantly referring to Allah in writing and in speeches, bin Laden expressed that the actions Al Qaeda was taking were the divine wish of Allah to humiliate the non-believers of the West. Al Qaeda's leadership, members, and followers truly believed that they were creating a new Islamic Universal Order (Gunaratna, 2002). They wanted to rebuild the empire that once belonged to the Middle East. Al Qaeda was impressing on Muslims that the way in which they rose to the most powerful nation in history was through the Khilafah, the Islamic ruling system (Lintner, 2002). In an article by Farah (2001) there was evidence that Arabs were more and more shifting away from secular nationalism in recent years and a growing number of Islamic activists were embracing the teachings of Islam. Muslims began challenging the Westernized thought of daily lives and affairs.

Al Qaeda's reiteration of past events fueled the flame of the new Islamic revivalism. Middle Easterners were reminded of incidents such as the U. S. abandonment after the Soviet-Afghan War, the U.S.'s strong support for Israel, the stationing of troops in Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf War. All of these events left a bad taste in the mouths of many Arabs, and Al Qaeda knew how to play into Arabs frustrations. This was evident in bin Laden's 1998 Declaration of Jihad against the U.S. where he expressed:

"For more than seven years the United States is occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of its territories, Arabia, plundering its riches, overwhelming its rulers,

humiliating its people, threatening its neighbors, and using its bases in the peninsula as a spearhead to fight against the neighboring Islamic peoples....Despite the immense destruction inflicted on the Iraqi people at the hands of the Crusader-Jewish alliance and in spite of the appalling number of dead, exceeding a million, the Americans nevertheless, in spite of all this, are trying once more to repeat this dreadful slaughter. It seems that the long blockade following after a fierce war, the dismemberment and the destruction are not enough for them. So they come again today to destroy what remains of this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors.... While the purposes of the Americans in these wars are religious and economic, they also serve the petty state of the Jews, to divert attention from their occupation of Jerusalem and their killing of Muslims in it " (Lewis, 1998, p. 14).

Al Qaeda made an art out of targeting the United States and insisting that no good could come from such a ruthless, corrupt, egocentric state bent on dominating the world. Through globalization, past events, and most importantly Islam Al Qaeda wove a convincing argument that getting back to an Islamic ruling system was the only path of the future and all Muslim should unite to see this vision to the finish.

Sufficient Condition

The sufficient condition is a critical component within the factors that both propel and restrain forces surrounding the attacks of 9/11. To use an analogy, if the necessary conditions were TNT, then the sufficient condition would be the fuse. In other words, necessary conditions—globalization, financial assets, leadership techniques, and support for Islamic Law—were the building blocks through which Al Qaeda increased its strength, moved forward, and facilitated the attacks against the U.S.; but “true believer” status-- the sufficient condition-- was imperative to actually completing the mission. Without members who were willing to give their lives to the greater cause, Al Qaeda would not have successfully accomplished its goal of killing so many people and ultimately becoming the agent of change for American security.

True Believer Status

In 1951, far before the creation of Al Qaeda, Eric Hoffer wrote the book *True Believer*. Hoffer centered his true believer research on associates involved in mass movements. Hoffer's examples of true believers include people involved in the French Revolution, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, and Hitler's Nazi army. Conclusions made by Hoffer in his true believer research can be extended to Al Qaeda's terrorist group. The true believers can be divided into two groups: leaders and followers.

Leaders

Although first inclination would suggest that all leaders qualify as having true believer status, this is not necessarily the case. There are leaders equipped with the necessary skill that may be driven more by power than by a true belief. True believing leaders include the originators of the belief and those, which can carry that belief to an audience of supporters. Hoffer (1951) describes the leaders as "men of words". Differentiation between the true believer leaders and other leaders manifests in the use of spoken and written words. In the life cycle of a movement Hoffer suggests that the creation usually takes the talents and temperament of a fanatic, but final consolidation results in the work of a typical man. Clerics, scholars and philosophers whose high intellect produces eloquent words commonly fill these positions.

Analysis within Islamic fundamentalism provides a similar leadership pattern. In 1929, Hassan al-Banna—a schoolteacher--organized the Muslim Brotherhood to oppose Islamic Reformation. Al-Banna relayed his vision of a return to the original form and spirit of Islam. Sayyid Qutb was also considered one of the most influential Islamists in recent history. The so-called "father of modern Islamic fundamentalism", was a top

member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb (1964) drew a great following after he wrote *Signposts on the Road*, maintaining that all Christians and Jews were destined for Hell. Both were exceptional motivators through their use of words, yet in two different ways. al-Banna assembled the group through his revivalist dreams and the goal of forging a guerilla army (Williams, 2002). Sayyid Qutb displayed the characteristics of the typical man of words by writing influential pieces that transmitted the message as a long-term goal for Islamists (Williams).

Bin Laden serves as an example of the typical man who has gained a common bond with his followers because of his modest lifestyle. His messages are conducted with a calm and quiet tone that exudes both patience and strength. The man of words seeks to undermine established institutions, discredit those in power, and weaken prevailing beliefs (Hoffer, 1951). Bin Laden's fatwa statements in 1996 and 1998 exhibit such messages. Although bin Laden is neither a cleric, scholar nor philosopher, he surrounds himself with all three types.

Those who create a vision and movement, and those who see that vision to its fullest potential characterize true believing leaders. True believing leaders differ from the followers for even though they are just as resolute in the end goal, they find it necessary not to engage in fatalistic actions unless a last resort for the good of the organization. Bin Laden has seen only limited amount of battle himself. His gift of words demands that his duty be to inspire the masses rather than risk his life in a singular event.

Followers

The followers are the self-sacrificing members of the group. The 19 hijackers who took their own lives as well as thousands of others on 9/11 fit the criteria of true believers. True believers possess some potent doctrine; have faith in an infallible leader; and a faith in the future, which creates an omnipotent environment. Extravagant hope and faith in the future alone can generate the most reckless daring.

Hoffer describes this faith in the future as a “millennial component.” Relaying the idea of faith in the future was a crucial point for Al Qaeda to get across to its true believers. This impression was left through several writings that the members were expected to read. Miller, Stone, & Mitchell (2002) give a vivid detail of how the 19 hijackers might have tempered their fears the night before the attacks occurred. The authors write about a five-page manual written specifically for final prayer, cleansing, and to rid oneself of lingering fears. Direct quotes taken from the manual analyzed by Miller, Stone, and Mitchell include: “Remember that anything that happens to you could never be avoided, and what did not happen to you could never have happened to you” (p.312). The manual reminded these suicide terrorists that women of paradise awaited them in the next life. Anticipation that fears would resurface up to the very end, the manual reminded the hijackers that the only fear they should accept is the fear in Allah. Quoted from the Koran, “Fear them not, but fear Me, if you are believers” (p. 312). It is the responsibility of the leaders of the organization to kindle this extravagant hope.

For Al Qaeda, the true believers were essential. Bin Laden and his cohorts were keenly aware of this: members angled propaganda and focused recruitment on finding those susceptible to becoming “true believers”. The Middle East was a prime location for

discovering such characters. Hoffer describes those people who have an innermost craving for a new life; a rebirth of sorts as the ultimate candidates for this true believer status. This craving is the key to a reckless giving of oneself. One factor that promotes self-sacrifice is the discontent for the present state of life. Most radicals and reactionaries loathe the present and invite change for the future. Hoffer explains that those who fear the future tend to cling to the present, while faith in the future renders change accessible. The second crucial factor for self-sacrifice is the desire of what is missing. People are less willing to die for what they have than what is wished for. According to Ibn Haibban, the ideal mujabid is the one who strives against himself (Jihad Fixation, 2001). When one hates himself and his position in life he is well-minded to give himself to beyond his physical being (Caillet, 1944). To ripen a person for self-sacrifice he must be stripped of his individual identity and distinctness.

For Al Qaeda members, they were assimilated into a collective body of ideology and faith. This commitment freed its members from conceptual problems. They are one for Allah; the faith became a process through which the individual ceases to be himself and becomes part of something eternal. The holy writ was presented as the one and only truth. A true believer must not base his conclusions on personal experience or observations, but should seek the absolute truth with the heart rather than the mind. In the Shariah, jihad comprises the supreme personal sacrifice in order to raise the word of Allah to aid his fight (Jihad Fixation, 2001).

No other group has invested so much time into programming its fighters for death. Instructors are dispatched to the West to indoctrinate new members. Psychological training is considered far more important than battlefield or terrorist-combat training

when it comes to executing the mission (Gunaratna, 2002). Al Qaeda deliberately emphasizes the role of these true believers. The word "suicide" is replaced with "martyrdom", which is assigned the highest authority. In Islamic usage the term "martyrdom" is normally interpreted to mean death in a jihad and the reward is eternal bliss, which is described in some detail in early religious texts. Suicide is another matter. Classical Islam in all its different forms and versions has never permitted suicide. This is seen as a mortal sin, and brings eternal punishment in the form of the unending repetition of the act by which the suicide killed himself (Lewis, 2001). Al Qaeda found a loophole for making self-sacrificing killing machines by maintaining that killing and dying for Allah are the ultimate sacrifices that any Muslim willing to take on such a mission will be rewarded. On a tactical level, the willingness of its fighters to die enabled Al Qaeda to drive fear into the enemy. The 9/11 hijackers military training was little compared to their psychological conditioning. These men were picked because the true believer mindset that existed within each of them was considered an operational priority.

Weaknesses of the Restraining Forces

The relationship between the opposing forces is a give and take process. As long as each side is continuously pushing and pulling the tension stays relatively balanced. Yet, in those instances when one side is clearly dominant over the threshold is crossed and change has occurred. The imbalance between the two forces is a product of both the dominating propelling forces and the weakness of the restraining forces. As in the case presented here, restraining forces are not altogether non-existent. Instead, restraining forces did exist but were not sufficiently kept in check with the level of power the

propelling forces were emitting. The following details the weaknesses exercised the restraining forces.

After the shock of the attacks wore off, citizens at all levels of society began questions as to how this could have happened, and why the government had no prior warning of such an attack. Investigation into pre-9/11 intelligence gathered by the FBI, CIA, and even the NSA determined that there were agency failures—both physical and systemic—that left the agencies open to weaknesses as witnessed on 9/11. Robert Mueller, FBI Director; George Tenet, CIA Director; and to a lesser degree General Michael Hayden, NSA Chief, came under intense criticism after an 800 page inquiry conducted jointly by the Senate Select Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence uncovered evidence of missed clues and botched opportunities. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham, D-Fla. stated “There were lapses, in my judgment, by all three agencies” (Diamond & Kiely, 2002, p. 7). Pre-9/11, there was information readily available that suggested a terrorist attack on U.S. soil was a very likely possibility in the coming future. In 1999 and 2000, three commissions issued reports detailing information about the new threat that terrorism posed and the immediate action needed to counter it. All three reports concluded that the openness of the U.S. and the inefficiencies of the government bureaucracies posed serious vulnerabilities. Such warnings were unheeded for at least three reasons.

First, the international terrorism units within the major agencies lacked the needed manpower and technical support. Staff translator shortages made it difficult to decipher all of the “chatter” being recorded (Diamond & Kiely, 2002). On 9/10, intercepts were received from Al Qaeda operatives boasting in Arabic “The match begins tomorrow” and

“Tomorrow is Zero Hour”, but the intercepts were not translated until 9/12 (Diamond & Kiely, 2002). The Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTTF) in New York City had been culled down to a handful of people, and requests for more agents were always denied with the only explanation being that there were more pressing matters in other divisions that needed the manpower (Miller, Stone, & Mitchell, 200). Likewise, at the CIA there was a shortage of agents on hand to tackle international terrorism, a growing problem that started in the early 1990’s. As the Cold War thawed, the government believed that the threat against the U.S. was thawing as well. In 1993, 80 percent of seasoned agents were forced into early retirement while the majority of new agents were based at U.S. headquarters rather than overseas posts (Waller, 1993). Many disagreed with the administration’s choice. Noel Koch, the Pentagon’s top counterterrorism specialist in the Reagan administration, argued ten years ago that in order to fight terrorism operatives have to be overseas and by relieving the seasoned operatives with this experience the institutional memory will be erased (Waller). But Koch and others who opposed the reduction did not win in the end. Intelligence agencies became understaffed and overworked which led to many oversights.

Reuel Marc Gerecht (2001), a former Near East Division operative, criticized the CIA for its lack of detail and arrogance in handling operatives abroad. Gerecht stated that even back during the Soviet-Afghan War there was never a team of Afghan experts developed, and that an operative with some Afghan language proficiency did not arrive until 1987, close to the war’s ending. Even in July 2001, when this article came out, Gerecht claimed that the CIA had no truly qualified operative that could speak an Arabic language. Gerecht also added that when Robert Baer, a Middle East case officer for 20

years, suggested in the 1990's, that the CIA developed cadres of operatives specializing in one or two countries and gathered intelligence in Afghanistan and neighboring countries the response of the CIA was that the Cold War was over, Afghanistan was too far away, and radical Islam was an abstract idea (Gerecht).

The second reason warnings were unheeded involved a lack of cooperation between the agencies. When CIA and FBI analysts had to work at the other agency it was referred to as a "hostage exchange program" (Diamond, 2002). One of the biggest examples of the failure of communication that the joint inquiry highlighted was the knowledge the CIA had of Nawaq Alhamzi and Khalid Al-Midhar, two suspected Al Qaeda members who later became hijackers in the 9/11 attacks. The CIA knew these men were in the U.S. and did not share the information with the FBI (Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2002). Another example was the knowledge the INS had about two of the 9/11 hijackers entering into the country. Again the FBI was never given this knowledge (Diamond & Kiely, 2002). Further, the State Department charges that the CIA and FBI never issued one list that could be used to identify potential terrorists entering the country. After the attacks occurred, the blame game was under way between the different agencies emphasizing the weakness critical to the success of the Homeland Security plan. Representative Jane Harman, D-Calif., suggested that the biggest obstacle to overcome in reorganizing the agencies to be more succinct is the turf problem (Diamond & Kiely).

Finally, there were clear and obvious oversights and missed opportunities that intelligence agencies missed. From 1998 to the summer of 2001, intelligence reports indicated that there was a steady stream of information being gathered to suggest the

possibility of terrorist attacks within the U.S. During the summer of 2001, some in the intelligence community described the increase in information as unprecedented. The NSA reported thirty-three communications by terrorists describing an imminent attack in 2001 that would occur with little or no warning. Warnings were issued by various intelligence agencies, yet no specificity as time or place was ever indicated; therefore, Senior U.S. government officials never had a sense of urgency. Agencies sent out numerous non-specific warnings while never bringing all of the information together to be analyzed collaboratively. In addition, some information never received follow up (Joint Inquiry, 2002).

The FBI was aware of communication between the hijackers and individuals the FBI had been watching, but the communications were not deemed terrorist-related. On July 10, 2001, an agent from the Phoenix field office sent an electronic communication to agents in the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU), the Usama Bin Laden Unit (UBLU), and the International Terrorism Squad that expressed concerns about a coordinated plan by Bin Laden to send students to the U.S. for aviation training. The agents suggested that all flight schools in the U.S. be checked. This communication was never responded to by any of the individuals to whom it was sent (Joint Inquiry, 2002). One of the most publicized of these incidents was the way in which the FBI headquarters handled the arrest of Zacarias Mousouai. After a Minnesota flight school instructor called authorities about the suspicious behavior, Mousouai was detained. The field agents in Minnesota asked for permission to gather information off of Mousouai's computer, and were denied access from superiors because it was felt that there was not probable cause under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (Miller, Stone & Mitchell, 2002:

Joint Inquiry, 2002). It was not until after 9/11 that any connection between Mousouai and the hijackers were made.

Regardless of the repeated warnings by experts that a terrorist attack in the U.S. may likely occur, possibly by a suicide hijacking, no specific evidence existed of the 9/11 attacks found by the Joint inquiry. However, the point of failure is that the information was never considered for its collective significance. If these agencies had shared information and looked at all of the information within their scope as a whole, the connections may have been made. The ranking Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama, suggested that a variety of intelligence could have forewarned the U.S. of the attacks. "If brought together to a central place with great analytic ability, these would have provided more than an outline of the coming attacks", he stated (Diamond & Kiely, 2002. p.6).

The FBI and CIA, as well as other agencies, have admitted to failures prior to the attacks. The attacks of 9/11 woke up the government and shed light on the holes present in the current security net. Such failures coupled with the success of the terrorists plan created a mandatory need to reorganize and strengthen the intelligence agencies. Protecting the homeland and stopping the terrorists became the focus of security agencies. Success could not be assured by the out-of-date and fallible system that had been in place. Each agency made it their mission to reinvest in international terrorism, overhaul old technology, and commit to inter-agency cooperation.

Chapter Summary

Al Qaeda's pre-attack stages built up over several years. One of Osama's old associates, Omar Abdel Hakim, stated: "Osama represents the method" (Holy War on the

World, 2001, p. 20). Bin Laden stood at the center of the organizational monstrosity. bin Laden's commitment, funds, religious devotion, and determination created the weaving of the terrorist network. But it was the construction of the interdependent forces that enabled Al Qaeda to transform itself from just another terrorist group to the archetype for all terrorist groups to follow. The past has been written. Al Qaeda will always be known as the international terrorist group that committed the shocking attack on U.S. soil and woke the superpower up from its long and isolated sleep. The U.S. did little in stopping the creation of Al Qaeda's network. Warnings went unnoticed and unheeded. The efforts being administered to deter terrorism versus the efforts taken by Al Qaeda in support of terrorism proved unbalanced. The defining moment was cataclysmic events of September 11, 2001, known as the "threshold point", in which it was revealed that Al Qaeda's interdependent conditions proved more powerful propellants than the deterrents responsible for keeping terrorism forces at bay.

Chapter 5 discusses the results in the framework of post-9/11. According to Lewin's model, once a threshold point is met restraining forces will be enacted to counter the dominance of the propelling forces. A variety of actions were chosen by the U.S. government to eliminate terrorism. The reason for a multi-front approach stemmed from Al Qaeda's use of a number of methods (ie. propelling forces) to reach its status as a globally infiltrated, powerful terrorist group. Al Qaeda did not use only a financial design to create its vast network of cells around the world. Instead, Al Qaeda exploited components from globalization, the financial industry, effective leadership and organization strategies, the cultural and religious ideologies of the Muslim people, and their psyches. Therefore, the U.S. government needed to strike back at each component

that Al Qaeda was using if it was to be a successful campaign against terrorism. Through the collection of information gathered on actions that have transpired after 9/11, the researcher argues that such restraining forces have been initiated and are currently working to decrease the power that the propelling forces had generated before the attacks occurred.

Chapter 5

September 11, 2001

- 8:46 AM Plane crashes into north tower of the World Trade Center
- 9:03 AM Plane crashes into south tower of the World Trade Center
- 9:17 AM The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) shuts down all New York City area airports.
- 9:21 AM The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) halts all flights at U.S. airports. It is the first time in history that air traffic has been halted nationwide.
- 9:38 AM Plane crashes into the Pentagon. Evacuation begins immediately.
- 9:45 AM The White House Evacuates.
- 10:05 AM The south tower of the World Trade Center collapses.
- 10:10 AM A portion of the Pentagon collapses.
- 10:10 AM Plane crashes in Somerset County, Pennsylvania.
- 10:22 AM The State and Justice Departments, as well as, the World Bank are evacuated.
- 10:28 AM The World Trade Center's north tower collapses.
- 10:45 AM All Federal buildings in Washington, D.C. are evacuated.
- 1:44 PM Five warships and two aircraft carriers are ordered to leave the U.S. Naval Station in Norfolk, Virginia to protect the East Coast.
- 4:10 PM Building 7 of the World Trade Center collapses.

-U.S. Department of State, 2002


The events of September 11, 2001 will forever be regarded as the “critical incident” that changed the way the United States understood and dealt with terrorism. Metaphorically, the critical incident refers to the point in time in which the tides change. In Lewin’s force field analysis, the change in direction signifies the emergence of restraining forces within the model once a certain threshold has been crossed. Al Qaeda’s pre-9/11 propelling forces were not necessarily unstoppable, but were allowed to continue until a critical incident—the attacks of 9/11—demonstrated that such an imbalance between the opposing sides existed that restraining forces had to be mobilized to shift the power once again. In this model, the restraining forces constituted a multi-

pronged approach initiated by the United States after being attacked by Al Qaeda terrorists.

Post 9/11 Restraining Forces

Following the attacks the U.S. government put into place a plan of action to combat terrorism that would draw upon five different but simultaneously utilized fronts: homeland security actions, financial actions, diplomatic actions, military actions, and investigative actions. The government's concept of a multi-front approach is a structural example of Lewin's restraining forces. To counter the social conditions that had enabled Al Qaeda to reach the critical incident, opposing conditions had to be enacted. Figure 1 demonstrates the hypothesized post 9/11 conditions in which the balance of forces have shifted and restraining conditions now outweigh the propelling forces.

Figure 5.1
Post 9/11 Conditions



The necessary and sufficient conditions that make up the restraining forces are dynamically pieced together to, on the one hand, explain the web of defense the U.S. is using to regain the upper hand on terrorism, and on the other, to demonstrate another the interconnectedness of the propelling and restraining forces. The U.S. government aimed to tear down the financial stability that Al Qaeda had built up over the past decade. The

restraining forces used to do this were the legislative actions taken to freeze the accounts of Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda supporters, and the cooperative efforts of countries in a united effort to combat terrorism. The exploitation of globalization in its endeavor to destroy the U.S. included both the technological capabilities and the frustrations of marginalized people. To counter this exploitation, coalition forces have joined together to trace the use of technology and to send a message to the citizens of the world condemning the acts of terrorism. The backlash of human emotion has also helped to curb the ability of Al Qaeda to recruit frustrated young Muslims. The strategic leadership of Al Qaeda has been met with a new organizational structure of government agencies. Now intelligence sharing among U.S. agencies as well as with agencies in other countries allows information to be spread rapidly to take out terrorist cells all over the world.

Finally, the true believer status has been restrained first by military action. Operation Enduring Freedom exhibited the power that the U.S. was willing to use to deter terrorism. For some Al Qaeda terrorists this served as a wake-up call from the illusion that Al Qaeda had been feeding them. The U.S. was not the paper tiger that Al Qaeda had insisted it was. Still many have remained loyal. The coalition remains strong and united to continue to flush out the faithful terrorists determined to see Al Qaeda's mission carried through. A detailed look at the connections between the forces, unveils a network structure. Rather than being linear in nature the structure of a network allows not only a multi-pronged level of attack, but also a reinforced structure because more than one restraining force can be a deterrent for a propelling force. It is also important to note that these conditions were not overnight manifestations of items never used before, but rather mechanisms that had low priority until it was proven absolutely necessary by the attacks

of 9/11. For more than fifty years, government supported intelligence organizations have operated with the mission of protecting the U.S. from harm. Unfortunately, these agencies have also carried weaknesses detected and exploited by Al Qaeda members. The reasons for this are complicated but the failure to hone in on and correct these internal problems were obviously catastrophic.

Necessary Conditions

Protecting the Homeland

The United States came to terms with the idea of being a high-profile target in the wake of the attacks. No longer able to deem terrorism as a peripheral threat the United States had to face the enemy head on (Woods, 2003). The Federal government defines homeland security as "a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S., reduce Americas vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur" (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002, p.2). Departments and agencies immediately took steps to strengthen and secure the homeland (Strengthening Homeland Security Since 9/11, 2003). Following the attacks multiple national strategies were created to serve as guidelines for dealing with terrorism issues. The National Strategy for Homeland Security was a document created in July 2002, that emphasized the prevention of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. This strategy compliments the National Security Strategy of the United States which was set forth to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of the United States. As mutually supportive documents, both provide the principles with which the executive branch and other departments and agencies follow.

Listed under the above two headings are other guidelines that pertain to specific areas. These guidelines include:

- *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* defines the war plan against international terrorism; the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction coordinates efforts to deny terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction.
- *The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace* outlines initiatives to secure information technology.
- *The National Money Laundering Strategy* provides the aims for cutting off the flow of illegal money to fund terrorist and criminal activity.
- *The National Defense Strategy* details priorities for our most powerful security instrument.
- *The National Drug Control Strategy* aims to combat drug smuggling and consumption (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002).

Each document serves a preparatory purpose by setting up a “how to proceed” plan for various sectors in the case that an attack should occur. In addition to the national strategy guidelines, the government engineered an anti-terrorism framework.

“Defense-in depth” is the phrase used to describe the United States’ framework to defend America and deter terrorism. The model boasts four concentric rings of defense: the outermost ring consists of diplomatic, military, and intelligence organizations operating overseas with a goal of pre-empting attacks on U.S. soil; the next ring includes organizations such as the Customs Service, immigration and Naturalization Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard-- newly installed under the Department of Homeland Security—to

protect the borders and flow of migration in and out of the U.S.; the third ring includes Federal, state, and local law enforcement “first responders” that operate within the U.S. to reduce vulnerability to perilous situations; and the innermost circle includes the private sector and Federal agencies that play a critical role in safeguarding the key physical infrastructures (Perl, 2003).

The attacks left many government officials, as well as, American citizens wondering why America was attacked without warning. After the Joint Inquiry revealed weaknesses and the agencies were publicly criticized, strengthening through reorganization ensued. President Bush also created a new Homeland Security Department (DHS) that would serve as the agency responsible for overseeing the protection and preparedness of the U.S. infrastructure. The following information details how the U.S. has upgraded and reorganized its agencies to ensure a seamless web of defense.

The Network

The U.S. anti-terrorism defense consists of departments and agencies working as nodes in a connected network. Sawyer (2003), an expert in defense policies and a researcher for the Journal of Homeland Security, states that the U.S. agencies must not only create the “dots”—collection of data—but also connect the dots by sharing and creating the knowledge centered around the “dots”. The PATRIOT Act of 2001, was a central piece of legislative action to accomplish exactly what Sawyer described. The four tenets of the PATRIOT Act include: facilitating the sharing of information and cooperation among government agencies; allowing investigators to use tools in a pre-emptive manner against suspected terrorists; update new laws to reflect new threats; and

intensify the punishment for those who commit terrorist crimes (Department of Justice, 2001). The PATRIOT Act supported the actions the intelligence community needed to diminish and deny terrorist activity. Re-emphasizing anti-terrorism divisions, reorganizing agencies, upgrading technology, sharing information between agencies, and having a wider range of pre-emptive power were objectives the government intended to attain in order to build a network-- much like that of Al Qaeda's—that would be more resourceful and prevention oriented. The National Security Council (NSC) advises the President on national security issues and foreign policy.

Within this framework is the Counterterrorism Security, which is composed of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, and the CIA and FBI. These departments both collectively and independently work to combat terrorism. The Department of State is responsible for all U.S. Government efforts to combat terrorism overseas. The Department of Defense is responsible for all military operations and works closely with the CIA on covert operations. The Department of Justice is the lead agency for all law enforcement, and criminal matters related to terrorism both domestically and internationally. Efforts to prevent, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the U.S. is the job of the Department of Homeland Security. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has the capabilities for both domestic intelligence and law enforcement and is housed under the Department of Defense. Finally, the Central Intelligence Agency is an independent agency that conducts research, develops and deploys high-level technology for intelligence purposes, and analyzes intelligence information. In 2003, the President created the new Terrorist Threat Integration Center to physically house staff from the DHS, FBI, and CIA, as well as,

work with the other departments as needed. This Center will integrate and analyze all terrorist threat-related information collected in the U.S. and overseas. The following paragraphs details what each of the network components have done to strengthen homeland security and diminish the presence of terrorists around the world.

Department of State

Through its Counterterrorism Office, the Department of State seeks to gain support from foreign countries to combat terrorism around the world. The Office offers programs to enhance the capabilities of countries to fight terrorism. The Counterterrorism Policy Workshop provides a line of communication between U.S. and foreign officials to produce concrete improvements in terror prevention capabilities. The Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) has been deployed to over 20 countries in the last decade to help timely responses to terrorist attacks. Top Officials (TOPOFF) assist in the preparation of top U.S. officials to deal with and respond to incidents of terrorism or weapons of mass destruction. Finally, the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) helps countries strengthen border security and stop terrorists before they can act (Counterterrorism Assistance, Capacity Building, and Training, 2003).

Department of Defense

The role of the Department of Defense in the war on terrorism includes executing military strikes overseas and maintaining weapons defense for the homeland security. Components of the Department that are utilized in the war on terrorism are the National Security Agency (NSA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The NSA is responsible for protecting U.S. information systems and producing foreign intelligence. Since 9/11 the NSA has increased the number of translators to analyze information in

other languages (The National Security Agency is the Nation's cryptologic organization, 2003). DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign military intelligence. The Agency supports combat missions by providing military intelligence to military planning and operations officials. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency provides logistical information to military forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and they also collect imagery intelligence.

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice is responsible for overseeing and coordinating law enforcement agencies and in bringing criminals to justice. The Department has brought charges against a number of suspected terrorists including the current suspect to be on trial, Zacarias Mousouai. The Department of Justice also works with international governments on extradition issues (Department of Justice). In December 2002 an agreement between U.S. and EUROPOL—European law enforcement organization-- that enable the exchange of data on terrorists between law enforcement. The U.S. and European Union state members also signed the Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements in June 2003. This agreement gives police and prosecutors on both sides of the Atlantic new tools to combat terrorism (Counterterrorism Cooperation Fact Sheet).

Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security was officially established on January 24, 2003, but the plans had been in the works shortly after the attacks. On November 25, 2002, the President Signed the Homeland Security Act of 2002. This Act consolidated 22 disparate separate federal agencies, offices, and research centers into the Department of Homeland Security (Perl. 2003). The Department is comprised of five major divisions:

Border & Transportation Security; Emergency Preparedness & Response; Science & Technology; Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection; and Management.

The Department of Homeland Security released a detailed list of initiatives that have occurred since 9/11. DHS orchestrated and launched Operation Liberty Shield, a comprehensive national plan that initiated involvement from multiple agencies and departments. Priorities of Operation Liberty Shield include: increased security at borders; stronger transportation protections; ongoing measures to disrupt threats against our nation; greater protections for critical infrastructure and key assets; increased public health preparedness; and federal response resources positioned and ready. The Department also takes the lead role in issuing warnings, threat advisories, and recommended response measures for American safety agencies and citizens. A study conducted by the Terrorism Research Center reviewed the actions taken by the U.S. government--post 9/11--to determine whether or not proper steps were in place to deter terrorist attacks. According to the report, one of the most important steps being pursued was a higher alert on the nation's air, land, and sea borders (Strengthening Homeland Security Since 9/11, 2003).

Border security initiatives include new tamper resistant visas, an enhanced lookout system, and requiring almost all applicants to have face-to-face interviews. A 50% increase in Border Patrol Agents has brought the total to 10,000. A larger agent pool has enabled increased examinations and round-the-clock staffing at remote crossings. The Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) was developed to provide a computer database system that allows quick identity reference of potential terrorists entering or leaving a country to border control officials in several different countries. The U.S.

signed the Smart Border Declaration with Canada in 2001, and the U.S.-Mexican Border Partnership with Mexico in 2002. Both documents enhance joint law enforcement for increasing security and protecting borders. The DHS also began operating the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) which tracks foreign students who come to the U.S. by making sure they are actually enrolled and attending classes.

The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection—housed in DHS—launched the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to enhance port security. Forty-six of the world's major ports have already or are in negotiations to support CSI. Mobile x-ray units are used to detect radiation and scan containers on high-interest vessels entering the U.S. Port security patrols have increased to 124,000 since 9/11, which is the largest commitment to port security since World War II. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 allows the Coast Guard to require stricter security assessments of ports, vessels, and facilities.

The DHS has suspended the Transit Without Visa program (TWOV) as one of the ways to cut off access of terrorists to board airplanes bound for the U.S. Over 48,000 Federal screeners have received training on baggage inspection, which will continue to be given to all employees. To alleviate safety concerns aboard planes thousands of Federal Air Marshals have been added and are flying on commercial flights more frequently, cockpit doors have been hardened to prevent a hostile takeover, and pilots who have been through the appropriate training have been armed with guns.

The DHS is also overseeing enhancements in the areas of infrastructure, cyberspace protection, and biological and chemical warfare detection. Protecting the infrastructure entails securing the physical and cyber-based systems that are vital to

national security, economic security, and public health and safety. By communicating with the private sector regularly, vulnerability assessment tools have been developed and many vulnerabilities have been identified. The DHS seeks to eliminate these weaknesses and deter terrorist attacks against soft targets.

In June 2003, the National Cyber Security Division (NCSA) was created under DHS. Within this division is the Cyber Security Tracking Analysis and Response Center that is responsible for examining cyber security incidents and neutralizing damage. Recent events dealt with by NCSA include the worms and viruses on the Internet, and technical experts responded by developing solutions to terminate the problems. Through the Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FedCIRC), NCSA officials provide Federal agencies assistance during any critical computer event to reduce the impact and damage of the event. The dependence on computer technology today has created another target for terrorists. The U.S. has enlisted the assistance of computer experts to diminish the threat of a cyberspace attack and to be prepared when destructive incidents occur.

The Administration also wants to eliminate the threat of an attack by chemical or biological weapons. The DHS and other agencies such as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are focused on detection, response, and research and development. After 9/11, the National Institute of Health's (NIH) civilian biodefense research budget increased from \$100 million to \$1.5 billion. By 2004, the budget will increase another \$1.6 billion. This money is intended to fund Project BioShield, research that will develop new countermeasures and permit distribution of treatments quickly in times of crisis. The funding will also go to development of new drugs and vaccines to fight against threats such as anthrax, smallpox, and Ebola. So far, 490,000 soldiers and

support personnel have been given vaccines against smallpox. The U.S. has enough smallpox vaccine to immunize every person in the U.S. if an attack were to occur. The goals of the DHS are centered on shielding the country and its citizens. By taking actions to alleviate weaknesses and predict future terrorist attack scenarios, the DHS continues to strengthen the homeland immune system.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The main concerns of the FBI dramatically changed after the attacks. As of September 10, 2001, there were 535 international terrorism agents located around the world and 82 at the FBI headquarters. On September 12, 2001, 7,000 FBI agents were reassigned from other areas of the organization (Mueller, 2003). In addition to cooperative initiatives that have taken place between intelligence agencies, intra-agency coordination has increased. Within the U.S. two important task forces have been established. The Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) consist of law enforcement officers, FBI agents, and other federal agents who work together to investigate and deter terrorism (Federal Bureau of Investigation). This task force was created in 1980, but as Miller, Stone, and Mitchell (2002) describe, the JTTF was slowly withering away prior to the attacks. Even after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the task force struggled with a small number of agents. The number of people involved doubled after 9/11. Today a total of 66 JTTF's operate nationwide with 2,300 personnel (Federal Bureau of Investigation). In October 2001, the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) was created under the direction of President Bush. Representatives of the FBI, Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Customs Service, and other federal agencies combine their expertise to prevent terrorist suspects from entering the U.S. In January

2003, the FTTTF had identified over 200 terrorist suspects (Federal Bureau of Investigation).

In the two years since 9/11, the FBI has substantially progressed its efforts in terrorism especially in intelligence and information technology. Mueller (2003) stated in a speech presented at an ACLU conference that "critical to preventing terrorism attacks is improving our intelligence capabilities so that we can increase the most important aspect of terrorist intelligence information—its predictive value" (p.2). The number of strategic analysts has quadrupled to 700 nationwide. They have hired new "report officers"—highly skilled in collecting intelligence information and transmitting it into the hands of those who need it—to man the new Intelligence Reports Offices (Bush to Create Terrorist Threat Integration Center, 2003). The Counterterrorism Watch Center is a 24-7 global command center for gathering and managing all domestic and foreign terrorism threats. The FBI has responded to over 3,000 terrorist threats since 9/11 through the Center. Keeping the flow of communication open between the different units is not only a physical mandate but also a technological one as well. Implementation of a revolutionary new data management system has made it possible to share information instantly with the CIA, Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies when deemed necessary (Bush to Create Terrorist Threat Integration Center). At 591 sites in the U.S., the FBI has deployed a new trilogy network to replace the outdated technology. This new network has increased bandwidth which helps agents communicate faster, displays three layers of security and will be installing new applications such as the Virtual Case File by 2004 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2003).

Reorganizing and implementation of new technology reinforce the infrastructure of an organization, yet in the case of homeland security actual deterrence activity determines the degree to which the improvement efforts are successful. The FBI has several items that can be noted as successes against terrorism. Over 260 individuals have been charged as a result of terrorist investigations. Terrorist cells in the U.S. have been disrupted through FBI investigative work and detention. Six U.S. citizens from Buffalo, NY pled guilty to providing materials to Al Qaeda members and training in Al Qaeda camps. Earnest James Ujaama was arrested in Seattle and eventually pled guilty to providing material support to the Taliban. In Portland, another seven people were detained for engaging in a conspiracy to join the fight against coalition forces in Afghanistan and supporting the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Two Detroit individuals were convicted of supporting Islamic extremists plotting attacks in the U.S., Jordan, and Turkey. Individuals who have supported other terrorist groups such as Hizballah have been arrested and detained by the FBI in North Carolina, Florida, and Virginia (Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism, 2003). In total, over 140 convictions and guilty pleas have been obtained from efforts displayed by the FBI in cooperation with other agencies. Although the intelligence community admits that they are still putting the puzzle together and much is still to be uncovered, at this point the successes outweigh the failures.

Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) went through its own adjustments in light of the attacks. Counterterrorism has been a priority of the CIA for many years. In the mid-1980s, a series of high-profile terrorist attacks galvanized US policymakers to take

the offensive against international terrorism. A task force chaired by then Vice President George Bush was formed in 1986 to address the problem of international terrorism. The task force concluded that US Government agencies collected information on terrorism, but did not aggressively operate to disrupt terrorist activities. As a result of these findings, then Director of Central Intelligence, William Casey, created the DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC) and directed it to preempt, disrupt, and defeat terrorists. Yet the ability of Al Qaeda to accomplish its successful attack on American soil suggests that the CTC failed to see its objectives all of the way through. Only speculations can be made as to the reason of this failure. Politics and bureaucracy red tape may have played a part, as well as, a lack of appropriations within the international terrorism operations.

Since 9/11 the "wall" between the CIA, FBI, and other departments such as the Department of Defense crumbled and cooperation has ensued. Within days of the attacks, President Bush signed a classified "finding" authorizing the CIA to take all measures in pursuing and eliminating Al Qaeda leadership threats. This included alleviating the tight constraints on such covert tactics as targeted killings (Cloud, 2002). The CIA has doubled the size of the Counterterrorism center and quadrupled the manpower engaged in counterterrorism analysis (Bush to Create Terrorist Threat Integration Center, 2003). To correct the problems within the agency, millions of dollars were spent and hundreds of employees were hired or reassigned to the anti-terrorism effort. Some of the new terrorism agents were officers drawn out of retirement that had more operational skills than rookie agents. Agents were deployed to posts abroad by the fourth week in September 2001, with 100 men sent to Afghanistan ahead of the U.S. Special Forces (Cloud, 2002). In addition, a new seven-member headquarters unit was created under the

name of Counterterrorism- Special Operations. This team was put in charge of the agents in Afghanistan. The CIA also helped advise, arm and bring together disparate anti-Taliban militias that were utilized in bringing about the change of power in Afghanistan. The CIA has continued to disrupt terrorist plans, expand the insight of terrorist organizations, and work on bridging the relationships between the U.S. and foreign partners. The CIA has helped law enforcement agents in a number of other countries to hunt down suspected Al Qaeda terrorists. The changes at the CIA constitute the largest and most rapid reorganization plan in its 55-year history.

Terrorist Threat Integration Center

President Bush created the new intelligence center to ensure effective and smooth flow of communication between organizations dealing with the terrorism threat. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center began operating on May 1, 2003. The Center has one central location where all foreign and domestic terrorist intelligence is collected and assessed (U.S. Department of State, 2003). The DCI's Counterterrorist Center, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, Department of Homeland Security, and when appropriate, elements of the Department of Defense generate and share information to combat terrorism. Specific goals of the TTIC include optimized use of expertise and capabilities to conduct threat analysis; create a structure that ensures information sharing among agencies; assimilate terrorist threat information to create a comprehensive threat picture; and the duty of providing threat assessments to the national leadership. TTIC seeks to "fuse" the efforts of all counterterrorism efforts.

The investigation and intelligence is only one of the fronts with which the U.S. is eliminating terrorism, and the new priority emphasis and reorganization has made this

anti-terrorism front a success. Before the creation of DHS, many of these divisions did not exist to research, develop, or implement defenses in areas critical to homeland security. Maintaining intelligence around the world had reached an all time low, and in fighting between the FBI, CIA, and military intelligence crippled the ability to effectively uncover terrorist plots. Although ideas about how terrorists might attack were voiced, countermeasures were also diluted by the illusion that a catastrophic terrorist attack would never occur on U.S. soil. 9/11 tested current security measures of the U.S. and inspired new views about terrorism in the U.S.

Military Operations

The military front of the war on terrorism commenced on October 7, 2001, under the heading Operation Enduring Freedom. Although the White House knew that this war would not be a war that was easily fought or won with militaristic weapons, immediate goals of the U.S. called upon assistance from the military. The military enlisted a strategy called the 4D strategy: Defeat, Deny, Diminish, and Defend. The main component was reduction of the terrorists' scope and capability by isolating and localizing their activities. In order to do this training facilities and base of operation had to be determined, as well as, identifying potential terrorists (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003). Afghanistan was the targeted location for military action because it was the base of operations for Al Qaeda. After the U.S. government in 1996 pressured Sudan, Bin Laden sought a country that had a weak central government where his terrorist business could flourish. Bin Laden found Afghanistan and the Taliban regime—which controlled close to 80 percent of the state—to be the perfect destination (Gunaratna, 2003). The Taliban emerged as the strongest faction of the Muslim Afghan mujahedeen rebels and gained

control of Afghanistan in 1996. The extreme interpretation of Islamic law led to the destruction of Afghanistan culture, starvation and repression of the society, and attracted widespread criticism. Afghanistan became a terrorist sponsored state with Al Qaeda members burrowed throughout the country (Gunaratna). On September 20, 2001, President Bush gave a list of demands to the Taliban that included turning over all Al Qaeda leaders and supporting members to the U.S., release all unjustly imprisoned foreign nationals, close all Al Qaeda training camps, and allow the U.S. access to these training camps (Bush, 2001). Anything less than immediate compliance with these demands was considered an act of siding with the terrorists, which came to fruition on October 7, 2001. Strategic military operations were led by General Tommy Franks with a goal to destroy the Al Qaeda network and bases inside Afghanistan and remove the illegitimate Taliban regime from power (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003). Evidence of the international coalition was visible during Operation Enduring Freedom. Coordination of staging, basing, and over-flight rights were examples of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

By the middle of March 2002, the Taliban were no longer in power, the Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan had been eliminated, and humanitarian aid was being given to the citizens of Afghanistan. Valuable information was also collected during the raids on Al Qaeda's bases. Intelligence was gathered on the plans, membership, structure, intentions of the terrorist group, and first hand investigations into the capabilities of the production of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons (Pike, n.d.). Operation Warrior Sweep commenced in July of 2003 with the help of the Afghan National Army. This operation was aimed at blocking positions to intercept any anti-coalition or anti-government forces

that may have been traveling in the Ayubkhel valley in the southeast part of the country (Pike). Also in August and September of 2003, Operation Mountain Viper was executed to drive Taliban forces out of their remote hiding in the mountains of Afghanistan.

***Once Afghanistan was** on its way to stability, the U.S. government turned its attention towards Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. On March 19, 2003, selected military strikes were initiated against the Iraqi regime under the title Operation Iraqi Freedom (Bush, 2003). Much dissention surrounded the United States' decision to engage in the dismantlement of the Iraqi regime. Even though President Bush and other government officials argued vehemently that taking Saddam out of power was the next progression in the war on terrorism, other countries and even coalition members did not see it that way. Documented on one of the pages from the White House website lists ten reasons why liberating Iraq supported the war on terrorism. Among the reasons listed is the termination of a state sponsor of terrorism, removal of a tyrant that is a security threat to the U.S. and the world, and destruction of possible links between Saddam and Al Qaeda (Results in Iraq: 100 Days Toward Security and Freedom, 2003). Twenty-seven countries have been counted as coalition allies in the Iraqi War with the closest ally being Great Britain. Victories for Operation Iraqi Freedom include removing Hussein from power, shutting down the Salman Pak training camp where members of many terrorist groups trained, and killing or capturing forty-two of fifty-five of the most wanted criminals of Saddam's regime—including both of his sons Uday and Qusay (Pike, n.d.).

The military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq were carried out by the U.S. and coalition forces as one of the fronts to the war on terrorism. The short-term goals of these military strikes have been considered successes by the U.S. government because a

majority of the goals—dismantling repressive terrorism supporting regimes, eliminating states that sponsor terrorism, and tearing down the bases and training camps that provide terrorists with knowledge and security—have been witnessed (Pike, n.d.). The long-term successes are more difficult to judge. Neither Afghanistan nor Iraq has stable governments in place, and terrorist attacks against U.S. and coalition forces continue to occur in an attempt to sustain instability within the countries. In addition, continued military efforts of the U.S. have come under fire from governments concerned that the U.S. is more concerned with its unilateral well being than it is in truly being a part of a global community. It is uncertain whether or not more military campaigns will persist into the future. Regardless of the actions taken in the future the U.S. military defense is a mainstay as a viable option to use if deemed necessary by officials responsible for the safety of America.

Freezing Financial Assets

One of the first actions taken after 9/11 was to shut off the supply of money that enabled terrorists to plan and execute their attacks. Since 9/11, \$34.2 million in the U.S. and \$70.5 million overseas have been blocked from terrorist hands. On September 24, 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order 13224 which empowered the U.S. Treasury Department to fast-forward efforts to starve the terrorists of their financial structure. The Order allows the Treasury Department to target those institutions and individuals that financially support terrorism by freezing U.S. assets and blocking U.S. transactions of terrorists. In addition, the Executive Order expanded the coverage of existing orders from terrorism specifically in the Middle East to global terrorism and included the targeting of those “associated with” designated terrorist groups. The U.S. government has

designated 36 terrorist organizations to have their financial assets frozen and transactions blocked. In addition, the Foreign Assets Office has released a list of 2500 names—both institutions and individuals—that have been blocked (Gunaratna, 2003).

Before 9/11, economic deterrence tools used by the U.S. came in the form of restrictions and sanctions. Restrictions included foreign assistance, technology transfers, foreign exchange and capital transactions, and economic access. Sanctions included embargos, foreign aid suspensions, restrictions on aircraft and ship traffic, and abrogation of a friendship (Perl, 2003). Although somewhat successful, these actions were created to be used against states and not terrorist groups. New strategies were imperative to fight the new enemy. The Executive Order has been accompanied by other strategies to suppress terrorist financing. New money laundering legislation was put into effect to give authorities the ability to investigate sources of foreign deposits that may stem from corruption, prohibits U.S. banks from dealing with foreign shell banks that do not adhere to regulated banking standards, adds forfeiture provisions for currency being smuggled into or out of the U.S., and gives the authority to monitor U.S. activities of Hawalas (Weintraub 2002). Several agencies—both old and new—have been working together to confront the financial side of terrorism. On September 14, 2001, the U.S. government created Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center (FTAT). The task force is a multi-agency effort to detect terrorist funding and freeze assets before future attacks are able to occur. In October 2001, the Treasury Department's Undersecretary, Jimmy Gurule, announced the goals of Operation Green Quest, an initiative led by U.S. Customs Service. This operation was responsible for bringing the full spectrum of the government's expertise to eliminate the money trail of terrorists. Another important

aspect of Operation Green Quest is to identify possible future terrorist funding. The Operation serves as the investigative arm that supports the new Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center and the long established Office of Foreign Asset Control. One notable tool used in Operation Green Quest is the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which is used to collect financial data under the Bank Secrecy Act (US Customs Service, 2001).

With money transactions occurring globally at the push of a button, the U.S. must rely on the help of other countries to successfully achieve its financial freezing goals. The U.S. received overwhelming support for the financial war on terrorism from 208 countries and jurisdictions around the world. A total of 167 countries have issued orders freezing terrorist assets while others have asked the U.S. for help in rooting out terrorist funding. The U.S. has even enlisted the support from Liechtenstein and the United Arab Emirates, both strong supporters of banking privacy (Gunaratna, 2003). The largest international effort in the financial war on terrorism is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Although it was created in 1989, the FATF has adopted forty changes eight of which deal directly with terrorist financing--since 9/11 that has enhanced the ability to deter money laundering. The task force, made up of thirty-three member countries, is a "policy-making body" that generates needed political will to create legislation and reforms to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The missions of the task force are reviewed on a five-year basis, with the next review to be in 2004 (New Anti-Money Laundering Standards Released, 2003).

Not all countries are fully supportive of the progressive efforts made by the U.S. and others. The FATF has listed the current non-cooperative countries and territories as

Cook Islands, Egypt, Guatemala, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nigeria, Philippines, and Ukraine. The non-cooperative designation was given to countries that do not implement anti-money laundering systems (FATF). Collaboration between the FATF and other international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank reinforce and encourage all countries to adopt the eight new recommendations to deter terrorist financing. The U.S. will continue to persuade countries that do not support the deterrence of terrorists, but still the overwhelming majority of countries support financial efforts to cease terrorist funding.

Cooperation Among Countries

According to the Nation Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), the U.S. was prepared to adopt old alliances and create new partnerships with states that were willing; assist and support weak states that asked for help; persuade states that are hesitant; and compel states that are unwilling to take the steps to needed to fight terrorism. As one nation combating terrorism there is still the ability of the enemy to hide, operate, and plan. The U.S., although a global superpower, cannot police the globe or trample on the laws established in other countries. A civilized world with sovereign nations does not allow such actions to occur. But as one world cooperating together to combat terrorism there is nowhere for the enemy to safely hide, nowhere to set up training camps, or to easily wire funds to those plotting an attack. When a terrorist organization is forced to stay on the run it becomes very difficult to set up the elaborate plans that take years to create. The U.S. recognized that while it would do everything in its power to protect itself from another terrorist attack of this caliber, it was essential to have the cooperation of countries to fully accomplish this goal.

United Nations

The United Nations is a pillar in the global community that encourages cooperative initiatives and standards for the stability of the world. The primary goal of the United Nations Security Council's is to maintain international peace and security. When the attacks of 9/11 occurred, the Security Council established Resolution 1373, which insisted that all states deter terrorism by eliminating its ability to operate internationally. Under the Resolution, the Counterterrorism Committee was established to raise the level of global counterterrorism capability, cooperation, and effectiveness (UN Action Against Terrorism, 2003). On January 16, 2002, U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1390, which obligated its members to freeze funds of all associated with the Taliban and Al Qaeda (Perl, 2003).

NATO and ANZUS

The nineteen members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) unanimously invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its 52-year history. Article V claims that the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all (Bennett, 2001). The members of NATO, which include: Belgium; Canada; Czech Republic; Denmark; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Italy; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Spain; Turkey; United Kingdom; and the United States, agreed that maintaining a united front would send a message to the terrorists that their actions would not be tolerated (NATO, 2003). Each member was ready to assist by all means necessary. Also, under Article V of the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America (ANZUS), Australia and New Zealand

also voiced their united front with the U.S. in response to the terrorist acts (Australia Commits Forces to Anti-Terrorism Coalition, 2001).

OAS

The Organization of American States (OAS) Representative, Roger Francisco Noriega, stated on September 19, 2001, "By invoking the Rio Treaty in particular, we recognize--and send a strong message to the terrorists--that in our democratic hemisphere, an attack against one is an attack against all. We also recognize our inescapable obligation and immutable political will to contribute to the common defense against threats to peace and security of the Americas"(p.1). The treaties set into action by the respective organizations was the first successful step in building the coalition of the willing to combat terrorism, and these were not the only states ready to fight terrorism.

Coalition of the Willing

Within hours of the attacks, multiple countries expressed their support and condolences over the effects of the attacks. When President Bush made his speech to the nation, he boldly stated that countries either stand with the U.S. or they stand with the terrorist enemy. The first objectives of the coalition were to stop Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist network and to terminate the power of the Taliban regime which provided safe housing for terrorists in Afghanistan (Campaign Against Terrorism: Coalition Update, 2003). The military front was underway immediately following the attacks and constituted the most visible evidence of the united coalition among countries. In the first few weeks after the attacks, some 70 nations had pledged military assistance in the war on terrorism. On October 17, 2001, a detailed report was conducted for members of Congress examining all of the countries that vowed to support the U.S. and

the assistance each country was willing to give in the fight against terrorism (Hildreth, Gerleman, & Stevens, 2001). Pledges by countries resonated in the form of armed forces; military equipment; access to naval ports, airspace, airports, and internal transportation routes; permission of basing land, air, and sea forces; and border security around Afghanistan to prevent Al Qaeda members to flee to other countries. An update of the coalition reported in January 2002, that a total of 136 nations had offered some kind of military assistance (Campaign Against Terrorism: Coalition Update).

Located next to the U.S. Central Command headquarters at MacDill Air Force base in Tampa, Florida, there is an international “coalition village” which stations military contingents for 43 countries that assist in various military operations. By March 2002, 17 coalition forces had deployed more than 17,000 troops in or around Afghanistan since October 2001 (Pike, 2003). In addition, the largest international naval task force since World War II was assembled with forty American ships and sixty allied ships to patrol the waters of the Indian Ocean (Pike). These forces came from Canada, Britain, Australia, Japan, Bahrain, and the Netherlands. A total of 89 countries granted over-flight authority, and 23 countries agreed to host U.S. forces involved in offenses. One important offering came from the Gulf Cooperation Council—made up of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—which stated that it supported the U.S. and could use established bases in the area. Although not considered part of the coalition, Iran said it would comply with the U.S. request to rescue all U.S. military in the area if needed and close off its border with Afghanistan (Hildreth, Gerleman, & Stevens, 2001).

Financial cooperation has occurred in the form of freezing assets in countries around the world and imposing tougher legislation to deter terrorism financing. The U.S. could only do so much to block the flow of terrorist money and freeze assets that belong to terrorist organizations. Cooperation from countries that are guided by their own financial regulations was essential to making a noticeable dent to the tune of \$133 million (Campaign Against Terrorism: Coalition Update, 2003). In addition to the joint effort of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), countries are taking it upon themselves to pass legislative acts and enhance detection of terrorism funding. In Germany alone, over 200 bank accounts have been frozen totaling \$4 million in terrorist funds. Mexico is in the process of drafting new amendments to its Federal Penal Code; Turkey already has comprehensive legislation to combat terrorism; and The people's Bank of China has set up an anti-money laundering task force to ensure that no money laundering takes place within the Chinese banking system (Campaign Against Terrorism: Coalition Update). A number of organizations and task forces are working towards a connected goal. Several examples from different continents include: Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG); Europol; East and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG); Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD); and The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (New Anti-Money Laundering Standards Released, 2003). Prohibiting terrorists to easily accumulate and transfer money within the banking system is a difficult but effective initiative that is being met by countries all over the world.

Another area in which the coalition of countries is very critical is the collection of intelligence and investigative actions. Members of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups

know they are not safe in countries that renounce terrorism and aim at bringing them to justice. Since the terror threat is global in nature, it calls for cooperation of countries to communicate information relevant to preventative measures and the capture of terrorists. Since 9/11, over 3,000 Al Qaeda suspects have been detained in 90 countries (Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America, 2003). Success has come through the maintained cooperation and dedication of the global war on terrorism. Secrecy is the nature of intelligence information; therefore, much of the evidence of intelligence cooperation is transmitted through information of key captured Al Qaeda members in different nations.

In Pakistan, over 500 extremists have been arrested. Top members of Al Qaeda such as Zubair, Rarnzi Binalshibh, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, and Khallad Ba' Attash were high profile captures by Pakistani authorities (Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism, 2003). The information sharing between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia has increased significantly according to the White House; however, public information has been limited at the request of the Saudi Royal family. The information known is that after the attacks on Riyadh in May 2003, Saudi Arabia broadly increased their security forces to put several Al Qaeda ringleaders and facilitators out of business including Abu Bakr al-Azdi (Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism, 2003). Hambali--who was captured by Thai police with the help of CIA officials--Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and others in Southeast Asia have taken local Al Qaeda terrorist and Al Qaeda members traveling through the area into custody. In France, Ahmed Laidouini--a liaison between Al Qaeda cells--was arrested; Italian officials discovered evidence of a bomb plot at the U.S. Embassy in 2002; Spain arrested eleven citizens with ties to Al

Qaeda in November 2001; the United Kingdom charged Sulayman Balal Zainulabidin, Yasser Al-Siri, and Sheik Abdullah el-Faisal in terrorist related actions; and Germany, which has maintained a strong working relationship with the CIA and FBI for many years has strengthened that relationship even more by increasing the number of liaisons between the organizations in each country (Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism, 2003).

The coalition of nations is the centerpiece for successfully preventing the proliferation of terrorism in the future. As President Bush made clear, this war will not be won in one defining moment. The coalition of nations must stay committed to capturing terrorists where they hide, creating state legislation and bilateral agreements that will freeze terrorist funds, increase severity of punishment for those guilty of terrorist activity, and fully prepared to take military action if terrorists strike. The evidence of cooperative coalition action has been witnessed repeatedly since 9/11. More and more multilateral initiatives have been put in place. At the 2003, G-8 Summit in Evian, leaders established a Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) to expand and coordinate training and assistance for countries with the will to combat terrorism (Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism, 2003). The Department of State's Counterterrorism Office continues to coordinate all U.S. Government efforts to improve counterterrorism cooperation with foreign governments (U.S. Department of State). The coalition of countries that has amassed has set its sight on combating terrorism on a global scale, and deterring states from, in any way, supporting international terrorist groups to ensure peace in the world for the future.

Sufficient Condition

The sufficient condition—again the one condition that can “make or break” the efforts to combat terrorism—is the collective emotional response experienced after 9/11. It is the aftermath of that event. For example, when a disruption occurs, such as the events of 9/11, human emotions explode and become entangled with the event itself. That contagion of emotions explodes both internally and externally. The collectivity of that society resonates. It resonates in proportion to the scale of that event. The larger the event; the greater the impact. Durkheim described this as “collective conscience”. Individuals are confronted with such overwhelming and consistent force that the collective conscience and the individual conscience are identical (Elwell, 2001). In the case of 9/11 we can see the best example. When a society has been affected in a similar way the similarity of their emotions will resonate. When a society has been affected in a similar way the similarity of their emotions will resonate.

The results of such emotions are a response of action or support for action, hence the idea of the collective emotional response. After the attacks of 9/11, there was a collective emotional response. It was felt not only in the U.S., but also throughout the world. Immediately after and the days to follow 9/11 an outpouring of not only government support but also citizen support came from countries all over the world. They too had felt the same anger, sadness and fears that U.S. citizens were feeling about the attacks. Our vulnerability as people is universal. People connect at the point of impact and hurt. It was this collective emotional response that initiated involvement from so many countries to help in any way possible. The attacks presented an opportunity for

new alliances to be formed because in times of crisis, when these collective emotional responses are felt, people feel the need to do something about it.

The notion of a collective emotional response to the attacks of 9/11 was nowhere greater than in the U.S. The society was caught off guard by the idea of terrorist attacks occurring on U.S. soil. It is the emotional response of the U.S. that makes up the sufficient restraining condition. This model explains much about that event and the events to follow right up until today. It explains foreign policy and collective actions taken. In fact that collective emotional response is the undercurrent for the policies and actions taken by the U.S. against terrorism. In other words, under normal circumstances support for policies and actions implemented by the U.S. government officials are met with wide variations of opinions and ideas.

Most commonly such initiatives tend to be split upon party lines of democrat or republican. However, in times of serious disruptions such differences are put aside and people let their emotions of the situation drive the support of actions for the greater good of the society. After 9/11 the collective emotional response of U.S. citizens resulted in overwhelming support for actions that included: military action in Afghanistan to dismantle the Taliban and hunt down Al Qaeda members; new legislative initiatives such as the PATRIOT Act, the Homeland Security Act, and other legislative acts to freeze terrorist money; funding for reorganization of intelligence agencies and more manpower. These examples cannot be overstated. The actions taken by the U.S. to restrain the propelling forces of terrorism would not have been as great or as unanimously agreed upon if there were not a collective emotional response created by the public that was experienced due to the events of 9/11.

Popular Opinion

The research question is this: how do we know? How do we know that these collective emotions are driving policy? What better way than to conduct public opinion polls. They can reveal much about the assumptions of these ideas. And so that is what this researcher did. Data allowed for the evaluation of these assumptions empirically. Thus several secondary quantitative analyses were conducted to evaluate whether or not there was a significant collective response to the attacks of 9/11. These are known as public opinion polls. Polls are commonly used to evaluate what people think, what they do, and what they want. Since ours is pluralistic society, polls vary as do their opinions. There are demographic and political differences in response to critical issues. This technique has become a science. The results of samples can be generalized to whole regions and populations. And that is the case with what follows in this thesis. ABC contracted with a polling agency to measure the impact of 9/11. They wanted to know what people felt. Thus these pollsters conducted telephone polls several times after the events. The early polls contained general information about the event and how angry people were about this atrocity. One such poll was taken one year after the event. Up then the questions had become rather sophisticated and detailed. This one poll is the one that this researcher chose to analyze because it contained several critical variables that might measure emotional contagion. Thus the analysis for this thesis came from a telephone survey poll conducted one year after the attacks occurred. The first part of this data analysis focuses on the cultural and demographic differences of the society affected by the 9/11 incidents. The second half of the analyses identifies the emotional effects and

the magnitude of these effects that the attacks had on the U.S. public as a collective society.

Just as researchers use ethnomethodology insights and techniques to examine the culture or the ethos in field studies, so too did this researcher. Similar approaches and research strategies were used to evaluate the patterns of interaction that were embedded into the Al Qaeda organization. The researcher went a step further and applied the same techniques then to what the public felt about these events and what policies they wanted. The U.S. collective response was examined empirically using critical variables and demographics to isolate who felt what and how deeply they felt. What they believed and how strongly they believed it.

That sounds simple enough. But this poll contains hundreds of data sets and literally thousands of pieces of information. Here is where the research of ethno methodologists became useful. After conducting years of research on various "cultures" of groups, the researcher suggest a strategy to follow. For example, Holstein and Grubium (1997) suggest that the three variables of gender, class, and religion are central to the understanding of a culture. Taking this cue from ethnomethodology and those who conduct qualitative research in this tradition, the researcher focused on gender, class, and religion. These variable choices became those that initially guided the exploratory direction that the researcher would take. These would be those factors that would open the door and provide insights into exactly how people responded at the moment of impact. These were the variables utilized in the analysis of collective emotional response.

To operationally define the dependent variable—the response of 9/11—the researcher used one question from the survey: “Thinking back to right after the attacks last September 11th, at the time did you personally feel Frightened?” After conducting a Chi-Square analysis, results indicated that the variable of gender exhibited a maximized difference in response. Descriptive statistics on the response and gender measures appear in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1
Gender response to the emotion of Fright

| | | | Q.8 Thinking back to night attacks last September 11th, time did you personally Frightened | | | Total |
|-----------------------|--------|--------------------------------|--|--------|------|-------|
| | | | Ver | Somewh | Not | |
| Q921. RESPONDENTS SEX | Male | Count | 44 | 75 | 107 | 226 |
| | | % within Q921. RESPONDENTS SEX | 19.5 | 33.2 | 47.3 | 100.0 |
| | | % of Total | 9.0 | 15.3 | 21.8 | 46.0 |
| | Female | Count | 145 | 71 | 49 | 265 |
| | | % within Q921. RESPONDENTS SEX | 54.7 | 26.8 | 18.5 | 100.0 |
| | | % of Total | 29.5 | 14.5 | 10.0 | 54.0 |
| Total | | Count | 189 | 146 | 156 | 491 |
| | | % within Q921. RESPONDENTS SEX | 38.5 | 29.7 | 31.8 | 100.0 |
| | | % of Total | 38.5 | 29.7 | 31.8 | 100.0 |

Chi-square = 83.778

dF = 5

P. value = .000.

The respondent's sex appears on the left hand side of the table followed by responses of very frightened, somewhat frightened, or not frightened on the right. Out of a total of 226 males, 19.5 percent felt very frightened, 33.2 percent felt somewhat frightened and 47.3 percent were not frightened. The female's had an opposite response in the ordinal sequence. The number of women polled totaled 265, from which 54.7 percent felt very frightened, 26.8 percent were somewhat, and 18.5 percent were not frightened. The data analysis concluded that women significantly exhibited the emotion of fright more than

men. According to ethnomethodologists, the difference in gender response is an effect of a normative pattern within a particular culture. It is the ideal that drives people within that culture. For instance, while it is an accepted response for women to respond with fear to a crisis, men tend to exhibit higher responses of anger.

The researcher extended the analysis to include modes of elaboration by controlling for confounding variables. In other words, did the difference in gender response remain constant when other demographic variables were analyzed? The first variable was class. Because the original survey did not ask specific questions that dealt with socio-economic status, which is a commonly used item to determine class, the researcher used two different variables to represent class. The first was region of the U.S. The East and West coasts tend to be larger financial centers and have higher standards of living than those who live in the Midwest and South regions. Therefore, differences in class were assumed between the coastal regions and midlands. The researcher compared the different regions in the U.S. to see if there was any difference in the way men and women responded through the emotion of fear. Table 5.2 examines the responses in the East—close to the attacks—and the South, which was more distant from the actual attacks to illustrate two extremes of region.

The top table shows the responses of men and women in the East as compared to the bottom half, which contains the Responses of men and women in the South. The one difference found within regions was on the scale of “not frightened”. A percent was 26.8 of the women polled in the South were not frightened after the attacks as compared to only 8.1 percent that were not frightened in the East. The second variable analyzed as part of the class distribution was between rural and urban areas. Again, the researcher

chose this as a factor of class because generally speaking, larger urban areas tend to be more affluent than rural areas. Descriptive statistics appear in Table 5.3 to compare differences between urban and rural areas. The top table represents gender response from large cities and the bottom from rural areas. Analysis of the female response on the scale of "not frightened" was slightly higher in rural areas than in large cities.

Table 5.2
Gender response within region

| REGION | | | Q.8 Thinking back to right attacks last September 11th, time did you personally Frightened | | | Total |
|--|--------|---------------------------------|--|----------|-------|--------|
| | | | Very | Somewhat | Not | |
| Censdiv = 1,2 (East) Q921. RESPONDENT's SEX | Male | Count | 8 | 14 | 20 | 42 |
| | | % within Q921. RESPONDENT'S SEX | 19.0% | 33.3% | 47.6% | 100.0% |
| | Female | Count | 23 | 11 | 3 | 37 |
| | | % within Q921. RESPONDENT'S SEX | 62.2% | 29.7% | 8.1% | 100.0% |
| Total | | Count | 31 | 25 | 23 | 79 |
| | | % within Q921. RESPONDENT'S SEX | 39.2% | 31.6% | 29.1% | 100.0% |
| | | % of Total | 10.1% | 17.7% | 25.3% | 53.2% |
| | | % of Total | 29.1% | 13.9% | 3.8% | 46.8% |
| | | % of Total | 39.2% | 31.6% | 29.1% | 100.0% |

| REGION | | | Q.8 Thinking back to right attacks last September 11th, time did you personally Frightened | | | Total |
|---|--------|---------------------------------|--|----------|-------|--------|
| | | | Very | Somewhat | Not | |
| Censdiv = 5,6,7 (South) Q921. RESPONDENT's SEX | Male | Count | 20 | 32 | 34 | 86 |
| | | % within Q921. RESPONDENT'S SEX | 23.3% | 37.2% | 39.5% | 100.0% |
| | Female | Count | 51 | 20 | 26 | 97 |
| | | % within Q921. RESPONDENT'S SEX | 52.6% | 20.8% | 26.8% | 100.0% |
| Total | | Count | 71 | 52 | 60 | 183 |
| | | % within Q921. RESPONDENT'S SEX | 38.8% | 28.4% | 32.8% | 100.0% |
| | | % of Total | 38.8% | 28.4% | 32.8% | 100.0% |

The researcher also used level of education as a confounding variable to determine whether the difference in male and female responses showed any differences.

Table 5.3
Cross tabulation for gender response between large city and rural area

| Q.913 Would you describe the areas in which you live as.. | | | Q.8 Thinking back to night attacks last September 11th, time did you personally Frightened | | | Total |
|---|--------|------------------|--|----------|-------|--------|
| | | | Very | Somewhat | Not | |
| Large city | Male | Count | 11 | 18 | 21 | 50 |
| | | % within Q921 | 22.0% | 36.0% | 42.0% | 100.0% |
| Q921. RESPONDENT'S SEX | | RESPONDENT'S SEX | | | | |
| | | % of Total | 10.1% | 16.5% | 19.3% | 45.9% |
| | Female | Count | 35 | 15 | 9 | 59 |
| | | % within Q921 | 59.3% | 25.4% | 15.3% | 100.0% |
| | | RESPONDENT'S SEX | | | | |
| | | % of Total | 32.1% | 13.8% | 8.3% | 54.1% |
| Total | | Count | 46 | 33 | 30 | 109 |
| | | % within Q921 | 42.2% | 30.3% | 27.5% | 100.0% |
| | | RESPONDENT'S SEX | | | | |
| | | % of Total | 42.2% | 30.3% | 27.5% | 100.0% |

| Q.913 Would you describe the areas in which you live as.. | | | Q.8 Thinking back to night attacks last September 11th, time did you personally Frightened | | | Total |
|---|--------|------------------|--|----------|-------|--------|
| | | | Very | Somewhat | Not | |
| Rural area | Male | Count | 4 | 18 | 16 | 38 |
| | | % within Q921 | 10.5% | 47.4% | 42.1% | 100.0% |
| Q921. RESPONDENT'S SEX | | RESPONDENT'S SEX | | | | |
| | | % of Total | 4.4% | 19.8% | 17.6% | 41.8% |
| | Female | Count | 28 | 11 | 14 | 53 |
| | | % within Q921 | 52.8% | 20.8% | 26.4% | 100.0% |
| | | RESPONDENT'S SEX | | | | |
| | | % of Total | 30.8% | 12.1% | 15.4% | 58.2% |
| Total | | Count | 32 | 29 | 30 | 91 |
| | | % within Q921 | 35.2% | 31.9% | 33.0% | 100.0% |
| | | RESPONDENT'S SEX | | | | |
| | | % of Total | 35.2% | 31.9% | 33.0% | 100.0% |

There were three scales for level of education: less than high school; graduated high school; and some college. There were no differences in responses either within the female population or between males and females. The level of education had no bearing

on the extent to which both genders exhibited fear. Finally, analysis of religiosity was used as a variable against response. Table 5.4 details the findings of descriptive statistics.

Table 5.4
Gender response and religiosity

| DEM 15. Would you describe yourself as a religious person, or not a religious person? | | | Q.8 Thinking back to right attacks last September 11th, time did you personally Frightened | | | Total |
|---|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|----------|--------|--------|
| | | | Very | Somewhat | Not | |
| Very religious Q921. RESPONDENT'S SEX | Male | Count | 12 | 18 | 29 | 59 |
| | | % within Q921. RESPONDENT'S SEX | 20.3% | 30.5% | 49.2% | 100.0% |
| | Female | Count | 51 | 29 | 21 | 101 |
| | | % within Q921. RESPONDENT'S SEX | 7.5% | 11.3% | 18.1% | 36.9% |
| Total | Count | 63 | 47 | 50 | 160 | |
| | % within Q921. RESPONDENT'S SEX | 39.4% | 29.4% | 31.3% | 100.0% | |
| | % of Total | 39.4% | 29.4% | 31.3% | 100.0% | |

| DEM 15. Would you describe yourself as a religious person, or not a religious person? | | | Q.8 Thinking back to right attacks last September 11th, time did you personally Frightened | | | Total |
|---|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|----------|--------|--------|
| | | | Very | Somewhat | Not | |
| Not religious Q921. RESPONDENT'S SEX | Male | Count | 9 | 25 | 29 | 63 |
| | | % within Q921. RESPONDENT'S SEX | 14.3% | 39.7% | 46.0% | 100.0% |
| | Female | Count | 17 | 8 | 13 | 38 |
| | | % within Q921. RESPONDENT'S SEX | 8.9% | 24.8% | 28.7% | 62.4% |
| Total | Count | 26 | 33 | 42 | 101 | |
| | % within Q921. RESPONDENT'S SEX | 16.8% | 7.9% | 12.9% | 37.6% | |
| | % of Total | 25.7% | 32.7% | 41.6% | 100.0% | |

A total of 34.2 percent of not religious females responded that they were not frightened from the attacks as compared to 20.8 percent of religious females who responded that they were not frightened. These are revealing statistics.

The results suggest that females that were either not as close in proximity of the attacks, not living in larger cities that resemble where the attacks occurred, or that were not as religious were less likely to exhibit the response of fright than other women. Nevertheless, the modes of elaboration analysis concluded that there was still a difference between gender responses. The emotion of fright was always higher in females than in males. The specific data analysis between gender responses to the emotion of fear was conducted to demonstrate cultural differences. By focusing on the variables suggested by Holstein and Grubium, the analysis was acquiescent of ethnomethodological, or cultural studies, for it exhibited the way in which the two genders emotionally respond to a major disruption in society.

Although cultural differences were identified through the emotion of fear response, this does not lessen the extent to which the society was collectively affected or the impact of support created for action. Specific survey questions were selected to illustrate the magnitude of the effects that the 9/11 attacks had on the U.S. society as a whole. Table 5.5 identifies specific questions and descriptive statistics to illustrate the level of society impacted by the attacks of 9/11.

Question 49 points to the significance of the event. When people are asked to remember certain dates, the amount of people who remember details of actions that occurred during an event results in the magnitude of the event. For instance, if the questions were asked: "Do you remember what you were doing when you heard about the biggest earthquake in San Francisco?" The amount of people who could answer that question would be much smaller because the event did not hold the amount of significance to people all over the U.S., as did the events of 9/11. Both were dangerous

events that took many lives and both were centralized to specific areas within the U.S., however, 9/11 resulted in a much greater collective response than did the earthquake. Out of a total of 1011 people polled in the survey, 973—or 96.2 percent--remembered exactly what they were doing when they heard about the attacks. This shows that the attacks of 9/11 were effectively imprinted into the minds of the U.S. public.

Table 5.5

| Q.49 Do you remember specifically where you were and what you were doing when you first heard about the September 11th | | | | | |
|---|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | Yes | 973 | 96.2 | 96.2 | 96.2 |
| | No | 38 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 1011 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

| Q.12a Do you feel that the events of last September 11th have or have not changed the United States? | | | | | |
|---|-----------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | Yes, changed | 474 | 46.9 | 93.7 | 93.7 |
| | No, not changed | 30 | 3.0 | 6.0 | 99.7 |
| | Don't know | 2 | .2 | .3 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 505 | 50.0 | 100.0 | |
| Missing | System | 506 | 50.0 | | |
| Total | | 1011 | 100.0 | | |

| Q.12b Do you feel that the events of last September 11th have changed the United States, or have not changed the United States? | | | | | |
|--|-----------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | Yes, changed | 465 | 46.0 | 92.0 | 92.0 |
| | No, not changed | 39 | 3.9 | 7.7 | 99.7 |
| | Don't know | 2 | .2 | .3 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 506 | 50.0 | 100.0 | |
| Missing | System | 505 | 50.0 | | |
| Total | | 1011 | 100.0 | | |

Q.13 Do you think it's a long-term change or short term?

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------|------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Long term | 731 | 72.3 | 77.9 | 77.9 |
| | Short term | 196 | 19.3 | 20.8 | 98.7 |
| | Don't know | 12 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 939 | 92.8 | 100.0 | |
| Missing | System | 72 | 7.2 | | |
| Total | | 1011 | 100.0 | | |

Q.14 Do you think it's a big change, or not so big?

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------|-------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Big change | 740 | 73.2 | 78.8 | 78.8 |
| | Not so big change | 192 | 19.0 | 20.5 | 99.3 |
| | Don't know | 7 | .6 | .7 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 939 | 92.8 | 100.0 | |
| Missing | System | 72 | 7.2 | | |
| Total | | 1011 | 100.0 | | |

Q.15 Do you think it's a change for the better, or a change for the worse?

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------|------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Better | 587 | 58.1 | 63.1 | 63.1 |
| | Worse | 303 | 29.9 | 32.5 | 95.6 |
| | Don't know | 41 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 931 | 92.1 | 100.0 | |
| Missing | System | 80 | 7.9 | | |
| Total | | 1011 | 100.0 | | |

Questions 12a and 12b are almost the exact question but were divided up between the two halves of the 1011 people polled. When asked whether or not the events of 9/11 had changed the U.S. or had not changed the U.S., responders answered in three ways: yes, no, or don't know. On question 12a a total of 46.9 percent answered yes and on question 12b a total of 46 percent answered yes. The sum of those percentages is 92.9 percent of the 1011 people polled believed that the events did change the U.S. Finally, questions 13, 14, and 15 focus on both the direction of change and its magnitude. Polling

statistics indicate that 72.3 percent believed that the change would be long-term, 73.2 percent believed that it was a big change, and 58.1 percent believed it was a change for the better.

Change is a word that represents action—mentally or physically. Change can occur through ideologies and through deed, which is what was exhibited after the attacks of 9/11. People's attitudes and beliefs about terrorism and about safety changed almost spontaneously. In addition, change of policies and ways of handling terrorists also changed. The intention of displaying these questions was to show that a collective emotional response resulting from the attacks of 9/11 did occur.

The policies and procedures enacted after the attacks were made possible by this undercurrent of collective emotional response, hence the reason it is the sufficient condition. The collective emotional response was the igniter for all other action. When a society grapples with the effects of a major disruption such as 9/11, the result will be markedly unique from other policy and procedure action for it will be swift and resolute.

Weaknesses of the Propelling forces

In Chapter 4 the weaknesses of restraining forces were discussed. Here, just as in Chapter 4, it is important to understand where the propelling forces lie in relation to the restraining forces. Propelling forces still exist as Al Qaeda is still trying to conduct terrorist attacks and recruit new terrorists. Yet, the limitations of these propelling forces are evident. Al Qaeda no longer has a base of operations where it can set up training camps or facilitate the exploration of biological and chemical weapons. Although globalization remains a viable force, the attacks of 9/11 created the opportunity for understanding what checks need to be put in place so terrorist find it more difficult to exploit globalization. Examples of checks that have been put in place are those such as

monitoring banking transactions more diligently, reinforcing Internet securities, monitoring messages in cyberspace, creating more multilateral cooperation between countries, making better efforts to understand cultural differences and alleviate degenerative problems. The relationship between the dominating propelling forces and the weak restraining forces discussed in Chapter four are dynamically different after the critical incident has occurred. Pre 9/11, the propelling forces were gaining power while the restraining forces were doing little in the way of keeping them in check. However, on the other side of the equation, the propelling forces are weaker not by choice but by force. Therefore, the restraining forces must remain in a dominant position or the propelling forces will again attempt to gain power.

Chapter Summary

Military operations, financial sanctions, homeland defense initiatives, and the cooperation among countries are all necessary conditions that are playing a critical and effective part in restraining Al Qaeda. In April 2003, the Department of State released the annual Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 Report (2003), which detailed statistical analyses in the fight against terrorism. The report indicated that worldwide deaths occurring from terrorist activity had decreased from 3,295 in 2001 to 725 in 2002; worldwide terror incidents declined 44 percent from 355 in 2001 to 199 in 2002; and anti-U.S. attacks declined 65 percent from 219 to 77 (Patterns, 2003). Although this report comes early in the war against terrorism, it can be a tool to monitor success or failure. Continued patterns of decline in the coming years will provide a stronger rate of success.

The U.S. government successfully mapped out a multi-front plan not only for immediate retaliatory measures but also to establish a long-term pre-emptive strategy that would prove destructive to the proliferated tactics that Al Qaeda's network had accomplished over the last decade. Deterrence objectives determined what measures would be taken to restrain the forces of Al Qaeda. For instance, once the U.S. had given the Taliban regime a deadline to relinquish the harboring of terrorists and they did not comply, one U.S. objective was to forcefully go into Afghanistan to destroy Al Qaeda training camps, seize Al Qaeda members, and to remove the Taliban regime from power in Afghanistan. In order to accomplish this initiative, the only option was to use military force. As more and more information began to unfold as to the vast and complicated nature of the enemy and in light of the new fourth generation warfare, the U.S. realized that military operations alone would not deter an organization that had embedded itself deep into the communities of democratic nations all over the world. It was clear that financing had to play an important part in the attacks. A high profile, orchestrated attack coupled with prior intelligence of bin Laden and Al Qaeda's wealth made it clear that another objective would aim at freezing the terrorists out of business. Money plays a huge part in any organization; even a terrorist organization. Immediately financial sanctions were increased through legislative action to freeze the assets and block transactions that keep terrorists in business.

As the shock of what happened resonated all over the U.S., there was also confusion and fear. Unknowing of what the future had in store, the first and foremost priority was to protect the citizens of the United States. As U.S. battleships and NATO AWACS planes guarded the east coast, the illusion of a nation too powerful and secure to

fall victim to such destruction crumbled. A lack of confidence in the intelligence organizations responsible for preventing attacks on U.S. soil began to grow. The objective on the home front was to build a homeland security that would finally bridge the gap of communication between intelligence organizations, and would never again allow the nation to be a victim of terrorism.

The cooperation among nations, not only at the outset of the attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom but also as a constant entity in the war on terrorism, will always be a crucial condition to restraining terrorist forces. As powerful as each of the necessary conditions were and still remain to be, the global coalition is a needed condition that continues to work together and send a message to terrorists as a united front that terrorism, will not be tolerated, and that peace, not terrorism will guide the future of the world.

Such actions carried out by the U.S. and other countries in the war on terrorism will remain the result of the collective emotional response generated from the public. Democracies are made up of the people within them and the action or inaction they are willing to take to eliminate the threat of terrorism. The immediate response of the collective emotions of the U.S. society as well as the societies of other countries was evident through the support of military action and other deterring policies enacted after the successful terrorist attacks of 9/11.

The final chapter contains the summary and conclusion of this research. The researcher discusses the findings and implications of this study, as well as limitations and suggestions for future research.

Chapter 6

Discussion

The focus of this research was an examination of both Al Qaeda and the causes of the attacks of 9/11, and the effects and consequences of those attacks. Another way of looking at this study is that of the processes of cause and effect and the factors surrounding those actions. The events of 9/11 permitted the unique ability to examine two different points of humanity and the social conditions from which each draw upon. Al Qaeda's organization exists in the world as a relatively invisible network of cells plotting and carrying out missions of terror. The attacks of 9/11 acted in a way as an x-ray machine does in that the organization was made visible for a brief but crucial point. The x-ray could then be used as a guide to understanding the make-up of the organization and the social conditions that enabled the organization to successfully accomplish the terrorist mission on U.S. soil. Likewise, the x-ray analogy can be used to describe the other side. It displayed a picture of the collective emotional response--also invisible until a disruption occurs--and how this response resulted in action against the attacks.

At the onset, the researcher proposed three hypotheses for this thesis. The first hypothesis stated that prior to 9/11, the propelling forces exceeded restraining forces. The researcher used social network theory as predictive tool to analyze Al Qaeda's flexible and resilient network. Understanding the make-up of Al Qaeda and the precipitating factors that led to the inception of Al Qaeda was pertinent to deciphering the social conditions of the propelling forces. Through the use of historical narrative analysis, the researcher traced the five necessary and sufficient propelling conditions from the creation of the network up to the attacks. It was through this analysis that the

unbalanced framework began to unfold. The interdependent social and biographical conditions of globalization; financial stability; strategic leadership; support of Islamic law; and true believer status were explained through information and documented actions. In addition, evidence of the weakness of the restraining forces pre 9/11 was included to reference the dominance of the propelling forces even further.

The second hypothesis suggested that after 9/11, restraining forces exceeded propelling forces. Through the evaluation of actions taken by the U.S. and the global coalition of forces, the restraining forces were enacted to drive back the propelling forces. The researcher used quantitative analysis to explain the collective emotional response that produced restraining forces strong enough to successfully hinder the dominance of the propelling forces. The conditions of protecting the homeland, military action, freezing finances, cooperation among countries were ignited by the collective emotional response felt after the attacks of 9/11, and have resulted in the destruction of Al Qaeda's bases and training camps, millions of dollars of frozen money and assets of both Al Qaeda members and supporters, the captures of numerous cell members and top officials within the terrorist group, and the decreased ability of Al Qaeda members to hide, plot, and plan out terror missions.


Finally, the last hypothesis of this study stated that both necessary and sufficient conditions were required for propelling and restraining forces to be effective. The researcher made the case for this hypothesis by examining how each of the necessary and restraining forces worked together as interdependent parts of a whole. If each component of the propelling forces is looked at individually, for instance the financial stability of Al Qaeda, all that can be explained from that one element is that financial backing was an

essential part of accomplishing the attacks of 9/11. However, it could not be stated that the financial stability of the organization by itself could have created the success that the attacks of 9/11 produced. The other necessary conditions were equally important in the success of the attacks. However, the distinction was also made between necessary and sufficient conditions, for there was an unequal balance between these two factors. Whereas necessary conditions served as equal parts to the picture, the sufficient conditions made up the item that served as the most important piece of the puzzle. Again, the sufficient condition could not be a stand-alone component to successful attacks; however, it did hold a significance not matched by the other components. As explained in Chapter 5, the sufficient condition--collective emotional response of U.S. citizens—was an overarching component to the other actions. It was the resolve of the people to support quick and effective action against terrorism that enabled the restraining forces to be dominating forces.

The researcher used the force field analysis model created by Lewin to explain the dynamic relationship of social forces, their identities as systems of action or inaction, and to ultimately make conclusions about the hypotheses presented. Not only were the conditions of the propelling and restraining forces identified, but the research went one step further to determine what flagship factors pushed action on both sides of the equation over the edge. It is important to note that Lewin's force field model is not a static model. The conditions within the framework exist dynamically. In other words, the opposing forces are in a constant state of tension--pushing and pulling. When one side is not keeping up with the actions of the other, it allows the threshold point to be surpassed as in the case of 9/11. Graph 6.1 illustrates the dynamic state of Lewin's model

in which the term “differential conditions” is used to explain that as the war on terrorism continues to evolve, conditions on both sides may be deleted or added as deemed necessary. These conditions will continue to shift depending on the force by which they are propelled or restrained.

Figure 6.1
Differential Conditions



The triangulation approach to the methods of this thesis created the thoroughness and depth needed to effectively construct the emersion of multiple ideas into one picture. Historical narrative analysis was utilized to reconstruct the actions of the terrorist group leading up to the attacks and to trace the restraining forces enacted post 9/11.

Ethnomethodology was applied to examine the culture and social cues for which Al Qaeda was founded upon and continued to apply to its organization. And the secondary quantitative data analysis was conducted to understand the imprint that the attacks left on a collective society and the reactions exhibited from those effects.

The significance of this research is to add a new framework for examining terrorism—one that synthesizes organization, actions, and social conditions. It will be a continuous battle to stay one step ahead of or at the very least, in stride with the evolving nature of terrorism. If this does not occur, a repeat of the magnitude of the attacks of

9/11 will be a result. In order to successfully meet the challenges of the new threat of terrorism, experts and analysts must be able to think and act in the same ways as the terrorist groups. That is, they must be structured in an organizational network, they must understand the significance of the social conditions surrounding terrorist situations, they must attempt to predict actions that will be taken by terrorist groups, and find resolutions to such actions. This thesis provides a framework for which to start this type of organizational and strategic approach to eliminating the terrorist threat.

Limitations of Study

Terrorism studies commonly look at data across different terrorist groups because it is difficult to gather data on one specific group. Much of the research conducted stems from actions that have already occurred where researchers use these ex-post facto actions to look for patterns of similarity to explain concepts of terrorism. The same is true for research about Al Qaeda. To date, minimal empirical research has been conducted on this dynamic terrorist network. But research conducted on Al Qaeda is conflicted by the fact that the organization is the centerpiece of a still recent and catastrophic event in U.S. history. Pertinent information about Al Qaeda remains classified by government agencies for security reasons as they continuously learn more about the network. Most of the available information about Al Qaeda comes from the same sources used in this thesis. While bin Laden has given interviews to a few reporters, this was before the attacks of 9/11 changed the environment with which this organization operated in. Therefore, the research resulted in qualitative data acquired from government information that has been declassified, experts in the field of terrorism whom have the ability to collect more difficult to find information, and from media sources.

The study of Al Qaeda has a second limitation. Military strategists have identified the new combatant environment, that of fourth generation warfare. The threat of terrorism is something that can be researched within the confines of a controlled experimental laboratory. This is an issue that takes place and must be researched within the parameters of the real world. Besides the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terrorism still being recent and in recent events, this new fourth generation warfare environment makes it almost impossible to quantifiably measure the difference between the number of terrorists being captured to the number of new terrorists entering the fight. There are no visible armies to destroy and there will not be a definitive moment of one side surrendering to the other as in wars past. Much of the research and strategy used to understand and eliminate the terrorist enemy will be rely upon hypotheses produced from unfolding information as it becomes available.

Future Research

This thesis represents research about a terrorist group about which there is still much to be understood. In addition, the approach to this study is somewhat novel. Lewin's force field model has not been applied to the study of terrorist groups before and the use of triangulation is a relatively new approach within qualitative analysis. These ideas are fitting being that the study of Al Qaeda through the events of 9/11 and the subsequent analysis of restraining actions post 9/11 are still rather new themselves. Therefore, future studies of Al Qaeda and the actions surrounding 9/11 should attempt to uncover more definitive answers as the resulting war on terrorism moves forward. More information about Al Qaeda will continue to be discovered which could result in more detailed research. Also, adding new elements of the war on terrorism, such as Operation

Iraqi Freedom. to monitor the whether or not restraining conditions such as the cooperation among countries, will be necessary.

In addition, more original participant data could be utilized to determine whether or not the collective emotional response does remain steadfast in the coming years. Using first hand data will allow future researchers to control for specific variables that the researcher was not able to control for using secondary data.

Conclusion

This study focused on the events of 9/11 and the Al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for them. However, the phenomenon of terrorism should not be exclusive to Al Qaeda. The new threat of fourth generation warfare and the organizational network make-up will continue to spread to other terrorist groups with their own grievances. While Al Qaeda is at the top of the list of terrorist groups to eliminate, it is important to take the war on terrorism for what it is—terrorism as a whole. The war on terrorism is, as President Bush has stated, going to be a long war. In fact, explaining it as a war may produce an incorrect assumption of the issue. The attacks of 9/11 changed the world forever. Terrorism is not new; yet in 2001 it was the situation that the world found itself in that was new. Not only did the catastrophic event take place on U.S. soil—a country regarded as one of the greatest superpowers for several decades —but also, it was an event that was not isolated to one country or one landmass within the world. The society of today is a globally connected society, one in which although the distances of land remain, cultures, ideas, communication, economics, and so forth have become so close and connected that it changed the way in which catastrophic events are absorbed by people. For this reason, the war on terrorism is not so much a war as it is a new way of

life. Terrorism will continue to be one of the many elements that exist in this world.

Therefore, it is the people who are unwilling to live in a world of fear that will be responsible for hindering terrorism at every opportunity.

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VITA



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Candidate for the Degree of
Master of Science

Thesis: THE AL QAEDA TERRORIST
NETWORK: PRE 9/11 CONDITIONS,
POST9/11 RESPONSES

Academic History: Completed the Degree requirements
for the International Studies Degree at Oklahoma State
University December, 2003

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| 1997-1998; 2000-2001 | Oklahoma State University Bachelor of Arts, December 2001 59 credit hours, 3.5 |
| 1999-2000 | Tulsa Community College 25 credit hours, 4.0 Associate of Arts - Psychology |
| 1998 (fall) | University of Central Oklahoma 12 credit hours, 3.8 |
| 1996-1997 | Tulsa Community College (high school) 6 credit hours, 4.0 |

Degrees:

Graduate Major: International Studies, 4.0
Thesis, Al Qaeda: Pre 9/11 Conditions, Post
9/11 Responses
Undergraduate Major: psychology, 3.8
Minor: sociology

Honors:

2003

2001

Phi Kappa Phi
American Indian's into
Psychology summer program

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| 2000- present | Dean's Honor Roll |
| 2000 | Today All-American Academic |
| 2000 | USA Today All-State Academic |
| 2000 | National Dean's Honor Roll |
| 2000 | Who's Who among American College students |

Professional Activities/Memberships:

| | |
|----------------------|---|
| 2001- present | Psi Chi Psychology Honor Society |
| 2001- present | Arts and Science Student Council |
| 2000-present | Golden Key International Honour Society National Honor |
| 2000- present | Psychology Club member |
| 1999- 2000 | Phi Theta Kappa National Honor Society; Vice President |

Research Interests/Experience:

| | |
|-------------------------|---|
| Fall 2003 | Oklahoma State University Supervisor: Dr. Maureen Nemecek, Program Director Internship Assistant: researched possible internships for all U.S. and international students within the program. Communicated with students on the internships available. Contacted businesses to set up potential internships. |
| Summer 2002 | Oklahoma State University Supervisor: Dr. Maureen Nemecek Created a plan to implement the School of International Studies into OSU Tulsa. Researched what it would take as far as staff, classes, money, and publicity in order for the program to be a success in Tulsa. |
| Spring/Fall 2001 | Oklahoma State University Supervisor: Dr. Shelia Kennison Worked on noun plausibility research formatting questionnaires, created noun phrase and clause interpretation sentence structures, distributing the questionnaires to participants, and collected and input data results. |
| Summer 2001 | Oklahoma State University |

Supervisor: Dr. Maureen Sullivan
Attended Weekly lab meetings in
which topics discussed included:
child behavior research, applying to
graduate school, and research design
for pet therapy work in children
homes. Coded interactions exhibited
in children's lab.

Work Experience/Clinical Experience:

Summer 2000

Brown's School of Oklahoma
Psychiatric facility for children 18
years and younger.
Mental Health Technician:
Monitoring and interacting with
children, ensuring the safety of all
inhabitants, and completing each
patient's behavioral charts every
thirty minutes.

Summer 2001

Indian hospital For Cherokee Nation
Behavioral Health Services
Student Volunteer
Shadowed Dr. Gastorf in therapy
sessions, ADHD testing, Drug and
alcohol abuse therapy, and cognitive
testing.

Teaching Interests/Experience:

Summer 2002

Oklahoma State University

Spring/Sum 2003

Supervisor: Dr. L.M. Hynson
Teaching assistant for Culture,
History and World Systems 5223
Duties included seminar leader,
curriculum preparation, and grading.

Spring/Fall 2001

Oklahoma state University
Supervisor: Dr. Shelia Kennison
Assisted in Quantitative Methods
Lab by helping students to
understand the functions of SPSS,
held office hours once a week, and
attended weekly lab meetings.