

THE "TRUTH" OF WAR:
JAPANESE DEPICTIONS
IN WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTARIES

By

KATHY ANN GARRISON

Bachelor of Arts


Emporia State University

2002

Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for
the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
May, 2005


THE "TRUTH" OF WAR:
JAPANESE DEPICTIONS
IN WORLD WAR II
DOCUMENTARIES

Thesis Approved:



Thesis Advisor







Dean of the Graduate College

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my major adviser, Dr. L.G. Moses, for all his help and guidance with this project. My appreciation extends to my other committee members, Dr. Laura Belmonte and Dr. Ronald Petrin, for their guidance and suggestions. They were invaluable to this study and to me! I would also like to thank Dr. William Bryans and the Department of History for providing me with this teaching assistantship, which provided me with financial support. I would also like to thank the Department of History secretaries, Diana Hover and Susan Oliver, for their friendship and advice.

Moreover, I would like to thank my family, especially my parents, Don and JoAnn Garrison, for their constant love, encouragement, and support. In addition, thanks go out to my friends who have talked me through the rough days during this project.

Finally, I would like to thank everybody in the Department of History for encouraging me during these two years of study.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. THE DIRECTORS.....	14
3. <i>THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY</i> (1942).....	22
4. <i>DECEMBER 7TH</i> (1943).....	28
5. <i>WHY WE FIGHT</i> SERIES 1942-1945).....	35
6. <i>KNOW YOUR ENEMY: JAPAN</i> (1945).....	46
7. CONCLUSION.....	56
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	60

The "Truth" of War: Japanese Depictions in World War II Documentaries

Chapter One: Introduction

The light flickers and the sound deafens. On screen, a mighty battleship blows up. Even though the picture is grainy black and white, viewers still jump in their chairs, and they will continue to do so each time they see the *USS Arizona* explode.

World War II documentaries have entered into American consciousness, and their influence is seen today. Originally, military and Hollywood filmmakers used these films as tools to persuade a formerly reluctant and isolated America to go to war. Now, teachers can use these documentaries as a means to instruct younger generations about the Second World War. These films are the genesis of such modern documentaries as *Fahrenheit 9/11* (2004), *Super Size Me* (2004), *Spellbound* (2002), and *Hoop Dreams* (1994). Documentaries may also be viewed as predecessors to reality television. Documentaries, even those made during World War II, advance the concept of "reality as entertainment."

So, how do these modern documentaries and reality television relate to 1940s non-fiction films of the Second World War? After all, documentaries, especially those that

depict historical events, have a popular reputation of accuracy. The cliché of "the camera does not lie" received greater authority due to the 1940s depictions of war.

However, documentaries are not necessarily truthful. Some are made for the express purpose of propaganda, as Michael Moore's movies have shown recently. Skilled directors of World War II films, such as John Ford, Frank Capra, and John Huston, edited their films to convey an idea or to show the audience only certain things. Therefore, even documentaries do not depict reality as it really is, but the filmmaker's vision of reality.

Films that many people consider documentaries are actually propaganda films. There are many subtle differences between the two film genres. Documentaries are "the creative treatment of actuality."¹ Genuine documentaries feature real events and involve real footage; they incorporate almost no fictional elements. The filmmaker believes the material to be true and presents the material without any staged scenes. However, the filmmaker has an interpretation and a viewpoint of the footage. The documentary filmmaker's tries to convince an audience to consider and accept the viewpoint. Documentary films can

¹ Erik Barnouw, *Documentary: A History of the Non-Fiction Film* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 287.

also be pure propaganda. Propaganda films methodically utilize the ability to organize messages, not viewpoints, in an effort to influence large numbers of people.² Filmmakers use fictional elements to support their messages. These films are designed to manipulate an audience's emotions and thoughts in order to sway the public into believing the presented message. They are usually politically motivated, and their goals are to move their audience towards certain political actions or opinion.³

Sources of propaganda during the Second World War include pamphlets, advertisements, cartoons, and movies, both feature films and documentaries. Because these items were able to reach so many American civilians, military advisors and politicians used propaganda films to influence political beliefs and commitment to the war effort.

The history of the United States's military relationship with Hollywood filmmakers goes back to 1917 and the Creel Committee on Public Information.⁴ President Woodrow Wilson asked George Creel, a journalist, to head the committee, whose goal was to promote American

² James E. Combs and Sara T. Combs., *Film Propaganda and American Politics: An Analysis and Filmography* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994), 6.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid. 28.

involvement in the Great War. The committee attempted to "sell" the war to America by releasing propaganda to the public.⁵ The message that Creel released to Americans sought to "maintain the official view as the dominant one, demonize the enemy . . . uplift public morale . . . and interpret in a favorable light all immediate war news."⁶ In order to influence the public with this message, Creel enlisted the aid of Hollywood. Silent movie stars promoted war bonds, and studios released pro-war features and documentaries, such as *Pershing's Crusaders* (1918).⁷

After World War I, the Committee on Public Information officially disbanded, and military documentaries became a memory. The war left many people disillusioned. During the 1920s and into the 1930s, the United States returned to a policy of non-involvement it had prior to participation in World War I.

The Great Depression made Americans less interested in other nations' affairs, and they were not interested in the military documentaries of World War I. Although the Department of Agriculture released the few documentaries, such as *The Plow That Broke the Plains* (1936), the most popular films of the 1930s were escapist screwball

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

comedies, such as Frank Capra's *It Happened One Night* (1932) or westerns, such as John Ford's *Stagecoach* (1939)⁸. In general, American documentaries ended after the 1920s.

Although feature-length documentaries disappeared in the United States of the 1930s, newsreels took their place. These short newsreels, mostly seen before feature films in theaters, became the clichéd eye on the world. They were also the beginning of the modern documentary. The shorts recorded events as they happened. Throughout the 1930s, these newsreels treated Americans to images of the Nazis rolling over Austria and Czechoslovakia and Japan invading Manchuria and China. However, most Americans considered themselves separate from the flickering images presented before them. The images of war did not involve America on a daily basis.

Other nations led the field in documentaries and other forms of propaganda films. Germany became especially adept in propaganda films. Many film buffs and historians

⁸ "John Ford (I): Director Filmography." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000406/>; accessed 5 April 2005; "Frank Capra." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001008/>; accessed 5 April 2005.

Note: Internet Movie Database is a large, detailed movie web site. It is useful for finding quick movie credits, since the vast majority of their information comes from onscreen credits, studio press releases, interviews, and official biographies of filmmakers. See "Internet Movie Database Help." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from [http://www.imdb.com/help/show leaf?infosource](http://www.imdb.com/help/show_leaf?infosource); accessed 13 April 2005.

consider Leni Riefenstahl's classic propaganda films, *Triumph of the Will* (1934) and *Olympiad* (1937) to be among the finest documentaries ever made.⁹ Although Riefenstahl's film *Triumph of the Will* does not use any fictional elements, it is overtly political. *Triumph of the Will's* opening five minutes tells almost everything viewers need to know about Riefenstahl's "beliefs."¹⁰ Hitler's airplane is flying in the clouds, and by implication, Hitler, godlike, is descending from on high. To augment that messianic visual, Riefenstahl shows the shadow of the plane flying over the Nuremberg crowds who must look up to see their savior's arrival. Finally, she always shows Hitler above the crowds and larger-than-life.¹¹ *Triumph of the Will* deliberately gives the idea that Hitler is the savior of Depression-era Germany. His Third Reich and the National Socialist Party is going to be around for a long time. The people are supposed to unite under Hitler and the Nazi Party.

⁹ "Triumph of the Will" [article on-line]; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triumph_of_the_Will; Internet; accessed 7 February 2005; "Triumph of the Will (1934)" [list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0025913/combined>; Internet; accessed 7 February 2005. See also Barnouw, 101, 103.

¹⁰ Although Leni Riefenstahl spent the rest of her life denying she was a Nazi (she died in 2003), her propaganda films proved to be invaluable to the Nazi cause. *Triumph of the Will* haunted her all her life. "Leni Riefenstahl" [biography on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0726166/bio>; Internet; accessed 12 February 2005. Also see Barnouw, 103.

¹¹ Leni Riefenstahl, dir., *Triumph of the Will*. (Synapse, 1934), Digital Video Disc, 2001.

Most nations ignored this film, but it foreshadowed the events that would lead many nations to fight Germany a little over five years later. Almost every group that Hitler inspects is militaristic in nature—these groups involve uniforms and marching. Even the labor group presents their shovels as if the instruments were rifles.

Five years later, Germany had conquered most of Europe, but the United States was slow in joining the war due to isolationist sentiments. However, once Japan attacked the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the need to fight quickly replaced any isolationist feelings. America mobilized for a fight. One group that was "called up" was Hollywood filmmakers. Whereas a number of actors, such as Jimmy Stewart and Clark Gable, saw action during the war, the military hired directors and writers to make documentaries explaining why the United States was going to war.¹²

The Army and the Office of Strategic Services asked two prominent directors, John Ford and Frank Capra to head up film divisions in order to present the war to Americans and encourage them to fight or work. These directors took Riefenstahl's cue of politicizing their documentaries. In

¹² Thomas Doherty, *Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture, and World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 24, 27, 42, 60.

order to encourage Americans to join in the war effort, the directors presented America and its allies as great and the Axis Powers as evil.

However, these documentaries generally depict the two main Axis Powers, German and Japan, in different ways.¹³

The directors do not show Germans as completely evil.

Hitler and the military leaders mislead the people; the

leaders are evil, not the people. According to Michael

Renov, "The wartime documentary film can . . . be seen as an ideal domain of stereotypical discourse."¹⁴

Documentaries show Japanese people to be as militaristic and evil as the emperor and the military leaders. The differences, which this thesis explores, are shocking.

Germany and Italy were enemies to the United States, yet Japan received most of the animosity, partly because of the nature of the "sneak attack" on Pearl Harbor, but also partly because of racism. Racism had existed between the United States and Japan before 1941. The United States government passed various laws designed to limit Asian immigration. With the "Gentlemen's Agreement," Japan

¹³ These documentaries usually show German and Italy together. Japan is separate from the two other Axis Powers.

¹⁴ Michael Renov, "Warring Images: Stereotype and American Representations of the Japanese, 1941-1991." Abe Mark Nornes and Fukushima Yujio, ed. *Japanese/American Film Wars: WWII Propaganda and Its Cultural Contexts* (Langhorne, PA: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1994), 103.

agreed not to issue passports to allow regular Japanese citizens to enter the United States. Japanese businessmen and other professionals were allowed to migrate, but the Agreement restricted unskilled laborers.¹⁵ The 1917 Immigration Act blocked South and Southeast Asians from entering the United States.¹⁶ The National Origin Act of 1924 restricted immigration in general to 150,000 a year, and the number of immigrants allowed from each nation depended on the proportion of Americans who traced their origins to that nation.¹⁷ Japanese who had managed to enter the United States before 1925 could not become citizens unless they had served in the American military during World War I. Many Japanese immigrants made their homes on the West Coast and in the Territory of Hawaii. These "aliens," who called themselves "Issei," were not citizens, but their children, called "Nisei," were born in the United States, and therefore, citizens. Most Issei and Nisei in

¹⁵ "Gentlemen's Agreement." Encyclopedia Britannica. [article on-line]; available from <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?tocId=9036439&query=null&ct=null>; Internet; accessed 5 April 2005; "Pacific Link: The KQED Asian Education Initiative." [article on-line]; available from <http://www.kqed.org/w/pacificlink/history/usimmigration/>; Internet; accessed 5 April 2005.

¹⁶ "Pacific Link: The KQED Asian Education Initiative."

¹⁷ Mae M. Ngai, "The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924." *The Journal of American History*. 86 (June 1999). 67-92. [article on-line]; available from <http://history.uchicago.edu/faculty/MaeNgai/ngai.html> and <http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/jah/86.1/index.html>; accessed 5 April 2005.

California lived prosperous lives until the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The attack on Pearl Harbor not only convinced Americans that they should join the war, but it also triggered increasing racial tensions until the war was over in 1945.¹⁸ One reason for the sentiments was the sneak attack. Another reason was Americans could not believe that a nation such as Japan, not a Western power, had defeated and humiliated them in battle.¹⁹ A third reason for the sentiments was the impact of atrocities the Japanese military committed, such as the Bataan Death March.

To maintain support for the war, American military leaders commissioned Hollywood directors and filmmakers to persuade skeptical or non-committed citizens why the United States had to fight in World War II. Hollywood filmmakers responded by producing and directing documentaries. The

¹⁸ The Immigration Act of 1924 ended all Japanese immigration to the United States. Japanese who managed to get into the States could not become citizens. However, many entered the country illegally and made their homes on the West Coast. These "illegal aliens" called themselves "Issei." Their children, born in the United States, and therefore citizens, they called "Nisei." After the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, which ordered Issei and Nisei on the West Coast into internment camps; "America Memory Project: Immigration/Migration: Today and During the Great Depression." The Library of Congress. [article on-line]; available from <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/ndlpedu/features/immig/japanese.html>; Internet; accessed 16 November 2004.

¹⁹ John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 33, 35, 83, 86, 100.

military leaders asked two notable directors, John Ford and Frank Capra, to head film divisions in the military. Both directors used their talents to reshape America's hatred of the Japanese into a will to defeat them.²⁰ Ford and Capra used the long-standing racial prejudice in America in order to create propaganda films; the documentaries that these two men produced depicted Japan as America's real enemy, as opposed to Italy and Germany.

The ways that World War II documentaries affected American resolve is not a new topic. Historians such as John Dower, Thomas Doherty, Scott Morton, Charles Ewing, and Frederick William Pearce have discussed documentaries.²¹ All five focus primarily on Capra's *Why We Fight* series. Dower explores how Americans shifted from racial hatred of

²⁰ The military asked John Huston to direct documentaries. The documentaries he produced during the War, *The Battle of San Pietro* and *Report from the Aleutians* were quickly pulled from general release. Both documentaries focus heavily on the tragedy of war. Huston shows dead Americans in both documentaries. He said that he wanted to show war as it really was. George C. Marshall relented and showed *San Pietro* as a training film. Because Huston's documentaries were not released to the general public, he is not included in this paper; "The Battle of San Pietro." Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. [article on-line]; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Battle_of_San_Pietro; accessed 28 February 2005.

²¹ See the following historical analysis for more information about World War II documentaries: Dower, *War Without Mercy*; Thomas Doherty, *Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture, and World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); A. Morton, " 'Why We Fight' : An Analysis of Filmic Construction in its Role of Propaganda During World War II" (M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1997); Charles B. Ewing "An Analysis of Frank Capra's War Rhetoric in the 'Why We Fight' Films." Ph.D. diss., Washington State University, 1983; Frederick William Pearce. "An Analysis of Frank Capra's *Why We Fight* Films, 1942-1945 as Documentary Film Rhetoric." Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburg, 1991.

Japan to tolerance after 1945 by incorporating documentaries, like Capra's, and cartoons. Dower explores both sides' racial propaganda. Doherty attempts to explain how documentaries and feature films changed culture. Of the five, only Doherty discusses Ford's documentaries in detail. Morton and Ewing focus on the themes of the *Why We Fight* series, such as the difference between the "slave world" and the "free world,"²² while Pearce analyzes how Capra chose the shots, music, lighting, and sounds. This thesis will examine the films, first to see if they are true documentaries or merely propaganda pieces, and second, to see how they promoted racial intolerance, intentional or not.

In the next chapter, I will give a brief background of the two directors, John Ford and Frank Capra. The chapter will also explore their military involvement. It will also examine how World War II affected the two directors and their post-War work.

²² Frank Capra, prod. and dir., *Why We Fight: Prelude to War*. (GoodTimes Home Video, 1943), Digital Video Disc, 2000.

Chapter Two: The Directors

Rear Admiral John Ford, born in 1894, is one of Hollywood's greatest directors. Although he is more famous for his westerns such as *Stagecoach*, which usually starred John Wayne,¹ he was equally adept at drama. Ford, nominated for seven Academy Awards for his work in movies, won three times.²

Ford promotes the ideal of the rugged American hero in his films.³ No matter what obstacles the hero has to overcome, he will be able to succeed. In addition, the hero generally battles the world and its problems alone.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Ford signed up for the military, along with many other filmmakers. He joined the United States Navy and served in its Field Photographic

¹ John Wayne best embodied the image of Ford's heroes. Ford directed Wayne in fifteen movies throughout the director's seven-decade career; "John Ford (I): Director Filmography." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000406/>; accessed 17 November 2004; "John Wayne (I): Actor Filmography." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000078/>; accessed 17 November 2004.

² "John Ford (I): Awards." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000406/awards>; accessed 18 February 2005.

³ Ford directed Wayne in fifteen movies throughout the director's seven-decade career; "John Ford (I): Director Filmography." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000406/>; accessed 17 November 2004; "John Wayne (I): Actor Filmography." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000078/>; accessed 17 November 2004.

Branch by producing documentaries for the War Department.⁴ Although his duty was directing films, he saw action. He recorded the naval operation in Doolittle's raid. Ford, wounded while filming the Battle of Midway, received a Purple Heart.⁵

His edited footage became the Academy Award winning documentary *Battle of Midway* (1942).⁶ *Midway* was one of the first documentaries to show real fighting. This documentary put the American audiences into the battle itself like no other American documentary before. The camera is in the midst of the action when Japanese fighter planes are attacking aircraft carriers and the base during the Battle of Midway. The camera shakes with each hit.

A year later, he produced *December 7th* and won another Academy Award for it.⁷ *December 7th* (1943) covered the attack on Pearl Harbor and its aftermath. It combined real footage of the attack and staged recreations. The original film, directed by Gregg Toland, a cinematographer who had

⁴ "John Ford." Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. [article on-line]; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Ford; accessed 21 February 2005.

⁵ Doherty, *Projections of War*, 252, 255.

⁶ "Awards for Battle of Midway, The (1942)." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0034498/awards>; accessed 17 November 2004.

⁷ It won "Best Documentary, Short Subject;" "Awards for December 7th (1943)." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0035790/awards>; accessed 17 November 2004.

worked with Ford on *The Grapes of Wrath*.⁸ Toland's documentary was a rambling eighty-four-minute feature; Ford cut it down to a slim thirty-two-minute short.

Ford continued directing pro-America feature films after World War II as well as serving in the Navy. Although he made some of his greatest westerns after 1945, he only directed one feature film about World War II: *They Were Expendable* (1945), starring John Wayne and Robert Montgomery. This film told the tale of a PT boat crew in Manila Bay. The title reflects Ford's attitude to the early part of the war in the Pacific Theater: the soldiers were expendable and were desperate to defeat the Japanese.⁹

Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Capra, born in 1897 in Italy, is another classic Hollywood director.¹⁰ Although many modern movie buffs and critics attack Capra's "feel-good" movies by calling them soft or "Capra-corn,"¹¹ his movies are immensely popular and influential. He is most famous for the classic screwball comedy, *It Happened One Night*

⁸ "Gregg Toland." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0005904/>; accessed 5 April 5, 2005.

⁹ "They Were Expendable." Internet Movie Database [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0038160/combined>; accessed 5 April 2005.

¹⁰ "Frank Capra." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001008/>; accessed 23 February 2005.

¹¹ Critics dubbed Capra's films "Capra-corn" due to the movies' simplistic plots and sentimentality. "Biography for Frank Capra." Internet Movie Database. [biography on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001008/bio>; accessed 23 February 2005.

(1934),¹² *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington* (1939), and *It's a Wonderful Life* (1946).

Part of the reason that many consider Capra's films to be so sentimental are their sappy plots. Critics focus on the uplifting endings that celebrate the individual American spirit and humanitarianism, such as the ending to *It's a Wonderful Life*. Capra's films have more depth in them than many people give him credit for.¹³

The director joined the Navy after the attack on Pearl Harbor, but unlike Ford, he never saw any fighting. He wanted to join the Signal Corps so he could join the fight; instead, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, knowing Capra was a popular director, reassigned Capra to the "Morale Branch" in an effort to keep the military and civilian morale high.¹⁴ Marshall asked the director to produce a series of documentaries that would explain to soldiers why they were fighting. Initially, Capra refused,

¹² *It Happened One Night* is one of the few movies that swept the four biggest categories at the Academy Awards: Best Actress (Claudette Colbert), Best Actor (Clark Gable), Best Director (Capra) and Best Picture; "Awards for *It Happened One Night*." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0025316/awards>; accessed 23 February 2005.

¹³ James Stewart best embodied the image of Capra heroes. Capra directed Stewart in three movies throughout the director's five-decade career; "Frank Capra: Director Filmography." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001008/>; accessed 17 November 2004; "James Stewart (I): Actor Filmography." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000071/>; accessed 17 November 2004.

¹⁴ Frank Capra, *The Name Above the Title* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1971), 328.

claiming he did not know how to direct documentaries, having never actually seen one. He changed his mind when the general reminded him that most soldiers had never seen combat either.¹⁵

Capra's first research was watching Leni Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the Will*. He realized that he could emphasize American strengths and downplay the Axis Powers' achievements. Many film critics and historians consider the series of documentaries Capra produced, *Why We Fight*, to be a masterpiece of wartime propaganda, surpassed only by *Triumph of the Will*.¹⁶ Capra won the Academy Award for Best Documentary for the first film of the *Why We Fight* series, "Prelude to War," (1943) and was nominated for Best Documentary for the second film of the series, "The Battle of Russia" (1943).¹⁷

Capra's goal was to release the *Why We Fight* series for the troops. After President Franklin D. Roosevelt

¹⁵ Ibid, 327-328. See also Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 15; Doherty, *Projections of War*, 24, 70.

¹⁶ "Frank Capra." Wikipedia. [encyclopedia article on-line]; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Capra; accessed 23 February 2005. See also Doherty, *Projections of War*, 70; William T. Murphy, "The United States Government and the Use of Motion Pictures During World War II." Abe Mark Nornes and Fukushima Yujio, ed. *Japanese/American Film Wars: WWII Propaganda and Its Cultural Contexts* (Langhorne, PA: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1994), 63.

¹⁷ "Awards for Prelude to War (1943)." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0035209/awards>; accessed 23 February 2005; See also "Awards for The Battle of Russia (1943)." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0036629/awards>; accessed 23 February 2005.

viewed the first documentary, "Prelude to War," he ordered theater owners to show this film to citizens.¹⁸

Capra originally intended to produce a series of documentaries designed to introduce Americans to their enemies and allies. He was only able to produce two feature-length documentaries. The War Department released Capra's first enemy documentary, *Your Job in Germany* (1945), after Germany surrendered, so soldiers and civilians missed this documentary for the most part.¹⁹ Capra released his second, *Know Your Enemy: Japan* (1945), before the dropping of the atomic bombs and Japanese surrender. Many historians consider *Know Your Enemy* to be equal to Capra's *Why We Fight* series in terms of wartime propaganda. It certainly is a good display of racial and cultural propaganda. This documentary introduced Americans to Japanese history, culture, and religion. Although he first developed the script in 1942, he was uncertain if he should blame the war on the Japanese people or the Japanese leaders. However, he had the misfortune to release the film on August 9, which was the day the United States dropped the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki. On August 28,

¹⁸ Capra, *Name*, 346. See also Doherty, *Projections of War*, 70-71; Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 70-71.

¹⁹ "Your Job in Germany (1945)." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0038264/combined>; accessed 23 February 2005.

General Douglas MacArthur ordered Capra to withdraw the film.²⁰

Capra continued directing pro-American feature films during and after World War II. His most famous film, *It's a Wonderful Life*, was Jimmy Stewart's first post-war movie. This movie paints small-town American life throughout the first four decades of the twentieth century as idyllic and peaceful to most American citizens. Many people find the film sentimental and "Capra-corn," but it reflects more of Capra's darker outlook of life after World War II even though *It's a Wonderful Life* ends happily and sentimentally. The movie tells the story of one man, George Bailey, played by Stewart, who does not share the same optimism about small town life and basic American values experienced by most of his community and by his family. He is an ambitious man who wants to leave his small hometown to travel, but events keep him from leaving. At the end, George is driven to attempt suicide and is cast into a nightmarish world, full of hate, mistrust, and prejudice, where he does not exist. After experiencing this world, George believes that his life, although a usual American life, is heavenly. Although the movie did not find an audience in 1946, it received a new life on

²⁰ Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 18.

television after the film's copyright expired.²¹ Now *It's a Wonderful Life* is an annual Christmas event on television.

John Ford once called Frank Capra, "A great man and a great American . . . an inspiration to those who believe in the American Dream."²² However, Capra's directing career stalled after the 1950s. He died in 1991.²³

Capra's directing career spanned five decades.²⁴ He was a popular director before the advent of World War II, and continued to produce and direct timeless classics after 1945. His World War II documentary series, *Why We Fight*, continues to influence directors today. Many historians consider the *Why We Fight* series to be one of the greatest wartime documentaries.

The next chapter focuses on John Ford's Oscar-winning documentary, *The Battle of Midway*. It examines the images that John Ford used and explores whether they are racial in nature. The chapter also focuses on the narration that

²¹ "Trivia for 'It's a Wonderful Life'." Internet Movie Database. [trivia list on-line] available from <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0038650/trivia>; accessed 5 April 2005.

²² "Biography for Frank Capra." Internet Movie Database. [biography on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001008/bio>; accessed 23 February 2005.

²³ "Frank Capra." Wikipedia. [encyclopedia article on-line]; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Capra; accessed 23 February 2005.

²⁴ "Frank Capra." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001008/>; accessed 6 April 2005.

Ford wrote to see whether it is racist against the
Japanese.

Chapter Three:
Battle of Midway (1942)

John Ford's *Battle of Midway* is the oldest of these World War II documentaries, and countless war documentaries since 1942 have used Ford's documentary footage.¹ Ford, wounded while filming, recorded the battle as it was happening. Naval intelligence cracked the Japanese military code and discovered their plans to attack the small island of Midway. Ford went to the island early to record the preliminaries of the battle. The film covers the battle itself, but does not discuss much on the aftermath because no one knew what the long-range consequences were. The immediate outcome, which Ford focuses on, includes the number of Japanese ships that were lost and the number of American men who were casualties.

For this documentary, Ford recruited many people he had worked with before. In fact, this documentary in post-production was essentially a *Grapes of Wrath* (1940) reunion. Henry Fonda and Jane Darwell served as narrators. Obviously, Ford wanted to pick people he knew and was

¹ It is interesting to note how many times the footage is used erroneously as footage of the Pearl Harbor attack. One of the most common parts of this documentary that is found in countless Pearl Harbor documentaries is the ambulance driving through the wreckage of the base on Midway. See the History Channel's World War II documentaries.

comfortable with to help him in the presentation of the battle.²

The Navy kept most of Ford's film because some parts could compromise the American intelligence at work in the Pacific Theater.³ However, they allowed him to release an eighteen-minute short.⁴ The documentary was released the second week of September 1942 to promote bond drives⁵ in American theaters. The public was astonished at the realistic attack sequences, since the newsreels they had been seeing could not get them into the battle like Ford's documentary.⁶

By the definition presented on page two of this thesis, *Battle of Midway* is a documentary film, not a propaganda film. Ford captured all of the footage while on the island of Midway. All of the battle footage is real, not staged. The only bit that was added to the footage was the title cards that reported Japanese losses to the American public. Ford edited his documentary film to emphasize Japan's cruelty and inhumanity in war. He wished to convey this image of Japan to the American public in

² "The Battle of Midway (1942)." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0034498/combined>; accessed 6 April 2005. See also "The Grapes of Wrath (1940)." Internet Movie Database. [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0032551/combined>; accessed 6 April 2005.

³ Doherty, *Projections of War*. 237.

⁴ "The Battle of Midway." Internet Movie Database

⁵ Another form of propaganda.

⁶ Doherty, *Projections of War*. 237.

order to boost their morale and keep the fighting spirit strong.

Ford's narration is what might make this documentary a propaganda film. Ford wrote and added the narration after he edited the film. The narration functions as propaganda—it does not depict reality but rather the official, political message and the director's own version of reality. The words both support and overshadow the images at the same time.

In *Battle of Midway* John Ford uses images of birds to suggest that the Japanese were not as intelligent as Americans. The first image is a shot of seagulls and the ever-present albatross walking along a beach, and the narrator, Henry Fonda, says, "These are the natives of Midway. [Japan's Premiere General] Tojo has sworn to liberate them."⁷ At the end, Ford revisits the birds, and Fonda points out that even though Tojo did not free "the natives," they were "as free as they ever were."⁸ With this bit of narration and imagery, Ford shows that no one can liberate birds, although Japan is foolishly trying to do so.

⁷ John Ford, prod. and dir. *The Battle of Midway*. (*World War II Greatest Battles Series* GoodTimes Home Video, 1942). Digital Video Disc, 2001.

⁸ Ibid.

The documentary continues with the notion that the Japanese are cowardly. Ford shows the searches by the PBYs, the patrol planes, and the attack starting. He shows the sky, and Japanese planes suddenly appear behind some clouds. Strategically, this is the best way to strafe a base, since cloud cover and flying out of the sun give an advantage to attacking planes. The planes are harder to see, and they are more difficult to hit with anti-aircraft fire.⁹ However, Midway had radar; therefore, the attacking planes were not a surprise. However, Fonda's voice-over implies cowardice for the Japanese not showing themselves sooner. Japanese Zeros fly from behind cloud cover, and Fonda's voice is heard exclaiming, "There! Behind the clouds! The Japs attack!"¹⁰

Ford devotes over five minutes of his fifty-minute documentary to the important idea that Japan does not respect life or offer mercy. After the battle, Ford shows an ambulance taking wounded soldiers to a hospital on Midway. Jane Darwell, the second narrator, grieves for the losses and hopes the wounded "boys" will recover. The director shows a bombed, destroyed hospital in answer to her wish, while Fonda sarcastically notes, "On [the

⁹Margaret Kim, ex. Prod. *Command Decision: Battle of Midway*. (The History Channel, 30 July 2004).

¹⁰ Ford, *Midway*.

hospital's] roof [was] a cross, plainly marked, a symbol of mercy the enemy was bound to respect."¹¹ Ford implies that Japanese cannot be trusted or respected if they are so willing to destroy things with "symbols of mercy" on them.¹²

Ford has a symbolic ending to his documentary. He concludes his documentary with a roll call of Japanese losses. The three title cards read, "4 Japanese carriers sunk"; "28 Jap Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers sunk or damaged"; and "300 Japanese Aircraft Destroyed."¹³ Over each title, paint splashes on the words. The red paint drips like blood on the first card. On the second card, a black "X" appears. The color black represents evil and death.¹⁴ Someone paints over the titles on the last card with a red V, which fades out slower than the words.¹⁵ The red V represents American blood and victory over Japan.

There is more to *Battle of Midway* than simply a look at a turning point in war, and the Japanese are seen as something other than a wartime enemy. This documentary film uses some propaganda techniques to support some of the

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² This was not the first time Americans criticized Japanese for destroying clearly marked non-combatants. In 1937, Japanese sunk the USS *Panay*. The Japanese originally claimed they thought the ship was a Chinese ship. Later, the Japanese military leaders and government apologized for the "mistake," but Americans thought that the attack was not an accident. *Newsweek*. 10 (December 27, 1937): 7-11.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Morton, " 'Why We Fight': An Analysis of Filmic Construction in its Role of Propaganda During World War II," 61.

¹⁵ Ford, *Midway*.

long-standing racial prejudices that Americans had. Americans are set above the Japanese, but the sense is that the Japanese are not human enough to measure up to Americans. After all, the Japanese are trying to liberate birds and they have no respect for symbols of mercy and human lives.

Chapter Four:
December 7th (1943)

In 1943, John Ford produced *December 7th*, which was a recreation of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Gregg Toland, Ford's cinematographer from *The Grapes of Wrath* (1940), directed the original eighty-four-minute documentary, and Ford edited it down to thirty-two minutes. Ford directed some of the incidental moments of the film, such as a created scene of a priest blessing the American soldiers before they dispersed to their battle stations.¹

Countless documentaries and feature films made since 1943 use footage from *December 7th*.² One image that pops up in just about every Pearl Harbor documentary is the artificial scene with the priest. Even Capra used this scene in one of his *Why We Fight* documentaries.³

Although Ford only directed bits of the documentary, *December 7th* was credited to him as much as it was credited to Toland. It won the Best Documentary Oscar for 1943, even though most of the film involved staged recreations.

¹ Ford, prod. *December 7th*. (*World War II Greatest Battles Series* GoodTimes Home Video, 1943). Digital Video Disc, 2001.

² The feature films *Tora! Tora! Tora!* (1970) and the most recent film *Pearl Harbor* both stage a recreation scene of the priest blessing the troops. Richard Fleischer and Kinji Fukusaku, directors. *Tora! Tora! Tora!*. Twentieth Century Fox, 1970, Digital Video Disc, 2004; Michael Bay, dir. *Pearl Harbor*. Walt Disney Home Video, 2001, Digital Video Disc, 2003.

³ Capra used the priest blessing the troops in *War Comes to America*. Capra, *Why We Fight: War Comes to America*. (GoodTimes Home Video, 1945), Digital Video Disc, 2000.

Ford and Toland's goal was to show highlights of the attack, including a spectacular shot of the explosion of the *Arizona*.⁴

Unlike Ford's *Battle of Midway*, *December 7th* is a true propaganda film. The film begins with a statement from the Navy Department. Although this film uses some real footage of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Ford and Toland stage most of the film. They use fiction, staged scenes, and animation to convey a message to the audience. This official message manipulates the American public to view the Japanese as evil. The film also keeps the American public wanting to continue fighting (and to defeat) the true enemy: Japan.

Ford's *Battle of Midway* is more subtle with its racial prejudice than *December 7th*. In the latter documentary, Ford presents Japanese pilots and Japanese leaders, such as Tojo, as subhuman. The attack begins when planes "swarmed into Pearl Harbor like locusts." The Japanese pilots sought to destroy property and sought to kill American soldiers, which is negative image of the Japanese pilots rather than true racial prejudice.⁵ Regardless, Ford uses

⁴"December 7th (1943)." Internet Movie Database [movie list on-line]; available from <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0035790/>; accessed 17 November 2004.

⁵ The narrator, Walter Huston, "addresses" Premier Tojo. "Well, you may crow, Mr. Tojo. You've done a good job of stabbing the back. You've

this negative aspect as motivation to keep the American fighting spirit high.

Perhaps the most disturbing bit of racism occurs after the attack. An animated radio tower rises over the island of Japan, and a gargoyle snakehead appears at the top of the radio tower. This head represents Premiere Tojo, who speaks to his people. The voice-over is in English with a broad, fake Japanese accent, complete with "L's" sounding like "R's."⁶ Ford implies with this image that Japanese leaders are faceless monsters who rule over the people.

The biggest part of the documentary relies on the image of deceit and betrayal. As the attack began, Ford notes that "Japan's smooth-talking, grinning [diplomats], Nomura and Kurusu, were blandly delivering to Mr. [Cordell] Hull a lengthy protestation of Japan's peace intentions. . . . At this very deceitful moment, about two hundred of Japan's messengers of death swooped in over [the] Pacific Paradise."⁷ To relate to the image of the "messengers of

darkened our cities. You've destroyed our property. You've spilled our blood;" Ford, prod. and dir. *December 7th*. (*World War II Greatest Battles Series* GoodTimes Home Video, 1943). Digital Video Disc, 2001.

⁶ The voiceover actor who does "Tojo's" voice-over says "Pacific 'Freet';" Ibid.

⁷ According to Gordon Prange, this was not true. The reality was that there was little reason for Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu to have prior knowledge of the attack. If the ambassadors knew about the attack beforehand, they might have accidentally exposed the plan. However, the Japanese government, beyond the two ambassadors, were deliberately deceitful and treacherous; Gordon Prange, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold*

death," the narrator dramatically intones, "The treachery of an empire was on the wing."⁸

Ford expands on the idea of Japanese deceit by presenting them as cunning and as treacherous. He shows a depiction of an interview between a reporter and a Japanese Consul in Honolulu.⁹ The Consul denies knowing anything about any attack by Japan, although the attack sirens were sounding at the time. Throughout the interview, the reporter gets increasingly hostile. At one point, the Consul says that he has "nothing to say." The reporter responds, "And judging by the smoke pouring out of your chimney, there'll be nothing left to show."¹⁰

To continue his argument, Ford presents the attack as sudden and without warning. Although he makes some brief mentions of events that might have prevented the attack, he does not alter his argument.¹¹ In his eyes, it was a sneak attack, although in reality, the Japanese military did not

Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: Penguin Books, 1981; reprint, 1991, 355-356.

⁸ Ford, *December 7th*.

⁹ This interview is probably fictional. Ford certainly stages it. According to the timeline of the documentary, Japan is attacking the Fleet at the time of the interview. Sirens are going off in the background. *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Ford mentions the miniature Japanese sub that the destroyer *Ward* sank more than an hour before the first attack began. He also mentions the ensign who spotted the first wave of Japanese planes on radar. Superior officers mistakenly informed the ensign that these were American planes from the mainland. Therefore, the officers did not raise any alert. However, Ford mentions these incidents very briefly, and almost as an afterthought. *Ibid.*

want the attack to be a surprise.¹² However, this detail might present the enemy as honorable and having human qualities. The narrator describes it as a "stab in the back" twice in the documentary.¹³ The mental image of the United States receiving a "stab in the back" from Japan is a powerful one. It implies Japanese betrayal, and it refers to the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor.

Ford makes the distinction between Americans of Japanese ancestry living on the Hawaiian Islands and the Japanese living in Japan. This seems to be his argument against the Japanese-American internment camps in the contiguous United States. He shows that Americans of Japanese ancestry relate more the United States than to Japan, and he shows these Americans trying "[to] erase their relationship with the homeland [permanently]."¹⁴ He

¹² Prange argues that it is against the Japanese code of honor to attack an unarmed opponent or enemy. Prange writes that Tokyo thought Secretary of State Cordell Hull would receive the fourteen-part declaration of war in time to alert the Pacific Fleet. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 468; also see "Pearl Harbor: Days that Shook the World." History Channel. Original Airdate: Jan 29, 2005, Video Cassette, 2005; "Tora, Tora, Tora: The Real Story of Pearl Harbor." History Channel. Original Airdate: November 28, 2000.

¹³ "War had come to American's tropical suburb. The Axis brand of war. A stab in the back Sunday morning" and "Well, you may crow, Mr. Tojo. You've done a good job of stabbing in the back." Ibid.

¹⁴ Ford edited Toland's rambling 82-minute documentary. One of the things he cut was a dialogue between "Uncle Sam," played by Walter Huston, and Uncle Sam's conscience, "Mr. C," played by Harry Davenport. This dialogue consisted of an argument between the two men about the Japanese-American loyalty. Uncle Sam argues that most Japanese-Americans are loyal citizens. Mr. C's view is essentially, "We need to lock all people of Japanese ancestry up and throw away the key." Bits of this dialogue can be found in Tom Thurman's *John Ford Goes to War*.

shows closed language schools and storeowners painting over written Japanese. One café owner takes down his sign "Banzai Café" and replaces it with a sign that reads, "Keep 'Em Flying Café" in a staged scene.¹⁵

Although Ford shows Americans of Japanese ancestry erasing memories of Japan, the scenes are artificial. Anti-Japanese sentiment forced these Japanese-Americans to deny their "homeland" of Japan, even if they had nothing to do with the attack and were not spies for their homeland. In a climate of fear and paranoia that resulted in thousands of Japanese-Americans on the West Coast being sent to internment camps, it is easy to imagine that this café owner had to prove that he was a loyal American by taking down his "Banzai Café" sign.

Although *December 7th* was not solely John Ford's film, it reflected his view of the Japanese. This film depicts some of the most blatant anti-Japanese racism in World War II documentaries about the Pacific Theater. However, the edited version presents hope for the future. In the edited version, Ford argues that Americans of Japanese ancestry are loyal citizens who want to be Americans, not Japanese.

Tom Thurman, director. *John Ford Goes to War*, 2002. MoviePlex Channel, 15 February 2005.

¹⁵ Ibid.

December 7th is pure propaganda. Although *December 7th* has some of the most blatant racial prejudice against the Japanese people, the film's message seems to have more in common with encouraging American nationalism than with genuine racial prejudice. Ford presents the official line that the cause for Japanese hatred should derive from the fact that Japanese were deceitful and treacherous, which were common forms of anti-Asian bias, and these traits are displayed in the "sneak" attack.

The next chapter will begin the study of Frank Capra's documentaries. The entire chapter will focus exclusively on the classic *Why We Fight* series. It is more sophisticated in its racist depictions, but the racism is evident in the documentaries.

Chapter Five:
Why We Fight Series (1942-1945)

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall approached Frank Capra to direct a series of documentaries explaining to the American troops why they were fighting in the Second World War. Marshall wanted these documentaries to show the troops their enemies and articulate what America could lose if the Axis Powers won the war. Finally, he also believed that standard military and orientation films were boring, and Capra could keep the military and civilians' morale high.¹

Capra initially balked at the command, claiming he had never seen a documentary before. Marshall reminded him that most of these soldiers for whom Capra was making the documentaries had never fought in a war before.² He agreed with that fact, and he resolved himself to direct the classic series *Why We Fight*, which contrasted the allied nations with the Axis Powers.³

Many historians of film consider Capra's *Why We Fight* series to be surpassed only by Leni Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the Will*. Capra's documentaries are more subtle and sophisticated in their racial rhetoric than John Ford's documentaries. He rarely strays away from his goal, which

¹ Doherty, *Projections of War*, 70.

² Capra, *Name*, 327-328.

³ *Ibid.*

was to differentiate between the "free" world of the Allied Democracies and the "slave" world of the Axis Powers.⁴

Capra uses captured Axis footage, such as footage from Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the Will*, to supplement his films along with animation produced by the Walt Disney Studio.⁵

Although Capra uses animation to supplement these films, they are documentaries. He uses genuine war footage to support his vision of the Axis Powers.⁶ Even though he is presenting the official message about the enemy, he believes he is doing a public service by presenting what the American public and troops needs to know about the enemy.⁷

The first film, *Prelude to War* (1943), groups the three Axis Powers together. The Axis nations have similar images,⁸ and the animation and narration included Japan, Germany, and Italy as members of the "slave" world and enemies to America. The Walt Disney Studio animators depict the Axis's conquering of other nations as a wall of black, engulfing the victim nation. In addition, the three nations turn into threatening objects—Germany turns into

⁴ Capra was an immigrant. He was born in Italy. His immigrant status probably shaped Capra's view of the "slave" world, of which Italy was part. In addition, it was in the United States where Capra found a prosperous career. In Italy, Capra's family was illiterate; in America, the family had opportunities. Ibid, 6-8, 9, 237.

⁵ Ibid, 336.

⁶ Ibid. 328.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Capra, *Prelude to War*.

the Swastika, Italy turns into a hammer, and Japan turns into a dragon. Capra wanted Americans to know that the Axis Powers are a real threat to the United States. If the Axis Powers win the war, they would commit the same acts of wartime atrocities on the United States that they did in China, Poland, and Ethiopia.⁹

Capra includes obvious racial prejudice in the same film. He mentions that Hitler wanted to meet "his buck-toothed pals" in the United States. This derogatory statement refers to a stereotype of the Japanese. Capra exposes American fears of invasion by Japanese forces in *Prelude to War*. In an attempt to increase American paranoia of invasion, he uses a bit of racial propaganda and double-exposed film to depict Japanese soldiers marching through Washington, D.C. He warns the American public that Japan would do the same atrocities in the United States that the Japanese soldiers perpetrated on Nanking, Hong Kong, and Manila. However, in this image, Capra ignores German atrocities in Europe.¹⁰

In the fifth movie of the series, *Divide and Conquer*, which covers Germany invading Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, ending with the invasion of France, Capra uses

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Capra showing the Japanese army marching through Washington, D.C. makes some sense. After all, Japan, not Germany, attacked the United States. Ibid; Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 16.

footage of President Franklin Roosevelt saying, "The hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor" to describe German treachery and deception.¹¹ However, the animators do not use the visual image of the dagger to describe Germany.¹² The animation consistently presents Germany and Italy as a black wall that engulfs other nations. According to the animators, Germany and Italy pour into the victim nations, and the boundaries disappear. Although the black is menacing, the disappearing borders between nations imply a merging of the countries.¹³

Capra expands John Ford's idea in *December 7th* that Japanese betrayed nations and the United States by comparing Japan to a dagger. In Capra's documentaries that describe a Japanese conquest, the animators represent the conquest not as engulfing black wall but as a knife with the Rising Sun symbol on it. This knife stabs into victim nations, including America. In *War Comes to America*, Capra continues the dagger image. Walter Huston, the narrator,

¹¹ Roosevelt's speech refers to the *Italian* attack on France in 1940. Therefore, Capra confuses the image. He mainly uses the dagger image to describe Japanese aggression; originally, this phrase was made to describe Italian aggression, but Capra uses the phrase completely out of context. Capra, *Why We Fight: Divide and Conquer*. (GoodTimes Home Video, 1943), Digital Video Disc, 2000.

¹² The episodes that include the dagger to describe are *The Battle of China* and *War Comes to America*. In the latter movie, which includes German and Italian aggression, Capra uses the image the dagger exclusively to describe Japan.

¹³ Capra, *Divide and Conquer*.

declares that America was impeding Japan's expansion into the South Pacific and into China, so "[the United States] had to be removed the Japanese way." Apparently, the "Japanese way" includes a knife slamming into the middle of the United States.¹⁴

Although this image of the dagger is not necessarily racist in nature, it is a negative aspect. The very image implies treachery and deceit, which many Americans believed were Asian traits. Capra uses the dagger image to encourage the troops to continue to fight their enemy.

Capra ignores the Russo-Japanese War, which took place in 1904. Russia and Japan fought over control of Manchuria and Korea. After about a year of fighting, Japan won, which shocked the Western superpowers. Japan proved that it was a military power and could defeat an established superpower.¹⁵ Including this war would give Japan too much authority as a power. Capra focuses instead on the Japanese invasion of China and Manchuria to explain why Japanese are deceivers.

The sixth movie in the series, *The Battle of China* (1944), is the only episode that focuses exclusively on Japan. The film is about the fighting in China from 1935

¹⁴ Capra, *War Comes to America*.

¹⁵ "Russo-Japanese War." Wikipedia. [encyclopedia article on-line]; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Japanese_War; accessed 7 April 2005.

to 1944. Capra provides a distinction between ancient, noble, allied China and barbarous, "blood-crazed" Japan.¹⁶

In the past, the United States included Chinese people in immigration bans that also affected Japanese people. Originally, Americans saw Chinese and Japanese as the same people (Asians) who happened to live in different countries.¹⁷ Shortly before the advent of World War II, American ideas regarding the Chinese changed: Americans saw China not as a barbarous, South Asian nation, but as a noble, proud nation and partner. Missionaries exposed Americans to Chinese culture. The novels by Pearl Buck, such as *The Good Earth*, spoke about the contrast between the poverty found in China and the nobility of the nation's ancient heritage.¹⁸ Henry Luce, a founder of *Time Magazine*, was born and raised in China, so he also contradicted the myth of Chinese inferiority that Americans felt in the latter part of the 1800s.¹⁹ Trade between the two nations increased, and China used Western industry to improve their

¹⁶ Capra, *Why We Fight: The Battle of China*. (GoodTimes Home Video, 1944), Digital Video Disc, 2000.

¹⁷ *Colliers* featured a cover story about the Boxer Rebellion in China. Included are images of Japanese Samurai. So, according to Western thought in the early 1900s, China and Japan are the same things. *Collier's Weekly* 24 (September 22, 1900): cover.

¹⁸ "About Our Founder: Pearl S. Buck." Pearl S. Buck International: Bringing Hope to Children Worldwide. [on-line web site]; available from <http://www.pearl-s-buck.org/psbi/PearlSBuck/about.asp>; accessed 7 April 2005.

¹⁹ "Henry Luce." TIME: About TIME: Bios: Founders: Henry Luce. [on-line web site]; available from http://www.time-planner.com/planner/about/time/bios/founders/henry_luce.html;

impoverished way of life.²⁰ Moreover, in World War II, America and China were allied against a common, barbarous enemy, which made China like the United States.²¹

In reality, the United States had greater trade with Japan than with China prior to World War II. China was poor, while Japan was had money to spend. Even though Americans allied themselves emotionally with China, the nation could not afford much of Western trade. Japan was richer and was quickly becoming a Pacific superpower. Americans might not have understood Japan's militarism or political goals, but they liked the Japanese trade.²²

Capra presents the Japanese as deceivers. According to his documentaries, they betrayed us by obtaining the Western industry, or "civilization," and used the industry, not to improve their way of life, but to make wars of conquest and "to create one of the world's most powerful war machines." Japanese soldiers attempted to conquer China to utilize its resources and its work force, although the Japanese military was not able to accomplish its goal. The Japanese Navy attacked the American gunboat *Panay*, and claimed the attack was an accident. These deceits built up

²⁰ Capra, *The Battle of China*.

²¹ Ibid.

²² "Henry Luce." TIME: About TIME: Bios: Founders: Henry Luce. [on-line web site]

until the attack on Pearl Harbor.²³ Anthony Veiller, the narrator, declares, "Without warning, as [the Japanese] have always struck, they struck again." A dramatic shot of the battleship *Arizona* blowing up follows his statement.²⁴

Capra also cites the Tanaka Plan, or the Tanaka Memorial, as evidence that the Japanese were betrayers and "blood-crazed." This plan supposedly details the Japanese plan of conquest. According to the plan, the Japanese wanted to conquer Manchuria and China, to establish bases in the South Pacific, and to "conquer the United States."²⁵ The Tanaka Plan was public belief. In its December 27, 1937 issue, *Newsweek* foreign correspondents write, "In line with the famous "Tanaka Memorial [Plan] the war lords see Tokyo's dominion systematically extended not only to...China...and, in time, to India beyond. In brief—complete domination of Asia and the Pacific."²⁶ Historian John Dower stated in *War Without Mercy*, "Most scholars now agree that [the Tanaka Plan] was a masterful anti-Japanese hoax."²⁷ However, Capra did not know the Tanaka Plan was fake; he thought the plan was the truth. Popular

²³ Capra believed that the Pearl Harbor attack was sudden and a surprise. He was mistaken in his assumption. There were several warnings prior to the attack. See Prange, *At Dawn We Slept* and Lord, *Day of Infamy*.

²⁴ Capra, *The Battle of China*.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Newsweek*. 10 (December 27, 1937). 11.

²⁷ Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 22.

magazines, such as *Newsweek* presented the plan, so it was reasonable that Capra also presented it in his documentaries as if it was reality.

Although Germany spread terrorism in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, Capra chooses not to focus on Nazis as terrorists. The director correctly shows that the Japanese are aggressors who spread violence and fear throughout the South Pacific and Asia. However, Capra mistakenly states in *The Battle of China*, which focuses exclusively on the Chinese war brought about by Japan's invasion, "[The Japanese] introduced to the world a new kind of war; a war of deliberate terrorization of deliberate mass-murder, of deliberate frightfulness."²⁸ In addition, the Japanese spread the "small bonfires" of violence throughout the world "until [everything] was aflame."²⁹

Capra describes the Japanese as violent barbarians. He compares ancient, "civilized" China, which "has never begun a war of conquest in its history," and Japan, America and China's enemy who attacked without warning. Anthony Veiller, the narrator, recounts almost gleefully that barbarians tried to defeat China before, and the country

²⁸ This is another misconception of Capra's. A terrorist style of warfare was used in the American Civil War. Terrorism is an ancient style of war.

²⁹ Ibid.

built the Great Wall of China to keep them out. Therefore, he and Capra suggest that China will overcome Japan.³⁰

Capra does not think the Japanese have any human compassion or redeeming qualities. Rather, he views them as sub-human. This is pure racism. He compares the population to an octopus and thinks they are "slimy." Veiller intones, "The octopus still holds in its tentacles great stretches of territory. . . . The barbarism which produced the Tojos and the slimy Kurusus still intoxicates the little yellow men, still promises them eternity in return for fanatic service to the God-Emperor."³¹

Although the *Why We Fight* series is more sophisticated and subtle in its depiction of American racism toward the Japanese, the racism is apparent. For example, Capra chooses to ignore some horrific things that Germany and Italy did in order to focus of Japan's deeds. *Why We Fight* includes the three Axis Powers and explores their treachery, but Japan seems to come off the worst of the three. Japan has the additional burden of being the only non-Western Axis Power, and therefore, the most suspect enemy.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

The *Why We Fight* series are documentaries that contain elements of propaganda. Capra mostly used real footage in his documentaries to present his viewpoint. The director believed that he was performing a public service by showing the troops what he believed was the truth: the Axis Powers were dangerous for all Americans. However, out of the three Axis Powers, Japan received the most animosity from Americans. In Capra's documentaries, he believes that the animosity came from a number of causes: feelings of betrayal and deceit from Pearl Harbor and "misusing" Western industry, paranoia about Japanese invasion, and simple racism.

In the next chapter, I will explore Frank Capra's other classic documentary, *Know Your Enemy: Japan*. This documentary attempts to introduce Japan to the American public. Instead, it presents the Japanese people in a very stereotypical view. The reason behind *Know Your Enemy: Japan* is to present the Japanese as inferior to Americans.

Chapter Six:
Know Your Enemy: Japan (1945)

Along with the *Why We Fight* series, Frank Capra produced and directed a series of documentaries that focused on American enemies and allies. In 1945, he released *Know Your Enemy: Japan*. Like the *Why We Fight* series, *Know Your Enemy* compared the enemy's way of life to the American and western life. This documentary introduced Americans to Japanese history, culture, and religion. Although he had developed the script since 1942, he was uncertain if he should blame the war on the Japanese people or the Japanese leaders.

However, he had the misfortune to release the film on August 9, 1945, which was the day the United States dropped the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki. On August 28, General Douglas MacArthur ordered Capra to withdraw the film.¹ Japan was a defeated nation by the time *Know Your Enemy: Japan* premiered. By September 1945, the United States was helping to rebuild the conquered nation, so a film depicting the defeated population as subhuman was unacceptable.

In spite of the controversy this film presented when it premiered in August 1945, historians of film considered

¹ Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 18.

it a masterful piece of propaganda and is considered to be one of America's greatest wartime documentaries.² This is also an influential propaganda film. Footage from *Know Your Enemy: Japan* is found in countless World War II documentaries made since 1945. It also supports the traditional Western view of Japan.

Although Capra uses real footage in this propaganda film, his goal in *Know Your Enemy: Japan* is not to present Japanese fairly or accurately. This film stands in stark contrast with the *Why We Fight* series. In the earlier films, Capra presented the Japanese with more hostility and animosity than the Germans and Italians, but he made an effort to present the Japanese fairly. Instead of giving possible reasons for the animosity feelings for Japan, Capra emphasizes the feelings without attempting to explain them in *Know Your Enemy*. Outrageous clichés, such as a gong ringing to begin every section and, again, Japanese pronouncing "L's" like "R's," dominate the film.³

Historians should not classify *Know Your Enemy: Japan* as a documentary film. This is a propaganda film. Capra's intention is to convince the American public and troops to keep fighting a nearly completed war. In order to convince

² Ibid.

³ Capra, *Frank Capra's The War Years: Know Your Enemy: Japan*. (RCA/Columbia Pictures Home Video, 1945), Videocassette, 1990.

the public, he wants Americans to view themselves as superior.

Capra's first argument of Japanese inferiority is that the Japanese are not different from one another. The narrator calls the population an "obedient mass with a single mind." Capra presents the peasant class as industrious, but he also describes them as a "human machine producing rice and soldiers."⁴ He also has empathy for teenaged girls whose parents sell them to brothels and factories in order to make a little money.⁵ Although Capra sees the peasants as machines, but he implies that this is not the peasants' fault. The government designs education to teach children to think identically with one another; to do this, the government contracted teachers to "teach in the shortest possible time only the knowledge and skills necessary to make the student an obedient, loyal subject of the divine Emperor." Capra says that Japan had a "thought police" to keep people from thinking differently. This thought police arrests people for simply thinking dangerous, subversive thoughts about the government or the war effort, and the police alone determine who is thinking

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

these thoughts. In the film, gangsters with automatic weapons represent this type of police.⁶

The Japanese "fanatical" devotion to their emperor is Capra's second reason why they are inferior to Americans. According to the documentary, all Japanese people worship Emperor Hirohito as the highest god.⁷ In mythology, the sun-goddess, Amaterasu Omikami, became human, and her son became the first Emperor;⁸ all following emperors are part of the sun and gods.⁹ The narrator, Walter Huston, has a sarcastic tone when speaking of Japan's worship of Hirohito. Wherever the Emperor's flag leads, the soldier follows "in a blind emotional rush." Since the Emperor is the chief god, "whatever takes place in Japan, it is he, the god-emperor, that causes it." The narrator continues, "From [the Emperor], all things emanate, and in him, all things subsist. He makes the Japanese rice grow, and he

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ After World War II, Hirohito denied his divinity; B.A. Robinson, "Brief History of Shinto." Religious Tolerance Organization. [article on-line]; available from <http://www.religioustolerance.org/shinto.htm>; accessed 20 November 2004; Robert Sullivan, ed. "The Son of Heaven." *Life Collector's Edition: Pearl Harbor: America's Call to Arms*. 1 (October, 2001): 26.

⁸ Robinson, "Brief History of Shinto."

⁹ The documentary continues with the Japanese idea that they all have a little bit of the sun in their blood. According to the mythology presented in *Know Your Enemy: Japan*, all emperors are true sons of the sun god. However, they marry human women. Over time, a little bit of the sun-god gets into every Japanese person. This is why they can join the gods after they die valiantly. However, only the emperor, who is a god while still alive, is the true son of the sun; Capra, *Know Your Enemy: Japan*.

makes Japanese soldiers conquer the world."¹⁰ The documentary continues this idea that Emperor-worship drives Japanese soldiers to "conquer the world" and commit brutal acts in his name. The narrator intones, "In [the Emperor's] name, [Japanese] bring to other people justice, enlightenment, truth, and peace." Images shown during the narration oppose the narrator's conclusion; Capra uses footage of soldiers herding Chinese prisoners of war, dead and wounded civilians, starving people, and a dead baby lying in the street to show that Japanese actions overshadow their words and goals.¹¹

Know Your Enemy: Japan shows Capra's belief that the Japanese are incredibly militaristic. Japanese leaders and citizens set out to follow *Hakko Ichiu*, the command of the first emperor, which states, "The Emperor of Japan is the emperor of all the races of the world." Therefore, Japan has to control all nations. When Japan opened to the West, the United States and other western nations brought industry, new forms of government, and Christianity to the closed nation, which Japan seemed to adopt, but it used these elements to develop its militarism and to obey the *Hakko Ichiu*. The nation used the Western industry, "not to

¹⁰ Ibid. Emphasis retained.

¹¹ Ibid.

raise the standard of living, but to prepare for conquest."¹²

In Japan, "to be a soldier is the highest human achievement."¹³ According to Japanese mythology, to die in battle would make the soldier into a god.¹⁴ The Samaria code, *Bushido*, emphasizes this mythology. Capra is presenting the reality of Japanese culture. Bushido is the code of the warrior. In Japanese culture, money should not influence true warriors, but loyalty to superiors and personal honor should be the motivating factors.¹⁵ Capra uses this code to make the Japanese seem incapable of human emotion. In one section of the documentary, mothers lay urns that contain ashes of their dead soldier sons at the foot of a shrine to the Japanese warrior god, but Capra argues that peasant mothers do not grieve when their sons die in battle. Rather, the women rejoice that their sons are now gods.¹⁶

Capra did not understand the Japanese national religion, Shinto, and thinks it is "a nice, quaint religion

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ "Bushido." Encyclopedia.com. [encyclopedia article on-line]; available from <http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/b1/bushido.asp>; accessed 7 April 2005.

¹⁶ Capra, Know Your Enemy: Japan.

for a nice, quaint people."¹⁷ Shinto involves various gods, the chief of which is the sun-goddess and ghosts of dead ancestors. Exceptional people, such as emperors, become gods.¹⁸ However, the director continues that "there [is] a diabolical joker in Shintoism.... The state has forced into the teachings of Shinto a mad, fanatical doctrine; a doctrine that has brought suffering and death to untold millions."¹⁹

The director sees the Japanese as incredibly violent. Contrary to their belief that one of their ancestors is the sun-goddess, Capra says that Japanese ancestors were cruel barbarians, and the people have not evolved from their barbarous nature. Opposing Japan's expansion "brought suffering and death to untold millions of innocent [Asians] and now to thousands upon thousands of Americans." The narrator, Walter Huston, says, "Treachery, brutality, rape, and torture are all justified in use against non-Japanese."²⁰

Capra also sees the Japanese as deceitful. He continues his image of Japan as the dagger that he introduced in *Why We Fight: The Battle of China*. Once

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Capra, *Know Your Enemy: Japan*. See also Robinson, "Brief History of Shinto."

¹⁹ Capra, *Know Your Enemy: Japan*.

²⁰ Ibid.

more, the dagger with the Rising Sun symbol, which represents betrayal, slams into opposing countries, such as China, India, Australia, and the United States. He also argues that the national pastime of Judo and the Samurai code, *Bushido*, expand this traitor image. Capra defines as "the art of giving in, making [the] opponent lose his balance, then tripping, choking, hit, chop, poke or kick [the] vital spots." This definition depicts Judo as treacherous and deceitful because Japanese will do anything to defeat their opponents, even by tricking their opponents into believing that the Japanese are defeated. When referring to the peace negotiations between Japanese Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Capra theorizes that Japanese diplomats "think in terms of Judo." The Samuria code, *Bushido*, is "the art of treachery and the double cross."²¹ Capra thinks that *Bushido* influenced Japanese military, as the Samurai transformed into military leaders.²²

Finally, Capra's documentary presents Japanese as sub-human. He calls the Japanese population "machines." An animation that Capra uses in *Know Your Enemy: Japan* compares the population to an octopus. The animation shows

²¹ The Samurai warriors of the Feudal age turned into the modern military; Ibid.

²² Ibid.

a dagger-wielding octopus, which represents Japan. This octopus stabs other countries, including the United States.²³

Generally, Nazi Germany did not receive the same kind of negativity from Capra. In both of his documentary series, he argues that the Germans were not essentially evil but misled by a fanatical dictator. In none of his documentaries that depict Nazi Germany does he mention the Holocaust; Capra did not know the full extent of the Holocaust at the time of producing his documentaries.²⁴ His focus is on the expansion of Germany. However, in Capra's documentaries, there is little difference between the Japanese people, the Japanese military leaders, and the Japanese government.

In *Know Your Enemy: Japan*, Capra presents a contradictory view of the Japanese civilians. On one hand, Capra feels sorry for the peasant class and angry that the government misled its citizens. However, he argues that the Japanese civilians perpetuate the government's abuse by believing in the Japanese culture and religion. Capra

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Capra completed the *Why We Fight* series and *Know Your Enemy: Japan* before the full extent of the Holocaust was publicly known. Although *Know Your Enemy* was released after Nazi Germany fell, it was in the works since 1942. It went through several revisions because the War Department did not like any portrayal of the Japanese "as ordinary human victimized by their leaders." Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 19.

believes that culture and religion result in two conflicting conclusions for the Japanese peasants. The first conclusion is that Japanese believe they are better than every non-Japanese person is, and therefore, Japan should be the most powerful nation, no matter the cost. The second conclusion is that the Japanese Emperor and military leaders are gods or demigods, and therefore, above even the Japanese population.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

John Ford's World War II films and Frank Capra's World War II films represent several important things to film historians. The first thing historians should consider when regarding these films is whether the films are documentaries or whether they are propaganda films. The difference between the two types of films is that documentary films tell some historical facts, while propaganda films, although historically relevant, are overshadowed by their message. The second thing is how the films reflect the climate of the time and place in which they were produced.

Some World War II non-fiction films that should be classified as propaganda fall under the genre of documentaries. There are some unique differences between true documentaries and propaganda films. In documentaries, the audience views a filmmaker's vision of the world. The filmmaker uses real events to encourage audiences to consider the director's vision of the world as the correct one. Propaganda films force audiences to accept the director's vision of the world. Propaganda films, and documentary films to an extent, incorporate fictional elements to present an official message.

Sometimes non-fiction films can blur the line between documentaries and propaganda. True documentaries can contain elements of propaganda. I viewed *Battle of Midway* and the *Why We Fight* series as pure documentaries. However, both directors use ingenious artificial techniques (narration and animation) to emphasize and support their real footage. These artificial techniques help to encourage audiences to make up their own minds on the subject. It is just as easy to see propaganda masquerading as documentaries. *December 7th* and *Know Your Enemy: Japan* are true propaganda films. Throughout most of the films, they use staged, misunderstood scenes and outrageous clichés to present their political message: the war is necessary in order to defeat a villainous people.

These World War II documentaries reflect the filmmakers' visions, as much as any fictional feature film does. They also reflect and capture the intended time and place. John Ford and Frank Capra did not simply release all the film footage they shot. They designed the story and edited it down so the films reflect their own standards and their government's official messages. Although documentaries depict reality, the directors, and the government they serve, have an agenda they wish to convey.

It is interesting to note that both John Ford and Frank Capra's early World War II films fell under the documentary category while their later films should be classified as propaganda. They altered their techniques and perceptions to include the official political message regarding the Japanese. The official message presents not merely a negative view of the enemy, but a racist view of Japan. It is not evident if Ford and Capra believed their own propaganda, but anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States continued after the war was over, partly due to documentaries. The impact is that some people today who lived through World War II still refuse to have anything to do with Japanese.¹

This shift of perceptions in World War II films also contribute to the post-War toleration of Japan. These propaganda films proved to be inaccurate after Japan's defeat. The Japanese citizens were not subhuman or monsters as the propaganda films depicted. Instead, Japan was a defeated nation, dependent on the United States for protection and aid.

Documentaries also reflect the climate of the country in which documentaries were produced. World War II

¹ "Tora, Tora, Tora: The Real Story of Pearl Harbor." History Channel. Original Airdate: November 28, 2000, Video Cassette, 2004.

documentaries are terrific depictions of the general American ideals, such as loyalty, patriotism, and a need to defeat the enemy, especially those films made during the 1940s.² Historians can figure out what Americans believe and what morality they prefer.

Ford and Capra had messages to relate to Americans in their films. These were meant to argue the American view of the world. They are also supposed to convince a skeptical nation that fighting the Axis Powers, particularly Japan, would preserve American democracy and freedom. Finally, these particular documentaries show that the Japanese were suspect and dangerous to Americans.

Historians do not view documentaries to gain information about the enemy. The Japanese depicted in the films are stereotypes, influenced by years of racist imagery. Instead, historians view documentaries to get an insight to the American moral mindset, something that can be overlooked in written documents about the war.

John Ford and Frank Capra did not want to explore Japanese society and culture as if they were ethnographers; rather, the directors wanted to keep American morale and commitment to the war effort high. These films showed American mentality during the Second World War. Americans

² Ironically, those are also Japanese ideals.

saw the Japanese as immoral, different, and subhuman, and Americans thought that they had the power of "civilization" behind their war effort. The United States's ideals of race, religion, culture were evident throughout the films.

After the war ended and the animosity between the United States and Japan dissolved, these images and documentaries remain as testimonies to the racial prejudice experienced by Americans. Although the racism and prejudice experienced by Americans were deep-seated and not easily forgotten, the racism slowly faded. In the post-War era, the two former enemies reached an understanding and joined forces to fight the new enemy: the Soviet Union. Japan was an ally against the United States's new foe: communism. The previous animosity between the United States and Japan virtually ended.

John Ford and Frank Capra filtered their documentaries through their Western perspective; in their eyes, which the films represent, Japan was an enemy to the United States, as was Germany and Italy. Although Japan was the United States's wartime enemy, the two directors wanted Americans to know that Japanese were different in all possible ways. Japan was America's cultural and racial enemy, not simply an enemy of war.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Videos

Bay, Michael. *Pearl Harbor*. Walt Disney Home Video, 2001, Digital Video Disc, 2003.

Bradley, Richard, ex. prod. *Days that Shook the World*. "Hiroshima." History Channel. Original Airdate: Dec. 29, 2003, Video Cassette, 2005.

_____, *Days that Shook the World*. "Pearl Harbor." History Channel. Original Airdate: Jan 29, 2005, Video Cassette, 2005.

Capra, Frank, dir. and prod. *Frank Capra's The War Years: Know Your Enemy: Japan*. RCA/Columbia Pictures Home Video, 1945, Videocassette, 1990.

_____, dir. and prod. *Why We Fight: The Battle of Britain*. GoodTimes Home Video, 1943, Digital Video Disc, 2000.

_____, dir. and prod. *Why We Fight: The Battle of China*. GoodTimes Home Video, 1944, Digital Video Disc, 2000.

_____, dir. and prod. *Why We Fight: The Battle of Russia*. GoodTimes Home Video, 1943, Digital Video Disc, 2000.

_____, dir. and prod. *Why We Fight: Divide and Conquer*. GoodTimes Home Video, 1943, Digital Video Disc, 2000.

_____, dir. and prod. *Why We Fight: Nazis Strike*. GoodTimes Home Video, 1943, Digital Video Disc, 2000.

_____, dir. and prod. *Why We Fight: Prelude to War*. GoodTimes Home Video, 1943, Digital Video Disc, 2000.

- _____, dir. and prod. *Why We Fight: War Comes to America*. GoodTimes Home Video, 1945, Digital Video Disc, 2000.
- Fleischer, Richard and Kinji Fukusaku, directors. *Tora! Tora! Tora!* Twentieth Century Fox, 1970, Digital Video Disc, 2004.
- Ford, John, dir. and prod. *The Battle of Midway*. (*World War II Greatest Battles Series*.) GoodTimes Home Video, 1942, Digital Video Disc, 2001.
- _____, dir. and prod. *December 7th*. (*World War II Greatest Battles Series*.) GoodTimes Home Video, 1943, Digital Video Disc, 2001.
- Huston, John, dir. and prod. *The Battle of San Pietro*. Vci Home Video, 1945, Video Cassette, 2000.
- _____, dir. and prod. *Report from the Aleutians*. GoodTimes Home Video, 1943, Digital Video Disc, 2001.
- Kim, Margaret, ex. prod. *Command Decision: Battle of Midway*. The History Channel, 30 July 2004.
- Riefenstahl, Leni, dir. and writer. *Triumph des Willens* (*Triumph of the Will*). Synapse, 1934, Digital Video Disc, 2001.
- Thurman, Tom, dir. *John Ford Goes to War*. 2002. MoviePlex Channel, 15 February 2005.
- "Tora, Tora, Tora: The Real Story of Pearl Harbor." History Channel. Original Airdate: November 28, 2000, Video Cassette, 2004.
- Wolff, Perry, dir. *Kamikaze*. Irja Films, 1960. Digital Video Disc, 2001.
- Wyler, William, dir. and prod. *The Fighting Lady*. GoodTimes Home Video, 1944, Digital Video Disc, 2001.

Books

Capra, Frank. *The Name Above the Title*. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1971.

Articles

Collier's Weekly. 24 (September 22, 1900): cover.

Life: Collector's Edition. "Pearl Harbor: America's Call to Arms." 1 (October, 2003).

Newsweek. 10 (December 27, 1937): 7-11.

Secondary Sources

Books

- Barnouw, Eric. *Documentary: A History of the Non-Fiction Film*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974.
- Beidler, Philip D. *The Good War's Greatest Hits: World War II and American Remembering*. Athens: University of Georgia, 1998.
- Blum, John Morton. *V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.
- Bohn, Thomas W. *An Historical and Descriptive Analysis of the "Why We Fight" Series*. New York: Arno Press, 1977.
- Brokaw, Tom. *The Greatest Generation*. New York: Dell Publishing, 1998.
- Combs, James E. and Sara T. Combs. *Film Propaganda and American Politics: An Analysis and Filmography*. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994.
- Culbert, David. *Film and Propaganda in America: A Documentary History*, 4 vols. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990.
- Doherty, Thomas. *Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture, and World War II*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
- Dower, John W. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1999.
- _____, *War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986.
- Fielding, Raymond. *The American Newsreel, 1911-1967*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972.

- Irons, Peter. *Justice at War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983; reprint, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Koppes, Clayton R. and Gregory Black. *Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits, and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies*. New York: Collier MacMillan, 1987.
- Lord, Walter. *Day of Infamy*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1957; reprint, New York: Owl Books, 2001.
- Nornes, Abe Mark and Fukushima Yukio, eds. *The Japan/America Film Wars: WWII Propaganda and Its Cultural Contexts*. Langhorne, PA: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1994.
- Prange, Gordon W. *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor*. New York: Penguin Books, 1981; reprint, 1991.
- Terkel, Studs. *The Good War: An Oral History of World War Two*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984.
- Toland, John. *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945*. New York: Random House Inc., 1970.
- Winkler, Allan M. *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978.

Articles

- Brcak, Nancy and John R. Pavia. "Racism in Japanese and U.S. Wartime Propaganda." *Historian* 56 (Summer 1994): 671-685.
- Garrett, Greg. "It's Everybody's War: Racism and the World War Two Documentary." *Journal of Film & Television* 22 (Summer 1994): 70-74.
- Krome, Fredric. "The True Glory and the Failure of Anglo-American Film Propaganda in the Second World War."

Journal of Contemporary History 17 (Winter 1998): 21-34.

Ngai, Mae M. "The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924." *The Journal of American History*. 86 (June 1999): 67-92.

Paris, Michael. "Lessons for Democracy: American Cinema 1942-1945." *European Review of History* 5 (Spring 1998): 85-95.

Robinson, B.A. "Brief History of Shinto." Religious Tolerance Organization [article on-line]; available from <http://www.religioustolerance.org/shinto.htm>; accessed 20 November 2004.

Renov, Michael. "Warring Images: Stereotype and American Representations of the Japanese, 1941-1991." Abe Mark Nornes and Fukushima Yujio, ed. *Japanese/American Film Wars: WWII Propaganda and Its Cultural Contexts* (Langhorne, PA: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1994).

Rollins, Peter C. "Frank Capra's Why We Fight Film Series and Our American Dream." *Journal of American Culture* 19 (Winter 1996): 81-86.

Steele, Richard. "The Greatest Gangster Movie Ever Filmed: Prelude to War." *Prologue* 11 (Winter 1979): 221-235.

Sullivan, Robert, ed. "The Son of Heaven." *Life Collector's Edition: Pearl Harbor: America's Call to Arms*. 1 (October, 2001).

Internet Sources

Encyclopedia Britannica. <http://www.britannica.com>.

Encyclopedia.com. <http://www.encyclopedia.com>.

HistoryCooperative. <http://www.historycooperative.org>.

Internet Movie Database. <http://www.imdb.com>.

Library of Congress. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov>.

Pacific Link: The KQED Asian Education Initiative.
www.kqed.org.

Pearl S. Buck International: Bringing Hope to Children
Worldwide. <http://www.pearl-s-buck.org/psbi/>.

Religious Tolerance. www.religioustolerance.org.

SourceWatch. <http://www.sourcewatch.org>.

Time.com. <http://www.time-planner.com/planner/>.

University of Chicago. <http://history.uchicago.edu>.

Wikipedia: The On-Line Encyclopedia.
<http://en.wikipedia.org>.

UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

Bennett, Michael Todd. "Reel Relations: Culture, Diplomacy, and the Grand Alliance, 1939-1946." Ph.D. diss., University of Georgia, 2002.

Ewing, Charles B. "An Analysis of Frank Capra's War Rhetoric in the 'Why We Fight' Films." Ph.D. diss., Washington State University, 1983.

Morton, Scott A. "'Why We Fight': An Analysis of Filmic Construction in its Role of Propaganda During World War II." M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1997.

Pearce, Frederick William. "An Analysis of Frank Capra's *Why We Fight* Films, 1942-1945 as Documentary Film Rhetoric." Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburg, 1991.

Kathy Ann Garrison



Home:
208 S. Duncan #6
Stillwater, OK 74074
(405) 612-8220

Office:
513 Life Sciences West
Stillwater, OK 74078
(405) 744-5678

Education

M.A., (candidate) Oklahoma State University, May 2005 (History)
B.A., Emporia State University, May 2002 (Social Sciences)

Teaching and Work Experience

2003-Present

Teaching Assistant (US History survey): Falls 2003, 2004, and Springs
2004, 2005.

Professional Memberships

Phi Alpha Theta, the International History Honor Society.

Conferences

Presented "The 'Truth' of War: Japanese Depictions in World War II Documentaries," at the Third Annual Emporia State University Conference, February 2005.

Presented "The 'Truth' of War: Japanese Depictions in World War II Documentaries," at the Southwest Social Sciences Conference, March 2005.

Honors / Awards

Best of Emporia State for paper "Kent State Reactions," 1999.

Distinguished Writing in Social Sciences for paper "Transgendering the Old West: Women in Male Roles and Outlaws," 2002.

Publications

"Kent State Reactions," in Best of Emporia State 1999-2000.

Fields of Study

Modern America (World War II)
Women's Studies
Ancient Mediterranean World

Committee

Dr. L.G. Moses
Dr. Laura Belmonte
Dr. Ronald Petrin