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Co-Winners of the Griswold Prize for Excellence in Undergraduate Historical Scholarship

The Liberal Libertine:

Gender and revolution in the writings of Francisco de Miranda

“Will you never tire of being so unjust?”¹

—Pierre Choderlos de Laclos, Les Liaisons Dangereuses

Introduction

Francisco de Miranda (1750-1816) lived a life that seems designed for historical study. From colonial Caracas, he embarked in 1771 on a globe-spanning journey that lasted decades, witnessing revolutionary moments in the nascent United States and republican France and building a family in England before returning to lead a botched attempt at revolution against the colonial order in his native Spanish America. He died after his failed attempts at nation-building in a Spanish prison cell, thoroughly defeated, but not without a substantial legacy as an early figurehead of Spanish American independence and anti-monarchical revolt. Over the course of the Atlantic odyssey that was his life, Miranda composed journals and exchanged correspondence that now serves as an important archive on international experiences of revolution at the turn of the nineteenth century.

In particular, Miranda’s documents offer a valuable window into questions relating to shifts in the perception of gender during the era of Atlantic revolutions. Miranda was an archetypical practitioner of “libertinism,” a phenomenon defined by Lynn Hunt as “an upper-class male revolt against conventional morality and religious

¹ Pierre Choderlos de Laclos, *Les Liaisons Dangereuses*, in *The Libertine Reader*, ed. Michel Feher (New York: Zone Books: 1997), 1061.

orthodoxy” originating in the seventeenth century, whose devotees were “imagined to be free-thinkers [...] open to sexual, and literary, experimentation.”² At the same time, Miranda was an avowed leader of liberal, republican, and anti-colonial revolutionary movements, professing a profound devotion to the ostensibly egalitarian ideals that defined the rhetoric of the North American, French, and Spanish American revolutions. How did libertinism—a distinctly white, elite, and masculine practice born of the social structures of the *ancien régime*—survive and prosper as a character trait of a key figure in apparently democratic movements? Miranda stands alongside other revolutionary characters as a prominent example of what I shall term the “liberal libertine”: a figure who personified the libertine ideologies and behaviors of the European, masculine elite while spearheading sociopolitical reform based on apparently contradictory liberal ideologies. The liberal libertine serves as an exemplary figure to interrogate key ironies of the Atlantic revolutions and challenge popular interpretations of the various movements.

The historiography of gender in the American and European revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries correctly acknowledges dramatic changes in perceptions of femininity and masculinity as important cultural components of the movements, but studies of gender in revolution often fail to acknowledge the perpetuation of pre-revolutionary philosophies and behaviors of gender across the temporal boundaries set by the movements themselves. The example of Francisco de Miranda demonstrates how *ancien régime* phenomena could survive and prosper alongside revolutionary ideologies.

² Lynn Hunt, “Introduction: Obscenity and the Origins of Modernity, 1500-1800,” in *The Invention of Pornography*, ed. Lynn Hunt (New York: Zone Books, 1996), 36-37.

Libertinism is a prime example of such a phenomenon in the realm of gender and behavioral history, alongside such maintained pre-revolutionary practices as slavery in the United States and monarchy in Haiti. Social, cultural, and political structures of the *ancien régime* and the colonial order were not cleanly eliminated through revolution; in fact, they often accompanied and evolved alongside revolutionary ideologies. The survival and predominance of the European, elite, masculine libertinism exemplified by Miranda suggests that historians of gender in the Atlantic revolutions should make a special effort to recognize the maintenance of pre-revolutionary phenomena and to avoid conceiving of revolutions as clear breaks with past conceptions of masculinity, femininity, and gender relations.

Masculinity in Revolution

Karen Hagemann and Jane Rendall point out in their introduction to *Gender, War and Politics: Transatlantic Perspectives, 1775-1830* that ideas about gender were complex and actively shifting in conjunction with Atlantic revolutions at the turn of the nineteenth century.³ For the purposes of this study, I will first examine historiographical takes on masculinity and femininity in revolutions before detailing how libertinism and the example of Miranda himself offer a chance to reevaluate this historiography.

In the case of Europe, much of the scholarship on gender in revolutionary contexts comes from twenty-first century analyses of changing perceptions of

³ Karen Hagemann and Jane Rendall, “Introduction: Gender, War and Politics: Transatlantic Perspectives on the Wars of Revolution and Liberation, 1775-1830,” in *Gender, War and Politics: Transatlantic Perspectives, 1775-1830*, ed. Karen Hagemann et al. (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 3.

masculinity in France. The most common argument regarding redefinitions of masculinity during the revolution comes as a result of studies of popular and official discourse (especially pro-revolution propaganda) during the recruitment of soldiers for revolutionary and Napoleonic armies, beginning with the *levée en masse* instituted in 1793.⁴

Alan Forrest and Joan B. Landes concur in the opinion that mass male conscription altered French conceptions of masculinity, creating a new standard for masculine citizenship and military camaraderie under the guidance of the revolutionary state. Landes points out specifically that this new standard of masculinity was contextualized in connection to femininity, with feminized visual representations of the French Republic serving to unify conscripts not only as brothers-in-arms but also as defenders of the sexual virtue of a feminized nation.⁵ The propagandists of revolutionary and Napoleonic France drew on martial pride and male heterosexual desire as tools for state-building, creating an idealized image of the male citizen as an egalitarian warrior and a virtuous husband, defending both his family and his homeland.

In the case of Spanish America, historiographical opinions on masculinity vary. Historians conflict in particular over the extent to which accepted masculine values remained intact from the colonial period to post-independence. Sarah Chambers posits that the end of the colonial regime in Peru brought about a shift in primary masculine values from “status” (a class-based claim to greater rights from birth) to “virtue” (a

⁴ Alan Forrest, “Citizenship, Honour and Masculinity: Military Qualities under the French Revolution and Empire,” in *Gender, War and Politics*, 95.

⁵ Joan B. Landes, “Republican citizenship and heterosocial desire: concepts of masculinity in revolutionary France,” in *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History*, ed. Stefan Dudink et al. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 101.

claim to the rights of citizenship based on good behavior and participation in the new state).⁶ This perspective, based primarily on an analysis of legal records, is generally convincing.

However, using a conflicting example from New Granada (modern-day Colombia), Víctor Uribe-Uran argues that the principle of class-based “honor-status” remained the central element of masculine identity after independence was achieved across Spanish America, and that the new bureaucrats that dominated independent Spanish American politics eventually merged with the former colonial elite as they pursued this form of status, composing “an economically heterogeneous ruling class.”⁷ Uribe-Uran’s elite-centered analysis does little to acknowledge variations in masculinity across class lines—especially among subalterns—but it is useful to gain a sense of elite masculine self-perception. Chambers’ study presents a more generalized picture of gender shifts during independence, but Uribe-Uran’s helps to reveal how male elites could maintain *ancien régime* social structures even as active participants in revolutionary republics.

There is a general tendency among historians to ignore the unabashed maintenance of *ancien régime* and colonial sociocultural structures across lines of revolution, as revolutions tend to serve as breaking-off points in the historical narrative. Uribe-Uran’s analysis of maintained conceptions of honor-status in revolutionary New Granada is particularly useful as a diversion from this tradition, indicating that *ancien régime* beliefs and behaviors were perfectly capable of surviving—and thriving—despite

⁶ Ibid., 161.

⁷ Víctor M. Uribe-Uran, “The Changing Meaning of Honor, Status, and Class: The *Letrados* and Bureaucrats of New Granada in the Late Colonial and Early Postcolonial Period,” in *State and Society in Spanish America during the Age of Revolution*, ed. Víctor M. Uribe-Uran (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2001), 59.

the apparent sociocultural challenges of revolution. The example of Francisco de Miranda proves that the phenomenon of libertinism similarly jumped the gap between pre-revolutionary and revolutionary contexts.

Femininity in Revolution

As Joan B. Landes emphasizes, feminized images of the nation were central in the process of national rebuilding during and after the French Revolution. As an appeal to masculine sensibilities, women and women's bodies were tremendously important to the propaganda machines of revolutionary states. But, of course, the feminization of the nation did not imply the real inclusion of women within new republics, in French or American contexts.

In fact, a unifying current between the historiographies of the French and Spanish American revolutions is the recognition of women's practical exclusion from citizenship, despite intermittent legal and rhetorical gestures toward enhanced equality. In this sense, the Atlantic revolutions were not particularly revolutionary for women. In fact, their social statuses within Atlantic society tended to experience little—or even detrimental—change. Geneviève Fraisse reveals how “enlightened” discourses of reason found a place in revolutionary France in order to cement the maintenance of “sexual equality in inequality,” with sexist social structures maintained around a supposedly egalitarian legal frameworks.⁸ The new French republic could reject gender inequality on paper while denying any effective social shift toward equality.

⁸ Geneviève Fraisse, *Reason's Muse: Sexual Difference and the Birth of Democracy*, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 92.

The same model applies in the historiography of femininity in Spanish American revolutions. In her foundational study of gender during the transition from colony to state in Arequipa, Peru, Sarah Chambers notes how conceptions of “republican morality”—particularly related to the capacity for public work—were the exclusive property of elite men, placing all women in the same camp as slaves and servants as unsuitable candidates for citizenship.⁹ So, as perceptions of masculinity shifted to encourage wider sectors of the male population to participate in the state, male elites still obstructed women from membership in the nation.

In the European and American environments that Francisco de Miranda explored during his travels through the various arenas of Atlantic revolution, women were rhetorically included but practically shut out of new republics. Their bodies formed the bases of revolutionary propaganda and their rights were supposedly enhanced through legal changes, but in concrete terms they suffered as exiles from the mechanisms of state power. While the roles of men in new republics actually changed as a result of military mobilization and its implicit universalized masculinity, the double-sided rhetorical inclusion and practical exclusion of women from new nations suggested little real change in perceptions of femininity. Francisco de Miranda expresses this reevaluation of masculinity, together with maintained *ancien régime* perceptions of femininity, in his simultaneously liberal and libertine writings.

Ancien Régime *Libertinism*

⁹ Sarah C. Chambers, *From Subjects to Citizens: Honor, Gender, and Politics in Arequipa, Peru, 1780-1854* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 189.

The evolution of libertinism as a historiographical premise is itself caught up in confusing definitional ambiguity. In the introduction to their broad-based collection of essays, *Libertine Enlightenment: Sex, Liberty and Licence in the Eighteenth Century*, Peter Cryle and Lisa O’Connell emphasize the multiple potential applications of the terms “libertine,” “libertinism,” and “libertinage.”¹⁰ They seek to break the bonds between notions of libertinism and its conventional connection to “the sexually free behaviour and norms of upper-class men.”¹¹ Successive essays in their collection go on to highlight usages of libertine discourse outside the realm of sexual behavior, as in the accusations of *libertinage des sens* levied against the philosopher Voltaire owing to his evidential *libertinage d’esprit*.¹² Only as the collection’s studies gain chronological distance from the origins of the Enlightenment do they begin to focus more specifically on the class- and gender-defined notions of libertinism that apply most readily to the case of Francisco de Miranda.

Jonathan Mee’s contribution to *Libertine Enlightenment* focuses on radical exposures of “aristocratic libertinism” during the French revolution, employing the term to summon up the preconceived notion of elite male promiscuity to which it normally refers in nonacademic discourse.¹³ Despite the various definitional possibilities of libertinism, which have undeniable usefulness in a wider historiographical context, in the case of Francisco de Miranda it is helpful to rely on Lynn Hunt’s definition of

¹⁰ Peter Cryle and Lisa O’Connell, “Sex, Liberty and Licence in the Eighteenth Century,” in *Libertine Enlightenment: Sex, Liberty and Licence in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Peter Cryle and Lisa O’Connell (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 2.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Marc Serge Rivière, “Philosophical Liberty, Sexual Licence: The Ambiguity of Voltaire’s *Libertinage*,” in *Libertine Enlightenment*, 75.

¹³ Jonathan Mee, “Libertines and Radicals in the 1790s: The Strange Case of Charles Pigott I,” in *Libertine Enlightenment*, 185.

“libertinism” as an “upper-class male revolt against conventional morality and religious orthodoxy,” as I did at the beginning of my analysis.¹⁴ This definition has particular relevance to the term’s real-world use in the context of the French Revolution as a tool for the social condemnation of aristocrats, as is recognized by both Jonathan Mee and Lynn Hunt in her essay on the mockery of aristocrats through pornographic images in revolutionary France.¹⁵

The examples provided by Mee and Hunt indicate that, in its contemporary context at the turn of the nineteenth century, libertinism appeared as a distinctive trait reserved to a white, elite, masculine realm. Despite the legitimacy of other definitions of the term—which is inevitably subjective, after all—a definition based on the phenomenon’s origins and its contextual significance rather than its multifaceted sociocultural products is both more useful in a discussion of Francisco de Miranda and more accurate as a historiographical tool.

Miranda’s Life in Scholarship

Studies of Miranda’s life are inextricably caught up in his legacy as a hero of Venezuelan independence and nationhood. He is often recognized in scholarly as well as popular discourse as the *Precursor* to Simón Bolívar’s *Libertador*, setting the stage for the continent-wide wave of revolutions that swept Spanish America in the first decades of the nineteenth century. The exciting nature of his international travels makes it tempting for students of his life to depict him only as a heroic adventurer rather than a

¹⁴ Lynn Hunt, “Introduction: Obscenity and the Origins of Modernity, 1500-1800,” in *The Invention of Pornography*, ed. Lynn Hunt (New York: Zone Books, 1996), 36-37.

¹⁵ Lynn Hunt, “Pornography and the French Revolution,” in *The Invention of Pornography*, 301.

multifaceted participant in revolutionary movements, and his libertinism is predictably caught up in his overall imagining as a romantic wanderer. Appropriately, Miranda was perhaps the first to write the term “*romántico*” in Spanish, using it to describe a German landscape in 1788.¹⁶

English-language scholarship has been particularly prone to hagiography, depicting Miranda as a praiseworthy (and distinctly Latin) figure. William Spence Robertson’s expansive *The Life of Miranda*, published in 1929, set the standard for hagiographical presentations of Miranda in English. In its final chapter, tellingly titled “The Man and His Role in History,” Robertson imagines the prospect of a “spicy article on his amorous adventures,” making use of as-yet unrevealed journals and letters, with laddish excitement.¹⁷ For all its thoroughness, Robertson’s biography fails as effective history due to its tendency to lionize Miranda.

Karen Racine’s 2003 biography, subtitled “A Transatlantic Life in the Age of Revolution,” helpfully contextualizes Miranda’s life within the framework of Atlantic studies, but also falls into the trap of praising Miranda as a romantic hero. Racine bases this praise both on Miranda’s revolutionary ideology and on his sexual behavior. In its final paragraphs, the book highlights how he “romanced women of all social ranks” as if his willingness to interact sexually with subaltern women indicated a greater sense of social justice.¹⁸ This tendency towards hagiography is potentially damaging to any attempt to gain an accurate understanding of Miranda’s perspectives on gender,

¹⁶ Oscar Rodríguez Ortiz, “Presentación,” in *Diario de Moscú y San Petersburgo*, ed. Josefina Rodríguez de Alonso (Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1982), 6.

¹⁷ William Spence Robertson, *The Life of Miranda* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1929), 229.

¹⁸ Karen Racine, *Francisco de Miranda: A Transatlantic Life in the Age of Revolution* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003), 258.

particularly as his interactions with women are often cited as a specific reason for his status as a supposed hero. For my purposes, it is helpful to ignore past scholarship on Miranda's life and focus as much as possible on his own words and those of his acquaintances.

Miranda's Liberalism

I do not intend to go into specific detail regarding the facts of Miranda's life; I will limit my attempts at biography to contextualizing the documents from his archives that offer evidence on the interaction of his politically liberal and personally libertine tendencies. His actions as a revolutionary leader speak as loudly as his words to confirm his identity as an avowed anti-colonial rebel and proponent of classical liberal ideals. Nonetheless, a brief glance at documents related to his political philosophy serves to cement his status as a revolutionary liberal.

One of the clearest indications of this designation's validity comes from Miranda's proposals for new government in northern Spanish America after the planned ousting of the colonial order. His draft of a "*Proyecto de Gobierno Federal*" proposes a system of oligarchic republicanism typical of the liberal regimes of the day, with local councils and a dual executive elected by popular vote among citizens—who must, of course, be propertied men able to prove their lack of African ancestry.¹⁹ Using a blend of titles from republican Rome and indigenous American tradition, Miranda formulates a

¹⁹ Francisco de Miranda, "La capital establecida tal vez en el istmo de Panama llevará el augusto nombre de Colombo," in *Documentos fundamentales*, ed. Elias Pino Iturrieta (Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1992), 120.

liberal regime along typical European lines, marked as distinctly American mostly by the presence of “*Incas*,” “*Curacas*,” and “*Amautas*” as functionaries of the new state.²⁰

Even in symbolic terms, Miranda’s political vision conformed to European models of revolutionary liberalism. In a list of necessary supplies for his planned coup against the Spanish regime in New Granada, he highlights both the need for proper weapons and uniforms and his special desire for “*10 banderas, los colores de la divisa: rojo, amarillo y azul, en tres franjas*” as part of the expedition’s cargo.²¹ Miranda’s desire for a tricolor flag like that of revolutionary France reveals his hope that Spanish America will follow the mold of European revolutionary liberalism, even visually. As a thinker and a military leader, Miranda was enmeshed in the symbolic language of the French Revolution and its liberal ideals.

Miranda was an exemplary revolutionary of his day, conforming to standards of political radicalism set in France and the United States as he sought to impose a liberal, republican vision on Spanish America. His egalitarian liberal language stands in ironic juxtaposition to his elite libertinism, and examining the latter in the context of the former reveals both the irony of Miranda’s condition and the need for flexibility in historical analyses of sociocultural change during revolution.

Miranda’s Libertinism

The roots of libertinism run deep in Miranda’s biography, beginning with an adherence to structures of white, masculine privilege as an elite participant in Spanish American colonial society. Miranda was born and educated in the highly racialized

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Francisco de Miranda, “Banderas tricolores, rojo, amarillo y azul—en tres franjas—para el empeño bélico,” in *Documentos fundamentales*, 126.

society of Spanish Caracas, and one of the early dramas of his life was an attempt to prove his whiteness to the province's governor in order to continue his university studies. His message to the governor describes his need and desire to "*hacer constar la limpieza de sangre de mis padres y mi conducta*," specifically highlighting his supposed lack of African ancestry.²² Miranda's studies and social role were contingent on a European identity—even if his true genealogical roots were not entirely European—and he never turned away from this element of his own identity, despite his avowed attempts to promote racial equity in later revolutionary rhetoric.

His classical formation included the breadth and depth of subjects required of an Enlightened aristocrat, and libertine interests played an early role in his intellectual life. In 1780 he made an expansive list of the volumes in his growing library—which accompanied him on all of his travels—and included works on "*onanismo*," "*ninfomanía*," and "*enfermedades venéreas*" alongside theological texts, multilingual dictionaries, and literature in Spanish, French, and English.²³ The presence of these texts in his library indicates his early adherence to elite European norms of libertine interest, with a fascination with sex—and particularly with taboo sexual practices—as a necessary component of his overall intellectual formation. His class and gender identity required him to evolve into a well-rounded classical scholar. He was socially obligated to engage in a wide range of study and lived experience including sexual and romantic liaisons, even as he learned to criticize the social structures that led to this behavior. As he began his travels through Europe in the 1780s, a fascination with sex and sexuality

²² Francisco de Miranda, "Yo pretendo servir. Necesito hacer constar la limpieza de sangre de mis padres y mi conducta," in *Documentos fundamentales*, 1.

²³ Francisco de Miranda, "Principios de una famosa biblioteca," in *Documentos fundamentales*, 9-10.

marked his reading, indicating, at least in intellectual terms, his participation in the *ancien régime* culture of libertinism.

Miranda's real-life involvement in the world of libertinism is affirmed through the letters included in his personal archives, which also begin to indicate how he conceived of this white, elite, masculine phenomena as a legitimate component of his liberal, republican, revolutionary ideology. After having traveled through the newly independent United States and arrived in France, Miranda embraced the identity of the aristocratic European libertine with gusto. While serving as a general in the army of revolutionary France in 1792, he exchanged corresponded with the famous humanist Jean-Baptiste Gaspard d'Ansse de Villoison. The thinker described Miranda thusly in a letter urging him to return to Paris and pay a visit to "Mademoiselle Saussure":

*Ce voyageur si remarquable, dont elle a oublié le nom, est un colonel mexicain, plein de génie, de feu, et d'imagination, qui a parcouru tout l'Univers, l'a examiné en observateur, étoit poursuivi par l'Inquisition, connoissoit beaucoup l'Impératrice de Russie et potemkim [sic], annonçoit le plus violent amour de la liberté, étoit avide de toutes les connoissances. á ce traits, monsieur, je vous ai reconnu sur le champ.*²⁴

Villoison's praise of the "Mexican colonel," offered in the context of a flirtatious interaction between Miranda and a potential amorous partner, ironically highlights both Miranda's closeness with Empress Catherine II of Russia (which I will address in greater detail later) and his "violent love of liberty." The letter's purpose affirms Miranda's libertine identity, while its content suggests an irony central to his identity. Miranda was

²⁴ Jean-Baptiste Gaspard d'Ansse de Villoison, "Letter to Francisco de Miranda," in *Colombeia*, ed. Josefina Rodríguez de Alonso (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1978), 304.

capable of subscribing to radical revolutionary ideologies while maintaining strong links to *ancien régime* traditions such as monarchism and libertinism.

Another exemplary letter from Miranda's time in France is a brief note mailed in 1791 by a correspondent whose name is only recorded as "Pepa." In a few lines of cursive, Pepa tells Miranda to bring a book he promised to lend her in person rather than sending it along with a messenger. She concludes with lines written in verse, telling the revolutionary, "*Venez qu'ant / vous voudres sans lui—un Mentor / vous est inutile.*"²⁵ The flirtatious tone and the implicit invitation included in the letter once again indicate the lived reality of Miranda's libertinism, while the letter's subtext reveals a greater truth about his ironic identity. His libertine behavior coexists with his liberal ideology, and the two do not exist in separate spheres; rather, they paradoxically contribute to each other, with egalitarian liberalism as a persuasive force in libertine seduction and libertine personal freedom as an element of a liberal philosophy focusing on freedom in both individual and national terms.

Miranda engaged frequently and enthusiastically with women on an intellectual level. He was well known for his personal library, and a good deal of the correspondence between Miranda and the various women included in his archives involves the exchange of books. Miranda clearly enjoyed conversing with women about scholarly and artistic subjects, as any Enlightened male aristocrat of *ancien régime* Europe should. However, Miranda's epistolary interaction with women is limited to this variety of discourse. He does not include women in conversations about revolution or practical political change, instead relegating female friends to the realm of flirtation and courtly conversation. In this subtle sense, Miranda conformed to the revolutionary paradigm of excluding

²⁵ "Pepa," "Letter to Francisco de Miranda," in *Colombeia*, 268.

women from real social change as a component of his libertine identity. A social trend common to Atlantic revolutions fit into his preexisting aristocratic, specifically masculine lifestyle. Much like the revolutions themselves, Miranda did not practically alter his behavior towards women based on novel liberal ideology. Instead, he maintained a previous paradigm of excluding women while professing the social justice of his political mission.

After the turn of the nineteenth century, while living in London, Miranda composed documents promoting the cause of Spanish American independence that affirm his belief in new revolutionary conceptions of masculinity as well as femininity. An 1801 message to fellow American revolutionaries calls on Spanish Americans to follow “*las huellas de nuestros hermanos los Americanos del norte,*” suggesting universal masculine solidarity between movements marked by violent struggle against colonial powers.²⁶ He goes on to affirm masculine equality as an essential trait of a just republic, suggesting that the racial castes that define Spanish American society should disappear and that “*un gobierno libre mira todos los hombres con igualdad*”—through the revolutionary process, he declares, “*seremos libres, seremos hombres, seremos nacion.*”²⁷ Based on this declaration, Miranda perceived liberty, universal masculinity, and citizenship as equally necessary and concordant goals of his sociopolitical project. By gendering participation in the nation, as well as personal freedom, he simultaneously maintained preexisting structures of privilege while calling out for the destruction of oppressive norms in favor of a supposedly egalitarian society.

²⁶ Francisco de Miranda, “Por la patria el vivir es agradable y el morir glorioso,” in *Documentos fundamentales*, 95.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

While adhering to class- and race-based factors of identity in his personal life, Miranda decried inequality (at least between men) in his political writings. His actions and opinions did not necessarily translate from the private to the public realm, and he was perfectly capable of maintaining an affection for aspects of *ancien régime* monarchies and aristocratic lifestyles (including libertinism) while proclaiming a need for radical sociopolitical change toward universal freedom and equality. William Doyle's study of aristocrats during the French Revolution indicates how members of the European nobility justified their elevated social status in the supposedly rational terms of Enlightenment philosophy in the buildup to revolution.²⁸ In a similar sense, Miranda could argue for universal equality along men using the rhetoric of liberal philosophy, all while occupying a space within the white, male elite.

While engaging in libertine behaviors, inextricably caught up in perceptions of gender, Miranda adopted interpretations of femininity and masculinity that conformed to the revolutionary paradigms of gender that surrounded him. His archives indicate not only that the seemingly ironic coexistence of a pre-revolutionary lifestyle and revolutionary ideologies was possible, but also that revolutionary ideologies could even serve to justify pre-revolutionary behaviors. This paradox is particularly apparent in Miranda's records of his time spent at the Russian court in the company of Empress Catherine the Great.

Journals and Letters from Russia

²⁸ William Doyle, *Aristocracy and its Enemies in the Age of Revolution*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 57.

Miranda traveled through Eastern Europe and Russia in 1787, often in the company of Prince Grigory Potemkin, the famous favorite of Catherine the Great. Potemkin introduced the Venezuelan revolutionary to the Empress of Russia on Valentine's Day of 1787, and Miranda describes the occasion with typical libertine flair in his diary: "...besé la mano de Su Majestad que con sumo agrado la sacó de su maguito y me la presentó de paso—pues no se usa aquí genuflexión ni nada."²⁹ Miranda writes in his diary how he became an exotic favorite at Catherine's court in St. Petersburg, invited by the empress to stay and form a part of her entourage due to his excellent manners and her legitimate fear that he would be persecuted if he fell into the hands of Spanish authorities due to his prior involvement in movements against the Spanish crown.³⁰

With Spanish American revolution weighing heavily on his mind, Miranda had no choice but to turn down this offer in a letter to the empress. This document is itself a summation of Miranda's paradoxical identity as a liberal libertine and a practitioner of *ancien régime* behaviors wrapped up in revolutionary ideology. Miranda begins by describing his "*profundo agradecimiento por todos los favores y bondades que V.M. se ha dignado concederme,*" which had "*penetrado de tal modo en mi alma que no podré sino quedar inviolablemente atado a su Augusta Persona.*"³¹ He then reaches the ironic climax of his message, citing the need for his involvement in Spanish American anti-colonial revolution as his only excuse for leaving the Russian court behind:

²⁹ Francisco de Miranda, "Con la Zarina y Potemkin. El tema de América Libre." in *Documentos fundamentales*, 38.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 40.

³¹ Francisco de Miranda, "Carta a Catalina de Rusia," in *Diario de Moscú y San Petersburgo*, 189-190.

*Solamente un gran e interesante asunto como el que me ocupa actualmente, sería capaz de hacerme diferir el agradable y dulce placer de poder, por mis servicios, pagar en parte lo que debo a la benevolencia de Vuestra Majestad, y de compartir con sus súbditos las ventajas inestimables e insignes de que goza la sociedad bajo su ilustre y glorioso reinado.*³²

In a letter designed to both excuse his abandonment of the Russian court and secure financial support from Catherine in future, Miranda simultaneously praises the Enlightened benevolence of an *ancien régime* monarch and uses his international opposition to monarchical, colonial regimes as a justification for his need to move on. He couches his self-defense in the flirtatious language of libertinism, politely sexualizing himself in order to appear more convincing to the monarch whose favor he so desperately needs. The record shows that Miranda was successful in obtaining financial support from the empress, and he indicates in his journal that she was reluctant to let him go despite his well-crafted letter of resignation from her court. According to Miranda's diaries, Catherine sounded almost revolutionary herself in her response, telling the traveler,

si el Imperio Español estaba en peligro por mí, en ninguna parte podría yo estar mejor que en Rusia, pues era estar a la mayor distancia, y que, en cuanto al aprecio que Su Majestad hacía de mí, no era por el rango

³² Ibid., 190.

*que yo tenía en España, sino por mis calidades personales que Su Majestad conocía particularmente...*³³

Much has been made of a rumored romantic relationship between Catherine the Great and Miranda, but there is no conclusive evidence to indicate that their interaction extended beyond written correspondence and conversations at court. It is true, however, that their interaction proves a general truth about Miranda's revolutionary identity, and, by extension, his practice of libertinism. The apparent friendship between the imperial monarch and the American revolutionary proves that ideological loyalties did not necessarily define personal behavior and interpersonal connections during the period of Atlantic revolutions. An apparent radical like Miranda could wholeheartedly oppose one empire while praising another, and an empress like Catherine could endorse revolutionary projects while maintaining autocratic control over her own lands.

This irony extends to the practice of libertinism, which Miranda maintained alongside his revolutionary identity at the Russian court, employing it as a rhetorical tool in his interactions with Catherine. Miranda was an object of interest at the imperial court precisely because he was a seemingly paradoxical combination of an American radical and a European aristocrat—he could simultaneously manifest ideologies of revolution and engage in the libertine experiences generated by the *ancien régime* elite. Miranda's journals and letters from his time spent with the Russian court prove that libertinism, along with fealty to monarchs, could easily survive and intermingle with systems of thought that called for dramatic shifts away from the sociocultural origins of such phenomena.

³³ Miranda, "Con la Zarina y Potemkin. El tema de América Libre." in *Documentos fundamentales*, 44.

Miranda as Liberal Libertine

Returning to questions of historiography, it is important to reaffirm the link between wider interpretations of gender in revolution and the primary evidence offered by Miranda's archives. In general terms, Miranda manifests the perceptions of femininity and masculinity that many historians put forth as consequences of revolution. In his public discourse on the need for independence in Spanish America, he argues for universal martial masculinity as a qualifying factor for citizenship. In his private discourse with female friends and romantic partners, he engages in intellectual conversation without including women in his political projects, mirroring the rhetorical inclusion and practical exclusion of women that Sarah Chambers and others identify as a common failing of Atlantic revolutions. Based on the conceptions of gender that modern readers can gather from his archives, Miranda conformed accurately to contemporary historiographical models of gender in revolutionary contexts. He also conformed to the model of the revolutionary liberal, endorsing violent action in favor of personal and national freedom and the foundation of egalitarian new republics. In terms of politics, ideology, and rhetoric, he was every inch the Atlantic revolutionary.

At the same time, Miranda's archives provide conclusive proof of his intellectual and lived identity as a libertine, following the pattern set by generations of European elite men before him. He maintained the "upper-class male revolt against conventional morality" that was paradigmatic in the *ancien régime* while fighting for causes that directly opposed the social norms that gave rise to the paradigm itself. His dealings with Catherine the Great are particularly illustrative of his ironic juxtaposition of ideology and behavior; he lived as an aristocratic libertine at a royal court, benefitting from every

element of his elite identity, all the while planning a violent revolt against a similar royal court based on universalistic philosophies of individual freedom and generalized equality. By embodying this paradox, Miranda serves as an illustrative example of the liberal libertine and as a helpful tool for the historiographical reevaluation of gender in Atlantic revolutions. His case indicates that historians must be willing to accept permanence as well as change as a factor in evolving perceptions of gender. Not every element of pre-revolutionary thought was lost as a result of revolution, and Miranda proves this point concretely as both a revolutionary leader and a practicing *ancien régime* libertine.

Conclusion

In his seminal novel *Les Liaisons dangereuses*, Pierre Choderlos de Laclos has one of his libertine protagonists protest plaintively to his love interest, “Will you never tire of being so unjust?”³⁴ Reversing the gender orientation of this question, it applies equally as a critique of liberal libertines, like Miranda, who perpetuated hierarchical and exploitative models of *ancien régime* libertinism even as they served as figureheads of supposedly egalitarian revolutions. As in the cases of many other pre-revolutionary phenomena, such as African slavery, authoritarian monarchy, and the subjugation of indigenous Americans, elite libertinism was incorporated into Atlantic revolutions using the discursive tools of the revolutions themselves. Dramatic shifts in gender during revolution, including as the universalization of masculine citizenship and the rhetorical

³⁴ Pierre Choderlos de Laclos, *Les Liaisons Dangereuses*, in *The Libertine Reader*, ed. Michel Feher (New York: Zone Books: 1997), 1061.

exclusion of women from new republics, could be adapted by leaders such as Miranda to justify and uphold behaviors that seemed ostensibly antithetical to revolutionary ideals.

The integration of liberal libertinism into revolutionary processes suggests that historians of gender in Atlantic revolutions should be prepared to acknowledge the survival of *ancien régime* notions of gender during revolutionary processes not only as isolated incidents but also as central components of the revolutions themselves. The perpetuated white, elite, masculine libertinism of Francisco de Miranda is only one example of the crossover of pre-revolutionary phenomena to revolutionary and post-revolutionary contexts. Miranda's example makes it clear that Atlantic revolutions—especially when perceived beyond their geopolitical implications as sociocultural events—were not terminal ruptures with the past, but multifaceted projects including diverse processes of permanence and change.

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Continuity in Care:
The History of Deinstitutionalization in Oklahoma's Mental Healthcare
System

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Honors Thesis

Dr. Metcalf

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List of Terms and Abbreviations

APA	American Psychiatric Association
CMHC	Community Mental Health Center
COCMHC	Central Oklahoma Community Mental Health Center
Deinstitutionalization	Nationwide process of rapidly releasing most patients from state hospitals.
NAMI	National Association on Mental Illness
OFC	Oklahoma Forensic Center
PACT (or ACT)	Program of Assertive Community Treatment

On October 27, 1894, Bishop R.K. Hargrove of the Methodist Episcopal Church travelled to Norman, Oklahoma. The Southern Methodists had been operating a women's school in Norman called High Gate College. However, the school had been struggling. The Panic of 1883 made it increasingly difficult for High Gate to compete against the nearby, tuition-free University of Oklahoma. With enrollment at High Gate already falling, University of Oklahoma President David Ross Boyd accepted a plan devised to close the school's doors for good. In December of 1893, Northern Methodist Bishop John H. Vincent suggested that Norman donate land so that Methodists could construct a dormitory for Methodist students who attended the University of Oklahoma. When Bishop Hargrove visited Norman in 1894, his purpose was to formally approve the University of Oklahoma plan and to begin the process of transferring students to this institution. By December, the High Gate building stood abandoned.¹

While these events mark the end of High Gate College, they are also the beginning of the story of state mental health care in Oklahoma. On April 12, 1895, the Oklahoma Sanitarium Company purchased the old High Gate building, expanded and renovated the facility, and opened its doors to receive its first patients on July 27, 1895.² While there had been facilities for mentally ill people in Oklahoma prior to the opening of the Oklahoma Sanitarium Company, such as the asylum six miles south of Tahlequah in the Cherokee Nation, this was the first time the state or territorial government involved itself in the care and treatment of the mentally ill within territory lines.³ Previously, the Oklahoma territorial government made contracts with the Oak Lawn Retreat for the Insane at Jacksonville, Illinois. The government paid the company

¹ David W. Levy, *The University of Oklahoma A History: Volume 1, 1890-1917* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005), 97-98.

² *Ibid.*, 98-99.

³ For more on the insane asylum in the Cherokee Nation, see Box 50 and 51 of the Cherokee Nation Papers, the Western History Collections, Norman, Oklahoma. See also Carl T. Steen, M.D., "The Home for the Insane, Deaf, Dumb and Blind of the Cherokee Nation," *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 21, no.4 (1943): 402-419. The Cherokee Home for the Insane, Deaf, Dumb and Blind was the first facility for the mentally ill in Oklahoma.

“\$25.00 a month for each patient” who was transported to Illinois to receive treatment.⁴

Similarly, prior to statehood the mentally ill of Indian Territory received care at St. Vincent’s Hospital in St. Louis, Missouri.⁵ Because the state contracted with the privately owned Oklahoma Sanitarium Company, this facility was not the first state hospital. The state merely paid for services instead of assuming complete responsibility for running the institution.

However, the facility at Norman is still the longest running state-funded facility for the treatment of Oklahoma’s mentally ill. In 1915, the state government ceased contracting with the Oklahoma Sanitarium Company and the facility became the Central Oklahoma State Hospital. Later, it would be renamed Griffin Memorial State Hospital after its first superintendent.⁶

The era of the psychiatric hospital in Oklahoma, which began with the closing of High Gate College, ended with the rise of community care and a messy process of deinstitutionalization. While the treatment of individuals in hospital settings seemed a promising way to treat mental illness, overtime problems arose with this treatment method. World War II and the Great Depression exacerbated issues with funding and overcrowding, making hospitals like Central State dismal places. However, World War II also sowed the seeds for the community mental health centers. War-trained psychiatrists postulated that mental illness could be treated in a community setting by addressing the environmental factors of mental illness before individuals became severely ill. This idea came to be known as “continuity theory.” After World War II, community-oriented psychiatrists drew on this theory to restructure mental healthcare in the United States. The development of new psychotropic drugs, which allowed doctors to treat

⁴ Junior Koenig Knee, “Administration of the Central Oklahoma State Hospital” (Masters thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1942), 9. The Oklahoma territorial government began making contracts with the Oak Lawn Retreat for the Insane in 1889.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

⁶ Dr. David Wilson Griffin first began working at the facility when it was still under the direction of Dr. A.T. Clark, superintendent of the Oklahoma Sanitarium Company. See Steve Sisney, photo of Dr. Griffin and Dr. Clark, date unknown in David Zizzo, “Hidden Oklahoma: Norman hospital once a ‘mythical city,’” *The Oklahoman*, March 13, 2011. <http://newsok.com/gallery/articleid/3546956/pictures/1378987>. See also Oklahoma Hall of Fame, “David Griffin,” *Oklahoma Hall of Fame*, accessed October 20, 2015. <http://www.oklahomahof.com/Portals/0/PDF's/HOF%20bios/Griffin,%20David.pdf>

patients outside of a hospital setting, made it possible for reformers to redesign state mental healthcare systems around a new facility: the community mental health center. While there are three such facilities in Oklahoma, the scope of this paper will be limited to a focus on one: the Central Oklahoma Community Mental Health Center.

In Oklahoma, the Central Oklahoma Community Mental Health Center (COCMHC) never replaced Griffin Memorial Hospital. While Griffin remained the primary way in which severely mentally ill people without the ability to pay received necessary treatment, the process of deinstitutionalization significantly reduced the role of this state hospital as the primary provider of long-term care for Oklahoma's most severely mentally ill citizens. The COCMHC, on the other hand, fulfilled a series of important roles in Oklahoma's mental healthcare system. At the start of deinstitutionalization, the COCMHC tried to provide services for the large number of patients being dispersed from Griffin Memorial Hospital by replacing the institutionalized treatment they received with alternative treatment in room and boards and temporary hospitalization in the COCMHC itself. In later years, the COCMHC focused on treating individuals with dual diagnoses of mental illness and substance addictions, including a rising number of individuals addicted to drugs. However, since the opening of the facility, the COCMHC's largest impact has been to provide a greater number of patients with treatment programs that are near their homes. This creates less of an interruption in their daily lives. The COCMHC was able to fill these various functions over time because the legislation that established the community mental health centers intentionally avoided defining their structure. Although Oklahoma officials implemented deinstitutionalization poorly, the lasting impact of the process has been fundamentally positive because the structurally ambiguous COCMHC could reinvent its programs to respond to changing community mental health needs.

A Crumbling System

Oklahoma had established its system of four state psychiatric hospitals by the early decades of the twentieth century. The first state hospital was Western State. Located at Fort Supply, this hospital opened in 1903 but did not receive patients until 1908.⁷ Western Oklahoma State Hospital cared for mentally ill people in or west of Kay, Noble, Garfield, Kingfisher, Canadian, Caddo, Comanche, and Cotton counties.⁸ Additionally, the eastern portion of the state received care at Eastern Oklahoma State Hospital. Located at Vinita, this facility was approved by the Oklahoma Legislature in 1908 and opened its doors on January 28, 1913. Eastern State cared for mentally ill people in or west of Osage, Tulsa, Okmulgee, McIntosh, Pittsburg, Coal, Atoka, and Bryan counties.⁹ Central State Hospital at Norman was the largest of the state hospitals for the mentally ill because it served the central and most populous part of the state. Oklahoma City and its suburbs, Guthrie, and Muskogee all fell under Central State's jurisdiction of care.¹⁰ Finally, in 1931 the Oklahoma Legislature approved the construction of a hospital for people who were both mentally ill and African American. Prior to 1934 these patients were treated in separate wards at Central State Hospital. However, in June of that year Taft State Hospital for Negro Insane at Taft opened.¹¹ One graduate student justified Taft's existence by writing, "Since [Oklahoma] is a southern region, segregation of Negroes is practiced."¹² Like

⁷ Knee, "Administration of the Central Oklahoma State Hospital," 10-11.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 58.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁰ Clara Viola Tatge, "Social Backgrounds of One Hundred-Six Families Under Care at Central State Hospital" (Masters thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1952), 3.

¹¹ Knee, "Administration of the Central Oklahoma State Hospital," 12-3.

¹² Tatge, "Social Backgrounds of One Hundred-Six Families," 3.

other institutions in the South, conditions at Taft ultimately proved that separate was not equal. It was the smallest and least equipped of the four state hospitals.¹³

From their establishment and on through the early decades of the twentieth century, there was little policy defining the powers and purpose of Oklahoma's state psychiatric hospitals or their governing bodies. Beginning in 1915, the State Board of Public Affairs managed these facilities. This governing body consisted of three men appointed by the governor and approved by the State Senate. There were few checks on their power; they were even free to grant or deny petitions to sterilize patients.¹⁴ The second tier of authority consisted of the hospital superintendents. Each was responsible for running his own facility. This was Oklahoma's structure of power for state hospitals until 1953. After this date, the administration of Oklahoma's mental healthcare system was restructured under the new Oklahoma Department of Mental Health. The first Director of Mental Health was Dr. Hayden H. Donahue, a psychiatrist and El Reno native with experience treating combat-related trauma.¹⁵

There were few limitations on the powers of the hospital superintendents and little to define proper treatment methods in the psychiatric hospital. Perhaps this was because the course of treatment seemed obvious to them; there were incredibly few treatment options available to doctors and their patients. Sick patients were committed to the hospital "upon a certificate of insanity and an order of admission."¹⁶ They had no right to refuse treatment.¹⁷ While hospitalized, patients were fed and housed until their condition improved or they died. There was little policy to define treatment because the task of providing mentally ill people with shelter and

¹³ See The Council of State Governments, *The Mental Health Programs of the Forty-Eight States: A Report to the Governors' Conference* (Chicago: The Council of State Governments, 1950), 235, 270, 282-3, 308-9. See also Knee, "Administration of the Central Oklahoma State Hospital," 50.

¹⁴ Knee, "Administration of the Central Oklahoma State Hospital," 51.

¹⁵ "Dr. Hayden H. Donahue," *The Oklahoman*, November 4, 2002, Obituaries/Death Notices.

¹⁶ Knee, "Administration of the Central Oklahoma State Hospital," 56.

¹⁷ Chris Guffey and Chris Olsen interview by author, October, 23, 2015.

custodial care overwhelmed hospitals and their staff. There were no standards to limit hospital size or staff-to-patient ratios, so patients who needed long-term care were allowed to accumulate in hospitals without appropriate supervision. The state was wholly responsible for the few policies that did exist. The federal government did not pass any legislation related to state mental healthcare systems until the National Mental Health Act of 1946. This legislation provided states with federal funds to improve mental health services that were alternatives to hospitalization.¹⁸ Aside from this legislation, authority over the state hospitals lay entirely with the states.

This was the state hospital system that was in place when the effects of World War II and the Great Depression strained American society and acted as catalysts for change. The Depression left psychiatric hospitals around the country with fewer funds to manage a growing problem. The outbreak of World War II also drew the nation's attention and resources away from home. These trends exacerbated problems in deteriorating hospital systems. As the historian Gerald N. Grob notes, during the 1930s "Staff-patient ratios decreased; new construction came to a halt; and normal maintenance was deferred" at a time when hospitals needed to increase their operations and improve their facilities.¹⁹ At the same time that hospitals faced budget shortfalls, the number of patients in psychiatric hospitals rose. Between 1940 and 1946 alone, the number of patients in state hospitals across the country rose from 410,000 to 446,000. Without a simultaneous increase in the number of facilities, "the excess population over capacity, according to federal statistics, rose from 9.8 to 16.3 percent."²⁰ However, this might have been an underestimation of the crisis. True levels of overcrowding across the nation might have reached somewhere between 20 to 74 percent.²¹ The effects of this overcrowding were felt in patient care

¹⁸ Gerald N. Grob, *From Asylum to Community: Mental Health Policy in Modern America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 58.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

as “restraint became more common; hygienic conditions deteriorated; individualized attention, medical and occupational therapy, and supervised recreation all suffered.”²² Psychiatric hospitals became dismal warehouses for the nation’s mentally ill.

Although World War II and the Great Depression siphoned off the limited funds available to mental healthcare systems, citizens and officials allowed hospital conditions to deteriorate for reasons associated with the stigma surrounding mental illness. Although confining mentally ill people in psychiatric hospitals was first proposed for their own safety, once they were relegated to these institutions the mentally well did not have to see them. Nor did the general public speak about them. A person’s mental illness was ideally kept a private affair. Therefore, policies and social attitudes contributed to the crisis by turning mentally ill people into an invisible population. Because few people saw the deteriorating conditions in psychiatric hospitals, few could condemn the treatment of the nation’s mentally ill population. Few who could do so actually would do so. Additionally, mentally ill people who could speak for themselves were silenced and disregarded by social attitudes and a paternalistic treatment system. Doctors were convinced they knew what was best for their patients. Policies regarding patient rights had not yet been established. Furthermore, the absence of policies regarding patient population size and staff-to-patient ratios meant that the underfunding and overcrowding was perfectly legal.

Needless to say, Oklahoma did not escape the effects of this national crisis. In its 1950 report, the Council of State Governments painted a clear picture of the decades-long process of deterioration that had been plaguing Oklahoma’s mental healthcare system. By January 1, 1950, Oklahoma had 6,059 hospital beds in its four state hospitals. The Oklahoma Department of

²² Ibid., 9.

Mental Health estimated that the state needed another 4,119 beds to operate effectively.²³ In 1950, Central State Hospital had an average daily resident population of 2,936. This was higher than any other hospital in the state. The hospital with the next highest average daily resident population was Eastern State at Vinita with 2,397, followed by Western State at Fort Supply with 1,318, and finally Taft with an average of 810 patients.²⁴ Even though it was housing almost 3,000 patients on average, Central State was rated as having a capacity of only 1,803. This means that the hospital had an excess population of 1,133 patients and was operating at 63 percent over capacity. Eastern and Western State Hospitals were both operating at 14 percent over capacity, while Taft had the lowest excess population at 60 patients, or 8 percent over capacity.²⁵

In addition to failing to provide adequate physical space and facilities in which to hospitalize these patients, Oklahoma also failed to provide the necessary funds to treat them properly. In 1939, Oklahoma was ranked 31st in the nation in state spending per resident patient in its state hospitals, having spent only \$219.62 per patient that year. Relative funding levels only deteriorated over time. Although by 1949 Oklahoma had increased its per resident patient spending to \$443.22, the state was not keeping pace with the rest of the nation. That year, Oklahoma ranked 44th in the nation in per resident patient spending.²⁶ These low levels of state funding were not balanced by funds from patients for services rendered. In 1949, only 244 patients paid for their treatment. The Department of Mental Health received \$68,654 from these paying patients. This paid for 2.1 percent of the Department's total maintenance costs of \$3,298,421.²⁷

²³ The Council of State Governments, *The Mental Health Programs of the Forty-Eight States*, 38.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 235.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 326.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 262.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 263.

To compensate for insufficient funding, Central State Hospital had a 590-acre farm to decrease the amount of money spent on food. While experienced farmers supervised this farm, it was Central State's patients who supplied much of the labor. The hospital's administration considered farm work to be part of some patients' treatment programs. However, utilizing farm work as therapy meant that some patients spent much of their time at Central State performing tasks that were necessary to run the hospital. In 1942, Government graduate student Junior Koenig Knee recorded that an average of 78 patients were employed on this farm.²⁸ Patients grew crops, such as "Irish and sweet potatoes, roasting ear corn, black-eyed peas . . . ensilage alfalfa hay, corn, oats, sweet clover seed, straw, sudan hay, and cotton."²⁹ They also raised the farm's 800 laying hens, 150 hogs, and "150 registered and high grade holstein [sic] cows, 57 heifers, 39 calves, and 5 bulls."³⁰ According to Knee, the Central State cattle herd was "recognized as one of the best herds in the state."³¹ This farm supplied a full twenty-five percent of the hospital's food with another two percent coming from government surplus. Because the hospital raised crops with the aid of patient labor, in 1949 the facility only spent 78 cents per diem per patient on raw food.³² Although cutting down the cost of food was a commendable achievement, the reliance on the cheapest raw foodstuffs led to a monotonous diet and often gastronomically confusing meals for patients. For example, on Monday, August 18, 1941, Central State provided its patients with a dinner that consisted of bread, milk, fresh tomatoes, pumpkin, pinto beans, peanut butter, and peaches. The following day they ate bread, milk, peaches, bologna, and beet pickles.³³

²⁸ Knee, "Administration of the Central Oklahoma State Hospital," 93.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 93.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 94-5. Central State Hospital's cattle were raised where soccer fields are now located in Griffin Community Park, just north of East Robinson Street. The farm's old silos are still there today.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 95.

³² The Council of State Governments, *The Mental Health Programs of the Forty-Eight States*, 301.

³³ Knee, "Administration of the Central Oklahoma State Hospital," 79.

In addition to the problems of overcrowding and underfunding, Oklahoma's state hospitals were also understaffed. To provide care for Central State Hospital's almost 3,000 residents, the hospital employed only six full-time physicians and one consulting physician. Although they had smaller resident populations, Western and Eastern each employed seven physicians as well. Taft employed two physicians. Therefore, Central State Hospital had a 1:489 physician-to-patient ratio.³⁴ By comparison, in 1942 the American Psychiatric Association (APA) recommended that hospitals try to maintain a ratio of one physician for every 150 patients.³⁵ Unfortunately, the APA's recommendation did not carry the power of law. To support its doctors, Central State also employed 14 graduate nurses. However, there were still 210 patients for every nurse. Oklahoma's understaffed hospitals therefore relied on attendants to closely monitor patients. Because Central State employed 280 attendants, there were only 10 patients for every one attendant.³⁶ This staff structure was problematic because attendants were less trained to provide adequate treatment for patients. Of the full-time psychiatrists at Central State, 67 percent had completed psychiatric residencies and were members of the APA. Additionally, all 14 nurses had received graduate psychiatric training. In contrast, only 2 of the 280 attendants had completed pre- or in-service training.³⁷

The abundance of patients, combined with the inadequacy of both staff and funds meant that conditions were ripe for an exposé. In 1946, a reporter from the *Daily Oklahoman* thrust Central State into the national spotlight. His name was Mike Gorman. Originally from New York City, Gorman moved to Oklahoma following his 1945 army discharge. Shortly after he began working at the *Daily Oklahoman*, the paper's editor received a complaint about poor conditions

³⁴ The Council of State Governments, *The Mental Health Programs of the Forty-Eight States*, 282.

³⁵ Knee, "Administration of the Central Oklahoma State Hospital," 102.

³⁶ The Council of State Governments, *The Mental Health Programs of the Forty-Eight States*, 282.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 290.

at the nearby Central State Hospital. Although Gorman had not previously had any connection with mental illness or mentally ill people, he was sent to investigate.³⁸

Gorman described conditions in Oklahoma's psychiatric hospitals in an article titled "Misery Rules in State Shadowland." What he found was too many patients, not enough staff, inadequate facilities, and a whole host of problems that could be attributed to these factors. Because of overcrowding, at Fort Supply "Bed space [was] at such a premium that beds [had] been squeezed into porches, day rooms, and even adjoining the hydrotherapy tubs."³⁹ Overcrowding led to poor living conditions such as "Broken wooden floors, cracked walls, and falling plaster," which were "the rule rather than the exception."⁴⁰ To fit all the necessary beds into the Central State buildings, "the beds were double-decked, in violation of every standard of mental and physical hygiene."⁴¹ Additionally, "Because every ward [had] almost double the number of beds it should, there [was] a frightful odor. On the hottest of summer days, there [was] practically no ventilation—not one fan in any ward."⁴² He also found that physical restraint was used far too often. Gorman wrote, "Practically every doctor in the Oklahoma mental hospitals is opposed to this excessive use of restraint, but explains it is due to the shortage of attendants."⁴³ He also found that there was an overwhelming presence of chronic patients, including of elderly, non-mentally ill patients. He described:

Over 1,000 seniles jammed to the bursting point the limited facilities of the Norman hospital [sic]. It didn't matter that they didn't belong there—that they were admitted because the state had provided no other place for them. They were there, all over the place, and they gave the entire hospital that hopeless, tired atmosphere one finds in homes for the aged.⁴⁴

³⁸ Grob, *From Asylum to Community*, 76.

³⁹ Mike Gorman, "Misery Rules in State Shadowland," reprinted from *The Daily Oklahoman*, September 22, 1946, 4. <http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/ResourceMetadata/TGBBGW>

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

Overall, Gorman's visit convinced him that Oklahoma's hospitals were being used as warehouses for the mentally ill and elderly that society failed or did not know how to treat. His conclusion was correct, too. Oklahoma's psychiatric hospitals were the last line of care for people with schizophrenia or age-related mental disabilities. There was no way to treat these people, so they accumulated in state hospitals over the decades. Gorman left Central State worried that the shocking conditions in Oklahoma's psychiatric hospitals were likely to exacerbate a sensitive patient's mental illness. To correct the failures he witnessed, Gorman advocated for the creation of new facilities for the elderly. He also championed the use of electro-shock therapy and new medications like Metrazol, both of which had had promising results.⁴⁵

Gorman pursued his newfound interest in the treatment of the mentally ill in Oklahoma by writing a series of articles on the conditions in the state's psychiatric hospitals. These articles were serialized in the *Daily Oklahoman*. He also signed a contract with the University of Oklahoma Press to write a full-length book on the subject, titled *Oklahoma Attacks Its Snakepits*. When "internal problems" blocked the publication of the book, a condensed form of the work was published in the *Reader's Digest*. In his writing, Gorman characterized the conditions in Oklahoma's state hospitals as some of the worst in the nation. His articles placed both himself and Oklahoma's state hospitals in the national spotlight.⁴⁶ The *Reader's Digest* piece caught the attention of Mary Lasker, a wealthy reformer. She had established the Albert Lasker Foundation for Medical Research and had connections to both the Planned Parenthood Federation and the

⁴⁵ Ibid., 7-8.

⁴⁶ Grob, *From Asylum to Community*, 76.

American Cancer Society.⁴⁷ Gorman's work convinced reformers like Lasker that the nation's psychiatric hospitals were in desperate need of improvement. With her help, Gorman became a nationally prominent mental healthcare lobbyist and embarked upon a new career to convince both politicians and the public that mental healthcare in the United States was in desperate need of reform.

National Changes

While reporters and philanthropists like Gorman and Lasker were developing public opinion in favor of a new standard in psychiatric treatment, psychiatrists were developing a new model of psychiatry that would herald community psychiatric clinics as the best way to treat mental illness. During World War II, psychiatrists observed that the environment was a significant factor in the cause of mental illness. Soldiers who had shown no sign of illness suffered psychological breakdowns on the battlefield. Removing soldiers from the war environment ultimately aided recovery.⁴⁸ This led to the development of a continuum theory of mental illness. As the historian Edward Shorter explains, many American psychiatrists began to believe that "only one form of psychiatric illness existed, and that this form exhibited mere quantitative differences on the basis of how severely one had failed to adapt to the environment."⁴⁹ Of course, this type of thinking ignored evidence that there were organic factors to mental illness. As continuum theory gained supporters, the transition between illness and wellbeing therefore became a "slippery slope rather than an absolute line between the ill and the

⁴⁷ U.S. National Library of Medicine, "The Mary Lasker Papers: Biographical Information," *Profiles in Science*, accessed October 27, 2015. <http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/Narrative/TL/p-nid/199>

⁴⁸ Grob, *From Asylum to Community*, 17-18.

⁴⁹ Edward Shorter, *A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 179.

well.”⁵⁰ Continuum theory posited that intervening in the environment would allow psychiatrists to treat individuals before they manifested symptoms of mental illness, thereby making the psychiatric hospital itself an obsolete institution.⁵¹ Therefore, it was the new continuum theory which was the foundation of deinstitutionalization.

Deinstitutionalization became an option for treating mental illness in civilian communities when a new generation of war-trained psychiatrists began to apply what they had learned in war to civilian life. These psychiatrists believed that mental illness could be treated by manipulating the environment in civilian communities in a fashion similar to the way illness had been treated during World War II. One of these psychiatrists was Colonel Albert Julius Glass. Glass firmly believed that the environment played a factor in mental illness. Even individuals who exhibited no predispositions toward mental illness could become ill after prolonged exposure to a war environment. He noted that “the unreliability of individual psychiatric screening” was “so well demonstrated” that “the routine examination of inductees by psychiatrists was abandoned by the Army soon after the end of World War II and was not even reinstated during the Korean War.”⁵² Glass summarized the lessons learned from World War II by writing, “It should always be remembered that modern war produces two unique types of casualties in large numbers; namely, injuries and psychiatric disorders, both of which are caused by traumatic forces set forth by a changing and hostile environment.”⁵³

The continuum theory that psychiatrists such as Glass developed during wartime became influential as it was imparted to an upcoming generation of doctors and social workers. In her

⁵⁰ Ibid., 179.

⁵¹ Grob, *From Asylum to Community*, 18.

⁵² U.S. Army Medical Department, *Neuropsychiatry in World War II* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Dept. of the Army, 1966), 741. For a summary of the career of Dr. Glass, see Jane C. Morris, “Albert Julius Glass, 1908-1983,” in *Builders of Trust: Biographical Profiles from the Medical Corps Coin*, ed. Sanders Marble (Fort Detrick, Maryland: Borden Institute, 2011), 135-144.

⁵³ Ibid., 739.

1952 masters thesis, Clara Viola Tatge quoted from *The Psychological Aspects of War* by R.D. Gillespie. On the topic of the experiences of servicemen Gillespie wrote, “When the rationalized mechanism of social life collapses in times of crises, the individual cannot repair it by his own insight. Instead, his own impotence reduces him to a state of terrifying helplessness.”⁵⁴ Tatge integrated this quote into her analysis of patients at Central State by writing, “While this description of mental breakdown referred to the individual exposed to the stress of war, it may also apply to the person who is caught in an environment which he cannot control, and to which he is unable to adjust.”⁵⁵ Therefore, the generations of mental health professionals that came of age following World War II were taught to apply the lessons of war to civilian life. Although there was little to prove that the battlefield could be equated with daily life in civilian communities, mental health professionals learned that intervention in the community setting could help an individual adjust to their environment and prevent the manifestation of symptoms of mental illness.

In addition to continuum theory, the development of new psychotropic drugs made a policy of deinstitutionalization possible for the first time. In 1949, a French naval surgeon named Henri Laborit conducted experiments with synthetic antihistamines in an attempt to improve the success rate of operations performed on patients who were in shock. Although he was not interested in psychosis, when Laborit began experimenting with antihistamines in the phenothiazine family, he noted that “some of his patients became quite indifferent to the world about them.”⁵⁶ In 1951, Laborit continued his experiments on shock with a new form of phenothiazine, which Rhône-Poulenc drug company had developed. Charpentier, a company chemist, named the compound “chlorpromazine.” During his experiments, Laborit confirmed

⁵⁴ R.D. Gillespie, *Psychological Aspects of War* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1942), 134.

⁵⁵ Tatge, “Social Backgrounds of One Hundred-Six Families,” 77.

⁵⁶ Shorter, *A History of Psychiatry*, 248.

that this drug caused patients to feel uninterested and relaxed. On January 19, 1952, psychiatrists gave chlorpromazine to a 24-year-old patient named Jacques L. who suffered from mania. For three weeks, Jacques received the drug as part of his treatment regimen. By February, he was able to resume a fairly normal life.⁵⁷

Once it was applied to psychiatry, chlorpromazine gained popularity in a few short years. Most famously, Jean Delay and Pierre Deniker of the Ste-Anne mental hospital conducted more tests on the effectiveness of chlorpromazine. After exclusively administering chlorpromazine to eight different patients, the two psychiatrists found that the drug “was much better than ECT, insulin, and the rest of the physical therapies, much less dangerous, and easily tolerated by the patients.”⁵⁸ After Delay and Deniker’s study, chlorpromazine spread throughout the French mental healthcare system before Rhône-Poulenc introduced the drug into North American psychiatry. The company provided samples to Dr. Ruth Koeppel-Kajander of Ontario General Hospital and Heinz Lehmann at Verdun Hospital in Montreal in two separate studies conducted during 1953. While studying the effects of chlorpromazine on 71 patients, Lehmann was stunned to find several patients with schizophrenia were symptom-free after a few weeks. In 1952, a drug house named Smith Kline & French bought the drug under the name “Thorazine” and began to market it in the United States.⁵⁹ After Thorazine, a multitude of other drugs, such as Haldol, followed. Thus, in the United States Thorazine became the first of the new psychotropic drugs to hit the market and alter professional views regarding what constituted treatable illnesses. The drug was a breakthrough because it offered the hope that even the most severely mentally ill patients who were once thought to be untreatable, such as those with schizophrenia, could

⁵⁷ Ibid., 248-9.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 250. The abbreviation “ECT” stands for “electroconvulsive therapy,” which is also known as electro-shock therapy.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 249-54.

potentially resume normal lives outside of psychiatric institutions.⁶⁰

Equipped with treatments that promised to make their theories reality, new community-oriented psychiatrists turned to a sympathetic president to turn their reform ideas into national policy. President Kennedy's sister Rosemary was mildly mentally retarded. However, in 1940 her condition worsened and it became difficult for her parents, Rose and Joseph, to control her at home. In a final effort to keep his daughter out of a psychiatric institution, Joe Kennedy permitted doctors to give Rosemary a lobotomy. Rosemary was never informed of this decision. Rose was not informed until 1961. Unfortunately, but predictably, the surgery only made Rosemary's condition worse.⁶¹ Rosemary's experience was central to the Kennedy-Shriver family's later philanthropic and political focus on the stigma surrounding mental retardation and mental illness.⁶² The Kennedy administration chose to make the treatment of mental illness and mental retardation the focus of a new policy initiative and on February 5, 1963, Kennedy delivered his Special Message to the Congress on Mental Illness and Mental Retardation.

In his speech, Kennedy lamented the current state of mental healthcare and created a vision for changes to come. In a decade where Kennedy saw other bodily illnesses treated more effectively than ever, he simultaneously understood that mental illness and mental retardation “require[d] more prolonged treatment, cause[d] more suffering by the families of the afflicted, waste[d] more of our human resources, and constitute[d] more financial drain upon both the public treasury and the personal finances of the individual families than any other single

⁶⁰ Thorazine and other early psychotropic drugs were not without side effects. Some patients developed an irreversible shuffling gait and involuntary movements of the tongue, lips, hands, and trunk (tardive dyskinesia).

⁶¹ Edward Shorter, *The Kennedy Family and the Story of Mental Retardation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), 32-3.

⁶² While there were other factors that also contributed to John F. Kennedy's endorsement of a new mental health policy, a more complete discussion of these influences is beyond the scope of this paper. For more information on the Kennedy family and mental health policy in the United States, see Shorter, *The Kennedy Family and the Story of Mental Retardation* and Grob, *From Asylum to Community*, 209-238.

condition.”⁶³ Because the treatment of mental illness and mental retardation cost taxpayers “over \$2.4 billion a year in direct public outlays for services,” Kennedy advised his audience that “prevention [was] far more desirable . . . It is far more economical and it is far more likely to be successful.”⁶⁴ Kennedy’s reform solutions were firmly grounded in the new continuum theory of mental illness. They centered around plans for a new preventive system of mental healthcare in the United States. For the Kennedy administration, prevention rested on a “range” of “community based” services such as “diagnostic and evaluation services, emergency psychiatric units, outpatient services, inpatient services, day and night care, foster home care, rehabilitation, consultative services to other community agencies, and mental health information and education.”⁶⁵ Kennedy predicted that these community-oriented reforms could “do much to eliminate or correct the harsh environmental conditions which often are associated with mental retardation and mental illness.”⁶⁶ He proposed legislation to fund the creation of Community Mental Health Centers (CMHCs) across the nation in the hope that these facilities would integrate services, respond to community needs, and ideally prevent mental illness altogether.

The Mental Retardation and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 1963 sought to implement this vision by providing grants for the construction of CMHC buildings and funds for staffing. The bill proposed that Congress appropriate \$6,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1964, and \$8,000,000 for the following fiscal year for the express purpose of “meeting the costs of construction of facilities for research, or research and related purposes, relating to human development, whether biological, medical, social, or behavioral, which may assist in finding the causes, and means of prevention, of mental retardation, or in

⁶³ John F. Kennedy, “Special Message to the Congress on Mental Illness and Mental Retardation,” February 5, 1963. *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9546>.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

finding means of ameliorating the effects of mental retardation.”⁶⁷ During 1966 and 1967, appropriations would decrease to \$6,000,000 once again.⁶⁸ State mental healthcare systems had to submit applications to receive these building funds. To submit an application, the Act required that states create an advisory council and designate a single state agency to administer or supervise the construction and operation of the CMHC.⁶⁹ The act also stipulated that facilities that had been constructed with these funds had to remain mental healthcare facilities for at least twenty years after their construction.⁷⁰ In the event of non-compliance, funds would be withheld.⁷¹ Although the original Act of 1963 did not contain provisions to appropriate funds to help staff these centers, in 1965 Congress passed an amendment to the act to provide funds to staff the CMHCs for the first four years of operation.⁷² After this time, the state government would assume the costs of running these facilities. President Kennedy signed The Mental Retardation and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act into law on October 31, 1963.

The passage of this Act signaled a shift in national attitudes toward mental health policy. With the development of a welfare system in the early decades of the twentieth century, citizens increasingly saw the government as having a role in maintaining the well-being of individuals. This included the care and treatment of impoverished mentally ill persons. While this task had been part of the jurisdiction of the state governments, an increasing awareness of the poor conditions found in state psychiatric hospitals convinced many that state governments were no

⁶⁷ Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 1963, Public Law 88-164, U.S. Statutes at Large 77 Stat. 282. 88th Congress, 1st Session (1963): 282.

⁶⁸ Although the act stipulated that these amounts should be appropriated, the Vietnam War and the Great Society Programs drained government funds. As a result, the implementation of the Community Mental Health Center Act of 1963 lagged behind expectations. See Grob, *From Asylum to Community*, 250.

⁶⁹ Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 1963, 287-8.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 282.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 289.

⁷² Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act Amendments of 1965, Public Law 89-105, U.S. Statutes at Large 79 Stat. 427 (1965): 428.

longer capable of being the sole providers of care. As Dr. Alfred M. Freedman noted, if community or state governments could not longer afford to care for these individuals, then “the responsibility for providing the funds must be assumed by another governmental level, namely, the federal government.”⁷³ By passing The Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act, the federal government accepted a temporary and limited responsibility for the care of the mentally ill. The Act provided federal funds to operate mental healthcare programs on a local level, which essentially bypassed state governments.⁷⁴ The Act was a central part of the deinstitutionalization process being implemented across the nation. At its roots, deinstitutionalization was an effort to impose standards and accountability where there had not been any before. The process of reducing patient populations and transferring some treatment responsibilities from hospitals to outpatient facilities proved to be a painful experience for everyone involved.

Community Care in Oklahoma

By the 1950s, the state of Oklahoma was implementing elements of deinstitutionalization. Dr. Hayden Donahue, the first Director of Oklahoma’s Department of Mental Health, began reducing the patient population in the four state hospitals. He did this in part with new treatment methods, such as electro-shock therapy and, for the first time, the use of medications such as Thorazine.⁷⁵ With the start of the 1960s came the appointment of a new Director; Dr. Donahue had resigned in 1959.⁷⁶ Upon his retirement from the military, The

⁷³ Alfred M. Freedman, "Historical and Political Roots of the Community Mental Health Centers Act," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 37, no. 3 (1967): 5.

⁷⁴ Grob, *From Asylum to Community*, 235.

⁷⁵ *Oklahoma Report: An Informative Documentary on the Progress Achieved in the Treatment of Oklahoma’s Mentally Ill*, (Oklahoma Mental Health Association, 1950), 16 mm film, from Oklahoma Historical Society Film and Video Archive, AVI video, 25 min., 48 sec., <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vg5sLuSYpdE&feature=youtu.be>.

⁷⁶ “Dr. Hayden H. Donahue,” *The Oklahoman*, November 4, 2002, Obituaries/Death Notices.

University Oklahoma offered Dr. Albert J. Glass a position as both a professor of clinical psychology and neurology and as the Director of the Department of Mental Health.⁷⁷ It is unsurprising that Dr. Glass, a figure central to military psychology and the development of continuum theory, desired to restructure Oklahoma's mental healthcare system to conform to an environmental theory of the cause of mental illness. Because of his long career focused on designing psychiatric medical units in the military, Dr. Glass's experiences reinforced his belief that community services could help address the psychiatric needs of individuals before they became ill enough to be admitted to a hospital.

With the arrival of Dr. Glass, Oklahoma's mental healthcare system underwent rapid change. In 1950, the four state hospitals had a combined resident population of almost 8,000 patients. By 1966, that number had been reduced to 4,900.⁷⁸ Dr. Medford Peterson, then the superintendent of Eastern State Hospital, told reporters that the patient census at his hospital had been cut from 2,074 to 1,700 since he had been appointed to the position a short eighteen months earlier.⁷⁹ By this time, Dr. Glass had also submitted a request for a grant to build a new CMHC in Norman under the new Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act. This CMHC would operate in connection with Central State Hospital, renamed Griffin Memorial Hospital upon Dr. Griffin's retirement. Plans were already underway for two more CMHCs; one was to be located "at Muskogee, operated in connection with the mental hospital at Taft and one at Woodward to be operated in connection with Western State Hospital" at Vinita.⁸⁰ Dr. Glass saw these changes as part of an effort to deinstitutionalize Oklahoma's mental healthcare system and restructure it around theories of community psychiatry. He told *The Oklahoman*, the "magic

⁷⁷ Morris, "Albert Julius Glass, 1908-1983," 136.

⁷⁸ "State Hospitals Eye Legislation for Medicare," *The Oklahoman*, May 19, 1966.

⁷⁹ "Mental Board Picks Official," *The Oklahoman*, May 19, 1966.

⁸⁰ "State Hospitals Eye Legislation for Medicare," *The Oklahoman*, May 19, 1966. To offset the cost of new services not covered by the Community Mental Health Center Construction Act, Dr. Glass expected to receive more money from paying patients ensured by the federal government's new Medicare program.

word is continuity” and expressed a belief that “community care” and the CMHCs would be the future of mental healthcare.⁸¹

Many psychiatrists, lobbyists, and politicians shared Dr. Glass’s beliefs in the importance of the “continuity of care.” While some hoped that CMHCs would eventually and completely eliminate the need for hospitals, for many the “presumption was that community services would supplement but not replace traditional mental hospital services.”⁸² Instead, they believed CMHCs and community programs would work with hospitals to provide pre-care and after-care services. By doing so, they would make it simpler for patients to move through mental healthcare systems to receive different levels or intensities of care in response to their immediate needs.⁸³

Although Glass’s Department of Mental Health submitted an application for funds to build a CMHC in Norman, the Mental Health Board did not wait for approval to begin offering services. On March 1, 1967, the Central Oklahoma Community Mental Health Center began offering services in a temporary space in Griffin’s 31 A and B buildings.⁸⁴ The first Director of the COCMHC was a German psychiatrist named Dr. Wolfgang Huber.⁸⁵

Eventually, the federal government accepted Oklahoma’s application and construction began. The contract to design the building was awarded to Smith, Day and Davies, Architects and Engineers. They submitted a design based on a cluster of four buildings which would have unique functions, such as outpatient services, a day hospital, a recreational space and cafeteria, and an inpatient unit.⁸⁶ The design of the inpatient unit enabled the COCMHC to treat a total of 32 patients. The building was evenly split between men’s and women’s rooms, allowing for the

⁸¹ “Mental Board Picks Official,” *The Oklahoman*, May 19, 1966.

⁸² Grob, *From Asylum to Community*, 157.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 146.

⁸⁴ According to Oklahoma’s Department of Mental Health, the COCMHC was the first CMHC in the nation because services were provided before the COCMHC had its own facility.

⁸⁵ Lachriseia “Chris” Guffy and Julia “Chris” Olsen. Interview by author, Central Oklahoma Community Mental Health Center, October, 23, 2015.

⁸⁶ Smith, Day and Davies, Architects and Engineers, “Architectural drawings for Central State Community Mental Health Center in Norman, Oklahoma,” BLUEPRINT 0054, 9 items, Architecture Library, The University of Oklahoma.

COCMHC to treat sixteen men and sixteen women.⁸⁷ On July 3, 1969, the building opened for services.

Initially, the COCMHC staff was preoccupied with managing the disastrous effects of the rapid deinstitutionalization of Oklahoma's mental healthcare system. The majority of patients were discharged from the state hospitals with little preparation to help them reintegrate themselves into the community. For decades, some patients had considered the state hospital to be their permanent residence. They had not expected to live life outside of the institution ever again. Then they were discharged. How would they feed themselves? Where would they live? Had their families moved on with their lives while they were in the hospital? Did they even have families to go back to? Patients suddenly found themselves faced with this harsh reality. Although many had difficulty caring for themselves, in a short amount of time deinstitutionalization made them responsible for their own housing and care.

In the Department of Mental Health's efforts to decrease the inpatient hospital population, some elderly patients were released to nursing homes in a "lateral shift" of care following the expansion of federal welfare funds.⁸⁸ The federal government provided more funds for nursing home treatment than the states provided for treatment in their psychiatric hospitals.⁸⁹ Additionally, new medications allowed some patients to be treated effectively outside of a hospital setting.

However, these shifting patterns in care did not account for all of the patients released during the process of deinstitutionalization. The magnitude of the drop in the inpatient population was staggering. Within a decade, the inpatient population was nearly cut in half, with

⁸⁷ Chris Guffey and Chris Olsen interview by author, October, 23, 2015.

⁸⁸ Grob, *From Asylum to Community*, 269.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 269.

a large portion of the decrease occurring in only a few months.⁹⁰ The reductions were so large and conducted so quickly that Chris Guffey, then a mental health aid at Griffin and later the COCMHC, referred to deinstitutionalization as “when they emptied the state hospital.”⁹¹ The ramifications for this rapid and badly-conducted dispersal were enormous. Guffey recalled that most patients “had been [at Griffin] years and years and years and they were institutionalized and then all of a sudden they were out in the community, able to walk and go free. And they weren’t used to that. And that didn’t work well at all.”⁹² Her colleague Chris Olsen, then a nurse manager at Griffin and later the COCMHC, agreed that deinstitutionalization was “devastating for staff and the people.”⁹³ She explained, “Staff were angry and devastated because these were their people and had been their people for twenty and thirty years. And they took care of them like they were family and suddenly these people were ripped out and sent to all these room and boards.”⁹⁴ The COCMHC was expected to help deinstitutionalized patients cope with life outside of the hospital. However, this facility was in its fledgling stages and was not equipped to counterbalance the ill effects of the rapidly shifting structure of mental healthcare. In the face of literally thousands of discharged and disoriented patients, the COCMHC facility only had the space to treat thirty-two people at a time. Therefore, staff could only implement programs to help moderate the effects of deinstitutionalization on high-risk patients.

To care for a dispersed mentally ill population with an inadequate support system, no consistent residence, and limited mobility, the staff opened room and boards and satellite areas

⁹⁰ These reductions were likely inspired by the Joint Commission on Mental Health, which recommended that hospital populations be kept under 1,000 patients. See Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health, *Action for Mental Health: Final Report, 1961* (New York: Basic Books, 1961) 267-75.

⁹¹ Chris Guffey and Chris Olsen interview by author, October, 23, 2015.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

across the southern fourth of Oklahoma County as well as Cleveland and McClain Counties.⁹⁵ There were satellite areas in Oklahoma City, Del City, and Midwest City. There also were COCMHC-affiliated room and boards in cities such as Oklahoma City, Purcell, and Lexington. There were two room and boards in Noble.⁹⁶ Room and boards provided temporary housing while satellite areas offered some of the same treatments the COCMHC offered but in areas which were closer to where patients lived.

At the facility in Norman, the COCMHC offered a number of treatments. There were a few seclusion rooms as well as a small inpatient hospital for the treatment of severely mentally ill patients. However, the most severely mentally ill patients who walked through the doors of the COCMHC were often sent straight on to Griffin until they were well enough to be released for subsequent treatment at the COCMHC on an outpatient basis. For outpatient treatment, COCMHC staff relied upon medications, such as Thorazine, Haldol, and fluphenazine (Prolixin). While today patients may choose not to take their medications, during the early days of the COCMHC it was mandatory that patients take the medications prescribed to them. By seeing outpatients regularly, staff determined which personalized services a patient needed, such as case management, individual therapy, group therapy, or recreational therapy.⁹⁷

While the COCMHC was originally concerned with following the recently-released Griffin patients, the focus of care quickly shifted to include services for new types of mentally ill patients. Although it had not been a large part of care prior to community psychiatry, the treatment of substance abuse and addiction became a major focus of Oklahoma's Department of Mental Health. Olsen remarked, "on Friday nights they would go out to the bars, they'd get drunk, they'd get in fights. And they'd end up—we used to call them the Friday Nighters. And

⁹⁵ This was the part of the state the COCMHC served.

⁹⁶ Chris Guffey and Chris Olsen interview by author, October, 23, 2015.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

sometimes, once they sobered up the next morning they could go home or go to jail. Whichever. But, yes. We had the Friday Nighters.”⁹⁸ Because the COCMHC was never certified as a substance abuse treatment program, Friday Nighters who were not mentally ill had their basic needs met. Sometimes, the structure of the program alone helped to stabilize them. However, with the increased use of illicit drugs later in the 1960s, the COCMHC increasingly devoted its resources to the treatment of individuals with dual diagnoses of drug addiction and mental illness. Guffey remarked, “drugs have really just taken over. It’s like everybody.”

The COCHMC has responded to the increase in the incidence of substance abuse in part by restructuring its treatment programs. After implementing the Thunderbird Clubhouse program, the COCMHC allowed it to become a private-not-for-profit organization.⁹⁹ By doing so, the COCMHC helped provide for the treatment of substance addiction while also freeing its own resources. Additionally, the COCMHC has allowed other state and private substance addiction treatment programs to emerge, rather than seek certification as a substance abuse treatment program itself. Olsen recalled that the COCMHC changed when “the Anna McBride clinic came into force. She had a son who committed suicide. And this was about fifteen, twenty years ago. So a whole shift came there in terms of having mental health court and drug court to keep these people out of the hospital.”¹⁰⁰ These new programs allowed the COCMHC to prioritize people discharged from the hospital or jail, “extremely fragile” people who seek treatment, and people who are in drug court or mental health court.¹⁰¹

Many historians have seen this increased focus on substance abuse as part of a trend of deemphasizing the treatment of severely mentally ill patients in state mental health systems. For

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ “Our History,” Thunderbird Clubhouse, accessed December 6, 2015, <https://www.thunderbirdclubhouse.org/our-history>.

¹⁰⁰ Chris Guffey and Chris Olsen interview by author, October, 23, 2015.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

this reason, they are critical of community psychiatry and the CMHCs. Grob notes, “Severely and chronically mentally ill persons were now scattered throughout the mental healthcare system, but no single organization accepted longitudinal responsibility to provide for their basic needs.”¹⁰² Edward Shorter concurs with this analysis. He writes, “The CMHC’s soon became diverted to psychotherapy sessions for the walking well, and in the first decades of deinstitutionalization no administrative arrangements were made to receive the actively ill patients who were simply being pushed out of mental-hospital doors.”¹⁰³ This analysis leads him to dub deinstitutionalization the “shame of the states.”¹⁰⁴ However, the scholars Richard G. Frank and Sherry Glied view changes in mental healthcare policy after 1950 in terms of exceptionalism and mainstreaming. They define exceptionalism as “Maintaining an exceptional, dedicated public mental health system” that “ensures the existence of caregivers of last resort.”¹⁰⁵ The process of mainstreaming, however, broadens the scope of care to include funding for an increasing variety of patients and severity of illnesses. For Frank and Glied, community psychiatry and the CMHCs were part of a mainstreaming of mental illness and mental healthcare which they saw as generally positive. They write, “Our review of the past fifty years provides considerable evidence that . . . Inclusiveness and mainstreaming of people with even the most serious mental illnesses has resulted in tremendous gains in economic support for mental health care through SSI, SSDI, Medicare, and Medicaid.”¹⁰⁶ However, the problem they see with community treatment is that, while “The economic tide created by mainstreaming improved the economic circumstances of people with mental illness,” it also “swept the institutional structure

¹⁰² Grob, *From Asylum to Community*, 264.

¹⁰³ Shorter, *A History of Psychiatry*, 280.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 280.

¹⁰⁵ Frank, Richard G., and Sherry A. Glied. *Better But Not Well: Mental Health Policy in the United States Since 1950* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 142.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 142.

of exceptionalism away with it.”¹⁰⁷ Therefore, scholars generally agree that deinstitutionalization weakened the role of state psychiatric hospitals, which were the last institutions able to provide long-term care to those individuals with the worst mental illnesses.

Although it is undeniable that the CMHCs weakened the role of the state hospital, it is arguable whether the long-term effect of this power shift was negative. Prior to deinstitutionalization, there were no standards in place to limit hospital sizes and protect patient rights. Although mental health officials lacked sufficient planning when they reduced inpatient populations, the reduction itself was a positive development. Psychiatric hospitals could not operate with thousands of long-term patients and still treat residents humanely. Even with today’s improved treatment methods, a patient population in the thousands would be incredibly difficult to manage. Griffin’s history has demonstrated that a rise in the inpatient population also leads to a decrease in proper supervision and an increase in physical restraint. Therefore, mental health officials had to limit hospital sizes by reducing both patient populations and the average length of stay. While this meant that hospitals had to admit high-risk patients continually over their lifetimes rather than just once, it also meant that hospitals had to develop programs to help patients live outside of the hospital when they were well. Such programs simply did not exist prior to deinstitutionalization. With treatment, many people with chronic mental illness experience periods of debilitating illness followed by periods of relative wellness in which they are capable of functioning in their communities. Other diseases, such as severe diabetes, have a similar effect on those who live with them. One would not suggest that a person with severe diabetes remain in the hospital when their blood sugar is under control simply because they will have to return eventually. It is no more humane to suggest that people with mental illness remain in the hospital during periods of relative wellness just because one expects that they will relapse

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 142-3.

into illness. The overall effect of the CMHCs was therefore positive. For the first time, the CMHCs helped people with chronic mental illness live life in their communities when they were well and provided some structure to help them return for more intensive treatment when they were not.

Therefore, the problem lies not with the fundamental goals of deinstitutionalization, but rather with the disjointed way in which it was implemented. During the early years of the COCMHC, there certainly were no programs to meet the long-term care needs of severely and mentally ill patients. Mental health professionals have tried to correct this problem by introducing new programs over time. One such COCMHC program is Program of Assertive Community Treatment (PACT or ACT). In this program, teams of doctors, nurses, therapists, case managers, and recovering patients assist groups of 100 outpatients. To be eligible for treatment with a PACT team, a patient must have schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major depression with psychotic features, or another comparatively severe and debilitating mental illness. PACT teams help their 100 patients treat their illness by providing daily follow-ups and case management and by assisting with daily living requirements. The National Association on Mental Illness (NAMI) describes this program as “mostly used for people who have transferred out of an inpatient setting but would benefit from a similar level of care and having the comfort of living a more independent life than would be possible with inpatient care.”¹⁰⁸

Although many historians criticize community programs for disrupting the hospital’s role as the consistent provider of care for severely and chronically mentally ill people, programs such as PACT provide a promising alternative to hospitalization. NAMI notes that “Studies have shown that ACT is more effective than traditional treatment for people experiencing mental

¹⁰⁸ “Psychosocial Treatments,” NAMI: National Alliance on Mental Illness, accessed November 9, 2015, <https://www.nami.org/Learn-More/Treatment/Psychosocial-Treatments>.

illnesses such as schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder and can reduce hospitalizations by 20%.”¹⁰⁹ Grob notes that programs like PACT were part of a shift from an emphasis on cure to “the need to limit disability and to preserve function.”¹¹⁰ Initially, Grob was highly critical of the way the CMHCs’ treatment of substance abuse overshadowed the care of severely and chronically mentally ill patients. However, in a subsequent book Grob softens his criticism of the changes wrought by community psychiatry. He writes, “The persistence of problems . . . should not be permitted to conceal the more important fact that a large proportion of severely and persistently mentally ill persons have made a more or less successful transition to community life as a result of the expansion of federal disability and entitlement programs.”¹¹¹ Therefore, through the use of programs such as PACT, the COCMHC has had some success in its efforts to help severely and persistently ill patients manage their mental illness on a long-term outpatient basis.

One constant in the analysis of the effects of community programs is that there are at least two ways to view any change: a positive and a negative one. For example, eliminating and introducing new programs in response to trends or the actions of private-not-for-profit organizations was often difficult for patients and staff. Too many changes led to sense of inconsistency. As soon as patients and staff became used to a program, it seemed that administration phased the program out. Chris Guffey remembered the day hospital at the COCMHC as “a good program” for patients, which was eventually shut down “like everything else.”¹¹² On the other hand, this inconsistency can be viewed as the very type of adaptation for which the CMHCs were uniquely capable. Unlike psychiatric hospitals, CMHCs had no definite structure. In fact, there were only five National Institute of Mental Health requirements for

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Gerald N. Grob, *The Mad Among Us: A History of the Care of America’s Mentally Ill* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 306.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 308-9.

¹¹² Chris Guffey and Chris Olsen interview by author, October, 23, 2015.

CMHC structures and services. These were that CMHCs

provide at least 5 essential services (expanded to 12 in later years) - inpatient, outpatient, partial hospitalization, emergency . . . consultation and education; serve a 'catchment' area of no less than [sic] 75 000 and no more than 200 000 people (what would become a controversial issue); ensure continuity of care between the services; be accessible to the population to be served; serve people regardless of their ability or inability to pay.¹¹³

Clearly, CMHCs were intentionally ill-defined institutions. The officials who drafted the legislation hoped this ambiguity would make it easier for the legislation to pass Congress. However, vague terms such as “be accessible” also permitted communities to experiment when determining the shape of their CMHC.¹¹⁴ Ambiguity of structure allowed these facilities to reinvent their programs in response to community needs, which changed over time. Eventually, the COCMHC did not need a day hospital because Griffin, general hospitals, and other facilities were providing similar services. The COCMHC day hospital was therefore an unnecessary use of funds which could be abandoned. Instead, Oklahoma was in need of a program that provided long-term care to help seriously mentally ill people live in a community setting. When this became apparent, the COCMHC had the structural freedom to implement PACT in response to this community need.

Similarly, the broadening of services had both positive and negative effects. Severely and persistently mentally ill people no longer had one institution providing all of their healthcare needs. Nevertheless, through the use of programs like PACT, the COCMHC began to construct a framework to help even these patients live outside of a hospital setting. This process is ongoing. Additionally, the broadening of services allowed more people to receive help. Prior to the rise of community psychiatry, individuals experiencing mild or moderate mental illness had no

¹¹³ Saul Feldman, "Reflections on the 40th Anniversary of the US Community Mental Health Centers Act," *Australian & New Zealand Journal Of Psychiatry* 37, no. 6 (December 2003): 663.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 663.

treatment options other than state psychiatric hospitals if they could not afford to pay a psychiatrist in private practice. With the conditions of state hospitals as dire as they were, it seems safe to assume that at least some individuals went without treatment rather than check into a state psychiatric hospital. It seems incorrect to imply that these people should have gone without aid just because their symptoms were not completely and thoroughly debilitating. While acknowledging that severely mentally ill people deserve priority, it should also be noted that CMHCs affected positive change by extending treatment opportunities to people who previously had to choose between no treatment or treatment in a facility whose conditions potentially rendered treatment more harmful than their mental illness itself.

Since the 1960s, community programs have increasingly become the standard of psychiatric care in Oklahoma. Mental health professionals still subscribe to a foundational view of care which assumes that outpatient care is preferable to inpatient care and that mental illness can sometimes be prevented by early intervention in the community environment. Far from believing that the way to improve the care of severely and chronically mentally ill people is to increase the size of state hospitals, mental healthcare professionals cannot fathom returning to the standard of care which existed in Oklahoma during the 1950s. On the contrary, in the state psychiatric hospitals the inpatient space available to people with severe mental illnesses is smaller than ever. Taft was shut down while Eastern State Hospital at Vinita was converted to the Oklahoma Forensic Center (OFC). In addition to the fact that this facility reduced its inpatient population to 200, the OFC's patients are limited to those "who have been found incompetent for adjudication or adjudicated as Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity."¹¹⁵ Fort Supply is now the site of a small inpatient and residential program for the Northwest Center for

¹¹⁵ "Oklahoma Forensic Center," Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services, accessed November 11, 2015, http://ok.gov/odmhsas/Mental_Health/Oklahoma_Forensic_Center.html.

Behavioral Health, which has a main facility in Woodward. Griffin Memorial Hospital decreased its inpatient population from almost 3,000 to only 120.¹¹⁶ While the rise of psychiatric clinics in general hospitals has offset the loss of some of these services, these units only serve paying patients. Those who are unable to pay rely increasingly on outpatient programs like the COCMHC. All of Oklahoma's state psychiatric facilities must meet the challenge of providing care for both Oklahoma's most severely mentally ill persons as well as individuals whose illnesses could become worse over time. Unlike general hospitals, they must do so despite the fact that many of their patients are unable to pay for services. Oklahoma's CMHCs will continue to be a central element of Oklahoma's mental healthcare system. Because they are more adaptable institutions than state hospitals, these facilities are crucial participants in the state's efforts to develop programs to integrate mental healthcare and physical care and, by doing so, continue to improve healthcare moving forward.

¹¹⁶ Griffin can treat forty-five females and seventy-five males.



Fig. 1 Dayroom scene of patients at the State Hospital for the Negro Insane at Taft, Oklahoma, July 27, 1946, The Mike Gorman Papers, U.S. National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health, Maryland. <http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/ResourceMetadata/TGBBGW>.



Fig. 2 Ward for violent female mental patients at Central State Hospital, Norman, Oklahoma, July 20, 1946, The Mike Gorman Papers, U.S. National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health, Maryland. <http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/ResourceMetadata/TGBBGW>

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Runners-Up

“Underground Cathedrals:
Moscow’s Struggle for a Subterranean Masterpiece”

Michaela Hill
HIST-4973: Stalin and Stalinism
November 24, 2015

Introduction

On May 14, 1935, Stalin delivered his first live radio broadcast. To thunderous applause, he commemorated the official opening of Moscow's first metro line. He gave special thanks to the subterranean workers of the Moscow Metrostroi, praising them for their contribution to the completion of the line. He awarded the Moscow *Komsomol* with the Order of Lenin for building "the best metro in the world." Three weeks before, the Metrostroi Office had already begun distributing tickets to Muscovites—some 50,000 people every day. The tickets became a statement of cultural development, and citizens without tickets were socially behind the times. This steady flow of passengers did not diminish the official opening of the Moscow Metro. On May 15, 1935, 370,000 people attended the official inauguration of the metro. The day was like a holiday, and people wore their best clothes on their first ride on the metro. Half a million participants marched in a parade on Nverskaya Boulevard and proudly marched in front of the Moscow City Council Building. The city of Moscow was enraptured with the underground.¹

The Western world looked on with perplexity at the Soviet reaction to the metro. After all, the Moscow Metro was some fifty years overdue by Europe's timetable. Some Westerners in Moscow thought that the money could have been better spent on improving housing and that it was unneeded extravagance.² Besides this minority negative opinion, however, the opening of the metro celebrated the Soviet people in ways that other massive building projects could not. Make no mistake, the completion of the first line was a logistical miracle. The Moscow Metro was mythical in the minds of the Soviet people. It was something unearthly, and only a few years

¹ William K. Wolf. *Russia's revolutionary underground: the construction of the Moscow subway, 1931-35*. (PhD diss, Ohio State University, 1994), 323-326.

² Wolf. *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 327.

earlier had it been unimaginable. The metro symbolized victory in the fight to establish socialism. It promoted the narrative of the government solving the issues caused by industrialization in urban centers. It changed the perceptions of what was and was not feasible for the Soviet Union to accomplish. The Moscow Metro was not simply another government project. For those who worked on it, it engendered personal attachment because it was the individual's way to participate in building the future. Because of this personal connection, the public was just as absorbed in the fight to complete the metro as was the Bolshevik Party and Soviet Government. The Moscow Metro symbolized both the individual's and the state's fight to build socialism.

The Soviet Government rallied the people of Moscow to go to great lengths in order to complete the metro. However, at the project's inception, the people of Moscow loathed it. How did the government shift people's perceptions of the project's meaning and desired results in Soviet Russia? How did the government kindle the citizenry's enthusiasm? The Soviet government spurred a reversal in opinion by the time the Moscow Metrostroi Project was completed. What narrative did the Soviet government infuse within the metro that resonated so effectively with the Soviet people?

Considering the magnitude of the Moscow Metrostroi Project, one would think there would be ample scholarship on the subject. Surprisingly, there has been next to no scholarship on the Moscow Metrostroi Project. It would be unthinkable to write a book overviewing subterranean subways without a section on the Moscow Metro. However, these books are about the technical aspect of building the metro and not its ideological significance within the Soviet Union. The closest Western academia has ever come to a thorough examination of the metro is William K. Wolf's, PhD, dissertation *Russia's Revolution Underground: The Construction of the*

Moscow Subway, 1931-35.³ His dissertation chronicles the project in its entirety from the time the Tsarist regime considered the project to the opening of the first line. Dr. Wolf's dissertation is more factual than analytical, however, leaving the gap in academia unpalatably large. Timothy J. Colton's epic of Moscow: *Moscow Governing the Socialist Metropolis* does include a section on the Moscow Metrostroi Project, but this section is brief and lacks in-depth analysis.⁴ Dobrenko and Naiman's book *The Landscape of Stalinism* offers an analysis of the discourse of metro during the 1930s. It pertains to the entire decade of the 1930s and provides integral understanding of the sensory experience within the metro.⁵ Other important sources pertaining to Moscow or urbanism during this time such as Richard Stites's *Revolutionary Dreams*, or Gleason, Kenez, and Stites's *Bolshevik Culture*, tend to agree that the Soviet Union was moving toward hyper-urbanism and city planning that would bring the Soviet Union on par with the capitalist world.⁶ Other than these works cited above, I could find no other work on the Moscow Metrostroi.

The lack of ample scholarship on the metro necessitates that scholars look almost entirely to primary sources; this is what I have done. The sources defending the assertions I will make in this paper are largely derived from Russian newspapers published during the time of the Moscow Metrostroi Project. I have also found memoirs by key figures on the project that provide insight

³ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*. Entire.

⁴ Timothy J. Colton, *Moscow : Governing the Socialist Metropolis*. Russian Research Center Studies ; 88. Cambridge, Mass. (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995). Entire.

⁵ E. A. Dobrenko, Eric Naiman, and American Council of Learned Societies. *The Landscape of Stalinism : The Art and Ideology of Soviet Space*. Studies in Modernity and National Identity. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), Entire.

⁶ Richard Stites. *Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). Entire
Gleason, Abbott. Kenez, Peter, and Stites, Richard. *Bolshevik Culture: Experiment and Order in the Russian Revolution*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. Entire.

as well. This does mean that what I have seen is strongly steeped in party ideology. However, this is not a disadvantage considering that I will be analyzing the ideology behind the metro.

There are many different narratives surrounding the Moscow Metro. There is a narrative of technological development and independence from foreign specialists, of conquering space, of conquering public opinion, of inciting the populous to vigorous work, and of innovation. But there is also a narrative of building socialism. In this paper, I will unfold this narrative. The Moscow Metrostroi Project told the condensed story of what the Soviet Union was moving towards during the First Five Year Plan: socialism. It told of the hardship, sacrifice, and triumph of building socialism and promised a future in which all problems of hyper-urbanization would be overcome. Then, the Soviet people would live in a technologically advanced urban socialist utopia. In short, the Moscow Metro invited the individual to participate in building socialism and provided a glimpse into the socialist future of the Soviet Union.

Why A Metro?

Moscow's population had been growing ever since the civil war.⁷ The congestion in the city center was horrendous. Muscovites had a four-hour commute to and from work on average. The city added more trams in an effort to alleviate the over-packed public transportation system, but this only made the congestion worse. At the same time that the city center was in a perpetual traffic jam, the outskirts of the city were completely devoid of any public transportation. The center and the periphery were completely disconnected, only increasing worker commutes. Tram or bus accidents were steadily increasing in the late twenties.⁸ The Tsarist government had suggested a metro multiple times starting in 1902, but plans never went beyond the drawing

⁷ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 18.

⁸ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 27-30.

board. The USSR first suggested a metro in 1924, and the city created a subway department that drafted metro plans to build the subway within the next five years in 1925.⁹ On November 2, 1928, an announcement appeared in *Pravda* declaring the city's decision to build a metro through the heart of the congested center.¹⁰ One would think that overwhelming approval would follow. It did not. Moscow cried out in protest against the metro.

The battle of the metro was about practicality and power. Many in the city felt that the congestion problem was minor in comparison to the housing crisis. An editorial in *Pravda* likened building a metro in Moscow to buying a silk hat for a man without trousers.¹¹ Exactly how much of the population opposed the project is impossible to determine, as all opposition was expressed in various newspapers controlled by political factions. Thus, the debate on the metro was a political one under the veil of representing the people's will. During the late 1920s, Moscow was under two forms of authority: the Moscow Committee and the local administrative committees. Stalin actively consolidated his authority within the Moscow Committee and eventually gained control over the entirety of Moscow in the late twenties.¹² When a member of the Moscow City Presidium announced the metro, it sparked an argument over who had the authority to make such a decision. There were numerous articles discussing the metro's pros and cons.¹³ Much of the debate was in the *Worker's and Peasants Inspectorate*, a newspaper commonly known as *Rabkrin* and that was firmly controlled by Stalin.¹⁴

⁹ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 20.

¹⁰ *Pravda*, November 10, 1928, 6.

¹¹ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 20.

¹² Colton, *Moscow*, 175-177.

¹³ *Pravda*, November 2, 1928, 2.

¹⁴ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 21.

In the end, the Moscow Presidium succumbed to the pressure. They would not build a metro before consulting the workers. They attempted to claim that they had not decided to build it in the first place, but were simply trying to open the discourse on the subject. This was a lie. The article in *Pravda* announcing the change was as minimalistic and to the point as possible; it communicated just how much the government wanted to sweep the controversial issue under the rug.¹⁵ Ultimately, the project was too politically controversial to continue.

When the question of a metro was raised again in 1931, it centered on the debated topic of urbanism within socialism. Following the Civil War, the Soviet Union had an ongoing debate over anti-urbanism and urbanism. At the heart of the debate was how to build socialism. The anti-urbanists believed that cities were the root of all social ills and that small centers of 80,000 inhabitants, connected by high-speed railways, would produce healthier, more productive individuals.¹⁶ Much of this stemmed from a belief that at the heart of all cities was capitalism, which meant that cities were incompatible with socialism and should be obliterated. The anti-urbanists were not trying to create a rural society, but instead trying to disperse the population throughout all arable land. During the 1920s, the anti-urbanists enjoyed favor among a number of Moscow organs. They could publish works without problems and enjoyed somewhat high popularity.¹⁷

The city may have decided against the metro, but the congestion issue only increased. Because of the First Five Year Plan, Moscow's population increased by almost a million people.

¹⁵ *Pravda*, December 1, 1928, 5.

¹⁶ Abbott Gleason. Kenez, Peter, and Stites, Richard. *Bolshevik Culture : Experiment and Order in the Russian Revolution*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 180.

¹⁷ Sheila Fitzpatrick. *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931*. (Columbia University. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 225.

In 1930, the city had 1,644 trams and 2,603,000 riders per day, or 1,583 riders per tram.¹⁸

No matter what the city did, the congestion worsened. Moscow could not add any more vehicles in the streets. It was evident that the only solution would be to expand below.

In the mid- to late twenties, Soviet leaders began to disregard anti-urbanism. The precise opposite of what the anti-urbanist had postulated in the early twentieth century concerning population shifts came true: peasants began to try and better their lives within cities, not small villages.¹⁹ As populations soared in cities, city organs must have been perplexed, considering what anti-urbanists had told them. The metro project coincided with the beginning of the end for anti-urbanism within the Soviet Union. As the First Five Year Plan started, it became evident that the government decided to build socialism along with urbanism. The metro debate began afresh in 1931 through a series of articles that attacked the anti-urbanist and defended the metro's socialist character. The anti-urbanists were on the defensive immediately. They saw no reason to build a metro within a densely populated center that they believed would be abandoned. This is how much of the discourse pertaining to the debate of the metro continued. The anti-urbanists claimed the metro was un-socialist, while the urbanists saw it as necessary for progress towards socialism.²⁰ For a few months, the public watched a battle of words carry on under a slightly different pretense than it had in 1928. Both sides were unilaterally silenced when Stalin declared the metro would be built in June 1931. His reasoning behind the decision has unfortunately been lost. Some scholars have postulated it was defense related, but the metro's military usefulness was only realized after the project switched to deep tunneling later. We can speculate the decision

¹⁸ Colton, *Moscow*, 174.

¹⁹ Fitzpatrick, *Cultural Revolution in Russia*, 236.

²⁰ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 35-39.

had much to do with Stalin's plan to hyper-industrialize the Soviet Union.²¹ Anti-urbanism or urbanism no longer mattered. Moscow would build a metro.

Battle to Build the Metro

The Soviet Union was in no situation to build a metro. The project surpassed its original price tag of 55 million rubles and took 800 million rubles to complete.²² The project's biggest challenge, which plagued it from its beginning, was the fact that practically no one in Russia had ever worked on building a metro. There was one key issue with employing the most promising candidate, an engineer named S. N. Rozanov with experience building the Paris Metro: he was in prison for economic sabotage.²³ A few other engineers may have briefly worked on metros in the West or seen a metro, but no others had the necessary experience. To make matters worse, the Soviet Union was no longer willing to pay to import technicians.²⁴ Eventually, Rozanov had to be released in order to help, and miners such as Nikita Krushchev were also employed to supervise the digging.²⁵ Clearly, the project suffered from a technical deficiency from the beginning.

Lazar Kaganovich managed the project. In many ways, the metro was more important to his public image than it was for Stalin. Kaganovich was mentioned more times in newspaper articles about the metro than Stalin was. A speech he gave in 1934 to the Metrostroi shock workers was transcribed into a tract of sorts titled *The Construction of the Subway and the plan for the City of Moscow*. This, in many ways, act as his memoirs during this period of construction.

²¹ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 40.

²² Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 41.

²³ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 56.

²⁴ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 57.

²⁵ Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. editors, Crankshaw, Edward, and Talbott, Strobe. *Khrushchev Remembers*. 1st Ed. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and, 1970), 64-65.

During the first phase of construction, according to Kaganovich, the only work done was “preparation and organization.” Initially, he admitted the project was a mess.²⁶ Kaganovich was certainly right. During this time, construction of the metro was plagued by multiple problematic disagreements between technicians who had no notion of what they were doing. To make matters worse, finding labor was incredibly difficult. The Moscow Metro had few incentives for workers, such as quality lodging. The project was operating with less than half of the labor it needed.²⁷ It was, as Timothy Colton described, “A tunneler’s nightmare...”²⁸ The project began with shallow, open cut shafts. This augmented difficulties because Moscow’s soil had qualities similar to moist quicksand. Makovskii, an engineer, suggested deep tunneling. Finally, after much debate, it was agreed to begin deep tunneling.²⁹ The second stage of construction was actually the first time construction began with a purpose. It was in 1933-1934 that the bulk of the work was completed on the metro. During the final leg of construction, the metro was ablaze with frantic work to finish it before the opening. The city pushed back the date a few months when it realized that the metro would not be finished. It was further pushed back by Stalin, who wanted the craftsmanship to be cleaned up before the Soviet Union opened the “best metro in the world.”³⁰

Even with all these difficulties and setbacks, the Moscow Metro opened just six months later than planned. The metro had thirteen stations, each unique in its own way. It showcased cathedral-like stations, covered in marble and lighted by chandeliers suspended almost two

²⁶ L.M. Kaganovich, *Construction of the Subway and the Plan of the City of Moscow*. (Soviet Union: Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers, 1934), 6.

²⁷ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 61-62.

²⁸ Colton, *Moscow*, 255.

²⁹ Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 68.

³⁰ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 321-322.

stories above the floor. It achieved the effect of fooling the passenger into thinking they were in a cathedral instead of a sunken train.³¹ Despite the setbacks, the metro was at least an ideological success.

Symbolic Nature of the Metro

The metro was not simply built to alleviate congestion. It was the embodiment of the ideals of the time, of the First Five Year Plan, and of building socialism within the Soviet Union. Building the first metro in Russia in Moscow was not an arbitrary decision. Moscow would become one of the greatest cities in the world. It was to embody the socialist future through renewal, a renewal that would be achieved through the expulsion of the emblems of the past. This philosophy doomed cathedrals like Christ the Redeemer and countless others to make room for new Soviet projects.³² Kaganovich stated during his speech in 1934 that “the construction of the first section of the subway, and the projected plan of the second section of the subway, to a great extent predetermined the fate of the plan for the further development and construction of the city of Moscow.”³³ This justified the metro project’s destruction of countless buildings that changed the face of Moscow and made way for new, Soviet architecture.³⁴ The metro embodied the coming change of Moscow. Moscow would transform into a new system of urban living—one in which technology remedied all problems caused by hyper-urbanism.³⁵ It would be the first city to build socialism. *Komsomolskaya Pravda* explained it as follows: “We undertook a

³¹ Dobrenko, Naiman, *The Landscape of Stalinism*, 264

³² Colton, *Moscow*, 262-265.

³³ Kaganovich, *Construction of the Subway and the Plan of the City of Moscow*, 37.

³⁴ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, May 12, 1935, 4.

³⁵ Colton, *Moscow*, 245,

big re-planning of Moscow, we decided to change the haggard face of the city, and we already presented Moscow with one more small change, a Metro!”³⁶ Moscow was old and resembled the Tsarist age too much to be a socialist city. Additions like the metro moved it closer to its vanguard status for all future Soviet cities and tilled the ground for other new projects. Kaganovich felt Moscow was “catching up” to the capitalist cities in technology and was an “urban laboratory” for determining how best to build socialist urbanism.³⁷ Hyper-industrialization ideally was not simply for industry alone; it was also to affect the Soviet people’s everyday lives for the better. Considering the massive shoe deprivation during the First Five Year Plan, however, the system was obviously not balanced. The civilizing effect of technology had to be harnessed by and for the new Soviet, socialist future.

The “cult of the machine” infatuated The Soviet Union during the 1920s. Hyper-urbanism and the corresponding belief that proletarian society could only exist within a culture of the machine and the factory affected policy greatly starting in the late 1920s.³⁸ The Soviet Union believed that machines and modernization led the way to a new civilization. According to Richard Stites, “City planning and the design of future living space requires a mentality and an imagination closely resembling the concoction of science fiction and utopia.”³⁹ Stites perfectly summarizes in this quote how the cult of the machine manifested itself within city planning. It became more than utility—it was ideological. The distribution of space among the needs of life and manufacturing had to reflect both mechanization and utopia. Both sections of

³⁶ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, May 12, 1935, 4.

³⁷ Colton, *Moscow*, 253-54.

³⁸ Stites. *Revolutionary Dreams*, 149

³⁹ Stites. *Revolutionary Dreams*, 190.

life had to reflect their union on equal mechanized terms. But they also had to have an element that enchanted the people, much in the way science fiction does. When Moscow built a metro, the utility of it was not only to reduce commutes. It was also ideological education. The Metro was neither underground or above ground, it was never day or nor night; it was the metro.⁴⁰ The one absolute of the metro was its owner: no one. The metro was a collective space of beauty, built by the ingenuity of Soviet technicians without foreign help.⁴¹ It was a socialist space. The Soviet Union still feared that urban landscapes were too capitalistic and crushed the soul of the proletariat, but the metro enlightened the individual of what the collective could achieve in an urban landscape. It offered a narrative of the possibilities of the socialist future that they could build devoid of capitalistic technology and over which all Soviet People had ownership.

When recruited for the management of the metro Nikita Khrushchev said that, “We thought the metro as something supernatural.”⁴² Khrushchev spoke briefly about his work on the metro in his memoirs *Khrushchev Remembers*. He believed that the metro went beyond the comprehension of the average Soviet citizen. As he put it, “I think it’s probably easier to contemplate space flight today than it was for us to contemplate the construction of the Moscow Metro in the early 1930’s.”⁴³ He elaborated on this incomprehensibility by describing how the project handled escalators. When switching to deep tunneling was suggested, the fear of the depth of the stairs that would be necessary for a deep metro lay at the heart of the argument of objecting parties. The logical solution was escalators. However, even Khrushchev admitted he

⁴⁰ Dobrenko, Naiman, *The Landscape of Stalinism*, 266.

⁴¹ Dobrenko, Naiman, *The Landscape of Stalinism*, 267.

⁴² Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 64.

⁴³ Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 64.

had to ask what an escalator was when he first heard the word.⁴⁴ They could not import escalators, nor technicians to build them at this time. It was not allowed, nor could the country afford it. Pavel Roter suggested elevators as an option as well, and the Soviets knew how to build elevators.⁴⁵ In the end, escalators won the battle. Why? The metro would push the Soviets to their utmost ingenuity; it tested the capabilities of the Soviet Union. This project required leaders to ignite in each builder an esoteric understanding of the project, which led to the development of an emotional bond between the worker and his work. Escalators embodied the mythological, utilitarian, ideological goal of the metro perfectly, and neither Stalin nor any other leader in Moscow could have failed to understand escalators' ideological significance in their fight to build socialism.

A Test Tube

The First Five Year Plan placed massive industrialization in the public eye through the news as well. Projects like Magnitogorsk were away in the Urals, hundreds of miles from Moscow. Although building projects were constantly mentioned in media, the signature projects were distant from urban areas. Factories in Moscow increased on a massive scale during the plan, but seeing factories was not the same as experiencing industrialization spring from the void as it did in the Urals. However, the metro project was literally under people's feet. The shafts were before their eyes, and the disruption to their lives was great. I believe that the Moscow Metro impressed upon the individual sensory realities of the building of socialism.

The metro project was not supposed to upset the lives of Muscovites: it failed this goal spectacularly. The Metro disrupted pedestrian and vehicle traffic from the start. The worksites

⁴⁴ Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 69.

⁴⁵ Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 68.

were ugly, dirty, and surrounded by mounds of disrupted earth. Many of the conditions created by the metro were similar to those of Magnitogorsk.⁴⁶ What was different was the reaction of the people. There were entire articles in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* complaining about specialized clothing and the administration that failed to produce and distribute them. This criticism went far for the Soviet Union. The same article stated that “Metrostroi management should in their turn become interested in the work of the metro-supply organization, which is more occupied with red tape, than procuring working uniforms.”⁴⁷ This article speaks to the idea associated with the metro that people had a right to speak of the issues of building socialism and a right to hold management accountable. The living conditions in the barracks were repeatedly criticized for being deplorable. A report that appeared in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* reported that,

138 barracks were checked and there wasn’t a single room without parasites. Bachelors, working families, young men, young women, and children frequently live in one room. There is a total lack of cultural services, which puts the workers, especially the young people, on the nasty path to drunkenness and gambling.⁴⁸

The criticism did not stop here; there was an entire article dedicated to describing the vermin infestation.⁴⁹ Each article articulated that the quality of life did not match the quality of work that the builders performed. The fact that printed criticism appeared and that party names appeared is telling of what the metro represented to the public: the problems of massive industrialization and their opportunity to overcome them. It was not simply the party’s opportunity to fix them, but the

⁴⁶ John Scott. *Behind the Urals, an American Worker in Russia's City of Steel*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942), Entire.

⁴⁷ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, September 15, 1933, 2.

⁴⁸ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 1, 1934, 3.

⁴⁹ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 1, 1934. 3.

people's as well. As much as these problems were the city's responsibility, they were also the workers' responsibility. One of the first volunteers stated that,

Our shaft number 12, a Komsomol shaft, is already well known in all of Moscow as one of the best, though we had quite a few shortages in the shaft especially at the beginning of the mobilization of the first volunteer brigades. There were also social problems that started in the barracks like theft: the result was great instability. During the recruitment of new Komsomol members, our shaft will need to pay special attention to the conditions of life in the barracks.⁵⁰

This builder saw his own success and felt it his responsibility to help see issues fixed. The workers could see some of the effects of building socialism. The workers took on the responsibility of the project. It was not simply a state project. The Moscow metro gave the Soviet people a place in building socialism.

Finding materials in the Soviet Union for any project was difficult. For the Metro, the problem presented itself as another obstacle the workers had to overcome. Wood beams supported the ceiling within the shafts, and the metro project became unacceptably unsafe without access to lumber.⁵¹ Management sent the workers to get wood themselves and began a campaign to have supplies shipped to the metro. A determined article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* appeared saying, "The disgraceful logging work at Arkhangelsk hampers work in the shafts. The constant lack of lumber delays sinking the shafts and concreting... 200 Komsomol members, the best shock workers, traveled to Arkhangelsk. They will work on the logging in Arkhangelsk before the shipping campaign is over."⁵² In the end, these metro workers cut 190,000 meters of wood.⁵³ The metro project could not be hindered even by other less efficient sectors of the Soviet

⁵⁰ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, September 23, 1933, 2.

⁵¹ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 204-203.

⁵² *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, March 5, 1935, 4.

⁵³ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, March 5, 1935, 4.

Union. Not only would the workers remedy their problems, but in record time as well. Even the obstacles within the Five Year Plan could be overcome by the workers. In reality, most of the lumber did not find its way to Moscow. Other projects commandeered it through bribery.⁵⁴ However, the statement had already been made that there was nothing that could not be overcome.

It is interesting to note how foreigners reacted to Moscow's attempts to pioneer its own field. Foreigners pondered why they were not being consulted. From 1933-1934, it seems foreigners were entirely pessimistic about the Soviet Union's ability to complete the metro.⁵⁵ Although they had no issues with praising the enthusiasm of the metro workers, foreigners did not attribute advanced technical knowledge to them.⁵⁶ As the project improved slowly, foreigners began to criticize less and even praised the project in late 1934. The idea that the metro could be built without foreign help was a victory. In reality, there was some dubious consultation with representatives of German and English firms who thought they were in Moscow to negotiate contracts, but in reality were figuratively interrogated for technical information. Such was the case with how the Soviets built escalators.⁵⁷ Still, it was important to send the message that the Soviet Union could be independent of paying for foreign technicians. Their own innovation was capable of completing the project. As

Komsomolskaya Pravda, put it, "We decided to manage without foreign help... but with our own

⁵⁴ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 212.

⁵⁵ *Moscow Daily News*, April 6, 1934. 4.

⁵⁶ *Moscow Daily News*, December 10, 1933, 3. May 27, 1933, 3.

⁵⁷ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 314-315.

engineers, our own shock workers—the *komsomoltsy* [Communist Youth League] decided to build the metro.”⁵⁸ The metro was a micro-Five Year Plan in and of itself. The Metrostroi Project conquered industrialization before the eyes of Muscovites and instilled a tangible experience of what the Soviet people were doing: building socialism.

Giving Control to the People

Labor shortages began to seriously affect building the metro in 1933. The recruitment process in 1932 had not produced the desired 18,000 workers, but only 10,000. In early 1933 the Metrostroi leadership decided to recruit from the Communist Youth League, or *komsomoltsy*. Although they lacked technical knowledge, *komsomoltsy* were relatively easy to recruit or mobilize and where they lacked technical training they espoused youthful enthusiasm.⁵⁹ *Komsomoltsy* working in the administration of the Metrostroi took over a shaft in early 1933 in an effort to provide an example for other shafts to emulate. The shaft quickly began to exceed its quota, but it did not spur better work in other shafts.⁶⁰ In April 1933, *Komsomolskaya Pravda* announced the mobilization of 1,000 new *Komsomol* workers for the metro.⁶¹ Again in June an additional 2,000 workers were mobilized.⁶² The addition of *Komsomol* labor transformed the discourse used to incite enthusiasm in the new workers. It transformed the project from a state project to a “project of the people.”

⁵⁸ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, May 14, 1935, 3.

⁵⁹ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 120.

⁶⁰ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 119-120.

⁶¹ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, April 11, 1933, 4.

⁶² Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 120.

The fact that the komsomoltsy had little technical experience and were more accustomed to factory work than mining presented both a problem and an opportunity. A new technical department opened at the Moscow Institute of Engineers. Incoming komsomoltsy went either directly to the shafts and trained there or went to the workers' school of 1,000 students.⁶³ Metrostroi management knew that, "With this mass of people, we will need to work long and hard; we need to reeducate them, to transform them into conscious builders."⁶⁴ It was not simply their technical education, but their socialist consciousness as well that had to be excited. Media about Metrostroi workers always stressed that people came to the metro as inept youths and became indispensable workers, as exemplified in the following:

When the first wave of 2,000 of komsomoltsy volunteers arrived at the metro, many wondered whether we should let them work in the shafts. You see, yesterday they worked on buttons and lace. The young workers proved themselves though, in 2-3 weeks they became the nucleus of the metro.⁶⁵

Komsomol workers became not just technicians, but the heart of the metro. The rhetoric stipulated that Metrostroi was a disaster. Therefore, the Metrostroi leadership were giving komsomoltsy access to education, allowing them to assume ownership and build the metro.⁶⁶ People ceased to be cogs in an inanimate machine: the metro project became the embodiment of building socialism and building *socialists*. The project made, "The Komsomol collective and all the young workers [grow] politically, in technical skill, and culturally."⁶⁷ The metro was no longer the innovation of the state, but the innovation of remaking people and the people's

⁶³ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, August 29, 1933, 1.

⁶⁴ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, September 23, 1933, 2.

⁶⁵ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, May 14, 1935, 3.

⁶⁶ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, August 29, 1933, 1.

⁶⁷ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, May 15, 1935, 3.

innovation thereafter. As Vlas Chubar put it in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, “We changed the nature of remaking people, we created the world’s masterpieces...”⁶⁸ The metro exemplified building socialism so that it was envied, and how that process remade the individual as well.

Work on the metro went through a metamorphosis. The builder began to connect on a personal level with his work. The metro was as much a test of the worker as of the First Five Year Plan. The results on the metro theoretically proved the benefits of Gastev’s theories on the worker’s place within hyper-urbanism and the cult of the machine. He postulated that the worker was a “sentient, creative part of the productive process who behaves like a seasoned, conscious, and well trained warrior.”⁶⁹ This philosophy directed labor on the metro. The propaganda pushed the builder in the shaft to become a part of the collective building project of socialism.⁷⁰ The quality of his work judged his quality and his Soviet consciousness, meaning that the ability to understand the significance of his work reflected his communist cultural enlightenment.

Metrostroi leadership gave the komsomoltsy a degree of control over the metro. Although it was in some ways a false sense of control, as key decisions were made by the top managers, it was not in other ways. Elements, such as operating the shield and waterproofing, took technical skills that few workers knew prior to coming to the metro.⁷¹ Details were not only espoused as the most important aspect of work, but genuinely just as important as the decision for deep tunneling. A leaky metro, especially with Moscow’s moist soil, would be a

⁶⁸ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, May 15, 1935, 3.

⁶⁹ Stites. *Revolutionary Dreams*, 153.

⁷⁰ Kaganovich, *Construction of the Subway and the Plan of the City of Moscow*, 25.

⁷¹ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, May 15, 1935, 3.

dangerous metro.⁷² The very nature of the work demanded a force that understood how important their contribution was because. Minutely regulating the work of thousands was impossible, especially considering that there was only a handful of technicians who actually had more technical knowledge than the average worker. Metrostroi leadership had to inspire the worker to be a sentient element within the system. The project became an extension of the individual. It is my analysis that by investing personal attachment to work, the Moscow Metro invited people to connect with the plan for building socialism within the Soviet Union.

The end product had to reflect the work of the people, and, more importantly, their emotional commitment to a communist future. The plans for the metro were not in workers' hands, but the leadership undoubtedly understood that the metro was no longer simply an example of the Soviet Union's hyper-industrialization or Moscow's status as a vanguard city: it was about the individual building socialism. It was in the hardest areas that "...the komcomolsky showed exemplary work."⁷³ If a portion of the komcomolsky workers had not been so enthusiastic about their work and had not risen to the technical demand placed on them, the metro may not have been completed anywhere near its projected date. The end result for all was something that could be celebrated for centuries: it would preserve the workers who had built it precisely for a socialist future. The benefits of the socialist future being built now could be had in the present.

Conclusion

⁷² Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 90.

⁷³ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, May 15, 1935, 3.

The Moscow Metro opened to thunderous applause, but the project still continues today. Moscow built a plethora of beautiful tunnels, but the first line is arguably the best. The Moscow Metro is considered one of the ideal construction projects of the Stalinist Era.⁷⁴ Moscow had to be modern and a city on a hill for the rest of the nation. It had to set the example of the socialist future. By building the metro, Moscow proved it could be just as modern and technologically advanced as the capitalist world as well as a humane landscape where the passenger came first over profits and utility.⁷⁵

The First Five Year Plan brought the semi-distant, socialist future to the present and showcased the grand technical capabilities of it. No longer were the elements of the future that affected everyday life purely imaginative. They were here now, in every magazine and in cinemas.⁷⁶ The issues of the First Five Year Plan could be overcome. By acknowledging the problems in the barracks, the city showed what they would fix later. This would be exemplified when Kaganovich would enter and fix workers' problems.

In the construction of the metro, the worker ceased to be a chess piece of the state and became a skilled laborer influencing his own future and the future of others. Work became a personal extension of the individual. Likewise, the product became such as well. The metro became the distant socialist future brought to the present.

The metro would not alleviate congestion for years after its opening; the first line was too small and the problem too great. It would not affect the lives of most citizens for years to come.

⁷⁴ Dobrenko, Naiman, *The Landscape of Stalinism*, 273.

⁷⁵ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, May 14, 1935, 3.

⁷⁶ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, May 12, 1935, 4.

It cost more to ride than most could afford.⁷⁷ Although we cannot know how widespread the feeling of endearment to their work was among the metro workers, the evidence that exists indicates it was not a feeling in the minority. The ideological platform of the state to mobilize people was excellent. The Moscow Metro presented the city dwellers with the task of implementing the First Five Year Plan and building socialism. This included facing problems, disruptions, and poor living conditions. All of these came to Moscow as it assumed its vanguard status. The metro made the heroic alleviation of these issues dependent on the individual. The individual became the hero who would make the future better. The individual became the engineer of the socialist future, which the individual accomplished by working in the collective. The worker must build socialism, not the state. Philosophies of the future became personal. The metro gave the individual an esoteric understanding of what socialism would require and what it required of him. The Soviet government allowed the Moscow Metro to be the individual's narrative of building socialism.

⁷⁷ Wolf, *Russia's revolutionary underground*, 331-332.

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Southern Ladies' Rebellion: The Failure of Women's Suffrage in Mississippi

HIST 4973

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“There was born in me a sense of injustice that had always been heaped upon my sex, and this consciousness created and sustained in me a constant and ever increasing rebellion.” -Belle Kearney, A Slaveholder’s Daughter¹

In the United States, the movement for women’s suffrage formally began with the Seneca Falls conference of 1848. There were no notable southern suffragists present at this pivotal conference, with the exception of the Grimké sisters who avidly disavowed their southern heritage. When thinking of women in the Antebellum and post-Civil War South, rather than picturing ardent feminists, most think of proper genteel women more interested in racism than their own advancement. Yet in 1920 several Southern states would play a pivotal role in the ratification of the 19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; what led to the success of suffrage in some Southern states and not in others?

The woman’s suffrage movement in the American South was motivated by extremely different factors than the Northern movement. Southern suffragists were bound by a much stricter social system than their Northern counterparts and thus were met with stronger resistance than in other states. In Mississippi, a state where slaves made up a majority of the population and almost the entire population lived in rural areas, it is unsurprising that these repressive social systems were particularly powerful.² The Mississippi government denied women the right to vote until forced to do so by the federal government in 1920. Perhaps most interesting because of their failure to spawn a state amendment or ratify the federal amendment, indeed only ratifying the 19th Amendment in 1984,³ women’s suffragists in Mississippi were nonetheless active.

¹ Belle Kearney, *A Slaveholder’s Daughter*, 11th ed. (Boston: The Abbey Press, 1900) HathiTrust Digital Library, accessed February 27, 2015, 107-108.

² Both of these factors influenced the development of the woman’s suffrage movement in Mississippi and will be discussed in depth later in this paper.

³ Richard Adams, “The 19th amendment that gave the women the right to vote, 90 years on,” *The Guardian Online*, August 18, 2010, accessed April 4, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/richard-adams-blog/2010/aug/18/19th-amendment-women-right-to-vote-90-years>.

In a society entrenched in the traditionalism accompanying slavery, Mississippian women attempted to counteract the social conservatism which limited women to the domestic sphere. These activists were spurred by social and economic changes after the Civil War, though social and economic opportunity was limited to upper class white women. Mississippians were affected by the Civil War differently than other Southerners. Though they would become effective activists, the opportunities brought by the Civil War largely failed to reach the general populace and therefore Mississippi suffragists could not hope for large-scale public support. Belle Kearney, the daughter of a plantation owner, and Nellie Nugent Somerville, the daughter of one of the most respected lawyers in Mississippi, were seminal in the creation of the Mississippi Woman's Suffrage Association (MWSA) in 1897 and headed the movement for women's rights in the state. To its great detriment, the MWSA was almost exclusively led by a few upper-class women including Kearney and Somerville⁴ and lacked significant popular support. While Mississippi suffragists were informally trained for activism through work in voluntary organizations such as the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) and church-affiliated missionary groups, their efforts were dampened by the relatively late advent of voluntary organizations in Mississippi. Once motivated to work for suffrage through the previously noted changes, Mississippians relied on several general ideologies to support their cause. Belle Kearney and Lily Thompson Wilkinson, two future presidents of the MWSA, argued that the enfranchisement of white women could serve to negate the votes of African American; Nellie

⁴ There were few, if any, other prominent activists in the first decade or so of suffrage activism in Mississippi. This is evident in the hierarchy of the MWSA—Somerville was elected as the first president of the organization in 1897 with Kearney as her vice president. Somerville served for two years before she retired of poor health and Kearney took over her position for a few months. After Kearney retired from this position, “the MWSA was dormant until...Kearney's efforts resulted in its revival in late 1906 with Kearney as president and Somerville as vice President.” In 1908, Somerville succeeded Kearney and served as President until 1912. After this, Lily Wilkinson Thompson, who had long been Somerville's correspondence secretary, took over the presidency of the MWSA. Marjorie Julian Spruill, “Nellie Nugent Somerville: Mississippi Reformer, Suffragist, and Politician” in *Mississippi Women: Their Histories, Their Lives*, Elizabeth Anne Payne, Marjorie Julian Spruill and Martha H. Swain, eds. (Athens: University of George Press, 2003), 45.

Nugent Somerville, in stark contrast to Kearney and Thompson did not believe white supremacy to be an effective political strategy, though she certainly still espoused racist ideas. Divisions between MWSA leaders on this question weakened the power of the organization. Perhaps more unifying for Mississippian suffragists was their invocation of religion and the image of the traditional “Southern Woman” in convincing their fellow citizens that women deserved the vote. Despite a strong ideological base, however, the lack of strong leadership in Mississippi suffrage organizations and the dissociation between the educated, wealthy women leading the movement and their fellow Mississippians prevented these arguments from resonating with a society married to notions of “True Womanhood”, female traditionalism and religious propriety.

Mirroring the events in Mississippi, the women’s suffrage movement across the Southern United States did not gain momentum until after the Civil War. Several decades behind Northern states, at the end of the 19th century, activists in Southern states began to create women’s suffrage associations which advocated not only for the right to vote but also for the advancement of “the industrial, educational and legal rights of women.”⁵ Despite this reality, historians studying the advancement of women’s suffrage in the United States initially focused on the complexities of the movement in the Northern states, assuming that women in the American South had little individual agency and simply benefitted from the Northern women’s movement.⁶ Over the last several decades, however, interest in women’s history and women’s suffrage in the United States has uncovered in the American South a unique and clearly distinct movement for suffrage from that which took place in the North.

⁵ *Report of the Organization of the Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association* Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association (Meridian, Mississippi: 1897) University of Mississippi Libraries, accessed March 20, 2015. <http://clio.lib.olemiss.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/suffrage/id/6/rec/19>.

⁶ Elna C. Green *Southern Strategies: Southern Women and the Woman Suffrage Question* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 2.

While the assumption that the Southern movement took advantage of the gains made by the Northern suffragists was temporarily popular among scholars, recent research by southern historians such as Marjorie Spruill Wheeler and Elizabeth Hayes Turner has demonstrated this assumption to be false. The Southern women's suffrage movement had its own leaders, its own causes, and its own characteristics which evolved in a particular context and was shaped by particular circumstances. The suffrage movement in the South differed from that of the North in its association with other social justice movements and its racial ideologies. Southern suffragists were more closely affiliated to temperance than to abolitionism and are often linked to white supremacy, though the latter point has been contested.⁷ Due to major social, experiential, and economic differences, the women's suffrage movement did not truly gain momentum in the South until the first decade of the 20th century. Once the movement gained traction, however, Southern women "set out with grim determination to win their enfranchisement and to do it in the shortest time possible."⁸ The suffragists' determination was more effective in some Southern states than in others.

The enormous disparity between Northern and Southern societies and cultures in Antebellum America led to the development of distinct suffrage movements in either region. Through research on women's lives in the South prior to the Civil War and during Reconstruction, historians came to understand the stark differences between Southern and Northern female experiences. Pivotal among this research is Elizabeth Fox-Genovese's *Within the Plantation Household*⁹ which addresses the unique nature of Southern plantation white

⁷ As will be discussed in depth later, while most historians addressing major southern suffragists note their emphasis on white supremacy as a means of supporting their cause, Elna Green contests this idea. She argues that while major suffragists may have advocated this viewpoint, most women did not embrace this ideology.

⁸ Green, *Southern Strategies*, 26.

⁹ Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, *Within the Plantation Household: Black and White Women of the Old South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).

women and African American slave women's lives before the Civil War. Elizabeth Hayes Turner, a prominent scholar on women and the South, has furthered Fox-Genovese's original research by analyzing the role of gender, class, and race in the post-Civil War South in her work *Women and Gender in the New South: 1865-1945*.¹⁰ Both of these works address the nature of gender and women's lives in the South and were seminal in sparking interest in Southern women's issues and fostering an understanding of what mattered to Southern women.

From this research focusing on the lives of Southern women, came scholarship on the Southern women's suffrage movement. Marjorie Spruill Wheeler,¹¹ Jeanne Perrault,¹² and Evelyn Kirkley¹³ all suggest that Southern suffragists were closely affiliated with racism, in stark contrast with their co-suffragists in the North. The Southern suffrage movement's connection to white supremacist ideology has been described and defended by scholars in the latter decades of the 20th century. In Wheeler's work *New Women of the New South*, she argues that among the relatively wealthy, Southern white women who dominated the women's suffrage scene in the South, "many supported and none challenged the movement to restore white political supremacy that occurred simultaneously with the Southern woman suffrage movement."¹⁴ The aforementioned historians, among others, agree that Southern suffragists perceived there to be a strong link between white supremacy and white women's right to vote. Certainly this is the image communicated by Wheeler's research on suffrage leaders in the New South. However, Elna Green, in her work *Southern Strategies*, challenges this portrayal. Green argues that

¹⁰ Elizabeth Hayes Turner, *Women and Gender in the New South: 1865-1945* (Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 2009).

¹¹ Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, *New Women of the New South: The Leaders of the Woman Suffrage Movement in the Southern States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

¹² Jeanne Perrault "Southern White Women's Autobiographies: Social Equality and Social Change" *The Southern Literary Journal* 41, no. 1 (Fall 2008).

¹³ Evelyn A. Kirkley "'This Work is God's Cause': Religion in the Southern Woman Suffrage Movement, 1880-1920. *Church History* 59, no. 4 (December 1990)

¹⁴ Wheeler, *New Women of the New South*, xv.

“southern white women did not band together and work...to obtain the ballot in order to outvote their black neighbors.”¹⁵ Green’s assertion is particularly relevant to the case of Mississippi. Of the two most important leaders of the MWSA, Kearney supported white supremacist language while Somerville perceived it to be a politically unviable tactic. While the power of the white supremacist narrative itself can be debated, there is little doubt that this ideological division among the MWSA leadership diluted the organization’s power.

Modern research has also demonstrated that affiliations between the women’s suffrage movement and other social movements differed greatly between Northern and Southern states. While in the North the women’s suffrage movement was closely affiliated with abolitionism, this link was understandably disavowed by Southern white women who were often the daughters or wives of ex-plantation owners and had little sympathy for African Americans.¹⁶ Instead the Southern women’s suffrage movement was closely affiliated with missionary groups and temperance organizations such as the WCTU. A variety of the aforementioned authors including Kirkley, Smith, Wheeler, and Green noted this association. Green argues that many women who became leaders in the suffrage movement found “opportunities for personal growth and social enrichment” in the WCTU.¹⁷ While few deny the importance of the WCTU for individual women, the role of the organization in relation to the suffrage movement remains up for debate. Some, Green among them, claim that the WCTU contributed to the women’s suffrage primarily in terms of public experience,¹⁸ while others, such as Kirkely, argue that the religious nature of the WCTU provided an example to suffragists of how to reconcile religious ideology with social

¹⁵ Green, *Southern Strategies*, xii.

¹⁶ In fact, southern suffragists in many cases had to disavow themselves from abolitionism and the Northern movements if they were to maintain influence. “As a movement native to the North, with abolitionist roots, the woman suffrage movement was anathema to most Southerners.” Wheeler, *New Women of the New South*, xiii.

¹⁷ Green, *Southern Suffrage*, 21.

¹⁸ Green asserts that women’s experience in the WCTU “were preparing southern women for leadership roles...years of critical experiences had been preparing them for new roles as activists and reformers, and, later, as suffragists.” Green, *Southern Suffrage*, 15.

progressivism.¹⁹ The temperance movement in the South held an undeniably important role for Southern women and the women's suffrage movement.

As the history of Southern women's suffrage has become more fully developed, scholars turned to the histories of particular Southern states. Taken as a geographic whole, the suffrage movements in various Southern states certainly had similarities. Yet much as an analysis of the Northern women's suffrage movement cannot be directly translated to the Southern suffrage movement, each Southern state's movement—its players, problems, and ideologies—must be understood individually as unique to its place and time. Significant research has been done on women's suffrage in North Carolina,²⁰ Virginia,²¹ and Louisiana,²² all of which were powerful locales of American Southern society during and after the Civil War. Perhaps the most notable scholar on states' histories of women's suffrage is Alexandra Elizabeth Taylor, who has written on the women's suffrage movements in Tennessee, South Carolina, and Texas.²³ Scholarship has largely focused on states wherein suffragists were relatively successful in garnering support for their cause; as such, many states whose movements failed to cause change have not yet been examined.

Paradigmatic amongst these cases is Mississippi: the Mississippi women's suffrage movement remains relatively unexplored, perhaps due to its ultimate failure. Due to the social

¹⁹ In these groups, Kirkely argues, the women's "'intense soul searching which had characterized southern religion before the war' was 'transformed into a demand for social reform' and inspired 'a sort of unself-conscious radicalism...'" Kirkley, "This Work is God's Cause", 518.

²⁰ A. Elizabeth Taylor, "The Woman Suffrage Movement in North Carolina" *The North Carolina Historical Review* 38, no. 2 (April 1961).

²¹ Sara Hunter Graham, "Woman Suffrage in Virginia: The Equal Suffrage League and Pressure Group Politics, 1909-1920", *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 101, no. 2 (April 1993): 227-250.

²² Armantine M. Smith, "The History of the Women's suffrage Movement in Louisiana" *Louisiana Law Review* 62, no. 2 (Winter 2002).

²³ A. Elizabeth Taylor, *The woman suffrage movement in Tennessee* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957). It should be noted, however, that this particular work by Taylor is quite dated. The movement in Tennessee has more recently been examined by Anastasia Sims. Sims, "'Powers that Pray' and 'Powers that Prey': Tennessee and the Fight for Woman Suffrage" *Tennessee Historical Quarterly* 50, no. 4 (Winter 1991).

A. Elizabeth Taylor, *Citizens at last: the women suffrage movement in Texas* (Austin: Ellen C. Temple, 1987).

changes caused by the Civil War, a limited number of Mississippi women were exposed to higher education which instilled in many women progressive values and often led them to the MWSA. Such women were the exception in Mississippi, not the rule. Yet those women who did become suffragists did so in large part because of experience gained through voluntary organizations such as the WCTU and religious, usually Methodist, missionary groups. However, these organizations came to Mississippi significantly later than in other Southern States, lessening their ability to garner significant public support for women's suffrage. In attempting to create sympathy for their movement, Mississippi women's suffragists relied on religious and chivalrous notions of women's proper role in society. Moreover, while it divided the leaders of the MWSA and may in fact have been spurred by white males in the state, many Mississippi suffrage advocates based their ideology on racial arguments, suggesting that granting the vote to white women would negate the influence of African American men in politics.

Until the passage of the 19th amendment in 1920 by the U.S. federal government, Kearney, Somerville, and other activists worked to advance the condition of women in Mississippi and grant them the right to vote. Due to the diluted power of Mississippian women's education and experience in comparison to that of other Southern women, deeply entrenched Southern ideologies, and the inability of Mississippi leaders to garner significant support for their movement, Mississippians never succeeded in passing their own suffrage amendment. In fact, the Mississippi House of Representatives expressly rejected ratification in 1920. While neither a state amendment nor the 19th Amendment was ever passed during the 20th century in Mississippi, it was not for lack of effort on the part of activists.

From Civil War to Social Activism

In contrast to Northern states which had previously struggled with the forces of industrialization and modernization, Antebellum Mississippi retained the marks of a quasi-capitalist economic system which presupposed inequality for significantly longer.²⁴ As the plantation home was the center of the traditionalist Mississippian economy before the Civil War, the household served as the primary space for both public and private activity. Fox-Genovese, in her analysis of Southern women, notes: “The persistence in the South of the household as the dominant unit of production and reproduction guaranteed the power of men in society.”²⁵ Moreover the fact that the Antebellum South, in clear contrast with the industrialized North, remained overwhelmingly rural “excluded women from many of the opportunities that were opening up for their Northern sisters, notably to live and work independently by their own labor, to develop female networks beyond the household, and to form associations of various kinds.”²⁶ As almost 92 percent of Mississippi’s population lived in rural areas and Mississippi remained an overwhelmingly agricultural society, these social divisions were particularly strong.²⁷ Women’s geographic and social isolation, along with their active participation in a society in which they dominated African Americans, meant that while white women were certainly not in control of Southern society, they lacked many of the connections and impetuses which drove Northern women to change their position in society.²⁸ The very nature of Southern society and its relevant

²⁴ Despite this typical traditionalism, Harris argues that many Mississippi entrepreneurs had long desired the development of non-agricultural opportunities, the “economic success of slavery and cotton had dampened organized enthusiasm for” the fulfillment of these ideas. It must be understood that this are broad generalities for Mississippi society and were not true for every case. Harris, *The Day of the Carpetbaggers*, 515.

²⁵ Fox-Genovese furthers this distinction in the formation of feminist movements, saying: “In the South, in contrast to the North, the household retained a vigor that permitted Southerners to ascribe many matters—notably labor relations, but also important aspects of gender relations—to the private sphere, whereas northerners would increasingly ascribe them to the public spheres of market and state.” Fox-Genovese, *Within the Plantation Household*, 38.

²⁶ Fox-Genovese, *Within the Plantation Household*, 70.

²⁷ Westley F. Busebee, Jr., *Mississippi: A History* (Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 2005), 185.

²⁸ Fox-Genovese notes that the frustration inflicted upon Southern women “did not tempt them into feminism” and that Southern women “complained about their lives, but their complaints rarely amounted to opposition to the

institutions worked to subjugate women and thus delayed even the formation of women's advocacy groups, much less the fostering of suffragist spirit.

The turmoil of the Civil War spurred important social change in the American South. The loss of nearly one quarter of the white male labor force²⁹ and the sudden emancipation of nearly more than 3 million previously enslaved African American men and women catapulted white Southern society out of the traditional slave-holding system and into a more industrialized, modern nation as ordained by Northern states. In Mississippi, as in most other Southern states, this modernization altered not only the economy but also traditional social systems and conventions. Adding to the desolation wrought by the war, the abolishment of slavery destroyed an economic institution which had long served as source of social cohesion and identity for white Southerners. While these changes affected all Southern states, Mississippi "in which blacks constituted a majority of the population" and which was under military control from 1867 to 1876, was particularly destabilized.³⁰ The changes produced by the Civil War at times permitted and at times forced women to undertake new endeavors and offered a much looser social system in which these women could form new identities as activists.

The Civil War blurred the long-standing line between Northern and Southern women. After the war, modernization and industrialization flooded into the South; in Mississippi this meant the creation of a railroad system and sawmills.³¹ These changes forced Mississippi society to cope with not only with drastic economic changes, but also to manage the human and

system that guaranteed their privileged position as ladies." This added to the sense of isolation which Southern women experienced. Fox-Genovese, *Within the Plantation Household*, 30.

²⁹ Green, *Southern Suffrage*, 203.

³⁰ William C. Harris, *The Day of the Carpetbagger: Republican Reconstruction in Mississippi*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), xii.

³¹ Harris, *The Day of the Carpetbaggers*, 516-517.

environmental tolls the war had wrought. Despite these negative repercussions,³² however, the Civil War was ultimately beneficial for the women's suffrage movement in Mississippi. Indeed, Kearney notes that the sudden changes caused by the Civil War in terms of the dearth of white men meant that "the daughters were sent to college...until, after fifteen years [after the Civil War] the superiority of culture of the young woman over the average young man was very noticeable...the tide had set toward the advancement of women in the educational and industrial field."³³ Due to the depopulation and turmoil left in the Mississippi in the wake of the Civil War, it is unsurprising that gendered expectations changed to fit the new society.

Many women who would become suffragists viewed the destruction of the Civil War as all the more reason to claim the right to vote. In Somerville's pamphlet discussing why Mississippi women sought the right to vote, she argued that during the Civil War:

Southern women saw homes burned, estates pass to strangers, fathers and husbands dead...and many a Southern grand-dame learned the true meaning of politics at the cook stove...Was not the war caused by politics? Was not the horror of reconstruction a game of politics? So Southern women pondered as they were forced to take the places of their own slaves.³⁴

In post-Civil War Mississippi the economic and social gap left by white men was filled by white women, particularly members of the middle and upper classes. Drastic social change left many women under less stringent supervision than they had been in the past and endowed them with both freedom and opportunity they had not possessed before the strict Antebellum social system collapsed. From this opportunity sprung a variety of voluntary organizations led by women—most

³² Middle and upper class white Southerners were particularly hard-hit by the Civil War not only in economic terms, but also in terms of personal and collective identity. In her autobiography, Kearney describes the time when the U. S. Federal Government ordered her state to be given over to the Union armies. "It was done, and Mississippi stood dismantled and dishonored. Every vestige of civil rule was thrust from sight." Kearney, *A Slaveholder's Daughter*, 11.

³³ Kearney, *A Slaveholder's Daughter*, 113.

³⁴ Nellie Nugent Somerville, "How Mississippi Women Work for the Vote", Lily Thompson Collection, University of Mississippi, accessed April 21, 2015. <http://clio.lib.olemiss.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/suffrage/id/117/rec/10>.

notably missionary organizations and the WCTU, both of which provided important experience for Mississippi women. Despite their best intentions, however, women's suffragists in Mississippi couldn't overcome the destruction of the Civil War in order to garner support for their cause.

Voluntary organizations as Training Grounds

Voluntary organizations had established themselves in most Southern states by the 1880s,³⁵ yet it was only by the turn of the 19th century that voluntary associations became active in Mississippi. These organizations, once entrenched in Mississippi society, gave women organizational experience, provided them with opportunities to increase their courage and sense of self-confidence, and offered the opportunity to travel and connect with other like-minded women. In 1897, Ella Harrison, spokeswoman for the National American Woman Suffrage Association, could still write of Mississippi: "...the truth is they are not ready for [suffrage organizations]—in many places they have no literacy clubs, never have had."³⁶ Harrison's statement reinforces the idea that at this time Mississippi had no tradition of women's voluntary associations as there had been in many other Southern states. Due to the influence of these organizations in other suffrage movements, the lack of voluntary organizations can be seen to as a significant detriment to the creation of suffrage associations in Mississippi. Significantly, as interest in voluntary associations increased through the beginning of the 20th century in Mississippi, so did interest in women's suffrage. Evidencing the importance of these organizations in creating suffragists, Nellie Somerville, the first president of the MWSA, was heavily involved in religious missionary work with the Southern Methodist church; Belle Kearney was a long-time orator for the WCTU. Both cited these voluntary associations as

³⁵ Mary Smith, "Constructing Womanhood in Public: Progressive white women in a New South", *Ph.D. Dissertation*, Louisiana State University, 2002, 1.

³⁶ Harrison quoted in *Green Southern Suffrage*: 23.

significant in stoking their interest in women's suffrage. Years later, the MWSA would emphasize the same notions of voluntarism and service as had been emphasized in these organizations, reinforcing their association: "The keyword of the Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association is Service."³⁷

Although Kearney suffered a period of doubt in her early adulthood,³⁸ both she and Somerville were dedicated Methodists by their adulthood. However, Somerville was always more active in religious missionary work. In fact, "Somerville's social activism began through her work in the Methodist Episcopal Church, South" in which she "served as the district secretary for Women's Foreign Mission work, as a member of the Board of Missions, and as the first president of the North Mississippi Conference Parsonage and Home Mission Society."³⁹ Having had close contact with influential Methodist church leaders throughout her childhood, Kearney also worked with the church as an activist.⁴⁰ The influence of these voluntary organizations upon the future leaders of the women's suffrage movement is clear, yet most Mississippi women were less involved in these voluntary organizations than Kearney and Somerville were and thus might not have been as strongly influenced.

For many women in Mississippi, the church was not only the locus of voluntary organizations, but was also one of the first places where they noticed and became dissatisfied with gendered hierarchies. Somerville noted her bitterness related to women's missionary work, writing in a church magazine: "What long-suffering creatures women are...they consent to hold office in a sort of *sub-rosa* way, doing all the hard work; but as soon as some immature stripling

³⁷ Nellie Nugent Somerville, "How Mississippi Women Work for the Vote", Lily Thompson Collection, University of Mississippi, accessed April 21, 2015.

<http://clio.lib.olemiss.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/suffrage/id/117/rec/10>.

³⁸ She details her loss of faith and religious awakening fully in her autobiography. What is important is that, regardless of this period of doubt, Kearney was a dedicated Methodist by the time she reached adulthood and understood her activism and suffragism through this lens. Kearney, *A Slaveholder's Daughter*, 128.

³⁹ Spruill, "Nellie Nugent Somerville" in *Mississippi Women*, Swain, Payne, and Spruill, eds., 42.

⁴⁰ Kearney, *A Slaveholder's Daughter*, 115.

or reformed drunkard joins the Church he gets the office, while women keep on doing the work.”⁴¹ Having expanded their spheres of influence into the next accessible locale, educated and motivated Mississippi women expressed discontent with the church before their conception of justice shifted to include the right to vote. Kearney wrote: “Young Southern women are beginning to ask for deaconesses’ orders and...are...filling almost every office known to the church except that of pastor.”⁴² Women’s frustration with their churches, however, led some to adapt their religious views in order to make room for their new, more activist identities while other women simply acquiesced to what they believed to be the proper, religiously-ordained gender relations and church hierarchy. While religious organizations provided some opportunity for women to partake in activism and empowerment, this was not true for all Mississippian women. Depending on a woman’s reaction to the challenging of deeply entrenched religious and social traditions—epitomized by the church hierarchy—church activism could drive a wedge between would-be activists.

The temperance movement provided further impetus for some Mississippi women to seek independence. Due perhaps to the turmoil of post-Civil War Reconstruction, alcohol consumption was particularly rampant in Mississippi. In fact, State Attorney General Morris “estimated that in 1871 alone 600,000 gallons of liquor...were sold in the state through licensed establishments.”⁴³ The negative effects of such copious liquor consumption led many women to join the already popular temperance movement. Kearney, while involved with missionary work in general, was more closely associated with temperance, in particular with the WCTU, as were many other Mississippi women. “The [WCTU] was the golden key that unlocked the prison

⁴¹ Interview with Lucy Somerville Howorth in Spruill, “Nellie Nugent Somerville” in *Mississippi Women*, Swain, Payne, and Spruill, eds., 43.

⁴² Kearney, *A Slaveholder’s Daughter*, 115-116.

⁴³ Harris, *The Day of the Carpetbaggers*, 580.

doors of pent-up possibilities. It was the generous liberator, the joyous iconoclast, the discoverer, the developer of Southern women. It, above all other forces, made it possible for women to occupy the advanced and continually advancing position they now hold...⁴⁴ In noting the position of women, Kearny was not arguing that women's political equality had been achieved, but rather that the WCTU had provided the opportunity to reach new highs as lecturers and social and political organizers which had never before been feasible.⁴⁵ In 1874, before Kearney and Somerville were involved with the WCTU, the governor of Mississippi stated that "'one of the finest features of the [temperance] law is its recognition of the voice of the women of the state.'⁴⁶ While women had long been involved in the movement for temperance in Mississippi, involvement with the WCTU in particular gave Mississippi women valuable experience and social credibility which they used to their advantage in the fight for suffrage.

Both Kearney and Somerville were brought to the WCTU by its president, Frances Willard, on her tour through Mississippi in 1889.⁴⁷ Less involved that Kearney, Somerville would nonetheless become president of the Greenville chapter of the WCTU in 1894 and corresponding secretary for the state chapter in 1896.⁴⁸ Upon hearing Willard speak in Jackson in 1889, Kearney stated that "a vision arose before me of the glad day when... women of all lands shall have entered into the human heritage—as man's equal in society, church, and state."⁴⁹ Soon after this initial meeting, Kearney became the state superintendent and organizer for two youth

⁴⁴ Kearney, *A Slaveholder's Daughter*, 118.

⁴⁵ "Southern women have developed marvelously as lecturers and organizers in philanthropic movements. Nearly every state in the South can boast of women orators who have addressed hundreds of enthusiastic audiences and unflinchingly pushed their way through overwhelming difficulties to positions of influence and power" within these organizations. Kearney, *A Slaveholder's Daughter*, 117-118.

⁴⁶ Governor Ames in Harris, *The Day of the Carpetbaggers*, 581.

⁴⁷ In an interview, Somerville's daughter Lucy Somerville Howorth stated that "...although there were many factors that converted her mother to woman suffrage, Willard convinced [her] that 'the women couldn't get anything done until they had the right to vote' and 'that is really what pinned my mother's mind to that point.'" Spruill, "Nellie Nugent Somerville" in *Mississippi Women*, Swain, Payne, and Spruill, eds., 43-44.

⁴⁸ Spruill, "Nellie Nugent Somerville" in *Mississippi Women*, Swain, Payne, and Spruill, eds., 44.

⁴⁹ Kearney, *A Slaveholder's Daughter*, 136.

divisions of the WCTU and, within her first year there organized more than 100 unions around the state. Through her work with the WCTU, Kearney traveled across the South, around the United States and even to Europe.⁵⁰ For both Kearney and Somerville, and many others besides, the WCTU provided not only a valuable locale in which to learn how to mobilize the public, but also created a valuable social and political network of women who would be invaluable for the suffrage movement.

The WCTU was particularly important as it provided suffragists credibility in their societies. By portraying the temperance movement as pertinent to traditional woman's spheres despite being largely political, activists were not seen as radical, but rather maintained the image of the "Southern Lady" innate to Southern white womanhood. By being politically active in a movement which could easily be framed as important for women's traditional household sphere, the WCTU gave these activists political credibility as well as personal training. In establishing their political place with the WCTU, "...leaders attempted to confirm that while they appeared to be stepping outside their traditional gender roles, they were still upholding their regional and racial responsibilities as southern white women by affirming their southern identity within the national women's temperance movement."⁵¹ Mississippi suffragists would similarly utilize the image of the "Southern Lady" in their fight for women's suffrage, proving their regional loyalty by petitioning for a state amendment rather than a federal one. The WCTU not only "provided many southern white women with their first lessons in political organization and reform...its leadership stressed the nineteenth century ideology of woman's domesticity and superior moral

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 166.

⁵¹ Smith, "Constructing Womanhood in Public", 5.

virtue”⁵² and thus helped suffragists understand how the traditionalism of their society could be manipulated for progressive goals.

However Mississippi lagged behind even other Southern states in public participation in voluntary associations. Along with North Carolina, Mississippi was the last Southern state to establish a chapter of the WCTU, only officially forming a chapter in 1883.⁵³ Through its vocal support of their cause, WCTU was an invaluable tool for women attempting to spur suffrage sentiment.⁵⁴ Once established, voluntary organizations such as the WCTU gave many women their first taste of political activism and are thus “given...much credit for producing experienced platform speakers and for creating a network of women that suffragists would use to their advantage later on.”⁵⁵ In places where such missionary organizations were not as highly prized among the general population, therefore, suffragist sentiment was hard to spur.⁵⁶ While such organizations were established in the state by the turn of the century, Mississippi women’s inability to create a network of organized political and social groups for so long certainly contributed to their inability to garner support for suffrage in the state.

The Privilege of Education

The discord between MWSA leaders and their admittedly small constituency and membership further harmed the women’s suffrage movement in Mississippi. As previously noted, Kearney and Somerville were the only influential suffragists in Mississippi until the

⁵² Smith, “Constructing Womanhood in Public”, 40.

⁵³ Green, *Southern Suffrage*, 20.

⁵⁴ In a report on the work of the WCTU by its then-president Lillian Stevens in 1908, she wrote that the WCTU “strives to redeem outcast women from a slavery worse than that of chains, and by better laws to secure the protection of women and girls from the outrages of brutal and designing men.” Lillian M. N. Stevens, “The Work of the National Woman’s Christian Temperance Union” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 32 (November 1908), 40.

⁵⁵ Green, *Southern Suffrage*, 21.

⁵⁶ As missionary groups “provided a school for women leaders of considerable significance in the shaping of Southern society”, in places where they were not present, communities lack the leadership necessary to begin and maintain suffrage movements and organizations. Kirkley, “This Work is God’s Cause”, 518.

1910s. Indeed, Kearney and Somerville were the only individuals to serve as president or vice president of the MWSA from its establishment in 1897 until Lily Wilkinson Thompson took over from Somerville in 1913. In addition to its lack of more than two qualified leaders, public participation in the MWSA was sparse. The initial report of the creation of the MWSA listed only 31 official members from the state⁵⁷—so what prevented this movement from attracting members of the Mississippi public? Green notes that while there were certainly some passionate, educated women who advocated for the right to vote in the late 1890s in Mississippi, they lacked support from “a critical mass of middle-class women ready to fill the ranks of the movement.”⁵⁸ Five years after the establishment of the MWSA, the lack of public support for the suffrage movement was a concern for both state and national activists. In their analysis of woman’s suffrage, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony noted that at a 1903 conference on women’s suffrage in Jackson, only Hala Hammond Butt—an eventual leader of the MWSA—and three other women were present.⁵⁹ The advocacy of women’s suffrage by a population of non-elite women which spurred the movement in other Southern and Northern states was largely absent in Mississippi.

In terms of education, which often imbued young women with pro-suffrage sentiment, the leadership of the MWSA was further divided from its constituents. The “privileged socioeconomic positions” of the MWSA’s leadership “enabled them to have educational

⁵⁷ Nine of these 31 members were, in fact, men. Certainly this does not negate their support, but it is interesting to note such a high percentage of men in the organization. Of the rest of the listed members, a few would go on to play roles in the MWSA including Fannie Clark and Lilly Wilkinson Thompson, but none have been written about or documented extensively, if at all. Both Clark and Thompson would go on to become presidents or vice presidents of the MWSA, but only after 1912 when both Somerville and Kearney had retired from active engagement in the organization. *Report of the Organization of the Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association*. Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association. Meridian, Miss., 5 May 1897. University of Mississippi Libraries, accessed March 25, 2015. <http://clio.lib.olemiss.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/suffrage/id/6/rec/19>

⁵⁸ Green, *Southern Strategies*, 12.

⁵⁹ Susan B. Anthony, Matilda Joslyn Gage, Ida Harper, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton *The History of Woman Suffrage: 1900-1920* (New York: Fowler and Wells, 1922), 326.

opportunities... that contributed to the undermining of provincial attitudes concerning woman's role."⁶⁰ While the leadership of the MWSA received education and prized it highly—indeed, in her autobiography Kearney wrote at length about her desire to further her education—most Mississippi women “seem[ed] to think that the little educated they rec'd in school [was] sufficient.”⁶¹ Harrison, the lecturer for the NWSA, cynically wrote: “I tell you...education has much to do to redeem this south-land.”⁶² The fact that both Kearney and Somerville were highly educated relative to their fellow Mississippian women put them at odds with many of the would-be supporters of the movement. Somerville came from a highly respected and well-educated family in Mississippi and was sent to Whitworth College, a Methodist school for women, when she was 12. She then attended Martha Washington College “from which she graduated as valedictorian in 1880.”⁶³ Somerville's father, one of the most highly respected lawyers in Mississippi,⁶⁴ even invited her to read law in his office.⁶⁵ Similarly, Kearney was sent to a woman's institution for several years before her father sacrificed her education in favor of her brothers' for monetary reasons. Both women read voraciously⁶⁶ and Somerville, being the wealthier of the two, amassed a significant personal library by the time of her death.⁶⁷

These experiences, however, were the exception, not the rule. “Never more than 52% of the school-age population [of both genders] attended the public schools” established by the

⁶⁰ Wheeler, *New Women of the New South*, 39.

⁶¹ Harrison in Green, *Southern Strategies*, 12

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Both of Somerville's grandmothers had studied at women's academies, rather unusual for wealthy Southern families. Spruill, “Nellie Nugent Somerville” in *Mississippi Women*, Swain, Payne, and Spruill, eds., 41.

⁶⁴ In fact, William L. Nugent, Somerville's father, argued a case before the Supreme Court in 1873 advocating for the right of property owners to enforce segregation. While his educational experience was passed on to his daughter, to her great benefit, Nugent's racial opinions were largely and unfortunately passed on as well. Harris, *The Day of the Carpetbaggers*, 448.

⁶⁵ Spruill, *New Women of the New South*, 61.

⁶⁶ Kearney says that, after many of the plantation families had moved out of her area: “I read, read, read—English and American poets, standard fictions, travels, histories, biographies, and philosophies.” Kearney, *A Slaveholder's Daughter*, 33.

⁶⁷ Spruill, “Nellie Nugent Somerville” in *Mississippi Women*, Swain, Payne, and Spruill, eds., 41.

Mississippi government during the 1870s.⁶⁸ Of those few women who were not wealthy enough to be sent to a private institution, but were lucky enough to have received a public education, fewer still were able to receive higher education. In 1888 only 8,000 women in the *entire South* were enrolled in some form of higher education. Even that number should be qualified: as of 1903, only two of the 140 so-called colleges for women in the South offered four year programs—all of which were well below the standards of those for Northern women.⁶⁹ Due to the lack of education among most Mississippi women, the leaders of the MWSA were largely alienated from the very people to whom they were trying to appeal.

Suffrage activists recognized the importance of an education in bringing women to their cause. An article in *The Biloxi Herald* supporting women's suffrage stated that: "The larger intellectual powers of women and the greater financial independence of women have tended to elevate the home."⁷⁰ Mississippi suffragists continually emphasized the value of education not only for the advancement of woman's status in general, but for its value in the creation of future suffragists. Upon its inception, the MWSA created a department specifically for the advancement of Educational Opportunities for women.⁷¹ Furthermore, in its constitution the MWSA described as their object "to advance the industrial, education, and legal rights of woman."⁷² Yet at the turn of the 20th century, a formal education remained a luxury for most in Mississippi. Therefore through the beginning of the 20th century, education, which commonly inspired both Northern and Southern women's activism was not a viable source of support for Mississippi suffragists.

⁶⁸ Harris, *The Day of the Carpetbagger*, 330.

⁶⁹ Green, *Southern Strategies*, 16-17.

⁷⁰ Reverend Anna H. Shaw, "Strong Please for Equal Suffrage: Champions of the Cause of Both Sexes Give Their Views", *The Biloxi Daily Herald*, June 29, 1900.

⁷¹ *Constitution and By-laws of the Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association*. Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association. Clarksdale, Miss.: The Challenge Print, 1898. University of Mississippi Libraries Digital Collections: Lily Thompson Collection, accessed February 28, 2015.

<http://clio.lib.olemiss.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/suffrage/id/148/rec/7>

⁷² *Report of the Organization of the Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association*. Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association. 1897.

While neither voluntary organizations nor educations were as productive for suffragism in Mississippi as they were in other places, “based on the numbers of women involved, voluntary associations appear to have had more impact on the consciousness of southern women than did higher education...”⁷³ Regardless, neither were able to create large-scale pro-suffrage sentiment in Mississippi.

The Ideologies of Suffragists and the MWSA

The 1890 Mississippi Constitutional Convention “seriously considered giving the vote to women”⁷⁴ in an effort to remove the power of African American voters, as they assumed Southern white women would vote the same way as their male counterparts; however, the proposal lost by a single vote in committee.⁷⁵ Despite important post-Civil War advancements in Mississippi women’s lives, the women’s suffrage movement did not garner any significant support until the end of the 19th century. When Harrison, spokeswoman for the NAWSA, undertook a tour of Mississippi in the state in 1897, she purportedly found little support for the women’s suffrage movement. Indeed, at a speaking engagement in Grenada, MS, Harrison had almost no audience. She later wrote that her landlady attributed the dearth of listeners to the fact that, “as for suffrage...she did not believe that women knew a thing about it or would even listen to a speaker—there was absolutely no sentiment here in favor of it.”⁷⁶ Yet while support for suffrage arrived later than in other places, the movement for women’s suffrage *did* in fact

⁷³ Green, *Southern Strategies*, 19.

⁷⁴ Marjorie Julian Spruill and Jesse Spruill Wheeler, “Mississippi Women and the Woman Suffrage Amendment” on Mississippi History Now, published by the Mississippi Historical Society, Dec. 2001, accessed March 31, 2015. <http://mshistory.k12.ms.us/articles/245/mississippi-women-and-the-woman-suffrage-amendment>

⁷⁵ Considering the significant power of “carpetbaggers” and Radical Republicans in the first, later overridden, Constitutional Convention in Mississippi in 1868, many Mississippians reacted with extreme conservatism when they eventually re-convened to establish a new Constitution in 1890. This may have influenced the lack of receptivity most delegates demonstrated in 1890 when it came to women’s suffrage. Harris, *The Day of the Carpetbaggers*, 160.

⁷⁶ Ella Harrison quoted in Green, *Southern Strategies*, 9.

arrive in Mississippi accompanied by particular forms of advocacy unique both to the South and to the state itself.

In stark contrast to the women's suffrage movement's association with abolitionism in the North, the Southern women's suffrage movement was passive at best when it came to the inclusion of newly freed African Americans. Many Mississippi suffragists advocated what they believed to be the most politically viable strategy: women's suffrage as a means of maintaining the political supremacy of Southern whites. At least for the some time, this tactic was not central to the formation of the MWSA: race was not mentioned at all in the minutes of the first five MWSA annual reports.⁷⁷ In the 1910's, after Somerville left the organization, race became a central tenant of Mississippian suffrage rhetoric. True to the Southern trend, several influential Mississippi suffragists vocally associated women's suffrage with white supremacy. Somerville's contestation of this particular point, however, meant that the leadership of the MWSA for the first decade of its existence was divided. Despite Somerville's political opinions, however, many Mississippians saw that Southern legislatures, including their own, considered the possibility of granting the vote to white women a feasible solution to "dilute the voting power of black men."⁷⁸ Due to this reality, many suffragists chose to support their cause with what they saw as this politically viable ideology.

In an analysis of the biographies of Southern white women, Perrault states "perhaps because of her generation, [Kearney] embraced the story of white supremacy with no

⁷⁷ In the minutes for the Fifth Annual Convention of the MWSA held in 1909, the authors wrote that the MWSA "insists that [the Declaration of Independence's] principles be applied to women who are citizens of the United States". While this did not overtly include African American women, neither did it overtly exclude them as African American women would have been considered "citizens" by this time. *Fifth Annual Report of the Mississippi Woman Association 1909* Lily Thompson Wilkinson Collection, University of Mississippi Libraries, 10. Accessed April 22, 2015. <http://clio.lib.olemiss.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/suffrage/id/63/rec/8>,

⁷⁸ Green, *Southern Strategies*, 10.

hesitation.”⁷⁹ Green, while denying that most non-elite women supported the idea of white supremacy as Perrault, Wheeler, and Kirkely have claimed, poses Kearney to be paradigmatic of the racism of Southern suffrage leaders, saying “outspoken women like Belle Kearney...were the exceptions” among the general public, but the rule among Southern suffragist leaders. Green argues that Kearney tried to “create a suffrage organization explicitly advocating the ballot ‘as a solution to the race problem’...”⁸⁰ While this was not true of all Mississippi suffragists, Kearney’s racism may indeed have influenced her political ideology. Certainly, Kearney asserted in several speeches that women’s suffrage was a potential “solution” to the race “problem”. At a 1903 convention of the NAWSA in New Orleans, Kearney gave a speech in which she said that “the white South would...be forced to look Anglo-Saxon women as ‘the medium through which to retain the supremacy of the white race over the African’”⁸¹ Kearney even asserted that the idea of using white women to negate the African American vote should be self-evident: “The South is slow to grasp the fact that enfranchisement of women would settle the race question in politics.”⁸² Similarly, the 1912 President of the MWSA Lily Wilkinson Thompson, espoused white supremacy as one of the desirable results of women’s suffrage in the state. In her 1913 Presidential address, Thompson continually spoke of “white women” specifically,⁸³ language which had never been utilized before in the MWSA’s annual conventions. Both of these

⁷⁹ Jeanne Perreault, “Southern White Women’s Autobiographies: Social Equality and Social Change” *The Southern Literary Journal* 41, no. 1 (Fall 2008), 49.

⁸⁰ Green, *Southern Suffrage*, 11.

⁸¹ Kearney in Smith, “Constructing Womanhood in Public”, 101-102.

⁸² Joanne Varner Hawks, “Belle Kearney: Mississippi Gentlewoman and Slaveholder’s Daughter” in *Mississippi Women*, Swain, Payne, and Spruill, eds., 65.

⁸³ *Minutes of the Ninth Annual Convention: Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association*, Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association, 1913. University of Mississippi Libraries, accessed April 22, 2015. <http://clio.lib.olemiss.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/suffrage/id/109/rec/12>.

important suffragists saw the narrative of white supremacy as a viable support for their cause politically, even if their personal stances on race may have differed.⁸⁴

Somerville, however, was not as committed to using race as a political tactic. An astute politician, Somerville argued that in Mississippi, “where African Americans had been virtually removed from the electorate since 1890, white rule was not in jeopardy.”⁸⁵ Somerville’s opinion was not inspired by “any feeling of what is now called ‘civil rights’” but rather because Somerville “didn’t think it was a good, sound argument,”⁸⁶ according to her daughter.⁸⁷ Throughout the period she was active in the MWSA, no overt mention of race appears in the organizations’ minutes. Furthermore, through inclusive language Somerville nods to the African American population in her state. Lack of exclusion, certainly, does not presume inclusion, but Somerville’s refusal to use racial language in her speeches for the MWSA put her at odds with Kearney and other suffragists.

Kearney’s preference for racism as a means of supporting women’s suffrage added to the tensions already present between the two women⁸⁸ and further divided the leadership of the MWSA. This division is apparent when looking at the advent of racialized language in the

⁸⁴ Kearney notes that she first heard the idea of women’s suffrage as a means of supporting white supremacy from Henry Blackwell, a man from Massachusetts who edited *Woman’s Journal*. While no model of racial equality, Kearney appears to be relatively progressive in her autobiography, even asserting at one point that she believes there to be no such thing as in-born racism, but instead that all notions of superiority are learned through society. Kearney, *A Slaveholder’s Daughter*, 100.

⁸⁵ Spruill, “Nellie Nugent Somerville” in *Mississippi Women*, Swain, Payne, and Spruill, eds., 49.

⁸⁶ Interview with Howorth in Spruill, “Nellie Nugent Somerville” in *Mississippi Women*, Swain, Payne, and Spruill, eds., 49.

⁸⁷ Due to the demographics of Mississippi, the voting power of African Americans in the state had long been in question. As early as 1868 in the first constitutional convention in the state, many delegates expressed concern that under a system which permitted unrestricted suffrage to African Americans, these freedmen who “constituted a clear majority of the voting population of Mississippi, would dominate the legislature...” Harris, *The Day of the Carpetbaggers*, 127.

⁸⁸ The relationship between these two women were historically tense. Coming from a family of modest means, Kearney supported herself primarily from her speaking tours with the WCTU. However, this meant that she was in the state significantly less than Somerville or other less important suffragists who were not forced to make their own wages. Somerville once “complained that Kearney would come home long enough to stir things up and then would be gone again.” As most of the other Mississippi suffragists were affluent women, they “may not have sufficiently taken into account her more precarious financial situation and need to support herself through her work.” Hawks, “Belle Kearney” in *Mississippi Women*, Swain, Payne, and Spruill, eds., 65.

minutes of the MWSA. As previously noted, the first five annual conventions made no overt mention of race. As late as 1912, in her address to the Eighth Annual convention of the MWSA, Somerville made no mention of race at all. However, once Somerville had effectively left the MWSA due to poor health and Lily Thompson Wilkinson had taken the presidency, racialized language was inserted into the ideology of the association. In the report of the 1913 convention, Thompson argued that the suffragists could make “woman suffrage...one more bulwark of the maintenance of white supremacy in the state.”⁸⁹ After Somerville left the active leadership of the MWSA, therefore, race began to be used in earnest as a means of supporting the suffrage movement.

What Kearney and Somerville did agree upon as leaders of the MWSA, however, was the use of religion and the image of the gentlewoman to further their cause. As many women were brought to the movement through the inequalities they saw at church and in missionary organizations, religion was a natural point of association between Mississippi suffragists. In fact, the MWSA even built into their institution a department for Bible Study in order to “set forth the true position of woman”⁹⁰ and set a verse from the Bible as the motto for their organization: “If ye abide by my work, ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free.”⁹¹ Every meeting of the MWSA opened with a prayer.

In an analysis of religious arguments made by both Southern suffragists and anti-suffragists, Kirkley argues that Southern suffragists used the Bible to legitimize their efforts. Suffragists, as described by Kirkley, argued that God created all of humanity equally and,

⁸⁹ *Minutes of the Ninth Annual Convention: Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association*, Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association, 1913. University of Mississippi Libraries, accessed April 22, 2015. <http://clio.lib.olemiss.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/suffrage/id/109/rec/12>.

⁹⁰ *Constitution and By-laws of the Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association*, Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association, 6.

⁹¹ *Report of the Organization of the Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association* Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association, 7.

therefore, that female subordination was a negative human invention not ordained by God which should be rectified.⁹² The relationship between missionary groups, the WCTU, and the suffrage movement further emphasizes the religious undertones of the Mississippi suffrage movement. Both Kearney and Somerville were emphatic Methodists and the both they and the MWSA as a whole used religion as a source of legitimacy. Over and over again, “suffragists used religion in their meetings, speeches, and articles. The Mississippi convention of 1906 invited a Methodist minister to open its meeting with a prayer.”⁹³ Indeed, Kearney began “a suffrage group with a Methodist minister as president.”⁹⁴ While in some ways, this tactic lent the MWSA legitimacy, it also caused significant divisions between Mississippi women who took the opposing view: that women were subordinate to men because of women’s position in the Bible and that women should “‘stay where God Almighty placed her—the queen of the home, the moulder of character...’.”⁹⁵ Kearney and Somerville used their religion in an attempt to lend their movement credibility, but this effort often backfired, pushing uneducated, religious women away from suffrage instead of towards it.

Similarly divisive was the image of the typical Southern Lady and suffragists’ views on the nature of propriety. Suffragists in Mississippi understood that as educated, generally wealthy, white women they were imagined to be “epitomes of the Southern Lady.”⁹⁶ Utilizing this image lent suffragists credibility individually, helped them operate in a society which necessarily respected upper class white women, and permitted them to use men’s chivalrous ideas in their favor. Yet from this same vantage point, the deep-rooted ideology of the Southern Lady repelled

⁹² Kirkley, “This Work is God’s Cause”, 510.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 520.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 518.

⁹⁵ This was part of a sermon preached by a lawyer in Mississippi. It demonstrates an attempt undertaken by both Northern and Southern anti-suffragists to elevate the position of women in the household in order to prevent women from seeking opportunities outside the household. Kirkley, “This Work is God’s Cause”, 512.

⁹⁶ Kirkley “This Work is God’s Cause”: 508.

many women from joining the movement as women often saw themselves as typical of this stereotype and could not imagine how suffrage could be synonymous with the Southern Lady. After the turmoil of the Civil War, “the image may have become even more tenacious as white women were constructed to be the repository of southern white culture and the personification of domestic purity, virtue, and morality for white southerners.”⁹⁷ Supporting the struggling image of the South, the “Southern Lady” was left “to represent the ideal of the southern white patriarchal order”⁹⁸ which had been diminished by the destruction of the Civil War. Many Southern white women and arguably more Southern white men clung desperately to the stereotype of the Southern Lady as a source of stability in a tumultuous time. For Mississippians in the post-Civil War period still the Southern Lady was an image wherein “the lady was expected to manifest in her character...all that was best in her society”⁹⁹ and was expected to accept “the dominance of men” while cultivating “her own sense of honor.”¹⁰⁰ Many women felt that this was incompatible with progressive activism or that their position of subservience was required by their position as Southern Ladies. An anecdotal anti-suffrage article published in *The Biloxi Herald* told of a Mr. Jobson saying of the Southern Lady “[men] slave for her and we fight and die for her. She is at once the incentive of our best efforts and the recipient of all the results thereof. We love, admire, and honor her.”¹⁰¹ Many Mississippi women were brought up with this stereotype and, lacking education and experience, took such imagery to heart. Yet having been inspired by the WCTU’s ability to manipulate the Southern Lady to incorporate political goals, both Somerville and Kearney understood the image of the Southern Lady to be necessary and attempted to use it to their benefit in the MWSA.

⁹⁷ Smith, “Constructing Womanhood in Public”, 3.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 16-17.

⁹⁹ Fox-Genovese, *Within the Plantation Household*, 196.

¹⁰⁰ Fox-Genovese, *Within the Plantation Household*, 203.

¹⁰¹ “Mr. Jobson on Suffrage”, *The Biloxi Daily Herald*, May 22, 1900.

In an appeal to “Members and Friends of the Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association,” Somerville warned that “the public, and especially the editorial public will be quick to see and use against us any mistakes that may be made. An unpleasant aggressiveness will doubtless be expected from us.”¹⁰² Somerville understood that any deviation from the traditional role of women in Mississippi society would bring suffragists criticism. Therefore Somerville emphasized that MWSA members should strive to limit the perceived threat to traditional ideas of Southern womanhood. Emphasizing the idea that propriety was important for most Southerners, Kearney wrote that “Southerners, though tenacious of social traditions...are chivalrous toward a woman who wishes their cooperation provided that she comes to them as a lady.”¹⁰³ Acting on her own advice, Kearney always appeared at events in dresses “with trains that swept the floor in an era when most women had long since given them up.”¹⁰⁴ Regardless of how careful these Mississippi women were, however, they could not help but polarize the public with a movement which forced men and women alike to radically alter perceptions of Southern womanhood. While not unique to Mississippi, the challenge of co-opting an age-old ideology did not add to the popularity of the MWSA.

Conclusion

The Mississippi women’s suffrage movement, like the Southern movement in general, began only after the Civil War had propelled drastic social changes for women who had previously been constrained by an isolating and necessarily unequal society. After the death and destruction of the Civil War, Southern women had access to a broader range of opportunities and experiences which permitted them to engage in voluntary associations and gave them educational

¹⁰² Nellie Nugent Somerville pamphlet entitled “Appeal to Members and Friends of the Mississippi Woman Suffrage Association” in Spruill, “Nellie Nugent Somerville” in *Mississippi Women*, Swain, Payne, and Spruill, eds., 45.

¹⁰³ Kearney quoted in Spruill, *New Women of the New South*, 75.

¹⁰⁴ Spruill, *New Women of the New South*, 76.

opportunities they had previously been denied. In Mississippi, Methodist missionary work and the WCTU played perhaps the largest role in granting suffragists experience and a social network upon which to build their organization. Once established, the MWSA utilized particular ideologies suited to their society in order to promote women's right to vote. Mississippian women's suffragists manipulated religious narratives and the image of the Southern Lady to fit their progressive needs and, though not all did, many Mississippi suffragists espoused white women's vote as a means of disenfranchising African Americans.

Despite their best efforts, Mississippi suffragists failed to pass a state or the federal amendment in favor of women's suffrage. The lack of significant leadership in the state and the ideological divisions between leaders was a tremendous detriment to the women's suffrage movement. Moreover, Somerville and Kearney's antagonistic relationship lessened the organizations influence and prevented a unified message from developing, as evidenced by their conflicting opinion on white supremacist ideology.

While Mississippi women saw a significant increase in the number of voluntary associations and educational and work opportunities after the Civil War, the lack of opportunity for many lower-middle-class women in the state meant that despite the best efforts of Somerville and Kearney, Mississippi suffragists failed to rally a strong female base to support their cause. Many middle and upper class white women in Mississippi used their social positions as gentlewomen and their religious beliefs to help push other Mississippians towards women's suffrage, yet they could not overcome the power of such deeply-rooted narratives. Ultimately suffragists in Mississippi failed to sway most women or political men and therefore failed to force the passage of a suffrage amendment in their home state.

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Uniquely British: Britain's Intellectual Response to Revolution

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Any study of the Atlantic world during the latter half of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries must include an examination of the American and French Revolutions. These two conflicts led to great changes in the political, social, and cultural structures within their respective places of occurrence. The American and French Revolutions also had consequences in places well beyond the areas where conflict happened. These revolutions' proximity in time and place, along with any other shared qualities, shows the importance and necessity of considering the revolutions in relation. David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam have noted that the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries have long been termed as an "Age of Revolutions."¹ This depiction implies that the two revolutions cannot be viewed solely in terms of their geographic location, but must take into account their relationship to other revolutions and even their impact in those places where revolutions did not occur.

The American and French Revolutions left great impacts upon Britain. Britain was intimately connected to the American Revolution because the rebelling colonists were British. Britain's link to the French Revolution, meanwhile, resulted from the geographic proximity and lengthy historical interaction between the two nations. The two revolutions impacted Britain socially and politically, with a heavy emphasis on intellectual discourse. Recently, Emma Vincent Macleod has argued that there is a need for more research to consider the "impact of the American Revolution on British attitudes to the French Revolution."² She has noted that a few scholars, such as Mark Philp and Amanda Goodrich, have attempted to connect the British

¹ David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Introduction: The Age of Revolutions, c.1760-1840 – Global Causation, Connection, and Comparison," in *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c.1760-1840*, ed. David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), xii.

² Emma Vincent Macleod, "British Attitudes to the French Revolution," *The Historical Journal* 50-3 (Sept. 2007), 708.

response between the two revolutions.³ The involvement of many leading British figures in the debates surrounding both revolutions and the proximity in time has illustrated the need to analyze the connection between the two events. The American Revolution's grand effect was to produce a more conservative, yet intellectually pluralistic, British society that faced the French Revolution. It is not enough to simply examine the conservative leanings of the political response and the debate over radicalism and conservatism in the intellectual responses to the American and French Revolutions. The American Revolution offered for the French Revolution opportunities for ideological adaptability, the presence of a state-based conservatism, and a chance for intellectual debate.

There were two principal ideologies that characterized the intellectual differences in Britain during the late eighteenth century: conservatism and radicalism. British conservatism focused on a "utilitarian theory of government" that sought a "commitment to maintaining a pan-European culture of moderation and civility ... [which] safeguard[ed] the benevolent social, political, and cultural hegemony of the empire's Anglicized élite."⁴ Conservatism desired a society that believed in the benevolence and stability of its institutions. On the other hand, the radicalism that persisted in Britain during the late 18th century emphasized the importance of liberty for all men and sought to change the way in which government institutions operated to "tip the balance in favour of the 'democratic' or 'popular' element in the Constitution."⁵ British intellectuals and politicians ascribed themselves to these ideological views, which would ultimately play key roles in their responses to the American and French Revolutions.

³ Macleod, "British Attitudes to the French Revolution," 708-709.

⁴ Eliga H. Gould, "American Independence and Britain's Counter-Revolution," *Past & Present* 154 (Feb. 1997), 129.

⁵ G. Rude, "John Wilkes and the Re-birth of British Radicalism," *Political Science*, vol. 14, no. 2 (Sep, 1962), 24.

In order to gain a sense of the intellectual tone surrounding the American Revolution it is important to examine the leading figures of the time period. The most dominant voices typically emanated from Members of Parliament. However, there were also some leaders that did not hold seats in Parliament, but utilized intellectual and political persuasion nonetheless

One of the most central figures in any examination of British opinions surrounding the events in America is Sir Edmund Burke, an intellectual and Member of Parliament. Burke offered his views both before and during the war with the American revolutionaries. His 1775 Parliamentary speech, “A Speech for Conciliation,” was given in response to the revolutionary stirrings of American colonists. In his speech, Burke offered a passionate plea to engage with the colonists’ rebellious attitude by utilizing “peace. Not peace through the medium of war; not peace to be hunted through the labyrinth of intricate and endless negotiations.”⁶ Burke was uninterested in Britain’s involvement in a drawn out war against an independent-minded enemy. He emphasized that Parliament had even “admitted that the complaints of our former mode of exerting the right of taxation were not wholly unfounded.”⁷ Therefore for Burke the problem was not the colonists’ actions, as even Parliament had agreed with their sentiments in parts. Instead Burke was concerned with the “question” as to “what, in the name of God, shall we do with it?”⁸ “It” referred to the situation in America and “what” referred to Britain’s course of action. Burke’s initial reaction was tentatively supportive of the colonists, yet he was not fully in favor of one side or the other, as he openly decried the prospect of war. He extended understanding and sympathy towards the colonists’ grumblings, while also explaining his desire that Britain attempt to enact a policy of acquiescence. Moreover, Burke adopted a pragmatic approach to the

⁶ Edmund Burke, *Speech on Conciliation with America*, ed. Albert S. Cook, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1901), 7.

⁷ Burke, *Speech on Conciliation*, 9.

⁸ Burke, *Conciliation*, 27.

American situations because he did not want Britain to enter into a conflict that might prove long lasting.

It was apparent that many Britons shared Burke's distaste for war before the outbreak of violence in the American colonies. Linda Colley has argued that the public's attitude at the war's onset was quite varied, especially owing to the fact that it would be a war between two groups of fellow Britons.⁹ It would have been difficult for many Britons to fight against their own countrymen and this meant, at least initially, that Britain was far from any unified opinion on the matter of war.

A prominent politician that echoed Burke's sentiments was Sir John Wilkes, a Member of Parliament, who argued, "Americans are neither to be cozened, nor by violence deprived of either liberty or property ... We cannot succeed by force, nor in this commercial country is the object worth our while, were it possible."¹⁰ Wilkes directly attacked the actions of Britain in response to the American Revolution and insisted that the war was futile. Wilkes' stance was pragmatic, similar in nature to Burke's, because he believed that even if Britain were to emerge as victors, the colonists would still be unwilling to accept further imposition of British rule.

There were a few British figures that went even further than Edmund Burke's limited support for the American colonists' discontent by offering full-fledged support for the American cause. Thomas Paine, who was a chief figure in the radical intellectual circle, wrote a 1776 pamphlet titled *Common Sense*, which became a rallying point for many in the radical movement. In *Common Sense*, Paine contended that "Britain, being now an open enemy, extinguishes every other name and title: And to say that reconciliation is our duty, is truly

⁹ Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 139.

¹⁰ John Wilkes, "The Speeches of Mr. Wilkes in the House of Commons," in *The Making of the Modern World*, (London: 1786), 183.

farcical.”¹¹ Paine wholeheartedly supported the cause of the American colonists, and he argued against the British government’s continued involvement in their affairs. In this strain, Paine shared many similarities with Edmund Burke, who also sought to prevent Britain’s involvement in war. However, Paine went further than Burke by declaring that Britain should not have had any interest in attempts at regaining the American colonies.

Opposition to the war in the American colonies was not only couched in intellectual leanings, but it also symbolized a political opportunity. According to Gerald Newman, the political opposition was due in part to distaste for King George III, because “Rockinghams [Whigs], even though conservatively opposed to popular movements, embraced the American cause as part of their opposition to the king.”¹² Thus opposition to the war could transcend ideological boundaries, and it was possible for some Britons to support the rebels while simultaneously pledging one’s loyalties to Britain.

Conservatives’ reactions to the American Revolution desired reintegration into the British system. Some men, like Samuel Johnson, argued that American sympathizers “mean in spite to destroy that country which they are not permitted to govern.”¹³ Johnson believed that revolutionaries would have been detrimental to the country that they desired to establish. Newman has termed these people as proponents of the “mindless conservative old-style patriotism,” precisely because of their intense distaste for supporters of the American cause.¹⁴ As the war progressed there was a public swelling of support, or at least a more vocal support, for the British cause in the American Revolution. This shift was most evident through the

¹¹ Thomas Paine, “Common Sense,” in *Rights of Man, Common Sense, and Other Political Writings*, ed. Mark Philp, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 23.

¹² Gerald Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 194.

¹³ Newman, *English Nationalism*, 194.

¹⁴ Newman, *English Nationalism*, 199.

chastisement and violent treatment of some American sympathizers at the hands of their fellow countrymen.¹⁵ J.H. Plumb has argued that Thomas Paine's position in the public consciousness became that of an "anathema, the symbol of a violent, radical traitor."¹⁶ Edmund Burke's letter to local sheriffs of Bristol during the war's course solidified his opposition to a war with the American colonists, as he wrote, "we have made war on our Colonies, not by arms only, but by laws."¹⁷ It is apparent that Burke was very much in resistance to the actions of the British government, because it utilized its power of governance to deny the rights of the colonists, which would be unhelpful in any attempts to establish goodwill between the two nations. Yet, it was still evident that Burke wanted to settle the question of the American colonists by bringing them back into the fold of the British structure.

But the war also highlighted the differences between those who supported American independence and those who wanted the colonists back in the British state. Burke's position as a moderate was drowned out by calls to choose a side, as Britons were pressed to support the conservatives' "successive war efforts" or the radicals' continual clamoring for "political and social change at home."¹⁸ As the American Revolution became defined as a movement to leave the empire, those who had initial reservations about the war had to reaffirm their loyalties to Britain or join forces with a political movement that was increasingly chastised.

Following the war's conclusion, Britain was left to grapple with the nature of its defeat. The scholarship on the consequences of the war certainly has had areas of divergence. Most notably, the events of the war had a definite effect on the strength of radicalism in Britain, but

¹⁵ Colley, *Britons*, 143.

¹⁶ J.H. Plumb, *In the Light of History*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 81.

¹⁷ "A Letter from Edmund Burke," in *Eighteenth Century Collections Online*, (London: Pall-Mall, 1777), 20.

¹⁸ Colley, *Britons*, 145.

the extent of the impact has been debated. John Brewer has argued that the American Revolution was a turning point for radicalism, especially for the strain that became emboldened in the last decade of the eighteenth century.¹⁹ This view gave credit to the strength of radicalism's leadership and ideology in overcoming an antagonistic public. But Ian Christie has asserted that radicalism was instead hobbled by the war, as he states, "even moderate schemes of reform of the representation made so little appeal at that time to members of the political class or to the interested public (either in Britain or in Ireland) at large that the issue was dead by the summer of 1785."²⁰ Christie took issue with Brewer's insistence on a strengthened British radicalism and instead argued that Britain's tendency towards support for the war kept radicalism from being a major force in British politics.

Much of the British government's response in the aftermath of the American Revolution took on a conservative approach. The fact that Britain fought against its own colonists to bring them back into the fold of governance illustrated that many Britons, or at the very least, their leaders, were concerned with the stability of empire. Eliga Gould has termed the British actions following the conclusion of the war as "counter-revolutionary."²¹ In doing so, he has alluded to the strong force to preserve the stability and status quo of the British system. Many Britons likely asked themselves if a revolution was necessary, but conservative leaders sought to deny this possibility from happening. Even though radicalism had enjoyed moments of exposure during the American Revolution, and it still held political and intellectual relevance through the prominence of men like John Wilkes and Thomas Paine, the lack of tangible reform or revolution

¹⁹ John Brewer, "English Radicalism in the Age of George III," in *Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776*, ed. J.G.A. Pocock, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 362.

²⁰ Ian R. Christie, *Stress and Stability in Late Eighteenth-Century Britain*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 48.

²¹ Gould, "American Independence and Britain's Counter-Revolution," 107.

was a heavy blow to its strength. Furthermore, Britain showed a reemphasis on solving its imperial problems through actions such as the India Act and the “fortif[ication] [of] its holdings in Canada.”²² This was surely disheartening to radicals who desired the recognition of sovereignty in the British colonies, because it showed that Britain was willing to deny independence to its colonists.

Six years following the end of the American Revolution, a new revolution began in France. The most important period of the French Revolution occurred from 1789-1794, and it was a time of enormous change for France and the rest of the world.²³ The French Revolution’s effects on Britain, two nations separated by a small body of water, were immense not only because of geographic closeness, but also in relation to the historical relationship of the two nations. The French Revolution’s impact in Britain, according to Stephen Prickett, must be examined in terms of the “original debate ... in the early 1790s” and the “later radical agitation over reform in England.”²⁴ And Seamus Deane has argued that the “reception of the French Enlightenment and Revolution in France is essentially a literary and cultural story.”²⁵ It is thus important to recognize the role of intellectualism and ideology in terms of France.

Scholarly disagreements have developed surrounding the strength of radicalism and conservatism during the 1790s. Jennifer Mori has asserted that “Foxite Whigs sought to act as

²² Maya Jasanoff, “Revolutionary Exiles: The American Loyalist and French Émigré Diasporas,” in *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c.1760-1840*, ed. David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, (Houndmills: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2010), 53.

²³ Stephen Prickett, *England and the French Revolution*, (Houndsmills: Macmillan Education, 1989), 1.

²⁴ Prickett, *England and the French Revolution*, 30.

²⁵ Seamus Deane, *The French Revolution and Enlightenment in England: 1789-1832*, Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1988), 3.

mediators between an overmighty state and a potentially rebellious people.”²⁶ Her claim suggests that the presence of radicals in Britain was large enough to be politically influential. Mori’s argument that Britain was marked by a restless population that was only kept stabilized through the actions of some of the more radical politicians reflected her notion of the power of radicalism within Britain. However, Thomas Schofield has argued in opposition and claimed “the intellectual case in favour of stability, made good by legitimating the ethical basis of British society, was instrumental in preserving that stability,” and subsequently defined stability as the “conservative analysis of the nature of civil society.”²⁷ This assertion meant that Schofield believed in intellectual conservatism as the most important factor in the upkeep of stability in Britain, not political Whigs. His insistence on a stability obtained through conservatism belied a belief in a powerful conservative movement.

Edmund Burke played a prominent role in the French Revolution’s debate, just as he had in the time of the American Revolution, because he was very much a cause for discussion and disagreement. His most influential work in this period was the *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, which he published in 1790. It is perhaps surprising that John Whale claimed that there were “relatively few positive public responses” in light of “its rich, contentious after-life.”²⁸ In light of the French Revolution, Burke withheld his support of the rebels’ actions when he stated

I should therefore suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France, until I was informed how it had been combined with government; with public force; with the discipline and obedience of armies; with the collection of an effective and well-distributed revenue; with morality and religion; with the solidity of property; with peace and order; with civil and social

²⁶ Jennifer Mori, *Britain in the Age of the French Revolution, 1785-1820*, (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), 9.

²⁷ Thomas Phillip Schofield, “Conservative Political Thought in Britain in Response to the French Revolution,” *The Historical Journal* 29-3 (Sept. 1986): 622.

²⁸ John C. Whale, *Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the revolution in France: new interdisciplinary essays*, (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2000), 1.

manners. All these (in their way) are good things too; and, without them, liberty is not a benefit whilst it last, and is not likely to continue long.²⁹

Burke's disagreement with the Revolution was tentative because he believed that the French could adopt multiple tenets in their pursuit of liberty to bring about his support. His major point of dissent with the events in France did not stem from the aims of its people. His insistence that liberty was a benefit for all was consistent with his earlier condemnation of the British government's imposition on the colonists during the American Revolution. Yet, in this situation it was a lack of institutional development that troubled Burke, not an overbearing government involving itself with the affairs of citizens.

Burke then launched into a defense of the British government's long history and used it to offer Britain as a model for the French revolting against their government. He insisted that the French have wrongly latched onto a few of the rights offered by Dr. Price, a radical supporter of the French Revolution, namely the "right 1. 'To choose our own governors.' 2. 'To cashier them for misconduct.' [and] 3. 'To frame a government for ourselves.'"³⁰ Burke believed that these rights were never present in Britain and they were not something to be sought. Instead, he argued, "if the *principles* of the Revolution of 1688 are any where to be found, it is in the statue called the *Declaration of Right*," which is "'an act for declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, and for *settling* the *succession* of the crown."³¹ Burke emphasized that the "Declaration of Right" was "drawn up by great lawyers and great statesmen, and not by warm and inexperienced enthusiasts."³² Burke's admonishment of the sovereignty of ordinary men in the development of government outlined his beliefs about the tenets that constitute a legitimate

²⁹ Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, ed. J.C.D. Clark (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 152.

³⁰ Burke, *Reflections*, 162.

³¹ Burke, *Reflections*, 163.

³² Burke, *Reflections*, 163.

government. He desired historical legitimacy, or at the very least, institutional legitimacy. It reinforced his argument that liberty needed to be safeguarded by a protective political structure if it had any hope of a lasting impact.

According to F.P. Lock, it was apparent that the new primary thrust for Burke's views on the French Revolution was a "tempera[nce] and conviction" for being a "conservative."³³ This conservatism was plainly evident in his insistence on both the historical validity of the British system and his opinion that the revolution in France was not moving towards an establishment of political or social structures. However, Burke's ideology was not set upon a defense of the monarchy. It might be appropriate to attribute to Burke a sort of moderate conservatism, which would allow his belief in the importance and validity of the historical nature of the British government, while also settling his recognition of the importance of liberty. Undoubtedly, one of Burke's great propositions was that he did "most heartily wish that France may be animated by a spirit of rational liberty."³⁴ It is apparent that Burke had problems with France's course of action, but not necessarily their desire, if it was their overwhelming one, for liberty.

In contrast with Edmund Burke's moderate conservatism was Thomas Paine's continued radicalism. The most important work that he published during the French Revolution was his response to Burke's *Reflections*. The *Rights of Man* was published in two parts in 1791 and 1792. First, the *Rights of Man* established that the French Revolution was "not against Louis XVI, but against the despotic principles of the government."³⁵ Paine lamented the troubles afflicted upon Louis, but he believed in the necessity of the revolution. Because Paine directly attacked the old

³³ F. P. Lock, *Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), 31.

³⁴ Burke, *Reflections*, 145.

³⁵ Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man: Being an Answer to Mr. Burke's Attack on the French Revolution*, Pt. 1, ed. Daniel Edwin Wheeler, (New York: Vincent Parke and Company, 1908). 17-18.

government of France as the source of problems, he sought to deny historical validity as a legitimate force of government. Moreover, Paine alleged that the failures of Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, especially through its omission of a discussion of the English Constitution might lead some to "consider, whether there is not some radical defect in what is called the England Constitution."³⁶ Through this allegation, Paine asserted that those who did not ascribe fully to either conservatism or radicalism could have been swayed by a full examination of the English Constitution. Radicalism was predicated on the necessity of reform and change to the status quo, and if Paine could have proved that there were problems associated with the English government's constitution, then it would have been in the best interest of the radical movement.

Although the second part of Paine's *Rights of Man*, according to Stephen Prickett, was "less concerned with the French Revolution than what an egalitarian society in general might look like," it is still an essential source to gauge British reaction.³⁷ This is most accurately reflected by the fact that Part II sold more copies than Part I and completely outsold Burke's *Reflections*, while the reaction in Britain became so dangerous for Paine that he was forced to "flee to France."³⁸ These two situations indicate a divided Britain because radicals were supportive of his work, while the government was worried about his French sympathies. Paine continued his arguments of Part I in Part II when he argued for the benevolence of the revolution in France preface, "it is not worth making changes or revolutions, unless it be for some great national benefit."³⁹ Thus, one of the radical responses to the events of France, at least for Paine, was to caution against revolutions that did not happen for the correct reasons. Because he offered

³⁶ Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man Pt. 1*, 104.

³⁷ Prickett, *England and the French Revolution*, 66.

³⁸ Prickett, *England and the French Revolution*, 66-67.

³⁹ Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man Pt. 2 Preface*, XV.

this admission, Paine allowed British radicalism an escape from having to lend blanket support to all other revolutions. Instead, Paine's political support could now be utilized to criticize uprisings and rebellions that were detrimental to the imposition of liberty. Later in Part II, Paine argued that revolutionary changes did not lead to a crumbled society. Instead, Paine reasoned "there is a natural aptness in man, and more so in society ... to accommodate itself to whatever situation it is in ... A general association takes place, and common interest produces common security."⁴⁰ Paine harkened back to his belief in the preface of Part II that men will naturally gravitate towards the formation of a unifying structure. He further backed his argument, although in a unique way, by positing,

Though it might be proved that the system of the government now called the NEW, is the most ancient in principle of all that have existed, being founded on the original inherent Rights of Man: yet, as tyranny and the sword have suspended the exercise of those rights for many centuries past, it serves better the purpose of distinction to call it a *new*, than to claim the right of calling it the old. The first general distinction between those two systems is, that the one now called the old is *hereditary*, either in whole or in part; and the new is entirely *representative*. It rejects all hereditary government.⁴¹

This claim, steeped in historical attributes, served to show that it was well within the rights of all men, not just for those living in societies that allowed for basic sets of rights, to agitate for new government. This new government could be one that did not expressly dictate to people that their social class defined their right. But Paine's insistence on referring to the past was quite brilliant because it would have garnered the support of the Englishman who looked to the past to gain a sense of stability. Through his criticism of tyranny and government rooted in wrong ideals, Paine drew a distinction between the value of history for government and the presence of a corrupting influence on government. As a popular intellectual, Thomas Paine could ensure the spread of his influence through Britain.

⁴⁰ Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man Pt. 2*, 228.

⁴¹ Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man Pt. 1*, 24.

The Revolution in France also saw responses by numerous women throughout Britain. They offered new attitudes and perspectives to the events in France. Mary Wollstonecraft was one of the more influential figures and she utilized a unique approach to the conflict in France, because of her willingness to modify her opinions as it progressed.

Mary Wollstonecraft's first major work, *A Vindication of the Rights of Men*, was one of the first works written in response to Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*.⁴² In *A Vindication of the Rights of Men* Wollstonecraft critiqued Burke's work and noted her shock at his refusal to adopt the tenets of radicalism, for she wrote, "had you been a Frenchman, you would have been, in spite of your respect for rank and antiquity, a violent revolutionary ... it is not impossible that you might have entertained the same opinion of the English Parliament, that you professed to have during the American war," a war in which he had validated the concerns of the colonists.⁴³ Wollstonecraft believed that Burke offered views and reactions that were in contention with his true opinions on revolution. It is thus unsurprising that she criticized Burke by placing him in the position of a Frenchman. In doing so, Wollstonecraft showed that Burke's arguments were not so conservative that he should have been precluded from an understanding of the revolutionaries' desires. This action was likely done in response to Burke's insistence on the attainment of liberty as a worthy ideal.

Furthermore, Wollstonecraft argued that the French cause was justified, not only because it overthrew an undesirable king, but also because it directly attacked the inequality that separated men. She wrote,

Inequality of rank must ever impede the growth of virtue, by vitiating the mind that submits or domineers ... And if this grand example be set by an assembly of unlettered

⁴² Gary Kelly, *Women, Writing, and Revolution*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 17.

⁴³ Mary Wollstonecraft, "A Vindication of the Rights of Men," ed. D. L. Macdonald and Kathleen Scherf, (Petersborough Canada: Broadview Press, 1997), 78-79.

clowns, if they can produce a crisis that may involve the fate of Europe, and “more than Europe,” you must allow us to respect unsophisticated reason.⁴⁴

Wollstonecraft threw her support behind the French uprising, as she was willing to gloss over the supposed “unsophisticated reason” of the French revolutionaries if she knew that they had made a “grand example.”⁴⁵ Wollstonecraft surely understood the powerful rhetoric of language about the position of men because she wrote extensively throughout the *Vindication* on the prospect of men facing poverty and suffering. Her insistence on featuring “inequality of rank” in her discussion on the French Revolution signaled that she respected and knew the power that class-based language would have upon readers.⁴⁶ She may have been asserting her own unhappiness with Britain’s stratified society because Tom Furniss argued that her views “can only flourish in a society based on equality in gender and class.”⁴⁷ Wollstonecraft believed that if the revolutionaries were able to rectify the problems of inequality, then the whole continent of Europe would benefit.

Wollstonecraft’s later work on the French Revolution, *A Historical and Moral View of the French Revolution*, was published in 1795, a full five years after *A Vindication of the Rights of Man*. Furniss asserted that Wollstonecraft’s work was “greeted in literary magazines with warmth and enthusiasm,” which showed that women had gained at least some level of respect.⁴⁸ In the preface of *A Historical and Moral View*, Wollstonecraft asserted her continued support of the French Revolution and its aims. She declared,

⁴⁴ Wollstonecraft, “A Vindication of the Rights of Men,” 82.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁴⁷ Tom Furniss, “Gender in revolution: Edmund Burke and Mary Wollstonecraft,” in *Revolution in writing: British literary Responses to the French Revolution*, ed. Kelvin Everest, (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1991), 92.

⁴⁸ Furniss, “Gender in Revolution,” 101.

We shall be able to discern clearly that the revolution was neither produced by the abilities or intrigues of a few individuals; nor was the effect of sudden and short-lived enthusiasm; but the natural consequence of intellectual improvement ... from a state of barbarism to that of polished society.⁴⁹

This view held that the French Revolution, contrary to conservatives' complaints, was not based in agitation, but rather in reasoned men. In this strain of thought, Wollstonecraft sustained her previous writings on the benevolence of the events in France. Moreover, Wollstonecraft's argument is also a response to the arguments that were evident even in the period of the American Revolution, one of which presumed that "by repudiating the legal authority of Parliament, [the American] Congress had erected an irregular power ... [that] depended on enthusiasm rather than law."⁵⁰ The same concerns were brought forth in the French Revolution when Sir Horace Walpole, a prominent writer, wrote a letter to his friend in 1790 stating, "how frantically have the French acted, and how rationally the Americans!"⁵¹ Thus there had been a concern that the societies and governments established by revolutions were not grounded in law. However, Wollstonecraft immediately repudiated that notion by characterizing the French Revolution as a result of the "natural consequences of intellectual improvement."⁵²

But as her essay moved forward, Wollstonecraft acknowledged the existence of flaws in the French Revolution. As the situation in France deteriorated, Wollstonecraft showed signs of disenchantment because she wrote, "from the commencement of the revolution, the misery of France has originated from the folly or art of men, who have spurred the people on too fast;

⁴⁹ Mary Wollstonecraft, *A Historical and Moral View of the Origins and Progress of the French Revolution and the Effect It Has Produced in Europe*, (Delmar, New York: Scholars' Facsimiles, & Reprints, 1975), vii-viii.

⁵⁰ Gould, "American Independence and Britain's Counter-Revolution," 119.

⁵¹ Horace Walpole, *Letters of Horace Walpole*, ed. Charles Duke Yonge, (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 2004), 308.

⁵² Wollstonecraft, *A Historical and Moral View*, 82.

tearing up prejudices by the root, which they should have permitted to die gradually away.”⁵³

Similar to Burke, she believed that the French needed to allow the establishment of social structures to defend liberty. Wollstonecraft likely understood that offering support to the men who were responsible for atrocities in France was detrimental. Some intellectual writers, especially the Romantics, also illustrated changes in response to the French Revolution because they offered “some kind of recantation” of the “enthusiasm” that was present in France, while others raised a “violent detestation of its French versions.”⁵⁴ Thus admonishment was not entirely unheard of, even amongst radicals.

In terms of the French Revolution’s impact on Britain, authors have pointed to the consequences that were felt following the Revolution’s end. David Eastwood has argued that the “effect of the 1790s might have been to retard the progress of political and institutional reform in Britain.”⁵⁵ Eastwood may have been looking at the horrors of events in France as the event did push some radicals, such as Wollstonecraft, to reexamine their support of the French situation. The lack of a revolution in metropolitan Britain or any grand measure of reform until much later likely influenced this view. Linda Colley was less willing to adopt this view because she wrote that the Revolution and subsequent war, two events closely linked, brought more “agitation for the franchise.”⁵⁶ Colley thought that the existence of radical intellectuals emboldened by a revolutionary debate in which they took part helped lead to more calls for the expansion of rights. Neither Colley nor Eastwood would deny the historical reality that reform in the 1800s

⁵³ Mary Wollstonecraft, *A Historical and Moral View*, 337.

⁵⁴ Prickett, *Britain and the French Revolution*, 111.

⁵⁵ David Eastwood, “Patriotism and the English state in the 1790s,” in *The French Revolution and British popular politics*, edited by Mark Philp, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 168.

⁵⁶ Colley, *Britons*, 329.

did occur, but both disagreed as to how much the radicals that were present in Britain during the French Revolution were responsible.

For some, the French Revolution was marked by a fear for the stability of the British system, but for others it offered a chance to point to a European power undergoing much needed change. Yet the popular sentiments that had garnered the most support during the American Revolution were popularized during the French Revolution as well. Government actions that were meant to suppress radicalism such as the Seditious Meetings Act of 1795, which proclaimed that “no meeting, of any description of persons, exceeding the number of fifty persons ... shall be holden, for the purpose or on the pretext of considering of or preparing any petition” showed the state was willing to threaten the speech and assembly of Britons.⁵⁷ This act was clearly conservative and a continuation of the state’s attempt to maintain stability throughout Britain.

Though radicalism had found a position in the intellectual, political, and social spaces of late eighteenth century Britain, it is apparent that the government aimed to strengthen its conservative approach to foreign and domestic affairs. Colley argued that there was a formation of an “officially constructed patriotism” in Britain, which was evidence that both the state and the population worked in tandem to assert the power and strength of its cause.⁵⁸ This did not preclude Britain from an examination of its position in relation to the outside world, but it meant the division between the radicals and conservatives would continue to be a point of division in a society. A radical intellectual ideology that advocated for changes to the contemporary British system was in constant contention with a conservative thought that argued for the historical

⁵⁷ “Pitts act, to prevent seditious meetings,” in *Eighteenth Century Collections Online*, (London: 1796), 1.

⁵⁸ Colley, *Britons*, 147.

legitimacy of the British system and its monarch. This divergence, coupled with the antagonism of the British population towards American sympathizers as the war in America dragged on, lent itself to a society that held radical views, conservative views, or aspects of both.

Most notably, the rhetoric of intellectuals, from all points on the ideological spectrum, highlighted an intellectual fluidity present throughout all of British society. Burke's calculated offer of support for the American Revolution was set in his affinity for liberty and rights, which he never lost in his future writings. And his belief in the validity of the British government and his admonishment of the French Revolution flowed from the differences he saw between the French and American situations. Burke's recognition of liberty as a rallying point in both revolutions certainly showed that he believed the two revolts' aims were similar, although the courses of action differed. Mary Wollstonecraft's shift in opinion regarding the revolution in France shadowed Burke's ideological journey between the American and French Revolutions. She initially noted the benign nature of the French Revolution, but later acknowledged the lack of improvement brought by the revolutionaries. These changes in response reflected the continual turns in the two revolutions and the adaptability of British intellectual response to the outside world. The emphasis of these two writers was not on an ideological purity but on a willingness to adopt a cautioned approach to ever-changing situations.

It must be noted that even with the occurrence of adaptable ideologies the immediate impact of the American Revolution also turned the British state's response to the French Revolution into a vastly conservative one. Eliga Gould has termed the post-revolution period in Britain as a sort of "counter-revolution," and Linda Colley has described the impact of the loss in America as a "sharp move to the Right" and a "patriotism which stressed ... the desirability of

strong, stable government by a virtuous, able and authentically British élite.”⁵⁹ These two descriptions point toward a conservative Britain, which was strongly reflected in the government’s actions during the French Revolution. The crackdown on the meetings of radical groups mirrored the patriotic outbursts against sympathetic Britons during the American Revolution. If anything, the government’s attempt to focus devotion upon itself was reinforced during the American Revolution and continued into the French Revolution.

The influence of the American Revolution in Britain also allowed a space for intellectual discourse and debate that would spill over into the French Revolution. The numerous conservative and radical writers, and the prominence of dissenting voices such as John Wilkes in Parliament, indicated that discussion of the two revolutions was never far from the minds of British citizens. The American Revolution, in spite of actions against partisans in Britain, had shown that divergence of opinions was a common occurrence in Britain. Radicals had pointed to the outcome in America as a worthy goal, especially later amidst the French Revolution, while some writers such as Samuel Johnson had found the American Revolution to be a destructive undertaking.⁶⁰ It is possible that the desire for an area of debate was occasioned by the “strikingly cosmopolitan dimension” of the “conservative response to the American Revolution, which Gould argued had been a focus of Britain after the American Revolution.⁶¹ As Britain was forced to confront all aspects of its empire, it desperately sought the ability to listen to all of the differing viewpoints. The debates over ideology translated into the French Revolution as well, because Thomas Paine’s *Rights of Man* sold more copies than Edmund Burke’s *Reflections on*

⁵⁹ Gould, “American Independence,” 107; Colley, *Britons*, 146-147.

⁶⁰ Mark Philp, “The Role of America in the ‘Debate on France’ 1791-5: Thomas Paine’s Insertion,” *Utilitas*, Vol. 5, No. 2, (November 1993), 223; Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 194.

⁶¹ Gould, “American Independence,” 110.

the Revolution in France.⁶² Yet, this did not mean that radicalism was the standard-bearer. Instead, the conservative backlash came from the government that passed laws to prohibit radical meetings.⁶³ Still, one of the consequences of the American Revolution was to uphold the framework that allowed the diffusion of opinions, both radical and conservative.

The American and French Revolutions left a remarkable impact upon British society. Some of the consequences were unique to only one revolution, such as the loss of the American colonies. However, many of the effects were linked to both revolutions, as the American Revolution shaped the reactions to the French Revolution in many ways. Although there will continue to be debates on the strength and presence of radicalism, especially when it comes to the level of influence that the two revolutions exerted, there is no doubt that radicalism played a role in the responses of British elites, writers, and citizens. The same can be said of conservatism though, because it dictated the aims of the state, as well as intellectuals and citizens. Although the two ideologies stood in contrast to each other, the level to which people adhered to these strains of thought did not always preclude them from supporting aspect of both. Furthermore, the Britain that confronted the French Revolution brought with it an impetus for fluid intellectual response, conservative government, and a space for intellectual dialogue. The effects of the American Revolution did lead to a more inwardly focused Britain but it did not prevent the voices of dissenters, radicals, and moderates from being heard.

⁶² Prickett, *England and the French Revolution*, 67.

⁶³ "Pitts act, to prevent seditious meetings,"1.

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The Unwilling Insider's Encounter with Nazism: Alsatian *incorporés de force* in World War II

World War II is most often discussed today in terms of its global implications: as a conflict waged across continents by soldiers from around the world, it marked the twentieth century and gave rise to a new world order consisting of international blocks of economic interests dominated by hegemonic superpowers. The appeal examining the universal impact of such an affair is clear, and yet it runs the risk of glossing over the incredible drama experienced in individual localities subject to the ravages of war. In France, ignominious defeat in the summer of 1940 precipitated a national crisis, perhaps experienced most profoundly in the regions of Alsace-Lorraine.¹ The German *de facto* annexation of these two regions, based on claims of a shared ethnic, linguistic, and political history, led to the special incorporation of nearly 130,000 of their soldiers between 1942 and the Allied liberation in the summer of 1944. For those who lived through this German conscription, intense questions of nationhood added to the grueling demands of livelihood within the military, made all the worse by the outcome of the war and the stain of having fought for the wrong side. Yet the process of coming to terms with forced service sheds light on the nature of the war, and has only become a field truly open to study by historians within the last two decades, as survivors and their descendants have brought their writings forward into the public sphere.² The largest quantity of these writings consist of letters exchanged between soldiers and their friends in family—for the most part resident in Alsace, but

increasingly spread across the continent as the war continued to displace fighters and civilians alike. In studying these documents, we encounter a unique record of the war, describing people, places, and events from the perspective of reluctant members of the German military. Given their physical proximity to the intensely Nazified soldiers of the *Werhmacht*, and the ideological war being waged within them, these are voices that merit serious consideration, and whose insights into what it means to be loyal and patriotic have lasting significance.

The question of Alsatian nationality stretches back over more than a millennium, far outdating the existence of the modern states of France and Germany. Sharing ethnic ties with the early Germanic Alemanni people, the development of Alsace's dual identity began with its incorporation into the Frankish kingdom under the Merovingian dynasty around the year 500 C.E.³ Despite the clearly visible influence of Germanic culture on the region, by the mid-nineteenth century Alsace, though divided into two departments, had become definitively French, thanks to the Revolution of 1789's powerful redefining influence on what constituted the boundaries of the French nation and what created French identity. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 severed this national unity in the act of binding the Germanic states, thus lifting the Alsace-Moselle territory from the defeated French nation on the basis of their cultural-linguistic connection to Germany. The internalization of this "black stain"—that is the affront of the forgotten provinces—has been extensively studied by scholars of the Third Republic whose work points to the profound importance of these seized French territories in the rise of Franco-German revanchism.⁴ The First World War ultimately reversed this annexation, restoring the territorial boundaries that stood before 1871 and securing French nationality for Alsace-Lorrainers in Section V of the Treaty of Versailles. Yet the effects of such a muddled history were not easily ignored, and at the outbreak of the Second World War, they came to bear as Germany and

France clashed once more in a contest of arms that swept across the Rhine and into the homes of Alsace.

Beginning in August of 1942, under the leadership of Gauleiter Robert Wagner, Alsatians were conscripted into the German armed forces.⁵ Among those forcefully recruited, resistance to German military aims and Nazi propaganda took many forms, some more active than others. Among the subtlest and yet most flagrant opportunities for disobedience available to the *incorporés* lay in the use of the French language. Though many Alsatians were conversant in German or its closely related Alsatian dialect, in addition to French, soldiers like Frédéric Hunzinger made the deliberate choice to revert to their natal tongue in direct opposition to German mandate. Moreover, Hunzinger channeled in his letters a frank, irreverent discourse, always toeing the line of blatant dissention. “The sergeants treat us less like men and more like savage beasts. Altogether there are 600 of us Alsatians that they have captured here. All of them are like me, recognizing their old motherland.”⁶ Though some leniency can be imagined due to the ambiguous concept of a *motherland* for Alsace, Hunzinger’s tone and other correspondences leave little doubt as to his true meaning. In another letter, after explaining the lengths he has gone in order to hospitalize himself, he writes to say that the “other 17 soldiers who are in the same room don’t share the same opinion with *l’homme à la moustache*... At any rate,” he continues after this dangerous aside, “I have already won the sympathy of all the staff: sister, adjutant, etc. and even the doctor.”⁷ Other *incorporés* took the risk of speaking and singing in French as they deployed towards the Eastern front, enjoying the feelings of unity this promoted among the Alsatians.⁸ In addition to these shows of deliberate noncompliance with instructions that all activity of army personnel be conducted in German, Alsatians resorted to French for more dangerous forms of subversion as well. Eugène Philipps notes in his memoirs that his

letters, composed in German, frequently contained hidden messages signaled in French, meant to convey important information to his wife including his whereabouts and future destinations.⁹ Such immediate, disobedient responses to the imposition of German authority point to the Alsatian reaction against what was perceived as a foreign, authoritarian power.

While German censorship seems to have failed to discourage all of these attempts at illicit communication, its effects can still be seen in the letters of the *incorporés*. Writing from “onboard,” one soldier, hoping to be granted an extended leave in time to return to his home in Duttlenheim and join his family in the summer cultivation of the fields, mentioned the orders forbidding candid correspondence, “And today, they told us again not to write the truth. What should I write then? That all goes well? It’s all that we have to write.”¹⁰ Those who had yet to make it to the front were evidently less concerned about violating such directives. A friend of Frédéric Hunzinger, Paul Finance also spent an extended stay in the hospital during his time in the *Reichsarbeitsdienst*, though his diagnosis of diphtheria seems to have been genuine. Writing to another friend, he expressed in rather excitable terms the ease with which the Germans could be deceived and the army situation plied for its benefits:

So can you see it for yourself!?? Give yourself a foretaste, but with pleasure... at the beginning, show yourself to be obedient! Write a good resume, if you understand (*Rescue!*— liberation of 1940!)? You have plenty of opportunity, in the company office, where you don’t serve at all, but instead [live] the real bureaucratic life! Once they’ve seen that you’re obedient (because they place great importance on obedience), you’ve won!¹¹

Another *incorporé*, stationed on the Western front, recounted the events of July 20, 1943 from his unit’s perspective. “We were on alert, ready to leave. At midnight, we listened to the Fuhrer’s speech. My sergeant, a NCO, said to me: ‘Well then Bordmann, once we’re on the front, will you open fire on me?’ Everywhere we go in the four corners, they know the opinion of the Alsatians,

that's the crux."¹² As Bordmann seems to suggest, a state of mutual suspicion and distrust seems to have permeated relations between German military officials and their Alsatian recruits.

Beyond the immediate disruption to the routine of their daily lives, Alsations under the rule of Nazi Germany were further forced to witness as the familiar comforts of their pre-war existence disintegrated in the chaos and violence of war. Writing just after the Robert Wagner's decision to mobilize Alsatian draft classes of 1914-1919 for the Germany forces, Eugène Philipps, a member of the 1918 class, wondered about the chilling implications of such a policy:

Whether that will be enough to save Germany, I don't know. Regardless, in my heart of hearts, I will remain what I have always been, and the German uniform will not change that... If I should not return or if some other mishap should befall me, I would not have voluntarily made the sacrifice, and *I refuse the title "hero's death," because if it isn't voluntary, one cannot be a hero, and I don't want to be a German hero, no, a thousand times no.* I am and will remain what I am and have always been!!! My heart is not German, nor can I be. *Against my will, I will go!* But we are not yet to that point.¹³

For Philipps, this point would arrive soon, unfortunately. When it did, his adamant protestations of French national sentiment, admirable though they may have been, served to intensify the nature of the internal conflict he and other *incorporés* faced, when in the field of battle, there would be little room for any form of hesitation. By dint of their tenure in the *Wehrmacht*, the Alsatian *incorporés* were of course necessarily the enemies of the Allied forces. Yet coming to terms with the practical consequences of changing regimes was hardly as simple as acknowledging the reversal of their fortunes. Another *incorporé* worked with the forces of the *Reichsarbeitsdienst* clearing the debris from an Allied bombing of Strasbourg in the fall of 1943. In describing the "atrocious work" of assisting in the devastated neighborhood, he remarked that although the strategically important rail line connecting the city to Germany had been disturbed by the strike, "proportionally the misery of the civilians [was] much greater."¹⁴ Confronted with nearly two hundred dead bodies predominantly made up of women and children, his assessment

continued in grim terms, brightening only when describing the interactions with his fellow Alsatians: “Only the civilian population was touched. For the rest of my life, I couldn’t forget what I saw here... The people behaved marvelously and weren’t taken by panic.”

The letters written by the Alsatian *incorporés de force* reveal a conflict between the soldiers’ internal sense of identity and the external elements of the Nazi regime they encountered within the army. While their correspondences did at times show a remarkable neglect for the prescripts of the censors, they still engaged the ideological challenges posed by participation in the German army only peripherally. Instead, their writing focused on the mundane: agriculturalists worried over their crops, men over their wives, boys over their friends, while all wondered about the fate of the world they had known.¹⁵ In seeking to share what they could of their new lives with distant loved ones, the *incorporés* chose to describe not the tenets of Nazi teachings but rather the realities of conscripted life. Criticism regarding the quality of food appears throughout many letters, while a preoccupation with the efficiency of the *Feldpost* (the German military postal service) was of the utmost importance to all the men who relied on its services for news and packages from home.¹⁶ Significantly, many of the Alsatian *incorporés* maintained an active, engaged communication among their own peer group. Even as the movement of *Wehrmacht* divisions separated *incorporés*, they went to lengths to keep up with their compatriots, helping to make connections among other *incorporés* brought together and passing along news to the families of friends in service.¹⁷ Understandably, men clung to their ties in Alsace, and to France itself. Yet from the moment of Germany’s invasion of France, the importance of regional identity surmounted that of national citizenship. Eugène Philipps expressed his thoughts on the matter in March 1943: “These events are very unfortunate for our little motherland. Alsace is alone. She must fold. She is obliged to drink this chalice to the thick.

What does she have in her tragic destiny? Who will understand it? No one.”¹⁸ Alsace’s particular history with Germany certainly played into this; a typical French-identifying *incorporé* whose family had been resident in Alsace for at least three generations might have parents born under the German Empire and grand-parents who remembered belonging to France during the emperorship of Napoleon III. What remains to a man of such confused nationality are the tangible elements of belonging. In a mournful poem entitled “*Mes montagnes*,” André Vogel expresses the longing he felt for home:

Regards, my charming mountains,
Encircling the beautiful Alsace
Regards from this far away land
Where I’ve found nothing of your kind
Towards you goes the melancholy of my heart
When alone I recall
You and all that you contain
My little treasure, all my happiness¹⁹

Beyond all the terror soldiers beheld on the fronts of World War II, the Alsatians swallowed a truly bitter pill, forced to accept the reimposition of foreign dominion along with the loss of their nationhood. Though soldiers’ letters home contained relatively few mentions of their opinions on the ideological chasm separating them from their Nazi “allies,” they did in fact contain a wealth of information on how Alsatians were able to direct their energies throughout the war, focusing on the small acts of defiance that could serve to subvert their duties to the German military. Perhaps the most compelling commonality that emerges from the study of the *incorporés de force* is their dedication to *la vraie patrie*, the true Alsatian motherland. In reconciling themselves to the defeat and loss of the France they had known, many Alsatians instead capitalized on their shared history as a people beaten but never defeated.

¹ The political region so hotly contested by both Germany and France has been called many names, each meant to signify slightly variant political and geographical areas. Historians typically prefer to speak of “Alsace and Lorraine,” which corresponds nicely to the modern regions’ names. The specific part of Lorraine that fell under German domain between the Franco-Prussian War and World War I has frequently been referred to as Moselle, the original department name derived from the Moselle River. For simplicity’s sake, this study is restricted to the experience of soldiers hailing from Alsace, though there were few practical differences in the administration of the *Elsaß-Lothringen* territory under the Third Reich. As such, it will make frequent reference to the “Alsatians,” recognizing that contemporary authors often conflated the experiences of *incorporés* from both regions.

² In the preface to the 1993 published collection of his letters and journals from the war, Eugène Philipps writes that “despite the incontestable efforts made by historians, the media and the press in Alsace, this troublesome moment in the history of Alsace, and, in particular, the problems tied to the incorporation by force into the Wehrmacht of the Alsatians of my generation, still remains little known and above all little appreciated beyond the Vosges” (p. 11). This assessment largely bore out in my own research. Apart from a popular, sensationalized autobiographical account of questionable validity (*Le Soldat oublié* [Paris: R. Laffront, 1967]), the vast majority of publications offering first-hand accounts of the incorporation have been published in the last fifteen years.

³ Philippe Dollinger, et al. *Histoire de l’Alsace* (Toulouse: Edouard Privat, 1970), 57-70, 86-120.

⁴ For writing on the phenomenon of French-German *revanchisme*, see the writings of Laurence Turetti, *Quand la France pleurait l’Alsace-Lorraine* (Strasbourg: Nuée Bleue, 2008), and Bruno Ferry, *L’art patriotique face à l’annexion* (Strasbourg: Editions du Quotidien, 2014).

⁵ *Europe Since 1914: Encyclopedia of the Age of War and Reconstruction*, ed. John Merriman and Jay Winter, (Detroit: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2006), s.v. "Alsace-Lorraine." Gale Virtual Reference Library, accessed October 28, 2015

<http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CCX3447000033&v=2.1&u=norm94900&it=r&p=GURL&sw=w&asid=ff2cb12e90d03a92fb8bfd9b43ab2839>.

⁶ Frédéric Hunzinger to Aline (Cheftiane) Janès, October 20, 1942, in *Lettres de Malgré-Nous*, 23.

⁷ Frédéric Hunzinger to Robert and Retzel, January 24, 1943, in *Lettres de Malgré-Nous*, 39.

⁸ Maurice Reppel and Norbert Reppel, *Mon père, une famille, la guerre : lettres d'un malgré nous. Destin d'un Alsacien, 1943-1945* (Colmar: Do Bentzinger, 2012), 56.

⁹ Eugène Philipps, journal, January 2, 1943, in *Une tragédie pour l'Alsace*, (Strasbourg: Editions S.A.L.D.E., 1993), 238.

¹⁰ Robert Geistel to his parents, May 18, 1944, in *Lettres de Malgré-Nous*, 150.

¹¹ Paul Finance to Victor Preiss, November 21, 1942, in *Lettres de Malgré-Nous*, 32.

¹² Georges Bordman to friends, July 30, 1944, in *Lettres de Malgré-Nous: Témoignages d'incorporés de force alsaciens* (Strasbourg: Nuée Bleue, 2012), 185.

¹³ Eugène Philipps, journal, January 2, 1943, in *Une tragédie pour l'Alsace*, (Strasbourg: Editions S.A.L.D.E., 1993), 238.

¹⁴ Jean Hugel, September 8, 1943, in *Lettres de Malgré-Nous*, 43.

¹⁵ François Wambst wrote a friend on November 1, 1943: "During the entire day, I was sad and depressed as never before, and I don't know why or how it came to be so. I reflected on my destiny a lot. What is yet in store for me? I don't know." In *Lettres de Malgré-Nous*, 95. For

examples of a husband's worries, Jacques Baltzer's daily letters to his wife in *Lettres de Malgré-Nous*, 59, 68, 71.

¹⁶ In particular, the lengthy and frequent letters of Jean-Pierre Bader to his mother show the extent to which both of these concerns could monopolize an *incorporés'* correspondence. See *Lettres de Malgré-Nous*, 34, 46, 50, 54, 60, 102.

¹⁷ See the letters of: Frédéric Hunzinger to Robert, November 17, 1942, in *Lettres de Malgré-Nous*, 31; Marcel Thomas to the Fuchs family, September 18, 1944, in *Lettres de Malgré-Nous*, 217.

¹⁸ Eugène Philipps, journal, March 16, 1943, *Une tragédie pour l'Alsace*.

¹⁹ André Vogel, June 18, 1943, in *Lettres de Malgré-Nous*, 57. Ironically, while the poem title, meaning "My Mountains" and the text of the letter were both written in French, both letters included in Vogel's letter were composed in German.

When Movie Magic Conjures ‘Historical Amnesia’:
The Over-Personalization and Simplification of the Origins of Nazi Antisemitism in Film

Rita Thompson

History 3573: Politicizing Prejudice in the 19th Century

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When Movie Magic Conjures ‘Historical Amnesia’

Nazi anti-Semitic hate has fascinated many scholars, as evidenced by the amount of scholarship on the subject. However, popular history specials and documentaries have oversimplified the reasons behind Nazi policy and chose to focus on Adolf Hitler. After watching four television documentaries on the subject: *Mystery Files: Hitler*; *The Most Evil Men and Women in History: Adolf Hitler*; *Hitler & Stalin: Roots of Evil*; and *Evolution of Evil: Hitler, Benchmark of Terror*, I found that, in most cases, these documentaries over-personalize the origins of Nazi anti-Semitic policies. In doing so, the films ignore the social climate and popular political thinking of the 19th century, such as the rise in nationalist sentiment, the anti-Semitic political movement, and a belief in race ‘science.’ By personalizing the origins of Nazi programs, the films portray Adolf Hitler as an anomaly instead of a culmination of many factors grounded in the society in which he lived.

The discussion in this paper centers on these four television documentaries about Hitler and the Nazis. I will compare each of the films’ stated reasons for Hitler’s anti-Semitism, as well as examine widely circulated anti-Semitic writings which influenced Hitler and the greater German community. All of the documentaries discussed in this paper are available through one of the following services: Netflix, YouTube, or Amazon video. I feel this makes them most likely to be viewed by the general public and therefore, have the potential to shape widely held ideas on the subject of Nazi anti-Semitism.

The films’ spotlight on Adolf Hitler is understandable because he was an imposing political presence in his time. Consequently, the fallout from many of his policies is still felt today. Hundreds of documentaries and films discussing his life and the Nazi party exist. Within many of these programs, Hitler is recognized as the epitome of evil, the ultimate monster. In

terms of the origins of Nazi anti-Semitism, this emphasis is misplaced. The viewers are supposed to believe that Hitler initiated the genocide of millions of Jews on the strength of his charisma alone. According to the films, he did this as revenge for what he believed were the wrongs done to him, and Germany, at the hands of the Jews. This personal hatred drove him to “convince a nation of sophisticated, civilized people to be complicit in his sickening crimes.”¹

In the four documentaries discussed in this essay, the filmmakers undoubtedly put Hitler forth as the driving force behind Nazi anti-Semitic policy. The films influence viewers to believe two common themes: Hitler’s anti-Semitism began during his time in Vienna, and that Hitler blamed the Jews (German or international) for Germany’s defeat in World War I. No matter how the films may present this information, they tend to come back to these common ideas in regard to the origins of Nazi anti-Semitism. Even though there may be truth in these statements, they usually derive from Hitler’s book, *Mein Kampf*, or his speeches, which present difficulties.

In my analysis, I found several problems with this personalization of Nazi policy origins. First, the filmmakers leaned heavily on *Mein Kampf* as a source. Although the book was written by Hitler, it is largely a work of propaganda seeking to influence public sentiment as well as pander to it. Using this book as the definitive source for Hitler’s feelings towards Jews is a mistake. *Mein Kampf* was written following Hitler’s failed coup of the Bavarian government in Munich, a part of the greater Weimar Republic. Hitler was jailed and had no political power at the time of its writing; but, as his failed ‘Beer Hall Putsch’ suggests, he was clearly seeking to gain some. Hitler had an agenda when writing the book; he wanted to create a clear political ideology for the Nazi party and gain political power. Because of his very specific goals and plan, Hitler’s words should be weighed carefully. In other words, anything within the book should not

¹ “Hitler: Benchmark of Terror,” *Evolution of Evil*, season 1, episode 2, directed by, aired July 23, 2015 (Amazon.com: Amazon Digital Services, Inc., 2015) Web Instant Streaming

be accepted as the whole truth and should be checked and compared against other sources. In historical research and historiography, it is commonly understood that a “historical fact is something that happened in history and can be verified as such through the traces history has left behind.”² The films offer little to no proof of any verification being done on the information they extracted from *Mein Kampf*.

Secondly, filmmakers exerted little effort to expand outward from Hitler and those with a vested interest in furthering the Nazi Party narrative—people like Hermann Goering, Joseph Goebbels, and Heinrich Himmler. Because of this narrow focus, viewers are given the false impression that the Nazis invented and masterminded the anti-Semitic political platform. In fact, only one of the documentaries, namely *Mystery Files: Hitler*, attempted to refute any of Hitler’s claims in *Mein Kampf*, or to balance them with other information. The lack of historical context in the films is a problem. A filmmaker’s historical retelling of events needs to keep the environment in which the featured happenings took place in mind, or there is a risk of “violating the boundaries of...possible meanings in the service of their own particular interpretation.”³ It does not seem like context was fully appreciated or presented within these films.

Another issue that should be approached with skepticism is the films’ strategic use of top-notch professors and scholars for commentary. The films include interviews with prestigious figures within the academic community. However, the employment of these figures do not lend the films any more legitimacy when the final product was possibly edited by filmmakers to have a certain bias, thereby changing the intention of their statements. Even if the filmmakers did not intend wrongdoing, pertinent information could have been left out due to the time constraints of the program, thus further damaging the message of the academic. In the course of this research I

² Richard Evans, *In Defense of History*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000) 66

³ *Ibid*, 80

was not able to discover who set the parameters for the material presented. For instance, did any of the scholars who participated have input into the direction that the program would take? This would include issues such as what events to highlight as pivotal moments in Hitler's life, and how they shaped him or contributed to his later actions.

One such event the films consider pivotal is Hitler's move to Vienna. *Mystery Files* and *Hitler & Stalin: Roots of Evil* discussed the anti-Semitic and racist literature circulating the city from 1908-1913, while Hitler was a resident.^{4 5} *Evolution of Evil* largely ignored this literature and stated different reasons for the importance of Hitler's time in Vienna. The film theorizes that the violence used by the Nazis was modeled after the strategies of militant socialist and communist groups Hitler had contact with while there. The filmmakers believed that Hitler witnessed the effectiveness of these violent tactics and incorporated them into Nazi practices.⁶

However, the four films do not give any context to the anti-Semitic literature of the period, which is a huge failure on their part. This literature was widespread and often combined anti-Semitism with nationalism and a hostility to new wealth. This new 'modern anti-Semitism' contained a combination of anti-modernism, anti-capitalism, and anti-liberalism, therefore rooting it in the social conditions and constructs of the period well before Hitler was a political player in Europe.⁷

In Germany, certain political parties started to draw upon those deeply held fears and prejudices and use them for political gain. The Christian Social Party, a political party in

⁴ "Hitler," *Mystery Files*, season 2, episode 2, directed by Marc Tiley, aired June 6, 2011 on Smithsonian Channel, available on Netflix Instant Streaming, Web.

⁵ Kara Dusenbury and Anthony Potter, *Hitler & Stalin: Roots of Evil*, directed by Diane Lechtiz, (History Channel: 2002) YouTube, Web streaming. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6u7j3zDxWI8>

⁶ *Evolution of Evil*, 1:2

⁷ Marcel Stoetzler, *The State, the Nation & the Jews, Liberalism and the Anti-Semitism Dispute in Bismarck's Germany*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press: 2008) 191

Germany, and the Berlin Movement, were crucial in carrying forward the ideas that Jews had infiltrated the business structure of the country. Negatively linking Jews to the fabric of business helped intensify anti-capitalism in Central Europe. The emergence of the new industrial economy contributed to the mistrust of both capitalism and modernity. As a consequence of the mistrust of capitalism, anti-modernism became prevalent because of its connection to investment and capitalism. This link also helped spread the theory of conspiratorial Jews attempting to undermine German workers and the German nation. It was helped along by the presence of international Jewish banking magnates, such as the Rothschild family, who owned banks throughout Europe. The idea of a conspiracy of Jews working against the German public gave people a sense that Jews were not really Germans, but were enemies of the state.

The nationalist tinge to the pamphlets and publications was an influential tool in captivating and drawing in readers at the turn of the century. In some circles a hostility already existed toward migrants from Eastern Europe living in Vienna. At the beginning of the 20th century, the city had one of the largest Jewish populations in Europe. In 1910 Vienna, only 48% of the population had actually been born there.⁸ In fact, Vienna was not unique in its hostility to new arrivals. Over the course of the 19th century, an important debate had taken place concerning the nature and meaning of a ‘nation.’ The argument focused on the central question: Was a nation determined by a common language, ethnicity, or a shared culture? During this period, nationalists began to “make sense of [nations] in radically new terms...from the nation as emblem to the nation as identity.”⁹ For example, in Central Europe, Slavic minorities strove for autonomy from the Hapsburg Empire. On this subject, Steven Beller discussed how Slovak

⁸ Rudiger Wischenbart. *Vienna: The World of Yesterday, 1889-1914*. Ed. Stephen Eric Bronner and F. Peter Wagner (New Jersey: Humanities Press: 1997) 36

⁹ Helmut Walser Smith. *The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press: 2008) 7

“resentment against Jews in Hungary...had a real basis in the support of most Hungarian Jews for the...Magyar—national cause. Jews in these cases were...supporting the national enemy.”¹⁰

So, the enmity towards Jews and the ‘other’ happened all over Central and Eastern Europe, including Germany and Austria. In fact, the aggression felt by the Jews in Hungary, and the rhetoric used against them was similar to that deployed in other parts of Europe. The enmity, aggression, and rhetoric made up some of the key components at work within the literature to which Hitler had access. These debates over who did and did not belong had been going on well before German unification and Hitler’s birth.

Another social issue driving the anti-Semitism of the time was class divisions.

Throughout the Pan-Germanic Empire during the 19th century, involvement in the financial markets and banking caused problems for Jews when they “appeared to occupy a privileged position.”¹¹ Prior to Jewish emancipation, there was a contingent of Jews who worked as court bankers, putting them in close proximity to the ruling elite. Many Germans felt that Jews were able to overcome barriers that common Germans could not, and therefore would never find themselves in the places of distinction seemingly dominated by Jews. In addition, the idea of a “‘privileged’ Jew was complicated by the conflict of nationalities...the Jew appeared as an accomplice of the dominant historic nations...a member of the wealthy oligarchy.”¹² The problems of national identity coupled with class divisions mixed to create the ‘villain Jew.’ To protect themselves against the harmful influence of Jews, many Europeans found reasons to exclude Jews based on their perceived wealth, privilege, and influence. In Europe, the greater German population had discovered the tools which legitimized the marginalization of their

¹⁰ Steven Beller. *Anti-Semitism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York: Oxford University Press: 2007) 65

¹¹ Peter Pulzer. *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany & Austria*. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: 1964) 296

¹² Ibid

Jewish neighbors, namely class strife and nationalist sentiment. Eventually, the employment of race science found its way within that demoting rhetoric as further justification for placing a limit on Jewish influence in society.

Racial science created another rationalization for anti-Semitism. It gave a scientific and academic foundation for the idea of minority inferiority. The discipline started in earnest with the work of Joseph Arthur, Comte de Gobineau, and the publication of his influential *An Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races*, in 1855. It was translated into German in 1897 as *Versuch über die Ungleichheit der Menschenrassen* by Ludwig Schemann for the Gobineau Society.¹³ Ludwig Schemann was a member of the Bayreuth Circle and a founding member of the Gobineau Society, along with Richard Wagner and others of the Circle.¹⁴ After Gobineau's work, the nature of anti-Semitic writings started to change. In the Post-Gobineau period, some anti-Semitic publications began including a racial bias against Jews based on this science, instead of concentrating solely on their religion or culture. It is important to note that these ideas about race were significant in providing a justification for the eugenic policies of the Nazis, but were popular long before Hitler came on the scene. Marcel Stoetzler argues that in turn of the century Vienna, racial anti-Semitism was a "deliberately offensive form of saying something that could also be said, and had been said, in other ways."¹⁵

Houston Stewart Chamberlain was another member of this group of racial separatists. He wrote the groundbreaking *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, which was still selling very well internationally, and was widely read in the early 1900s. In fact, a new edition and an

¹³ Elizabeth A. Drummond, "Schemann, Ludwig (1852-1938)" in *Anti-Semitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution*, ed. by Richard S. Levy, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005) 640

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Marcel Stoetzler, *The State, the Nation & the Jews, Liberalism and the Anti-Semitism Dispute in Bismarck's Germany*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press: 2008) 192

additional English translation of this influential text was published in 1912.¹⁶ Chamberlain wanted to substantiate the idea that humans were made up of separate races recognized by identifiable characteristics.¹⁷ By 1914, the book had sold over 100,000 copies and Alfred Rosenberg, a prominent Nazi ideologue, considered it “an indispensable accompaniment in the coming struggle for German freedom.”¹⁸ Through this book, Chamberlain managed to create a space for a largely middle class audience to engage in “respectable anti-Semitism” by using pieces of nationalist sentiment mixed with racial ideologies already present within German society.¹⁹ Chamberlain’s book was highly influential in the development of Nazi policy.

Other books that influenced racial science were Joseph Deniker’s *The Races of Man: An Outline of Anthropology and Ethnography* (1900), and William Z. Ripley’s *The Races of Europe* (1899). Deniker wrote of six, mostly European, races.²⁰ William Z. Ripley had a theory of three races. Ripley stated, “Race, properly speaking, is responsible only for those peculiarities, mental or bodily, which are transmitted with constancy along the lines of direct physical descent from father to son.”²¹ These ideas were another component used to justify the eugenics movement and helped validate Nazi Germany’s Nuremberg Laws. The fact that there was a proliferation of race scientists before and during Hitler’s early years, proves its popularity and pervasiveness in the culture prior to the Nazis.

¹⁶ Roderick Stackelburg, “Chamberlain, Houston Stewart (1855-1927)” in *Anti-Semitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution*, ed. by Richard S. Levy, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005) 113.

¹⁷ Geoffrey G. Field, *Evangelist of Race: The Germanic Vision of Houston Stewart Chamberlain*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981) 180

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 225

¹⁹ Ruth Rinard, Review of *Evangelist of Race: The Germanic Vision of Houston Stewart Chamberlain* by Geoffrey G. Field. *The German Quarterly* 56 (1983), 183–84. doi:10.2307/404860.

²⁰ Joseph Deniker, *The Races of Man, An Outline of Anthropology and Ethnology*, (New York: Walter Scott Publishing Co. Ltd., 1904) 325

²¹ William Z. Ripley, *The Races of Europe: A Sociological Study*, (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1923) 1

Additionally, the films also considered Hitler's rejection from Vienna's Academy of Art as pivotal in his formation of Jewish hate. *Hitler & Stalin: Roots of Evil*, portrayed Hitler as believing his rejection was instigated by Jewish members of the Board of Admissions for the Academy.²² The film gives no information about how this conclusion was reached or the evidence it is based on, but I believe it has roots in *Mein Kampf*. *Mystery Files* speculated that his inability to get into the Academy fed into his sense of being an outsider, possibly leading him to look outward for social acceptance.²³ Lastly, *Evolution of Evil* hazarded that Hitler's rejection plunged him into a deep depression. He lived on the streets of Vienna and made contact with communists and socialists. According to the film, Hitler had a front row seat to the violent tactics these groups used, which showed him the effectiveness of violence as a political tool.²⁴

Evolution of Evil and *Hitler & Stalin: Roots of Evil* both agreed that Hitler's time in Vienna was his first exposure to Eastern European Jews.^{25 26} The films differ on what impact this exposure had on Hitler. *Hitler & Stalin: Roots of Evil* believed it pushed him towards racist and anti-Semitic publications.²⁷ *Evolution of Evil* used Hitler's words in *Mein Kampf* to establish how he became an anti-Semite in Vienna. It claims that the large Jewish population in Vienna bothered Hitler. Another quote from *Mein Kampf* is used to illustrate Hitler's hate for the Jews of the city. "Wherever I went I now saw Jews. The more I saw, the more sharply they set themselves apart in my eyes from the rest of humanity. I had ceased to be a weak kneed cosmopolitan and became an anti-Semite."²⁸

²² Dusenbury and Potter, *Roots of Evil*.

²³ *Mystery Files*, 2:2

²⁴ *Evolution of Evil*, 1:2

²⁵ *Evolution of Evil*, 1:2,

²⁶ Dusenbury and Potter, *Roots of Evil*

²⁷ Dusenbury and Potter, *Roots of Evil*

²⁸ *Evolution of Evil*, 1:2. This is the quote as it was taken from the film. A text of *Mein Kampf* is not available to check the quote for accuracy. The book has not been published in many years due to its contentious nature.

A problem exists with narrowly focusing on Hitler's *Mein Kampf* writings. There were many newly arrived Eastern European Jews in Vienna at this time, but there were also many assimilated Jews who did not 'set themselves apart.' Sigmund Freud, Stefan Zweig, Gustav Mahler, and Karl Kraus were all important figures in Austrian society, and none of them segregated themselves from the non-Jewish Viennese community. In the *Evolution of Evil's* featured quote from *Mein Kampf*, Hitler drew attention to the newly arrived immigrants, but never mentioned the Jewish scholars, journalists, composers, or writers who were thriving in Vienna who looked no different from the rest of the population.

Mystery Files addressed Hitler's *Mein Kampf* claims through Dr. Richard Evans. This was the only film which attempted to balance the material from *Mein Kampf* with other information. Evans stated that despite Hitler's assertions, the historical record shows no proof he demonstrated any signs of anti-Semitism before 1914 (Hitler left Vienna in 1913).²⁹ Dr. Evans conceded that Hitler read anti-Semitic literature while in Vienna, but points out that reading this literature was not unusual during that time period.³⁰ Dr. Evans' statement was the only indication in any of the films that widespread anti-Semitism existed before the rise of the Nazi party, although this fact was not explicitly stated.

In terms of anti-Semitism, the other shaping life event the films referred to was World War I. The effect it had on Hitler's world views must be scrutinized carefully. The lasting effects of war on all parts of a population can be significant. According to *Mystery Files*, in *Mein Kampf* Hitler wrote of his belief that in 1916-1917 Jews were no longer supportive of the War. Dr. Evans addressed this claim, telling viewers that instead of a lack of support, Jewish soldiers were

²⁹*Mystery Files*, 2:2

³⁰*Mystery Files*, 2:2

overrepresented in the war effort.³¹ The percentage of Jewish soldiers serving in the military was well over the percentage of Jews in the general population. Again, *Mystery Files* was the only film of the four that tried to give a balanced treatment to the subject matter. On the subject of World War I, *The Most Evil Men and Women in History* gives its only contribution to the origins of Hitler's hate. This film posited that Germany's defeat in World War I angered Hitler, who believed a conspiracy of Jews responsible.³² The film did not give any other information about the origins of Nazi anti-Semitic policies or of Hitler's personal anti-Semitism.

But if Hitler believed there was a lack of effort or support from Jews, he was not the only one. In October 1916, the Prussian War Minister ordered the Judenzählung, or 'Jew Count,' a count of Jewish soldiers serving on the front as opposed to those serving in the rear in non-combat roles. A belief existed that Jews found ways of evading front line combat service. Anti-Semitic groups pressured the government to do something to put the 'shirking Jews' to work. Commanding officers were required to determine how many Jewish enlisted men, officers, and medical personnel were in their regiment. They also counted how many Jews had been decorated or killed, as well as the number serving in the rear but fit for forward combat.³³

John H. Morrow cited the beginnings of this governmental census as concerns with the food supply in Germany.³⁴ The problems with food distribution were put into the Prussian War Ministry's hands. Therefore, civilians and the military were reliant on the War Ministry to meet the demands of both populations. The War Ministry created the War Food Office to deal

³¹ *Mystery Files*, 2:2.

³² "Adolf Hitler," *The Most Evil Men and Women in History*, season 1, episode 3, aired October 1, 2001, (Discovery Channel: 2001) YouTube, Web streaming. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wMwnz36L4as>

³³ Michael Geheran, "Judenzählung (Jewish Census)" in *1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, ed. by Ute Daniel et al. (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2015) doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.15463/ie1418.10684>.

³⁴ John Howard Morrow. *The Great War: An Imperial History*. (New York: Routledge, 2004) 164

separately with civilian needs. However, this largely toothless agency had no power to enforce any of the policies or restrictions it put into place. As hunger and frustration grew, so did a need to focus anger outward, and it fell on the traditional enemy of the state, “the Jew, the middleman, the shirker, as the source of all their woes.”³⁵

The Hindenburg Program, and its goal to co-opt as many men as possible from all other areas as manpower for the front was also a contributing factor in conducting this ‘census,’ but these two things do not exclude the fact that pressure from anti-Semitic groups was the reason that only the Jewish population was counted. The results of the Judenzählung were never published to general public, in part because of Kaiser Wilhelm II’s anti-Semitic leanings, and the fact the results did not present political gains for anti-Semitic groups. The news that Jewish soldiers and civilians were exonerated of impropriety was not the hoped for result. The findings were kept within the upper echelons of the military and government. Even though these claims against Jews proved untrue, the failure to publish the results gave a false legitimacy to the charges against them, and helped reinforce prejudices against Jews.

Contrary to the films’ portrayals, hostility toward Jews was not new in Germany and Austria. In the late 19th century, political parties on the Right who were proponents of anti-Semitism, such as the Christian Social Party, began their rise in prominence. These political movements enjoyed popularity among the common people, but it did not translate into elective successes. The radicalism of these parties was not appealing to the masses even if many of their fundamental anti-Semitic ideas were.³⁶ However, the Christian Social Party and the Berlin Movement managed to effectively instill their anti-Semitic ideas culturally, despite their lack of political success.

³⁵ Ibid

³⁶ Beller, *Anti-Semitism*, pg. 64

In Vienna, one of the most noted figures of political anti-Semitism was the mayor of the city, Karl Lueger. Consequently, he was also the founder of the Austrian Christian Social Party. Lueger's tenure as mayor covered the years 1897-1910, which puts Hitler in the city during his time as its leader. Lueger was successful because he depicted his Liberal adversaries as Jewish, utilizing the widespread ethnic prejudices present in Vienna at the time.³⁷ In short, anti-Semitism had been ingrained into the political framework for over thirty years before Hitler was in Vienna, or a member of the Nazi party. The Nazis were able to recycle and rework the concept of political anti-Semitism to their own ends.

However, even though anti-Semitism was present, its popularity and the utilization of anti-Semitism in politics, and society, depended on the social struggles taking place at a particular time.³⁸ When there was widespread social friction, anti-Semitic feelings seemed to rise, only to fall when conditions got better. Therefore, there were times when anti-Semitism was more pronounced and worked as a constricting force against Jews, as opposed to others when it was present, but less outspoken.

A shift in the way anti-Semitic hatred manifested itself took place at the turn of the 20th century. Typically, animosity toward Jews had exhibited itself through discrimination, threats, and violence, but systematic murder was rare.³⁹ Before this period, pogroms and violence against Jews and 'others' had been mostly spontaneous, driven by the populace, and had not been state-sponsored.⁴⁰ But as the 19th century wore on, nationalism and race permeated into anti-Semitic

³⁷ Ibid, 66

³⁸ Peter Pulzer, Review of *Exclusionary Violence: Antisemitic Riots in Modern German History* ed. by Christhard Hoffman et. al in *Central European History* 36, no. 2 (2003): 288-289

³⁹ Helmut Walser Smith, *The Continuities of German History*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 8

⁴⁰ Jay Howard Geller, Review of *The Butcher's Tale: Murder and Anti-Semitism in a German Town*, and *Exclusionary Violence: Antisemitic Riots in Modern German History* in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 18, no. 2 (2004) 320-321

rhetoric and the nature of the violence changed.⁴¹ Societal conditions in Central Europe were also changing, which triggered an ebb and flow of anti-Semitic tensions. By the early 20th century, the numbers of State and government sanctioned ‘exclusionist’ style murder rose, which indicated a shift in the way these acts of hatred were carried out. Therefore, despite what many might believe, Hitler was not the architect of state sponsored murder or genocide. This trend began in the late 19th century and was carried into the 20th century by others.

The most remarkable of these early acts of government endorsed violence was the Ottoman genocide of Armenians in Turkey, which began in 1915.⁴² The historical record shows that Hitler was aware of the atrocities committed against the Armenians. While Hitler’s reaction to the massacres at the time is unclear, in 1939 he was quoted as saying, “Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?”⁴³ Because of the context in which this rhetorical question was given, there are many who believe he felt this lack of attention justified the killing of Slavs in Poland and elsewhere in 1939.⁴⁴ My own analysis leads me to believe that Hitler took what he perceived as the world’s lack of attention, as a signal that his own orders and actions would be quickly forgotten, allowing him to ‘get away with murder.’ Although Hitler was not referring to Jews, but to the people of Poland when he made these statements, the words still demonstrate his understanding and knowledge of government sponsored killing, as well as the possibility that memory was temporary or could be managed. When Hitler spoke, he was pointing out what David Myers called “historical amnesia.”⁴⁵ This is the same concept that is

⁴¹ Helmut Walser Smith, *The Continuities of German History*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 117

⁴² Tim Anderson, "Chapter One: Background," *Armenian Genocide 1*, (*Book Collection Nonfiction: High School Edition*, 2009)

⁴³ Kevork B. Bardakjian, “Hitler and the Armenian Genocide,” (Cambridge: The Zoryan Institute, 1985) 1

⁴⁴ Louis Paul Lochner, *What about Germany?* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1943) 2

⁴⁵ David Myers, Review of *Hitler and the Armenian Genocide* by Kevork B. Bardakjian, *Holocaust and Genocide Studies: An International Journal* 2 (1987), 177

being propagated through these four films. A lack of sufficient context and an oversimplification of the subject matter creates an environment where such an ‘amnesia’ can thrive.

Although there is a great deal of coverage on World War II and the Third Reich in these films, the origins of Nazi anti-Semitism are over personalized and under contextualized. These films give entertaining, but largely speculative information based on dubious primary sources, such as *Mein Kampf*. Each presentation exhibited a definite slant and bias, demonstrated by the information it included and excluded. This is true even when allowances are made for the time constraints of television and film programming. Largely missing from the films are: the prevalence of racist, anti-Semitic literature in Central Europe, the rise of nationalism, and the importance of race science in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. None of the *credible* information the films mentioned was out of the ordinary for the time period.

Without the proper context being provided viewers are misled into believing a simplified version of events. Almost every Nazi policy had a precedent that was unoriginal to the Nazis, they were not inventing anything new. Presenting Hitler’s personal anti-Semitism as the only driving force behind Nazi policy is misleading. It disregards the widely held beliefs of the masses, and their social context. Nazi policies would not have been successful without the deep rooted social beliefs of the time. The focus must be taken off of Hitler’s personal anti-Semitism as the driving force behind Nazi policy. Because as this paper demonstrates, widespread bias and discrimination against Jews was common all over Europe during this time period, particularly in Germany and Austria where anti-Semitism had been used politically. However, if a focus *must* be placed on Hitler, it should be on his willingness to find and administer an efficient, industrialized way to carry out large scale, state-sanctioned murder, which was actually original to the Nazis.

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Shorter Works

Our shorter works section underscores the important role that more limited research plays in the learning process of OU history students. Not every paper is a senior thesis, but these submissions are nonetheless exceptional in their lucid style, excellent research, and range of interests. John Sulkowski's "Student Stars: How the Media Covered 1960's Student Protest Leaders," demonstrates the continuing importance of analyzing the role our media plays in influencing our perception of history (Written for Dr. Ronnie Grinberg). Our other short paper, Caleb Farris's "The King and I?: An Analysis of Social Class and Loyalty in the Sagas of the Icelanders," describes the role of social hierarchies in Viking society. It is not only brilliantly written, but underscores the utility of non-traditional sources in analyzing ancient society. (Written for Dr. Roberta Magnusson). Both of our short papers this year are important historical works that prove the quality of our students' work.
-Sarah Miles

Student Stars: How the Media Covered 1960s Student Protest Leaders

John Sulkowski

HIST 3573

Protest movements fighting for civil rights, free speech, an end to the Vietnam War, women's rights, and a generally more democratic political system and open culture marked the 1960s. While historians largely agree that media coverage and portrayals of 1960s movements and their leaders did not match reality well, they are divided on which side is to blame, how leaders felt about media coverage, and the consequences of media treatment for the larger movements. This paper will shed light on these debates and offer a synthesized analysis of the various aspects of how the media covered the protest movements of the 1960s. The media's tendency to distort the messages and actions of movements and turn leaders into celebrities regardless of their desire for fame helped lead to the disintegration of and popular backlash against the protests and a wide range of consequences for leaders, such as Mario Savio of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement (FSM) and Mark Rudd of the Columbia chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), from withdrawal to burn out.

Historians debate whether the media or activists were more responsible for the distortion in the coverage of 1960s protest movements. Edward Morgan, a professor of political science at Lehigh University who has done extensive research on the 1960s, belongs to the large group who views the media as more at fault. Morgan argues that the mass media "systematically reinforce the prevailing order" through three key ways that emerged during the 1960s.¹ First, the media determined what views were acceptable to have and delegitimize those that are radical or outside the dominant debate of elites. Thus, dissent could occur, but it was limited to within the bounds set by the media, which reflected establishment interests. Additionally, the media sought to entertain their audience by overdramatizing people and events. This led to little public discussion and exposure to real issues. The third way was the media's consumerism and thus

¹ Morgan, 88.

tendency to commercialize anything rebellious or generally outside the mainstream. This undermined non-conformity by bringing it into the very mainstream it was rejecting.² This side of the debate sees the media as having distorted protest movements by presenting them as far outside the bounds of the proper discourse, focusing on their most radical and provocative elements and actors, and undercutting their image and truth by selling them to the mainstream.

Paula Eldot, a history professor at California State University in Sacramento, exemplifies those who believe the protesters to be more at fault. Eldot argues that student protesters have tended to overstate and radicalize larger trends in American society.³ In regard to the FSM, she finds the students becoming increasingly militant and violent over time to the point that their activity becomes revolutionary. This is shown in their massive demonstrations designed to disrupt campus activity and the leaders' aversion to compromise. Furthermore, Eldot argues that the FSM leaders manipulated the largely moderate student base into following them in radicalism. Focusing on one leader, Mario Savio, she rejects his equation of the system at Berkeley to Mississippi and finds his rhetoric revolutionary and radical.⁴ For Eldot, the more radical students, especially leaders, exerted undue influence and drug their movements farther outside the mainstream creating great distortions.

The distortion debate also has a middle ground that holds both activists and the media accountable for the kind of coverage provided. Paul Weaver believes each side contributed significantly to false news. Weaver, the former Washington Bureau Chief and Assistant Managing Editor at *Fortune* and also a professor of political science at Harvard University, has done considerable work in trying to expose hidden problems in news coverage. Weaver argues

² Morgan, 88-90.

³ Eldot, 269.

⁴ Eldot, 277-8.

that the media actually helped movements and their leaders stage the news by presenting their actions as genuine, authentic protests.⁵ In trying to appear credible, the media could go too far leading to a particularly structured story lacking in substance and based on simple facts, an overly objective voice, and the exclusion of details that may undermine the narrative.⁶ Weaver also finds fault with the activists, such as those in the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, who, in his mind, sought to gain exposure and sympathy by staging sit-ins and strikes. With the Sproul Hall incident, the most famous FSM demonstration in which hundreds of students took over a campus building and were later forcibly removed by police, Weaver sees the FSM trying to make political gains by capitalizing on the publicity provided by the media's coverage of it as authentic and real rather than staged and scheming.⁷ By examining the lives and leadership of Mario Savio and Mark Rudd, this paper shows that the media were mostly responsible for distortions in coverage.

Media coverage of Mario Savio, a leader of the Berkeley FSM, was characterized by over-dramatization and an undesired elevation to celebrity status. Savio's critiques of the university's treatment of students were not taken seriously by the media and were cast aside as radical. One *Washington Post* article called the activists "rebels without causes."⁸ They are compared to the student protesters of the 1930s, who were seen as legitimate and positive forces who helped bring about the New Deal in a terrible time in America's history. In contrast, the Berkeley activists are viewed as protesting various issues to fill a lack of self-worth rather than wanting to create social change out of concern for those oppressed. Savio is singled out as the embodiment of this problem with the FSM. He is presented as participating in Freedom Summer

⁵ Weaver, 28.

⁶ Weaver, 32.

⁷ Weaver, 31.

⁸ John Chamberlain, *Washington Post*, December 29, 1964.

to give his life some meaning.⁹ In actuality, Savio demonstrated a passion for civil rights before going to Mississippi. His Catholic upbringing instilled a strong moral inclination toward social justice and helping the oppressed. Savio joined civil rights group upon arriving at Berkeley. He was arrested for a protest he helped organize of discriminatory hiring at a Sheraton Hotel in 1963.¹⁰ Thus, this characterization of Savio is inaccurate and ignorant of his personal background. In other instances, the media sought to discredit Savio and the FSM by presenting them as far outside the mainstream.

Savio's image was also distorted by how the media covered FSM incidents. Following the major sit-in at Sproul Hall in December, 1964, which may be viewed as the culmination of FSM, a *Chicago Tribune* article classified the event as "organized rioting."¹¹ The students are presented as violent rebels comparable to communists leading revolutions around the world. Indeed, the article focuses considerably on the leftist involvement in the FSM and sit-in despite admitting its actual numbers being relatively small. Savio is presented as the sole leader of the event, tied in with communists, and against the administration proposed "peace plan."¹² The article is clearly attempting to delegitimize Savio and the protest by making them appear extremist. This portrayal was wildly inaccurate though. Savio despised hierarchy and was overtly non-Marxist. He was also just one leader among many in the highly democratic FSM, so the view of him as the leader of the sit-in undermines the FSM's structure and elevates Savio to a higher position than he or anyone else wanted.¹³ Additionally, looking at Savio's speeches during the sit-in shows a lack of violence and ideas that are not unreasonable. Before the event

⁹ John Chamberlain, *Washington Post*, December 29, 1964.

¹⁰ Cohen, 49-51.

¹¹ *Chicago Tribune*, December 8, 1964.

¹² *Chicago Tribune*, December 8, 1964.

¹³ Eynon, 51-2.

began, Savio emphasized order and peace in the protest. He urged students not to bother painters in the building and he encouraged everyone to participate in learning and discussion of freedom and to watch movies once inside.¹⁴ This seems to be a far cry from violent revolution and destruction. Savio critiqued bureaucracy and asked for greater freedom for students in speech, protest, and learning in another speech given inside Sproul Hall. He mentions that all he is advocating is adherence to freedoms and proper treatment clearly enshrined in the Constitution and founding of the nation.¹⁵ Thus, the issues he and FSM were protesting were actually not very radical and certainly not extremist as the article portrayed them. Media coverage tended to present them as revolutionary and unreasonable though as the students were viewed as privileged and unable to be truly oppressed. The media frequently made Savio the spokesperson and face of the FSM. This was a reputation that compromised both his and the movement's democratic principles and thus caused him great personal anguish.

In the first biography of Mario Savio, Robert Cohen, a history professor at New York University, chronicles Savio's life from his working class, Catholic upbringing to his rise to leadership of FSM to his departure from the public eye for much of his later life. Savio's fiery rhetoric and incredible oratorical skills launched him to the top of FSM and made him a media star. A sort of cult of personality even developed around him.¹⁶ However, Cohen argues that Savio actually disliked the media attention. Savio did not want to be placed above everyone else and felt uncomfortable at the power and influence his celebrity status might afford him. Cohen argues Savio was truly committed to the democratic ideals he and the movement espoused.¹⁷ Indeed, Savio's interactions with the media confirm his personal anguish. Frustrated with a

¹⁴ Savio, *Bodies Upon the Gears*.

¹⁵ Savio, *An End to History*.

¹⁶ Cohen, 10.

¹⁷ Cohen, 133-6.

growing cult of personality and elevated status above the rest of the movement, Savio refused to do an interview with a *New York Times* reporter unless the rest of the FSM leadership was included. He desperately tried to change the media coverage of FSM as solely his movement to more accurately represent its highly democratic spirit.¹⁸ Bret Eynon, the former Research and Education Director for the American Social History Project of the City University of New York, shares this view with Cohen. Eynon notes how Savio and the FSM were deeply inspired by the civil rights movement and thus modeled their movement on it. This meant decision-making was collective in nature and had a more bottom up approach. Savio, in particular, tried extremely hard to make the FSM inclusive and democratic and create a sort of community feel within the movement.¹⁹ Deeply committed to his ideals, Savio anguished over the unwanted fame and pressure the media pushed on him in an interview with Eynon. He felt uneasy about being viewed as the spokesperson for the entire movement and how that ignored the great contributions from everyone else and undermined the FSM's ideals. Savio experienced tremendous personal feelings of guilt and shame from his status.²⁰ These inner conflicts were significant factors in his disbanding of the FSM after it reached its goal and his withdrawal from activism altogether.²¹

Todd Gitlin, a former president of Students for a Democratic Society and now a sociologist, also notes how the media created celebrities from the protest movement. Like Cohen, Gitlin sees the media as creating many celebrities or stars from student movements. Those who were most vocal, dramatic, and radical in addition to those with great charisma got the most attention.²² This could hurt movements by creating leaders ill suited for the role.

¹⁸ Cohen, 134.

¹⁹ Eynon, 59-61.

²⁰ Eynon, 61-2.

²¹ Cohen, 245.

²² Gitlin, 146-9.

Gitlin aligns with Cohen and Eynon in telling how Savio rejected the fame granted to him by the media ultimately leading to his stepping down from leadership and activism. Gitlin also mentions how Savio struggled internally a great deal with how to balance his celebrity with his democratic ideals.²³ Some leaders followed the Savio pattern, but many did not according to Gitlin. Gitlin argues that other leaders used their media given celebrity to grow their own image, which they may then use to further their movement's agenda or simply make a career out of their celebrity.²⁴ Mark Rudd, an SDS leader, fell into this second category.

Mark Rudd gained celebrity status from the media coverage of the Columbia University student protest of 1968. Being in the media center of New York City, the protest received extensive coverage. Despite several organizations and leaders being involved in the Columbia protest, the media selected Rudd, who had recently been elected president of Columbia's SDS chapter, as the representative and spokesman of the revolt.²⁵ In his book, *Underground: My Life with SDS and the Weathermen*, Rudd tells his story of his time as a radical. In his book, Rudd discusses the role of the media in his life and the protest and the advantages and disadvantages it provided. Rudd hoped to use the extensive press coverage to make people aware of the issues at stake and to spread the movement across the country and even the world.²⁶ In this respect, Rudd was similar to Savio. They both thought media attention could be useful in engaging and gaining the support of those outside the actual protests.

After their initial protests ended, however, Rudd departed greatly from Savio's behavior. Rudd continued to use his celebrity for the movement and even himself while Savio retreated from activism altogether. Rudd embraced his stardom rather than downplayed it like Savio did.

²³ Gitlin, 176-8.

²⁴ Gitlin, 166.

²⁵ Gitlin, 150.

²⁶ Rudd, 96.

A fellow movement member said celebrity status captivated Rudd. While claiming to use his fame to help the movement, many in the movement saw Rudd thoroughly enjoying it. Rather than emphasize the democratic structure and group leadership of SDS and the student movement, Rudd grew his own image and influence by embracing his media-created role as spokesman.²⁷ Rudd recognized there were some advantages to his celebrity such as his ease in attracting large audiences and an ability to make money for SDS through his public appearances. He went on a speaking tour after being expelled from Columbia to grow the protest movement. He also found he was able to advance his own more militant vision for SDS though. He used his celebrity to gain a following and make a run at the SDS national presidency in 1969 as leader of the more action based, confrontational Weathermen faction of SDS. Rudd even advocated for himself by referencing his stardom and role as a symbol of the movement as why he should be president.²⁸

Rudd was overall disappointed in the media's treatment of the Columbia protest because it concentrated on the events of the uprising rather than the motivations behind it. An article discussing the police raid that ended the nearly weeklong occupation of five buildings on the Columbia campus focused mostly on the police events. It dedicates only a few sentences to explaining why the students took such drastic action and simply notes their protest of the building of a gymnasium due to the surrounding Harlem community's opposition to it.²⁹ This barely scratched the surface of why the students rose up though. Rudd also notes how the *New York Times* and Columbia University were well intertwined with one another. Columbia connections filled the university's board of trustees as well as the editor ranks of the paper. This led to constant bias in favor of the university and its administration by the influential newspaper

²⁷ Gitlin, 153.

²⁸ Gitlin, 151.

²⁹ Peter Millones, *New York Times*, May 1, 1968.

in Rudd's opinion. However, the fact that the paper published a story on the police raid before it actually occurred gives support to Rudd's assertion.³⁰ The coverage of police behavior was also inaccurate in favor of Columbia and the police. The article on the police raid mentions next to no instances of violence. It presents a peaceful picture of the removal of students and attributes injuries to crowd dispersal of spectators to the raid.³¹ However, Rudd insists that the police attacked the students without restraint in a violent, bloody affair that left hundreds injured.³² Additionally, almost no coverage was even given to the story of police attacking a *New York Times* reporter.

Rudd also complains in his book that he and others "tried to explain why we were forced to take action, but the press could only portray us as lunatic, destructive kids."³³ The media did not seem to care about reporting the real reasons behind the protest, which were weapons development supporting the Vietnam War by Columbia research and the lack of care of a racist nature for the surrounding Harlem community from which Columbia had been acquiring property.³⁴ In fact, the students actually had real, strong feelings about these situations and acted to stop them. Mark Rudd's activism was heavily informed by his Jewish heritage and own experiences in Harlem. Growing up Jewish just after World War II, Rudd thought extensively about the Holocaust and what it meant for Jews. He imagined the horror he might have experienced had his family not come to America the generation before. This led Rudd to identify with oppressed or targeted peoples, such as the Vietnamese and African Americans.

³⁰ Rudd, 97.

³¹ Peter Millones, *New York Times*, May 1, 1968.

³² Rudd, 87-8.

³³ Rudd, 97.

³⁴ Rudd, 98.

Rudd strongly opposed the Vietnam War and saw the United States as murdering innocents.³⁵

Rudd also came to sympathize with African Americans and the Harlem community around Columbia through a tutoring program he participated in early on in college. Rudd became close with a poor, black boy he tutored and his family. He became passionate about ending poverty and racism and believed Columbia to not only be failing to help address the problems but making them worse by evicting people from their homes and encroaching on their community and through other forms of subtle discrimination.³⁶

The media focused in on Rudd rather than the racism and support for the war by the university that were the real issues behind the protests. Trying to provide entertainment, the media usually gave attention to the most active, outrageous, or flashy of protesters.³⁷ Rudd was already a leader of the “action faction” of SDS before the Columbia protest and thus a prime target for the media. Within a month of the Columbia protest, the *New York Times* had done a story on Rudd that documented his upbringing and life leading up to the uprising. The reporter even interviewed Rudd’s parents for the article. Even this story did not dive deep into Rudd’s motivations for activism though. It presented his activism as filling some personal void rather than stemming from true concerns for oppressed people.³⁸ This personal story on Rudd illustrated how the media elevated him though and made him the celebrity of the Columbia protest. The media’s desire for the provocative only led Rudd further down a radical path based on aggressive action.³⁹ Unable to gain control of SDS, the Weathermen faction broke away after the elections in 1969. It become increasingly violent and revolutionary and went underground in

³⁵ Rudd, 23-4.

³⁶ Rudd, 7-9.

³⁷ Gitlin, 153.

³⁸ Steven V. Roberts, *New York Times*, May 19, 1968.

³⁹ Gitlin, 193.

1970. The split weakened SDS and the violence associated with the Weathermen discredited its celebrities like Rudd as other activists and the public became alienated from the movement.⁴⁰ Rudd emerged in 1977 when he turned himself into authorities after being a fugitive sought by the FBI for over seven years. While Rudd still attracted a large media crowd, he seemed burnt out by his fame and the new direction of his activism and refused to speak with the press or draw extra attention to himself.⁴¹ Rudd now regrets giving into the media attention and using his celebrity the way he did. He feels that it hurt him and the movement by compromising their democratic principles, feeding into the false media narrative, and hiding the contributions of other leaders and the rank and file.⁴² Thus, over time Rudd has come close to the position Savio held when he left activism in 1964.

While there is a consensus on media coverage and movement realities not aligning, there is great disagreement over who is to blame. This paper argues that the media are largely responsible for distortions in coverage of 1960s activism. When protesters employed tactics different from their professed ideals, it was generally to gain the attention of a media that had largely ignored them. This sometimes caused more distortion as movements were forced to drift away from their original stances. Additionally, there are a wide variety of ways leaders, such as Mario Savio and Mark Rudd, gained celebrity status from the media and how they handled it, especially the tension over a need for individual leaders' abilities and a desire for collective decision-making. While some leaders used their celebrity poorly and caused distortion themselves and thus deserve some blame, the media are still ultimately for their constantly inaccurate coverage and their pushing of leaders down a fame filled but more radical path.

⁴⁰ Gitlin, 164-5.

⁴¹ Dorothy Collin, *Chicago Tribune*, September 16, 1977.

⁴² Rudd, 319.

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The King and I? : An Analysis of Social Class and Loyalty in the *Sagas of Icelanders*

By Caleb Farris

Professor Magnusson

Vikings and their World

April 23, 2015

At the height of Viking history, social class was an ever present feature of society from the Scandinavian mainland to the distant colonies of the western isles and Eastern Europe. Although the class system of the Vikings was stratified and decided by birth with little to no social mobility, individual and group loyalties often blurred the lines between ruler and subject. These complex allegiances between entities such as class, kin, and one's own self were important aspects of life. Nowhere else is this theme more apparent than in the *Sagas of Icelanders*. Through analysis of *Egil's Saga* and the *Saga of the People of Vatnsdal*, loyalty can be seen as the central defining exception to the class system of Viking society.

Scholarship

Scholarship pertaining specifically to social class in Viking society is difficult to come by. Although there is a fair amount of research that focuses on slaves and the slave trade, overall class studies seem to be severely lacking. Through research into many scholarly and sudo-scholarly works it seems that class, compared to other subjects like raiding and sailing, is often just briefly glimpsed over when discussing society or social structures. This deficiency in the scholarly body of Viking history may very well be correlated with the general feeling of uncertainty many primary sources leave behind. Where some vague law code or accepted social norm may affirm a rigid social structure, a saga could contradict a well as support through its complex interlace of loyalties. This difficulty is what many scholars have had to work around in the past century, and is exactly what this paper intends to address directly.

In one of the earliest secondary works on Viking history, *the Viking Age (1889)* by Du Chaillu, the author claims that “from very early times the people of the North [Scandinavians]

were divided into classes”¹. Chaillu also claimed that through the *Rigsmal* poem alone there can be found 5 definite classes, “the *slave*; the *karl* or *bondi*; the *jarl*, and the *hersir*”². In Chaillu’s overall analysis of various sources he even lists a possible 7, “Konung, Jarl, Hersir or Lendmann, Hauld, Bondi, Leysingri, and Thrall”³. Similarly scholars such as William R. Short (2010), Magnus Magnusson (1980), and Kirsten Wolf (2004) acknowledge the possible existence of classes that varied more or less with Chaillu’s list. All of these authors do however seem to agree on three major class categories existing. These categories are slaves (Thralls, unfree), free men (the broadest class including everyone from tenants to chieftains), and Nobles (chieftains, earls, kings, and titled men). With the exception of Iceland in which the “traditional Scandinavian social structure was flattened”⁴, as many people moved there to escape the oppressive unilateral monarchy, this system is largely how society was structured throughout North West Europe.

Du Chaillu also pointed out that “this demarcation into classes was acquiesced in by the people of the land, for it could not have existed a single moment without their will”⁵. The Scandinavian peoples came to accept their stations in society as it was reinforced by “their surroundings and their Mode of Life”⁶ from birth until death. Although detailed, and more or less accurate compared the other works listed earlier, perhaps Du Chaillu’s most important insight on

¹Paul B. Du Chaillu, *The Viking Age* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1889), 486.

² Paul B. Du Chaillu, *The Viking Age* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1889), 486.

³ Paul B. Du Chaillu, *The Viking Age* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1889), 491.

⁴ William R. Short, *Icelanders in the Viking Age: the People of the Sagas* (London: McFarland & Company Inc., 2010), 32.

⁵ Paul B. Du Chaillu, *The Viking Age* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1889), 486.

⁶ Paul B. Du Chaillu, *The Viking Age* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1889), 486.

Viking social class is his claim that “no man was allowed to rule over the people unless he excelled in many things”⁷. Much more modern scholarship agrees with Chaillu’s assumptions (although not directly referencing him) regarding the will of the populous and the need of higher classes to be remarkable in many ways. In this an important research question is raised. If all leaders had to excel in many things, how much prowess could separate one noble from another?

The Vikings: A Very Short Introduction by Julian D. Richards is a brief but thorough map of Viking history. Published in 2005, it serves as a modern secondary source of the main features and theories that are in the scholarly dialogue today. Although the work does not have a section that focusses on the origins of class and the structure of society, it does mention it as an important aspect of the various colonies that the Scandinavians settled.

When discussing Iceland and how it was founded Richards claims that contrary to the belief that farmers were more or less equal, “medieval Icelandic society comprised several hundred powerful farmers each in control of a considerable number of people on his own estate and having political authority over up to 3,000 lesser farmers”⁸. Iceland showed a good example of the society of Scandinavians upon their first arrival, including the families of *Egil’s Saga* and *the Sagas of the People of Vatnsdal*. Roberts also points out that “Land ownership was the basis of economic as well as political power. Livelihoods depended upon stock-breeding, supplemented by fishing and fowling, rather than cereal cultivation”⁹. As a side note when discussing the colonies of Greenland and the theories behind why they failed, Roberts claims that, parallel to the Scandinavian mainland, “Farmers lived in a stratified society controlled by

⁷Paul B. Du Chaillu, *The Viking Age* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1889), 486.

⁸Julian D. Richards, *The Vikings: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford UP, 2005), 103

⁹Julian D. Richards, *The Vikings: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford UP, 2005), 103

powerful chieftains and church officials. The social and economic structure rested upon payment of tithes to landowners, the church, and the Norwegian crown”¹⁰. This system along with many other factors including nationalistic (meaning also systemic) and occupational pride, made the Greenlanders unwilling to adapt and thus spelt their eventual abandonment of the Greenland settlements. This unilateral structure is exactly what the characters in the sagas will be confronting.

Primary Sources

For the purpose of the paper, the only primary sources used are the Icelandic sagas that are being analyzed in conjuncture with existing scholarship. The Saga’s of Icelanders are an impressive collection of stories based around wealthy and prominent Icelandic figures of the late first millennia. In the past century these sagas have been criticized more and more for their questionable authenticity. This is due to the presumption that most of them were written down in the 13th century by Snorri Sturluson, a medieval Scandinavian aristocrat. Even though Snorri wrote the sagas several centuries after the events in the sagas took place, he did it by piecing together existing written works and oral traditions. Yes, there is a good case against the extent of their use as accurate historical depictions. However, questionable the material may be, it has not stopped many scholars in the past 123 years from Du Chaillu in 1889 to Anne Pederson in 2014 from using them in their works. This repeated use suggests that although they are not exactly history, their credibility is up to the discretion and interpretations of the scholar.

Prologue: Resistance towards Unilateral Rule

¹⁰ Julian D. Richards, *The Vikings: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford UP, 2005), 115

In Egil's Saga, social class and loyalty clash from the very beginning. Starting chronologically at the beginning of Egil's saga, King Harald Tangled-Hair has begun his conquest of Norway. When many people rise up against Harald's aggression, King Audbjorn calls upon Kveldulf, the eldest of Egil's line in the saga, to join in the fight against Harald with him. However Kveldulf, a wealthy farmer of some upper class renown, is not convinced the conflict involves him at all, even if his king requests it. He replies "I don't think it's any duty of mine to go up north to more and fight there to defend other people's land... I have a feeling Harald has plenty of good fortune in store for him, but our king doesn't have enough to fill the palm of his hand"¹¹. Kveldulf declines the request of his king to defend the land that he has no connection to, but which he knows will eventually lead to the fall of the province he does live in.

This conflict between king and subject so early in the text is significant. Kveldulf outright denies the request of his Konung (king) on the grounds that he has no obligation. This suggests that at least with the upper class farmers, who are considered by Kirsten Wolf to be "the most important class"¹² in Viking society, loyalty was specifically a domestic issue when it came to rulers and subjects. That is if it doesn't directly involve oneself or ones kingdom, rulers had little authority. This also suggests a disdain for unilateral authority in a culture where no one could, let alone should, be prominent in society unless they possessed significant personal prowess.

Attempts at Reconciliation between Independence and Servitude: Act I

In the Saga of the People of Vatnsdal, this question is echoed. How much prowess and respect separates the classes and when is it legitimate? The Saga of the People of Vatnsdal is an interesting source in this regard. In the saga there are prominent characters who out right support

¹¹ Snorri Sturluson, "Egil's Saga" *the Sagas of Icelanders*, Bernard Scudder (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 10.

¹² Kirsten Wolf, *Daily Life of the Vikings* (London: Greenwood Press, 2004), 107.

a king, but then also live their lives separated from that kind of direct authority. A good example of a character like this in the saga is Ingimund, the founder of Vatnsdal. One summer when Ingimund is raiding with his friend Saemund they came upon a battle between King Harald Tangle-Hair and local chieftains. Seeing this Ingimund declares “All the mightiest men in the land are committed here; but I think that King Harald is the worthiest of them”¹³. Ingimund would then go into battle for King Harald believing it right to support an excellent leader who could also reward his loyalty. This was normal thing for good warrior to do at the time. As Anne Pederson pointed out “generosity was a mark of the worthy ruler” and “Loyalty was rewarded and the gifts served as a reminder to all of the donor’s wealth and status”¹⁴. Interesting enough, Saemund an equally stout warrior “would not risk his life for the king’s sake; and he took no part in the battle”¹⁵. Unlike Ingimund, Saemund did not think any benefit that could come from loyalty to the king would be worth wagering his life. This could very well be Saemund also recognizing the downside of being in the king’s service rather than independent. Even Ingimund advises him that “it seems to me not a bad idea for you to head for Iceland, as many worthy men do these days who cannot be sure of defending themselves against the power of the king”¹⁶. Through the suggestion by Ingimund, who chose the king’s side, that one could defy the king and still be worth his stock is important. This odd duality of loyalty could very well be an

¹³ Snorri Sturluson, “the Saga of the People of Vatnsdal” *the Sagas of Icelanders*, Andrew Wawn (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 201.

¹⁴ Anne Pedersen, “Power & Aristocracy” *Vikings life and legend* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2014), 128.

¹⁵ Snorri Sturluson, “the Saga of the People of Vatnsdal” *the Sagas of Icelanders*, Andrew Wawn (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 201.

¹⁶ Snorri Sturluson, “the Saga of the People of Vatnsdal” *the Sagas of Icelanders*, Andrew Wawn (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 203.

attempt by Ingimund to reconcile with the traditional independence of his culture and the fast expanding centrality of rising kingdoms.

Attempts at Reconciliation between Independence and Servitude: Act II

Returning to Egil's Saga, the subject of social class, loyalty and allegiance becomes even more complex. At this time now Harald Tangel-Hair is the king of a large swath of Norway including Kveldulf's province. It is arranged that relations between Kveldulf and King Harald should be more or less the same as it was between his family and the last king. However pressure by this more powerful king and the opportunity that he offers persuades Thorolf, Kveldulf's son, to join King Harald. Just like Ingimund and to other Vikings, the offers of rewards for loyalty were very enticing.

Thorolf in response to Harald's offer "swore allegiance to the king and joined his followers"¹⁷. Likely this agreement was both for the wealth and prestige he could acquire as well as for the protection of his family and kinsmen, some of which join King Harald as well. From here on Thorolf's life takes a defining pivot away from that of his father's.

As the years pass Thorolf does everything from fighting in wars for Harald to becoming nobility under him administrating whole districts of Norway and collecting taxes and tribute. However while under the title given to him by Harald, Thorolf becomes a potential threat with his wealth and influence. When the king is told a lie about Thorolf's loyalty being questionable, he gives Thorolf the opportunity to leave his post and once again join his personal guard. But in

¹⁷ Snorri Sturluson, "Egil's Saga" *the Sagas of Icelanders*, Bernard Scudder (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 16.

doing this Thorolf would have to give up his own war party that had been with him through most of his rise to prominence.

In a system where, according to Scholar Magnus Magnusson, “conspicuous wealth and ostentatious generosity were considered virtues” and “Loyalty to ones lord was reinforced by the distribution of largesse”¹⁸, taking away such an entity would not be a simple demand.

Thorolf replies “I am reluctant to relinquish this band of men... you will decide my title and the privileges you grant me, king, but I will not hand over my band of men for as long as I can provide for them”¹⁹. As a side note, similarly to his father this act is another refusal by a wealthy free man, the request of his king.

Interestingly enough, of all things, Thorolf seems mainly concerned with losing his band of warriors. This perhaps can be attributed to warriors and their chieftains having a personal loyalty to each other. Perhaps more pertinently this could also be seen as an attempt by Thorolf to reconcile with a culture where men of prowess only have so much authority over each other, and with the life he had been living under the king.

This time, the king is not just asking, he is giving a direct command. Harald makes Thorolf an adversary of his kingdom, fulfilling the intuition of his father Kveldulf “That the way things would turn out for you would not bring good fortune to any of us” and when Thorolf visits his family and spreads the news Kveldulf continues “I have an intuition that this will be our last meeting”²⁰. At this moment the saga could be making a statement that alliances with those who

¹⁸ Magnus Magnusson, *Vikings* (New York: Elsevier-Dutton, 1980), 18.

¹⁹ Snorri Sturluson, “Egil’s Saga” *the Sagas of Icelanders*, Bernard Scudder (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 27.

²⁰ Snorri Sturluson, “Egil’s Saga” *the Sagas of Icelanders*, Bernard Scudder (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 32.

have power and who are also not kinsmen, the center of trust for most Scandinavians, is always dangerous to oneself and one's family.

Either way Kveldulf's intuition is ultimately proven correct when Harald traps Thorolf at his farm. Harald gives Thorolf one chance to give up, "If Thorolf is prepared to surrender and put himself at my power and mercy... then his life and limbs will be spared but his men will be punished as they deserve"²¹. This chance however shows another emphasis on the bands of men Thorolf has under his command and patronage, again suggesting that perhaps warriors that are together for periods of time are more loyal to each other. It could also be suggesting that the king has a no tolerance policy towards men, even under his own command, who have a level of power even close to his own. The latter of which would be a stark contrast to the more flattened (short) social structure wealthy farmers like Thorolf practiced.

In one last act of independence against the system he tried to reconcile with, Thorolf replies "I will not accept any settlement that the king tries to force on me"²². Soon a fierce battle ensues, but Thorolf is eventually slain along with many of his men.

Kin or Konung? : Act III

Soon after the death of Thorolf, a surprising event occurs. Thorolf's kinsmen Olvir Hump and Eyvind Lamb, who are highly trusted by the king, show a partiality towards their fallen kinsmen even if he was an outlaw and hated by the king they serve. One says to the king "My brother and I would like to ask your leave to return to our farms, because after these recent

²¹Snorri Sturluson, "Egil's Saga" *the Sagas of Icelanders*, Bernard Scudder (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 35.

²² Snorri Sturluson, "Egil's Saga" *the Sagas of Icelanders*, Bernard Scudder (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 35.

events we are not in the mood to sit and drink with the assailants of our kinsmen Thorolf²³.

Although they are the king's most trusted members of his party, they still seem to hold family at a high if not equal level of priority, at least morally, as they cannot stand to be around those who killed a member of that trust centered group. Once again there is a duality present that works against the principles that the king is trying to establish in his conquering of Norway. Although Harald eventually lets one return to his home, this duality would soon become too much of a strain on his power.

When Harald's own foster sons are killed by Thorolf's family in revenge, it's the last straw and the flood gates open. A sweep is initiated to kick out or eliminate all those closely related to Thorolf who wasn't already a part of Harald's train. "The king's animosity towards Kveldulf and his son grew so fierce that he hated all their relatives or others close to them, or anyone he knew had been fairly close friends. He dealt out punishment to some of them and many fled to seek sanctuary elsewhere, in Norway or left the country completely"²⁴. Although this was clear revenge by Harald it is also a convenient excuse for him. In a bid to solidify his power must Harald must get rid of those who can prove a threat. This is a substantial sign that at this time mixed loyalties seriously hampered any attempts for centralized power.

Kin or Myself? : Act IV

In the Saga of the People of Vatsndal, loyalties run more clearly but also perhaps much deeper than in the other sagas. But this does not keep other factors from skewing loyalties in certain circumstances. From the start Family is the biggest player in the lives of the people of Vatsndal, which is a village in Iceland. The protagonist, Thorstein, is in a dilemma with himself

²³ Snorri Sturluson, "Egil's Saga" *the Sagas of Icelanders*, Bernard Scudder (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 37.

²⁴ Snorri Sturluson, "Egil's Saga" *the Sagas of Icelanders*, Bernard Scudder (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 49.

and his father. He has not done much with his life and is not as big and strong as his father. He feels disgraced by his father's words that it would "better serve his kinsmen honour if there were a gap in the family line rather than having him"²⁵. This remark, as one could imagine in such a culture, strikes very deep and drives Thorstein on to either win fame or die trying.

In an interesting turn of events, Throstein kills the bandit that singlehandedly plagued the roads leading outside of Vatnsdal. Throstein actually could have been killed along with the bandit had the bandit chosen, however "because of your [Thorstein's] daring and manliness"²⁶, he is released along with a wish by Jokul the bandit that he help take care of his family. Although Thorstein is hesitant at first, considering he's never been referred to as a man of prowess before, he later tells his father, who is now jubilant of his son's being alive. His father however doesn't want him to put his life in the hand of enemies, to which Thorstein replies "I will carry out my promise to Jokul; and even if I bring neither foot back in one piece, I will go there just the same"²⁷. This event in particular shows an importance to family. Not wanting to shame them with mediocrity, Thorstein risk his life to bring them and himself honor. The End of the scene however, shows a tittering loyalty between family and the duties of a man who has not only a life debt, but more importantly has made a promise based on his own honor.

Epilogue

²⁵ Snorri Sturluson, "the Saga of the People of Vatnsdal" *the Sagas of Icelanders*, Andrew Wawn (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 192.

²⁶ Snorri Sturluson, "the Saga of the People of Vatnsdal" *the Sagas of Icelanders*, Andrew Wawn (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 193.

²⁷ Snorri Sturluson, "the Saga of the People of Vatnsdal" *the Sagas of Icelanders*, Andrew Wawn (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 194.

Scandinavian society in the late first millennia was characterized by a stratified class system. Although there were clear differences and boundaries between slaves and nobility, to say the class system was rigid would be overstatement. As the sagas have shown in conjecture with the secondary works, class did not absolutely define a person. Before class could really take hold in society it had to be juggled along with a complex set of allegiances to ones kin and one's own honor/self-interest. Personal prowess meant little if someone couldn't show an equal amount of respect to people just as remarkable or influential. The rise of kings seeking unchallenged authority was in direct confrontation with the culture of the time, and would eventually shape the geopolitical future of Iceland and the Scandinavian nations.

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Honorable Mention

As our journal grows and we receive ever more fine submissions, we have decided on several submissions for an honorable mention. Each of these works was vouched for by one or more of our editors and each merits contemplation and study. Not only is each paper a fascinating read, but these honorable mentions help to demonstrate the quality of work done by OU history students, the myriad of interests they pursue, and the depth of their knowledge. –Sarah Miles

Madison Unruh

The Tragedy at Robin Hood Hills: How the Media, Witchcraft, and a False
Confession Imprisoned the West Memphis Three and Ultimately Led to Their
Freedom

I. Introduction

Beginning in the 1980s, America was plagued with a fear of Satanism and witchcraft. The establishment of Anton Lavey's Church of Satan, the expansion of the Wiccan religion, and cult leaders like Jim Jones and Charles Manson making headlines in the decades prior, culminated in national anxieties over occult practices. In the midst of the hysteria, three gruesome murders of young boys occurred in the small town of West Memphis, Arkansas. Unable to comprehend the shocking homicides, the community turned to witchcraft to explain the unexplainable.

This investigation amalgamates the work of existing scholarship in order to examine how media bias, fears of Satanism, and a false confession worked cohesively to find three presumably innocent teenagers guilty of grotesque murders and ultimately transformed to aid in their release from prison. Police and media reports asserted the homicides were a result of "satanic-ritual-abuse." This claim led the tight-knit, fundamental community to single out one man, Damien Echols, and his friends, Jason Baldwin and Jessie Misskelley, as the perpetrators of the murders due to their affinity for black trench coats and the Wiccan religion. It is the central thesis of this study that the media, witchcraft, and a false confession led not only to the imprisonment of Damien Echols, Jason Baldwin, and Jessie Misskelley but these factors also resulted in their release from prison.

II. Background

On the night of May 5, 1993, three eight-year-old boys, Christopher Byers, Stevie Branch, and Michael Moore, did not return home after school. One day later, police pulled their lifeless bodies out of a creek in their hometown of West Memphis, Arkansas.¹ Each of the

¹ Mara Leveritt, *Devil's Knot: The True Story of the West Memphis Three* (New York, Atria, 2002). 5-10

children was found nude and hogtied with their own shoestrings. Although the boys had similar injuries, unlike Stevie and Michael, Christopher's scrotum was gone and his penis was skinned. Stevie and Michael died from injuries consistent with drowning, but Christopher's cause of death stemmed from multiple wounds.²

The police issued little information regarding the brutal slayings the days following the trial. Police Chief Gary Gitchell did, however, give a statement in which he claimed that his team was not ruling out "gang or cult activity," but he was quick to add there was no evidence to support his notion. Gitchell created a profile for the killers not grounded in evidence, but instead, fear. As a result of this criminal profile, Damien Echols, 18, Jason Baldwin, 16, and Jessie Misskelley, 17, known collectively as the "West Memphis Three", were arrested after a confession from Misskelley. The West Memphis Three were charged with the murder of the three boys exactly one month after the deaths. The subsequent trials found Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley guilty of capital murder. Misskelley was sentenced to life without parole for the murder of Michael and he received an additional twenty years each for the deaths of Stevie and Christopher. The jurors at Damien and Jason's joint trial believed Damien was the ringleader of the group; therefore, he was given the death penalty. Conversely, the jury viewed Jason as an accomplice, and as a result he was given a lesser sentence of life without parole for the three counts in the indictment.³

An unscheduled hearing on August 19, 2011, freed Damien, Jason, and Jessie from the cells they called home for eighteen years.⁴ The West Memphis Three entered Alford Pleas - a

² Leveritt, "Devil's Knot." 10-11, 158

³ *Ibid.* 14, 1, 92-93, 267,190, 275

⁴ *Ibid.* 348

legal maneuver that allows defendants to plead guilty while maintaining their innocence.⁵ Although the West Memphis Three are released from prison, they remain guilty in the eyes of the law.

III. Literary Review

This paper relies on existing scholarship in order to synthesize the three main elements that led to the imprisonment of the West Memphis Three: the media, a fear of Satanism, and Jessie Misskelley's coerced confession. Emily Battersby and Wolfgang G. Robinson argue that "the relationship between media and law is an amorphous, symbiotic one."⁶ Battersby and Robinson use their theory of the intersectionality of media and law as a microscope to examine how the community of West Memphis had preconceived ideas about who was guilty due to media headlines. "The Police Department found the 'killers' and the jury knew this," the authors assert, "not on the basis of personal experience, but on the vicarious experiences cultivated in the media."⁷ Dan Stidham, Haley Fitzgerald, and Jason Baldwin contend that 'Satanic Panic' – the phenomenon of using witchcraft to explain events⁸ - led to a modern day witch-hunt that resulted in the incarceration of three innocent teenagers.⁹ Finally, John H. Blume and Rebecca K. Helm acknowledge that the case against Misskelley relied "entirely on his confession" and without his statement "the prosecution's case could not have survived."¹⁰ Although these scholars address different circumstances surrounding the trials of the West Memphis Three, each are correct. The teenagers were victims of the media perpetuating undue fears of Satanism that led to increased

⁵ Sydney Schneider, "When Innocent Defendants Falsely Confess: Analyzing the Ramifications of Entering Alford Pleas in the Context of the Burgeoning Innocence Movement" (Winter 2013) 281-283

⁶ Emily Battersby and Wolfgang G. Robinson, "Paradise Lost: Media in Injustice and Injustice in Media," (Vol. 22, 2012) 32

⁷ *Ibid.* 49

⁸ Dan Stidham, Haley Fitzgerald, and Jason Baldwin, "Satanic Panic and Defending the West Memphis Three: How Cultural Differences Can Play a Major Role in Criminal Cases," (Summer, Vol. 42, 2012) 1068

⁹ *Ibid.* 1083-1086

¹⁰ John H. Blume and Rebecce K. Helm, "The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty," (2014) 3

pressure on the West Memphis police force, resulting in a forced admission of guilt from one of the defendants.

Though media bias, unwarranted suspicions of satanic ritual killings, and a false confession contributed to the arrest of the West Memphis Three, this study argues that these elements were also crucial in their eventual release from prison. The 1996 documentary “Paradise Lost: Child Murders at Robin Hood Hills” followed the arrests and trials of Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley. Joe Berlinger and Bruce Sinofsky, directors of the biopic, relied on footage from the trial and interviews with the suspects and their families as well as the relatives of the victims. Without narration, Battersby and Wolfgang resolve, “the film’s ultimate conclusion – that the West Memphis Three trials were miscarriages of justice – is never articulated.”¹¹ The documentary sparked a movement to “Free the West Memphis Three” and successfully changed public opinion in favor of the convicted teens. Battersby and Wolfgang make a case for the power of media in changing public perception of the convicts by concluding; “Absent these films [the Paradise Lost documentary trilogy], society, by and large, would not have formed an opinion about the West Memphis Three trials,”¹² following the intense media coverage. Furthermore, the fear of Satanism morphed into a fear of a modern-day witch-hunt. A nation that once feared satanic-ritual-abuse, now was terrified of a corrupt legal system that could use its power to incarcerate three teens for no other reason than they differed from societal norms due to their gothic lifestyles. Lastly, where Misskelley’s false confession led to the imprisonment of the West Memphis Three, a different sort of false confession led to their freedom, an Alford Plea.

¹¹ Battersby, “Media in Injustice,” 50

¹² *Ibid.* 53

IV. The Media Paints a Grisly Picture

International headlines reported the gruesome ‘ritual killings’ in West Memphis following the discovery of Moore, Branch, and Byers’s bodies. These reports created an environment of injustice in West Memphis. *The New York Times* reported that Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley focused their art on “pentagrams, skulls, and snakes” and that they attended a football game “decked in black with black tears painted on their faces.”¹³ Despite acknowledging that there was no official motive for the case, *USA Today* informed readers “the three [boys] were sexually mutilated as part of some satanic ritual.”¹⁴ Attention-grabbing headlines aided in spreading the rumor that the killings were related to witchcraft. A caption for *Reuters News* declared, “Jury Selection Begins in ‘Satanic’ Murders Trial.” The article claims, “at least one of the defendants was active in a small ring of youthful Satan worshippers.”¹⁵ *The Commercial Appeal*, based in Tennessee, avoided the word ‘Satan,’ opting instead for the phrase “shadowy cult,” but the paper quoted Terry Hobbs, Stevie’s stepfather, stating “Satan worshippers... This is some of their work.”¹⁶ *The Ottawa Citizen* painted a grisly picture of Damien Echols. “Echols carried a cat’s skull, wrote satanic poems and called himself Damien [birth name is Michael],” the Canadian newspaper maintains, “he once told a minister he worshipped the devil.”¹⁷ The West Memphis police’s unwarranted killer profile permeated newspapers across the globe, vilifying the teens before they had their day in court.

News segments also hyped the aspect of devil-worship in their nightly news programs. KAIT 8 News, based in Little Rock, Arkansas, claimed that the community was not surprised the children were victims of a ritual killing. “Since the very beginning of the investigation, people all

¹³ “3 Teen-Agers Accused in the Killings of Three Boys,” *The New York Times*, June 6, 1993

¹⁴ Carol J. Castaneda, “2 Sides Emerge of Teens Accused in Slayings,” *USA Today*, June 7, 1993

¹⁵ “Jury Selection Begins in ‘Satanic’ Murders Trial,” *Reuters News*, January 20, 1994

¹⁶ Marc Perrusquia, “Parents of Slain Boys Face Own Trial of Grief,” *The Commercial Appeal*, January 28, 1994

¹⁷ William Thomas, “Arrests of Teens in Kids’ Killings Unleashes Father’s Fury,” *The Ottawa Citizen*, June 6, 1993.

around West Memphis have come forward with stories of satanic cults... One year ago Damien Echols told the church's youth minister he had a pact with the devil and he was going to Hell."¹⁸ Fear-mongering news stories such as this one engendered an atmosphere surrounding the case that was more concerned with religion than physical evidence.

The newspapers did not act alone in perpetuating the myth that the second-graders were offered as a sacrifice to Satan. As previously stated, the police planted the seed shortly after the discovery of the corpses by mentioning that they were looking into cult involvement. According to a case file of Dan Stidham, the defense attorney for the West Memphis Three, the "police leaked misinterpreted facts to the public via police scanners and later to the media itself."¹⁹ A community desperate for answers relied on hearsay and media fodder for details concerning the crime. The public, hungry for answers, was enthralled by the tales of a sadistic cult leader corrupting his friends into the dark realm of Satanism. These depictions of the suspects became the main source of information regarding the murders, causing the public to form false opinions about the teenagers.

On June 4, 1993, a day after police apprehended Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley, Chief Gitchell held a press conference to inform the public the suspects were behind bars. Although Gitchell refused to comment on questions concerning motive, he did alert the media he was confident he had detained the killers. A reporter inquired, "On a scale of one to ten, how solid do you feel your case is?" To this, Gitchell smugly responded, "Eleven," before smiling to the applause that followed.²⁰ The media and Gitchell's sensational remarks added to the delusion that the boys were victims of a cult killing.

¹⁸ *Paradise Lost: The Child Murders at Robin Hood Hills*. Joe Berlinger and Bruce Sinofsky. June 22, 1996. HBO

¹⁹ Stidham, "Satanic Panic," 1067

²⁰ "Paradise Lost"

The media's obsession with the 'satanic killings' in a small Christian community in Arkansas rendered it impossible to find an unbiased jury. During voir dire for Misskelley's trial, a man was dismissed after admitting it would be difficult for him to not be persuaded by details he had heard concerning the case outside of court. Misskelley's confession was entered as evidence in his own trial, but he refused to testify against Echols and Baldwin, making the confession inadmissible in their subsequent hearing. However, defense attorneys for the case knew any potential jury pool would have heard the details in Misskelley's confession that implicated Echols and Baldwin considering the trials occurred in a short time span. On the first day of jury selection for the Echols and Baldwin trial, Judge Burnett asked the prospective jurors who in the room was not familiar with the details surrounding the case; no one raised their hands.²¹ The damage that the media created tainted the jury pool ensuring that the teens could not receive a fair trial.

V. Satan Takes Center Stage

The entire nation, not just West Memphis, feared satanic-ritual-abuse during the time that the brutal murders transpired. Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, children accused adults, mainly teachers and parents, of abusing them during satanic rituals.²² Although many of these cases resulted in acquittal, some of the trials returned guilty verdicts. Further investigation found that in most instances, adult insistence caused the children to claim molestation by Satanists.²³ These paranoid delusions stemmed from an increase in satanic literature and an expansion of

²¹ Leveritt, "Devil's Knot," 157-212

²² Debbie Nathan, "Satan's Silence: Ritual Abuse and the Making of a Modern American Witch Hunt" (Authors Choice Press, Nebraska, 1995) 2-3.

²³ Nathan, "Satan's Silence," 2-3

beliefs that were subversive to Christianity.²⁴ America was in the midst of satanic panic resulting in the public and the courts to consider devil-worship as a motive for murder.

West Memphis was susceptible to crediting horrific events to demons and the devil due to the religious background of the community. The townsfolk fell victim to Demonology,²⁵ which caused the community to blame Satan for the unspeakable crime that occurred in Robin Hood Hills. Echols was an easy scapegoat for the crime due to his fascination with the color black and his collection of heavy metal music.²⁶

Following the arrests of the West Memphis Three, Damien Echols's name became synonymous with Satan. In a news interview with Pamela Hobbs, the mother of Stevie Branch, a reporter inquired if she believed that her boy was the victim of a satanic ritual killing, to which she responded that she did. When asked why she held this belief, Pamela answered, "Just look at the freaks! Just look at 'em. They look like punks."²⁷ Pamela was not alone in her perception that Damien and his friends stood out among others in West Memphis. Stidham notes that Echols was "West Memphis Weird" because he would "wear all black clothes year round" and read books from "an author named Stephen King" and "wrote dark poetry." Stidham concludes that these behaviors rattled the small community situated in the heart of the Bible Belt, whereas his gothic lifestyle would have been accepted in larger cities.²⁸ The police force attempted to connect the murders to the occult from the beginning of the investigation, and Echols's religious studies, drab garb, and love of Metallica made him a convenient target for the department.

²⁴ Demonology is the narrative, specific to every culture that identifies the ultimate evil threatening the group *Ibid.* 2-6

²⁵ *Ibid.* 33

²⁶ "Paradise Lost"

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Stidham, "Satanic Panic," 1065

The suggestion that the second-graders were murdered as a sacrifice to the devil did not exist just in the media and the town of West Memphis - black magic found its way into the courtroom as well. During the trial for Echols and Baldwin, the prosecution bombarded Echols with questions about Satanism, witchcraft, and the occult. Investigators removed posters from Echols's bedroom, raided the local library for books checked out under his name, and put his journals on trial. State's Exhibit 116 was a skull found in Echols's bedroom. Concerning this evidence, the prosecutor questioned, "In addition, there was a skull of some kind - it looks like an animal skull... Are you familiar with this?" Echols replied, "It was a skull me and my stepdad...had found...it was a decoration for my room." Dissatisfied with the answer, the prosecutor prodded further probing if the skull had "any type of Satanic meaning" or "any type of cult meaning" and finally "any type of occult meaning;" each of these inquiries received a firm "no" from Echols.²⁹

Questions concerning Damien Echols's peculiar interests were prominent during his cross-examination. The state hurled questions at Echols such as, "Did you do a lot of reading about the Wicca religion?" "Did you like Metallica music?" "Did you ever use any of that material there [referring to spells found in a notebook of Damien's] to conjure up any evil or anything of that nature?" To each question regarding religious practices, Echols maintained that he was an avid reader of various religions including Wicca, Satanism, and Catholicism.³⁰ This tactic of putting Echols's religious studies on trial further influenced public opinion that he was a servant of Satan and steered not just the public, but also the jury into believing the legend that the killings were part of a ceremony for the devil.

VI. Misskelley's Coerced Confession

²⁹ Transcribed by Douglas O. Linder, University Of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. *Famous Trials*

³⁰ Linder, "Famous Trials."

One month following intense media coverage on the morning of June 3, 1993, Detective Sergeant Mike Allen drove Jessie Misskelley to the police station for questioning regarding the murders at Robin Hood Hills. Detective Allen informed Misskelley that his father would have to sign papers to allow the police to interrogate him.³¹ During the ride to locate his father, Misskelley recalls, “While we was on the way, he told me if I knew anything, that there was a \$35,000 reward, and if I could help them out, we’d get the money.”³² The monetary aspect was significant to Misskelley since he and his father had little wealth.³³ Thus, the West Memphis Police manipulated the young Misskelley before the official interrogation began.

Unbeknownst to Jessie Misskelley during his interview, the West Memphis Police Department viewed him, Damien Echols, and Jason Baldwin as prime suspects in the massacres of Stevie Branch, Christopher Byers, and Michael Moore. Previously, police worked with Misskelley’s neighbor, Vicki Hutcheson, in an attempt to uncover new information about Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley. Their efforts were futile, leading Gitchell and his team to bring Misskelley, an unaccompanied minor, into the police station for questioning. Detective Mike Allen gave Misskelley a ride to the police station at 9:45 A.M., where he remained for nearly twelve hours. While in custody, the detectives read Jessie his rights two different times. Allen, along with another officer from the department, Bryn Ridge, instructed Misskelley to sign the Miranda forms. Although Misskelley claimed to understand his rights, he was unable to sign his name in cursive.³⁴ Misskelley, a young and impressionable minor, was thrust into the middle of a murder investigation without proper representation.

³¹ Leveritt. 76

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Paradise Lost

³⁴ Leveritt, “Devil’s Knot,” 73-76

Next, the department's polygraph expert, Bill Durham, administered a polygraph examination to Jessie Misskelley. Of the experience, Misskelley recounts that Durham questioned him if he had ever used drugs three separate times in the course of the exam. Misskelley admitted to initially lying, but then confessed he had in fact used drugs in the past. According to Misskelley, Durham quipped back, "I know you have because I've seen you sell them." Misskelley adamantly denied any involvement with the distribution of drugs. It was then that Jessie recalled, "That's when he told me I was lying. He told me that my brain was telling him so." Misskelley, convinced Durham told him the machine had the capability to read minds, admitted he "didn't know what was going on" and did not understand how his "brain [could] be telling him that [he] was sitting there lying."³⁵ Misskelley's confusion regarding the process provides insight into how law enforcement was able to coax a confession from him.

By early afternoon, Gitchell conducted an unrecorded interview with Misskelley. During questioning, Misskelley expressed his desire to go home, to which Gitchell responded he could "go home in a minute" as he continued the interrogation. As Gitchell pressed for answers, Misskelley insisted the only details he knew concerning the case came from the press and town gossip. After relentless badgering from Gitchell, Misskelley, in an attempt to return home to his father, gave the chief the responses that he was desperately seeking. Unfortunately for the West Memphis police, however, Misskelley's responses did not align with the details of the crime. "They hollered at me until I got it right. So whatever he was telling me, I started telling him back," Misskelley reasoned, "I figured something was wrong, 'cause if I'd a killed 'em, I'd a known how I done it."³⁶ Jessie's account explains the many inconsistencies he told law enforcement during the unrecorded examination, including the time of death and what material

³⁵ *Ibid.* 78-82

³⁶ *Ibid.* 78 - 81

served as binding for the victim's arms and legs.³⁷ The West Memphis Police used Jessie's gullible nature to pressure him into implicating himself and their target suspects, Echols and Baldwin.

After hours of interrogation by police, Jessie Misskelley's account of events changed dramatically. The teenager who once proclaimed his innocence was now handing West Memphis Police their person of interest, Damien Echols, directly to them. By 2:20 P.M., Misskelley confessed to Gitchell that he had been at the crime scene during the murders.³⁸ It was only then that detectives decided to tape record the interrogation. Stidham notes that the detectives made a conscious decision to use a tape recorder instead of a video recorder because the detectives used pictures and body language to manipulate Misskelley's answers during the official interrogation.³⁹

Even with police priming, Misskelley's official testimony contained several factual errors. For example, Misskelley claimed that he, Echols, and Baldwin skipped school to murder the boys although this testimony did not match the evidence. Additionally, Misskelley asserted he and his friends bound the boys with rope, however; in actuality, shoestrings were used. Furthermore, dialogue between Misskelley and investigators indicate that police coached Misskelley with crime scene photographs during the interview.⁴⁰ Leading questions ensured Misskelley would provide police with information they wanted to hear. "Did anyone ever use – a stick and hit the boys?" Gitchell asked. Jessie had not previously mentioned a stick, but with prompting, he told police that Damien hit one boy with "kind of a big old stick."⁴¹ As further proof of police coercion, Misskelley's version of events aligned with Gitchell's interpretation of

³⁷ *Ibid.* 77-80

³⁸ Leveritt, "Devil's Knot," 80

³⁹ Stidham, "Satanic Panic," 1095

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 1096

⁴¹ Leveritt, "Devil's Knot," 86

the evidence and not the medical examiner's report. Gitchell mistook the dilated anuses of the boys to be a sign of rape, when in actuality the swelling was consistent with the bodies being submerged in water. Moreover, Byers's penis was not skinned in the killings as first assumed, it was removed post-mortem by an animal.⁴² The unethical practices of the West Memphis Police Department made Misskelley, a naïve minor, a victim of police intimidation.

The police department's interrogation methods made Jessie Misskelley's susceptible to falsely confession because of his mental capacity. Misskelley scored a seventy-five on an IQ test a few years prior to the murders, placing him on the low end of normal. His verbal skills, however, were consistent with mental retardation. Despite these findings, the judge found Misskelley fit to stand trial.⁴³ In an examination following Misskelley's conviction, a psychologist determined that his IQ was not on the low end of average, but that Misskelley was in fact, mentally handicapped.⁴⁴ Misskelley, who has the reasoning capacity of a child, aimed to please the authority figures. The graphic photographs, eerie audio recordings, and the police manipulating Misskelley into believing he could not be reunited with his father at home until he correctly answered their questions, frightened Misskelley and left him vulnerable.⁴⁵ Gitchell, Allen, Ridge, and Durham latched onto Misskelley's economic and mental deficiencies in order to coerce a confession.

By today's standards, evidence that Jessie Misskelley's confession is false is compelling, but that was not the case in 1993. The psychology of false confessions substantially improved over the twenty years following Misskelley's trial. During the days leading up to the trial, Stidham realized that Misskelley's acknowledgement of involvement in the crime did not make

⁴² Stidham, "Satanic Panic," 1098

⁴³ "Paradise Lost"

⁴⁴ Stidham, "Satanic Panic," 1093

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 1093-1096

sense, but the phenomenon of people falsely confessing to crimes was not understood at the time. Yet, Stidham, determined to find answers, began researching. “There were three to four people on the planet who knew and understood the dynamics and psychology of a false confession,” Stidham recalls, “I became the fifth or sixth.” Moreover, a confession is the most damning evidence that can be presented at a trial.⁴⁶ In order to win the case against Misskelley, his lawyers would have to convince the jury of the relatively new science behind false confessions. The prosecution’s case relied almost entirely on Misskelley’s confession.⁴⁷ Despite the inconsistencies in Misskelley’s confession to the evidence, ultimately, the jury was not persuaded that his profession of guilt was the result of police insistence.

VII. ‘Paradise Lost’ Changes Public Perception of the West Memphis Three

Following the release of ‘Paradise Lost: The Child Murders and Robin Hood Hills,’ the media that once vilified the ‘Satanic’ teens from West Memphis now embraced them. Newspapers that once speculated the teens were devil worshippers now viewed them as symbols of injustice, persecution, and an example of the failure of the American legal system. Concerning footage from the trial on the documentary, *USA Today* remarked, “The police have at best sketchy circumstantial evidence.”⁴⁸ In 1993, the public viewed the notion of a false confession as fantasy. Now, three years and one documentary later, the public understands the concept of a false confession and evidence of coercion is considered at trials. The *New York Times* described Jessie as the “shakiest of the three suspects” due to his “I.Q. of 72” and the fact that he “confessed to taking a minor part in the crime, then withdrew his confession.”⁴⁹ The lack of narration in “Paradise Lost” means the film’s ultimate conclusion is open to interpretation. The

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 1090-1097

⁴⁷ Paradise Lost.

⁴⁸ Matt Roush, “Murder and Mayhem in a Grim ‘Paradise’,” *USA Today*, June 10, 1996.

⁴⁹ Walter Goodman, “3 Nightmarish Murders Followed by a Wave of Hate,” *New York Times*, June 10, 1996

Austin-American Statesmen concluded, “[The filmmakers] expose some troubling inconsistencies of criminal justice.”⁵⁰ These reports immediately following the release of the “Paradise Lost” showcased how public opinion was turning in favor of the West Memphis Three.

Not all newspapers, however, were willing to alter their perceptions of the convicted teenagers. The *Commercial Appeal*, a paper infamous for their portrayal of the ‘satanic’ teens, was not convinced. After expressing that the film has “nothing enlightening” and “much that offends,” the paper hypothesized, “When Joe Echols [Echols’s stepfather] asks what’s wrong with wearing black... what parent won’t wonder if it wasn’t just this sort of... irresponsible coddling of a kid who was already a juvenile delinquent that led Damien Echols from dabbling in the occult and drinking blood to murder?”⁵¹ The *Commercial Appeal* latched on to the sensationalism that disturbed teens sacrificed the children to Satan, despite the fact there are no proven instances of sexual-ritual-abuse in organized groups of Satanists.⁵² Although *Paradise Lost* changed the conversation surrounding the West Memphis Three, The *Commercial Appeal* refused to entertain the notion the teenagers may have been wrongly convicted.

“Paradise Lost” not only radically changed public perception of the West Memphis Three, but that of the directors of the biopic as well. Berlinger and Sinofsky’s original idea for the movie was to film the high-profile trial of three guilty and bloodthirsty teens, but upon interacting with the victims, the accused, their families, and the evidence, their views markedly transformed. “When we went down there, we were convinced that they'd done it, just based on what we read and because we met the victims' families first," Sinofsky told the *Austin American-Statesman*, “But then we met the boys' families and started digging, and it became more

⁵⁰ Anna Hornaday, “PROFILE: “Paradise Lost: The Child Murders at Robin Hood Hills,” *Austin-American Statesmen* March 7, 1996.

⁵¹ Bart Sullivan, “Film on W. Memphis is Depressingly Vivid and True,” *The Commercial Appeal*, June 9, 1996.

⁵² Stidham, “Satanic Panic,” 1081

difficult.”⁵³ This transformation of beliefs further illustrates how the media corrupted public opinion of the accused before they had their day in court.

The media reversed course after “Paradise Lost” highlighted the apparent injustice of three outcasts in a community of fundamentalists. Though the public once pressured the local police to find the perpetrator, citizens now declared that appellate courts should re-examine the evidence. Out of public interest, Sinofsky and Berlinger created a second documentary, “Paradise Lost 2: Revelations.” In addition to interviews with victim’s families and the West Memphis Three, the sequel focused on support groups that had formed following the initial film that raised funds and consciousness to the plight of the teens.⁵⁴ The “Paradise Lost” documentaries brought awareness to a group who might have otherwise lived out the rest of their days in prison.

Exposure to “Paradise Lost” caused the general public as well as celebrities to fight for the exoneration of the West Memphis Three. Johnny Depp, Metallica, Eddie Vedder of Pearl Jam, and Natalie Maines of the Dixie Chicks raised funds for the incarcerated and spread awareness about the lack of physical evidence.⁵⁵ The celebrity platform was beneficial to rallying support. In fact, whenever the media reported Depp’s involvement with the group, the public’s attention to the case boosted.⁵⁶ The general population likely would have lost interest after the trial ended without exposure from “Paradise Lost” and the celebrity platform.

VIII. West Memphis: A New Salem?

When the nude and broken corpses of three eight-year-old boys were pulled from a shallow creek bed in 1993, the nation feared satanic-ritual-abuse. However, as satanic panic

⁵³ Hornaday, “PROFILE.”

⁵⁴ *Paradise Lost 2: Revelations*. Bruce Sinofsky and Joe Berlinger, June 22, 2000.

⁵⁵ “Johnny Depp: Free the West Memphis Three,” *CBS News*, February 27, 2010.

⁵⁶ Battersby, “Media in Injustice,” 55

ceased and “Paradise Lost” premiered on HBO, the nation found a new fear: a modern day witch-hunt. Similarly to Salem, what happened in West Memphis was the result of an overly religious, tight-knit community that was susceptible to fears of subversion.⁵⁷ In both Salem and West Memphis, unspeakable tragedies unfathomable to the community resulted in demonology. The hysteria spread in Massachusetts and Arkansas, implicating citizens based on hearsay instead of physical evidence. By the end of the twentieth century, the public feared, more than any demon, a corrupt legal system that wielded the power to put Americans on death row for nothing more than social differences.

The comparisons of West Memphis to Salem were prevalent from the beginning of the trial. Perhaps a bit of foreshadowing, the Salem Witch Trials entered the courtroom during the cross-examination of Echols. As the state confronted Echols with books that he had checked out from the library, the prosecution drilled him concerning “a book on witchcraft by Cotton Mather.”⁵⁸ In an ironic twist, the prosecution failed to realize that Cotton Mather was a Puritan minister who did not celebrate Satanism, but in fact, warned about the dangers of witchcraft in his writings and celebrated the executions in 1692.

“Paradise Lost 2” used the notoriety from the original film as a tool to expose how the West Memphis Three were victims of a modern-day witch-hunt. For example, filmmakers interviewed Chris Worthington, a member of the “Free the West Memphis Three” support group. Expressing his concern for the failure of the judicial system, Worthington lamented, “This case is a travesty!...It is a case where someone is in prison right now because of prejudice.”⁵⁹ The prejudice Worthington speaks of is the same prejudice that existed in Salem against people who study beliefs that are seditious to Christianity.

⁵⁷ Stidham, “Satanic Panic,” 1072

⁵⁸ Linder, “Famous Trials.”

⁵⁹ Paradise Lost 2.

The fear of subversion mutated into a fear that America had regressed back to the age of the Salem Witch Trials. This transition from a fear of Satanists to a fear of a witch-hunt was essential to the eventual release of Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley from prison. Where public opinion once corrupted the judicial process with tales of spells and sacrifices, concerned citizens once again aimed to influence the judicial process, but this time the goal was to “Free the West Memphis Three.” Support groups for the now adult men traveled to Echols’s appeals hearings in order to spread their message to anyone who would listen: the victim’s families, strangers, and the media. These justice-seeking persons sold t-shirts to raise money in an attempt to further spread the word. Not only did these members create a website and politic for the exoneration of Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley, but they also corresponded with them in order to provide emotional support.⁶⁰ The documentaries, support groups, and concerned Americans effectively alerted the nation to the injustice that occurred in West Memphis in 1993. The horror of a corrupt legal process led to a national movement that culminated in Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley pleading out of prison eighteen years after their conviction.⁶¹

VIII. The West Memphis Three Are Freed

Jessie Misskelley’s false confession was crucial in convicting the West Memphis Three in 1993, but a different kind of false confession, an Alford Plea, resulted in their freedom. The West Memphis Three entered an Alford Plea on August 19, 2011. Through this arrangement, Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley pled guilty to lesser charges, and in exchange, the court gave ‘time served’ and an immediate release from prison to the West Memphis Three.⁶² The deal was contingent upon each of the three men accepting the plea bargain. If one of the men rejected the Alford Plea, the offer would have been withdrawn to the additional members. The opportunity

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Leveritt, “Devil’s Knot,” 348

⁶² *Ibid.* 4-5

arose in light of new DNA evidence - a hair found in the knot of Michael Moore's shoelaces - discovered in 2007 that did not implicate Echols, Baldwin, or Misskelley. Originally, Baldwin did not want to take the deal and instead go to trial in an attempt to become exonerated in the eyes of the law. Ultimately, Baldwin agreed to enter in the Alford Plea for his friend Damien Echols who faced execution by lethal injection if he lost at trial.⁶³ "This is not justice," Jason pronounced to the courts after pleading guilty, "However, they're trying to kill Damien, sometimes you just have to bite down to save somebody."⁶⁴ The West Memphis Three, although guilty on paper, were now free men.

Empirically, DNA evidence was not sufficient to overturn the West Memphis Three's guilty verdicts. Byers's corpse featured a mark on his forehead that was mistaken as a wound from a belt buckle during the original trials. Forensic scientists later determined the injury to be a bite mark. Like fingerprints, teeth indentions are unique. The court granted Echols a hearing based on the discovery and a dentist made molds of his, Baldwin's, and Misskelley's teeth. Their teeth molds did not match the impression on Byers's forehead. However, the prosecution brought to the stand a dentist who insisted the bite was not human. It is important to note, however, that he admitted he did not make a report or take notes concerning his investigation and he never billed the state for the examination.⁶⁵ This failure at appeal demonstrates how the hair may not have been effective in freeing the West Memphis Three. The follicle matched Terry Hobbs's DNA, the stepfather of Stevie Branch.⁶⁶ However the prosecution could easily claim Moore picked up the hair while at Hobbs's home, as he and Branch were friends. Therefore, it is

⁶³ Blume, "The Unexonerated," 6

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Leveritt, "Devil's Knot," 315-334

⁶⁶ Shaila Dewan, "Defense Offers New Evidence in a Murder Case That Shocked Arkansas," *The New York Times*, October 30, 2007.

unlikely this DNA evidence would be the leading factor in the release of the West Memphis Three from prison.

Similarly to Jessie Misskelley's confession nearly two decades prior, the Alford Plea screamed of injustice. The judicial system made Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley a deal they could not refuse, but the plea came with significant drawbacks. To begin, the West Memphis Three are likely innocent of the crime that they are legally guilty of committing. In turn, this means the victim's families will not see justice for the deaths of their sons since the courts view the murders as a closed case. Consequently, the West Memphis Three are unable to seek monetary retribution from the state for their imprisonment due to the fact that they were not exonerated.⁶⁷ Like many aspects of the case that transformed, a seemingly 'false' confession freed Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley, although justice was hardly served.

Jason Baldwin recognized the irony of entering an Alford Plea after Misskelley's false confession eighteen years prior. "It took a false confession to put us in prison and it took a false confession to get us out," Baldwin remarked at a press conference following his release from incarceration.⁶⁸

IX. Conclusion

In the end, the three aspects of the trial that led to the convictions of the West Memphis Three progressed over nearly two decades and became the reasons for their release. First, the media played a large role in priming not only the jury, but also the prosecution, through their accepted narrative that Satanism and occultism causes crime. By focusing on the gossip, rumor, and hysteria surrounding the case, the media infiltrated the courtroom and prevented six youths from receiving justice. Second, Misskelley's low IQ, poor understanding of the legal system and

⁶⁷ Campbell Robertson, "Deal Frees 'West Memphis Three' in Arkansas," *New York Times*, August 19, 2011.

⁶⁸ Stidham, "Satanic Panic," 1101

his rights, and his financial status, made him an easy target for police coercion. These factors concerning Misskelley accompanied with the media narrative made the prosecution's case appear to be compelling. Finally, the continued existence of the Alford Plea in court cases deems possible innocent defendants guilty and closes off other investigations into the crime. Despite the fact that Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley are no longer behind bars, they, as well as the families of the victims and the convicted, have yet to see justice in the case of Byers, Branch, and Moore and likely never will due to the problematic nature of the Alford Plea.

In this highly publicized case, nearly everything that could have gone wrong to prevent justice did. Although it is unlikely another case will be influenced by each of these elements simultaneously, grand media narratives, the vulnerability of certain populations to false confessions, and the Alford Plea system are still problems in the American judicial system. It is important to study each of these aspects in an effort to maintain impartiality within the courts.

The Deepest Circle of Hell:
Sex Crimes Propagated at Unit 731 During the Pacific War (1931-1945)
March 7, 2016
Kiersten Strachan

In a previous paper on the subject of Unit 731, I argued that Japan, before and throughout the Pacific War (1931-1945), attempted to systemically bolster its imperial credentials as a colonizer by developing its scientific establishment, in an attempt to display that it had surpassed Western nations. The experiments conducted at Unit 731 contributed to this goal. Japanese medical professionals used Unit 731 as an opportunity to conduct experiments on humans, which social stigma and global scientific ethical standards had previously prevented. The results of the Unit's experiments were disseminated worldwide in order to prove Japan's capacity to contribute to global scientific establishments.¹ Additionally, a broad range of sex experiments were also conducted using (mostly) female and child prisoners. When reviewing primary source material that relates to sexual experiments conducted at the facility, it seems that though the scientific or rational motivations underpinned some experiments, other sex crimes cannot be justified as anything other than gross excesses of senseless violence.² While non sexual experiments could be justified as attempts to solve disease, display Japanese modernity, or collected research for the development of advanced biological weaponry, the obscenity of some sex acts committed cannot be justified by these motivations. Why were sex experiments unique? Why were women, whose limbs were black with disease, raped by multiple guards at once? Why were prisoners abused and defiled, as their children, who were the result of forced impregnation, watched? In terms of the abuses that occurred at Unit 731, it is easy to homogenize 'sex experiments' and 'sex crimes' as the same thing. However, when analyzing these grotesque incidents, it becomes clear that the guards of the facility were motivated by different factors during experiments, which I will contrast with sexual violence propagated against the inmate population. The distinction I will argue in this paper is that it was the guards, staff, and independent medical practitioners who

¹ Publications released globally were carefully worded to conceal that test subjects were humans.

² C. Hudson, "Doctors of Depravity," *Daily Mail*, Associated Newspapers Ltd. March 2, 2007.

perpetuated crimes against humanity (expressed in sexual form). In regard to this violent, they acted as individuals, independent from the military-scientific establishment that operated and conceived of the Unit and the clinical sex experiments.

Sex Crimes: Definitional Clarity

Perceptually, it seems easy to accept that sexual experimentation and sexual crimes perpetrated at the facility are not the same thing. However, consideration of what constitutes sexual abuse is culturally and historically specific. Furthermore, a global definition of what international courts consider sex crimes has not been established.³ Despite this, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court establishes a framework with which we can analyze “sexual crimes against humanity.”⁴ Unfortunately, this definition groups specific acts as sexual crimes but does not establish a framework by which crimes can be judged as sexual offenses. For example, whereas we can determine a crime is theft because it has violated someone else’s ownership rights, it is difficult to distinguish if an assailant tearing a woman’s blouse is assault or a sexual crime. However, the Rome Statute provides some clarity, stating that “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity” are definitively sex crimes against humanity.⁵ At Unit 731, where so many crimes against humanity existed, aggregating sex crimes and sex experiments risks mistaking subtle influences of masculinity and domination as crazed perversion. While all crimes committed at the facility, both human sexual experimentation and individual sexual violence experienced by prisoners at the hands of guards, were sex crimes

³ Caryn E. Neumann, *Sexual Crime: A Reference Handbook*. Contemporary World Issues, Santa Barbara, California.: ABC-CLIO, 2010.

⁴ "Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes: International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor," *Reproductive Health Matters* 22, no. 44 (2014): 99-101.

⁵ "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court," *Social Justice* 26, no. 4 (78) (1999): 125-43.

against humanity, for the purpose of this paper, I will delineate the two as either ‘sex experiments’ and ‘sex crimes.’ Sex experimentation will be defined as experiments that were sexual in nature that had a clear aim to produce a medically relevant result. Conversely, sex crimes will be defined as instances in which prisoner’s sexuality was used as a way to hurt, emotionally maim, or degrade prisoners. While natural impulses may entice us to think of every sexual violation of the prisoners of Unit 731 as disgusting crimes against humanity (which they were), we must resist prescribing any one motivation to individual acts, instead viewing each offense as a discrete crime.

Background- The Unit

The story of the establishment of Unit 731 is impossible to tell without continuous reference to the facility’s head practitioner, Shiro Ishii, who is often dubbed as the “madman architect of the unit.”⁶ Ishii, a microbiologist turned medical officer, was described as an egotistical maniac with a destructive lust for power.⁷ Ishii eventually amassed the political capital and relationships to turn the 1931 invasion of China into opportunity for his medical work.⁸ By 1935, construction on Unit 731 in Pingfang began, after a previous complex proved too weak to contain prisoners.⁹ Emperor Hirohito himself announced that ‘the Togo Unit’ was an “official unit of the Japanese army.”¹⁰ By 1938, the laboratory-prison consisted of a six-square-kilometer area, housing five buildings, surrounded by trenches, electrical gates, and barbed wire

⁶ Hal Gold, *Unit 731: Testimony*, North Clarendon: Tuttle Publishing, 2004, 24.

⁷ Sheldon H. Harris, *Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American Cover-up*, Rev. ed. New York: Routledge, 2002, 24.

⁸ Daniel Barenblatt, *A Plague Upon Humanity: The Secret Genocide of Axis Japan's Germ Warfare Operation*, 1st ed. New York: HarperCollins, 2004, 1-3.

⁹ Barenblatt, 26.

¹⁰ Thomas A. Faunce, "The Oxford Textbook of Clinical Research Ethics," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 300, no.12 (2008): 1466.

fences.¹¹ By 1939, Ishii had been given power to run Unit 731 operations in near secrecy.¹² At its height, “the Japanese program consisted of more than 150 buildings in Pingfan, 5 satellite camps, and a staff of more than 3000 scientists.”¹³

“Aim” of Sex Experiments

The activities and experiments analyzed in this paper are neither extensive nor complete. In a previous paper I analyzed a broad range of experiments and the motivation for performing them. I substantiated the assertion that the creation of Unit 731 was not due to racist desires to subjugate and defile Chinese people, but as a goal oriented mission to advance the offensive capabilities of the Japanese Imperial Army and provide solutions to internal problems that weakened the formidability of the Japanese forces. With regard to acts of sexual violence, sex experimentation seemed to be performed in accordance with the same goal. That is, they were conceptualized to solve sexual disease.

“Research at Unit 731 took as its starting point a simple and correct observation: more soldiers die in wartime from disease than in battle.”¹⁴ Accordingly, sex experiments were conceived to combat the rising prevalence of venereal disease within the ranks of the Japanese Army. The prevalence of sexually transmitted disease is evident in its euphemistic moniker as “the scourge of armies.”¹⁵ In addition to creating treatments for venereal diseases, doctors at Unit 731 also used experiments to further educate themselves about the female body. Mr. Makino, a former medical assistant now living in Osaka, provided testimony of the operations he assisted

¹¹ Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011.

¹² Gregory Dean Byrd, “General Ishii Shiro: His Legacy is That of Genius and Madman” Master’s Dissertation, East Tennessee State University, 2005, 11.

¹³ Stefan Riedel, “Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: A Historical Review.” *Proceedings (Baylor University Medical Center)* 17, no. 4 (2004): 415.

¹⁴ Tia Powell, “Cultural Context in Medical Ethics: Lessons from Japan,” *Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine*, Vol 1, Iss 1, P4 (2006): 4.

¹⁵ Powell, 8.

while stationed at Pingfang: “These barbaric acts were, he said this week, ‘educational,’ to improve his knowledge of anatomy. ‘We removed some of the organs and amputated legs and arms. Two of the victims were young women, 18 or 19 years old. I hesitate to say it but we opened up their wombs to show the younger soldiers. They knew very little about women - it was sex education.’”¹⁶ Like wise, Japanese surgeons used experiments as an opportunity to practice procedures that would be needed in battle. Common procedures included amputations, removing bullets, suturing, and performing transplants and transfusions.

Perhaps ironically, the necessity of venereal disease human experimentation, one crime against humanity, was created by another crime against humanity propagated by the Japanese Army, the comfort system in which women were confined to “comfort stations” and expected to service the masculine needs of Japanese forces.¹⁷

While these experiments served a medical and rational goal, informal, sexual violence was also occurred, which was carried out outside the orders of the Japanese medical military complex. While the guards and staff that carried out these crimes were part of this establishment, they acted as individuals when directing violence against the prisoners. This represents a fairly common wartime phenomenon that while “perpetrators of systematic sexual atrocities in war target individuals who belong to a particular ethnic group, religious community, or political affiliation. Moreover, reports indicate that the usual victims of sexual crimes are those most vulnerable during armed conflicts: the unarmed, particularly women, as well as children and individuals in captivity.”¹⁸ For the purpose of Unit 731 this is significant: guards and medical

¹⁶ Hudson, 1.

¹⁷ Chunghee Sarah Soh, "From Imperial Gifts to Sex Slaves: Theorizing Symbolic Representations of the 'Comfort Women'," *Social Science Japan Journal* 3, no. 1 (2000): 59.

¹⁸ Kristen Boon, “Rape and Forced Pregnancy Under the ICC Statute: Human Dignity, Autonomy and Consent,” *Columbia Human Rights Law Review* 32 (2001): 625.

staff carried out both these sexual experiments and sex crimes, however the identity with which they justified each category was unique.¹⁹

Victims

Subjects used for sex experiments were diverse and varied. As demonstrated in my previous paper, organizers of the Unit took great pain to ensure ethnic diversity in the prison population in order to ensure testing was universally applicable.²⁰ A continuous supply of subjects was furnished by Military Police, army officials, and through special transfer, with an average of 400 to 600 of subjects being received by the facility annually.²¹ Some inmates “were simply rounded up off the streets of Harbin to meet quotas set by Unit 731 officers.”²² In special relation to sexual experiments, some women from comfort stations throughout China and Korea were relocated to Unit 731. Of the more than 10,000 prisoners suspected to have been killed at Unit 731, “at least 3000 of these victims were prisoners of war,” which included “Korean, Chinese, Mongolian, Soviet, American, British, and Australian soldiers.”²³ Female prisoners were especially diverse, with study findings revealing that white Russian women, “mothers of Chinese spies,” and even Indonesian female prisoners were used.²⁴

In my research I have found little to substantiate the idea that children were a prominent portion of the inmate population. This is not to say that children were immune from testing, just that they were not subject to imprisoned testing in the same proportion of adult men and women.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Gerhard Baader, Susan E. Lederer, Morris Low, Florian Schmaltz, and Alexander V. Schwerin, “Pathways to Human Experimentation, 1933-1945: Germany, Japan, and the United States,” *Osiris* 20 (2005): 221.

²¹ Takashi Tsuchiya, "The Imperial Japanese Medical Atrocities and Its Enduring Legacy in Japanese Research Ethics," Paper presented at the 8th World Congress of Bioethics Beijing, China, August 8, 2006, 4.

²² Clay Farris Naff, *Biological Weapons*, Contemporary Issues Companion, Detroit, MI: Greenhaven Press/Thomson Gale, 2006,

²³ Riedel, 2.

²⁴ Ibid, 4.

The biological weapons and pathogens were tested on children in towns surrounding the Unit. Children used in experiments conducted inside of the Unit were the result of female prisoner's pregnancies while incarcerated. In some cases, males were also used in sex experiments. Usually, in cases that sexually transmitted diseases needed to be spread to other prisoners, forced copulation between men and women occurred. These groups—children and men—while subject to sexual experimentation did not endure the abusive sex crimes that was exercised by guards and staff upon women.

Testing- General

Experimentation on humans that took place at Unit 731 can be categorized by two different approaches. The first consists of bacteriological studies, those in which subjects were deliberately infected with disease in order to view the progression of the disease and search for cures to it. The second approach consists of physiological studies, which involved viewing how a subject reacts to stimulus. Both were performed at Unit 731 and featured in scientific publications written by the scientists and doctors in charge at the facility.²⁵ Sex experiments authorized by the organizers of Unit 731 were primarily bacteriological in nature; the majority of 731 sex experiments tested transmission and treatment of venereal disease. Conversely, sex crimes were neither bacteriological or physiological because they were not experiments, were unauthorized, and perpetrated by individuals acting as individuals instead of members of the scientific establishment of the Unit.

In the previous section I outlined that surgical practice, disease investigation, and female education were the motivation for sexual experimentation, the facility also came to represent an opportunity for Japanese doctors. The growing trend throughout Japan to apply scientific method to everything, especially sexuality, made it permissible to ignore the inherently militaristic and

²⁵ Baader, 221.

grotesque nature of the crimes doctors were actually committing. Morally atrocious human testing became possible, if the neutral scope of ‘science’ could assuage practitioners guilt.²⁶

Syphilis

Of the venereal diseases investigated, none was more important than syphilis. Developing a cure for syphilis was crucial to treating and rehabilitating infected soldiers, “among whom the prevalence of syphilis was high due to the systematic rape of women and the widespread use of sex slaves.”²⁷ However, while serums were easily produced to infect patients with tuberculosis, smallpox, and other virulent pathogens, infection of syphilis could not be easily facilitated by injection. Accordingly, doctors orchestrated forced sex acts between infected and non infected prisoners to transmit the disease. Consider the testimony of a prison guard on the subject of devising a method for transmission of syphilis between patients:

"Infection of venereal disease by injection was abandoned, and the researchers started forcing the prisoners into sexual acts with each other. Four or five unit members, dressed in white laboratory clothing completely cover the body with only eyes and mouth visible, handled the tests. A male and female, on infected with syphilis, would be brought together in a cell and forced into sex with each others. It was made clear that anyone resisting would be shot.²⁸

An important distinction is revealed by the above testimony. The individuals orchestrating the forced sex acts are described almost as accessories to the overall framework of the experiment. Dressed in white, with only eyes and mouth visible, their individual dominance was not expressed, instead they served as panoptic extensions, and as a reminder that copulation was required and consequences could be forced if the prisoners resisted. This tangential association is very different from the direct violence noted in other testimony, which I will

²⁶ Miriam Kingsberg, "Legitimizing Empire, Legitimizing Nation: The Scientific Study of Opium Addiction in Japanese Manchuria," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 38, no. 2 (2012): 350.

²⁷ E. Cuerda-Galindo, X. Sierra-Valentí, E. González-López, and F. López-Muñoz, "Syphilis and Human Experimentation From the First Appearance of the Disease to World War II: A Historical Perspective and Reflections on Ethics," *Actas Dermo-Sifiliográficas (English Edition)* 105, no. 8 (2014): 765-67.

²⁸ Gold, 165.

analyze in a later section. This event was part of a sex experiment, but was not marked by the direct abuse of sex crimes.

After victims were infected, they were vivisected at different stages of infection, so that internal and external organs could be observed as the disease progressed. Confusingly, testimony from multiple guards rhetorically blames the female victims as being hosts of the diseases, even as they were forcibly infected. Genitals of female prisoners that were infected with syphilis were called “jam filled buns” by guards.²⁹ This colloquial degradation of the prisoners sharply contrasts with the clinical numbers by which the staff refer to patients for the purpose of official experimentation.

Beyond the affects of syphilis infection in adults, Unit 731 doctors also wanted to understand how children were affected by various pathogens. A Youth Corps member deployed to train at Unit 731 recalled viewing a batch of subjects that would undergo syphilis testing: “one was a Chinese woman holding an infant, one was a White Russian woman with a daughter of four or five years of age, and the last was a White Russian woman with a boy of about six or seven.”³⁰ The children of these women were tested in ways similar to their parents, with specific emphasis on determining how longer infection periods affected the effectiveness of treatments. In short, some children grew up inside the walls of Unit 731, infected with syphilis.

Rape and Forced Pregnancy

Women prisoners were forced to become pregnant for use in in experiments. Specifically, the plausibility of vertical transmission (from mother to fetus or child) of diseases was test. This was especially true in the case of syphilis, which was suspected to affect fertility. Whether or not a fetus survived and if its mother’s reproductive organs were compromised, was of great interest

²⁹ Ibid, 55.

³⁰ Ibid, 172.

to practitioners at 731. Though “a large number of babies were born in captivity” of Unit 731, there has been no account of any survivors of the facility, children included.³¹ It is suspected that the children of female prisoners were killed or the pregnancies terminated.

While male prisoners were often used in single studies, so that the results of the experimentation on them would not be clouded by other variables, women were sometimes used in bacteriological or physiological experiments, sex experiments, and the victims of sex crimes.

The testimony of a unit member that served as guard graphically demonstrates this reality:

One of the former researchers I located told me that one day he had a human experiment scheduled, but there was still time to kill. So he and another unit member took the keys to the cells and opened one that housed a Chinese woman. One of the unit members raped her; the other member took the keys and opened another cell. There was a Chinese woman in there who had been used in a frostbite experiment. She had several fingers missing and her bones were black, with gangrene set in. He was about to rape her anyway, then he saw that her sex organ was festering, with pus oozing to the surface. He gave up the idea, left, and locked the door, then later went on to his experimental work.³²

This testimony demonstrates the divide of motivations for different sexual abuses endured by prisoners. The individual staff member’s volition is what drove the two men above to commit the above abuses against the two female prisoners, which is contrasted by the ‘orders’ they received as a part of regular duty. Whereas the rhetoric of the guards towards facilitating their given order is spoken with obligation, responsibility, and respect, their attitudes towards sexual degradation of the prisoners is casual.³³

Children

As previously noted, children were used in experiments, though not in mass. For sexual experiments the impetus for their inclusion served the practical purpose to ensure variable consistency and applicability of their results. A former doctor, now farmer, with reputation for

³¹ Gold, 45.

³² Ibid, 166.

³³ At what point does your soul degrade into such a pitiful blob of mush that you can casually ask, “Hey, are you down for raping some people right now, I was going to work out but....”

being one of the cruelest of Unit 731 on the subject of children: “When the topic of children came up, the farmer offered another justification: ‘Of course there were experiments on children. But probably their fathers were spies.’”³⁴

Yoshimura Hisato, who ran frostbite experiments at the facility, recounted an experiment he ran with a three-month-old baby. “A temperature-sensing needle was injected in the baby's hand and the infant was immersed in ice water, then temperature changes were carefully recorded. After the war he issued a paper on this experiment and the results. Since it would have been impossible to conduct an experiment like this in postwar years.”³⁵ This confession gives the reader interesting insights to how victimizers conceptualized their work medically—as an opportunity, a gray area of morality, and eagerly approach the task. Here, Hisato emphasizes the academic possibilities and the scientific procedures he took to secure his results. He does not reflect on the pain of the child, the cruelty of forcibly insert glass into an infant’s hand, or watching a wholly innocent being frozen to death in front of him. Other hallmarks of sex crimes involving children are not present: there is no sexual subjugation, consideration of the patient in relation to his own social position, and vulgar expressions of anger are not voiced. Instead, Hisato considers his actions strictly scientific, as if he is not morally or individually responsible for the death of the child.³⁶

Mother-Child Experiments

³⁴ Kristof, Nicholas. “Japan Confronting Gruesome War Atrocity” *The New York Times*, March 17, 1995.

³⁵ Gold, 165.

³⁶ Sheldon H. Harris, *Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American Cover-up*, Rev. ed. New York: Routledge, 2002, 99. Furthermore, outside of the unit, in the surrounding town of Harbin, children were targeted to test the effectiveness of biological agents developed in the facility. The Japanese officers offered children pastries and chocolates filled with pathogenic serum. On warm days in the summer, their approach changed to offer children lemonade laced with anthrax or malaria. This distribution was critical to understand what methods to disseminate biological weapons was most effective.

Another class of experiments seemed intended test the bonds between mother and child. Death was slowly inflicted upon a mother and her children. Japanese doctors and technicians would view desperate attempts of women to protect themselves and their children: “A Russian mother and daughter left in a gas chamber, for example, as doctors peered through thick glass and timed their convulsions, watching as the woman sprawled over her child in a futile effort to save her from the gas.”³⁷ Japanese doctors gauged these relationships in scientific terms; they wanted to see the physical manifestations of maternal instinct in contrast with the new weapons produced at the facility. For this reason, the woman’s attempts to protect her child are of great interest to the observer. While eliciting emotional pain and the intentional use of violence against a child to cause anguish qualifies this experiment as a sex crime, the goal of the project was to understand how this trauma would provoke biological response. This example perfectly demonstrates why it is difficult to assert that sex experiments and sex crimes were the same; substantial overlap exists between them. However, this experiment is marked by a demonstrative desire to produce results, rational findings, and apply knowledge collected, rather than interpersonal expressions of dominance that characterize sex crimes.

Male Sex Crime Victims

While this paper has focused mostly on crimes propagated against women and children, males were also subject to sexual experimentation. As mentioned previously, sex acts between male and female partners was forced, especially in the case of venereal disease study. Male prisoners were subject to a wide and bizarre spectrum of testing, including forced male-male sex acts and genital mutilation.³⁸ For example, it is hard to image what type of information Japanese

³⁷ Krisof, 2.

³⁸ Stefan Vetter, "Understanding Human Behavior in Times of War," *Military Medicine* 172, no. 2 (2007): 7-10.

doctors sought when they “[inserted] glass rods to their rectum.”³⁹ It is in this class of experimentation that I find it most difficult to parse sex experiments from sex crimes. However, it seems likely that because the male prisoners of the Unit were, definitionally, enemy combatants, sexual violence propagated towards them could have been the result of wartime aggression.

Cures/Treatments Developed

The unit was overwhelmingly successful in terms of medical innovation, including “development of therapies, vaccines, surgical techniques both in hospital and on the battlefield, hemostasis, and transfusion of blood.”⁴⁰ The current method to treat frostbite, which involves submerging limbs in warm water instead of applying direct heat, was developed as the result of experiments conducted at Unit 731. The Unit’s contributions to global health, frostbite, new ways to purify water, treat dysentery, perform surgery, and much more, cannot be ignored. Innovations developed at the facility are credit to have reduced wartime death by eight percent overall.⁴¹ The cost of these advances was an estimated 3,000 lives inside the facility and many thousands more that were the victims of field testing.⁴²

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to identify the extraordinary suffering of the women and children that were sexually abused outside of the context of the scientific and medical mission of the Unit. While tremendous suffering was endured by all prisoners at the Unit, the additional

³⁹ Joshua A. Perper and Stephen J. Cina, *When Doctors Kill*, New York, NY: Springer New York, 2010, 82.

⁴⁰ Takashi Tsuchiya, “The Imperial Japanese Experiments in China” In *The Oxford Textbook of Clinical Research Ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 8.

⁴¹ Louis Livingston Seaman, *The Real Triumph of Japan, the Conquest of the Silent Foe*, New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1906, 238.

⁴² Steven Kuhr, and Jerome M. Hauer, "The Threat of Biological Terrorism in the New Millennium," *The American Behavioral Scientist* 44, no. 6 (2001): 1032.

burden of sex crimes, the independent actions of guards and staff, has not been acknowledged or analyzed as two separate forms of violence. Those who committed these crimes against humanity upon already traumatized victims should be recognized as especially heinous individuals, who cannot hide behind the comforting thought that the Unit produced scientifically beneficial research.⁴³ More importantly, the victims of these crimes should be acknowledged and remembered. It is these men, women, and children that should be credited for the thousands of lives the success of the Unit made possible.

⁴³ After the war an agreement between Ishii and General McCarthy was formulated to exchange immunity for the results of the testing conducted. For more information see: Nie Jing-Bao, "The United States Cover-up of Japanese Wartime Medical Atrocities: Complicity Committed in the National Interest and Two Proposals for Contemporary Action," *The American Journal of Bioethics* 6, no. 3 (2006): 21-33.

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The Political Marginalization of Arab Christians in the British Mandatory Period

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The Arab/Israeli conflict has been addressed as an ethnic conflict to a simple conflict over land. The use of a religious framework receives a lot of attention in the popular imagination, pitting Islam against Judaism. There are numerous problems with this paradigm, but one problem that often goes unnoticed is the erasure of Arab Christian involvement within the conflict. This erasure causes an oversight in regards to the very important contributions Christians made to the development of Arab nationalism. This oversight causes the fundamental misunderstanding that the conflict is religious and not political. A historical examination of Arab Christian involvement can break away from this paradigm. It can also develop a deeper understanding of the conflict. Focusing the analysis on the British Mandatory period, with special regard to Christian involvement in the nationalist movement, one can gain insight into the critical moments of the conflict and the necessary processes for its maturation into what it is today. However, to understand these developments, one must understand the historical movement of Arab Christians within the branch of Arab nationalism that reacted against Zionism. The British mandatory period was the critical period in determining the future scope of the conflict and the manner in which it has continued to unfold. In so doing, one will find that Arab Christians were disproportionately influential in the Palestinian nationalist movement, but their role gradually subsided as a result of increasing Islamic rhetoric, British policy, internal sectarian divisions, and Zionist political maneuvering.

Understanding Arab Christian involvement in the Palestinian nationalist movement requires familiarity with five conditions: Christian social standing before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Zionist presence in Palestine, the movement from Pan-Arab nationalism to a more localized Palestinian nationalism, religious connection to the land, and the diversity and structure of Christian sects in Palestine. Within the Ottoman Empire, guided by Islamic law, the

millet system was formed to address the variety of religious minorities. The idea was to identify people by their religious sect and separate them into millets, which constituted their collective ability to communicate, worship, and even govern their private lives along the guidelines of their own religion.¹ This system went through extensive reform in the nineteenth century, giving more rights to religious minorities, while also being pressured by intervening Western powers under the guise of protecting the rights of Christians.² As the Ottoman Empire weakened in the face of Western powers, and non-Muslims were given greater rights within the system, there was a flourishing of nationalist sentiment among the various demographics, especially Christians.

The development of nationalist sentiment among Arab Christians can be attributed to a variety of causes. The first being a desire to move away from religious identification as the basis for rights within a governing system. The Ottoman millet system, while constructed to allow religious differences to exist, held Muslims in higher regard.³ Negib Azouri's call for Arab independence reflects the discontent among Arab Christians, "the league wants, before anything else, to separate the civil and the religious power, in the interest of Islam and the Arab nation, and to form an Arab empire."⁴ The second was the effect European ideas had on Arab Christians. According to Rashid Khalidi, Arab Christians were exposed to Western ideas of nationalism through contact with European Christians and missionaries.⁵ Azouri is also representative of this connection. He spent time in France in the 1890s (where he was exposed to pervasive antisemitism) and took refuge in France following his critiques of the governor of Jerusalem and

¹ Beral Aral, "The Idea of Human Rights as Perceived in the Ottoman Empire," *Human Rights Quarterly* 26.2 (May 2004), 475.

² *Ibid.*, 478-480.

³ *Ibid.*, 476.

⁴ Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds., *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict* (New York City: Penguin Books, 2008), 10.

⁵ Rashid Khalidi, "The Formation of Palestinian Identity: The Critical Years, 1917-1923," in *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East*, edited by James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 175.

the subsequent treason charges by the Ottoman Empire.⁶ The European ideological connection to Christian Arab involvement in nationalist movements is very clear.

Another cause for Christian involvement in nationalism, particularly in Palestine, is the emergence of Zionism. The Zionist enterprise of settling in Palestine became more organized contemporaneously with the rise of the Young Turks (who desired to modernize the Ottoman Empire).⁷ The newspapers *al-Karmil* (established 1908) and *Filastin* (established 1911) were both founded by Christians and devoted much of their energy to anti-Zionism.⁸ Many early Zionists described opposition to their cause as largely a result of Christian animosity.⁹ This animosity had a long history driving it. As Mandel notes, “the Eastern Christians...had, as a group, traditionally vied with Oriental Jews in the Ottoman Empire as clerks, bankers, merchants, and interpreters.”¹⁰ This economic rivalry is reflected in the varying responses of urban Arabs to Jewish immigration, with the Christian segments definitively more concerned about the economic consequences.¹¹ Along with the economic concern came religious prejudice that was pervasive and violent, as a blood libel in 1847 attests.¹²

Along with this response to Zionism a more localized idea of Palestinian identity gained currency, replacing more Pan-Arab political programs. There was an expectation in Palestine and Syria that Palestine would fall under the control of Syria after the collapse of the Ottoman

⁶ Elie Kedourie, “The Politics of Political Literature: Kawakabi, Azouri, and Jung,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 8.2 (May 1972), 231-232.

⁷ Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict 1881-2001*, 1st Vintage Books Edition (New York City: Vintage Books, 2001), 59-60.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 63-64.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 61.

¹⁰ Neville Mandel, “Turks, Arabs, and Jewish Immigration into Palestine, 1882-1914,” *Middle Eastern Affairs* 17.4 (1965), 84.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 86.

¹² *Ibid.*, 84.

Empire, but Britain eventually ended up occupying and controlling Palestine.¹³ The idea of Palestine being incorporated in Syria had considerable support among Palestinian Arabs.¹⁴ While this desired border did not unite all of the Arab Middle East, it did aim at forming a large, Arab state. This vision failed to materialize due to European encroachment and an emerging Palestinian identity. The Sykes-Picot agreement between the British and French split the Arab Middle East between the two powers, placing Syria under French control and Palestine under British control. Further, Palestine was placed under British control as a mandate. Palestine was a unique mandate in that Britain had issued the Balfour Declaration during World War I, which promised Jews a “national home” in Palestine.¹⁵ This vague pronouncement of Jewish rights to the land of Palestine helped spur the conflict between Arabs and Zionists in the mandatory period. This further separated Palestinian Arab concerns from the concerns of the wider Arab population in the Middle East.

Another factor that helped cultivate a unique Palestinian Arab identity is the religious connection to the land. Rashid Khalidi notes that both Muslims and Christians thought of the land as holy.¹⁶ For the purposes of examining the formation of Palestinian nationalism with regard to Arab Christian involvement the view of Palestine as a holy land takes on particular importance. The Christian view of Palestine was given definitive geographical boundaries rooted in biblical texts, which were further reinforced by the boundaries in which the Orthodox, Latin, and Protestant leadership exercised authority.¹⁷ Not only were Arab Christians given a

¹³ Musa Budeiri, “The Palestinians: Tensions Between Nationalist and Religious Identities,” in *Rethinking Arab Nationalism in the Arab Middle East*, edited by James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 194-195.

¹⁴ Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement 1918-1929*, (London: Frank Cass, 1974), 71.

¹⁵ Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds., *The Israel-Arab Reader*, 16.

¹⁶ Rashid Khalidi, “The Formation of Palestinian Identity,” 173.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

geographical awareness of a unique Arab land, but that awareness developed religious governance along those borders. Islam lacks such ecclesiastical organization making a rigid geographical connection less prevalent. This might explain the initial goal of a united Palestine-Syria state. As such, Arab Christians had some form of Palestinian identity predating the Mandatory period, which certainly contributed to the larger trend of localizing Palestinian concerns. Leading into the Mandatory period it was clear that Arab Christians were active in broader Arab nationalist concerns. As these nationalist ideologies became more localized there continued to be an observable Christian presence.

The diversity and internal structuring of Arab Christians both contributed and detracted from their involvement in nationalist causes. Due to the politics of Arab Christians their church hierarchies located power outside of Arab spheres.¹⁸ The Orthodox, Catholic, and Anglican churches maintain their highest ecclesiastical seats outside of Arab speaking countries. Among the Orthodox Christian laity special care was given to make the Church more Arab in nature, which often went hand-in-hand with nationalist concerns.¹⁹ This is demonstrated by the establishment of the First Arab Orthodox Congress in 1923 that focused on attaining an Arabic speaking Bishop of Nazareth, as well as furthering nationalist causes over and against Zionism.²⁰ The Latin Christian community was led by the patriarch Louis Barlassina. He was very influential in how Latin Christians engaged with the nationalist movement. While he was strongly opposed to Zionism and British rule, he advocated that Latin Christians further distinguish themselves from an Arab identity.²¹ This stance was effective in preventing large Latin involvement in the Arab nationalist movement, which weakened Christian involvement

¹⁸ Noah Haiduc-Dale, *Arab Christians in British Mandate Palestine: Communalism and Nationalism 1917-1948* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 29.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 30.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, 31.

from the very start. This void was filled by Melkite Christians, who were disproportionately represented within the nationalist movement. The Melkites were locally led by Bishop Grigorios Hajjar, “the highest ranking Arab clergyman in all of Palestine.”²² His strong stance against the British garnered him influence among Arab nationalists and even led to deference being given to Melkites, even though they were both internationally and regionally less influential than the Latin community.²³ This preference for a less influential Christian sect weakened the overall influence of Arab Christians in moving and shaping the nationalist movement. However, this was a more long term result. Initially Christian influence was still significant.

One of the central reasons for the influence of Christian Arabs on the early nationalist movement was their cooperation with Muslims. If Christians were going to have any influence on the Arab nationalist movement within Palestine this cooperation would be absolutely necessary. A census taken of Mandate Palestine in 1922 showed that Christians made up just under ten percent of the population.²⁴ This demographic pressure alone forced Christians into cooperation with Arab Muslims. However, the Christian population of Palestine was rather urbanized.²⁵ This came with benefits in regard to their involvement in Arab nationalism. Their urbanization meant higher levels of education and commercial activity than their Muslim counterparts who were more evenly dispersed among urban and rural areas.²⁶ It was this union of Palestinian Muslims and Christians that represented the “first nationalist response to the British occupation” forming as early as 1918.²⁷

²² Ibid., 33.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Anthony O’Mahoney, “Palestinian Christians: Religion, Politics, and Society, c. 1800-1948,” in *Palestinian Christians: Religion, Politics, and Society in the Holy Land*, edited by Anthony O’Mahoney (London: Melisende, 1999), 34.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Erik Freas, “Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Haram al-Sharif: A Pan-Islamic or Palestinian Nationalist Cause,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 39.1 (April 2012), 21.

²⁷ Musa Budeiri, “The Palestinians,” 196.

One of the early successes of Christian/Muslim unity was the Muslim Christian Association (MCA). These interreligious organizations labored toward nationalist aims. Their early activity worked for the establishment of a Syrian nation with Palestine included, but retaining some local autonomy.²⁸ They also tried to activate a strong anti-Zionist stance among the populace.²⁹ It is fair to say that their efforts in influencing local opinion were largely successful. British administrators readily admit that the MCA was largely representative of the broader Arab opinion within Palestine.³⁰ This influence translated into real political results as well. When the British administration called for a legislative council, the MCA called for a boycott of the elections because the council would contain a majority of British and Jewish members, and signify an acceptance of the Balfour Declaration.³¹ This boycott was a tremendous success as Christians and Muslims turned out in extremely low numbers for the elections (eighteen percent of Muslims and around five to six percent of Christians).³² While Palestinian Arabs were working against the British administration, the actions of the MCA suggest that if any state building were to happen among the Arab population it would develop out of cooperative effort between Muslims and Christians. This is precisely what the earlier Christian Arabs wanted from a nationalist movement: cooperation between Muslims and Christians for a greater Arab cause.

However, one has to wonder how efficiently Arabs were able to transfer from the millet system, which prioritized religious identity, to a unified Arab identity. Ideologically, there was still a gulf to be bridged between Arab Christians and Arab Muslims. Erik Freas notes that Christians viewed Arab nationalism as a secular political program, but this secular movement

²⁸ Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, 90.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Haiduc-Dale, *Arab Christians*, 51.

³¹ Ibid., 44.

³² Ibid., 45.

held Islam in high regard for its cultural importance to the Arab people.³³ This pragmatic tone defined Christian involvement within Arab nationalism. Pragmatically, it was necessary to give some deference and respect to the religious majority. Muslims did not have to be so cautious in their espousal of Arab nationalism. The more religious Arab Muslims were able to espouse an Arab nationalism that was inextricably linked to Islam.³⁴ This ideological gulf certainly strained Muslim/Christian relations, and eventually led to the demise of their cooperation. Initially, though this gulf existed, the MCA was an organ through which these differences could be overcome through popular support. Certainly Muslim and Christian elites vied for control and influence, but these differences could be put aside in the face of external pressure applied by the British and Zionists.

British external pressure played a causal role in cooperation among Christians and Muslims, but their policies throughout the Mandate eventually led to the demise of this cooperation. British policy was not very effective largely due to their ignorance in regards to the varying religious populations within Palestine. British officials recognized Arab Christians, first and foremost, as Christians rather than Arabs.³⁵ As the official organ within Palestine this surely would have made it difficult for Arabs to stick to their unifying plan as they were constantly recognized by what distanced them from their fellow Arabs. Edward Keith-Roach, the governor of Jerusalem, recognized the emerging interreligious unity between Christians and Muslims, but still felt it prudent to have governing bodies be divided up by proportional representation of religious groups.³⁶ During the early stages of the Mandate, the British actually thought of Muslim/Christian cooperation as a pretense and that neither side was truly content with the

³³ Erik Freas, "Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Haram al-Sharif," 21.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 20.

³⁵ Haiduc-Dale, *Arab Christians*, 28.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 26.

other.³⁷ This misunderstanding of the emerging Palestinian nationalist movement, coupled with policy that overemphasized religious distinctions, was destructive to Arab unity.

The British decided to continue the millet system leftover from the Ottoman Empire.³⁸ This policy would work against Arab nationalist sentiment. By giving official backing to this division of society the British prevented Arabs from reimagining themselves as a cohesive whole. No longer did the British assume that Christians and Muslims would not cooperate with one another, but now the British policy placed communal barriers between Christians and Muslims. The prevention of inter-communal cooperation surely exacerbated any existing religious tension that Arabs were working to overcome. Not only did this continue the previous Ottoman divisions that Arabs were trying to eradicate, but due to the nature of the Mandate it relegated Muslims to the millet system. Tsimhoni notes that this change placed Muslims “in an inferior position to that of Christians and Jews; they had no representation of their own and their religious institutions were administered by the British officials, some of whom were Jewish.”³⁹ This sort of relegation was sure to increase any existing tensions between the religious groups. This continuation of the millet system also had negative effects on the Christian community. According to Tsimhoni, it exacerbated existing sectarian differences among Christians (as different denominations were given separate communal protections), encouraged division between the laity and church hierarchies (non-Arab church leaders could not represent their Arab laity), and Protestants were never formally recognized due to their lack of recognition within the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁰ The resulting divisions failed to produce a strong, unified, Christian political

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Daphne Tsimhoni, “The Status of Arab Christians under the British Mandate in Palestine,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 20.4 (October 1984), 169.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 185-186.

body, which led to the British administration ignoring the voices of Christian communities.⁴¹

This gradual weakening of Arab Christian political standing created a void. This void was then filled by a more Islamic focused Palestinian nationalism.

The increasing significance of Islam might have been inevitable considering the ideological framework that was popular among Palestinian Muslims at the time of the Mandatory period. Regardless, it created a rhetorical environment that was not inclusive of Christians. Hajj Amin al-Husayni was the main figure in this political program that exploited the religious beliefs of the populace, and as a result, the waning of Muslim/Christian cooperation. Hajj Amin al-Husayni was the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the head of the Supreme Muslim Council, which placed him in control of the Muslim millet.⁴² It should also be noted that he was associated with the more radical sector of the Palestinian nationalist movement.⁴³ This already placed him in opposition to most Christians. While most historians suggest that Christians gravitated towards al-Husayni's rival Raghib al-Nashashibi out of fear of al-Husayni's religious position, Haiduc-Dale counters that this is a simplification of the rivalry as Nashashibi's political party was more prone to utilize anti-Christian rhetoric.⁴⁴ In the early 1920s the Nashashibi family indicated their opposition to the Palestinian National Congresses through the establishment of the National Muslim Association (NMA).⁴⁵ This opposition was directed against those involved in the MCA (which was backed by the Husayni family).⁴⁶ Nashashibi's involvement with the NMA made him a suspect ally to Palestinian Christians and could have driven Christians to Hajj Amin al-Husayni, despite his radical stance and religious rhetoric. Further evidence that Christians would

⁴¹ Ibid., 186.

⁴² Freas, "Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Haram al-Sharif," 22.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Haiduc-Dale, *Arab Christians*, 62.

⁴⁵ Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, 214-215.

⁴⁶ Haiduc-Dale, *Arab Christians*, 49.

be unlikely to support Nashashibi is al-Husayni's vocal support of Arab Christians during the Arab Revolt in 1936-1939.⁴⁷ Haiduc-Dale's analysis certainly adds a layer of complexity to the historical narrative. He also recognizes that the intense rivalries among Muslims (largely the Nashashibis and al-Husaynis) weakened Christians politically.⁴⁸ His argument strongly calls into question the accepted idea of Christians gravitating toward the Nashashibi camp. These conclusions merit serious consideration. However, his analysis of the relationship between Christians and al-Husayni is lacking. This theory, which goes against the grain of most scholarly work on the subject, does not seem to connect the al-Husayni of the 1936-1939 Revolt with the al-Husayni of the 1920s.

Despite al-Husayni's declarations of support in the 1936-1939 Revolt, he had built up a radical, Islamic-focused, rhetoric in the 1920s and early 1930s. Hajj Amin al-Husayni's politics during this period are marked by radicalism. This was in stark contrast to Arab Christians who became more moderate and willing to work with the British government in the 1920s.⁴⁹ Hajj Amin al-Husayni's prominence among radicals began with his leadership role in the Arab extremist group *al-Nadi al-Arabi*, which incited anti-Jewish violence in 1921.⁵⁰ His appointment as President of the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC) brought his radical ideas to a mainstream institution. The appointment as the head of the SMC and as the Grand Mufti gave him more religious than political influence, but he used his position as a religious leader to influence political movements within Palestine. The first instance of this was the Wailing Wall Riots of 1929. The riots originated from a belief that Jews were encroaching on the Islamic religious site

⁴⁷ Ibid., 132.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 51-52.

⁴⁹ Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement*, 298-299.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 133-135.

at the Temple Mount with their prayers at the Wailing Wall.⁵¹ The resulting riots largely comprised of Palestinian Muslims responding violently to the perception of Jewish encroachment on Islamic holy sites, and in the resulting British investigation Christians were asked to be chauffeurs due to being perceived as “neutral.”⁵²

The reason for this Christian neutrality is due to the religious character of the disturbances. This religious nature is the result of al-Husayni’s posturing in the late 1920s. Avraham Sela notes that al-Husayni called for the defense of Islamic holy sites against the encroachment of Jews.⁵³ Furthermore, this political maneuver allowed al-Husayni to garner support from rural populations that heavily identified with Islam.⁵⁴ Another important political result is that it yielded some positive outcomes from an Arab perspective. The report by the British following the riots called for a curtailing of Jewish immigration, and it was rather novel for the British to respond to Arab grievances.⁵⁵ Also, Avraham Sela makes the convincing argument that the riots created a larger political gap between Zionists and Arabs while also increasing the importance of Judaism to the Zionist movement.⁵⁶ The Mufti’s involvement with the 1929 Riots garnered him support among Muslims (particularly rural Muslims) for an Islamic cause. His rhetoric, and his following, worked directly against urbanized Christians seeking out a secular nationalism.

Furthermore, the relevance of Arab Christians continued to decline with the World Islamic Conference in 1931. Hajj Amin al-Husayni was the central architect of the conference,

⁵¹ Freas, “Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Haram al-Sharif,” 24-25.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 28.

⁵³ Avraham Sela, “The ‘Wailing Wall’ Riots (1929) as a Watershed in the Palestine Conflict,” *The Muslim World* 84.1-2 (January-April 1994), 69.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 70.

⁵⁵ Yehoshua Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement 1929-1939: From Riots to Rebellion* (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 4.

⁵⁶ Sela, “The ‘Wailing Wall’ Riots,” 92.

using it to focus attention on Palestinian issues.⁵⁷ Sela notes that al-Husayni's motivation for the conference was to respond to the British government's ruling on the riots in 1929, which he viewed as lackluster.⁵⁸ The conference was fairly successful in drawing Muslim attention to Palestine as the conference "defined the Palestinian cause as an Islamic one."⁵⁹ By drawing in Muslim clerics from outside of Palestine, al-Husayni pushed influence outward and away from the localized Palestinian movements. This mixture of Islamic ideology and an outward motion of influence detracted from Christian influence on the Palestinian nationalist movement. While there were efforts to recognize Christians as an important part of the nationalist movement at the conference, there was rhetoric that complained of British favoritism toward Christians.⁶⁰ This drove another wedge between Christians and the nationalist movement.

This all feeds into the question of Christian involvement in the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. Here again, Haiduc-Dale proposes ambiguity, while the scholarly consensus proposes a simpler division of loyalties. Porath describes Christians as "aloof" in the Revolt, which sometimes came with violent reprisals from Muslims.⁶¹ If this account is true then it would represent almost complete inactivity of Arab Christians in the nationalist movement. Haiduc-Dale takes issue with Porath's analysis stating that his conclusions are based on very few sources, and that Christian involvement in the Revolt is much more complex.⁶² Instead, he suggests that many Christians engaged in the Revolt from a wide range of positions within society, while also recognizing that some took more moderate stances.⁶³ Despite Haiduc-Dale's protestations to Porath's work, the near absence of Christian officers in the Revolt, Porath notes

⁵⁷ Freas, "Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Haram al-Sahrif," 38.

⁵⁸ Sela, "The 'Wailing Wall' Riots," 75.

⁵⁹ Freas, "Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Haram al-Sharif," 39.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁶¹ Yehoshua Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement*, 269.

⁶² Haiduc-Dale, *Arab Christians*, 131.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 152.

only 4 out of 282, is indicative of low Christian involvement.⁶⁴ Furthermore, Khalidi notes that the participants of the Revolt were defined by radicalism, and an anti-British/anti-Zionist stance.⁶⁵ This political character of the Revolt runs counter to the political development of Arab Christians, who had taken more conciliatory tones toward the British government. Even Haiduc-Dale recognizes that within the Revolt there was increased distrust of Christians, which did lead to violent responses and even a boycott.⁶⁶ When the St. James Conference (convened to address Palestine) was announced in 1938, Christians worked against the rebel political agenda stating they would send a Christian delegation to better represent their interests.⁶⁷ As a result of this action rebel leaders reversed policy and allowed Christians to work on Fridays and rest on Sundays, which had previously been revoked.⁶⁸ This might suggest some political influence, but it should be considered minimal. The concession of the rebels was for pragmatic concerns that ultimately did not reshape their ideology. Considering that the controversy over Christians was reflected in notable political discourse suggests widespread Christian inactivity in the Revolt. Ultimately, Haiduc-Dale's argument lacks evidence and the safer conclusion is that Christians only were minimally involved with the Revolt.

Christians were a prevalent force in the early nationalist movement. The MCA is testament to this, but in outbursts of radicalism and violence Christians were ostracized. The Wailing Wall Riots of 1929 and the Revolt in 1936-1939 are the result of an increasing Islamic movement. The cause of this transition can be attributed to the prominence of the Husayni/Nashashibi rivalry, in which Hajj Amin al-Husayni worked from a religious position to

⁶⁴ Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 154.

⁶⁵ Rashid Khalidi, "The Palestinians and 1948: The Underlying Causes of Failure," in *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, edited by Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 24-25.

⁶⁶ Haiduc-Dale, *Arab Christians*, 140-142.

⁶⁷ Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement*, 270-271.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 271.

organize nationalist efforts. The Nashashibis did not offer much relief from Islamic rhetoric establishing the NMA, which expressly excludes Christians. Furthermore, radicalism became the norm in the 1930s. Christians, uncomfortable with such approaches, were pushed into political isolation, which gave rise to distrust. This distrust of Christians manifested violently during the Revolt of 1936-1939. The interreligious tensions that the early MCA had tried to overcome were free to flourish in the changing nationalist landscape that sought to exploit the religion of Islam.

It is necessary to examine the impact of Zionism on Christian involvement in Palestinian nationalism. While internal factors within the Palestinian movement were more important in the dissolution of Muslim/Christian cooperation, there was some pressure from Zionist organizations. Jews were fairly wary of Christians in Palestine. They did describe Arab Christians as the more opposed group to Jewish settlements in the early 20th century.⁶⁹ Despite this opposition, Zionist organizations felt that Christians (more specifically the Orthodox and Protestants) could become their allies through economic leverage.⁷⁰ Their efforts were consistently frustrated, which led them to believe that Christians were immovable and possibly influencing Muslims to be anti-Zionist.⁷¹ Chaim Kalvaryski, who worked frequently with Arabs, helped the Nashashibi family start the NMA, which became the principle organ of the opposition to the MCA in Mandatory Palestine.⁷² While there was distrust between Zionists and Christian Arabs, their relationship should not be simplified to just oppositional factions. The relationship was much more complex. Zionists would not have tried to win over Christians to their cause if they felt that was an impossible goal. Also, despite the strong anti-Zionism among Arab

⁶⁹ Yaacov Ro'i, "The Zionist Attitude to the Arabs 1908-1914," *Middle Eastern Studies* 4.3 (1968), 225.

⁷⁰ Haiduc-Dale, *Arab Christians*, 27.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 27-28.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 48-49.

Christians they did provide shelter for Jews during the riots in 1929.⁷³ Taking into account the complexity of the relationship between Jews and Christians it is best to view their opposition in political terms. Seeing these two groups as intrinsically against one another would do a disservice to the understanding of the conflict. However, due to the political maneuvering of Zionists, who sought to form a political environment conducive to their settlement, the influence of Christians in the Palestinian nationalist movement did subside.

Christians have a long history in the land of Palestine. Though their numbers are not as great as Muslims or Jews, they played an important role in the formation of the conflict during the Mandatory period. Their early call for nationalism and suspicion of the Zionist movement were important in the embryonic development of Palestinian nationalism. Unfortunately, due to a variety of factors their roles fell by the wayside. This has had negative effects on the Palestinian movement as many important figures who were instrumental in helping develop a coherent nationalist platform were pushed to the margins. Furthermore, it has prevented us from viewing the conflict for what it is and placed our focus unnecessarily on the idea of a “religious feud.” Looking long term, as a result of the marginalization of Christians in the Palestinian nationalist movement, there are other questions that should be explored. The conflict has seen an increase in radical Islamist involvement, in which Hamas claims the conflict is a matter of faith.⁷⁴ What, then, is the role of Arab Christians? This becomes a matter of integration or assimilation. If Hamas continues to operate under the notion that the true solution to this conflict is in the pervasiveness of Islam among Palestinians, then the outlook for Arab Christian involvement is very bleak.⁷⁵ An understanding of this history might break a binary conceptualization of this

⁷³ Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 114.

⁷⁴ Meir Litvak, “The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Case of Hamas,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 34.1 (January 1998), 148.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 149.

conflict and create space within scholarship for the voice of Palestinian Christians, who still are invested in the solution of this conflict.

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The American Media and the Soviet Union at the Onset of
U.S. Intervention in World War II

Anthony Joyce

1942 was a crucial year for America and the Soviet Union. For the past twenty years, the United States had been fearful of the U.S.S.R. and the possibility that communism would spread. However, World War II forced Americans to change their perceptions of Russia. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the United States entered the war on the side of the Allies, which included the Soviet Union. Furthermore, with Hitler threatening to conquer Europe, America had to unite with the U.S.S.R. in order to defeat him. At this point, the U.S. supported a country that it had recently viewed as its enemy. But were Americans completely supportive of the Soviet Union during this time period, or did they remain suspicious of it? This paper will focus on the reaction of the American media to Russia within the first year after the United States entered the war. It will study articles from three major news publications: the *New York Times*, the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, and *Time* magazine. The *New York Times* and the *Chicago Daily Tribune* represented two distinct regions of the country (the East Coast and the Midwest, respectively), and *Time* magazine reached the nation as a whole.

Not surprisingly, the publications all showed support for the war effort and therefore stressed the important role of the U.S.S.R. in the conflict. In 1942, certain themes and attitudes were evident. The *New York Times* was trustful of the U.S.S.R. and even suggested that communism did not pose a particularly grave threat to the United States. In contrast, the *Chicago Tribune* was generally wary of the Soviet Union and Stalin. *Time* magazine was the most praising of Russia, as it emphasized the heroic ways in which the Soviets were fighting the Germans and how victory in the war depended primarily on the U.S.S.R. These different viewpoints were often subtle, but they demonstrated that the American press did not all share the same perception of the Soviet Union during the first year of the U.S.'s involvement in the war.

Historians have not extensively studied the response of American newspapers to the Soviet Union during World War II. Of course, many scholars have closely examined American-Soviet relations at this time. However, they have focused mainly on the diplomatic negotiations between Franklin Roosevelt and Josef Stalin. These studies emphasize the interactions between the two governments. Edward Bennett analyzes Roosevelt's response to the Soviet Union before and during the war. He asserts that even though the United States was concerned about Stalin, Roosevelt had to be sure not to antagonize the Soviet Union lest it become allied with Hitler.¹ The U.S. therefore was cautious in its relationship with the U.S.S.R. Warren Kimball has a similar analysis of American foreign policy in the early years of the war, and he notes that Roosevelt was careful not to upset Stalin.² Taking a different approach, Amos Perlmutter claims that Roosevelt's relationship with the Soviet Union was more of an actual alliance with Stalin rather than simple appeasement.³ These historians all address how Roosevelt and other government leaders perceived the U.S.S.R. But there is little study of how other Americans felt about these issues. Did they agree with foreign policy at this time? Were they suspicious of Stalin and the Soviet Union? These are the types of questions that have received less attention from academics, and an analysis of the press's coverage of these subjects can reveal how the media presented such issues to the American public.

Nonetheless, some scholars have discussed how the media felt about the U.S. alliance with the Soviet Union. Typically, this analysis is not as thorough as the historiography on

¹ Edward M. Bennett, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Victory: American-Soviet Relations, 1939-1945* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1990), xxii-xxvii.

² Warren F. Kimball, "Anglo-American War Aims, 1941-43, 'The First Review: Edén's Mission to Washington,'" in *The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-45*, ed. Ann Lane and Howard Temperley (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1995), 5-8.

³ Amos Perlmutter, *FDR & Stalin: A Not So Grand Alliance, 1943-1945* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1993), 2-5.

Roosevelt and the American government's relations with Stalin. Whereas the diplomatic policies between the two countries are the primary focus of most historians, the reactions of the media, if mentioned at all, often receive a cursory glance. For example, Bennett briefly discusses that the U.S. government's foreign policy depended in part on how the public and media viewed Russia. He argues that much of the American press was not concerned with issues of self-determination in Eastern Europe and that it "refused to take sides on the Polish boundary question and regarded favorably 'the Soviet claims to Eastern Poland.'"⁴ Perlmutter observes that the American population was anti-Stalin before the war, but once the two countries became allies, the media attempted to portray the Soviet Union as heroic.⁵ Yet these arguments are mere footnotes compared to the scholarship on the government's interactions with the U.S.S.R. Bennett and Perlmutter mention how Americans responded to the Soviet Union, but fail to go into much depth on the issue.

This paper expands upon the works of other scholars in that it examines the American response to the Soviet Union through specific means: newspapers and magazines. This essay covers an area that few other historians have studied in detail. Such an examination adds to the previous scholarship in important ways. By focusing on the media coverage, it is possible to determine how the American public was informed about the Soviet Union. How were the issues presented to ordinary Americans? Furthermore, this study assesses whether different parts of the United States had slightly different perceptions of the U.S.S.R. Most scholarship on this topic presents the American public as uniform in its opinions of Stalin and the Soviet Union. However, an investigation of various newspapers and magazines throughout the country can determine whether there were different opinions of the Soviet Union. Just how diverse was the public's

⁴ Bennett, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Victory*, 123.

⁵ Perlmutter, *FDR & Stalin*, 102-106.

viewpoint? In general, Americans had a negative opinion of the Soviet Union originally, but they began to view it more favorably once the United States joined World War II. However, this paper contains a deeper analysis in order to determine if the reactions were more complex than this simple explanation. It extends beyond the actions of the government leaders and instead explores the thoughts and responses of the media. Since newspapers and magazines were popular in the United States at this time, the media coverage undoubtedly influenced the opinions of the broader American public.

In order to understand the effect that the press had on the public, it is first necessary to know how popular these specific publications were during the 1940s. The *New York Times* was perhaps the most important and widespread newspaper at this time. Throughout World War II, it published more columns of war coverage than any other American newspaper.⁶ Also, in 1941, it had a weekday circulation of 455,000; therefore, it was widely read.⁷ Of course, *The New York Times* was not the only prominent newspaper in New York. Other papers competed with the *Times*, but by the end of the war, the *New York Times* had the widest circulation. The *Times* was dedicated to covering the war in more depth than its competitors, which was a significant reason for its eventual success.⁸ Thus, the articles that the *New York Times* published would have had a notable influence on the population in New York and the East Coast. The *Chicago Daily Tribune*, meanwhile, had a substantial effect on the Midwest. Although it had to compete with other newspapers in Chicago, it was still a prominent publication in that region of the United

⁶ Edwin Diamond, *Behind the Times: Inside the New New York Times* (New York: Villard Books, 1994), 48.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 48.

States.⁹ *Time* magazine, however, was not simply a regional publication. It was popular and widely read throughout the entire country. In 1941, *Time* had a circulation of nearly one million, and its sales doubled the next year.¹⁰ Therefore, the magazine was even more influential than the newspapers because it reached all parts of the nation.

The 1940s were a transformative time for the American media. Newspapers remained a popular form of communication, but they faced competition from other media outlets such as radio and film. However, *Time* magazine presented a new style of reporting that was different from that of newspapers such as the *New York Times* or *Chicago Daily Tribune*. A principal purpose of *Time* was not simply to inform its readers, but also to entertain them.¹¹ The writing was short and clear, and the publication summarized and interpreted the news in a manner that made evident the writers' opinions. Often, the news reflected the thoughts of the magazine's founder and editor-in-chief, Henry Luce.¹² Therefore, *Time* was generally more subjective than newspapers. Even though the *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* still displayed their own views of the issues within their writing, they were not as clear or explicit as *Time* magazine.

When the United States first entered World War II, the nation's primary focus was on Japan. However, by early 1942, it quickly focused much of its attention on the Soviet Union's defense against the German army. At this point, the Nazis had already conquered Ukraine and had achieved gains across the entire front. Leningrad was under siege, and the Germans threatened to take Moscow. Stalin wanted to initiate counter-offensives so that the U.S.S.R.

⁹ John Tebbel, *The Compact History of the American Newspaper* (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1969), 225.

¹⁰ Norberto Angeletti and Alberto Oliva, *Time: The Illustrated History of the World's Most Influential Magazine* (New York: Rizzoli International Publication, Inc., 2010), 93.

¹¹ Wiley Lee Umphlett, *The Visual Focus of American Media Culture in the Twentieth Century: The Modern Era, 1893-1945* (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2004), 248.

¹² Angeletti and Oliva, *Illustrated History*, 22-23, 28.

would be attacking rather than only defending.¹³ He also urged the United States and Britain to open a Second Front against Germany to take the pressure off the Soviet Union (though the Allies would not introduce this other front for two more years).¹⁴ During that summer, the Russians lost territory in the southern part of the country, as the Nazis earned victories in the Caucasus and moved towards Stalingrad.¹⁵ The American media reported extensively on this situation. As the Germans continued their invasion and the Soviets counter-attacked, the battles on this front were crucial for determining who would eventually win the war. Throughout the year, the American newspapers and magazines demonstrated their thoughts about the Soviet Union through the manner in which they covered these events.

Most of the articles that the press published were simply informative; they reported on specific events in the war, such as how the Soviets were faring against the German invasion. Nevertheless, from all of this coverage, certain trends emerged in respect to the way in which the press portrayed the U.S.S.R. For example, the newspapers focused more on the war in Europe than the conflict against Japan. They recognized that the Soviet Union was busy battling the Nazis, and therefore they did not argue that the country ought to help the Americans fight the Japanese. Additionally, Russian heroism and unity between the Allied powers were common themes. This coverage demonstrated that the media publications were generally supportive of the Soviet Union at this time.

Such support was repeatedly evident in the stories from the *New York Times* during 1942. It published many articles that dealt with American-Soviet relations, in which the United States

¹³ John Erickson, "Stalin, Soviet Strategy and the Grand Alliance," in *The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-45*, ed. Ann Lane and Howard Temperley (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1995), 144.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 145-146.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 145.

highlighted the need to aid Russia in order to defeat Germany. Not only did the U.S. try to help the U.S.S.R., it also praised Soviet heroism. The *Times* displayed such praise when it reported on certain cases in which Russia honored its citizens who had died in defense of their country. Recipients of this honor included people who died in the siege of Leningrad and specific individuals whom the Nazis killed. The tone of these *New York Times* articles suggests that the newspaper viewed the Russians in Leningrad as heroic. The soldiers' mood "was of high exaltation as they knelt and swore to give their lives if necessary to smash the blockade," and as the Soviets made advancements, "the heroic millions of Leningrad can now see some lightening of the menace that has hung over them."¹⁶ This coverage was crucial because it almost admired the Soviet troops for their actions. Russia was not simply helping the Allies fight the war; it was doing so courageously and was therefore essential for achieving victory.

Much of the reporting on the Soviet Union during this time period was not particularly surprising. Since the United States was allied with Stalin against the Axis powers, it makes sense that the *New York Times* emphasized the unity between the two nations and their leaders. That the newspaper portrayed the people of the U.S.S.R. as heroic is significant in that it shows that the *Times* lauded the actions of the Soviets. It had moved past any distrust of the Soviet Union and was completely supportive of it, despite Russia's radically different political ideas. Even more surprising is that the *Times* began to publish stories that indicated less criticism towards Soviet ideology. Although the newspaper did not advocate communism by any means, it did suggest that communism did not pose an especially grave threat to the Allies.

Some of the *New York Times* articles implied that the Soviet system of government had an influence on success during the war. One editorial commented on the Russian view of why its

¹⁶ "Leningrad's Stand Honored in Russia," *New York Times*, Feb. 9, 1942, 7.

citizens had sacrificed themselves during the war: “Only Socialism, it is felt here, can create that situation where every one fights . . . with the feeling that what the people are being called upon to defend belongs to them.”¹⁷ Here, the *Times* presented a Soviet perspective of communism, in which the ideology itself was a principal reason for the relentlessness of the people. Furthermore, another story examined Russian culture during the war. It reflected on the popularity of Russian literature (such as *War and Peace*) and how the government praised individual heroes for their sacrifice to the country.¹⁸ But the final sentences of this article are the most revealing. Noting that the Soviets had previously disapproved of the glorification of individual actions, the *Times* wrote that “It would be wrong to think that these modifications are sudden or temporary. They have been going on gradually for several years in preparation for national defense.”¹⁹ This editorial did not mention communism, but it did refer to the Soviet system and the actions of the government. It was not critical of the Russians, nor did it suggest that they threatened America, but it instead admired how the preparations for war had created a positive effect for the Soviet people.

Perhaps the *New York Times* editorial that was the most explicitly dismissive of the threat of communism was published in April 1942. Its author was a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, Joseph E. Davies. The title of the editorial was “Is Communism a Menace to Us?,” and the answer to this question was an emphatic “no.” Davies studied the state of Russian communism. He argued that the U.S.S.R. did not have true communism as Marx and Engels had envisioned, because the nation was forced to use some capitalistic principles in order to undergo industrialization. Because of this rapid development in industry, the Soviet Union was able to

¹⁷ “May Day in Soviet Union to be Working Day,” *New York Times*, May 1, 1942, 4.

¹⁸ “Soviet’s Social Outlook Altered in Fixing Public Interest on War,” *New York Times*, April 25, 1942, 4.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 4.

defend itself from the German invasion.²⁰ Therefore, not only was the Soviet state not really communist, but also its system was crucial for fighting the war. Davies then examined the conditions that were necessary for communism to emerge. He concluded that “Russian communism . . . [had] nothing to offer [the United States]” because “conditions [were] certainly not ripe for it yet, nor [were] conditions even possible to conceive that would be so bad, so desperate, as to cause our people to turn to communism as a relief.”²¹ He listed economic and social factors that would prevent this ideology from spreading to America, which included private property and a deeply religious people.²² Finally, Davies argued that it was far more important to defeat Hitler, and an irrational fear of the menace of communism would only aid the Nazis.²³ This editorial is crucial for several reasons. It reflected the mindset that Hitler was more dangerous than communism at that time, which was a common viewpoint during the war. But it extended beyond the attitudes of most Americans by claiming that communism did not even pose a legitimate threat to the United States. Thus, the perception of the Soviet Union, based on the reports of the *New York Times*, had shifted dramatically since the U.S. had entered the war. Obviously, not all Americans held the same beliefs about the U.S.S.R. as Davies, but this editorial, along with others from the same period, shows that the *Times* was generally more trustful of the Soviet Union and less fearful of communism.

The *Chicago Daily Tribune*'s coverage during 1942 contained many similarities in its overall perception of Russia as the *New York Times*, but it also had a few crucial differences. Much of the *Tribune*'s reporting dealt with simple information about how the war was progressing and what diplomatic policies the American government was enacting. The content

²⁰ Joseph E. Davies, “Is Communism a Menace to Us?,” *New York Times*, April 12, 1942, SM3.

²¹ *Ibid.*, SM3.

²² *Ibid.*, SM3.

²³ *Ibid.*, SM3.

and tone of these articles are not surprising. They underscored the attempts of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union to remain united and supportive of each other in order to defeat Hitler. Furthermore, like the stories from the *Times*, they noted the heroism of the Soviet citizens and Russia's important role in defending against the German invasion. Nonetheless, the most intriguing articles of the *Chicago Tribune* from this year were about the impact that the Soviet Union and communism would have on the United States. As the year progressed, the articles displayed a fear of communism and distrust of the Soviet state.

In February, President Roosevelt vetoed a bill that would have required the registration of the communist party.²⁴ The *Chicago Daily Tribune's* coverage of this event clearly reflected the tensions over the issue of communism in America. The article cited the thoughts of different government leaders on this subject. Congressmen who supported the law believed that it was necessary to expose communists within the American government who threatened to undermine the country. In contrast, Roosevelt reasoned that the bill could harm the U.S.'s relationship with foreign countries.²⁵ The *Tribune* provided a deeper analysis of America's views of communism. From this article, it is clear that the United States government was divided on whether communism constituted a real threat to the country. Nonetheless, President Roosevelt believed that unity with other nations took precedence over the potential threat of communism within the U.S., indicating that the highest officials within the government were willing to trust the Soviet Union.

In this previous article, the *Chicago Tribune* demonstrated that some American government officials were concerned about communism, whereas Roosevelt was more

²⁴ Chesly Manly, "Bill to Register U.S. Communists Vetoed by F.D.R.," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Feb. 10, 1942, 11.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

dismissive of this threat. In May 1942, the *Tribune* revealed that it was critical of Roosevelt's attitude towards his conservative opponents. Leading up to the midterm elections, Roosevelt's administration had urged the defeat of congressmen who had resisted the president's pre-war intervention plan. The newspaper claimed that these actions were "the activity of the alliance between the Roosevelt administration and other left wing groups to purge congress of pre-war noninterventionists and right wingers."²⁶ The tone of this article showed that the *Tribune* disapproved of the president's attempts to remove members of Congress. It continually used the word "purge" to describe these events and argued that the goal of the administration was "the repudiation of prewar noninterventionist senators and representatives by their constituents who at the time gave ample evidence of overwhelming support."²⁷ Furthermore, the article claimed that the president targeted members of Congress who "opposed the Roosevelt intervention policy or incurred the displeasure of the communists and other left wingers on social and economic legislation."²⁸ Therefore, the *Tribune* viewed this "purge" as strictly a political move in which left-wingers had influenced the administration's actions. Even though the issue did not directly involve the Soviet Union, it showed that the newspaper was distrustful of the president's relationship with communists and leftist groups.

One article in particular from the *Chicago Daily Tribune* most clearly demonstrated its misgivings towards the Soviet Union. Titled "At Loose Ends with Russia," this editorial was critical of the Russians and the American diplomatic relations with Stalin. It began with a bold assertion: "Relations with Russia are not improved by what happens from day to day. Each new

²⁶ Arthur Sears Henning, "New Deal-Red Alliance to get Test at Polls," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, May 18, 1942, 3.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

touch of allied diplomacy and strategy makes them worse.”²⁹ The article argued that the Soviets were not fighting the Germans in order to help Britain or the rest of Western Europe. Instead, they became involved in the conflict because “the dealings of Hitler and Stalin came to a bad end for both of them.”³⁰ Finally, the author maintained that Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill were not working together well. Although all of the leaders wanted to defeat Germany, they each had their own plans for doing so and did not have a grand strategy for winning the war.³¹ The arguments of this editorial contrasted sharply with the ideas that most other articles had promoted. According to this author, the Allies were not really united, but were instead self-interested. The Soviet Union was not heroic, and the relationship between it and the United States was worsening. Also, it is essential to note that this article clearly stated the viewpoint of the *Chicago Daily Tribune* on the issue of American-Soviet relations. Unlike the *New York Times*, this newspaper did not portray the two countries as united, but rather it was concerned about the actions of Stalin and the Soviet Union.

The coverage of *Time* magazine in 1942 differed from that of the *New York Times* and *Chicago Daily Tribune* in that it was more consistent in respect to Russia. Each week’s edition contained a detailed analysis of how the war was progressing on the different fronts, which included how the Soviets were faring against the German invasion. Most of the time, *Time*’s reporting was informative and technical, as every week updated the public on any new developments in the conflict. But from the publications, certain themes were apparent. Throughout the year, *Time* repeatedly emphasized that the Soviet Union was crucial in order for the Allies to defeat Germany. When Hitler began to gain momentum, the magazine predicted

²⁹ “At Loose Ends With Russia,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Oct. 10, 1942, 12.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 12.

what would happen if Russia fell: “The best and only present chance to destroy the main German armies will be gone; the Allies will then have lost their best chance to defeat Germany and win World War II.”³² Victory in Europe therefore depended almost entirely on the Soviet Union at that time. This idea was reiterated in other editions from that year. One article described in more exact terms what the Allies would have lost if Germany had conquered Russia. Losses would have included manpower, air power, oil, and industry. Considering that the Soviet Union accounted for a large proportion of the soldiers and industry in Europe, such a defeat would have been a severe blow to the Allies.³³ Another story reported that the Red Army felt confident about its chances against the Germans. It then noted that this confidence was encouraging for the British and Americans because “if Russian confidence was justified, victory might be in sight. If not, the long night of war might grow darker and colder than ever.”³⁴ In other words, the rest of the Allies were relying on Russia. This sentiment was apparent in many editions of *Time* throughout the entire year. The magazine understood and stressed that the United States needed to support Russia because the key to victory in World War II lay with the Soviet Union and its ability to hold off the Nazi invasion.

Additionally, *Time* frequently portrayed the Russians as heroic in their struggle against Germany. Since it was vital that the Soviet Union defend itself from Hitler, the publication praised the country for its successes. It declared that Russia’s Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov was a great military mind on whom Stalin relied, and that these two men deserved credit for any victories against the Germans.³⁵ In a different article, descriptions of Russian attacks on the Nazis signified that the Soviets had battled well. It used phrases such as “they fought savagely

³² “Hitler is Winning,” *Time*, July 13, 1942, 20.

³³ “If Russia Fell,” *Time*, August 3, 1942, 20.

³⁴ “Confidence,” *Time*, May 4, 1942, 18.

³⁵ “What Will Spring Bring?,” *Time*, Feb. 16, 1942, 26.

from Kerch on Crimea's eastern tip to the snowbound Leningrad pocket," "they also fought effectively," and "Russian pilots worked hardest at knocking down transport planes with supplies for the German 'centers of resistance.'"³⁶ The word choice in this story implied that the Russian soldiers were strong fighters whose will enabled them to emerge victorious. Finally, a feature from June 1942 referred to Leo Tolstoy's *War and Peace* and compared the German attack to Napoleon's invasion of Russia in the 19th century. It also asserted that "in spirit, in the will to win or die, the Red Army has no superior."³⁷ Such a statement offered high praise to the Russian soldiers and their determination to fight. It credited the Soviets themselves with having the capability to win the war because of their heroic qualities. In this sense, *Time* magazine viewed the Soviet Union more admirably than the *New York Times* or *Chicago Daily Tribune* did. Even though those newspapers emphasized the need for unity with the Soviet Union, they were not as explicit as *Time*. Furthermore, *Time* displayed more trust in Russia and focused more on the outcome of the war rather than the potential threat of communism.

Even when the U.S.S.R. suffered losses, *Time* still emphasized that there were some moral victories. Although the city of Sevastopol on the Black Sea fell in the summer of 1942, at least the Germans were not able to conquer it in time for the one-year anniversary of the invasion (which had been a political goal for Hitler).³⁸ The Germans advanced, but the Soviet Union could still stop them:

After twelve months the Germans had occupied about 7% . . . of Russia's land, but they had not conquered Russia. They had destroyed or captured upwards of 4,500,000 Red soldiers, 15,000 Red tanks, 9,000 Red planes. But they had not destroyed the Red Army. . . . But they had not captured Leningrad . . . The swastika flew within 115 miles of Moscow. But the Germans had not taken the

³⁶ "Spring is Coming," *Time*, March 16, 1942, 24.

³⁷ "The Time is Now," *Time*, June 29, 1942, 22.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 22.

U.S.S.R.'s heart and capital, the vast railway system which rays out from Moscow and serves most of Russia.³⁹

Thus, *Time* was optimistic that the Soviets could eventually defeat the Nazis. Despite all of their gains up to that point, the Germans had not yet taken several major cities nor had they broken the will of the Russian people. Even as the publication reported on the victories that the Germans had achieved, it still reminded its readers of how the Soviet Union had limited the invasion and stressed that the determination of the Russian soldiers could enable them to emerge victorious. The *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* did not display as highly or clearly such confidence and optimism towards the Soviet Union's ability to win the war. Of the three publications, *Time* portrayed the Soviet Union in the most positive and heroic manner.

There are several factors that could explain why these publications reported on the U.S.S.R. in slightly different manners. The clearest explanation is that the depiction of the Soviet Union depended on the ideology of that particular newspaper or magazine. At this time, the *Chicago Daily Tribune* was conservative. It had criticized President Roosevelt and his administration, and it was anti-communist.⁴⁰ These viewpoints help demonstrate why the *Chicago Tribune* was more suspicious of the Soviet Union during World War II. Since the newspaper was strongly opposed to communism, it is understandable that it would criticize Russia and claim that the country was self-interested. Furthermore, the *Tribune's* negative opinion of Roosevelt may explain why it published an editorial that argued that the Allied leaders were not united. As an opponent of Roosevelt and his ideology, the publication was more willing to disapprove of his policies. The *New York Times*, though obviously not pro-communist,

³⁹ Ibid., 21-22.

⁴⁰ Tebbel, *Compact History*, 225.

was generally more liberal and supportive of President Roosevelt during this time period.⁴¹

Therefore, it did not share the same suspicion as the *Tribune* and was more supportive of unity between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Time magazine's coverage of the U.S.S.R. can best be understood from the ideology of Henry Luce. Luce was a strong supporter of the war, and he had wanted the United States to join World War II prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.⁴² Frequently, he ensured that his own opinion and interpretation of the news were evident in the magazine. For example, *Time* chose Stalin to be man of the year twice, in 1939 and 1942. In 1939, Luce was upset that Stalin had signed the non-aggression pact with Hitler. Therefore, the *Time* magazine cover for that year depicted Stalin as a villain, with an arrogant expression on his face.⁴³ In contrast, the cover for 1942 showed him more heroically, with a benevolent facial expression. At this time, Luce supported Stalin because the Soviet Union was fighting against Hitler.⁴⁴ Luce's attitude towards the war explains why *Time* magazine was more praising of the U.S.S.R. than the other publications were. Just as the front cover in 1942 portrayed Stalin as a hero, the news stories extended such praise to the Russian soldiers. Since Luce was so supportive of the war against the Nazis, *Time* magazine repeatedly commended the country that fought against them.

Overall, there were some important distinctions in the way that the three different publications reported on the U.S.S.R. The *Chicago Daily Tribune* was more suspicious of Russia and communism than the *New York Times* was, whereas *Time* magazine clearly praised it the most heavily. This analysis shows that a variety of viewpoints about the Soviet Union existed among the American press during the first year of the United States' involvement in the war.

⁴¹ Diamond, *Behind the Times*, 289-290.

⁴² Angeletti and Oliva, *Illustrated History*, 85.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 92.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 92.

Even though all of the publications were supportive of the war effort, some of them remained more skeptical of the Soviet Union than others. It is important to understand the media's portrayal of Russia at this time because newspapers and magazines had a profound impact on the American people. Examining the role of the media helps explain how the country as a whole perceived these issues. From the study of these three publications, it is evident that the United States was not uniform in its opinion of the U.S.S.R. Instead, the media displayed diverse views about the Soviet Union's new role as an ally of the United States.

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Washington:

A European Capital City in the Early American Republic

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With the Peace of Paris in 1783, the United States achieved *de jure* independence from Great Britain and began the monumental task of nation building. One of the most pressing priorities was the establishment of a permanent seat of government. Philadelphia and New York City, as the two largest cities in the new country and major centers of commerce and culture, were obvious contenders. However, these places were all-too-recently hubs of British imperial authority, and their northerly locations were deemed by many Southern citizens as unsuitable for the new American republic. Therefore, for the first time since antiquity, a new capital city would be planned and built from the ground up.¹

Nonetheless, this new city would have to be constructed on a grand scale, to project America's vision for the future and rival the great cities of Europe. Newly-elected President George Washington insisted to Thomas Jefferson that "The buildings...ought to be upon a scale far superior to anything in *this* country."² For this bold dream to become a reality, trained architects and urban planners would be needed. However, the burgeoning United States had no schools for architecture, and native artists lacked either the sophistication or the confidence to tackle such an ambitious plan, so government leaders again looked to Europe.³ Men like Washington and Jefferson consciously understood that the adoption of European urban designs was a means of giving grandeur, authority, and European-style refinement to the new capital. Even though the goal of the founding generation was the creation of a new America separate from Europe, they sought to build a capital city to embody its republican ideals using European

¹ Patricia Kelly, "Washington in Ruins," *American Art* 25, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 117, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/663956> (accessed November 8, 2014).

² Ron Chernow, *Washington: A Life* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2010), 665.

³ C. M. Harris, "Washington's Gamble, L'Enfant's Dream: Politics, Design, and the Founding of the National Capital," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 56, no. 3 (July 1999): 539, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2674560> (accessed November 8, 2014).

designers and architects and injecting European aesthetics into the federal city. Therefore, the United States during the Federal Period was reliant upon European culture to frame its growth.

The designer who was entrusted with the design for the new capital city turned out to be a Frenchman. Pierre Charles L'Enfant was born in Paris in 1754 and trained as a painter at the Royal Academy of Painting and Sculpture.⁴ In the midst of the Revolution, he immigrated to the United States to offer his services to the Continental Army, serving as a military engineer under General George Washington. After the war, L'Enfant elected to remain in America. In 1788, with the national capital relocated to New York City, the old city hall was requisitioned by the federal government as the new headquarters of Congress and L'Enfant was selected to remodel the building. With the passage of the Residence Act in 1790 that decided that a new, permanent capital would be located on the Potomac River, a designer for the new city was suddenly needed. Washington's former officer L'Enfant, whose design of Federal Hall was admired by the President, applied and was selected as the city's planner and architect.⁵

With the Residence Act stipulating that the federal capital must provide "suitable" buildings for Congress, the President, and "the public offices" by December 1800, planning began in earnest.⁶ Major L'Enfant wrote Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson requesting "The number and nature of the publick building[s]...[and] what Ever map may fall within your reach, of any of the differents grand city now Existing such as for Example, as London, madr[id], paris,

⁴ Chernow, 662.

⁵ J. L. Sibley Jennings, Jr., "Artistry as Design: L'Enfant's Extraordinary City," *The Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress* 36, no. 3 (Summer 1979): 225, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29781817> (accessed November 8, 2014).

⁶ Harris, "Founding of the National Capitol," 539.

Amsterdam, naples, venice, genoa, [and] florence...” to look to for inspiration.⁷ It is significant to note that all but two of the cities that L’Enfant requested plans of are located in southern Europe. He recognized that the climate, topography, and horticulture of these cities were more akin to this new city on the swampy banks of the Potomac.⁸ As L’Enfant began laying out the city, he incorporated designs that had already been successfully used in the courts, palaces, and public works of Europe.⁹ Building height would be restricted, as it was in Paris, to a height of forty feet, which would not only keep the streets light and airy but also reduce the danger from fires.¹⁰

He placed the Congress House (the Capitol) on the brow of the highest spot in the city, known as Jenkins Hill, which he praised as “a pedestal waiting for a superstructure.” “This building would be the visual centerpiece of the city, with broad, diagonal thoroughfares radiating outward.” As had been done in his boyhood home of Paris, these diagonal streets would provide “contrast and variety” and serve as express lanes, shortening the distance between places.¹¹ Public squares, like those seen in Venice, Madrid, Florence, and in Paris at the place des Vosges, place du Palais-Royal, and the place du Théâtre Français would also be situated throughout the city.¹² Connected to the Congress House by one of these grand boulevards (Pennsylvania Avenue) L’Enfant positioned the President's House (the White House) on a commanding hill. Between these two structures, he designed a "Grand Avenue" (the National Mall) based on the

⁷ Pierre Charles L’Enfant to Thomas Jefferson, Georgetown, April 4, 1791, in *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1 April-4 August 1791*, ed. Julian P. Boyd (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 83-84.

⁸ Jennings, 232.

⁹ Chernow, 662.

¹⁰ Jennings, 249.

¹¹ Chernow, 662.

¹² Jennings, 240.

gardens at Versailles, where an equestrian statue of George Washington was planned.¹³ An individual standing at any one of these locations would be able to see the other two distinctly. Similarly in Paris the Place Louis XV, featuring a statue of the king on horseback, was created to join the Tuileries Gardens with the Champs-Élysées.¹⁴ In the end, L'Enfant's plan covered fifty square miles, providing for a city of 800,000 citizens, the size of eighteenth-century Paris. "The American city was, like Versailles, conceived of as an outdoor palace in which the viewer moved out from major centers harmoniously through one visual experience after another."¹⁵ However, for "a republic so often proclaiming the equality of men and the virtues of democracy, there appeared something incongruous in adopting as a plan for its capital the architectural and landscape forms brought to perfection first in ancient Rome and then in eighteenth-century France under the most autocratic of regimes."¹⁶

One of the main public buildings that initially needed to be erected in the new federal capital was a grand residence to house the President, which L'Enfant clearly marked on his first plan of the city in 1791.¹⁷ Secretary of State Jefferson, preferring the building to be in the French taste, wrote to the Major, "Whenever it is proposed to prepare plans...for the President's house I should prefer the celebrated fronts of modern buildings, which have already received the

¹³ Ibid., 272.

¹⁴ J. P. Dougherty, "Baroque and Picturesque Motifs in L'Enfant's Design for the Federal Capital," *American Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (March 1974): 29, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2711565> (accessed November 10, 2014).

¹⁵ James Thomas Flexner, "The Great Columbian Federal City," *American Art Journal* 2, no. 1 (Spring 1970): 37, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1593863> (accessed November 14, 2014).

¹⁶ John W. Reys, *The Making of Urban America: A History of City Planning in the United States*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 263.

¹⁷ Pierre Charles L'Enfant, "Plan of the city intended for the permanent seat of the government of t[he] United States : projected agreeable to the direction of the President of the United States, in pursuance of an act of Congress, passed on the sixteenth day of July, MDCCXC, 'establishing the permanent seat on the bank of the Potowmac' : [Washington D.C.] /," *The Library of Congress*, <http://www.loc.gov/item/88694205/> (accessed November 15, 2014).

approbation of all good judges. Such are the Galerie du Louvre, the Gardes meubles, and two fronts of the Hotel de Salm.”¹⁸ The Frenchman envisioned a vast palace, five times larger than the residence that would eventually be constructed.¹⁹ When L’Enfant refused to compromise on his plan and was dismissed from his post in early 1792, Jefferson recommended a nationwide contest be held to decide the design for the President's House. Advertisements were placed in all of the major newspapers, offering a \$500 grand prize. The winning design was that of James Hoban, an Irish émigré to South Carolina. Hoban had trained with the English builder and architect Thomas Ivory and studied at the Dublin Society architectural school before coming to America and designing the county courthouse in Charleston, which George Washington had admired on his tour of the south.²⁰ The plan called for a relatively small, unadorned three-story Georgian structure, articulated by a plain temple front marked by four Ionic columns. The building would be very similar to Leinster House in Dublin, of which Hoban was familiar, but with the addition of a neoclassical oval room in the rear, based upon the designs of Scottish architect Robert Adam.²¹ “Hoban’s design borrowed heavily from the work of Italian Renaissance theorist and architect Andrea Palladio, specifically his reworking of Roman orders and vocabularies” and the influential British architect James Gibbs’ *A Book of Architecture* (1728).^{22 23} However, after consulting with President Washington, it was decided that the

¹⁸ Thomas Jefferson to Pierre Charles L’Enfant, Philadelphia, April 10, 1791, in *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1 April-4 August 1791*, ed. Julian P. Boyd (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 86-87.

¹⁹ The White House Historical Association, “Overview,” *White House Tour*, <http://www.whitehousehistory.org/history/white-house-facts-trivia/tour-overview.html> (accessed November 22, 2014).

²⁰ Damie Stillman, “Six Houses for the President,” *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 129, no. 4 (October 2005): 426, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20093818> (accessed November 28, 2014).

²¹ Stillman, 429.

²² Kelly, 118.

building would be twenty percent larger with more Federal-style ornamentation, including Palladian motifs and an eagle amid arrows, but have only two main floors.²⁴ Additionally, due to costs and material and labor shortages, brick made at the construction site would be used to line the Virginia sandstone facades.²⁵

Later that year on October 13, 1792, the cornerstone for the President's House was laid, beginning construction on the first public building in the city. Hoban, at Washington's urging, brought over skilled stone carvers and craftsmen from Scotland, Ireland, and other European nations to adequately execute the building's European design.^{26 27} However, progress was frustratingly slow. When President John Adams moved into the home on November 1, 1800, not one of the thirty rooms of what First Lady Abigail Adams called a "great castle" were completed.^{28 29} Just four months later, President Thomas Jefferson took up residence in the sparsely furnished home that he quipped was "...big enough for two emperors, a pope, and the grand lama."³⁰ Nonetheless, Jefferson had a passion for basing American buildings on the best European sources.³¹ As chief executive, he devoted more attention to the President's House and the Capitol than any other president, before or since. "He enlarged and embellished the

²³ Flexner, 44.

²⁴ Stillman, 429.

²⁵ The White House Historical Association, "Overview," *White House Tour*.

²⁶ Flexner, 45.

²⁷ The White House Historical Association, "James Hoban – Architect of the White House," *Building the President's House*, <http://www.whitehousehistory.org/presentations/james-hoban-architect-white-house/james-hoban-architect-white-house-04.html> (accessed November 28, 2014).

²⁸ Harris, "Founding of the National Capital," 531.

²⁹ Kelly, 118.

³⁰ The White House Historical Association, "Overview," *White House Tour*.

³¹ Flexner, 44.

presidential residence and its appendages, albeit in the manner of a country villa.”³² By the end of his presidency in 1809, he had colonnades built on the east and west sides of the mansion and added the south portico, possibly based on the Château de Rastignac, which he may have visited during his term as minister to France.^{33 34}

Equally important to the new federal city was the Congress House, renamed the Capitol by Jefferson after the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitoline Hill in ancient Rome.³⁵ L’Enfant wanted the Capitol to have the proportions and character of the Garde-meuble.³⁶ However, due to his dismissal, a competition was held in 1792 to decide the building’s design, with the prize being \$500 and a prime lot in the city. After receiving lackluster proposals, the plan of Dr. William Thornton, an English physician and amateur architect from the West Indies, was selected in 1793. As Thornton was formally untrained in the art of architecture, he likely received assistance with the plan from his friend John Jacob Ulrich Rivardi, a Swiss engineer who had served in the Russian army.³⁷

³² C. M. Harris, “Washington’s ‘Federal City,’ Jefferson’s ‘Federal Town,’” *Washington History* 12, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2000): 52, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40073432> (accessed November 29, 2014).

³³ Rubil Morales-Vázquez, “George Washington, the President’s House, and the Projection of Executive Power,” *Washington History* 16, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2004): 48, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40073580> (accessed November 29, 2014).

³⁴ Michael Johnson, “A chateau fit for a president,” *The New York Times*, September 15, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/15/opinion/15iht-edjohnson.html?_r=2& (accessed November 29, 2014).

³⁵ Fergus M. Bordewich, “A Capitol Vision From a Self-Taught Architect,” *Smithsonian Magazine*, December 2008, <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/a-capitol-vision-from-a-self-taught-architect-91773428/?no-ist> (accessed November 29, 2014). For an in-depth discussion into the early Capitol, see Donald R. Kennon’s *A Republic for the Ages: The United States Capitol and the Political Culture of the Early Republic* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1999).

³⁶ Jennings, 267.

³⁷ William C. Allen, *History of the United States Capitol: a chronicle of design, construction, and politics* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 20, Hathi Trust, <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951d02020559a> (accessed December 1, 2014).

Thornton's design was an amalgam of the emerging neoclassical style and orthodox, high-style Georgian.³⁸ It was composed of three parts: a central section and two wings flanking it. The central section featured a domed rotunda fronted by a Corinthian portico with twelve columns standing in a one-story arcade. The dome and the portico were a close replica of the Pantheon in Rome, built in the second century A.D. The two wings flanking this section were designed in "...a conventional Georgian manner with a rusticated ground story supporting Corinthian pilasters and a full entablature..." with curving pediments topping the main floor windows.³⁹ Thornton studied examples of classical architecture by Andrea Palladio and Sir William Chambers as well as *Vitruvius Britannicus* (1715) by Colin Campbell, which featured the great houses of Britain, to come up with his plan.⁴⁰

Because of Dr. Thornton's unfamiliarity with construction, his design was criticized as unworkable. Therefore, Étienne Sulpice (Stephen) Hallet, a trained French architect who fled to the U.S. in 1789, was charged with making alterations to Thornton's plan and supervising construction. Hallet was the runner-up in the Capitol design competition, but his plan was deemed too elaborate and expensive. As slight modifications were being made, Jefferson convinced Hallet to incorporate an interior dome over the House chamber like the one he had adored at the Paris grain market, the Halle au Bled, which featured beautiful glass skylights.⁴¹ With a plan made, the cornerstone for the Capitol was laid on September 18, 1793, in a grand ceremony by President Washington. The north, or Senate, wing was begun first because its

³⁸ Ibid, 19.

³⁹ Allen, 20.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 20.

⁴¹ Ibid., 23.

numerous rooms could house the House of Representatives, Senate, Supreme Court, and Supreme Court until the south wing was built.^{42 43}

As the new building, like the President's House, would be dressed in sandstone, craftsmen would be needed. Unfortunately, there were almost no local stonecutters, and the few that were around were not experienced enough to work on a project of this magnitude and importance. Once again, the Founders would have to look to Europe. British stonemasons George Blagden, Collen Williamson, Robert Brown, James and John Maitland, John Delahanty, and John Dobson were hired and began work on the Capitol.⁴⁴

Just a short time later, in 1794, after attempting to make unauthorized changes to Thornton's design, Hallet was dismissed. As his replacement, an English architect named George Hadfield was hired in 1795. Born in Italy and the brother of Thomas Jefferson's friend Maria Cosway, Hadfield had studied architecture at the Royal Academy in London and brought excellent credentials to the project. However, he too tried to alter the preferred design for the building and was forced to resign in 1798.

Permanent work on the Capitol building ground to a halt until well into President Thomas Jefferson's first term due to lack of funds. On March 3, 1803, Jefferson approved a \$50,000 appropriation for the "repairs and alterations in the Capitol...for the accommodation of Congress in their future sessions."⁴⁵ It was understood that the majority of these funds would be used for the construction of the south wing of the Capitol while the remainder would go towards repairs

⁴² Pamela Scott, "'Temple of Liberty': Building a Capitol for a New Nation," *Information Bulletin*, <http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9506/capitol.html> (accessed December 2, 2014).

⁴³ Allen, 44. When Congress first convened in 1800, portraits of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette hung prominently in the Capitol.

⁴⁴ Allen, 25, 28.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 50.

to the existing north annex and the President's House.⁴⁶ To oversee this new development, Jefferson appointed Benjamin Henry Latrobe as the Surveyor of Public Buildings in Washington. Latrobe, born in Britain, trained under civil engineer John Smeaton and the neoclassical architect Samuel Pepys Cockerell and worked for a time as the Surveyor of the Public Offices in London. In 1796, he came to the United States, first settling in Virginia where he designed Richmond's State Penitentiary before migrating to Philadelphia. There, he designed the Gothic Revival Bank of Pennsylvania and successfully engineered the city's first water system.⁴⁷ Government leaders now hoped that Latrobe could finally bring Dr. William Thornton's Capitol to fruition.

By 1805, the exterior walls of the south wing had been completed to the point where Latrobe could focus on the interior, where the House of Representatives would meet. To recruit artists, Latrobe wrote to Philip Mazzei requesting "...assistance in procuring for us the aid of a good Sculptor in the erection of public buildings in this city, especially the Capitol."⁴⁸ Mazzei was an Italian friend of President Jefferson; the two had first met in 1773 and saw each other periodically again during Jefferson's tenure in Paris. Mazzei scoured Italy and recruited two accomplished sculptors, Giuseppe Franzoni and Giovanni Andrei. The two arrived in Washington in early 1806, with Franzoni to work on figural sculpture and Andrei to model the "roses and foliage" and the columns in the building.⁴⁹ Latrobe set Franzoni to work on a seated statue of Liberty positioned behind the Speaker's chair which, when completed, would stand

⁴⁶ U.S. Capitol Visitor Center, "Continuing Construction," *The Capitol 1789-1815*, <http://209.134.55.115/exhibitions/online/1789-to-1815/the-capitol/continuing-construction.html> (accessed December 3, 2014). By this time, the north wing was already suffering from rotting timbers and falling plaster.

⁴⁷ Joseph Downs, "The Capitol," *The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin* 1, no. 5 (January 1943): 172, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3257045> (accessed December 3, 2014).

⁴⁸ Allen, *History of the United States Capitol*, 62. See also Donald R. Kennon's *The United States Capitol: Designing and Decorating a National Icon* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000).

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 65.

“...eight and a half feet tall, holding a liberty cap in one hand and a scroll in the other. An eagle stood guard to one side of the figure, its foot resting on a crown and other emblems of monarchy and bondage.”⁵⁰ Franzoni also sculpted a majestic, spread eagle for the frieze in the House chamber, as well as figures representing Arts, Commerce, Agriculture, Science, Military Force, and Civil Government.⁵¹ ⁵² Andrei was tasked with carving the interior capitals, designed by Latrobe after the ancient Tower of the Winds in Athens.⁵³ Both of the Italian sculptors continued at the site until their work was completed in 1810. Latrobe would remain employed at the Capitol, renovating the interiors of both wings until 1813, when the War of 1812 resulted in the halting of all construction due to the diversion of funds.

With a system of government modeled after the ancient Grecian democracies and the republican values of Rome, America was also unable to discard its fascination with European architecture and craftsmanship during the Federal Period. This can be explained partly by the simple fact that the United States lacked any formally trained architects. As Thomas Jefferson himself explained to the Italian Philip Mazzei, “The Capitol was begun at a time when the country was entirely destitute of artists and even good workmen in the branches of architecture upon which the superiority of public over private buildings depend.”⁵⁴ Additionally, the Founders of the Republic wished to lay the groundwork for a legitimate capital city that would be respected by the powers of the earth. Prominent American leaders like Washington and Jefferson believed that to achieve this, the United States would have to emulate Europe to an extent. This was accomplished by first employing a Frenchman to draw out a plan for the federal

⁵⁰ Ibid., 72.

⁵¹ U.S. Capitol Visitor Center, “Continuing Construction,” *The Capitol 1789-1815*.

⁵² Allen, 72.

⁵³ Ibid, 73. In architecture, a capital is the top portion of a column.

⁵⁴ Downs, 172.

city and having a succession of other Europeans design the city's principal public buildings and execute their construction. Due to their efforts and vision, Washington became a marble and stone symbol of the new country's republican ideals, and a capital city admired around the world.

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