UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

CHALLENGES OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN: GROUNDED

THEORY CASE STUDY 2004-2007 FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF US SENIOR

OFFICIALS

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

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Norman, Oklahoma
2017

CHALLENGES OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN: GROUNDED THEORY CASE STUDY 2004-2007 FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF US SENIOR OFFICIALS

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BY

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I wish to dedicate this dissertation to my family (Mom, Jimmy, Marie and Marlene). I am happy to acknowledge their influence on their son and little brother growing up in Petaluma, California.  A special dedication in remembrance to my big brother Jimmy who passed away in August 2012 and to my loving mother, Aline L. Martinelli-Heath who passed away in July 2015—incredible losses in my life.

## Acknowledgements

A warm thank you to Dr. Susan Sharp, the chair of this dissertation, for her continual support and enthusiasm for this dissertation. I wish to acknowledge and thank the dissertation committee members, Dr. Young Kim, Dr. Aimee Franklin, Dr. Trent Gabert and Dr. Trina Hope, all of whom were such a strong part of this dissertation.  I would like to acknowledge Dr. Alex Kondonassis, who retired before this dissertation was completed.  A special thanks to Dr. Kirby Gilliland and Dr. Joe Rodgers, the directors of the doctoral program in Organization Leadership, and all the wonderful faculty members and Graduate College personnel who added to my knowledge of organizational leadership.  A thank you to Magen Badnar and the Bizzell Library staff who helped with formatting the dissertation and with assistance in locating scholarly research.  I want to recognize the Graduate College, especially Don "the Don" Rodgers, Dean Lee Williams and Dean Randall Hewes, for all of their support and encouragement.

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# Abstract

The African nations determined that an African continental body was needed to specifically address the African States' needs for self-determination in addressing African problems, rather than relying on outside assistance, specifically for intervention determination. The African Union (AU) rose from the ashes of the former Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 2002 to address this. Central to the African Union is the capability to mount and sustain peace-support and peacekeeping missions on the continent of Africa. Just such a mission presented itself to the AU in 2004 in the Darfur region of western Sudan. This study assesses the key factors of the AU leadership, organization, US Support and communication in executing African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) from its inception in 2004 through its conclusion in 2007 prior to the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission, UNAMID, using the perceptions of United States (US) senior officials who were involved with and interacted with AMIS. The dissertation is a qualitative study using the case study method, capturing the perceptions of eight US senior officials addressing organization, leadership, US support and communications. The theoretical framework used were transformational leadership, cross-cultural communications, organizational and grounded theory.

The data suggested that the AU was lauded by the US officials for its decision to engage with the execution of AMIS, although the AU was severely challenged by a shortage of resources, personnel, organic logistical base, equipment, training, experience, modern communications, and organizational structure. AMIS was hampered by impediments of the host nation, Sudan, and the ability of the AU to request and receive US Support.

This case study examined the US leaders' perceptions of the leadership and communication organization of the AU and its challenges for intervention in an intrastate genocide within the continent of Africa—the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan. An analysis of the case study of a major African-led and directed peace-support operation, such as AMIS, in reaction to the Darfur crisis may serve as a significant interest in lessons learned for future US interaction for a future peace operation by the AU.

**Chapter 1**

**Introduction**

*Background*

There have been several Africa-related issues that a regional body could address since the fall of the colonial powers within the continent of Africa in the 1960's. The world leaders established the United Nations (UN) following World War II to address global issues, including Africa. A large number of African nations were under the "protection" of the colonial powers until the 1960's, when most African nations won or were provided with freedom to establish sovereign nations, independent of the former colonial nations (Reader, 1998, p. 663). The UN, as well as the world's industrial nations, did not shoulder responsibility or show moral obligation on a humanitarian level to assist Africa outside of any assistance that the former colonial powers were willing to provide during the colonial period. The international community interests in Africa were economic as well as political throughout the Cold War era, which followed the Colonial period (Murithi, 2005, p. 15). The only recourse for most African nations was through the UN, which was controlled mainly through developed nations' manipulation or through the nations that had subjugated them throughout the colonial period. This led to the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 with the follow-on organization, the African Union (AU) established in 2002 (Moller, 2009, p. 1), the subject matter of this research study.

The current study was intended to develop a grounded theory based on transformational leadership theory and cross-cultural communication theory to illustrate the challenges that the AU exhibited in executing AMIS. Interviews of eight senior US

officials out of a population of 12 were used by the researcher to capture their perceptions of the challenges faced by the AU.

The African nations determined that an African continental body was needed to specifically address African states' needs for self-determination in addressing African problems, rather than relying on outside assistance, specifically for intervention determination (Moller, 2009, p. 5). There was a recognized need by the Africans for an African solution to African-specific issues and a military as well as a civilian police force to act as a reaction force that could be used as an instrument for humanitarian and peace operations on the African continent (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 71).

The genocide in Rwanda that started in 1994 has been debated throughout the western world as a case where there was a justifiable need for an outside intervention to save lives and stop destruction of a nation and its people (Oguonu & Ezeibe, 2014, p. 325). Although the UN was aware of the occurrence of the genocide in Rwanda, the UN did not have the mandate or the military strength on the ground to react (Reader, 2008, p. 676). Powerful nations, such as the United States (US) and France, were determined not to intervene. The African continent had an organization, the OAU, in existence at the time of the genocide, 1994. However, the OAU did not have the ready military force nor the mechanisms in place in order to deal with such a rapidly moving intra-state humanitarian crisis—which fell outside of the OAU's charter of non-interference in an intra-state issue (Fogwell, 2013, p. 6).

The OAU was abandoned and a new charter established under the banner of a newly formed African Union (AU), established in 2002, providing the AU with the

charter to allow for invention in an intra-state issue should it be deemed appropriate by the AU leadership (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 40).

Central to the AU is the capability to mount and sustain peace-support and peacekeeping missions on the continent of Africa. Just such a mission presented itself to the nascent AU in 2004 in the Darfur Region of Sudan. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Darfur region was estimated at three million (Adebajo, 2011), with no relief in sight as rebel groups leveraged for control of areas which were under the control of the Government of Sudan. The AU established the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004 in order to act as an observer force and protection force to assist the IDPs and minimize the effects of the rebel forces in the Darfur region (Bellamy, 2005, p. 32). The AU had engaged in a peace-support operation in Burundi in 2003 and therefore had an opportunity to learn from the lessons that it had experienced in that operation which could then be applied to the design and execution of AMIS.

In the years following the end of the Cold War, the international community did not view Africa as strategically vital to their national interests, as had been the case during the polarizing years of the Cold War era (Cilliers, 1999). The US was distracted with two wars in the Middle East in 2004 and hesitated to characterize the mass killings in Darfur as genocide and therefore did not react nor engage international partners or the UN to react to the Darfur humanitarian crisis (Piiparinen, 2007). China was beginning to demonstrate an interest in oil production in Sudan and did not desire to endanger its relationship with the Government of Sudan (Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2011).

The AU initiated the all-African led and staffed AMIS in 2004 in the absence of a UN mandate.

The AU established AMIS in an effort to address the Darfur Humanitarian Crisis in February 2004 with the establishment of AMIS I with sixty AU "green beret" African troops as observers, closely followed by the inclusion of three hundred and eight African troops who acted as a protection force for the observers (Adebajo, 2011). An expanded AMIS mission was authorized in July 2005, known as AMIS IIE (AMIS II expanded) (Appiah-Mensah, 2006, p. 4). The AU relied on troop-contributing countries for voluntarily donating the required number of African troops to conduct AMIS (Cohen & O'Neil, 2006, p. 56). At that time, 2004-2007, 53 of the 54 African nations, all but Morocco, were members of the AU which could be called upon to voluntarily contribute troops to the AMIS missions (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 25).

AMIS ended in 2007 when the UN and AU formed a hybrid UN-AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to address the continuing struggle in western Sudan, Darfur (De Waal, 2007). UN Security Resolution 1769 passed by the international community in 2007 authorized a turn-over of mission responsibility from AMIS to UNAMID in Dec December 2007 (Kreps, 2007). Prior to the Hybrid UN-AU mission, UNAMID, the AU struggled to produce a mandate that was effective in stemming the violence and the IDP genocide (Akuffo, 2010, p. 81). The AU, during the period 2004-2007, found it increasingly difficult to organize, lead, garner US support and communicate effectively, with Africans from the troop-contributing countries who fielded AMIS in Darfur.

The US was a major supporter and contributor to the AU during the execution of AMIS (US GAO Report, 2006, p. 23). The terrorist events that unfolded in New York

and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 were factors that the US was taking into account with its support of the AU during the execution of AMIS (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 150).   The US European Command (EUCOM) and the US Central Command (CENTCOM) held the largest share of US military interaction on the African continent during the execution of AMIS.  However, the US, sensing the importance of Africa and the strong involvement of the European Union (EU) and growing Chinese presence, established a US military major combatant command, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) to execute US military interests on the continent (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 151).

*Theoretical Framework*

The theoretical framework of this study revolved around leadership theories of transformational and transactional leadership and communications theories of organization and culture to determine if the organizational and cross-cultural communications were a challenge that the AU faced in executing AMIS.  These theories formed the analytical basis of this study.  The theories were used in the analytical portion of the study for comparisons between the responses of the participants and four major areas that addressed the AU's organization, leadership and communications, as well as a look at the challenges perceived for US support as requested by the AU.

*Context of the Problem*

The current scholarly literature addresses lessons that have been learned during and after the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur region of Sudan.  However, a gap in the current scholarly literature exists in that the most senior US officials who were directly involved with the AU during its execution of AMIS, 2004-2007, have not

contributed to the scholarly literature.  The senior US officials have not voiced their

perceptions of the AU organization, leadership, US support and communication issues

related to the AU's execution of AMIS in any scholarly research studies to date.  On a

larger scale, their experiences may help us better understand the issues of collaborative

leadership for other organizations that engage in collaborative support roles.

*Purpose of the Study*

The purpose of this study is to investigate the perceptions of senior US officials

of challenges that the AU faced during its execution of AMIS from the inception of the

mission (AMIS) in 2004 through the conclusion of the mission in 2007.   This

dissertation, using a qualitative case study, looked at the challenges experienced by the

AU during AMIS.  A case study method was chosen in order to study the AU related to

mission and time frame and examining the case to provide a clear understanding of the

challenges faced by the AU (Creswell, 2013, p. 123).  Leadership theories of

transformation and transaction and communication theories of cross-cultural

communication were examined against the responses of the participants' perceptions to

determine, from a US perspective, the challenges that the AU faced in its execution of

AMIS.

Significance of the Study

The Africans began to shoulder more responsibility in addressing African issues

by establishing the peacekeeping mission of AMIS.  The UN and the internal

community have addressed many peacekeeping operations since the inception of the

UN peacekeeping operations as an observer force in Palestine in 1948 (Goulding, 1993,

p. 452).  The importance of this study centers on the perceptions of how senior US

officials viewed the AU and its peacekeeping mission, AMIS.  Both the AU and the US

could better organize the support mechanisms that are provided by the US for future

peacekeeping missions through the AU from the results of this study.  The fact that the

AU is taking more responsibility and direct action in the realm of peacekeeping on the

continent of Africa demonstrates a need for such a study to determine, the challenges of

leadership, organization, support and communication.

This study is significant because it addresses the US perceptions of the

challenges that the AU faced in executing AMIS in the areas of organization,

leadership, US support and communications.  The findings can be can be applied to

future African-led peacekeeping missions on the continent of Africa.  How the US

supports a non-UN mission can be gleaned from a study that address the challenges of

organization, leadership, US support and communication as a case study.

*Scope and Limitations*

The scope of this study is reflective of the perceptions of senior US officials

who were involved with directly supporting the AU and AMIS through the inception of

AMIS beginning in 2004 through the close of AMIS in 2007.  The study is limited to

AMIS and does not cover the period before AMIS was officially organized as a

peacekeeping mission in 2004, nor does the scope extend beyond 2007 when AMIS

officially ended and transferred to a hybrid UN-AU mission known as UNAMID.  Berg

(1998, p.229) suggests that by using the purposive sampling technique that was used by

the researcher in this study, there may be a limit in the ability of the researcher to

generalize the findings to the general population. Grounded theory was used to develop

an explanation derived from the collected data and illustrated by providing examples of

the data (Pickard, 2007, p. 160). Emotionalism provided the basis of the collected data as the interviewees were providing their insight from their experiences (Silverman, 2001, p. 87) in dealing with US policy and support while observing the challenges that the AU experienced in the areas of leadership, organization and communication. The scope of the data collected was using the participants' beliefs about the facts related to the AU during the execution of AMIS (Silverman, 2001, p. 88). While more information would be gained by also including perceptions of AU and UN officials, the current study has the limited focus on US officials involved in AMIS.

Keeping Berg (1998) in mind, this study is also limited in scope in that it provides only the perceptions of US senior officials that were able to or willing to respond to the researcher's recruitment for this study. Of the 12 senior US officials who were involved with the AU, four were either unavailable or failed to respond, and therefore their perceptions were not captured in this study. The study is further limited by the fact that the perceptions of the US senior officials may or may not accurately reflect the perceptions of other nations that were involved with the AU and AMIS. The study does not capture the perceptions of the African Union officials and is narrow in its scope, capturing solely the perceptions of US senior officials that responded to the study.

The scope of this study is further limited to addressing four areas related to organization, leadership, US support and communication within the AU and addressing its execution of AMIS. No other peacekeeping missions of the AU were addressed. There were a number of other areas that could be addressed in further research, and

these are described in Chapter 5, *Conclusion and Recommendation for Future Research.*

*Assumptions*

It is assumed the perceptions of the study participants are accurate to the best of their recollection. This study assumes that the perceptions captured through interviews reflect the thoughts and perceptions of the individual participants only and does not reflect any official US policy or the perceptions of others that assisted the AU in the execution of AMIS during this period. The perceptions of the study participants are assumed to be as accurate as possible nine years after the end of AMIS and may or may not completely cover all aspects of organization, leadership, US support, and communications. It is assumed that each participant had varying degrees of access and perceptions due to their particular role and involvement with the AU as the AU faced challenges with executing AMIS. Each participant is assumed to have direct knowledge of the AU challenges during the execution of AMIS.

*Research Question*

There is one main question with four key sub-questions to ascertain the perceptions of the senior US Officials who were intimately involved with the African Union and the African Union Mission in Sudan from 2004 to 2007. The research question is designed to ascertain the perceptions of US officials of the challenges that the African Union faced in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan. The key sub-questions are designed to focus on four challenges in the areas of organization, leadership, US support and communication.

The main research question is: "How did the US senior military and State Department officials view the challenges in organization, leadership, US support and communication the African Union faced in conducting the African Union Mission in Sudan from 2004-2007?"

*Key Sub-questions*

Key Question One

Organizational Structure: What were the challenges for the African Union organizational structure in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan?

Key Question Two

Leadership:  What were the leadership challenges for the African Union in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan?

Key Question Three

US Support: What were the challenges of US support to the African Union during the African Union Mission in Sudan?

Key Question Four

Communication: What were the communications challenges, including cross cultural communication, in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan?

*Justification for Research*

Africa has become increasingly important to the US, the European Union (EU) and China, after a long period of neglect in the post-Cold War era.  The US, EU and China have begun to engage the African nations, organizations and institutions in an effort to gain influence and resources on the continent.  The Darfur Humanitarian Crisis did not foster a positive response from the international community in the form of a

peace-support or peacekeeping mission or mandate for intervention in Darfur during the period 2004-2007.  Therefore, the AU established AMIS to address the increasing humanitarian crisis that was looming in the vacuum created by non-engagement from the international community, namely the UN, US, EU and China.

The increased importance of the continent of Africa on the global stage has become apparent, during AMIS and since the end of AMIS and transference of the AU led AMIS to a hybrid AU-UN mission under UN African leadership and staffing known as the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).  The US demonstrated an increase in engagement with Africa by establishing a new combatant command, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), in 2008.  Prior to 2007, Africa mission responsibility for the US was divided among three Combatant Commands: US Central Command (CENTCOM), the US European Command (EUCOM) and the US Pacific Command (PACOM).  AFRICOM is now fully engaged throughout the continent of Africa but did not exist during the important days that the AU was organizing and implementing AMIS.  Sudan was located in the CENTCOM area of responsibility as well as the AU headquarter, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  The CENTCOM was heavily engaged in the Global War in Terrorism (GWOT) in Iraq, Afghanistan and Djibouti and distracted during the period of the African Union Mission in Sudan with the three Combined Task Forces in the above-mentioned areas of responsibility.

China has demonstrated its commitment to the establishment and implementation of strong economic ties to Africa over the last decade.  The EU, comprised several former colonial powers (France, Portugal, the United Kingdom,

Spain and Germany), has been a strong contributor to the African Union Mission in Sudan and has become increasingly involved in Africa as a major player, representing all EU-member states.

The increase in Chinese, European and US involvement and the associated engagement and economic ties has demonstrated a need for research to ascertain how the US viewed the African Union's execution of AMIS in the areas of organization, leadership, US support and communication.

*Definitions*

A list of acronyms is provided in Appendix A. The main definitions that are essential to the understanding of the research study and its focus are included in this section.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU):  Pan-African organization established in May 1963 with a commitment of member states to collectively establish, maintain and sustain peace and security in Africa until disbanded in 2002 with the establishment of the African Union (Murithhi, 2001, pp. 71-72).

The African Union (AU):  Pan-African organization established in 2002 with a commitment of member states to collectively establish, maintain and sustain peace and security in Africa with a charter that included the authority of the AU for intervention in intrastate conflict (Murithi, 2001, pp. 75).

Combatant Command: A unified or specified command under a single commander established by the President of the United States, through the Secretary of Defense with a geographical responsibility (Staff, Joint, 2001, p. 37).

US Official:  A person who has a position of authority in the US government (Merriam-Webster, 2004).

Peacekeeping:  A technique to help control and resolve armed conflicts (Goulding, 1993, p. 452).

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): AU established peacekeeping mission, 2004 to 2007, in the western Sudan region of Darfur. (Murithi, 2001)

United Nations and African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID): A hybrid peacekeeping mission in the western Sudan region of Darfur that replaced AMIS in 2007.

Troop-Contributing Country (TCC):  Individual country that provides military or civilian personnel and assigned to the United Nations or African Union for peacekeeping missions. (Accessed through World Wide Web: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml)

*Data Collection Strategy*

Data collection consisted of structured interviews with eight senior US officials who were directly involved with AMIS, either directly in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia or in Washington, DC during the period 2004-2007.  Every attempt was made to conduct in-person structured interviews.  When an individual subject was either at a significant distance, in an area not accessible to the researcher, or it was requested by the participant, interviews were conducted through secure email.  Due to concerns about anonymity of the participants as well as security, no telephonic or virtual telecommunication (VTC) or Skype was used of the subjects with participants who were not able to take part in face-to-face interviews.

*How this Study is Unique*

This research is unique in that it fills a research gap that currently exists related to the AU mission challenges conducting AMIS.  Specifically, information is needed on how US officials (and the US more generally) perceived the operation, which could inform future missions similar in nature.  The researcher was a member of the US Defense liaison and the senior military advisor to the African Union, as well as a member of the U.S Embassy and US Defense Attaché Office, located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 2004-2007, which provided direct access to the senior US officials that comprised the participants of the in-depth interviews that formed the basis for this case study.  The researcher was assigned to AMIS and deployed into Darfur with the AU in the summer of 2006 and served with the US Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 2004 to 2007 as a member of the Darfur Integrated Task Force.

The researcher, after exhaustive review of the existing academic research related to AMIS, recognized that there was a gap related to the testimony and experience of senior US officials that could add to the body of knowledge and spur additional research on AMIS and other African peace support operation and missions. This study may provide a clearer understanding and knowledge of AU capability that may be useful to US officials and African planners, as well as the international community that may support African peace operations initiatives and development of independent AU peace operations capacity.

*Study Layout and Chapter Design*

Chapter 1 provides the historical basis of the AU and AMIS.  The introductory chapter of this research study provides the background of the AU and its execution of

the AU mission in Darfur, Sudan (AMIS), from its inception in 2004 through its conclusion in 2007. AMIS was disbanded and turned over to a hybrid AU and UN mission entitled UNAMID in January 2007.  Chapter 1 includes a brief description of the theoretical framework, the context of the problem, the purpose of the study, the significance of the study, the scope and limitations, assumptions, the research question and the key sub-questions, justification for the research, and the definitions

Chapter 2 consists of a comprehensive review of the existing literature covering the AU and AMIS and the challenges experienced by the AU in executing AMIS. Additionally, this chapter reviews the theoretical literature for the study.  The review of literature is broken in four thematic areas: The African Union, the African Union Mission in Sudan, leadership theory and communications theory

Chapter 3 lays out the methodology of the study. A qualitative study was determined by the researcher to be the best method for determining the perceptions of US senior officials who had been involved with the AU and AMIS.   A case study was determined to be the method that would most effectively capture the perceptions of the US senior officials was a case study.  The case study chosen for this study was AMIS and the challenges that the AU faced in executing AMIS.  The researcher used a set of interview questions that focused on organization, leadership, US support and communications.  Participants were selected from a small, comprehensive population that consisted of 12 US officials with Department of State and Department of Defense senior rank that were involved with the AU and AMIS during the entirety or partial period of 2004 to 2007. Eight individuals were interviewed.

Chapter 4 consists of the findings from an analysis of the data. The researcher conducted seven face-to-face interviews in the Washington DC area with the participants who agreed to participate in the study.  One participant requested the interview be conducted via email due to senior official responsibilities, time constraints or location.  Additionally, two potential participants who had initially responded favorably to the request for an interview had requested that the interview be conducted through email due to distance and professional time constraints but did not provide any written responses to the researcher and were not included in this study.  None of the participants felt comfortable with using Skype or teleconferencing due to security concerns.

Chapter 5 provides the purpose of the study and the researcher's background with the subject matter.   The discussion focuses on an analysis of the findings and recommendations for policy and program applicability and a recommendation for future research that could be of a guide to the scholars and followers of the AU.

# Chapter 2

## Review of Literature

### Overview

In order to identify the gap that exists in the literature, a thorough review of existing literature was conducted focusing on the challenges faced by the African Union (AU) in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS. The review of existing scholarly literature provides preparation for conducting a case study (Yin, 2009, p.37) and identifies what has already been done related to the topic at hand.

The literature review is focused on three areas: the AU organization and its challenges as it relates to AMIS, relevant theories of leadership and communications that could be used to illuminate the responses of the participants and focus the responses in this study, and developing and designing the methodology using a grounded theory approach.  The theories of leadership and communication, particularly transformational leadership as applied to culture as well as cross-cultural communication, were reviewed for applicability to the response of the participants.  This led to the design of a study for this dissertation.

### The African Union

#### *Historical Background of the AU*

Pan-Africanism remains the most effective vehicle addressing the debilitating problems of Africa.  Africa cannot be developed using externally imposed economic paradigms, cultures and models.  Africa is in need of an African cultural renaissance.  An African socio-cultural renaissance is essential…to reverse the on-going marginalization of the continent…and this can only be in the interests of the African people. (Matthews, 2008, p.36)

An examination of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) offers the researcher the ability to better understand how the AU is organized, led, and communicates. The OAU preceded the AU as the Pan-African organization that was designed to address the African-specific issues related to peace, governance and stability on the continent (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 13). The OAU provides the basis for understanding the current configuration of the AU. The OAU was established on May 25, 1963 (Binns, et al., 2012, p. 340; Kieh, 2008, p. 114). It existed as an African organization from 1963 to 2001 when the OAU was replaced by the AU in 2002 (Fogwell, 2013, p.1). The OAU Charter was replaced by the Constitutive Act of the AU (Odinkalu, 2013, p. 852)

Fogwell argues that the objective of the OAU was to promote "unity, solidarity, and cooperation between African States" in relation to forming independent African states into a collaborative organization after they gained independence from the former colonial powers (Fogwell, 2013, p. 5). The AU served as a forum for cooperation among nascent African states that were not prepared to have a continental organization supplant state sovereignty (Yusaf, et al., 2012, p. 17). A unified Africa would allow for the union of independent African states for the economic well-being as expressed through a Pan-African organization for cooperation, as pointed out by Mohammed Bedjaoui (Yusef, et al., 2012, p.16). The charter of the OAU did not allow for intervention into intra-state issues during its tenure (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 13). The intent of the OAU was to give Africa "an independent voice in world affairs" and to unite all of Africa together under one organizational umbrella (Reader, 1999, p. 666).

The Constitutive Act that created the AU in Togo in 2001 and the Secretary

General of the defunct OAU stated:

[It] is important to point out that when African leaders decided to establish the

African Union when they adopted the declaration and, subsequently, the

Constitutive Act, they did not aim at establishing an organization which was

going to be a continuation of the OAU by another name. (Yusef and

Ouguergiuz, 2012, p. 50)

The transition from the OAU to the AU was summed up by the Interterm Chairperson

of the Commission of the AU:

The world had changed, the continent had changed but the organization vehicle

at the regional remained pretty much the same, with prisms and methods that

could not cope with emerging challenges. The commitment to change this

situation fostered the birth of the African Union. (Yusef and Ouguergiuz, 2012,

p. 50)

The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 is just one example of an issue with which the

OAU was not able to engage since this was an intra-state issue that was beyond the

ability of the OAU to address. However, the need to revamp the Charter of the OAU

was slow to materialize as the OAU Charter Review committee met only six times

between 1994 and 2001 (Yusef & Ouguergiuz, 2012, p. 30).

One of the main objectives of the AU design was the charter that allowed for

intra-state intervention, a mechanism that the OAU did not possess (Chazan et al., 1999,

p. 311). The OAU did not possess the political will and had a limited mandate to

intervene in in intra-state and regional affairs that the AU does possess in its charter

(Affa'a Mindzie, 2010, p. 176). The start of the change in the mindset of the Africans began with the end of the Cold War in the late 1980's when they decided that a change was necessary with regards to an approach to crisis intervention (Affa'a Mindzie, 2010, p. 176). The AU was designed with the change in mindset of the Africans to the "right of the AU to intervene in domestic affairs of member states" with the decision of the AU Assembly (Moller, 2009, p. 9). The AU, through its Peace and Security Commission, differed from the former OAU charter by offering:

> A definition of defense which encompasses both the traditional, military, and state-centric notion of the use of armed forces of the state to protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the less traditional, non-military aspects which relate to the protection of the people's political, cultural, social and economic values and ways of life (Moller, 2009, p. 13).

Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU served as the mechanism that allowed the AU to "promote" peace through a responsibility to protect (Murithi, 2007, p. 15). This differed from the charter of the OAU that was mainly designed to address the issues related to the African continent with the end of colonialism (Murithi, 2007, p. 16).

**Figure 1. Map of African Union Member States**



**Note. Map of African Union member states.  Reprinted from Student News Daily, Retrieved from https://www.studentnewsdaily.com/world-current-events/news-from-taiwan-germany-and-philippines. Accessed 30 November 2016**

*Organization of the AU*

There are currently 54 member states of the AU (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 25) (see figure 1).   Fifty-three of the 54 African nations, all of which but Morocco were members of the AU, could be called upon to voluntarily contribute troops to the AMIS missions (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 25).

Since its inception in 2002, the AU was organized around 26 "organs" that fall under an assembly of the AU (Makinda, et al., 2016, p.43).  The Assembly of the AU

consists of Heads of State or national representatives that must reach a major consensus,

two-thirds, on its decision-making process, including peacekeeping operations such as

AMIS (Makinda et al., 2016, pp.44 and 45).  The term of office is one year (Makinda et

al., 2016, p.44). Another organ of the AU is the Executive Council consisting of African

foreign ministers that have been appointed through the Assembly members (Makinda et

al., 2016, p.47).  The Pan-African Parliament of the AU is a major organ of the AU that

comprises five members of each member State and has to include at least one female as

a part of the five (Makinda et al., 2016, p.49).  The Pan-African Parliament serves as a

continent-wide advisory role for the AU (Makinda et al., 2016, p.48).

The Peace and Security Council of the AU has the responsibility to promote and

advise on the "peace, security and stability" issues facing the continent that the AU may

wish to address (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 52).  The Peace and Security Council consists

of 15 members and is distributed equally among the five regions of Africa (Makinda et

al., 2016, p. 53).

**Figure 2. Organization Chart of the Assembly of Heads of State or the AU.**



**Note. Organization Chart of the Assembly of Heads of State of the AU. Reprinted Ft. Leavenworth, Retrieved from http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/OEWatch/201306/images/African%20Union.JPG. Accessed 30 November 2016**

*Leadership of the AU*

The AU leadership includes: The Chairperson, the Assembly of the Union, the Executive Council, the Pan-African Parliament, the Judicial and Human Rights Institution, the Commission, the Permanent Representatives Council, the Specialized Technical Committee, the Peace and Security Council, the Financial Institutions, the Economic, the Social and Cultural Council and the Legal Organs (AU Website, Accessed 2016, para. 1). There is a total of 26 organs of the AU (Makinda, Okumu &

Mickler, 2006, p. 43).  For the purposes of this research, the leadership of the Assembly

of the Union and the Peace and Security Council will be reviewed.

The Assembly of the Heads of State for the AU is considered the supreme organ

of the AU, according to Makinda, Okumu and Mickler (2016, p. 43).  The Chairperson

of the Assembly is elected by the African heads of state and serves a one year term

(Makinda, Okumu & Mickler, 2016, p. 44). According to the AUs main website (Union,

2016, para 1):

> The Assembly is the African Union's (AU's) supreme organ and comprises
> Heads of State and Government from all Member States. It determines the AU's
> policies, establishes its priorities, adopts its annual program and monitors the
> implementation of its policies and decisions … It may give directives to the AU
> Executive Council and Peace and Security Council on the management of
> conflicts, war … and the restoration of peace. The AU Constitutive Act provides
> for the Assembly to decide on intervention in or sanctions against Member
> States in specific circumstances. The Assembly delegated this mandate to the
> Peace and Security Council when it became operational in 2004 (See figure 2)

The official website of the AU illustrates that the leadership of the Assembly

was delegated to the Peace and Security Council in 2004, thus the focus of the literature

review for the AU leadership (Union, 2016, para 1).  The Peace and Security Council

consists of fifteen members whose terms range from two to three years (Makinda,

Okumu & Mickler, 2016, p. 52).  The Council is charged with decision-making "for the

prevention, management and resolution of conflicts" (Maganga, 2007, p. 2).

**Figure 3 Organization Chart of the Peace and Security Department of the AU.**



**Note. Organization Chart of the Peace and Security Department of the AU. Reprinted from Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Retrieved from http://www.tdrp.net/news_102411.php. Accessed 30 November 2016**

*US Support to the AU*

The AU has a funding requirement for each African member state (Muganga, 2007). Article 4 of the AU's Constitutive Act states that one of the objectives of the AU is to "encourage international cooperation" (Makinda, 2016, p. 136). The AU has depended on the international community for "forging" partnerships that include peace, security and governance as well as funding shortfalls it experiences from its member states (Makinda, 2016, p. 137). The US has been a major donor nation to the AU, in particular during the AU's execution of AMIS (Dagne, 2006, p. 10).

The US established a combatant command specifically for Africa, called the Africa Command (AFRICOM) (Makinda, 2016, p. 151). However, the support that the AU has received and continues to receive from the US in the form of AFRICOM, did not exist during AMIS. AFRICOM was established in 2008, and for the first time in US history brought forth a capability of military support (Garrett III et al., 2010, p. 16) that was not available for support to the AU in executing AMIS.

The AU itself suffers from a lack of internal African funding as did the OAU and must depend on the international partners, such as the US, to fund its missions (Udombana, 2002, p. 1239). The US provided support to the AU unilaterally and under the flag of NATO during AMIS (Murithi, 2007, p. 14). NATO, with the US as a lead member, provided training and airlift to the AU as it deployed African troops into Darfur (Murithi, 2007, p. 14). NATO, again with the US as a senior member, assisted the AU with airlifting African troops during AMIS and provided training to AU officers as well as "technical assistance" to the AU at its headquarters with US and European support staff (Daalder & Goldgeier, 2013, p. 109). NATO, which received heavy US financial support, was a strong supporter of the AU throughout AMIS, including capability building and logistics (Smith-Windsor, 2013). Appiah-Mensah (as cited in Jentzch, 2014, p. 97) illustrated the NATO, and the US, contributions to AMIS as well as UNAMID airlift by demonstrating that NATO had airlifted in approximately 31,500 troops from 2005 to 2008.

The US has provided other valuable non-monetary support to the AU. The US sought a negotiated peace to the conflict in Darfur (Murithi, 2007, p. 14):

> The United States has made solving conflict in this region [Darfur] a priority [and] our view remains that a negotiated way out of the crisis in Darfur … is the

most desirable alternative and option most likely to yield success (Murithi, 2007, p. 14; US Department of State, 2007).

Vorrath (2012, pp. 1-2) illustrated the problem that the AU faced with funding during its execution of AMIS in that the AU received only two percent of its peace fund from member states. The time frame that Vorrath (2012, pp. 1-2) was referring to was 2008 to 2012 but it does demonstrate how the AU must depend on the international partners, such as the US, for funding.

*Communications of the AU*

There was a dearth of literature on the cross-cultural communications directly related to the OAU or the AU, especially during the AU's execution of AMIS. The AU organizational structure dictates the methods of communication internally within the organization and external to the organization. The AU possessed a mix of cultures within the organization with a host of international personnel and languages that illustrate cross-cultural communication issues of the 53 member states during AMIS (Makinda, Okumu & Micklar, 2016). Muganga (2007, p.12) did point out that the AU possessed a "chronic lack of resources … that effectively crippled … communications" within AMIS. The AU communicates with its member states via communiques that are produced in four languages; Arabic, English, French and Portuguese (Magliveras & Naldi, 2002, p. 423).

**Review of the African Union Mission in Sudan**

*Historical Background of AMIS*

Darfur is a region located in western Sudan. The region of Darfur was an independent Muslim sultanate until 1916 (Medani, 2010, p 1039). Darfur became a

part of Sudan during the 40 year Sudanese colonial period from 1916 to 1956 (De Waal, 2007, p. 1039). Darfur, along with Sudan, gained independence from colonization in 1956 and found itself embroiled in the Chadian civil war in the 1980's, which caused friction with the Sudanese government in Khartoum (Burr and Collins, 2008).

The conflict in the Darfur region began when two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement attached the Sudanese Air Force while the aircraft were on the ground in El Fashir, Darfur, in April 2003 (Salih, 2005, p. 15). It was at this point that the Government of Sudan reacted by conducting a counter-insurgency campaign using a rebel group, the Janjaweed, that Sudan had trained and equipped for just such a mission (Flint & De Waal, 2005, p. 36). There had been an estimated 350,000 individuals killed in Darfur with the displacement of nearly two million individuals by 2006 (Nathan, 2006, p. 1).

The protection of the civilian population in each African nation was stated in the Constitutive Act adopted by the AU as it organized in 2002 (Mirithi, 2007, p.5). The AU reserved the right to intervene under its organization if a nation did not adhere to its own right to protect its civilian population, as determined by the AU in Darfur (Appiah-Mensah, 2006).

The AU sent special envoys to Khartoum, Sudan, in March 2004 in order to discuss the involvement of the AU in the struggle and to stem the violence perpetrated against the civilian population (Mugnaga, 2007, p. 6). The AU established AMIS as a way of monitoring the Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement and became operational on June 19, 2004 (Muganga, 2007, p. 6; Allen, 2010, p. 7). Murithi (2007, p. 77) points out that the AU had established AMIS in order to "alleviate the suffering of the

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Darfurians" while the AU was seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict.  AMIS

experienced the escalation of protection force deployments throughout 2004 to 2007,

reaching a high of 7,000 African troops, ending the mission (AMIS) in July 2007 to

merge into a hybrid UN-AU mission called UNAMID in 2007 (Murithi, 2007, p. 78;

Williams, 2006).

<div align="center">*Organization of AMIS*</div>

Chad, with the assistance of the AU, began an "initial round of negotiation to

resolve the Darfur conflict" in Sudan on April 8, 2004 (Murithi, 2007, p. 5).   The AU

became involved with the Darfur crisis on May 28, 2004 when the AU assigned an AU

Chairperson to the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, followed by the deployment of

60 AU observers to Darfur on June 19, 2004 (Appiah-Mensah, 2006, p. 1; Murithi,

2007, p. 6).   AMIS, as the mission was referred to in 2004, had an initial mission of

observing and protecting the observer force that was followed by a protection force of

300 in July 2004 (Murithi, 2007, p. 6; Grono, 2006, p. 625).   The original mandate of

AMIS was to observe only and further bolstered its presence to include monitoring the

ceasefire in AMIS II.  The addition of protecting civilians was added to the mandate of

AMIS II-E (Expanded) in July 2005 only if AMIS troops were able to conduct the

mission with confidence of success (Appiah-Mensah, 2006, p. 4).  AMIS, including

AMIS, AMIS II and AMIS-II-E spanned the period of time from June 2004 to July

2007 (Baldo, 2011).  The AU programmed AMIS to be a transition between assisting

the civilian population in the Darfur region of Sudan in 2004 to an eventual turn-over of

the mission to the UN—which did not occur until 2007 (Cilliers, 2008, p. 7 & 8).

AMIS II was established in October 2004 followed by the expanded AMIS II, AMIS-II-

E, in July 2005, with an expanded AU mandate to strengthen the role of the AU in enforcing the ceasefire agreement, protecting civilians, disarming the rebel force and ensuring that humanitarian aid was received in the Darfur region (AU PSC, 2004; Muganga 2007, p. 14).  Murithi (2007) points out that at the insistence of the Government of Sudan, the AU deployed a smaller force than originally envisioned and its mandate did not include the protection of civilians until AMIS II-E.

The AU had initially established AMIS with the ideal of turning over the mission to the UN but the UN was slow in convincing the Government of Sudan for an UN mission in Darfur (Grono, 2006, p. 626).  The turnover did not occur until July 31, 2007 with the adoption of UN Security Resolution 1769 and was a referred to as a hybrid UN and AU mission called the UN and AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) (Allen, 2010; UN.ORG, Accessed 2016, para 1).  The establishment of UNAMID officially ended AMIS.

*Leadership of AMIS*

The senior leadership of the AU's mission in Sudan (AMIS) came in the form of a force commander, a police commander and a senior political officer (Muganga, 2007). Appiah-Mensah (2006, p. 4) argues that the force commander often misinterpreted the mandate and thus weakened the leadership component of AMIS.

*US Support to AMIS*

We are totally dissatisfied with the fact that the African Union … has asked the international community to allow it to be an African solution to an African problem, and unfortunately the logistics from our own governments did not follow … The UN Security Council, the European Union, the African Union,

the United States *Foreign Minister Gadio of Senegal, 2005* (Rice, as cited by

Allen, 2010, p. 12).

The US support first came in the form of supporting the Darfur conflict from a

political standpoint. The Secretary of State, Colin Powell, stated in September 2004

that genocide was being committed in the Darfur region of Sudan (Makinda et al., 2016,

p. 188). AFRICOM was a US effort to bolster the US support mechanism throughout

Africa and the planning for the AFRICOM occurred during the AMIS time frame

(Francis, 2010, p. 9). The formation of AFRICOM did not occur until the 2007-2008-

time frame, outside of the AMIS mission although AMIS had an impact on the

establishment of AFRICOM (Francis, 2010, p. 8).

The US trained African peacekeepers through the African Contingency

Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program during AMIS (Copson, 2007, p.

105). ACOTA, at the time of AMIS, was a bi-lateral training program and therefore

could not train on a multi-national level such as in the AU which had brought together a

multi-national force for executing AMIS (Copson, 2007, p. 106). Due to the failure of

ACOTA to offer training to institutions during the AMIS time period, ACOTA did not

have the availability to train the AU and AMIS staffs (US State, 2016, web-site).

Liegeois (2010) illustrates the lack of internal AMIS facility to conduct its mission,

"lack of ability … despite numerous international actors providing considerable

financial, material and training assistance" (Liegeois, as cited by Allen, 2010, p. 13).

Donor funding was a major impediment to the execution of AMIS. Muganga

(2007, p. 9) illustrates the funding issue by stating that the US had provided $43 million

of the pledged $243 million in October of 2004.   Commander Seth Appiah-Mensah, a

military advisor to the AU, noted that AMIS possessed a, "chronic lack of resources"

(Muganga, 2007, p.12).

<center>*Communications of AMIS*</center>

Communication during AMIS was a debilitating factor for execution of the

mission, according to Maganga (2007, p.12).  No scholarly literature exists that

illustrate the cross-communication or organizational communication issues that existed

in AMIS.

<center>**Review of Leadership Theories**</center>

> The multitude of good communication channels and trust among people in thick
> informal networks allow for an ongoing process of accommodation and
> adaptation regarding who plays what role, and regarding conflict among roles.
> Those channels also help produce visions that are linked and compatible (Kotter,
> 1990, p. 91).

This study focuses the responses of the participants, leading to the development

of a grounded theory. However, existing transformational leadership and culture of

leadership is relevant. An historical view of how leadership theories developed is

germane to understand how the scientific method contributed to the formation of the

present-day leadership theories used in this study.  The theories of transformational

leadership and culture of leadership, the scholarly literature of such leadership

researcher notables as Bass, Conger, Fiedler, House, and Russell and were examined for

their applicability to the study.   Bass, Conger and Fielder have contributed to the field

of leadership and organizational design for understanding the reasons behind different

theories such as Transformational Leadership.  House, Hnages, Javidan, Dorfman and

Gupta produced *Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62*

*Societies* that offers insight into the leadership dynamics related to international cultures

<center>32</center>

and their views of leadership.   GLOBE stands for 'Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness" (Northouse, 2013, p. 387).

*Historical*

The basis of transformational leadership as well as culture related to leadership were derived after the establishment of organizational study research methods developed in the early half of the 20th century.   The historic view of the methods that led to the use of scientific method of enquiry laid the foundation of the theories used in this study.

Taylor discussed the development of the scientific method as applicable to the study of leadership and management by addressing and studying the selection and training of workers for specific jobs as industry began to build steam (Kanigel, 2005). Many theories have evolved related to leadership, starting with Taylor publishing *The Principles of Scientific Management* in 1911. He used observation, collection of data and analysis to determine that using the method of scientific management paid off for organizations in the end by lowering the cost of production and creating higher output through more efficiency (Wrege & Greenwood, 1991).  He also provided support for his argument that by using scientific management techniques, the organization and the individual worker both profit in productivity as well as efficiency (Nelson, 1980).

In 1926, Follett suggested that there is a need for executives to recognize that that they will not receive worker buy-in without changing the patterns of habit and action (Natemeyer & McMahon, 2001).  He further suggested that convincing the workers through intellectual means alone is not enough to guarantee worker compliance with executive orders (Natemeyer & McMahon, 2001).

The Hawthorne Experiments were a watershed event in experimentation by illustrating an effect on the outcome to stimuli that were not considered to be a part of the experiment: that of the effect of the presence of researchers on the subjects (Mayo, 1930). The Hawthorne Experiments were the genesis of the idea that external, unexpected factors can influence the outcome of an experiment and emphasize the need control external factors to the extent possible (Jones, 1992).

In the early 1900's, there was an increasing desire to use the factors of human behavior and psychological recognition that scientific principles could be applied to management in order to positively affect the productivity of the worker, while at the same time realizing that workers needed stimulus and input in order to function at the optimum level (Natemeyer & McMahon, 2001). This was a change from the past where the boss and management issued orders with an expectation that the orders would be followed without question and without taking the workers into account (Natemeyer & McMahon, 2001). Natemeyer and McMahon (2001) suggest that this stemmed from labor-intensive work that was changing with the industrial revolution and the invention of advanced mechanisms that increased productivity and moved the worker from a mere muscle-driven status to a more integrated part of production.

Progressing into the 1940's, there began an approach to understand how and why managers, leaders and followers reacted to increased productivity that included Douglas McGregor's X, Y theory of management (Natemeyer & McMahon, 2001). In the 1950s, the work of Argyris brought to the forefront a view toward motivating the individual, while Douglas McGregor emphasized the humanistic side of an enterprise (Koontz, 1961; Greenwald, 2008). McGregor pointed out some challenges that must be

overcome and recommended a series of steps such as delegating authority and allowing

an individual to expand responsibility, as illustrated in corporate giants such as I.B.M.

(McGregor, 1960). McGregor suggested that by allowing individuals to be creative,

they were encouraged to set targets and objectives and become more self-evaluative

(Kopelman, Prottas, & Davis, 2008; McGregor, 1960). McGregor completed his

proposal for the new Theory Y by restating that he believed in the approach of Theory

Y as humanistic and raising the importance of the process, rather than simply the

economic ends, bringing in the social sciences to the equation of management (Carson,

2005).

An historical view of leadership and organizational theory assists the researcher

and the reader in understanding the historical roots that formed the basis for the

leadership theories of today. The theory of transformational leadership was next

explored to understand the challenges that the AU faced in executing AMIS.

*Transformational Leadership*

Transformational leadership theory was used in this study to understand the

perceptions offered by the senior US officials that were involved with the AU during

AMIS. The terms visionary leadership and inspirational leadership are often used to

describe transformational leadership with an understanding of charismatic and

emotional aspects of leadership (Yukl, 2013, p. 53).

Literature exists that marks a distinction between transactional leadership and

transformational leadership. There are distinct differences between the two. In the

transactional leadership model, there is an exchange between the leaders and the

followers (Northouse, 2013), and rewards are provided to employees for the services

they deliver (Bass, 1990). Transformational leadership offers a connection, according to

Northouse (2013), which will increase the level of both the leader's and the follower's

motivation and morality. Burns was the first to coin the concept of transactional and

transformational leadership in 1978 (Bass, 1998). Bass (1998) provides a picture of

transactional leadership as satisfying the followers' immediate self-interests where a

transactional leader exchanges things of mutual value, to the leader as well as the

follower (Kuhnert, 1994). Transformational leadership may also lead to major changes

in attitude and assumptions of the members of an organization that will lead to the

establishment of commitment to the organization's mission and strategy (Yukl, 1989),

while Bass and Avolio (1990) points toward transactional leadership using merely

contingent reward and management by exception.

A transformational leader will instill a change in an organization further than

expected through a strong emotional connection with the followers leading to a

collective commitment (Diaz-Saenz, 2011). Burns was the first to bring

transformational leadership into use in 1978 by stressing that transformational

leadership involved a leader "morally uplifting" the followers through creating a vision

(Diaz-Saenz, 2011, p. 300) A transactional leader finds him/herself separated from

his/her followers, while a transformational leader is more in tune with the internal

motivation of his/her followers (Greenwald, 2008). A transformational leader must

possess the ability to take risks and to fail (Burns, 2008, p. 903). An organization is

changed through a transformational leader when that organization is led by inspiring

and sharing a vision between leader and follower, creating a "great revolutionary force"

to cause a new orientation in an organization (Burns, 2003, p. 26).  When the leader and the followers raise each other to a higher level, transformational leadership occurs (Burns, 1998).  Transformational leadership can also be viewed as appealing to a follower's values, raising their consciousness regarding ethical issues and mobilizing their energy and resources to reform an institution (Yukl, 2013, p. 321).

Bass focused a great deal on distinguishing between transactional and transformational leadership (Seltzer & Bass, 1990; Bass, 1996).   Bass and Riggo (2006) tied transformational leadership with contingency reward and management-by-exception, adding idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation and individualized consideration.  There are four common strategies exercised by transformational leaders: vision; social architecture; trust; and creative deployment of self through positive self-regard (Bennis & Naum, 1985).  Other research with CEOs found that leaders managed change using a "three-act" process: recognize the need for change; creation of a vision; and institutionalizing changes (DevVanna & Tichy, 1990 as cited in Northouse, 2013).  Kotter (1996) took the three-act process concept a step further and suggested that charismatic leaders transformed organizations. There are a number of strengths to this theory based on a number of qualitative studies, according to Northouse (2013).   This theory also provides for a wider look at the field of leadership based on becoming aware of the process that occurs between the leader and the follower (Seltzer and Bass, 1990). There are inherent criticisms as well. It ignores how leadership training and education, as well as experience, can add to the leader's ability to lead (Bryman, 1992). A major criticism is in the measuring instruments used to examine transformational leadership (Tejeda, Scandura & Pillai, 2001).

Mumford developed a "three components of skills model" that outlined individual, attributes, competencies and leadership outcomes (Northouse, 2013). Aside from the "great person" approach, the literature of the 1990's to present has focused on skill development through training, education and experience (Northouse, 2013). Skills can be divided by level. For example, a lower level manager-leader (supervisory level) will concentrate on skills development at the technical and human interaction level. Katz (1955) points out that the conceptual level required by a lower level manager is less than that of a middle or top level manager-leader. This concept has held true, as we have seen in the leadership literature of the 1970's that started to address how leaders motivate their followers in order to reach the goal.

Transformational leadership will form the lens through which the responses of the senior US officials will be viewed in this study related to the challenges of leadership of the AU. Contingency theory, emotional intelligence, management versus leadership and charismatic leadership theory will also assist the researcher in examining the AU and applying the theory of transformational leadership.

*Contingency Theory*

> Cultural effects will be most powerful in the process of organizations relating to authority, style, conduct, participation and attitudes, and less powerful in formal structuring and overall strategy. However, we will require a more adaptive theory of organizations which specifics the points at which contingency, culture and the system of relationships have their main effects (Boyacigillar & Adler, 1991, p.p. 270-271).

The study of contingency theory in light of transformational leadership may offer insight into the African leadership style of the AU during AMIS. Contingency theory, (Fiedler, 1978) deals with matching the leadership style to the situation. Other scholars have dealt with situational leadership. Hersey and Blanchard (2008, illustrated

how to match the leadership style to the follower. Fiedler (1978) uses contingency theory to match the leadership style to the context and setting. According to Fiedler (12981), Sogdill's concept of perception is something a leader has inherently and is not supported by research evidence. He further suggests that the effectiveness of the leader is determined by the situation and context (Fiedler, 1981).

The Least Preferred Co-Worker Scale (LPC) and Contingency Model of Leadership Effectiveness developed by Fiedler transcended the earlier works related to leadership styles (Jago, 1982). Jago (1982) argues that Fiedler's model is trait-based rather than behavior-based. Fiedler (1981) laid the ground work in contingency theory that others, like Jago, have taken to the next level of research and scholarly publication. Contingency theory is supported by a large volume of empirical research and has brought forth the third dimension of leadership: the context of the situation with the follower and leader, not merely follower-leader or leader-situation (Northouse, 2013). The strength in contingency theory allows for the leader not to have to be effective in all situations (Northouse, 2013). There are criticisms of the theory. Contingency theory can be criticized because of the enigma of why certain individuals are more effective in certain leadership situations (Fiedler, 1993). Another criticism is its reliance on the LPC as a measure (Fiedler, 1993 as cited in Northouse, 2013).

However, Trandis (1993) suggests that contingency theory may be applied from a cultural perspective deriving from the leader's behavior based on their cultural background. The cultural aspects of contingency theory may add a measure of comprehension to the perceptions that participants in this study had in observing the AU.

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*Emotional Intelligence*

Another transformational leadership characteristic involves emotion. Daniel Goleman (1995) popularized the concept of emotional intelligence. He codified emotional intelligence as one's ability to recognize, understand, and manage one's own feelings and emotions and project that onto others as well—creating a vision. There have been a number of studies using emotional intelligence as a basis, and there have been several forms of measurement and testing developed, such as the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT), the EQi and the Bar-On. Goleman has published numerous articles and books on the subject (Goleman, 1995; Goleman, 1998; Goleman, 2001a; Goleman, 2001b; Goleman, Boyatzis & McKee, 2002) Goleman defined emotional competence as "a learned capability based on emotional intelligence that results in outstanding performance at work" (Cherniss & Goleman, 2001, p. 27). Boyatzis, Goleman and Rhee (2000) further developed this by introducing emotional resonance. Resonant leadership starts with emotional intelligence identification through personal competence (self-awareness and self-management) and social competence (social awareness and relationship management) (Boyatzis & McKee, 2005). When leaders get in touch with their emotional intelligence as well as that of followers, they are able to foster a change so that creates resonance. A leader's positive or negative emotion can cause a positive or negative impact on self and followers, opening the leader up to cognitive flexibility (Boyatzis & McKee, 2005). Leaders are at the highest point of instilling a sense of emotional tie to the organization by the follower as a stakeholder of the organization, reaching inside to have an effect on their emotional intelligence (Freidman, 2002).

Goleman (2008) refined his emotional intelligence model and reduced the number of competencies down to 20 and the previous five domains into "four clusters of general abilities" (self-awareness, social awareness, self-management, and relationship management) based on the findings of Boyatzis, Goleman & Rhee (2000, p 28).  This fits with Burn's (2003) analysis of transformational leadership, where an organization is changed by a leader who inspires and shares a vision between leader and follower and where a leader and the followers raise each other to a higher level.  The strength in the theory of emotional intelligence is that it can offer leader insight to broaden their leadership ability and to identify how emotion has an effect on their ability to transform themselves and their organization (Mayer and Gehr 1996).

Ciarrochi, Chan, Caputi and Roberts (2001) criticize the validity of emotional intelligence and note that a scientific test to validate emotional intelligence is needed. The measuring instruments may not actually identify the emotional intelligence quotient, and further standardization is needed before it can be viewed as an acceptable theory (Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey, 1999). However, tests to measure Emotional Intelligence such as the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT), the EQi and the Bar-On may not be applicable to the cultures that represent the AU. Measurement tools that would arguably work fine with the US or other western cultures may not be effective for the various African cultures.  The aspects of emotional intelligence would not be an effective manner to collect data on leadership at the AU.

Figure 4 Comparing Management and Leadership



| Leadership<br>Produces change and movement | Management<br>Produces order and consistency |
|---|---|
| 1. Establishes direction<br>   ▪ Creates a vision<br>   ▪ Clarifies the big picture<br>   ▪ Sets strategies<br><br>2. Aligns people<br>   ▪ Communicates goals<br>   ▪ Seeks commitment<br>   ▪ Builds teams, coalitions and alliances<br><br>3. Motivates and inspires<br>   ▪ Energizes<br>   ▪ Empowers subordinates & colleagues<br>   ▪ Satisfies unmet needs | 1. Planning and budgeting<br>   ▪ Establishes agendas<br>   ▪ Sets timetable<br>   ▪ Allocates resources<br><br>2. Organizing and staffing<br>   ▪ Provide structure<br>   ▪ Make job placements<br>   ▪ Establish rules and procedures<br><br>3. Controlling and problem solving<br>   ▪ Develop incentives<br>   ▪ Generate creative solutions<br>   ▪ Take corrective action |

**Note.  Comparing Management and Leadership. Reprinted from John P. Kotter, A Force for Change. The Free Press, 1990.**

*Management versus Leadership*

One of the key sub-questions of this study deals with the perceptions of senior US officials in regards to the AU leadership.  To understand whether senior US officials view the style of the leaders of the AU as leaning toward management or leadership, a review of the literature of management versus leadership was conducted.  Management and leadership are different in their approach and outcome (Kotter, 2012) See Figure 4.

Kotter's (1990) contribution in this area of research deals with seeing management as producing order and consistency, while distinguishing the function of leadership as producing change and movement.  Kotter (2007) takes Bass' theory on

transformational leadership and offers that there are eight stages that, if accomplished,

provide an avenue for better success in transformation (see figure 5):

**Figure 5 Eight Steps to Successful Change**



**Note. Eight Steps to Successful Change. Reprinted from John P. Kotter, Leading Change. Harvard Business Review Press, 2012.**

The leader of an organization causes a transformation through his vision and

empowering the followers to act on that vision (Kotter, 2012, p. 82). Kotter and

Schlesinger (2008) looked further at adapting strategy to the situation after diagnosing

the various types of resistance that could be encountered (see figure 6).

**Figure 6 Methods for Dealing with Resistance to Change**

**Methods for dealing with resistance to change**

| Approach | Commonly used in situations | Advantages | Drawbacks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Education + communication | Where there is a lack of information or inaccurate information and analysis. | Once persuaded, people will often help with the implementation of the change. | Can be very time consuming if lots of people are involved. |
| Participation + involvement | Where the initiators do not have all the information they need to design the change, and where others have considerable power to resist. | People who participate will be committed to implementing change, and any relevant information they have will be integrated into the change plan. | Can be very time consuming if participators design an inappropriate change. |
| Facilitation + support | Where people are resisting because of adjustment problems. | No other approach works as well with adjustment problems. | Can be time consuming, expensive, and still fail. |
| Negotiation + agreement | Where someone or some group will clearly lose out in a change, and where that group has considerable power to resist. | Sometimes it is a relatively easy way to avoid major resistance. | Can be too expensive in many cases if it alerts others to negotiate for compliance. |
| Manipulation + co-optation | Where other tactics will not work or are too expensive. | It can be a relatively quick and inexpensive solution to resistance problems. | Can lead to future problems if people feel manipulated. |
| Explicit + implicit coercion | Where speed is essential, and the change initiators possess considerable power. | It is speedy and can overcome any kind of resistance. | Can be risky if it leaves people mad at the initiators. |

**Note. Methods for dealing with Resistance to Change. Reprinted from John P. Kotter and Leonard Schlesinger, Choosing Strategies for Change. Harvard Business Review Press, 2008, p. 136.**

Plato provides an avenue of contrasting leadership from management and administration in *The Republic*. He described the differences between the leader (the Philosopher-King), the mid-range manager (the Guardian), and the administrative level (the Bronze level) or follower (Cawthon, 2002). Northouse (2013) suggests that there are a number of similar attributes and functions that a manager and a leader share, but in the end, leadership can be distinguished by the power of the leader to shape vision and strategic vision where the manager does not have such authority or charter.

Leaders have the authority to create a vision and authority while balancing the management of resources and missions that come from a higher authority (Northouse,

2013).  Plato's Republic uses the cave analogy to contemplate how a leader has a better and clearer vision (Klosko, 2006).  This may illustrate how leaders can shape vision based on position and authority, or are inherently different from those who remain in the cave in darkness (Cawthon, 2002).

Plato offers a vision of what he envisioned to be leadership traits and desired traits of an effective leader, explaining the knowledge and insight that leaders have over followers (Akiskal, 2007).  There is a fundamental closeness in functions that leaders and managers share, but there is a clear distinction in that leadership demands shaping vision, the ability to influence followers, and possessing the authority to cause change within an organization (Northouse, 2013).  Northouse (2013) points out that there is a trait view and a process view of leadership and leaders.

A shortfall of the management versus leadership dynamic for this study is that the definitions for each may not be applicable to an international organization because the AU that possesses a variety of cultures within one organization.  Even Plato addressed a single culture.

*Charismatic*

Charismatic leadership is often associated with transformational leadership. Observing the leadership of the AU from the perceptions of the senior US officials that were involved with supporting AMIS will assist in determining the charismatic aspects as well as the transformational aspects of the AU's leadership.   Max Weber coined the term of charismatic leadership as possessing a faith in the leader's ability (Conger & Kanungo, 1994, p. 440).  Transformational leadership behaviors are often described in the theory of charismatic leadership (Yukl, 2013, p. 53).  Northouse's fourth

characteristic of a charismatic leader embodies what a leader is transmitting:

"charismatic leaders communicate high expectations for follower…exhibit confidence

in the follower's abilities to meet these expectations" (Northouse, 2013, p. 193).  A

charismatic leader articulates their transformational vision as a shared vision to what

Boyatzis and McKee (2005) refer to as movement away from the prior life toward a life

that talks to our dreams.

There is a difference in charismatic and transformational leadership in that a

leader does not need to possess charisma to be a transformational leader (Northouse,

2013).  Kotter (1996) took this a step further and offers charismatic leaders as

transformational figures that transform organizations.  There is evidence to suggest that

charismatic leadership is explained through the leader-follower relationship where the

charismatic leader has profound effects on the followers (Yukl, 2013).

The traits of charismatic leadership are close in line with transformational

leadership.  There are eight leader traits that are identified with charismatic leadership:

1.  Articulating an appealing vision

2.  Using strong, expressive forms of communication when articulating the
    vision

3.  Taking personal risks and making self-sacrifices to attain the vision

4.  Communicating high expectations

5.  Expressing optimism and confidence in followers

6.  Modeling behaviors consistent with the vision

7.  Managing follower impressions of the leader

8. Building identification with the group or organization

9. Empowering followers (Yukl, 2013, p. 312)

There are data to suggest positive aspects of charismatic leadership; the

followers may experience psychological growth and development of their abilities as

well as the organization being more likely to adapt to a dynamic environment that is

hostile or competitive (Yukl, 2013).  Some of the negative aspects of a charismatic

leader may include; inhibition of criticism, risky projects can fail, leader taking credit

for success, and failure to develop successors (Yukl, 2013).

*Culture of Leadership*

The development of images is part of the culture or the sub-culture in which
they are developed, and it depends upon all elements of that culture or sub-
culture (Boyacigillar & Adler, 1991, p. 271-272).

Culture has been defined as "a way of life, customs and script pf a group pf

people" (Gudykunst & Ting-Tommey as cited by Northouse, 2013, p. 384).  The AU,

possessing 53 different nations with multiple + cultures, cannot be researched without

examining how culture may have created a challenge for leadership.

A dearth of data exists for examining the cultural aspects of leadership

experienced by the AU.  The Sub-Saharan countries examined by the GLOBE project

demonstrated that the African cultures examined demonstrated high scores on humane

orientation and offered that Sub-Saharan cultures are sensitive to the feelings of others

(Northouse, 2013) (See figure 7).  Sub-Saharan cultures tend to view leadership based

on charisma, team orientation, and participative leadership as effective (Brodbeck,

Chhokar & House (2007).  Additionally, both participative leadership and autonomous

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leadership were shown to be tolerated for the African countries that were represented in the Middle-East study portion of GLOBE which differed from the Sub-Saharan countries examined (Brodbeck, Chhokar & House (2007).

The GLOBE study indicated that there was a difference in how the northern African and Sub-Saharan cultures viewed leadership: northern Africa data suggested that the culture was more attuned to participative and autonomous leadership and the Sub-Saharan cultures suggested that the culture norm was more aligned with humane and charismatic leadership (Brodbeck, Chhokar & House, 2007).  In this study, the definitions used are:

> Participative Leadership: reflects the degree to which leaders involve others in making and implementing decisions.  It includes being participative and autonomous
>
> Humane-oriented leadership: emphasizes being supportive, considerate, compassionate, and generous.  This type of leadership includes modesty and sensitivity to other people (Northouse, 2013, p. 395).

GLOBE deals with but a few of the 54 nations that existed in Africa in 2004 and the 53 member nations of the AU.  The House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman and Gupta study (2004) thus offered a narrow view of Africa through the representation of only five of the 54 African nations.  Another fault found in the GLOBE study was that all five African cultures studied were in sub-Saharan Africa and did not include the northern African nations as it might relate to the AU.

**Figure 7. GLOBE Project Cultural Clusters**



**Note. GLOBE Project Cultural Clusters. Reprinted from Robert J. House et al..,
Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies, Sage
Publications, 2004.**

The Globe study did offer two additional African nations, Egypt and Morocco,

under the cultural rubric of the Middle East but did not address those cultures as they

would relate to an international organization such as the AU that possesses a mix of

diverse cultures in one organizational body. Due to this omission, the GLOBE study

therefore cannot offer an insight into the leadership dynamics related to international

cultures and their view of leadership. Additionally, the GLOBE study did not include any eastern African nations and cultures, focusing on the southern countries of Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe and the inclusion of only one west African nation, Nigeria. This convenience sample lacked controls for type of organization or responders. (Yukl, 2013, p. 369). There is a lack of universal theories that can apply to a wide range of cultures based on interaction of people from different cultures or a regionally-centric applied theory (Boyacigillar & Adler, 1991, p. 283).

There is a weakness in the study of culture that has been observed by the research in the GLOBE and the review of literature. The use of grounded theory may thus be of value to determine how culture might have affected the AU during AMIS.

## Review of Communication Theory

There are two communication theories applied to this study: cross-cultural communication and organizational communication. These are related to centralization versus decentralization methods of communication. These two theories are compared with the responses of the participants of this study. The theory underlying cross-cultural communication was incorporated due to the AU representing a majority of the African nations, each nation state having its own unique culture or cultures including colonial and indigenous languages not shared by every member of the AU.

Cross-cultural communication lays the foundation for the perceptions of senior US officials in their responses to the question related to the challenges of communications of the AU in executing AMIS. Organizational communication theory is vital to understanding the responses of the participants to the challenges related to the

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AU's organization as related by the participants of the study. Note that Morocco was

not a member of the AU during AMIS due to its stand on the status of the western

Sahara (Makinda, Okumu & Mickler, 2016) See figure 1 for map of current AU

membership.

*Cross-Cultural Communication Theory*

> Some of the more interesting issues that we have [in the organization] are
> conflicts within a particular ethnic group but are from diverse backgrounds. We
> had a situation…where there were two Vietnamese people on the same work
> team, who could not get along. And, you know, to most Americans, you would
> say, "They are both Vietnamese, they are going to love each other!" But, they
> did not. One was Buddhist. One was Catholic. One was from an urban area.
> One was from a rural area. One was highly educated. The other was
> uneducated. Yet, they performed the same tasks, so it caused a lot of conflict.
> (Personal communication, March 18, 1993 cited by Lieberman & Gurtov as
> cited in Wiseman & Shuter, 1994, p. 141)

Cross-cultural communication is an important aspect of this research and

provides the basis for identifying how a diverse group of cultures at the AU

communicated with the representation of 53 different nations, each with their own

identity. Braun suggested that barriers to intercultural communication were a vital

aspect to the future of many international organizations (2001). This holds true for the

AU, where 53 individual cultures were presented in one international organization

(Maganga, 2007).

Communication and culture have an influence on each other where the culture in

which one is "socialized" influences the way that the individual communicates, and the

way that an individual communicates can alter the culture over a period of time

(Gudykunst, 1997, p. 327). An individual adapts to a new culture by "acculturating" to

the new host patterns of communication (Kim, 1998, p. 72). Kim's use of assumptions

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and predictive theorems relate to adaptability of an individual to a host culture. The assumption is that when a person adapts to a cultural environment, they form a cultural identity, and that an individual's ability to communicate facilitates their ability to adapt to the new culture (Kim, 1998, p. 73). Kim's assumption of cultural adaption was used to analyze response from study participants.

Non-verbal communication, can also be a barrier to communication (Samovar & Porter, 1991, p. 349). An illustration of a barrier to cross-cultural communication can be seen in the West African interpretation of the meaning of "hand," that a western African understands to be the entire arm (Jandt, 2004, p. 105). According to Kincaid 1988, pp. 288-289), one of the assumptions when addressing intercultural communication is that the initial differences in communication "between members of different cultures are expected to diminish over time with frequent contact." Kincaid (1988, pp. 288-289) uses a theorem to demonstrate that a "relatively closed social system" with unrestricted communication among its members will converge "toward a state of greater cultural uniformity." Intercultural communication can be viewed as communication between individuals of that have different backgrounds that has been shaped by their experience within a group. (Kim, 1988).

The AU can be viewed as a host culture where 53 diverse African cultures converge to form an organizational culture. In the view of Young Kim (2005) view, the practices of the new culture lead an individual to acculturate to the host culture through the external influence of the host cultural system. Kim argues that de-culturation, or unlearning, of the individual culture must take place in order for acculturation to take

place, where an individual begins to assimilate to the new culture through enculturation

(Kim, 1988, p. 53). (See figure 8).

Kim (2001) provides a structural model for the factors that influence cross-

cultural adaptation (see figure 8).   Individual adaptability is based on factors such as

their personality, host receptivity and host pressure that may lead one to transform to

the identity of the new group (Kim, 2001).

**Figure 8. Kim's Process Model: The Stress-Adaptation-Growth Dynamic.**



**Note. Y. Y. Kim's Process Model: The Stress-Adaptation-Growth Dynamic.
Reprinted from Y. Y. Kim, 2001, p. 57.**

Stress is a factor in adapting to a new culture where ongoing imbalances in

adapting to stress grows in a subtle fashion (Kim, 2005).   Adaptation is not linear but is

rather caused by a series of cyclical draw-backs, leading to the individual adapting

through "leaps-forward" in adapting and integrating to the new culture (Kim, 2005, p.

384) (Kim, 1988, p. 57).  Kim (2005, p.394) brings together acculturation and stress

adaptation to theorize that the two approaches are competing yet complementary

"psychological forces intrinsic to the adaptation process." The intercultural

transformation model of acculturation and adaptation may be useful in exploring what

happened when 53 diverse cultures formed the organizational culture of the AU (Kim,

2001) (See figure 9).

**Figure 9. Kim's Structural Model: Stress Adaptation.**



**Note. Y. Y. Kim's Structural Model: Stress Adaptation. Reprinted from Y. Y. Kim, 2001, p. 87.**

Cross-cultural relationships often break down not due to language but because

of assigning a different understanding or interpretation of the communication itself

(Hurn & Tomalin, 2014, p. 1). Communication is formed when members of a group

are "indoctrinated" into a shared vision (Olufowote, 2006, p. 458). People search for a

common means of communication and meaning in an organization (Samovar & Porter,

1991). A group identity is formed when members share an interpretation of reality

through communication. "Shorter term members may be left out of the shared vision

(Gossett, 2002, p. 385). Multiple visions within one organization can exist (Endres,

1994) and E. G. Bormann holds that multiple rhetorical visions may co-exist in a group

or organization peacefully (Zanin et al., 2016, p. 441). Groups develop a common

group consciousness when members demonstrate a shared vision and develop patterns of communication unique to that group based on shared meanings (Bormann, 1996). However, Bormann is criticized by Olufowote (2006) for using a static model to address membership acceptance for a group identity and notes that Bormann does not take into account each member's multiple identity targets (Zanin et al., 2016, p. 442).

Figure 10 graphically demonstrates a continuum of six stages from left to right illustrating movement along a continuum of intercultural sensitivity (Bennett, 1986, p. 182). It takes time to move from denial (the ethnocentric stages) to full integration (the ethno-relative stages) (Bennett, 1986, p. 181). The AU had members from 53 diverse states with individual cultures. The theories related to cross-cultural adaption and intercultural sensitivity will be examined against the responses of this study to determine whether these theories are applicable to the AU during AMIS.

**Figure 10. Bennett's Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity.**



## Development of Intercultural Sensitivity

### Experience of difference

Denial   Defense   Minimization   Acceptance   Adaptation   Integration

**Ethnocentric
Stages**

**Ethnorelative
Stages**

© Milton Bennett

Note.  Bennett's Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity.  Reprinted from Milton J. Bennett, *A Development Approach to training for Intercultural Sensitivity International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 1986. P. 182.

All of Africa may be addressed, as Louw points out in South Africa (as cited in Tanno & Gonzalez, 1998, p. 149), as having conflict between pre-modern, modern and post-modern cultures. This has an effect on how each nation views itself culturally. Collective memory can be used to provide a basis of for shaping the present from a shared memory of the past (Drzewiecka, 2003).   Diversity may be embraced in the AU as the members come from so many different cultural backgrounds.

The cross-cultural communication theory is used in this study to illuminate the potential challenges of communication in an organization that comprises a mix of 53 nations and a wide variance of native and official languages within one body of

membership. The adaptation of the individual to the host organization is pivotal to analyzing the data collected by the researcher for this study.

*Theory of Organizational Communication*

The participant's views on the organization of the AU can provide insight to the challenges of organization and leadership during the period of time that the AU was executing AMIS. Centralization versus decentralization of an organizational structure can determine the avenues of communication and the effectiveness of communication (Macey et al., 1989). Macey et al. (1989) found that participation through decentralized communication allowed for the increased of influence exhibited by members of the organization at lower levels and offered a more robust involvement in decision-making (McPhee & Poole, 2001, p. 509). Centralization of organizational communication, on the other hand "grants all decisions to the top decision maker" (Mintzberg, 1979 as cited in McPhee & Poole, 2001, p. 509).

Vertical communication is the normal avenue for instructions to pass down from the leader to the subordinates, and information flows upward (Simpson, 1959). Horizontal differentiation describes the division of labor that devolves into smaller tasks and skills to accomplish the tasks of the organization and increases communication in an organization (McPhee & Poole, 2001). The size of the organization may overwhelm the informal process of organizing for the need of "mechanistic organization" in an organization of larger size, according to Jablin (1987). Smelter and Fann (1989) found that the size of an organization could lead to restrictions on the width of decision-making within the organization (McPhee & Poole, 2001, p. 506). Horizontal communication is widely seen at the lower levels of the organizational chart (Simpson,

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1959).  Horizontal communication accomplishes five functions: task coordination,

problem solving, sharing information, conflict resolution and building rapport (Harris &

Nelson, 2008) and is vital to coordinating details (Harris & Nelson, 2008).  The basic

definitions of vertical and horizontal communication are found in figure 11. The AU

will be examined to determine whether the communication is vertical or horizontal in

the perceptions of senior US officials.

**Figure 11 Vertical and Horizontal Communication**

| Subject | Vertical communication | Horizontal communication |
|---|---|---|
| 1.Definition | When information is exchanged between superiors and subordinates of an organization then it is known as vertical communication. | In case of horizontal communication information are exchanged of same rank of an organization. |
| 2.Degree of formality | Vertical communication is more formal than horizontal communication. | It can use both formal and informal channels of communication. |
| 3.Media | It may use both written & oral media, but basically uses the written media. | On the other hand this type of communication more dependent on the oral media. |
| 4.Co-ordination | It enhances the co-ordination between superiors and subordinates. | Co-ordination between the employees of different departments increased through horizontal communication. |
| 5.Secrecy | In this case secrecy can be maintained. | In case of horizontal communication maintaining the secrecy is difficult. |
| 6.Time | As it follows the formal chain it takes more time to transmit messages. | As both formal and informal channels are followed, information can be exchanged faster than vertical communication. |

**Note.  Vertical and Horizontal Communication.  Reprinted from Applied Organizational Communication and Business Communication, Retrieved from http://communication-business.com/ search/label/ Vertical%20communication. Accessed 30 November 2016.**

Jablin (1987) found that the superior-subordinate communication within an organization suggested the individual's position or level within the organization's hierarchical structure impacted his or her communication in the organization (McPhee & Poole, 2001). McPhee and Poole (2001, p. 507) point out that Barnard (1991) found "that higher level employees exhibited greater reliance on peers for advice" than those who were occupying positions at the lower levels of the hierarchical structure.

Organizational communication theory may prove helpful in analyzing the perceptions of senior US officials about the organizational challenges faced by the AU during the execution of AMIS.

## Review of the Research Design

A comprehensive review of literature for the method that was used for this qualitative study is contained in chapter 3 of this dissertation. The justification for using a grounded theory approach was that none of the theories overviewed seemed applicable to this study, although they did help inform it. A qualitative study with an emphasis on grounded theory can be developed through the use of a case study, "where a … program, or event is studied in depth for a defined period of time" (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010, p. 137) was determined to be the best research design to address the perceptions of senior US officials who participated in AMIS. Purposive sampling (Berg, 2007, p. 40) was used to focus the responses of participants.

The researcher has to be aware of his own knowledge of the data and should be cognizant not to interject with his own viewpoint, ensuring that the data are "solely from the vantage point of" the participants (Lofland, et al., 2006, p. 62). A fallacy often arises when the researcher attempts to use quantitative methods with a nonrandom

sample (Feagin, 1991).  Quantitative studies often exhibit more reliable data than that

offered through a case study using qualitative methodology but validity in qualitative

studies is not attainable theoretically (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg, 1991).

The smaller samples used in qualitative research differ from a quantitative

methodology. The researcher selects the "lens" of the study by elicitation of the

viewpoint of the sample of the participants rather than the numeric validity methods

used in qualitative methods (Creswell and Miller, 2000, p. 125).   A different metric is

used in qualitative research because the data collected represent the reality according to

the participants of the study (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008, pp. 76-77).  The entire

population of this research was only 12, with eight participating.

Questions used in an interview must be developed with the end result in mind

(Berg, 2007).  Berg reminds the researcher it is important to share the terms that are

used in common with the researcher and the participants of the study in order to elicit

responses that meet the objective of the research (2007).  Questions need to be open-

ended and non-leading in order to capture the actual experiences of the sample pool

(King & Horrocks, 2010, p. 2The qualitative method uses an inductive method where

the researcher selects the interview questions using an open-ended questioning

technique that offers an ability to collect data from the interviewee and arrange the data

into themes or categories (Creswell, p. 63, 2009).  The development of the inductive

method, according to Creswell (p. 63, 2009), allows the research to analyze the data

collected through interviews to seek out broad patterns for generalization from the past

experiences of the participants, leading to the development of new or revised theoretical

understanding. This grounded theory approach was deemed suitable to address the focus of this study.

## Conclusion and Identification of Gap in the literature

The researcher conducted a comprehensive review of the scholarly literature related to the AU, AMIS and the theories related to leadership and communication that were applicable to this study in order to determine the challenges that the AU faced in executing AMIS.  The four major themes that the researcher studied in the review of literature were related to the overall research question of, "What were the challenges in that the AU faced in conducting AMIS from 2004-2007" and the four key sub-questions of the research study related to the challenges that the AU faced during AMIS with organization, leadership, US support and communication.

The researcher determined that the current body of scholarly literature did not address the specifics of the key sub-questions that would answer the overall research question.  Although the current body of scholarly research did address the basics of the AU and AMIS through such notable authors as Murithi (2007), Cilliers (2008), Packer & Rukare (2002), Garrett III et al (2009), Williams (2011), Makinda, Okumu & Mickler (2016) and Muganga (2007), there was a gap identified by the researcher in that none of the literature was related to the study of what the perceptions were of the US senior officials who had been directly involved with supporting the AU during the time period of AMIS, either out in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia or at the headquarters of the US Department of State and the Department of Defense in Washington DC.

The scholarly literature found in the comprehensive review failed to provide data specially related to Africa and the theories of communication and leadership

dealing specifically with the AU and AMIS. There was literature on a specific country or culture, such as South Africa and apartheid, but no literature addressed the entire continent of Africa or the AU as related to the perceptions of US officials or from any scholarly approach. The culture cluster of the GLOBE study focused on a mere five of the Sub-Saharan countries and two of the North Africa countries in attempting to deal with culture cluster analysis (House, Hnages, Javidan, Dorfman & Gupta, 2004). The GLOBE leadership study relied on broadly defined leadership behaviors that made it difficult to ascertain a clear picture of cross-cultural differences in behavior (Yukl, 2013, p. 369).

In addition, the researcher determined that the thematic areas of US Support and Communications were not addressed in the current body of scholarly literature from the perspective of the US senior officials working directly with the AU and AMIS. The researcher was able to locate a body of literature that provided the basis for interview questions that related to US support mechanisms using communications theory, in particular cross-cultural communication and organizational communication. Kim (1995 & 1998), Gudykunst (1983), Gudykunst & Kim (1994 & 1998), Jandt (2004), Collier (2002) and Katriel (1995) provided an overview of the general principles and theories of cross-cultural communication as applied to individuals and organizations. However, the scholarly literature did not demonstrate the kinds of cross-cultural communications challenges that were exhibited at the AU during its peacekeeping mission in Darfur, Sudan, known as AMIS. Further, the scholarly literature spearheaded by Kim (1988), and edited works of Gudykunst & Kim (1998) and Wiseman (1995), Hecht et al. (2005)

provided theories that could be applied to the collection of data through the perceptions of US senior officials who had been directly involved with the AU and AMIS.

Due to the identification of a gap in the literature, a research design was developed to fill the gap through the use of a case study of a sample of the majority of the population of US senior officials that directly observed the AU and AMIS. The sample population was provided a recruitment letter that offered them an opportunity to provide their perceptions of the challenges that the AU faced in executing AMIS through the organization, leadership, US support and communication. It was determined by the researcher that the use of a grounded theory approach would be the best method of collecting the perceptions of the sample of the population to fill the gap that existed in the scholarly literature.

# Chapter 3

## Methodology

### Methodological Overview

This dissertation examines the challenges that the African Union (AU) faced in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) peace operations from the perspective of senior US officials. The study is based on responses of participants utilizing qualitative analysis of interviews with senior US officials directly involved with the AU and AMIS during the period 2004-2007, in whole or in part. A grounded theory approach was developed through a case study, "where a … program, or event is studied in depth for a defined period of time" (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010, p. 137).

#### *Study Sample*

The strategy used was a "purposive sampling" technique where the researcher used his personal knowledge to select the participants as subjects for this study (Berg, 1998; Berg, 2007). The population of participants selected for this study were the entire senior US official population involved in supporting the AU during the time period that the AU organized and operated AMIS. To ensure that the US perspective was at the senior level, only those US senior officials who were directly involved at the General Services (GS)-15 and Senior Executive Level (civilians) or equal military rank (Full Colonel, 0-6, or above) were selected for this study. By using the purposive sampling strategy of Berg (2007, p. 44), the researcher was able to garner the perspective of the senior US official community and limited the study to represent only the perspective of senior US officials who had been directly involved with the AU and AMIS. The protection of the identity of the participants was paramount, given their seniority and

positions with the US government, in order to ensure robust and honest responses were

provided (Lofland, et al., 2006, p.98).

The total population was 12 senior US officials who were present at the AU or

in Washington DC working with AMIS. Not all of the senior US officials were involved

during the entire three years that the AU conducted AMIS but had physically visited the

AU during AMIS and therefore had first-hand knowledge of the challenges that the AU

faced during AMIS.  All members of the population were at a senior level within the US

Government during the time period 2004 to 2007 and were directly involved with

providing US support to varying degrees.

Seven in-person semi-structured interviews and one email interview were

conducted for a total of eight interviews.  IRB approval was obtained, and a copy of the

Consent Form can be found in Appendix D. King and Horrocks (2011) concluded that

when physical distance from participants or the participant's availability is limited, this

may necessitate the need to conduct the interviews via telephone or through remote

video teleconferencing techniques in order to capture the option of the participant who

cannot be interviewed in person (pp. 79-80). They point out that a researcher should

consider ethical issues when conducting an interview through telephone or remote video

in that the researcher should verbally remind the participant that the interview is being

recorded (p.85).  Skype, telephone or another form of video teleconferencing were not

used due to security concerns for the senior US personnel.  Another avenue for

interviewing is the use of online or email interviews through asynchronous method

where the participant has time to reflect on the response that will be provided to the

researcher (King and Horrocks, 2011, p. 86). For this study, one individual was interviewed via email due to difficulty arranging a face-to-face interview.

Race, gender, position, location, work site or other personal identification factors were not reported in this study in an effort to maintain anonymity. The participants were assured of anonymity so that they could feel comfortable with responding to the interview questions in an open and frank manner. Had the participants been identifiable, it might have skewed the data that they provided in an effort to maintain their current positions or to mask their true perceptions of the challenges that the AU faced in executing AMIS.

All members of the population were contacted via email recruitment letters and provided an opportunity to participate in the study (See Appendix B). Ten potential participants responded positively to the recruitment. However, only eight followed through with the interview process. Seven were interviewed face-to-face, and six of those were recorded using a digital recorder. The remaining participant requested that the interview be conducted via email due to being at a remote location that made a face-to-face interview impractical. Two potential participants did not respond to the request to participate, although the researcher attempted contact on three occasions. One potential participant was unreachable due to retirement. The other was in a combat zone and not available for the interview. Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample as percentages of the population.

Table 1. Sample as Percentage of Population

| Population | In-Person Interviews | Email Interviews | Total Sample | sample as a % of Population |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12 | 7 | 1 | 8 | |
| | 58.3% | 8.3% | 66.7% | |

*Interview Procedure*

The researcher conducted an in-depth face-to-face interview with each

participant in a private setting using a digital recording device or note-taking.  A pilot

interview was conducted with the subject matter expert (SME) in the fall of 2014 to test

for applicability and questioning and listening techniques.  The researcher conducted an

informal pilot interview with a non-selected potential participant that had been an

observer of the AU and had tangential knowledge of AMIS as a SME on Africa.  The

individual who was the subject of the pilot interview was not a direct participant with

the AU during AMIS and was junior in rank and therefore selected by the researcher as

the best possible outside SME who had general knowledge of the AU and AMIS.  No

other pilot interview was attempted with the participant population due to the small

number of potential participants (12).

The face-to-face interviews took place in the District of Columbia area at either

the offices of the participants or another location, such as private home, as selected by

the potential participant.  One interview took place at a mutually agreed location which

was the home of a mutual friend.  For each interview, no other individual was present.

The digital recorder was tested for acceptable recording level at the interview site prior

to the actual interview to test for functionality and placement for best recording results. Two recorders were used to ensure the data were captured when a recorder was used in the interviews. One of the in-person interview participants requested that no recording device be used. Therefore, the researcher took copious notes of the responses of this participant's responses. One participant was interviewed via email due to the location of the participant who was at a distance and unavailable to conduct an in-person or face-to-face interview. IRB approval was obtained to reflect a change in protocol for allowing email responses.

The interviews lasted from 45 to 60 minutes with minimal discussion from the researcher. A short informal greeting was made with each participant in order to make each participant feel comfortable and relaxed with the interview and the interviewer. A brief introduction of the research as well as how the interview would be conducted was provided to each participant before the formal portion of the interview commenced. The researcher received written consent from each participant prior to the interview and provided the participant (subject) with the overall concept and reason for the interview to mitigate any ambiguity. Follow-on questioning techniques were used during the interview for clarity when required and the researcher annotated emotional or environment factors where applicable to capture the mood and non-verbal responses of each participant. The brief introduction to the study and the basics of how the interview would proceed also served as an ice breaker to make the participant feel at ease.

The researcher did respond to any request from the participant for clarification but only when requested specifically by the participant. The researcher did chat with the participants at the conclusion of the interview when the participant made the

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request.  The researcher took notes when deemed germane to the study although the formal interview had concluded.  The researcher took notes in front of the participant when any informal discussion followed the formal, recorded portion of the interview so that the researcher's intent was clear to the participant.

Adequate time was allotted after the completion of the interview to allow the researcher to capture the tone and personal observations that were observed during the interview while fresh in the mind of the researcher for inclusion into the transcription of the interview.  Each recorded interview was sent to a vetted transcriber at the University of Oklahoma immediately following the interview. Each participant was offered an opportunity to review the transcription of their interviews.  The offer to review the transcripts allowed each participant a comfort level and acted as a confirmation of accuracy of the responses in the transcription.  All interviews were erased following the verification of the transcripts.

The majority of the participants were still in the labor force.  The researcher wanted to ensure that the research questions were fully and openly answered and therefore provided each participant anonymity to ensure the protection of each participant in the research study. Researcher assured each participant that their names and official duty title would not be used in this research study.  The researcher used verbatim responses from the participants of the study.  However, ums," "you know," and "right?" were removed from the transcriptions used in data analysis to streamline the responses without changing the intent or meaning.

*Study Design and Analysis*

The research design for this dissertation incorporated qualitative interviews to derive a grounded theory through purposive sampling of subject matter experts. Open-ended questions (See Appendix C) were asked by the researcher, who conducted analyses of the responses from the study participants (Straus and Corbin, 1998, p. 1). The researcher listened and allowed the participants to answer a set of questions that elicited a response based on their perceptions without forcing them to select pre-established responses (Lofland, et al., 2006). Question refinement was conducted with the assistance of an African subject matter expert and the chair of the dissertation committee prior to submitting the questions for the University of Oklahoma Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval. Each dissertation committee member was aware of the potential questions through the dissertation prospectus defense process. The chair and committee members provided valuable input during the defense of the dissertation prospectus in relation to question comprehensibility and clarity of questions as well as question applicability. As a result of the defense of the dissertation prospectus, questions were adjusted for clarity and applicability to the study. The researcher refined questions and procedures based on the outcome of the subject matter expert input and the submission to the Chair of the dissertation committee.

Leedy and Ormrod (2010), Berg (1998), King and Horrocks (2010) and Feagin, et al. (1991) provided the analytical framework and analysis techniques for a case study. Creswell (2009) offers research design techniques for the use of qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches to conducting and designing a research product. He provides an overview of how to select the proper research design for a qualitative study

along with the method to use for inquiry, such as in the case of using interviews.  The

inductive method used in this dissertation provides a logical flow from selecting the

interview questions that offer the researcher the ability, using open ended questions, to

analyzing the data collected from the interviewee into themes or categories (Creswell,

2009). The data were coded using open coding to identify concepts that emerged from

the responses of the participants (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 101).

*Research Design*

An open-coding technique was used, then analyses were conducted and

compiled with the aim of drawing a conclusion as to what were the perceptions of the

participant's in relation to the organization, leadership, US support and communications

of the AU during the execution of AMIS

*Analytical Strategy*

The data were divided into five categories using a color code scheme.  Each

code had a color associated with the questions asked from the in-depth semi-structured

interviews to ensure stability, accuracy and reproducibility without changing the codes

over time (Campbell, Quincy, Osserman & Pedersen, 2013).  The responses of the

participants were coded according to the best fit of the 4 key sub-questions of the study

and the fifth code was associated with responses that fell outside of the 4 key sub-

questions.

*Validity*

Qualitative methodology differs from quantitative methodology in that the

researcher selects the "lens" based on the views of the participants and those who

conduct the study rather than the numeric validity methods used in qualitative methods

(Creswell and Miller, 2000, p. 125). Although this study was not ethnographic in the traditional sense of spending time observing the subjects, each participant in this study had been observed by the researcher in the execution of their duties, and thus the study follows the paradigm assumption of establishing validity of the data through prolonged exposure to the study topic (Creswell and Miller, 2000, p. 127). The length of time between the execution of AMIS and the interview of the participants, 10 to 11 years, may present a threat to validity.

*Assumption and Scope*

An assumption is that the AU will continue on its current path to develop the capability to conduct peace support operations based on its findings from former peace operations on the continent, such as AMIS. The case study captured data not currently available and added to the current body of research and will be of value to future research for US as well as provide international knowledge of the leadership, organization and communication challenges that the AU faced in executing AMIS and the challenges of US support of an African peacekeeping mission.

The scope of this research was limited to AMIS for the period January 2004 to January 2007 that consisted of AMIS I, AMIS II, and AMIS IIE (Enhanced), collectively known as AMIS. It did not include the ongoing mission that now includes the UN, which is a hybrid force organization that is African-led due to the demands of the Government of Sudan. The current organizational structure and mandate is the African Union-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and was not examined in this study.

*Researcher as Interviewer*

The researcher for this dissertation was the sole interviewer and researcher for this entire dissertation, using scholarly research articles, official documents, and participant perceptions as the basis for this study. No other researcher or interviewer was used to conduct this study. An outside transcriber was used to transcribe the verbal recordings from the face-to-face interviews that were recorded on a digital recorder. The transcriber was not provided with the key to the identity of the participants. The transcriber destroyed any paper or electronic version of the transcription after confirmation that the researcher had received the transcription of the recordings. Once the researcher was in possession of the transcription, each digital recording was erased and dubbed over with silent recording in order to delete any recording trace of the participants.

The researcher and interviewer for this study is a doctoral student in the University of Oklahoma Doctor of Philosophy program in Organizational Leadership housed under the university's Advanced Programs division. The researcher completed the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) training in January 2014 and updated the CITI training in December 2015. The University of Oklahoma IRB was initially approved in January 2015 for a series of face-to-face interviews and updated in December 2015 to included interviews via email when the potential participant was at a remote or distant location or when a potential participant made a request for an interview through email due to lack of time to sit for an interview. The interviews were conducted by the researcher from June 2015 through March 2016.

*Limitations of the Methodology*

The researcher found that the face-to-face interview that was not recorded brought forth a smaller yield of material than the interviews that were recorded. Taking notes in that interview was difficult to accomplish while attempting to listen to and capture the exact words of the participant. Another limitation was observed in the use of an email to elicit responses. The participant who was offered an interview through email took much longer to respond and did not offer the same volume of response as those who were recorded live. The researcher observed that there was a limitation in the responses of those being interviewed in that the participant often failed to directly answer the question posed.

*Post-interview Procedures*

The interviews that were captured through the use of a digital recorder where loaded onto Drop Box and sent to the graduate student in the Department of Sociology at the University of Oklahoma for transcription to written form. The interviewer took few notes during the interviews that were recorded but did note if there were any emotions or facial expressions displayed by the interviewees throughout the interview. In the one interview where a digital recorder was not used, the interviewer immediately went back over his notes in order to capture the words and thoughts of the interviewee while his memory was fresh.

The researcher offered each interviewee a copy of the transcription for authentication of accuracy. All but one of the interviewees declined the offer to be provided a copy of the transcriptions. The one participant who requested a copy of the transcription did not challenge or make any comment on the interview transcription.

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The transcriptions and any notes were locked in a container located at the office of the researcher's place of employment, which is located within a secure building with multiple layers of check points and access codes. No other researcher or individual, outside of the transcriber, had access to the digital recordings or transcriptions or notes. Once the defense of the dissertation is completed and approved, all transcriptions and notes will be destroyed through a mulch shredder.

Woven into the challenges faced by the AU from the perspective of US senior officials who worked AMIS is the theory of transformational and transaction leadership as well as cross cultural and organizational communication theory. The researcher was careful not to inject his own ideas about the AU and AMIS and elicited the data "solely from the vantage point of" the participants (Lofland, et al., 2006, p. 62).

# Chapter 4

## Analysis of the Data

*Study Parameters*

This chapter uses four sections that capture the perceptions of the eight senior US officials who were respondents, using four key questions that address the main question. The use of a testable hypothesis was not appropriate for this qualitative study that possessed a small population.

Main Question and Key Sub-Questions

The main question of the study, "What were the challenges of that the African Union (AU) faced in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)" used the perspective of US senior officials who had worked directly with the AU during the time period of 2004-2007, either in part or during the entire time period. The main question is addressed through the use of four key sub-questions dealing with the organizational structure, the leadership, and the communication of the AU as well as US support to the AU during AMIS.

*Profile of the Sample*

In order to elicit robust and honest perceptions of the population, many of whom are still engaged in their careers, the participants were offered anonymity and are not listed by name anywhere in the study to protect their identity. The respondents were all senior US officials at the time of AMIS. The Department of State as well as the Department of Defense were represented in this study. Three (37.5%) respondents were from the Department of Defense (DoD) and five (62.5%) respondents were from the Department of State (DoS). The time that each participant of this study represented the

US in supporting the AU (during AMIS) ranged from 1 to 3 years. Three years

represented the entire period the AU's execution of AMIS.  Table 2 illustrates the

length of time spent by the US senior officials supporting the AU during AMIS that

ranged from one year to three years (entire mission) with a mean of 2.25 years and a

mode of 2 years (4 respondents).

Profile of the Participants

Table 2 presents the time frame and parent organization of the participants of
this study:


Table 2 Participant Organization and Time with African Union

| Interview Participant | Department | Years working AU |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | State | 3 |
| 2 | State | 3 |
| 3 | State | 2 |
| 4 | State | 2 |
| 5 | State | 2 |
| 6 | Defense | 3 |
| 7 | Defense | 2 |
| 8 | Defense | 1 |


Four of the face-to-face interviews were conducted at the participant's office or

within the office complex.  Three of the face-to-face interviews were conducted at the

residents of the participants at their request.

**Data Collection of Key Sub-Questions**

The participants of the study provided their insight relating to the challenges of

organization facing the AU and AMIS.  The following responses were captured from

the study participants for each key sub-question:

**Key Sub-Question 1**

Organizational Structure*: What were the challenges for the African Union*

*organizational structure in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan?*

### ***The Structure of the AU:***

The challenges that the organizational structure of the AU has been examined through the scholarly literature and found to be lacking.  The organizational design of the AU was examined through the perspective of senior US officials through interviews. The study participants provided an overview of the organization of the AU and the organizational challenges faced by the AU during the time frame of AMIS. One participant commented:

> The AU was suffering from a lack of structure and a lack of, you know, history and skill and staff, and everything else.

The participants had a view of the AU, as a multi-national organization, as a nascent organization.  The design of the AU was believed to have been built on the model of the UN and the European Union (EU), as a hybrid of those two organizations, whose purpose for existence was the start of new era of African independence at the end of the period of colonization.  The AU was seen as a 53-member organization that was formed so that Africa, as a continent, could determine its own fate when dealing with economic and political engagement. Participants in the research had the following to say:

…a multi-national organization that was comprised of 53 states. Its structure

resembles closely to that of a hybrid between the UN and the European Union.

Clear the organization was relatively new at that point, the outgrowth of the

Organization of African Unity whose primary focus was liberation of colonized

countries on the African continent with the end--with the last or next to last

country achieving its independence roughly about 1994, South Africa, only

leaving western Sahara under this colonized umbrella. The African Union was

created to move forward since its prior mission had been nearly completed with

again the exception of western Sahara

Their primary purpose was to determine economic development, political

engagement and to act as one voice when engaging primarily with the UN. The

African countries, in particular, are noted for their block voting within the UN in

organization. There was also a direct relationship with the EU, with the OAS,

the Organization of American States as well, and with the Arab League.

…so, it was just sort of a nascent time for AU peace operations.

…I do remember them standing up the new Peace and Security Council.

A lack of organizational depth was viewed as a challenge by one respondent.  The depth

of the Peace and Security Commission was only one deep.

Hierarchically, the Peace and Security Commission had only one entity, the Peace and Security Department.

Some of the respondents felt that the AU possessed structural and organizational flaws but that the AU should be recognized for its intervention policy in Africa, specifically Sudan, with launching AMIS. However, it was pointed out, that AMIS was not the first mission that the AU had been involved within the continent. One participant wanted to ensure that the AU was recognized for the political will that was demonstrated by the AU as significant:

As for the AU organization structure--well it wasn't the first mission that the African Union had conducted a peace operation on the continent, so I think it's important to note the political will of the organization is significant.

The study participants suggested the idea of the newness of the organization and that the AU was not a developed organization. Not every participant had thought through the organizational challenges or faulted the organization of the AU due to the fact that the AU was just a young organization:

There were organizational challenges but I never really thought about it …since the AU was just getting started.

It wasn't a developed organization, so it had no choice. It was going to be

involved in such a serious matter to rely on the outside world, really. I don't

think they could have repaired or done too much different themselves, honestly.


I didn't fault them for their organization shortfalls –I never really thought on

how they could improve the organization per se.


A respondent believed that the AU was lacking.  The lack was due to the AU not

being a developed organization.  Given the way the organization was designed and the

background of the staff, the participant did not see how the AU could have done a better

job at the time of AMIS:


 I mean just all around lacking really. I don't think that they could have done,

necessarily, could have done too much more given the way they were. It's

almost like saying if you had a developed organization what could have done

better.  Challenges. It wasn't a developed organization, so it had no choice. It

was going to be involved in such a serious matter to rely on the outside world,

really. I don't think they could have repaired or done too much different

themselves, honestly.


However, the interview subjects did not see the problems faced by the AU is

limited to that organization.  There was the perception among the participants that the

challenges faced by the AU were believed to be an issue that every new organization

faces in adaptability—that of structural organization.

> I think because it was very brand new, really, the fact it wouldn't have had the
> history or back ground or structure to be able to cope with something on the
> scale of trying to, you know, stop a genocide basically (laughs) on its own, and
> it's not something that you could just create out of thin air, um you know, even
> very developed countries face challenges when they are trying to put into place
> some major operation and these guys were brand new and didn't really have any
> structure to be able to do that, and uh the staff to be able to do it.

> Basically, from what I recall the peace and security counsel of the African
> Union was just about to get up and running; I was there for the launch of it. So
> prior to that, of course the organization for African Unity had transitioned to the
> African Union and then it created this special peace and security counsel to deal
> with matters of peace and security of course.

### *The AU acted unilaterally to the crisis in Sudan:*

Added to the view of the AU's intervention in Sudan, was a participant's belief
that the AU acted on its own when the EU and the international community had not
been willing to intervene in Darfur.  Despite some structural and financial challenges
there was the attitude that the AU had accomplished on its own a mission the
Organization of American States and the Arab League had never done as an
organization. This participant commented:

The OAS, the Arab League, none of those organizations have ever intervened on their own in a country, and its only recently that in the last--at that point no other entity, including EU, had been willingly intervene. So first of all I want to applaud the African Union despite maybe some structural or financial challenges.

There was also the belief that there would not have been an AMIS-style peacekeeping mission in western Sudan without the AU:

There would have been no peacekeeping mission except for an AU peacekeeping mission.

Not all participants agreed on the effectiveness of the AU launching AMIS and demonstrated that the AU possessed a challenge with executing AMIS in Sudan due to the Government of Sudan. One respondent went as far as indicating the AU's decision to initiate AMIS was not well thought out by the organization:

Well, first of all I would start with the decision to launch AMIS is one that was not well thought out.

**_Sovereignty Issues related to Organization:_**

Along with Sovereignty of a member state of the AU, the ability to exercise its own expertise in peacekeeping and availability of personnel and equipment, allowed certain countries to exercise more leverage in AMIS.  The ability of a nation to operate unilaterally also surfaced in regarding to operating in AMIS.

I think between the sheer size of the Nigeria forces and Nigeria's experience in West Africa in peace keeping missions under ECOWAS and then under the AU umbrella. It was seen that they had the greatest amount of experience, so therefore at the lead. The Algerian's because of their own constitutional--this is where we come back to the AU and individual sovereignty does not put boots on the ground in other countries, but they're one of the best equipped on the continent in terms of airlift capability and very efficient in their ability to do that.

So in terms of political, the Rwandan's, I think, had second in command on the ground. The Rwandan's were particularly instrumental in terms of their own historical background having undergone and been the victims of genocide at one point, but at the same time not only--they were the ones who rescued themselves, so, what irony in that sense.

The challenges of the organization of the AU could have its positive aspects with its inclusiveness of its member states as described by the participants.  The sovereignty of the member states was also a challenge that was brought forth by the

participants. However, some participants pointed out the challenge to reality of member states acting as a coalition was not a negative aspect or challenge for the AU:

> The AU doesn't force any nation state in this case to participate, so it is a coalition of the willing just like with the UN. The challenge for--and challenges aren't necessarily negative, and I think that's important to note.

> So, in this particular I think you have the best of both worlds--the AU is following the structure of the UN, the AU like the UN, has demonstrated the political will to commit troops on the ground, but like any sovereign entity it has the right to say what its unwilling to have to do, and the AU, like the UN, must get the permission of the country to enter, otherwise you--the risk of declaring war comes about.

Sovereignty was an issue, as well, for the peacekeeping forces, as they came from different countries:

> Peacekeeping missions comes down to the sovereignty and putting their troops under the command of an organization, and not of a country.

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> themselves, so, what irony in that sense.

There was a challenge related to sharing the vision of the AU as opposed to the norms

of the culture of the individual sovereign nations.  The view of the participants

recognized that they were observing the AU and AMIS from the cultural lens of a

western perspective.

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I don't think there was a broad shared vision. I think each contingent region had their own views on how things should be done.

…I mean I can be this western person saying, well this how they could have done it better, but when you look, they're playing that the hand that they have been dealt.

The sovereignty right of each nation in Africa could be an impediment and challenge to any peacekeeping mission, such as AMIS, that the AU must navigate. In particular, the host nation or the nation that accepts a peacekeeping force has sovereign rights under the AU charter. Several of the interview subjects noted this:

And no country to date right now is willing to give up its sovereign authority.

Sudan provided and what ceiling amounts of AU and peacekeeping troops its willing to take on its soil with AMIS.

Looking at the challenges would be, uh getting the cooperation first of all of the host country. Sudan held up, unfortunately, at its port for a long time--supplies, equipment, vehicles, which didn't totally undermine the mission, but slowed setting up the mission down.

…given the impediments of the host country, the Sudanese government, had in place, I think even with the best of organizational structures this was a horrendous undertaking to put troops on the ground. We couldn't get a UN force, so I think the Sudanese government refused a UN force, so it's important to note.

I don't know what the official understandings were at the high level between the government of Sudan and who clearly did not want us there, but compromised to allow the AU to come in instead of the UN.

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Peacekeeping missions comes down to the sovereignty and putting their troops under the command of an organization, and not of a country.

### *The Government of Sudan related to AMIS*:

A key issue for the AU in launching AMIS was the reluctance of the Government of Sudan of having any sort of intervention on its soil.  It was pointed out that the Government of Sudan allowed the AU to launch AMIS on its soil as a compromise to not having UN peacekeepers in western Sudan.

AMIS is a challenging one because the Sudanese government under President Bashir was opposed to any kind of intervention into his country. At that

particular point in time, it was a compromise to have AMIS go into Darfur

rather than a UN mission, so he was definitely opposed to a UN mission, and it

was also shortly after the US intervention into Iraq.

I don't know what the official understandings were at the high level between the

government of Sudan and who clearly did not want us there, but compromised to

allow the AU to come in instead of the UN.

There were more than the challenges related to sovereignty from the host nation.

Each member state of the AU had its own sovereignty issue:

Most countries are unwilling to subjugate their military force to someone else's

command, and until nation states in general are willing to do that-- the

Nigerian's were just like the US (laughs) in the sense that the US's role in

peacekeeping missions is primarily as observers, and they're unwilling to put

their troops under anyone else's command. So the Nigerian government, as the

hegemonic power, considers itself the hegemonic power on the continent, was

also not willing to so easily have its troops under.

The sovereignty right of each nation in Africa could be an impediment and

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I don't know what the official understandings were at the high level between the government of Sudan and who clearly did not want us there, but compromised to allow the AU to come in instead of the UN.

The participants of the study also noted that progress with the establishment and sustainability of AMIS was often hampered by the Government of Sudan impeding the

movement of peacekeepers and equipment. The local government also impeded the movement of the peacekeepers and denied access to certain areas.

I say there was a challenge was dealing with the Sudanese government. The Sudanese government, they're very good at getting to "yes" diplomatically and never getting to "yes" administratively. So they will say yes, yes, yes at the diplomatic negotiation. Sure you can bring in all the people you want. We're going to be happy to help you, and then when those people start to arrive...oh. They haven't had this immunization. They haven't had this--uh we didn't tell you had to have these documents. Oh, no, no you can't bring those weapons in, you have to have this form filled out, so the administration burden of dealing with the Sudanese.

Because the resources for the base camps, supplies for the troops on the ground, supplies for the victims of the genocide on the ground were delayed by Sudan. Holding up personnel in the airport, detaining them for a time or confining them to the airport, were tactics of intimidation and threat to the foreign personnel.

The fact that the local governmental structures in the Darfur region also provided an impediment to the progress of the mission and its mobility in the region. These were things again where you had a non-cooperative--they would probably say that they were cooperative given the fact that you were in their country, but they at every turn, the Sudanese government, both the national and

the local government, time and time again put impediments in the way. The point with the local government by restricting access to certain key areas with their local militia on the ground.

There was a perception that the Government of Sudan, through bombing placed the local population at risk as well as the peacekeepers of AMIS.  The peacekeepers were also impaired by the Sudanese military and the militia that was sponsored by the Government of Sudan:

> With the national government, by continuing to bomb in key areas of the Darfur region, which not only put the lives of Darfurians in danger, but also put the lives of the peacekeepers who were there to observe them, as well as the non-governmental organizations who were providing humanitarian support to them.

> So the bureaucratic structures of the Sudanese government were a major impediment to things as well as their use of military forces, as well as their use of the local militia.

> …the problem was getting the resources to them through the host country. No change in structure could have changed that. So unless the Sudanese government was willing to be more cooperative it wouldn't have mattered much on the ground the ability of them to affect.

The AU had a reluctance to push Sudan too far and didn't possess the leverage or political process it needed to force Sudan to accept the demands of the AU and AMIS.

I think one of the problems was that the African Union had very little leverage on Sudan itself other than supportive sanctions. I think part of that maybe was the political culture. Again, they're just moving from non-difference to non-interference, and so there was some reluctance to push Sudan too hard.

I think one of the observations was that Darfur was part of a complicated subset of an even greater complex set of issues. What was Winston Churchill's' "Every riddle in an enigma" or something like that. But um, you know one of the observations of Mr. Wan, who was then head of the peace and security department of the African Union and now is the Secretary General for Peacekeeping at the UN, was that at the same time that the AU and international partners were working on Darfur there had to be implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement and there were a lot of north/south issues that hadn't been resolved, and I think we see that now with the situation in Sudan arguably has degraded, right?

Not only do you have the concern about Darfur, but then you still have tension

between north and south and indeed within the South Sudan itself, it's sort of imploding. I think in hindsight there were a lot of things uh in 2004 that were much more complicated that weren't being addressed. I think one point of it probably is peacekeeping is necessary, but not sufficient, right, to address conflict. You need to have a political process?

The participants of the study also noted that progress with the establishment and sustainability of AMIS was often hampered by the Government of Sudan impeding the movement of peacekeepers and equipment. The local government also impeded the movement of the peacekeepers and denied access to certain areas.

I say there was a challenge was dealing with the Sudanese government. The Sudanese government, they're very good at getting to "yes" diplomatically and never getting to "yes" administratively. So, they will say yes, yes, yes at the diplomatic negotiation. Sure, you can bring in all the people you want. We're going to be happy to help you, and then when those people start to arrive...oh. They haven't had this immunization. They haven't had this--uh we didn't tell you had to have these documents. Oh, no, no you can't bring those weapons in, you have to have this form filled out, so the administration burden of dealing with the Sudanese.

Because the resources for the base camps, supplies for the troops on the ground, supplies for the victims of the genocide on the ground were delayed by Sudan.

Holding up personnel in the airport, detaining them for a time or confining them to the airport, were tactics of intimidation and threat to the foreign personnel.

The fact that the local governmental structures in the Darfur region also provided an impediment to the progress of the mission and its mobility in the region. These were things again where you had a non-cooperative--they would probably say that they were cooperative given the fact that you were in their country, but they at every turn, the Sudanese government, both the national and the local government, time and time again put impediments in the way. The point with the local government by restricting access to certain key areas with their local militia on the ground.

There was a perception that the Government of Sudan, through bombing placed the local population at risk as well as the peacekeepers of AMIS.  The peacekeepers were also impaired by the Sudanese military and the militia that was sponsored by the Government of Sudan:

So, the bureaucratic structures of the Sudanese government were a major impediment to things as well as their use of military forces, as well as their use of the local militia.

…the problem was getting the resources to them through the host country. No change in structure could have changed that. So unless the Sudanese government

was willing to be more cooperative it wouldn't have mattered much on the

ground the ability of them to affect.


### *The staffing shortage and size of the AU's organizational structure as well as member state participation level:*

There was the view that the structure of the AU and being inclusive of all

member states was both a "gift and a curse" for the AU due to the broadness of its

structure, much like the issues related to the UN. For example, one participant

commented:


…the structure has to be so broad in order to allow countries to participate. If

you start to refine it even further, then many of those countries would be

unwilling to participate. So, the structure has to have flexibility, and like the UN

that flexibility is both a gift and a curse (laughs) at the same time. Because if

you started to say that every country had to provide this number of troops, then

countries would be giving up their sovereign authority.


The AU had a strong diplomatic engagement within and outside of Africa. The

ability of the AU to engage diplomatically was seen as the avenue for the AU to

expedite the development of AMIS:


The AU's diplomatic engagement with both Africa--within the structure of the

AU was critical to facilitate, the bringing together of the mission, as well as their

diplomatic engagement with non-African countries, to expedite things.

Diplomatic engagement was important…I didn't want to reorganize the AU - I just wanted to have input so the US was not excluded.  Input into their thinking. I wanted a dialogue.  Have to talk to people if you are going to influence them.

The AU was challenged by its organization personnel staffing and the relatively small size of the organization.   The lack of a sizable personnel force with the AU appeared to be a challenge to the participants.  The personnel configuration of the Peace and Security Commission was specially mentioned as being "undermanned":

…one challenge would be the size of the personnel in the peace and security commission. It's a very small office. Roughly maybe a total of anywhere between 5 and 8 personnel total.

The AU Peace and Security Council, and particularly the "permanent party" secretariat who were there to support the PSC fulltime, were woefully undermanned.

I don't think for organizations of that type the staffing is appropriate because there were 53 countries just like UN.

Although there were some talented individuals within the AU, the overall lack of support staffing to handle "everything" was seen as a challenge to the AU in executing its everyday mission set as well as AMIS. The level of expertise was mentioned as lacking by study participants, along with a shortage of personnel.

(Long pause) yeah, I mean everything just seems very ad hoc. That's the overall impression I had always. Some are very ambitious and well-meaning people and some very talented people…but not enough people and not enough background, and not enough structure, not enough resources, and not enough support staff was a challenge. So, there is only so much a few talented people can do and really that created an extreme reliance on developed countries for everything.

At one point, there was this commodore, this Ethiopian commodore, and later an officer from, Madagascar, as the head of AMIS but again very thinly staffed.

The biggest challenges as an organizational structure again, not sufficient number of personnel to handle everything. Personnel who were permanent enough without the expertise that they needed at the time

The general consensus of the participants was there was a lack of personnel to staff the organization, to include the Peace and Security Commission. The "thin staff" and the "lack" of personnel was a challenge that the participants offered in their responses about the organizational challenges faced by the AU:

…a small organization having to handle things that they were not yet prepared to do.

…because not just in the peace and security part of the organization, but throughout the larger structure, their personnel staffing is very small. That has provided real challenges to the level of efficiency that an organization, which has such great heart and political will to operate, has been challenged by.

…very thinly staffed they had very thin then administrative base as well, you know maybe one secretary and one runner here or there. They were usually local Ethiopians doing those jobs and you know we we're being in a meeting with somebody who was supposed to be kind of starting to plan out this, you know, deployment you know, African forces to Darfur and at the same hand had to leave to actually go make a photo copy and to book his own tickets and all these types of things, basically just extremely thinly stretched.

Telephones didn't necessarily work you know just very bare basics and didn't really have any type of like a crisis management structure per say, like if you would think of a task force; it didn't really exist.

…again, at the time, I mean if you look at the other thing is the lack in the overarching structure of the African Union.

It's just--with the new organization that's just-- I keep repeating myself--that's you know, thinly staffed, extremely thinly staffed has you know, of course a huge deal of political baggage that they have to deal with.

The AU lacked personnel…

### *The AU guidance and level of skilled personnel:*

In addition to a personnel shortage in the organization, the AU personnel had insufficient guidance and lacked skilled personnel to understand the scope of the organization. The AU did not always have the expertise in knowledge and experienced personnel to launch such missions as AMIS and depended heavily on international partners for the technical aspects of developing plans and documents needed to for deploying forces into AMIS, as noted by several of the study participants:

...not just personnel, but personnel who are equipped with the skills to understand the rest of the world's processes…

Another weakness was the organization's not having sufficient personnel to manage on daily basis and to understand the scope of the mission.

The personnel at the AU didn't always possess the necessary skill set to complete the tasks required for deploying a force into Darfur. The international

partners were key in assisting the AU with the documentation and plans. I saw where the US personnel would start out assisting the Africans at the AU with such plans and then one-by-one the AU personnel would melt away and the plan was completed by the US and international partners.

I think AMIS was just starting and the AU didn't have a blue print or the organizational structure for what the AU was trying to do.

The Africans just didn't have the organizational structure to handle the issues of deploying a force.

The Africans assigned to the AU were in a sense African bureaucrats and not people with specialized knowledge and all of a sudden, they had to come up with things and they didn't know how to which is why it was important to have the US there as advisors. They were smart and no issue with intelligence, they just lacked experience.

The African union depends solely on international support both in day-to-day operation and special programs and in running any type of peace support operations.

It was the quality of the personnel not the lack of organization that some participants found important with the structure of the AU:

…it's more the quality of the people they had and whether those people most important how they accomplish their tasks or that they accomplish rather than looking at their lack of organization.  I saw in important to improve the implementation of the idea rather than the organization.

The number of skilled personnel at the AU was another challenge to the organization of the AU.  The personnel and staff of the AU were seen as learning on the job as opposed to possessing the requisite skill set required for the AU.  There was a perception that there was a lack of technical expertise for managing the AU itself:

So, really kind of learning and making--I wouldn't say making it up while they went a long, but really relying a lot on outside expertise as they went along.

With regards to the AU itself, completely lacked the required personnel and technical expertise, facility, and material to manage the deployment mission called AMIS.  Small number of people without expertise, logistical, financial to manage AMIS and everything else, God bless them.

Personnel lacked technical expertise –task responsible and didn't possess logistical facility/equipment and facility with mission.

Ops/Sit Center could not perform to its title mission…no material with IT, Audio-visual facility.

The skill set for the operational needs of AMIS was seen as missing in the AU. The participants believed that the AU member states did not provide the experienced planners to the AU:

…was always realistic about the limited planning capability he had on his staff, and always asked for help there. I remember a Malagasy Navy Captain (don't recall his name) who was the Commission's main military deputy, but the guy had very little experience or capability to plan a military operation on the scale of AMIS.

The charter for the Peace and Security Commission detailed that certain AU member nations were supposed to provide military staff officers, planners, etc for any crisis. But those guys were few and far between; and those who showed up had little planning experience.

Planners and staff officers who did arrive at the AU were working outside of their fields of expertise. The personnel of the AU had had a difficult task to learn their jobs at the headquarters, let alone meet the challenges running a peacekeeping mission in Darfur.

Because I mean of course because a lot of these guys were not operating outside of their own field. They didn't know their jobs, so they had to learn their jobs

while they were setting up this mission. They had to learn their jobs while they were trying to do their jobs.

The staff at the headquarters in AMIS--none of these guys had done this before, you know? So, they were incredibly challenged to learn a task while they were doing it and the additional challenge is you are in Darfur and there's just nothing out there…

Well, it was definitely lacking in institutional capacity and experience. I again, AMIS was one of the first, if not the first AU peace operation and so having experienced cadre of people on reporting, mandating.

Respondents suggested that there might be a skill difference among different individual member militaries supporting AMIS. The skill levels of one nation might have been high or low, depending on the emphasis of the leadership:

That kind of tasking that the Rwandan army when those guys came to AMIS came from a speech made to them by their president. They were tactically incredibly proficient and they were aggressive on the ground in terms of stopping fighting, breaking up rebel groups from attacking civilians, keeping them protected. They were very, very aggressive in this action because their president had done that. As for the Ghanaians, I don't know what the head of the Ghanaian Army or the President of Ghana said to the AMIS chief of staff, a

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colonel, when he came out. I don't know what the marching orders from their {Ghana} president.

Even if the AU had had enough personnel they would have lacked the technical expertise.

…context of many donors seeking an ear so capacity problem was adversely effected by so many donors telling to so few AU ears

AU could give but inadequate because AU lacked the personnel who could do it.

The skill levels of some members of the AU were seen from the standpoint of a lack of currency in procedures. A participant offered that the staff was often not current in the tasks that were needed:

And so, you had, Commodore Mesfin, doing budget and finance um, and he was an individual from a different era, right? I mean he was--if I recall he was a commodore because he was an Ethiopian Navy Officer (laughs), right? When Ethiopia, actually wasn't carved into several countries--you know before it became land locked became.

Even if the AU had the skilled personnel and a strong knowledge base, there was a deficiency in organizational infrastructure and standard operating procedures

(SOP). The lack of a standard method to accomplish mission and tasks led to problems in the view of study participants:

> But the African Union itself was so new to this that there wasn't a sufficient level of; there weren't SOPs. There wasn't sort of muscle memory, oh yeah we have done this a thousand times…we know how this works. There weren't competent administrators, they didn't exist, and there were no rules.

> It wasn't, not even UN standards, they didn't…sort of at the operational level again nobody in Addis answered the phone after 5:00, if you get a hold of the Ambassador who was the political leader of the African mission, African Union mission in Sudan. If you could get a hold of him, it was usually on a cellphone.

> The AU was so new to this that there wasn't a sufficient level of experience and there weren't SOPs. There wasn't sort of muscle memory.

People were creating rules as they went along for you know, the issuance of the ID (Identification badge) and the issuance of the medal for the people who participated in the mission. The issuance of equipment. Some units showed up with more equipment than others. Units couldn't you know, weren't told what to bring really--a just come as you sort of are or think best. So, the muscle memory, the experience, the level of admiration competent, rules, all those things. They were a struggle

### *The challenge of resources and training:*

Coupled with the personnel shortage, there were factors that led the organization personnel to not have the will to address the threat posed in AMIS.  The diverse mission set of the AU was mentioned by some of the participants as a diversion for the AU's limited resources:

> Any number of factors to cause their will to address the threat less than adequate

> So, the primary mission of this organization was supposed to be political and economic development. Yes, security is a component. Unfortunately, security has taken up much too much of its attention, so maybe we would better to say that the AU could advert some of this if its resources were allowed to be diverted in other places, the political and economic development and social development of the continent.

> AU could give but inadequate because AU lacked the personnel who could do it.

The lack of training was also a challenge brought forth by the participants.   The lack of training was seen as a challenge for ability of the AU to execute a peacekeeping mission:

> Not having personnel trained to effectively given the mission and any number of factors to cause their will to threat less than adequate.

…not having personnel trained to effectively given the mission.

…there was no unified training.

I don't think they, correct me if I'm wrong, did they get any sort of training before they deployed?

…so the contingent some--the degrees of professionalism in training is another factor when you look at the sectors that they were set to and who did what.

The AU and the Peace and Security Commission lacked sufficient personnel as well as financial resources. The payment of dues by the member states were lacking or subsidized. The AU was viewed as having over-dependence on donor countries external to Africa:

The resources of the AU peace and security are dependent upon donor countries' contributions. Even donor countries within the AU as well as observer countries to the AU, so that presents a challenge. However, that's the same challenge that the UN faces on a regular basis. You're only as strong as an organization as the dues that are paid.

…the areas where it could be more efficient would, if resources permitted, broadened the number of the personnel in its peace and security operation.

If resources permit to provide more of a, how can I say this, standing area or

retain equipment that could be used--it's in its infancy in doing that and trying to

do it, but like most big organizations, resources.


Libya was seen as breaking the membership rules for annual contributions by

subsidizing economically those nations that could not afford the dues levied by the AU.

The participants saw the nations that paid dues to the organization as having "undue

influence" beyond their normal membership over those who did not pay their fair share

of the membership dues to the AU.  The lack of resources was also seen as not allowing

the AU to possess autonomy from the international community. This was noted by

several study participants:


Of the 53 countries at the time, each country is assessed a particular amount of

dues. There was only one country that bent the rules on that and that was Libya

by subsidizing, not through the proper channels, but subsidize the payment of

dues of many of the smaller countries that could not really afford to pay their

dues and would have been in arrears.


So that's internal challenge that I think their biggest concern about other

countries paying dues is having undue influence in the organization. There was

another concern about outside countries providing certain amount of revenue

over, I would say, would be a standardized amount because then again countries

could have an undue influence over other countries and leverage the organization in.

So, it's not quite a catch-22 situation but if the AU is to have the autonomy it wants to have then it has to be very careful, which I think it has been in saying what kind of resources can be.

The general resources to organize and run the AU were perceived to be lacking. Participants viewed the AU as not being able to fund its internal work. The newness of the organization and the reliance on outside funding were seen as a challenge to the AU's operation, by participants:

There is a limit to it seems to budget you know, that's another issue. Not having any money for even things internally, you know, like getting taxis and things like that…

There is a limit to it seems to budget you know, that's another issue.

Not having any money for even things internally, you know, like getting taxis and things like that. I mean just all around lacking really. I don't think that they could have done necessarily, could have done too much more given the way they were. It's almost like saying if you had a developed organization what could have done better, challenges.

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Resources related to funding of AMIS in Darfur created a challenge for the AU. A challenge to the resources of the AU were those countries that did have the resources to support but would not contribute the missions of the AU:

Darfur had major organizational issues related to funding.

…the biggest challenge that the AU has is you have these countries who can contribute, but they don't.

However, not every participant believed that the resource shortage experienced by the AU was a particular issue related to Africa alone.

But I want to also say that the EU doesn't have this capability either at this time--to handle that with more resources and fewer countries.

…the problem for the AU was getting the resources to AMIS through the host country

…that until they have the revenue, you can change the structures all you want, until they have the capital to support it it's going to continue to meet and have.

*Donor-nation resources:*

There was an organizational challenge processing the resources the AU

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received. There were occasions that the AU was placed in a position of having to return donor financial contributions due the challenge of getting sufficient personnel for AMIS, according to study participants:

…their ability to even process the resources they get is challenging.

And until they can plus up to the numbers that they need, their ability to even process the resources they get is challenging. Much to my surprise, the AU has had to return money back to donor countries because they couldn't--their personnel is not sufficient to handle all of the different nation states' requirements.

There was also a challenge with the AU, according to the participants, that dealt with the insufficient knowledge possessed within the AU to understand and adhere to the standards demanded by donor nations to receive resources. The lack of skilled personnel at the AU was an example of how the AU was deficient in having trained personnel to handle the intricate requirements set by donor nations. For example:

And so, unfortunately not just with AMIS mission, but with other non-peace keeping missions…election monitors and all, the AU has resources they can't effectively spend because they lack, not just personnel, but personnel who are equipped with the skills to understand the rest of the world's processes and how to do them in order to meet their standards in order to get money. That alone,

even without returning money, they couldn't access money because they didn't

have enough personnel to give the kind of accountability to process to get the

money coming in.

I noticed bureaucratic layered needed knowledgeable senior personnel even

though has the power to make decisions from US perspective were in

organization structure.

A major challenge was the extremely centralized procedures for donor nations to

access Peace and Security Council members/officers leading to tremendous

difficulty in country's desire to help access.

### *Personalities and leadership related to organization:*

There was a perception that the head of the Peace and Security Commission,

Ambassador Djinnit, did recognize that there were limits to his staff having the planning

capability to run AMIS.  However, Djinnit was viewed as being an optimistic individual

toward the mission. One research participant noted:

I met several times with Said Djinnit, Commissioner of the Peace and Security

Commission, who was an impressive guy on his own.  He tended towards

optimism, but was always realistic about the limited planning capability he had

on his staff, and always asked for help there.

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## *Standard Operating Procedures (SOP):*

In particular, the Peace and Security Commission, according to a participant, lacked SOP's. The lack of a standard procedure to handle the various tasks led to a sense of "discovery" for the Peace and Security Commission personnel:

> The Peace and Security Commission lacked Standard Operating Procedures for handling tasks and functions—every minor task became a "new discovery."

> Yeah, the AU itself in the same time that the United Nations before DPKO {Department of Peacekeeping Operations} was stood up was, you know, relied on a series of ad hoc structures, and you know I got the sense that the AU commission also at that time was that way.

The AU's lack of a physical infrastructure for monitoring AMIS was seen as a challenge, as was communication between the AU and AMIS. A challenge perceived by the participants was the lack of a dedicated infrastructure to handle and support a peace operation. Several noted:

> I remember once visiting the nascent operations center of the African Union and looking you know, forward to seeing sort of the big screens and maybe a live speed from Al-Fashir or something like that, and they were watching the World Cup, so, yeah. They had a lot of challenges.

Yeah, so it just, it hadn't kept up with the times. But, no, it didn't have dedicated

communications with AMIS.  I think what was lacking was a dedicated

infrastructure to support peace operations.

You know the Alert Center, but again that was not functioning, you know it was

rudimentary at best. So, they just lacked general communication infrastructure.

### *Organizational Communication:*

The lack of an organized method of communicating was also viewed by

interview subjects as a challenge to the AU in executing AMIS.  The lack of both

equipment and strong communication between the force commander of AMIS and the

AU headquarters was perceived as a challenge. Several commented:

And I'm not sure how they actually physically--I do know that they transmitted

written reports I think on a weekly and daily basis, but, that is not necessarily

the most efficient.

I mean that should be one communication mechanism, but a commander should

be participating probably in daily calls with the AU and I don't know whether

that happened or not.

…doesn't have the right kind of equipment or any kind of modern

communication system.

…one of the things to my knowledge and this is where the United States I think was trying to enhance is that from a military standpoint I don't think they had the communications infrastructure, i.e., either HF (High Frequency) or FM (Frequency Modulation), you know the physical communication capability, you know where the field commander could communicate directly.

### *The Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF):*

Respondents had a view that the AU had taken some positive steps as it progressed with AMIS and established the Darfur Integrated Task Force at the AU headquarters. The establishment of the DITF allowed for interaction between the Africans and the international partners. Another positive for the establishment of the DITF was that the African were beginning to feel a sense of having to "do it themselves."

AU positive step in 2005 to establish a sub-organization to handle the AMIS from the AU headquarters called "DITF" and yet problems didn't go away in organization for the mission. There was the organization and technical expertise to interpret the taxonomy each of the pieces of AMIS, policies and number of personnel and training and education of personnel within the organization. Facility –ops center lacked the material and equipment needed to be there greater that DITF was an improvement.

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So, you saw these lessons learned by the African's themselves, they learned that if we are going to improve, then we have to do it ourselves and we have to enable. So, at that time frame I don't think the mindset--you know even though they probably could have done it better, the political institution itself was the impediment.

I mean the Darfur Intergraded Taskforce got expanded, you know as more players came in. So, the UN joined at one point and we had visits from NATO folks and stuff like that too.

…one of the mechanisms was this AU DTIF (Darfur Integrated Task Force) and there was Partner's Technical Support Group that comprised a lot of the EU representatives, NATO, UN and the United States was part of that.

Although the Darfur Integrated Task Force was technically a part of the AU headquarters, there was a perception that the physical distance between the Task Force and the AU headquarters created a challenge to organization for running AMIS:

The establishment of the Darfur Integrated Task Force at a location outside the confines of the AU headquarters caused a challenge for the two organizations in staying current.

The physical separation of the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), the planning cell for AMIS, from the AU headquarters was seen as a challenge for running an effective peacekeeping mission:

> I recall that the DITF was physically separated from the rest of the AU compound, so, obviously, that that was a problem

### *Decision Making:*

The AU made many of its decisions at AU summits. However, some of the participants pointed out that the summits lacked focus and therefore not all the summits were able to accomplish what was on the agenda.  The summit members tended to made speeches rather than accomplishing the tasks:

> …when it came to interfacing the member states, (sigh) it seemed of times at the summit, the summits where they make or take decisions on a 1,001 topics, they weren't very focused and they could have been better at agenda setting maybe in part of the African Union itself because they just ran out of time basically in interest or maybe in pre-briefing, and I don't know what could have been done, you know to kind of prepare the representatives of the various member states to be serious when they actually came to the summits. There was a lot of speechifying, a lot of, you know not decisions in a way--declarations, I mean that's you know, not uncommon for you know, kind of political organizations to begin with, but yeah that happened a lot.

The decision making of the AU was often after consultation with the international partners as well as the summits.  Since the AU lacked a strong structure, history and a staff that was skilled, the AU organization often relied on the international partners who had a lot of access, according to a participant:

…I mean I can't recall there being a very--I mean obviously being from the outside, we were not necessarily privy to everything to happened internally. We weren't at every single internal meeting, although I would say that probably the partners had a lot more access and were a much greater part of the decision making and agenda setting that would be the normal, but you know they had no other choice….(pause) they were suffering from a lack of structure and a lack of, you know, history and skill and staff, and everything else, so I didn't sense that there was a very concrete set of tasks or commands that they were ordered to carry out necessarily

### *Logistics related organization:*

Logistics and the lack of equipment were mentioned as major organizational challenges that the AU faced in exciting AMIS.  The US was instrumental in establishing logistics for AMIS, particularly with the development of the base camps in Darfur.

I mean the biggest thing, and this comes to as no surprise, is the logistics. I mean

that is the largest limiting factor to their operation. Because in order to be

operationally effective you basically need to have strong logistics in the United

States that wind up through the African program.

You know, they had to build their base camps they had to provide the

overarching logistics. They didn't have armored vehicles, so from, you know,

organization from a military standpoint I don't think there was too much of a

problem, but the biggest limitation was just logistics and sustainability and that's

where or why they weren't effective, which was because of that.

The opinion of one participant was that AMIS was not able to accomplish its

mission to react quickly in Darfur.  The AMIS Chief of Staff lamented that the

organization in Darfur did have the capacity to feed and house the troops.  However, a

participant perceived that Nigeria did in fact arrive in Darfur with some basic food and

tents, at least for a couple of days of sustainability in Darfur.

I was told by, I don't remember which it was, either the AMIS chief of staff or

the deputy, we don't have that capacity and we don't have the ability to move

that quickly…because we can't feed people because we don't have the tents and

stuff like that. And I found out somehow that that wasn't accurate. That one of

the Nigerian units had brought tents with it and had brought at least basics, such

as a few days of cooking stuff…

African militaries often are challenged by logistics, according to participants' experience, in comparison with the US.

> ...you have quality peacekeepers and then the logistics component as well. But, again most African militaries are challenged logistically.

> …it's the classic peacekeeping--you have quality peacekeepers and then the logistics component as well...most African militaries are challenged logistically.

> …the hospital in Darfur got its first ambulance in 2004. I watched it being delivered. They were like, "wow, this is great thanks!" They didn't have an ambulance before that.

### *Doctrine:*

Interoperability and knowledge of how to operate in a joint environment was a challenge to the AU and AMIS. The participants had mixed reviews on how the Africans who participated in AMIS performed in peacekeeping and together with different military doctrines:

> I think there could have probably been better coordination between the Nigerians and the Rwandans, but were also bringing, just as a UN mission, two different militaries together. So the challenge of interoperability is there, no

matter whether it's an AU force or a UN force or a Coalition of the willing force in Iraq, so these are just challenges which come with the territory.

…there was no unified training. So, you have each country basically came with their doctrine and with their own perceptions and how did things. The Nigerians also have a history of doing peacekeeping. But, again their performances; some of it was good some of it is not so good.

### *Regional challenges to the AU:*

The view point of each Regional Economic Community may be different based on region.  ECOWAS and SADC were more advanced in terms of organization and experience, observed a participant.  What worked in a region, such as West Africa may not have the same dynamic as the issues related to AMIS in Sudan.

And again, part of it is at that time when you look at the Nigerians--if you look at ECOWAS at that time was the most advanced regional economic community followed by SADC with the East African community and ECOWAS coming in behind. But, again, based on the experiences of ECOWAS primarily dealing with Sierra Leone and Liberia, they felt, okay, well we know how to do this. And the dynamics in West Africa may not have been the same in Darfur. So, you can't necessarily say what is good for West Africa doesn't necessarily work in Sudan.

*__Rules of Engagement (ROE):__*

The participants pointed toward the mandate in addressing the ROE {rules of engagement) as a challenge faced by the AU in executing the AMIS mission effectively.

Standardize as much as possible amongst the countries the rules of engagement and the kind of the training that countries must come to the table with.

The AU should have had a been given a mission commensurate with threat and the equipment commensurate with threat as well as the manning the mission in accordance with the threat provided to them with ROE appropriate with the threat.

There was also an organizational challenge seen in the mission area of Darfur for AMIS, and this challenge was one of infrastructure.  The infrastructure on the ground in Darfur was a challenge to executing AMIS as well as the infrastructure at the AU headquarters, as one participant lamented about the lack of organization to monitor the operations of AMIS from the AU operations center. Research participants noted:

I mean in western Dar province. There were three provinces: North, South, and West. In West Darfur there was no paved road. There was not a mere of paved road in the entire province.

I think they {AMIS} suffered some of the same challenges that any coalition

force would have in infrastructure.

Darfur, I remember very vaguely only that you know, I believe that there is like a command center and then various other kind of posts (long pause).

I remember once visiting the nascent up center of the African Union and looking forward to seeing sort of the big screens and maybe a live speed from Al-Fashir or something like that, and they were watching the World Cup, so, yeah. They had a lot of challenges.

### *Conducting AMIS as an organization:*

There was a challenge for the AU in having a desire to conduct AMIS alone, as an African solution to minimize the western influence and mitigate any western interference, but the AU needed the US and international donor resources.  The AU had an interest in allowing member states the leeway to succeed.

…some of them were wanting to give the member a state a chance to breathe and redeem itself. Others wanted to show that the organization was very capable. Others wanted to make it look good…I got the sense that they had things under control to try and minimize the western you know, impact or footprint. I think they definitely had kind of competing interests in a sort of way.

There was a challenge related to sharing the vision of the AU as opposed to the norms of the culture of the individual sovereign nations. The view of the participants recognized that they were observing the AU and AMIS from the cultural lens of a western perspective.

I don't think there was a broad shared vision. I think each contingent region had their own views on how things should be done.

…I mean I can be this western person saying, well this how they could have done it better, but when you look, they're playing that the hand that they have been dealt.

### *Future Peacekeeping Missions for the AU:*

Respondents saw hope for the AU in the future, based on its experience with AMIS. There were suggestions for future peacekeeping operations run by the AU. The participants viewed the AU and its current mission and organization as having learned lessons from AMIS that they can apply today.

And again, when you fast forward, when you look at AMIS as the first mission the lessons learned and now AMISOM is now touted as the way things should be done…then you look at the morphing into the EASTBRIG or the African Standby Force, and they have actually taken a step further where they are actually building a rapid response force, and in order to be a participant there,

you have to fund yourself. So, I mean the good news is here we are in 2016 and the lessons learned through AMIS, and they're getting better.

I think again, the best way would have been to be a little more selective in the force contribution…

I mean all the things that we take for granted now with the African Union or peacekeeping in general, didn't exist a decade ago.

…for our current project on strength and cooperation to the UN secretary and the AU we are looking at how the UN's human rights due diligence policy can either be adapted or complied with by the African Union itself, and I think certainly 10 years ago there was not an emphasis on that sort of thing. It was trying to get troops to a critical location as quickly as possible

AMIS transitioned to a UN mission in 2007, but with the same force.  There was a belief that just turning the "Green Hats" (AU) to "Blue Hats" (UN) would not address any issues of command and control or discipline of the peacekeeping force.  The issue of simply renaming a mission from the AU to the UN was viewed as not being entirely effective.

…clear lessons learned that simply re-naming AU missions to UN missions creates problems with command and control and discipline.

But definitely, that was a big concern of you know, the UN and we were looking

at trying to blue hat the green hats (laughs). Try to convert the AU and AMIS

into UNAMID.

…having collaboration between the African Union and the United Nations is

more than just financing its support, so you tease those things apart, and for

example on logistical support and human rights so this is really something for

example that's really just come to the attention of policymakers on UN

peacekeeping in the last six months, arguably. And certainly a decade ago we

didn't enough attention to this.  And that I think one of the things that the AU is

working on now is strengthening accountability.

*Summary of Key Sub-Question 1*

Several participants focused on the newness of the organization and that the AU

was not a developed organization.  The design was perceived to have been built on the

model of the UN and the European Union (EU), as a hybrid of those two organizations,

whose purpose for existence was the start of new era of African independence at end of

the period of colonization.  The AU was seen as a 53-membership grouping that was

organized so that Africa, as a continent, could determine its own fate when dealing with

economic and political engagement.   The mission of the AU during AMIS was seen by

the respondents as different from the mission of the OAU in previous years.  Namely,

the OAU was designed to deal with the new-found independence of the former colonial

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states who had won their independence from the European empires. The AU was viewed as dealing with the inter-state and intra-state issues on the continent. The AU made many of its decisions at AU summits. However, some of the respondents pointed out that the summits lacked focus and summit members tended to make speeches rather than accomplishing the tasks.

The challenge of organization facing the AU in executing AMIS encompassed a multitude of issues, as relayed by the respondents of the study. There was an issue of infrastructure both in terms of physical environment in Darfur but also in terms of AU development and organization. The mandate, as far as rules of engagement (ROE) under which the peacekeepers of AMIS were to operate, was seen as lacking and a challenge. The participants perceived that the AU did not understand the extent of the threat its peacekeepers were facing in Darfur.

The structure of the AU was found to be lacking in personnel, being "thin" on personnel and lacking skilled practitioners who had organizational knowledge as well as how to conduct a peacekeeping operation. The organizational depth and under-manning were seen as an organizational challenge that the AU faced in running its internal organization as well as planning for AMIS. The AU was challenged by its personnel staffing and the relatively small size of the organization. The lack of a sizable personnel force within the AU organization appeared to the participants to be a challenge. The personnel configuration of the Peace and Security Commission was especially mentioned as being "undermanned." There was a perception, however, that the head of the Peace and Security Commission, Ambassador Djinnit, did recognize that there were limits to his staff having the planning capability to run AMIS.

The level of expertise was mentioned as lacking, along with a shortage of personnel. Respondents saw the AU personnel as not having insufficient guidance and lacking in skilled personnel to understand the "scope" of AMIS and the organization. The AU didn't always possess the expertise in knowledge and experienced personnel to launch such missions as AMIS. It was the low quality of the personnel not the lack of organization that some participants found important about the structural challenges of the AU. There were occasions that the AU was placed in a position of having to return donor financial contributions due the challenge of getting sufficient personnel for AMIS. There was a challenge with the AU, according to the participants, that dealt with the insufficient knowledge possessed within the AU to understand and adhere to the standards demanded by donor nations to receive resources. The personnel and staff of the AU was seen as learning on the job as opposed to possessing the requisite skill set required for the AU. There was a perception that there was a lack of technical expertise for managing the AU itself. The respondents believed that the AU member states did not provide the experienced planners to the AU. Those planners and staff officers who did arrive at the AU were working outside of their fields of expertise. The personnel that the AU had had a difficult task to learn their jobs at the headquarters let alone meet the challenges running a peacekeeping mission in Darfur, according to the respondents.

Participants suggest that there may be a skill difference among different individual member military organizations supporting AMIS. The skill levels of one nation may be high or low depending on the emphasis of the leadership. There was a cultural aspect noticed in the skill level of the enlisted corps versus the officer corps

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exhibited in African cultures.  One respondent offered that one of the challenges to operating in AMIS was the lack of the African non-commissioned officer corps to get things done in the field.  There was a challenge in the organization related to the lack currency in procedures.  Personnel within the organization lacked the institutional knowledge and experience, according to the participants.

There was also a challenge for the AU in having a desire to conduct AMIS alone, as an African solution, and minimizing the western influence and mitigating any western interference while still needing the US and international donor resources.  The AU had an interest in allowing member states the leeway to succeed.  The AU had strong diplomatic engagement within and outside of Africa.  The ability of the AU to engage diplomatically was seen as the avenue for the AU to expedite the development of AMIS.  The AU depended heavily on international partners for the technical aspects of developing plans and documents needed for deploying forces into AMIS to make up for its own challenges in organization. Since the AU lacked a strong structure, history and a staff that was skilled, the AU organization often relied on the international partners who had a lot of access, according to a respondent.

Although, there were a number of structural challenges facing the AU, there were respondents that felt the AU should be recognized for its invention policy in Africa and specifically Sudan with launching AMIS, and a respondent wanted to ensure that the AU was recognized for the significant political will that was demonstrated by the AU.  Added to the view of the AU's intervention in Sudan was a participant's belief that the AU acted on its own when the EU and the international community had not been willing to intervene in Darfur.   Despite some structural and financial challenges

there was the attitude that the AU had accomplished on its own a mission the Organization of American States and the Arab League had never done as an organization.

Some respondents pointed out the challenges in organization were outweighed in that member states were acting as a coalition under the AU organization. There was the view that the structure of the AU, being inclusive of all member states, was both a "gift and a curse" for the AU due to the broadness and lack of depth of its structure. Not all respondents agreed on the view that the AU should be lauded for launching AMIS or that the AU possessed a challenge with executing AMIS in Sudan due to the Government of Sudan. One participant went as far as indicating the AU's decision to initiate AMIS was not well thought out by the organization. It was pointed out that the Government of Sudan allowed the AU to launch AMIS on its soil as a compromise to not having UN peacekeepers in western Sudan. The respondents noted that progress with the establishment and sustainability of AMIS was often hampered by the Government of Sudan impeding the movement of peacekeepers and equipment. The local government also impeded the movement of the peacekeepers and denied access to certain areas.

Another challenge for the AU was in the view point and interests of each regional economic community in Africa having their own view point, which may be different based on region. ECOWAS and SADC were more advanced in terms of organization and experience. What worked in a region such as West Africa may not have the same dynamic as the issues related to AMIS in Sudan.

Resources were mentioned often as a challenge to the AU and its execution of AMIS. Respondents viewed the AU as not being able to fund its internal organization. The newness of the organization and the reliance on outside funding were seen as a challenge to the AU's operation. The diverse mission set of the AU was mentioned by some of the respondents as a diversion for the AU's limited resources. The AU and the Peace and Security Commission lacked sufficient personnel resources as well as financial. The payment of dues by the member states were lacking or subsidized. The AU was viewed as having over-dependence on donor countries external to Africa. The lack of resources was also seen as a challenge by not allowing the AU to possess autonomy from the international community. The participants saw the nations that paid dues to the organization as having "undue influence" beyond their normal membership over those who did not pay their fair share of the membership dues to the AU. A challenge to the resources of the AU were those member countries that did have the resources but would not contribute the missions of the AU. The AU itself had to depend on the international community as its member states were not financially able to provide the financial resources as or the resources in terms of skilled personnel that were needed for undertaking a peacekeeping operation the size and complexity of AMIS.

Training as individuals as well as collectively was lacking and presented a challenge to the AU and AMIS. The lack of training was seen as a challenge for the ability of the AU to execute a peacekeeping mission. The lack of skilled personnel at the AU was an example of how the AU was deficient in having trained personnel to handle the intricate requirements set by donor nations.

Communications were a challenge of the AU headquarters as the organizational communication was not running efficiently.   The communication between the AU headquarters and the commander of AMIS was lacking, as well as, the AU organizational communication with the US.  The infrastructure on the ground in Darfur was a challenge to executing AMIS as well as the infrastructure at the AU headquarters, as one participant lamented about the lack of organization to monitor the operations of AMIS from the AU operations center.

Logistics and the lack of equipment were mentioned as major organizational challenges that the AU faced in executing AMIS.   The US was instrumental in establishing logistics for AMIS, particularly with the development of the base camps in Darfur.  African militaries often are challenged logistically, according to a participant's experience, in comparison with the US.   The AMIS Chief of Staff lamented that the organization in Darfur did not have the capacity to feed and house the troops.

Interoperability and knowledge how to operate in a joint environment was an organizational challenge for the AU and AMIS.  The respondents had mixed reviews on how the Africans who participated in AMIS performed in peacekeeping and together with different military doctrines.  The physical separation of the DITF, the planning cell for AMIS, from the AU headquarters was seen as a challenge for running an effective peacekeeping mission.  Sovereignty was an issue as well for the peacekeeping forces, as they came from different countries.

 The future of the AU was seen by the respondents as one where the organizational challenges could be overcome through the experience of the AU with AMIS. There was a belief by some of the study participants that the lessons learned by

the AU were used in future operations such as AMISOM and the development of an African Standby Force.   AMIS transitioned to a UN mission in 2007 but with the same force.  There was a belief that just turning the "Green Hats" (AU) to "Blue Hats" (UN) would not address any issues of command and control or discipline of the peacekeeping force. The participants viewed the AU and its current mission and organization as having learned lessons from AMIS that they can apply today.

## Key Sub-Question 2

<u>Leadership</u>:  *What were the leadership challenges for the African Union in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan?*

The AU has faced challenges in leadership that have been illustrated in the scholarly literature and found to be lacking.  The leadership of the AU and the challenges it faced during the time frame that the AU was executing AMIS was examined through the perspective of senior US officials through the series of interviews for this dissertation.  The respondents provided an overview of the leadership of the AU and the leadership challenges:

### *Leadership related to conducting AMIS:*

AMIS was a new role for the AU. The AU, as a nascent organization, was trying to overcome the short-falls in leadership of the former OAU, and there was a desire to hold the leadership of the AU accountable.  The importance was that the AU got the job accomplished as an important aspect of leadership. Respondents noted:

…the AU was taking on a new role and at the same time attempting to hold the leadership of the AU accountable…working on making a sort of report card for the leadership and non-corruption and at the same time taking on this new mission that they hadn't done before.

Tremendously new role for the African states particularly on the peace and security side on the continent that never done peacekeeping like AMIS…

There were participants that did not form an opinion of the leadership style of the AU. There was an expression of how well the job was accomplished as a challenge for the AU.

I don't have any impression of the leadership style of those in AMIS.

I thought it was more important on how they did the job.

### *Leadership understanding the challenge of AMIS:*

A main leadership challenge faced by the AU was not understanding to scope of AMIS.   There was a perception that the leadership challenge often faced in the AU and AMIS was a lack of understanding of the scope of AMIS and the followership ability to act out the leadership desires:

Leading leadership challenges didn't understand the scope of the mission and threat.

Not having personnel trained to effectively complete a given the mission and any number of factors to cause their will to address the threat was less than adequate

Leading leadership challenges didn't understand the scope of the mission and threat.

### *Shortfalls of the organization:*

Although some participants perceived that the AU possessed short falls in the organization that impeded the mission, they also viewed the leadership of the AU as recognizing those shortfalls. There was a perception that this recognition could be viewed as a strength in the leadership of the AU. This lack of structure in the organization was a point that the AU leadership wanted to "remedy."

Strengths: clear that couple of …in all sincerity, leaders did recognize short falls in organization and desired to remedy the same.

…getting better. And they are also realizing that if we want to really be effective, we need to be able to do this on our own.

…in all sincerity, leaders did recognize short falls in organization and desired to remedy the same.

…if increased revenue and resources and more personnel that was what was missing. The heart and everything is there.

### *Vision of a key leader—Ambassador Djinnit:*

Leadership was mentioned as possessing vision. Ambassador Said Djinnit, Commissioner of the Peace and Security Commission, was mentioned as having the vision to be an effective leader.

The AU was developing a shared vision and had been working on the continent before in ways other than security.

I met several times with Said Djinnit, Commissioner of the PSC (Peace and Security Commission), who was an impressive guy on his own.

In addition to possessing vision, some participants saw Djinnit as an impressive leader who was able to push forward some agendas in the AU.

…I thought Said Djinnit was an impressive guy. Articulate, thoughtful, educated, fluent in Arabic, French and English…but pretty much overwhelmed with the task at hand when it came to Darfur, which was only one of several

conflicts the PSC was trying to deal with at the time.  I don't think he had any

military experience, though his diplomatic experience was quite extensive.

Djinnit pushed the concept of the African Standby Force very hard, but the ASF

was just a paper concept at the time and had no real structure or resources on the

ground anywhere.

So, while yes, there were challenges, they were not insurmountable, and it was

that level of the head of the peace and security commission, Ambassador

Djinnit.  Djinnit was the quintessential ambassador.  Djinnit was the

quintessential diplomat, as well as practitioner…his leadership allowed him to

overcome some of the difficult structural impediments that came about. And

they weren't there designed not to have things to work, but like any large

bureaucratic organization those things are put into place as checks and balances.

So, I would say, while the institutional structures sometimes presented

challenges, the leadership of Ambassador Djinnit allowed them to overcome

those in order to deploy the mission as expeditiously as possible.


It was that diplomatic engagement from Djinnit, Ambassador Djinnit, who also

came from Algeria and Algeria Status and that--its role in quote, its one foot or I

would probably say, the Algerian's say one toe in the Middle East (laughs). The

whole foot is solidly in the African continent, but they could push back…that

leadership having the conversation under the AU umbrella with Bashir was the

leverage, and you bring in the Arab League. So I think the success of being able

to get a peacekeeping mission on the ground belongs to the diplomatic expertise

and the gravitas of the AU.

Although Djinnit is described above as a visionary leader and impressive guy, there were a number of dissenting viewpoints of Ambassador Djinnit's role as the leader of the Peace and Security Commission.

Djinnit was the guy who--now he was a piece of work.

And I would say Djinnit might not have been the most effective because he's about Djinnit.

I think he (Djinnit)--again I didn't have much interaction, but from what I saw. I don't see-- it's almost like, okay we've been told we have to do this, so we are going do the bear minimum. I don't see him trying to increase the effectiveness of the institution.

Djinnit--he's the consummate African diplomat. And I had also heard that you know that some of the funding he didn't actually use to the benefit of the forces to because he was patting his own you know, little rice bowl.

There was another view of Ambassador Djinnit in not believing he was aggressive enough and that he did not empower anyone at the AU or AMIS.

Djinnit, like I said before. I don't think - I mean he was more of diplomat. I don't

think that he was very aggressive. I mean he was doing the bare minimum to support the mission, but to try enhance it and improve it, you know. It's like alright. I've got this. I've got to do it. I'm going to do it, but I'm not going to go out of my way to make it--you know to be a champion if you will

I don't think Djinnit empowered anyone else to complete the mission of AMIS.

The commissioner of the AU Peace and Security Commission (Ambassador Djinnit) exhibited a style of leadership that offered him a level of respect with the leaders of the member states within reach region. Djinnit demonstrated a sense of listening that was a skill that he was seen as possessing.

Then by region going to region to region to see where the final decision would be made. And this is where I would say Ambassador Djinnit was very skilled at doing this, and had the respect because you don't get anywhere in that organization, and I will say in life in particular, but really in this organization if you hadn't had the respect.

Even though many might had disagreed with him (Djinnit), they respected him and his ability to listen.

President Konaré and Ambassador Djinnit were mentioned as having "vision" in their leadership style.   However, there was the view that the AU leadership did not provide a broad shared vision for the AU.

I don't think there was a broad shared vision.

### *Leadership of the chairperson the AU Commission—President Konaré:*

President Kanaré was mentioned as having a strong leadership role based on his positive relationship with the Heads of State and not being a deposed leader but a successful leader in Mali.  His Muslim roots were seen as positive and influential with the Muslim populations and predominately Muslim countries that were member states of the AU.  His academic background was also viewed as a positive.  His successor, according to a participant, could be another successful Head of State, such as one from Botswana.

…Alpha Konaré's [who was the Chairperson of the AU] relationship with the heads of state. There were times when it was a huge plus, but there were some times where they had to gently remind him he was no longer a president, so I think it was at that point--I think he was the right person to start the organization because you needed the gravitas of a head of state, and a head of state who had not been over-thrown.

A head of state who had been duly elected and I thought it was very interesting,

and I don't know if this was a factor in their decision-making process, but the fact that he was a Muslim who headed a large Muslim population when the continent also has one of the largest Muslim populations in the world. So, I don't know if that was calculated, but there were other former heads of state, so I think he's an academic scholar so that comes in as another component. So he was the total package at the time, and I fundamentally believe the right person to lift, but I also think it was also prudent to have led this into the foreign minister as someone who would defer to the heads of state and then when you looked at some- I think the one who would come to mind if you were going to have a successor as a former president would have been the former president of Botswana--I can see his face. His name just went right out of my head, he's the third president of Botswana (laughs) that much I still remember, but he would have been the one who would have stepped in.

There was the participant who believed that although Konaré should be applauded for his vision of creating a rapid force, it might be better to start looking at the leadership of the AU from a more business-oriented perspective, such as a CEO.

So while I applaud President Konaré for the concept, the fact to have a permanently positioned set of forces was, I would have to say, not realistic and not do-able, which might explain the shift from a former president holding to that position to moving it to more a CEO-type like the foreign minister from Gabon, you know minister Ping, was the next individual to take that position,

and then the foreign minister of South Africa. Zuma, was the next individual to take that position.

The chairperson of the African Union and that person at the time was quite idealistic, had a lot of vision, a lot of grand speeches and things like that…then there were kind of (long pause), I can't remember what the exact title was it was the peace and security director maybe?

### *Bureaucracy challenge:*

Bureaucracy of the AU caused delays for the Peace and Security Commission to make decisions on AMIS. Even minor decisions needed to be referred to the senior leadership of the Executive Council of the AU that caused delays in action.

Complicated decision-making bureaucracy was a leadership issue and difficult to overcome within the AU as well.

My impression from Djinnit and his deputy was that even some of the most routine decisions had to be referred from the PSC up to the Executive Council for decisions, which resulted in lengthy delays,

### *Combining foreign military challenges:*

There was also a perception that the leadership challenges in Darfur were the same challenges of that at the AU headquarters. The melding of foreign military is a challenge faced by many nations. Study participants noted:

I would say, for the leadership in Darfur the same challenges that AU leadership

and any peace keeping mission whether it's a coalition of the willing, whether

it's the UN, the challenges you have troops from different countries.


### Leadership knowledge:

The AU as an institution was growing at the same time that AMIS was being

executed through the AU headquarters. The experience and knowledge of the

leadership was mentioned as well as the need to understand the mission.


I do remember Mosamaka, who was I think number two at the AU during

AMIS…from Rwanda. He possessed institutional knowledge of what a genocide

was.


The Rwandans were viewed as posing the will to act and fight in Darfur given their

history of genocide and the failed UN peacekeeping mission during the Rwandan

genocide.


Yeah, I mean so was Nigeria and Rwanda as well. But, again the Rwandans, you

know, they felt the pain of a failed UN mission and so they understand what it is

to you know--if peacekeepers don't do their job.


…then not only that my understanding was that Kagami (President of Rwanda)

basically briefed his contingence before they deployed. He basically told them,

"Look guys, you guys are being sent on a mission the reputation of our country

is important." Not only that, but Kagami used it as a way to change the

perception of the RDF (Rwandan Defense Force) because they had been on the

defense force under this because of their engagement in Democratic Republican

of Congo the world had a very negative perception of the RPA (Rwandan

Patriotic Army) and then the RDF (Rwandan Defense Force). But, because of

their performance in Darfur, starting with AMIS, that has changed.

They're in Central African Republic and the Rwandans have really done well,

and part of it is because they would fight to change their way. They would fight

whom ever, it didn't who. You know, they're not going to take sides. You know,

their job is to protect the innocence as you will and they took their mandate very

seriously.


### *Challenges of language:*

The lack of training and the multi-national complexion of the nations in the area

of languages was perceived as not being unique for the AU and AMIS.  Due to the

differences in national languages of the 53 member states of the AU, a participant felt

there was a language barrier "across the board" in AMIS.


 …you had language barriers across the board, so AMIS is not unique. This is

textbook case in the sense that any time you bring a coalition of the willing

together of nations with different language, different training structures.

### Training challenge:

There was also a perception that the lack of training over extended periods of time was a challenging factor for AMIS and the AMIS chain of command.

> If there's not the opportunity to train together for an extended period of time before you deploy, then you are going to have challenges with chain of command.

### Government of Sudan:

Some of the challenges related to leadership for the AU and AMIS were due to the host nation of Sudan. This was exhibited in the challenges of organization for AMIS and the AU.

> You're going to have leadership challenges with ability to execute and also if you are like AMIS and you are in a hostile environment where the host nation state doesn't want you there.

### Resource challenge:

The lack of resources was also listed as a leadership challenge. The bulk of the resources for AMIS was perceived as coming from the US and the EU, both international partners of the AU but not the member states themselves.

> No matter how great the structure you're going to have leadership challenges.

Now, if AMIS had had a great abundance of resources, I think those resources

were supplemented to a large extent by the US and some of the EU countries.

…try and do what they could with our limited resources.

### *Personnel challenge:*

One of the participants viewed the leadership of the AU as recognizing that the

AU possessed a personnel shortage—seeing the leadership's recognition of the shortage

as a strength.

Strengths…clear that couple of …in all sincerity, leaders did recognize short

falls in organization and desired to remedy the same.

### *Cultural challenge:*

There was a cultural challenge that the participants perceived with the AU and

AMIS, both facing a leadership chain of command challenge in the way that each nation

designed their leadership structure.  The UN standards were not observed for AMIS and

getting in touch with the AMIS leadership was a challenge after 5 p.m. except on a

cellphone.

It wasn't, not even UN standards, they didn't. follow… sort of at the operational

level again nobody in Addis (AU Headquarters) answered the phone after

5:00…if you could get the political leader of the African mission, African Union Mission in Sudan. If you could get a hold of him, it was usually on a cellphone.

There was a cultural challenge in that the absence of enlisted leadership existed in most of the African military. The leadership aspects of the African nations involved with AMIS often exhibited a lack of junior leaders in the form of a non-commissioned officer corps.

There were no non-commissioned officers in the J6 office. So, that work wasn't going to be done. One of the Westerns went in and plugged everything up. So, that sort of cultural thing was a real hold back, and these guys, I think they were Nigerians…they were Anglophones from--they may have been Gambians, but I think they were Nigerians. So this absence of a strong non-commissioned officer core and tradition is an enormous problem or was an enormous problem I don't know maybe it's been solved in the years since I've been there…that lack of respect for the competence of the enlisted soldiers.

…one of the real challenges is the absence of the strong non-commissioned officer core in many of these African armies…the Nigerians had a pretty good, pretty strong traditional NCO corps, the South Africans did, but it started to fall off really quickly after that…in some of these armies there's still the idea exists that officers don't do physical work, right?

…the J6 communication shop…the guys who technically knew how to set up the satellite gear and how to make the computers work were officers. They had college degrees and they had been educated, but you could not get them to walk outside, put their hands on the antenna and plug things in because that wasn't what officers did. And then there was no non-commissioned officer who you could say, "Hey sergeant do this." so the work just wasn't going to be done because the privates didn't know how to do it, the sergeants did not know how to do it, only the officers knew how.

### *Skill level challenge:*

The leaders of AMIS in Darfur were seen as possessing both leadership skills and diplomatic skills in order to accomplish the mission.  This was critical to mission accomplishment to any degree despite a number of impediments to the mission. One respondent noted:

I would like to add that the AMIS leadership on the ground, both the Nigerian and Rwandan deputy commanders, were not only soldiers. They had to be diplomats on the ground. I think it was the combined skills of both that were instrumental in AMIS being as successful as it was despite all of the impediments. They also demonstrated the courage, both Nigerians and Rwandans.

### *Decision-Making process:*

The participants offered that the decision-making process of the AU was based on a centralized leadership decision model. The Heads of State made the decisions that were implemented by the AU commissioners and staff. The countries of Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal South Africa and Tanzania were seen as the member state leaders who possessed the most influence.

The leadership in general--you got to look at the tiers, the heads of states, no decision is made final without the African heads of state. So, those two meetings that are held annually, bi-annually, are fundamentally the decision-making process.

The next tier would be the foreign ministers and that is dependent upon each country, so I will tell you that the foreign ministers of Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopian, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, those are the core, leveraging, and countries on the continent.

The leadership of the Peace and Security Commission had the span of one entity, the PSOD (Peace and Security Operations Department). Noticed bureaucratic layered needed senior leadership even though has the power to make decisions from US perspective were in the organizational structure.

The leadership of AMIS was at such a distance from the AU headquarters that leadership decisions were perceived by some to be made by the local leadership.

The leadership in AMIS was more or less autonomous from the AU, being at such a distance along the leadership in AMIS did travel to the headquarters of the AU on occasion to report and receive guidance.

I don't know what the official understandings were at the high level between the government of Sudan and who clearly did not want us there, but compromised to allow the AU to come in instead of the UN. I don't know what was happening at that level. We don't know--I don't know what Kingabay, I'm sorry, Major General Festus Okafor, I don't know what his instructions were. I do know that there was an attack going on--there was an attack scheduled--we were watching the Sudanese in South Darfur move brigades from just South of Nyala in a series of villages moving towards the East along a road um, it was a dirt road that ran all the way out of Darfur and into Khartoum and all the way to the Nile to the river and then into Khartoum. And sorry I can't remember the names of some of this

...we went on the ground and talked to this brigade commander, and we said, "What are your orders?" He said, "Clear the road to Khartoum?" And we were like, "Whoa that's a long way." And he said, "That's the task." And we said, "What are your sort of your rules of engagement?" And he said, "I have the force of the Sudanese government behind me.

I don't know what Okonko's original orders were, don't be aggressive? Don't piss

off the Sudanese government? I don't know I'm not privy to that, but I know that

with sufficient level of pushing, of interest, of suggestion, you know, we were

able to get things done. That problem would not have been done otherwise.

The structure of the AU also created obstacles. The decision making at the AU

tended to follow a block voting system by the leadership within regions.  Research

participants commented on how this affected the mission:

…which countries had the greatest leverage?  I saw regional blocks were

fundamentally important. I haven't seen any other continent or group vote in that

way to date, whether they vote in the AU as regional blocks or whether they

vote in the UN as regional blocks, and rarely do they break rank.

…they do it better than anybody else in terms of communications on issues.

Division of labor also was noted. The ambassadors of the individual countries

attended the committee meetings and did the ground work for the decision-makers, but

the Head of States were the decision makers and attended the larger meeting where

there were decisions to be made.

…in terms of heads of states directly engaging with each other. In terms of the

African ambassadors and the foreign ministers, or weld an enormous amount of

influence and they're doing the heavy lifting at those two, you know, biannual

meetings but the ambassadors do the ground work, the committees.


…I mean peace and security counsel in of itself which also had a political

component as well, if I recall correctly it wasn't just a physical body. It also you

know, and convened meetings of various heads of state, who were at a high

level, meetings of heads of states and foreign ministers from all other countries

as well to make political decisions that would impact the kind of on the ground

work


### *Regional Economic Community:*

The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as well as the individual nations

were mentioned as having leadership aspects based on their individual strengths and

influence on the continent.  Angola was mentioned as having a "pivotal" leadership role

of influence as well as being geographically pivotal, based on its location on the

continent.  Uganda, Rwanda, and Botswana were also seen as having important key

leadership roles on the continent and with the AU.


There's also with leadership it's important to look at the five regional

organizations (Regional Economic Regions of Africa).


…so the power of West Africa to leverage has to be taken into consideration.

North Africa the key players are Algeria and Egypt. In Southern African the key

players are South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Angola. Angola actually plays on two fronts (laughs) it plays in the West--well three, it plays in West Africa as part of ECOWAS (Economic Community of the Western States). It plays in central Africa as part of that central Africa grouping, and it plays in Southern Africa, so Angola not only geographically pivotal, but also politically plays a pivotal role, so I will add Angola into that mix. This becomes the key deciding factors in leadership.

…while not big countries Uganda and Rwanda played major roles in the decision-making process, and they leverage very effectively. Botswana also played a key role, not always in the peacekeeping components, but in the economic development and the democratization process as well. So Senegal put in that top tier because you go back and look at the countries that played important roles in the formation of OAU.

However, each contingent (Troops Contributing Country) had their own vision of how AMIS should be executed based on their membership in a regional economic community. This was viewed as problematic on occasion:

I think each contingent region had their own views on how things should be done. And you know again, part of it is at that time when you look at the Nigerians--if you look at ECOWAS (Economic Community of Western African States) at that time was the most advanced regional economic community

followed by SADC (Southern African Development Community) with the East

African community and Central coming in behind…but, again based on the

experiences of ECOWAS primarily dealing with Sierra Leone and Liberia, they

felt okay, well, we know how to do this. And the dynamics in West Africa may

not have been the same in Darfur. So, you can't necessarily say what is good for

West Africa doesn't necessarily work in Sudan.

One of the participants saw Angola and South Africa in a different light than the

pivotal role envisaged above.   Along with Zimbabwe, Angola and South Africa were

viewed as having to "push themselves into the room" due to their late independence.

The new comers to the table because they didn't receive their independence till

the 70s and the 80s are Angola and Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Those players

come much later and South Africa not until the 1990s, which we start to see as

they come to the table there was some concern by some member states whether

they were going to push themselves into the room because they didn't have the

long history that the other countries had…

Certain countries led in Africa and the AU decision process and certain leaders

at the AU were more influential than others.

The ambassadors in the structure reflect the larger countries and big players who are on the ground. I think if the ambassador has the ear of their foreign minister, the ear of the president, then you noted their ability to play.

The roles of the chairperson and deputy chairperson of the AU commission were mentioned for their leadership position and decision-making position. The chairperson was seen as possessing "ideas" and "vision" for the continent and the deputy chairperson was viewed as being able to "get things done."

…the chair person I would say was very big on kind of ideas and visions for the whole continent I would say less concrete in hand on for other things but of course he is the chair person.

…the deputy chair person, as far as I recall, kind of handled a lot of more of the almost like a DC Embassy in a way, you know, getting stuff done more.

***Personnel and Staffing:***

Another major challenge for the leadership of the AU was the support staff and the personnel at the mid and lower levels. At the strategic level of leadership, the leaders were mentioned as being "motivated" and "very strategic." However, the personnel and staff of the AU was one of the leadership challenges faced by the strategic level leaders and was seen as a "weak link" at the AU. The AU was viewed as overall being "thinly staffed."

… if you are talking about the strategic leadership then I would say very

motivated and very strategic. I think where their biggest challenge is in their

personnel and staff is probably their weakest link because--and this has

happened in the UN, too, but less now in the UN because it's had more years to

evolve and more resources to staff its bureaucratic structure.

…there's several commissioners…and then under--for so we mostly dealt with

obviously the peace and security commission when it came to Darfur and under

that there was I think a crisis management division and there was a director--

there was a commissioner for peace and security and a director for peace and

security, and there was also a crisis management division that also had its own

director…but very thinly staffed basically was the kind of the overall.

### *Resources:*

The time frame of organization also created a challenge for the AU as opposed

to a more mature organization, such as the UN.  The AU was relatively a newer

organization in 2004 that did not have the resources and time to recruit a talented set of

personnel within the AU.

And one might argue with the UN it's so well staffed in its bureaucratic

structure that it hasn't gotten to the mission, but in the case of the AU, which one

at that time in 2004 was three years old. So, I think we have to contextualize in

2000 because it only came into existence, and correct me if I'm wrong in 2000, either 1999 they were starting the formation--but 2000 we see the trend, yep, it was 2000…So, at 2004 to deploy, even though it transitioned from OAU, to deploy troops on the ground was huge. So, it has not had sufficient time I would say as well to staff itself, and to be able to screen out the kinds of people and the money and the resources to bring the talent you want.

…there is some good talent because there is political will and heart, but there's also at this juncture, it's too small in terms of its staffing, but doesn't have the resources to expand.

The leadership of the AU has the authority to hire and fire personnel, but a challenge to the leadership for the AU was the lack of revenue to compete with the likes of the UN which has a more robust budget for hiring.  The payment of dues created a challenge for the AU to operate and to have the revenue to attract quality personnel. Since the fall of Gadhafi, who covered a lot of the African dues, only countries such as Nigeria and South Africa were fully paying their membership dues to the AU.

The AU does have the authority to hire in its personnel structure and to fire, but in terms of its revenue--its base is still pretty small. So, if you are competing with a UN position and AU position the ability of the UN to pay a higher salary and provide better accommodations - living and all those kinds of expenses, and perks, and health care that come with the job - then if you are up for an AU job

then up for a UN job and you get the offer from the UN it—you're probably not going to turn the UN down, and with probably a great retirement plan. So, it's like anything, it's a great organization, but its packages and competing with a UN makes it kind of hard to compete in these early stages, so either it's not clear to me if they have other than the dues how those dues are, how can I say it, revenue generating--if they have a structure, that's not clear. If they put the money or the resources in the market, or if they're not at that stage yet to have something of an endowment that allows them to become more independent--at this stage I'm not sure that that is in place.

…Nigeria, of course pays its dues, the South African pays his dues, but right now in the last few years, and I think it is two or three since Gaddafi's fall, they're probably anywhere from 8 to 15 countries who aren't paying their dues. And so, the subsidy, even though it was back door through Gaddafi, is gone. So, that is going to impact your ability to hire more personnel to set up for your security purposes, you dispose and maintain them, and to attract the kind of people you would really like to attract.

### _Personnel:_

There is a challenge exhibited in that the lower echelons of the AU were perceived as being staffed with inferior individuals due to a lack of resources that the leadership could access with certainty. Participants in the project noted:

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…I would say that those people who are there now are there because they are

committed, not because they couldn't have gotten better jobs elsewhere. There's

a small group at the bottom who probably, you know, should I dare say should

be fired, but getting other to deal with those challenges

The AU does have the authority to hire in its personnel structure and to fire, but

in terms of its revenue--its base is still pretty small.

Personnel to come in you know, it's just one of those situations. That's what

they're got.

There weren't competent administrators, they didn't exist, and there were no

rules. People were creating rules as they went along.

### *Lessons Learned:*

AMIS produced leadership challenges that the AU did not repeat in their

mission in Somalia (AMISOM-African Union Mission in Somalia) which came after

AMIS due to a US effort to provide a "lessons learned" approach on leadership of the

mission that the AU experienced in Darfur with AMIS to the leadership of the Peace

and Security Commission.  This was noted by several of the participants:

…in the case of I know AMIS, but in the case of the mission in Somalia the

Ugandan's gave a general with experience, paid his salary, continued to take care

of his family, to provide the expertise that were needed to do the strategic planning for the mission, countries would in order to supplemented AMIS, would have needed to have done the same thing.

I will say that for Somalia it was through direct US negotiation to ask the Peace and Security Commission to give a general in order to not repeat some of the challenges that AMIS had, so there were lessons learned.

Lessons learned from AMIS are paying dividends for the AU leadership in implementing changes to address future peacekeeping missions based on what they learned in AMIS.

When you fast forward when you look at AMIS as the first mission the lessons learned and now AMISOM is now tatted as the way things should be done, and then you look at the morphing into the east brigade or the African Standby Force, and they have actually taken a step further where they are actually building a rapid response force, and in order to be a participant there you have to fund yourself. So, I mean the good news is here we are in 2016 and the lessons learned through AMIS and they're getting better. And they are also realizing that if we want to really be effective, we need to be able to do this on our own. But during that time frame, there clearly was a mindset within African Union, oh well, we will just the United States to do it, we will get the Brits, we will get everybody else to do it and they weren't ponying up. The only thing they were

ponying up were the troops. Again, some of the limiting factors are the contingents, and who you send on missions. You know, some countries do better than other countries, but again when you are looking for forces and to go into bad places, beggars can't be choosers so again, again I would probably say the weakest aspect was the logistical support. And then again training.

### *Characteristics of Leadership:*

Listening and dealing with the issues before the final decision was made was a characteristic of the leadership style within the AU.  The African leadership style is one of listening and considering the arguments before a decision is made. The Africans were viewed as "less hasty" in the decision-making process:

> It's easy for outsiders to say, "Oh, well I don't think they are doing anything." But, without dialogue, there's nothing. I would say my two years' experience on the ground just further highlighted the importance of the dialogue.

> The western countries--I think we take for granted the, or we've had a quick conversation in 5 minutes, but I found the African's doing the due diligence, of listening to the other. You might--one country might have disagreed with the other country, but they do diligence, to listen and to go back and forth, I was impressed with that. So, that you just didn't there was less of a hasty decision.

We didn't have to like their decisions but they were their decisions, and they had

done the due diligence to get there, so the committee's work extremely hard and

because of a good relationship with key players like Djinnit and some of the

other ambassadors, I was privy to some of those internal dynamics uh, that

meant building trust, and also listening. So as an American I had to learn to

listen a little bit closer.

It wasn't just that they were a different group of people coming together, but the

seriousness of understanding the issues and looking at all the options first and

then coming to a conclusion that okay maybe these are the three we have, this is

what we are going to leverage.

### *Government of Sudan:*

Launching AMIS also created a challenge for the leadership of the AU in Africa.

The decision to launch AMIS was mentioned as being "well thought out" by the

Africans.  It was the Government of Sudan, under its president, Bashir, that was

opposed to AMIS.  However, Sudan preferred the AU over the UN or western

intervention. In contrast, others lauded the decision.

Well, first of all I would start with the decision to launch AMIS is one that was

well thought out. AMIS was a challenging one because the Sudanese

government under President Bashir was opposed to any kind of intervention into

his country. At that particular point in time, it was a compromise to have AMIS

go into Darfur rather than a UN mission, so he (Bashir) was definitely opposed

to a UN mission, and it was also shortly after the intervention into Iraq that also

made many of the African heads of states clearly against of a US intervention

into Sudan.

Their own in a country, and its only recently that in the last--at that point no

other entity, including EC, had been willingly to intervene. So first of all I want

to applaud the African Union despite maybe some structural or financial

challenges. It demonstrated the political will has historically since its inception,

in what 2000, to intervene into another country. So with that said--and to date

other than the OAS (Organization of American States) who I think have only

really talked about, so I would stand corrected. If they haven't we are only now

seeing in 2015 the Arab League, or certain members of the Arab League, now

intervening into other countries within their region?

…I think the success of being able to get a peacekeeping mission on the ground

belongs to the diplomatic expertise and the gravitas of the AU

So without that diplomatic gravitas of AU there would have been no mission. So

that negotiation took place outside of the realm of the European leadership, the

US, the Canadian leadership.

***Diplomatic:***

The leadership of the AU had a strong need for diplomatic engagement within Africa and externally to Africa that expedited AMIS. The Arab League was viewed as an influential player and one of players needed to overcome the challenge of getting AMIS to deal diplomatically with Sudan.

The AU's diplomatic engagement with both Africa--within the structure of the AU was critical to facilitate, the bringing together of the mission, as well as their diplomatic engagement with non-African countries, that expedited AMIS.

We had probably some indirect support from the Arab League you had the blessings of we would say because the Arab League is an influential player with the AU that it took the blessings of both of those entities to have an AMIS mission allowed to be on the ground at all.

I think at the forefront for AMIS to have been created at all; for AMIS to get permission to get boots on the ground, even though there were impediments and obstacles put in the way.

The countries that provided the most personnel as a troop contributing country (TCC) were allocated the force command position for AMIS.

The Nigeria's were able in the initial stages to have the highest-ranking officer within the structure on the ground due to the size of their contribution of troops.

There was the perception that the AU could have been more selective in which countries were allowed to contribute to their troops to AMIS.

I think again, the best way would have been to be a little more selective in the force contribution…

*Training:*

Executing AMIS created challenges to the leadership in Darfur.  The first force commander, General Okono, a Nigerian, and his subordinate leadership staff, were not trained or prepared to handle the threats posed in Darfur.   The senior leadership of the AU was viewed as failing to grasp the "seriousness" of the threat that was present in Darfur.

Fundamentally two problems. Question about the will of the mission to execute the mission—especially protection of civilians –observers at first and they did…frequently indicators of will and leadership.  Okono went to Darfur he wasn't prepared, nor subordinates by training or expertise in the mission set. Not likely structured, postured or by mission to efficiently engage the threats in Darfur.  They (AMIS) were organized/structure for mission task far more benign then they faced.

I would say the AU commission itself - the senior leaders - may have failed to
grasp the seriousness of the threat in terms of geography scope and willingness
for brutality.

I think the structure in terms of the leadership structure on the ground--this
happens whether you're a UN peacekeeping mission. And the UN has had a
longer history of experience with peacekeeping missions, but we still find the
same challenges

### *Personnel:*

Others saw the leadership of the AU as not being well-qualified, other than
Konaré (Head of the AU Commission) and Djinnit (Commissioner of the Peace and
Security Commission).  This was reported by several of the research participants.

…if you look at the other thing is the overarching structure of the African
Union. I mean I had heard that the African diplomats sent to the African Union
were not the A-Team for countries.

…if they wanted to get rid of somebody a lot of countries would send the has-
beens.

So, when you look at--here you have this overarching organization that is
supposed to better African, but you have people who are not the best and the
brightest, and you throw into that the most aggressive. The African's got what

they got.

You know, they created that own institution, but you know, again they realized, hey if we want to be effective--and you are starting to see more effective diplomats, you know. And I saw this as I was leaving Ethiopia when Uganda was brought in Eda Simpalo, who was one of their--she had been the Ambassador to the United States, you know clear ambassador--and Zephanie kind of he got it. He said, "Okay you know we are only going to be as good as we can." And then even sent General Burraro to go work with peace and security commission. And Burraro is probably one of the smartest Ugandan officers.

…you saw these lessons learned by the African's themselves, they learned that if we are going to improve, then we have to do it ourselves and we have to enable. At that time frame, I don't think the mindset--you know even though they probably could have done it better, the political institution itself was the impediment.

…well but also the extent to which various personalities in the African Union would have been susceptible to that type of pressure, you know, so that goes a little bit leisure…it is just very, very thin, if somebody wasn't there and neither nothing got done, or there is nobody to meet with, or somebody at a probably inappropriate level was just calling the shots is what happened.

…I didn't sense that there was a very concrete set of tasks or commands that they were ordered to carry out necessarily.

That they were given what they were given.  Some of it again was political, you know? We need to show some certain member state will want to show that they are contributing somehow so they get some kind of slot that maybe that person wasn't the best suited for. I mean that type of thing happening. I don't remember the specific names or anything like that. Definitely politics played a part in it, you know. Where the chief contributors are going to come from, who's going to be commanding, who's going to be inserted in a post inside the African Union itself, um, and it wasn't always--I would say probably not necessarily the most qualified folks that various countries had to offer. I am not sure honestly how desirable a posting was; I don't know and that could have played into it

### *Multi-national leadership:*

One of the leadership challenges of the AU, as seen by participants, dealt with establishing a multi-national force under one commander.  One aspect that was mentioned was the difficulty of placing a nation's troops under the command of an organization.  Another issue was that the AU wanted to establish a standing force that would be under the control of the AU, an organization, and therefore under the command of a nation other than the nation providing the troops.  The idea that the even the US doesn't have such a force seemed impractical for the AU at the time of AMIS.

Participants in the study noted this repeatedly:

The same challenges that AMIS experienced in the peacekeeping missions in Congo. The peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone and throughout West Africa faced because it comes down to the constitutional constraints of a multinational and a multilateral organization that anyone faces no matter whether you are African or not

Peacekeeping missions comes down to the sovereignty and putting their troops under the command of an organization, and not of a country.

…one of the things that President Konaré did when we came to his position was he wanted to create a rapid reaction force, a standing--and the fear was a standing army and what country wanted to give their troops to be placed under the direct command in someone else's country?

Because the AU is not a country it resides in Ethiopia the same way the UN resides in New York. That small bit of land is sovereign territory, but if you are Nigeria or your Botswana and are giving up a company for or a battalion; none of these countries can afford to give up a company or a battalion and financially support it.

The US government has yet to create a rapid reaction force with all its wealth

and resources, and size. If you want to say the marines are that, but that's not the marines mission to be a rapid reaction force, to be deployed just for peacekeeping missions, so that amount of resources in today's world or yesterday's world at the time of AMIS are impractical. And at this point no country no matter how great it's wealth was going to give up that resource or finance that resource and relinquish command of vital resources too.

Certain country leaders that were present in Darfur were viewed as leading their troops based on their own leadership strengths. The Rwandans and the Nigerians were perceived as leading their countries' contingents based on their own leadership skills even in the face of a lack of equipment and authority.

…well I will say the Rwandans in particular in putting themselves in harm's way when did not have the equipment or the authority to return fire against the Sudanese in order to protect Darfurians. So, I would say it was that kind of courage in a hostile--very hostile environment that both the Nigerians and the Rwandans leadership and it was their leadership that was critical to their troops following them in a situation where they could have said, "Not my mission." So, I think we as the world need to acknowledge that under such incredible conditions that they would with so little resources both in terms of personnel and equipment and those kinds of things that these troops were willing to be on the ground and those leaders willing to stay.

*OAU transition to the peacekeeping role of the AU:*

The research participants also viewed the AU leadership in light of having accomplished the mission of the OAU and now needing to come together to address the leadership that was needed, such as peacekeeping.

So, I think the lessons are learned from the--relatively new organization with a new charter. It is--should be applauded for what they accomplished because their primary mission as the OAU, and that's where I will bring you back in history, was designed to decolonize the continent.

…the leadership came together and said, "We have completed the mission except for one, so we're going to move forward and what are the needs of the continent today

### *Missions of the AU:*

The AU has a multitude of missions including political and economic development as well as security.  Since security has taken such a toll on the leadership and the attention of the AU, the other missions of the AU have not received the attention of the leadership. Study participants commented on this:

The primary mission of this organization was supposed to be political and economic development. Yes, security is a component. Unfortunately, security has taken up much too much of its attention, so maybe we would better to say that the AU could advert some of this if its resources were allowed to be diverted in other places, uh the political and economic development and social

development of the continent. And the AU has had to step in where the UN

refused, with better resources, more personal, and a historic mission.  I think it's

important to acknowledge that the AU has done what the UN mission has failed

to do

…commission, there were various commissions dealing with all different topics

like health and um security, and various issues around the continent…

### *Western Involvement:*

The Africans did show a reluctance to have the western world involved with the

AU outside of the need for resources to support AMIS.  One of the greatest leadership

challenges that the AU faced was in how to organize AMIS so there would be support

from the member states of the AU as well as the funding support of the western nations.

The US president gave his support of an intervention in Darfur but not with the

commitment of the US military.

…did get the sense that there is a lot of external influence and a lot of influence

especially from maybe some of the northern African countries not wanting too

much involvement from the western world in African, and in dealing with this

issue…

Greatest challenges to leadership was how to organize AMIS in a way that would support by member states that provided manpower and western partners that would provide funding and still meet the threats in Darfur.

President George W. Bush, the 43rd president of the United States, had said that there would not be a genocide on his watch and he was not willing to put as we say in quotes, "Boots on the ground into Darfur."…after careful consultation with the president of South Africa and the president of Nigeria, and then several other consultations with President Mubarak of Egypt. The Algerian's had also weighed in that they didn't believe, given the intervention in Iraq that it was prudent to have an intervention. So all of the African heads of states, including also President of Senegal, with the Muslim population of almost 98 percent and others at that time.

There was an attempt by the AU leadership to transform the AU. However, the lack of resources often muted the energetic attempts of the leadership to establish, for example, a conflict management center at the AU.

I mean there were definitely some attempts of the leadership to transform the creditability of the organization, as I said having gone from like the OAU to AU, trying to be taken more seriously I definitely saw that like, you know, look at a short piece of security, particular was quite energetic and you know the director for the Conflict Management Center was also equally energetic and try and do

what they could with limited resources.

### *Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF):*

The AU senior leadership could have improved its leadership through engaging directly with the individuals working the Darfur Integrated Task Force. There was a perception that the leadership at the AU did not demonstrate their vision to the leadership of AMIS in the field and the DITF leadership. The leadership of the AU was viewed as not always clear on what type of force was permissible with the AMIS leadership.

…the high-level folks engage directly with the Darfur Intergraded Task Force and the officers that they had running that, maybe convening you know, conference calls if they had the capability, which they probably didn't; things like that with the field with AMIS in the field. And just kind of having a better-- making sure that their teams were better oriented with any type of vision of where they wanted all of this to go, and that they were more well aware of the various challenges, and what it took to get the job done.

The participants who dealt with the AU headquarters but had little knowledge of the leadership aspects of AMIS located in Darfur.

I mean I wasn't too familiar with that. I mean I just you know was privy to reports back because I joined conference calls that had you know, people out in

the field on them.

I remember there being every now and again confusion about commands and you know whether or not discerning types of use of force were allowed and things like that…again, more logistic issues, that kind of they seemed to some extent be operating a little bit on their own…obviously not clear where they were getting their orders from. I don't know. Maybe it's because I wasn't part of that (laughs).

### *Understanding scope of AMIS:*

The leadership of the AU was also not perceived as understanding the scope of the mission to execute AMIS.  The threat posed in Darfur was mentioned as exceeding the understanding of the leadership of the AU.  There was a lack of trained personnel up to handling the threat posed in Darfur and a lack of understanding of the limitations of deploying a force. For improvement, participants suggested the leadership of AU could have developed a vison that was commensurate with the threat in Darfur as well as demonstrating courage and the ability to gain support from the western powers and the UN for AMIS.   There was a perception that the leadership of the AU did not share its vision with the key stake holders. Their vision was viewed as not always equal to the threat the leadership in AMIS faced.

Leading leadership challenges didn't understand the scope of the mission and threat

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Leading leadership challenges didn't understand the scope of the mission and threat 1. Not having personnel trained to effectively given the mission 2. Any number of factors to cause their will to address the threat less than adequate. 3. Same political and others sober relations of the limitation of deploying an AU force.

Improved leadership-AU could have if they had leaders at the AU who had a vision commensurate with the threat and courage and ability to gain support for that vision from key stake holders. Especially the member states and the west…I'm thinking UN and developed world.

The leadership style in Darfur was perceived as cautious, with a desire to avoid conflict of any kind with the AU member states or to upset the government of Sudan. The Government of Sudan was viewed as not wanting the US on its soil but compromised to allow the AU in Darfur in lieu of the UN. Respondents commented on this:

Leadership style Darfur…cautious—strong desire to avoid anything that the members state of the AU or West objected to –and conflict parties in Darfur…Government of Sudan groups conflict party—leave as cautious.

…. I don't know what the official understandings were at the high level between the government of Sudan and who clearly did not want us there, but compromised to allow the AU to come in instead of the UN

### *Mandate:*

There was a sense that the AU could have improved AMIS through the development of a solid mandate that was communicated and monitored by the AU for successes and failures. Other ways the AU could have improved AMIS was through the training of the leaders and observers prior to deployment and setting up viable communications between the AU and AMIS by providing assistance to the leadership of AMIS with guidance and decision making capability:

> If AU had direction for the mission and a solid mandate for such a mission that was communicated effectively and monitored for success and failures.

> Training and education of leadership (Darfur) before deployment.

> More defined tactics of objective/observation oriented on more effective Observers and particular techniques on how to observe.

> Have better communication gear through a strong tactical force and communication available to assist leadership in Darfur with decision making and guidance from AU leadership.

Nigerians, who provided the largest force for AMIS, secured the leadership position.  The AMIS force commander was perceived as not wanting to engage in fighting as opposed to the Rwandans.  The Rwandans and the Senegalese were seen as the best performers in AMIS, according to the participants:

I mean if you look at the Nigerians themselves and it's clearly…you know they see themselves as a regional if not a continental power. I mean they are legends in their own minds.  But when you look at their actual capabilities of their forces, you know they don't necessarily want to fight. I mean that said, there are good Nigerian units and good Nigerian officers.  By and by, in large, I would say their performance in AMIS was lackluster, you know, especially if you stack them up again the Rwandans

I think with the Senegalese did pretty well. And again the Senegalese have a long history of UN peacekeeping and by in large their forces tend to do fairly well.

That kind of tasking the Rwandan army when those guys came in they were tactically were incredibly proficient and they were aggressive on the ground in terms of stopping fighting, breaking up rebel groups from attacking civilians, keeping them protected. They were very, very aggressive in this action because their president had done that. I don't know what the Chief of the Ghanaian Army

or the president of Ghana said to the chief of staff, a colonel when he came out. I don't know what the marching orders from the president of the AU were to the Political head of AMIS were.

### *Style of Leadership:*

The AU style of leadership was perceived by some of the participants as being one of consensus.

…the African Union style of leadership it falls into the African style of leadership, which is consensus

And the idea, I mean and this you know, through most African cultures, traditional leadership. Even though you had a chief or a paramount chief, there was a small counsel around him and again this falls back--I mean you could argue that African traditional politics is democracy. It may not be Westminster Parliamentarian democracy, but consensus is a critical node intendent of decision-making and this would fall in, you know.

You see military operations it's not very good to lead by consensus. But, again and you could say that this is probably one of the negative aspects of the mission, but that's what they did.

…if you are faced with a very difficult situation. If one member disagrees, then it's not going to happen. And so, on the surface people would say it's ineffective,

but that is how they do things. And it's about--it factors in to different aspects of the situation so in that sense instead of having a big man dictating what's going to happen, you get this consideration of different aspects.

Because on the surface you know, if you are about immediate response or whatever by factoring in a consensus building and factoring in these different points of view, you may get a more positive solution that is better for the long term as to something that may be good on the surface and short term, but you are not looking at third and fourth order of factors. And as we have seen third and fourth order of facts are very critical.

A participant lamented about how the western model allowed for the degradation of Libya where the AU was more cautious about the aftermath and would consider the aftermath in its calculus whether to intervene, especially where genocide was not a major factor.

No, we haven't learned it. That's why we undone tens of years' worth of work by getting rid of Kaddafi. Now, we have AQIM we have Boko Haram and we have all this stuff and we {the US} created it whether we want to admit it or not.

The senior leadership below the Head of the AU is mentioned as leaning toward stronger engagement with partners and the potential involvement of NATO and the EU.

Yeah, I mean people who were very active on discussions in AMIS at the time from the AU Commission...he was always a strong proponent of greater engagement by the African Union partners.

Djinnit was one of the string of AU Peace and Security Commissioners who was a very strong advocate. President Kagame and the government in Rwanda was also very active. I recall Masomhaka personally being very much in favor of NATO and possibly EU and definitely possibly NATO involvement in AMIS…a view that didn't necessarily reflect the sort of AU's corporate position, but he personally very much an advocate, at least in his conversations with US officials…and I think you know, that might influence the Rwandan interest in peacekeeping.

### *Task-Oriented:*

The AU leadership was seen as more task-oriented during AMIS. There is a new initiative at the UN to form a senior leadership position at a deputy chairperson level to handle peacekeeping. The AU is forming its own study that may be modeled after the UN study for increased leadership for peacekeeping at the senior level. It should be noted that the new measures now being taken by the UN to form a deputy did not exist at the UN or at the AU during AMIS.

When you look at studies of peacekeeping now, so you have to so-called

HIPPO, report the High-level Panel on Peace Operations that were issued by the United Nations in September of last year (2015), there is a similar study now being done by the African Union Commission.  In the African Union's Study, which is draft, there was a recommendation, a draft recommendation that echoes a recommendation HIPPO that is to create a deputy chairperson for peace operations. So, in the UN now you have a UN Deputy Secretary General who doesn't just do peace operations, but there is much more infrastructure institutionally now to deal with the peacekeeping, so with the UN just having the DBKO (Department for Peacekeeping Operations) wasn't sufficient. And so the AU I think is lagging behind a little bit, but trying to follow that model. And you know all of the things that are being proposed now didn't exist obviously in 2004

Well, the commander and the deputy commander both made regular trips back to Addis (AU headquarters) to debrief with Ambassador Djinnit and President Kanuri and to provide them with an overview of what was taking place.

I mean pretty standard levels of communication they turned in reports of accountability, of challenges they faced in the field, so AU is no different than any other peacekeeping organization in that stand point. Again, the difference is the sheer--that they were small.

*Planning:*

Some participants felt that the AU should communicate the strategic views with the AMIS leadership. There was a view that the leadership in AMIS did not do strategic level planning—that was done at the AU headquarters.

And that doesn't make either one of them wrong, but means that it was important for them to share those views, which from my perspective they did, and to communicate them, and at the end of the day the commander on the ground executes and doesn't do the strategic planning.

### *Government of Sudan:*

Sudan's sovereignty was taken into account by the AU leadership that may have wanted to provide Sudan with the room to deal with changing its attitude toward the issues ion Darfur while limiting the western foot print.

> …some of them were wanting to give the member a state a chance to breathe and redeem itself. Others wanted to show that the organization was very capable. Others wanted to make it look-- I got the sense that they had things under control to try and minimize the western you know, impact or footprint. I think they definitely had kind of competing interests in a sort of way.

> I don't know what Okonko's original orders were, don't be aggressive? Don't piss off the Sudanese government? I don't know I'm not privy to that, but I know that

with sufficient level of pushing, of interest, of suggestion, you know, we were able to get things done.

*Summary of Key Sub-Question 2*

The participants of the study offered their view of the leadership challenges faced by the AU and AMIS. The AU, as a nascent organization, was trying to overcome the short-falls in leadership of the former OAU and there was a desire to hold the leadership of the AU accountable.

The leadership of the AU was lauded for its intervention in Darfur and the establishment of AMIS. The President of Sudan was against any intervention peacekeeping force but preferred that the AU establish AMIS over any type of UN or western intervention. The impediments put in place by the Government of Sudan caused a challenge for the implementation of AMIS and the leadership at the AU and in AMIS. The perceived leadership style in Darfur was cautious with a desire to avoid conflict of any kind with the AU member states or to upset the government of Sudan.

It was noted that the northern African states were strongly against western intervention in Sudan. A leading challenge of leadership for the AU was in how to organize AMIS so that its member states would support the mission with peacekeepers and at the same time organize AMIS so that the western nations would offer funding support.

There were individual leaders who exhibited energy and wanted to transform the newly established AU into a responsive organization, away from the perception the world had of the OAU. However, the lack of resources often muted the ability to carry out some of the basic leadership challenges for organization, such as the establishment

of a viable conflict management center located at the AU headquarters.  Another challenge of leadership was the view that the AU followed the African style of leadership as one of consensus.

The AU leadership was cognizant that there were organizational shortfalls at the AU headquarters but did not understand the limitations of deploying a force.  The leadership of the AU was not perceived as understanding the scope of the mission to execute AMIS or the threat posed in Darfur.  The AU leadership also was not able to recognize the lack of training its personnel required to complete AMIS effectively, but some leaders did recognize there was a shortfall in personnel but that resources held those leaders back from making the necessary changes.  The AU could have improved its leadership by developing a vison that was commensurate with the threat in Darfur and sharing that vision with the western donors and the UN for support of AMIS.

Ambassador Said Djinnit, Commissioner of the Peace and Security Commission, was mentioned as having the vision to be an effective leader.  Djinnit was seen as a visionary and an "impressive guy" while some described him as filling "his own rice bowl" and not being aggressive enough.   The former President of Mali, Alpha Konaré, who served as the President of the AU Commission, was viewed as having the respect of the Heads of State of the member nations due to his former successful presidency that was not overthrown.  Other leaders of the AU were mentioned as being respected due to their former positions as leaders of their countries.

The lack of decision making at the Peace and Security Commission was seen as a challenge to for the AU's leadership to operate effectively. Even the most minor decisions often had to be made by the most senior leaders at the Executive Council

level.  The fact the AU was a new organization in the early 2000's and therefore the staff was seen as too thin and not enough depth to handle the leadership complexities of the AU and AMIS.

The AU senior leadership could have improved its leadership through engaging directly with the leadership of AMIS and the leaders of the DITF.  The leadership at the AU was not always clear in sharing its vision for the mission, as in the use of what type of force was acceptable in AMIS.  The AU could have improved AMIS through the development of a solid mandate that was communicated and monitored for successes and failures.  Other ways the AU could have improved AMIS were through the training of the leaders and military observers prior to deployment.   There was a need for viable communication link between the AU headquarters and AMIS that would have assisted the leadership of AMIS with providing guidance and their decision-making capability.

The Nigerians had knowledgeable leaders while the Rwandans were seen as aggressive and lauded for their experience of genocide that gave them a keener sense of purpose.   The TCC that contributed the greatest size contingent, Nigeria, was allocated the force commander position, Nigeria provided the most troops to AMIS and therefore was allocated the main leadership position of force commander followed by the Rwandan who were given the second leadership position; that of the deputy force commander.  The Nigerian leadership was viewed as not wanting to engage in an actual fight in Darfur as opposed to the Rwandan leaders, who were more willing to engage in a fight.  The Senegalese were also perceived as a positive force in AMIS.   Rwanda was mentioned as having an interest in supporting the intervention in a genocide, given its history and the leadership of its president, who was up for re-election.

The RECs were perceived by the participants to hold leadership decision-making positions as were the key nations of Angola, South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt and Algeria. Member countries of the AU tend to vote in regional blocks which give the regions more power. The actual leadership decisions were made at the annual conferences by the Heads of State which means that very little decision making is made at the lower levels of leadership in the AU.

The AU faced challenges in having the revenue to hire talented personnel. The UN has a more robust budget and is able to compete for higher quality personnel and staff. The lack of a quality staff is a challenge faced by the leadership of the AU. The revenue generated by the AU for membership in the form of dues has diminished since the fall of Gadhafi who was covering the membership dues of the less economically viable nations of Africa during the time of AMIS. Therefore, the AU is perceived as bring staffed with inferior personnel that the AU will not fire staff and leaders for fear of not being able to replace due to a lack of resources.

The chairperson of the AU commission, President Konaré, wanted to set up a standing force but faced the challenge of nations not wishing to have their forces under the leadership of an organization or the leadership of another nation. Another issue was whether an African nation could afford to provide a dedicated company or battalion to the AU for a standby force.

One of the positive outcomes of AMIS was that the AU was able to avoid the mistakes of leadership of AMIS in later peacekeeping operations, namely AMISOM. The AU leadership of the peace and Security Commission was able to exercise the lessons learned from AMIS in AMISOM.

**Key Sub-Question 3**

US Support:  *What were the challenges of US support to the African Union during the*
*African Union Mission in Sudan?*

      The AU has faced challenges in receiving and requesting US support.  There
was a dearth of data provided in the scholarly literature referencing US support for the
AU during AMIS.  The study participants provided an overview of the US support as a
challenge to the AU and in the context of international engagement.

*US reaction time to AU requests:*

      There was a challenge on the US side of not being able to react quickly on some
requests for equipment.  A participant found the US military more helpful than other
parts of the US Government as a whole.

> There was a big challenge in getting a request for equipment to the AU
> processed in a timely manner.  Sometimes it took 6 months to make a request
> through the normal US procurement channels.

> The US can't react quickly on equipment…

*US timeline for support:*

US support did not come at first as there was no monetary or resources provided by the US at the outset of AMIS.  The US military involvement sped up the process of proving US support engagement.

US Support between Washington and the AU was slow…once the US military engaged then things began to move quicker.

Resources: No monetary or resources initially

Airlift was one challenge that the US was able to meet in a rapid manner through the US military.  Since most African nations did not possess airlift capability, the US and NATO did most of the airlift for AMIS.

…but perhaps faster on things like airlift.

The African countries didn't possess organic airlift capability so I remember more of the US providing airlift on a fairly quick turnaround.

I found the US military more helpful than other parts of the US government that were a little slower to respond.

***Regional Economic Communities:***

At the beginning of AMIS, the Africans had the establishment of some structure, through the regional communities. There was some political participation through the regional communities but the AU was viewed as "feeling their way."

They already had certain regional economic communities which were mainly economic but had some political overcast. They were all really feeling their way.

The AU and the US had decided that it was not in the best interest of the US to intervene directly in Darfur. US support has evolved over the years since AMIS and is working with the AU and the UN to strengthen the role of the UN in assisting the AU with logistics and finances.

They urged that this would not be in the best interest of the continent nor the best interest of the United States at that time. So, with that said, the African heads of states agreed to deploy a peace-keeping force into Darfur with the support of the United States, and with the support of the EU, and with the blessings of the UN.

I think as I noted the United States is now working on a project with the African Union to build a new partnership between the UN secretary at specifically DBQ (document based question on genocide) and DFS (department of field service for peacekeeping) on the one hand and the African Union Commission on the

other to strengthen cooperation on peacekeeping on both logistical support and financing.

*US view of the AU:*

A major challenge described by a participant was the lack of knowledge of the structure of the AU in order for the US and other international parties to provide any form of resource or assistance.  There tended to be an ethnocentric view of the AU from the perspective of the US and the Europeans.

…I think what from an outsider's perspective, an observer country's perspective…that we still don't have as good as an understanding of the whole institutional structure of the AU the way we have an understanding of the UN, and I think that is fundamentally important to helping to facilitate how well we engage with them and how successful they can be in terms of how we put resources forward. The Europeans, I think have it somewhat better but I also found a bit of ethnocentrism in play and wanting them to do things and forgetting about the structure and the constraints of the constitution. I think the Chinese have also attempted to leverage but also find themselves facing some of the same similar constraints because the AU wants to remain as autonomous.

In the beginning, the AU was viewed by Washington as a by-product of the old OAU with the same view of the new organization as wanting to de-colonize Africa.

That caused Washington to give instructions to the senior personnel on the ground in Ethiopia to stay clear of the AU in the early days of the AU establishment.

> Frankly speaking, I think Washington was mired in its thinking that the AU was the same old organization of the OAU which in their point of view was ineffectual and basically support de-colonialization of the continent. We had mixed view in our US foreign policy as far as de-colonialization and the freedom of South Africa. So, I am not sure if the US was organized out in Ethiopia that we would have had a forward looking, leaning outward posture.

> Washington was working off of old information and would have continued to inhibit the free flow of information.

> Washington can have a bureaucratic way of telling those Americas working with the AU in Ethiopia what to do and not to do that can be a hindrance. …didn't want the US to give too many instructions…

### *AU resource and assistance requirements:*

Not understanding the way, the AU operated and the Africans planned was a challenge for US support. The AU itself was not sure what it needed, as the US had expected, but was not reticent to ask for help due to the engagement that the US Embassy had with the AU. Both the US and the AU were challenged in learning each other's needs and capabilities.

But again, they weren't sure what they needed.  This was new to them; a new experience for them.  This is why I wanted the AU to have US advisers rather than expecting them to be fully set up and ready to run that is usually our expectation (laughs).

It was a learning challenge on both sides because frankly they would have never asked us if we weren't forward learning through the US Embassy.

A challenge for the AU was that it did not always know what to request from the US. The US personnel engaging with the AU had to be careful not to commit the US to anything until Washington agreed.

There challenge at the AU was them no knowing to ask for and what the US was willing to provide.  They weren't sure so you had to go meet with them and figure out what they might need and go back and check with Washington without making an obligation on the part of the US and go back and see if we were willing to do it.

There was a lot of tiptoeing around in terms of not extending the US too far out in front; going back to our agencies to see what they were willing to do something.

*US support challenges:*

The US could have improved its support challenges with the AU through developing a better way to coordinate its support mechanism.  Another challenge that the US faced was not having high level visits from Washington to the AU, especially at the start of AMIS.

Washington can always improve its coordination and development—it doesn't do it too well any more.

The visit by high level US officials would have been more effective at the outset of AMIS.  Washington began to understand that the AU was a different organization from the OAU after the Embassy began to report on the dynamics at the AU and the start of AMIS.

Although Washington was hesitant at first, the US personnel on the ground in Ethiopia began to forge relationships with the AU.  These initial contacts turned out to be critical at the start of AMIS as the US had already developed a relationship with the AU. Washington was thankful for any reporting after their initial reluctance for engagement with the AU by US Embassy personnel.

The State department told me to keep AU at arm's length…however I saw the Europeans engaging and since the instructions were verbal and not in writing I engaged with the AU and started meeting AU personnel.

We are the US so we had to get involved with the AU and establish contacts.

When Darfur broke out the US had was already having a dialogue with the AU so it was easy to get access.

Washington didn't help or give instructions at the beginning.

Washington was happy with any reporting that it received at the outbreak of the Darfur conflict and the start of AMIS.

The US did not have difficulty getting appointments with the AU officials. One participant offered that the US sought ways to approach the AU with the suggestion of idea but that the way the "ideas" were transmitted to the AU were carefully couched to ensure the AU was leveraging the assets of the international partners.

It was easy get an appointment and see the senior official at the AU and give them "ideas" and then consult with partners and come up with a consensus to leverage the assets that the US could provide and the support that the Europeans

could support.  Talking and perhaps give them ideas and consult with Europeans
to get an organized approach.

Some diplomatic efforts seen as being fruitful by extending ideas to the AU and
the African ambassadors supporting the AU.  The act of diplomacy was the avenue that
began to push for the US to provide support to the AU.  Sometimes that means
intellectual capital though diplomatic interaction to influence the thinking of the
Africans.

> The US on the ground maybe encouraged them to look in certain direction
> though direct dialogue with the African Ambassadors and maybe your idea
> would pop up a year down the road.  That's all diplomacy, that's what it is.

> The act of diplomacy is planting a seed and hope it works out.

> I was looking at the intellectual capital and to have US influence on there
> thinking.

> …you could give them some ideas through their African ambassadors who were
> accredited to the AU to give them some ideas, some sense of an idea that cold
> get some support at the AU.

The diplomatic engagement of the US support mechanism provided an avenue for the AU not to repeat the challenges it had experienced with AMIS. The US wanted the AU to learn the lessons from AMIS and apply them to AMISOM. A US, as well as an AU, initiative that the US desired is that the AU develop a closer working relationship with the UN; a relationship that did not exist during the time of AMIS.

I will say that for Somalia it was through direct US negotiation to ask the AU to give a general in order to not repeat some of the challenges that AMIS had, so there were lessons learned.

…through the US auspices working with Ambassador Janet as the head of peace and security, we were able to secure that, so there were lessons learned, creative--this is where I say that diplomatic engagement was fundamentally important to overcome.

Communications was an area that the US provided assistance to the AU. One US initiative was the improvement of the AU internal communications through development of an operations center at the AU that could communicate with AMIS and other operational requirements.

I know big, if I recall correctly, a big initiative by the United States at that time and following in the next few years, was trying to set up sort of an operations center for the African Union and improve its sort of internal communications

and communications with missions in the field.

One of the many of the issues that the US assisted the AU with was in setting up

a command and control center at AU Headquarters centered on computers and

communication infrastructure, not just compatible hardware between the

headquarters and the field, but also general IT capability of AU staff

officers.  Most had little to no experience with computers or the basics of the

internet.

The US did show support for the AU and AMIS by providing individuals to sit

in on open AU open meetings as an observer country.

I think it's a dynamic one as I was able to um, there were many open meetings

where we [the US] were able to sit in as observe countries to observe that

dynamic.

The US provided the AU with personnel to assist in their planning and

management mechanisms and was the top international contributor to support AMIS.

The US provided financial support (in kind) for the deployments and the sustainability

of AMIS.

The US provided personnel to aid in planning and management of AMIS…US

provided financial support for actual deployment and employment and

sustainment of AMIS. The US was the top international contributor.

How did AU request US Support? AU requested in 2 bi-lateral through our US

Embassy Mission and EU parties in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia partners. Multi-

lateral formally hand-over through actual AU donors.

The United States and the EU were also critical, observer countries who

provided expertise in terms of practical strategic planning. They also provided

the resources that were critical to the AU in terms of setting up the base camps,

providing military personnel with expertise that were invaluable

One of the challenges seen with US support was with the contractors that

were acting on the behalf of the US. There was a view that some of the contractors

may not have taken the mission as seriously as they should have and therefore there

were shortcomings experienced in AMIS due to the contractors not adhering to the

standards. The US was not always able to fulfill its stated obligation since it was using

contract work and depended on the company hired to fulfill its obligation in a time

agreed upon.

Well, I think it was critical. I mean we provided the base camps. We provided

logistic support. I think part of some of the downfalls were within some of the

contractors themselves.

… to my knowledge there were PAE and DynaCorp both had the contracts to do that and some of DynaCorp's own shortcomings in not adhering to standards and timelines had a negative impact on the AMIS mission…the AU could not have done it without us. With that said, some of the contractors provided by the US just didn't take the mission as seriously as it needed to be.

And this is where I am able to make my criticisms of DynCorp because they did not think they were supposed to build thirty camps and they were behind the eight ball much to the dismay to our government and the AU. I believe the mechanism was that AU went directly to State and then State would levy the requirement.

There were other contractors outside of AMIS that the US supplied to the AU headquarters for support. Although, there was the view that there were but a few US contractors supporting the AU headquarters where the AU lacked expertise.

…we only provided a couple of individuals to my knowledge, you know. I think they needed some expertise and I think we provided it again through contract support.

The lack of a US mission to the AU during AMIS was seen as a huge challenge and disadvantage for the US in providing support to the AU. During most of AMIS, the role of the US was handled by the local US Embassy staff and information from

Washington. There was some assistance the US military sent but it was challenged by short duration work that lacked continuity and expertise.

> …not having a mission with the AU kind of hampered the mission of the US. We didn't--Washington didn't really deploy permanent staff.

Every now and then we got some military liaisons at major levels as well on rotations, only on really like really quick rotations as another challenge--not having much continuity, not everybody actually understanding the importance of the mission or not necessarily having the background for that type of mission. We had a meteorologist who was a really great guy and I'm sure he's-- I mean I remember a lot of times where we were like planning an organization that he didn't understand. It was kind of ad hoc also who we got to be able to support the African Union.

### *US support mechanisms:*

The US department of State and the White House were involved with developing support mechanism for the AU with the bi-partisan support of the US Congress. There was an interagency cooperative effort under way with the US congress to provide funding for the AU and AMIS.

> The AU requested support directly through both the US State Department and the White House.

There was bi-partisan support in Congress, so this made it much easier to provide that kind of situation in terms of funding for AMIS. There was on this particular case the state department played a critical role. The interagency as a whole, NSC (National Security Council) as well, this was one of those issues where it really took interagency cooperation as well as cooperation with congress in order to be able to execute US assistance with AMIS.

…I think that's a bureaucratic thing and really wasn't that important, in all honestly…the beauty and the course of bureaucracies is that these decisions were strategic decisions. The paper work is important to get the movement down at the bottom to get things in. It goes back to what I said, they don't have sufficient personnel. They don't know the American system very well. They know the European system very well, so we as the US have not done a very good job on our part to understand their mechanisms. The problem isn't with the AU. The problem is with the US, wanting things to happen the way that we are comfortable, not taking time to understand the mechanisms of an organization. So it isn't a problem in their structure it's a problem in the US failure to understand how the AU mechanisms work and to work through their time frame and their schedule

The US provided support for AMIS through the establishment of base camps and the use of a contract company such as Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) in

Darfur as one of the resources offered and used by the AU.  A challenge was observed

in the US contractors being able to access resources in Sudan.

> …we built the camps in Darfur.

> It got to the point where you know, there is a lot of oil produced, a lot of oil
> taken out of the ground in Sudan, and they have refineries. So you would think
> that fuel would not be an issue, but it was cheaper for PAE, the contractors, to
> fly fuel from Kuwait and fill bladders than it was to have fuel trucked from the
> refineries into Sudan. So I mean that's the level of non-cooperation and friction
> that the Sudanese government was able to put in.

The US was cognizant that the AU needed assistance and that the way the US

ran its normal speed had to be adjust to the bureaucratic speed of operation of the AU.

The lack of structure was mentioned as a challenge to supplying US support.  There was

a perception that it was sometimes easier to deal with the troop-contributing countries

themselves rather than the AU headquarters.

> …we seemed willing to support.  But again, you know--no I think you know
> from a US Government standpoint, we were in certain aspects we were more
> forward leaning because we would see things and try provide suggestions in the
> AU at times, you know. It's like, "Well, wait a minute guys. This is ours. You
> need to wait for us

I would say yeah out of efficiencies, you know we wanted to help improve, but the Africans were like, "Well, wait a minute." And they tended to be very bureaucratic in their approach.

I think what perhaps might have been frustrating more for the US and the EU countries was not having the elaborate structure. But, it was a bit ironic because neither does the EU have this structure in place (laughs) to deploy forces, to handle resources, and has to rely on its NATO partners to do that kind of peace keeping engagement. It was easier for the US to directly engage with the AU or to directly engage with the country's-- contributing countries to the AMIS mission

The US had supplied the AU with some vehicles and communications equipment prior to AMIS. The equipment was in poor repair and the US was able to inspect the equipment and offer some level of support in ordering spare parts through a US Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa located nearby in the country of Djibouti.

The US did have some US HMMWVs (8 or 10, I think) and other peripheral military equipment (including some communications equipment) that had been provided to the AU some years before under a security assistance case. The vehicles and other equipment were in a poor state of repair, but we were able to

get logistics soldiers from CJTF-HOA in Djibouti to come and inspect the

vehicles and equipment in order to order spare parts and get them into

operational condition, with an eye towards possibly shipping them eventually to

Darfur for AMIS.

The US was the major contributor to AMIS and Darfur.  Through the US

Department of State's Agency for International Development (USAID), the US was

perceived to have placed more money support and assets to Darfur than any other donor

nation.  The US built all the AMIS base-camps through US funding and US hired

contractors.

> Well, I can tell you what, you know the US support--the US put more money in
>
> terms of humanitarian aid into Darfur than everybody else put together was I
>
> think the standard response to that. The US money built all of those camps. The
>
> US construction teams or the US contractors, PAE, funded by the US
>
> Department of State built all of those camps…our support was noticeable our
>
> interest both at the international development level through USAID (US Aid
>
> International Development) it was a huge number. I don't have those numbers in
>
> my head anymore, but if I remember correctly the standard response was that the
>
> United States is putting more development money and assets into Darfur than
>
> everyone else put together.

The USAID International Development office was in Kenya handling Darfur issues rather than located in Khartoum due to the refusal of the staff to relocate to Sudan.   Due to the lack of staff and senior level personnel located in Sudan, the US was impacted by this challenge of locality in providing US assistance through the US Department of State.

> …there was a US office, a USAID office in Khartoum but yet a lot of the Sudan
> operations were stilling running out of Nairobi for political reasons within
> USAID.  Some of the USAID people said I will never move to Khartoum, you
> know, because they have been fighting--they had been working with South
> Sudan for 20 years under Operation Life Line Sudan. They literally had a little
> revolt in their office, "We won't go." We had the deputy secretary come out to
> Darfur, the Deputy Secretary State Zoellick came out to Darfur. There was high
> level interest on the part of the US State Department.  I am trying to remember if
> we had any senior military people come to Darfur.

### *Future of Peacekeeping:*

The adoption in 2015 of the Kigali Principles laid out the policy that a peacekeeping mission's responsibility is the protection of civilians.  These types of principles did not exist during AMIS.

> …was sort of a clear lessons learned that simply re-hatting AU missions to UN
> missions creates problems with command and control, and discipline. And that

you know I think one of the things that the UN is working on now is strengthening accountability…so for our current project on strength and cooperation to the UN secretary and the AU we are looking at how the UN's human rights due diligence policy can either be adapted or complied with by the African Union itself, and I think certainly 10 years ago, there was not an emphasis on that sort of thing. It was, you know trying to get troops to a critical location as quickly as possible.

…so, one of the big priorities for the United States now for example is having countries to adopt the so-called Kigali Principles and so after the UN peacekeeping summit in September 2015, which was co-hosted by Obama, President Kagame, the President of Rwanda, and a few others…it had been a series of international conferences in peacekeeping. And so one last year was in Kigali and one of the main results outcomes of that conferences was the adoption of the Kigali Principles, which is essentially a focus on the protection of civilians.

### *The right for the AU to intervene:*

The right to intervene was an issue that the AU faced in executing AMIS. The Government of Sudan's impediments would not be an issue for the peacekeepers of today.

The United States…adopted the Kigali Principles…so 10 years after Darfur

there's now a recognition formally that one of the key reasons you have peacekeeping is to protect civilians and I think that was certainly an argument that wasn't made as strongly back then. There was a lot of difficulty in getting in the--there's a lot of deference in the government of Sudan on what could or could not have been done by AMIS by UNIMID a lot of issues related to the transition from the AU to the UN for example, there was a debate on whether the different UN or peacekeepers wearing the UN insignia. There was always a continual reliance on the government of Sudan in trying to but they would deny visa for people going and so, you know there was just a lot of things that we just would not stand for now

### *US policy:*

The US had a policy of "no genocide on my watch' during AMIS and the US Administration.  The US was developing policies toward Sudan that included Darfur as well as the issues related to Sudan.  The US was exerting pressure on the diplomatic front to resolve the issue in Darfur.

…from a policy level, it was first and foremost the commitment of the president not to have genocide on his watch, and the administration as a whole was very forward leaning in developing a Sudanese policy. A multipronged Sudanese policy--one that dealt with Darfur, one that dealt with Juba and the other that dealt with Khartoum in terms of a civil war simultaneously taking place, while you had genocide on going in the Darfur region.

Tremendous diplomatic support from the US to try and resolve crisis.

The US had a special envoy in Sudan to address the north-south issue. There were a number of issues in Sudan to include Darfur and the peace mission of the AU and AMIS that was not on the agenda of the US Special Envoy to Sudan.

…from that prospective it was having a special convoy to handle the civil war component which was between north and south. That commitment to a special convoy allowed the US government and the admiration to have at least a two-pronged approach to the issue. There was also unrest in parts of northern Sudan as well going on…

…with an ongoing civil war taking place the thought of having a peace keeping mission in Darfur was unthinkable for the Sudanese government. So, from a standpoint of the US you had to look at all of the parameters. You had humanitarian crisis taking place in the south (laughs) you know with the civil war. You had the potential for regional conflict to take place with the neighboring states. You had from the intervention of Chad into Darfur at times, or the Sudanese intervening into Chad to overthrow the current regime there.

You had the Central Africa Republic on the other side, you had the influence of refuges into Kenya as well.

…the United States itself has had a series of US special envoys for Sudan…most recently Donald Booth, but at the time of AMIS, Darfur was not on the agenda of the US Envoy, I think--there was certainly a time when it did not have one and the AU itself I recall, if recall correctly, was not very active politically as well. I think that was definitely was a problem.

The lack of interest from the US military in supporting missions outside of those missions it had in Afghanistan and Iraq was also seen as a challenge exhibited by the US. The US military was heavily engaged with Iraq and Afghanistan at the time of AMIS. CENTCOM demonstrated little interest in supporting the AU or placing AMIS as a priority.

...US bosses had little to no interest in supporting any AU mission in Darfur. Obviously, at the time, OEF and OIF were both in high gear. CENTCOM was stretched very thin and completely focused on al Qaeda, other radical Islamist groups in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen. Darfur was absolutely not a priority.

…through my experience, I quite often I had to play the hand that I got dealt. So I am used to, you know, being under resourced because no one gets two shits even in our own military about Africa.

CENTCOM was obviously focused on Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen,

etc.  They were not interested in providing resources or staff officers for an AU

mission in Darfur.


The US election also impacted the US military level of involvement with AMIS

and Darfur.  The Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Department of Defense

was briefed daily on the number of US military personnel in Sudan. There was a

perception that the US military was limited to five personnel on the ground in Sudan for

US political reasons.


> And so, there was a US election coming up and the person sitting at the head of
>
> the table said, "We just have to keep a lid on this till November." Meaning that
>
> there was a slide presented to the chairman regularly on the exact count of US
>
> service personnel in Darfur and that number was never officially supposed to get
>
> more than five, but yet there could be a few people brought in from Juba. So, the
>
> exact size of the US Defense Liaison Office was five and that's what the
>
> chairman said, "That's as big as we are going to get," based on I'm sure
>
> instructions from the civilian side. So, there wasn't a lot of military interest in
>
> being there but USAID and the State Department really wanted to sort this out.


### *AU resources:*

To overcome the issues that AMIS faced, there is now a move to get involved

before the introduction of peacekeeping forces by the UN.  However, the AU still

remains poorly resourced to handle peace intervention before a peacekeeping force is

introduced to address the problem.

> I think the greater sort of discussion globally now and peacekeeping recognizes that there's a lot of discussion now within the UN Security Council on peace building and peace building architecture on that it's obviously better to get involved before you have to get to a peacekeeping situation to prevent conflict. There is a greater emphasis on conflict prevention now and I think a lot of rhetoric is paid to that although the AU is still resourced very poorly.

### *Interference of Sudan:*

Sudan often stepped in the way of the AU to exercise its peacekeeping mission, slowing the progress of AMIS. The US along with the EU had difficulty in getting support personnel into Sudan and Darfur to offer expertise to AMIS.

> I recall spending hours of meetings discussing things as mundane as you know people not being able to get visas…where you would have partners from the United States, from the European Union who were critical to AMIS who simply couldn't get there because of the Sudanese host government.

### *Training:*

Training was another aspect of how the US provided support to the AU and AMIS. There was an effort by the US to expedite training when needed. Training was a challenge for the AU and those African countries supporting AMIS but not

insurmountable since the US was attempting to provide training through its peacekeeping training initiative.

>…we did the training of the troops--the peace keeping training of the troops was fundamentally a major contribution.

>For some it was immediate--there were refresher courses to be given for the Nigerians.

>I think an important factor too is the countries were trained through our peace keeping--through the US peacekeeping program that really added to the quality of the troops that were going to be placed on the ground, and the US was instrumental in providing. I would say not quite overnight training for those who hadn't had the training yet, but the political will to make that training available in as expeditious amount of time that could be done. So, the challenges, while clear, were not insurmountable for the AU.

The US African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) and the US International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs were force multipliers for the troops that populated AMIS.

>…all of the militaries that were involved, the Senegalese, the South Africans, the Nigerians, the Rwandans, IMET was a positive aspect for AMIS.

…what I would say though is there has been a positive impact of the US IMET program because we have seen over time an enhanced African professionalism of the voluntaries.

I think it contributed to it and then you throw in the ACOTA as things you know when they morphed--you the original AMIS mission didn't have the benefit of the ACOTA. But, subsequent because the lessons learned from the first AMIS-- clearly when you look at the improvement of the forces because of the ACOTA training part of deployment.

For the French, there was some level of animosity toward the US training former French colonial nations, such as Rwanda. However, the training for the Rwandans was a straight forward effort for the US.

For the Rwandans, that presented a much bigger change because for one the French were not supportive. Now, why would the French have anything to do with our process? Well, they were interfering a little bit with the AU process in terms of not wanting Rwanda peacekeepers…not outwardly stating, but that animosity was there…our training of the Rwandan peacekeepers was pretty straight forward.

One view was the avenue for training was not seen as being hindered by the US.

The US tended to act swiftly to provide the training.

> There was very little resistance within our own systems. That was just simply bureaucratic mechanisms of nominating them for it and moving them forward.

There were other views on how swiftly the US could react to the training requirements of African troops for peacekeeping.   One of the challenges for US support came in the form of accountability for the training form the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

> But those mechanisms again come back to the US doing a better job of our own mechanisms are not well put into place, so it's not about the AU (laughs) with that it's about the US.   Our own bureaucratic challenges between you know ACOTA (Africa Contingency and Operations Assistant) and IO (Information Operations) and who controls it, between the Defense Department and the State Department--those were some of the biggest impediments to getting people trained and moved, and money moved, and who would lift them and who would authorize it.

> …despite the sheer enormity of our bureaucracy, we were at times the biggest impediment of getting things done. The contracts, that wasn't part of my portfolio so you know those are things that I think internally the US would have to look at but there are legal impediments to what we can and cannot do, but

there are legal impediments to what the AU can and cannot do…until someone

takes the time--some really smart bureaucratic, who does the due diligence--and

we did have some who helped make it work overtime, but those were patch

work things, we haven't go back to reduce those.

I think with having US and AU on board we are better able now, we were better

able to do it for AMISOM because there was a team on the ground. We had

wonderful people who had been placed on the ground for AMIS to help us, but

that was Ad hoc.

…because we didn't have a joint US and AU, mission things with AMIS were

harder.

One of the challenges for the AU and the US was the lack of a multinational

training availability to train multinational African forces—the type of training that was

viewed as invaluable for African peacekeeping force for integration in AMIS.  US

training for the African troop contributing countries was based on a bi-lateral basis.

The US ACOTA (Africa Contingency and Operations Assistance) training was

governed on a bi-lateral training basis.  Thus, the US could not provide multi-

national peacekeeping training to multinational peacekeeping forces destined for

AMIS.

_US interest in the AU and AMIS:_

During the bulk of AMIS, the US did not have an accredited Ambassador or official military advisor to the AU.  The Ambassador to Ethiopia and the Defense Attaché Office took on the responsibility of being the senior US representatives, but their involvement was more a function of desire on their part and not sanctioned as an official US Embassy mission by the US Department of State.

There wasn't much interest in the Central Command leadership with involvement with the AU at the beginning.

The Department of State did not place the AU and AMIS as a mission associated with the US Embassy at the start of AMIS.

The AU even engaging with us was very kind because we did not have diplomatic status at the time. So, it's very interesting that it wasn't until very late in 2006 did we have diplomatic relations formalize. We had a courtesy, we had a gentleperson's agreement to work, but didn't have diplomatic privileges

…we were fortunate enough to have DOD to dedicate at least two personnel overtime during AMIS to facilitate the airlift requirements because our Ambassador to Ethiopia was not accredited as an ambassador to the AU, and we had a wonderful ambassador, but the ambassador didn't have that authority.

…it was very much sort of an ad hoc working level arrangement. We didn't have people fully dedicated to the African Union. We had junior political officers who did a great job, but you know nevertheless they had other responsibilities, and so. And the African Union itself was sort of an adjunct responsibility for the United States Embassy at the time.

...and finally, on the diplomatic side, that was a time when the US mission to the African Union was first established, you know that carved out of the bilateral mission at the US Embassy in Addis Ababa.

The US did not want to provide direct monetary support and opted to provide goods in-kind as well as providing US personnel to support such challenges as logistics.

We didn't want to give money per say, so was support was going to be in kind because we didn't' think that there was enough people in capacity for the African Union to handle money transparently. I think that's where most of the partners tended to go as well to go support in kind. Um, I don't recall the various exact things we provided them honestly at this stage

And of course, personnel provided, for instance logistics…military personnel were kind at a major level at one stage initially to help out with logistic planning.

### Ability of the AU to receive US support:

The AU had a lack of expertise to handle the paperwork and documentation it took to receive US support. The AU did not use the US system for request for support, rather the AU used telephonic or a simple letter for requests. One participant believed that the US should have simplified our system for requests rather than the one mentioned above. There was the view that the US could streamline its bureaucratic process for the AU. In addition, the perception was that the US Representative can now "translate" the requests for the AU and place the request for support in the US system.

Right of the top I can't think of anything in particular. I mean there biggest--one their biggest concern was the enormity of the amount of paper work, which they could not handle because of personnel go through and have the expertise on.

AU requests for US Support were haphazard and generally passed simply by voice or simple letter to State political officers from the Embassy. I'm unaware if other avenues of communication from the AU to Washington were open or operating.

I would say streamline bureaucratic processes for requests, you know making your requests

So, it would be important for us to simply our process before you go to understand their structure. The diligence is not on the organization there to understand your entire--they do have some responsibility, but recognize that

they have 53 of their own countries to understand and then they have rest of the world. So, I think that we could be far more efficient if we would take the time to have now with our embassy on our ground, dedicated personnel to understand the structure there, and then communicate that back so we could begin to look at how we do business with the AU, and then it would truly be a win-win situation.

The lack of qualified and experienced personnel at the AU who could handle the intricate paperwork for accessing US support was also seen as a challenge to the AU. The perception was that the AU could have improved its request mechanism for the support of the US by increasing the number of personnel handling such requests at the AU. There was also the perception that the US could have had a more rapid response time to the AU requests.

Challenges AU had in seeking US Support? AU had difficulty clearly articulating requirements in detail for US to react to the requests

How could US have improved the request mechanism for US support for AMIS? The AU needed more personnel with ability to identify/interpret/transmit request for support—US could have been more available and able to react quicker.

Several participants were not familiar with how the AU personnel requested US support. There was a perception that the US most likely overwhelmed the AU system. The DITF was a way to get the AU into the US request system.

I'm not familiar with that mechanism, so I don't know to be honest.

Oh (pause), you know, I'm trying to think. I am trying to remember the exact nature of the request. I think it was-- I mean obviously certainly the US was extremely interested in, I would say probably quickly overwhelmed the capacity of the African Union too (laughs), to deal with our extreme desire to have them to request assistance (laughs) as how I would put it (laughs).

I do not know how that worked. There were very few times that I was privy to or that I was asked to relay messages to the government for direct support. I think all of that was sort of handled at the African Union level dealing with the office of International Organizations--the Bureau of International Organizations at the State Department.

I don't recall how they did that. I know one of the mechanisms was through the partners in the--there was a partner's meeting that meet weekly in Addis Ababa that was chaired by working level members of the African Union Commission. And maybe that was the problem that uh, often it would be uh the so-called AU DITF (Darfur Integrated Taskforce) as opposed to say the Vice Chairperson, someone of a higher level--the peace and security commissioner who would make direct request to partners.

The US wanted to have visibility for assisting, although there was reluctance in Washington on how to engage with the AU on Darfur and AMIS.  There was the idea that stronger diplomatic push by the AU at a higher level would have been an avenue for the AU to engage with the US.

…definitely there is this desire to be seen, as I mentioned before, as a relevant actor and a real organization, and to get accredited even in Washington, you know…it was kind slow in coming to terms with that higher level of diplomacy, and part of it was probably due to the fact that you know, Washington was still skeptical of what this organization is and where it's heading and what it represented. Is it in contrast to what we are trying to achieve on the continent, but on the other hand, realizing that there's this genocide happening and we can't go in ourselves, so we need that organization to be capable. I think maybe a higher level of diplomacy on the part of the African Union could have been called for as well; a lot was done at lower levels (laughs).

### *African member and international partner support:*

There was, in many cases, a complete reliance on international partners, such as the US to provide many of the logistical, training and monetary resources for AMIS. Most African countries supporting AMIS were challenged with basic clothing and equipment with a few exceptions.  Inoperability of equipment was a concern for the US and the support it could offer.

There were a million and one basically because they relied fully on the partners, so called…with the US, UK, Canada, European Union, and so on and so forth and France to be able to provide everything they that they needed…and were very clearly about what kind of equipment and trying to prioritize and we just get lists and lists and lists from the various countries that were going to contribute to AMIS.  South Africa didn't require too much, but some other countries even asked for like underwear. Fruit of the loom (laughs), you know, that's what we were given because they literally had nothing to be able to send to help make sure that these forces were deployed properly.

They relied on outsiders for vehicles, which of course took a long time to get there…for satellite and other kind of communications. Again, making sure that their equipment was compatible with each other that was another issue…waiting for it to get there, clearing it through customs, and I mean every single bit, you know (pause), was a challenge (laughs).

The African Union has not been able to project itself logistically and depends solely on international partner.

…caused the African Union to depend solely of international funding support and financial accounting.

The AU had to depend on member nations to volunteer to provide peacekeeping

forces. The AU could not involuntarily commit a sovereign nation's troops to peacekeeping in AMIS.

Again, I mean I think the AU itself probably did just about as much as it could have given its capabilities at the time, and given the fact that they we're relying on you know, force contributors from various countries of with very different capabilities in it of themselves (laughs).

US contributions through NATO was another avenue that the US demonstrated support to the AU for executing AMIS. The view was that the AU could not have executed AMIS on their own without outside assistance.

I think that you know, once the UN got involved and you know, NATO as well that that was basically what was needed. I don't think necessarily that they could have done it on their own, and I don't know what they could have done at that point in time to improve apart from being a little more organized (laughs), maybe calling convenient task force something of nerve center that would be really dedicated to the issue.

There were issues related to the colonial period with the EU and NATO that the US did not necessarily have to deal with in supporting the AU. The African member states may have viewed NATO as having members that were former colonizers fighting against the liberation of several African nations through its membership.

…the AU has always been reliant on partners. The United States played a critical role at that point in providing assistance with planning. The EU did as well. NATO had an office in Addis Ababa that also that contributed, but I think one that's not worth noting now.

One thing that is worth noting that is perhaps different 10 years ago, was that NATO in 2004 I got the impression still had some stigma from Cold War Era. That you still had some Africans who recalled NATO fighting against the Wars of Liberation, and so I think now obviously maybe that stigma is not so strong but it was always more palatable politically to propose that EU would do something as opposed to NATO even if it was the same countries.
I think in hindsight, the African Union welcomed American engagement and involvement obviously as a non-European country we did not have the baggage of the colonial past in Africa, and I think it is relevant.

…I do recall some reticence of dealing with NATO for example, as opposed to the European Union because of this perception that they were, you know, colonial powers trying to exert influence in African.

There was also a need to establish an international partners group.  At the start of AMIS, every international partner was working independently of the other partners, and the AU was becoming overwhelmed attempted to answer the questions and requests

from the international partners, one by one.

…an attempt at that type of once stop shopping to convene, you know representatives from the African Union together with the partner countries--they didn't like the donor countries, so partner countries of the African Union to try access what the needs were and to get answers back more quickly in a real time…but again that was basically an outside creation member meetings at the US embassy--well we initially had our own kind of partner coordination group that then involved the African Union and we were kind of going one by one, you know the American's are calling the same the folks, the Canadians were calling the same folks and the other international partners were calling the same folks at the AU.  The AU became over tasked with all the phone calls…

There was an effort to stream line the process between the AU and the international partners, the US looked at what type of international partners group could work most efficiently without interfering with any one partner.

…so, that's why we set up--we basically decided that they needed to have a system that better handled all our queries in one place.  I remember meeting at the embassy, the US embassy, where we had some folks out from Washington to try and look at what-- okay what kind of structure could be effective for the African Union to use. Is it interfaced with a partner's? And to try to coordinate things a bit better and that's how the integrative task force was born.

The international partners group sent representatives to the DITF.  The four representatives of the partner's group. The US, UK, Canada and the EU represented the whole with interaction and questions for the AU related to AMIS. Later, the UN and NATO began to participant in the DITF meeting.

So, the Darfur Intergraded Taskforce was this basically (sighs)…we had (sighs)--we had one sometimes usually one civilian and one military sometimes a member from like the African Union meeting together with representatives of partner of countries: US, UK, Canada and the European Commissioner were core members, and then every now and again we invited like some other AU member state to come and sit in on a rotating basis

I mean the Darfur Intergraded Taskforce got expanded, you know as more players came in. So, the UN joined at one point and we had visits from NATO folks and stuff like that too.

There was a challenge at the AU in planning for US and international partner support.  The International partners and the US filled the planning gap themselves to assist the AU with AMIS.

The international partners themselves decided to create a structure to field requests and to harmonize and de-conflict.  We basically again, we meaning the

partners, kind of realized that as a gap and sort of created that structure for them

to help them organize themselves. They were basically working ad hoc. Just

kind of allowing various partners to be taking up all their time and meetings and

not really being able to plan. There's a huge planning deficit, which again is a

challenge.

I remember we were going to be contributing I remember tents like lodging

basically; not simple tents but lodging. We played a huge kind of a coordinating

role in terms of daily in some cases and in many cases conference calls with the

various capitals, to make sure that the capitals were in sync with what the

various embassies were hearing.

As the AU was in the process of transferring AMIS to UNAMID in early 2007,

the US established a full-time US Representative to the AU (USAU) with

Ambassadorial rank. The USAU was installed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in order to

provide more direct US high level support to the AU.

…what we take for granted now just didn't exist more than a decade ago and so

when the US mission to the African Union was first stood up, I think for several

months there was no there who was actually was a foreign service officer. You

had US personnel assigned in temporary assignments…civil servants from

Washington and some basic ways of engaging with things just didn't exist. For

example, now we have the equivalent of a DATT (defense Attaché) that the

defense had to share with the defense liaison office to engage with the African Union on peacekeeping planning and a whole gamut of issues. But, back then it was much more ad hoc.

The US was the first country to have provided a direct representative to the African Union. The EU followed suit about a year later, year fourteen months, but it was an EU representative. So, the US to date still remains the only non-observer country who has a dedicated representative to it.

The US was allowed access to the AU headquarters that some of the other non-member states did not have due to the relationship that the US had established with the AU prior to and during the start of AMIS.

The relationship between the US and the AU, a very positive one, allowed for some areas of access that some of the other non-African countries would not have had.

At first the US and the international partners did not have direct access to the AU and therefore much of the US work was completed at the US Embassy. In high-level meetings, the US Ambassador would meet with the AU to provide strength to the US position.

Well, again we didn't have admission to the African Union, so we were dealing

with everything out of the embassy, which is a challenge (laughs). We didn't have enough gas to the African Union even, um many other countries did. Um, we again, um, you know, um (pause) while definitely the ambassadors ceased and you know, the secretary of state would busy with what was happening in Darfur and the African Union response.

It was what it came down to in coordination with Washington by telephone of course and daily situation reports. I definitely wouldn't say that higher levels weren't at ease with that matter because they were, and definitely we could count on the ambassador and others to meet with their counterpart or whatever necessary.

At times, there was a competition between the international partners in supporting AMIS. Some partners would attempt to support AMIS through their missions in other countries, such as the Australians who were located in Kenya. There was the perception there were challenges due to the lack of senior people around the table taking the requests and that there was a measure of ad hoc planning and support from the AU for accessing support, such as the US and western partners.

Well, I mean apart from of course there is always this kind of competition from with the partner countries as well and who's going to give a lot, and how that's played to their public, and you know the Europeans wanting to "Okay--We will air lift these folks because they-- we had a closer relationship with them, and

kind of all of those little interests played into it as well.

I remember that the Australian's didn't have any mission there either. They were covering it with their mission in Kenya. I mean just there's a lot of ad hoc, a lot of telephone calls…we had these structures to help coordinate these things a bit better but most of the people around the table were fairly junior most of the time.

### *Challenge of AU with AMIS:*

The AU did recognize that AMIS was a huge undertaking and that the AU required outside assistance from the US and the west.  However, there was a reticence to get the west involved, especially the African didn't want the US or western troops on the ground and US didn't want to send in US troops.

So, I don't know that they necessarily… because again going back to you know, the influence of you know, Libya and others and not desiring too much-- definitely no western boots on the ground, um but even any type of meddling as they may see it on the part of the United States and some European countries. Um, I would say the fact that they needed help was made apparently clear-- abundantly (laughs) clear to them rather than necessarily realizing themselves. I don't know that they really had the capability to assess exactly this huge task that was in front of them, and probably they would tentative had a much smaller scale reaction that would not satisfied at all--kind of western expectations…

That's definitely a challenge for AMIS.

…from a US prospective, in order to support AMIS, after direct consultation with the key African heads of state, in this case with the Ethiopians, with the Nigerians, with the Senegalese, with the South Africans, with the Algerians, with the Tanzanians, as well as in this case the Egyptians it was fundamentally important and at their urging--and I go back to what I said earlier the political decision was not US boots on the ground, but there would be African boots on the ground and we would support.

The AU may not have recognized what western and US support it actually required to run AMIS and did not know how to organize itself to request support. The US may have had a perception that the AU was able to act "above its weight" and therefore had an expectation of a more sophisticated method of requesting US support.

…as good as despite the fact that (pause) I don't think they necessarily had the where with all to realize what type of support they needed or to organize or to realize the type of mission they would have required. So that's why I think that maybe they didn't necessarily request support as such but I think they--our desire to have them make an impact and to plunge above their weight, kind of met their desire to be taken seriously (laughs) to some extent.

There were also competing US interests in Sudan, between the North-South issue and Darfur that split the attention of the US Department of State.

I fully suspect that State's interests were equally balanced between keeping the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) between North and South from falling apart and stopping the fighting. I think those two things were probably equal.

The perception was that the US could have been a stronger supporter of the AU during AMIS. There was a cable sent back to Washington in 2006 outlining how an intervention by the US military could succeed but there was not the political will of the US Government regardless of the fact that two US presidents and three Secretaries of State called Darfur a genocide—something that was not to be tolerated by the US.

We absolutely could have done more. A cable was written in 2006 from an individual to the Department of State that was intended to be a decent channel cable back to Washington explaining that the ongoing peace agreement, peace talks in Abuja were not going to be successful…the cable explained why…If we really want to stop the war here this is what we have to do…basically it was a call for intervention, a military intervention. Had we wanted to do that and had that been politically acceptable, we could have very easily have done so. I say very easily with the fact that we had what 300,000 troops deployed at that point because the surge was on going or the surge was ending…71 brigades and 47 of

them were deployed at exact moment…a third of the army is prepping to go, a third of the army is there, and a third of the army recovering.

You could not have sent a lot of US troops, but you could have very easily using special operations taken out the Sudanese Air force, you know get some NATO help.

There were any number of ways that the United States could have done more to stop what two presidents, three secretaries of state, have called genocide, right?

But it's an incredibly difficult thing to do.  We would have had to have gone to get approval from the UN and China or Russia would have never allowed that, right? China gets way, way, way too much oil from the Sudanese. Russia was just never going to support that.  So, we would have had to find some why to have an authorization. We would have never gotten it through NATO, right? Although there was some talk about the European Union and the African Union coming together into a support role, so maybe this would have been a mission. But could we have done more?

Yeah! Did the political will exist? No. Did the authorization from the international community exist? No. Would it have been incredibly hard? Absolutely. But, you know the cable that was written at the end of the April titled, "Darfur who will apologize?" Because in 1996 I guess after the genocide

in Rwanda President Clinton flew to Rwanda, was he president then? Whatever. He was still there. He flew to Rwanda and you know on the tarmac gave a speech and he said, "We didn't know. You know, we didn't understand."

And he more or less apologized as diplomats do to the people to Rwanda. And I asked the rhetorical question, "If we don't solve this problem in Darfur who will apologize to the people of Darfur? You know the dead of Darfur?" Because at that point we had probably upwards of 350,000 approaching 400,000 dead with 2.5 million displaced; two presidents, three secretaries of state have called it genocide, and under the responsibility to protect, which the agreement came in 2005, the international community is duty bound to respond to this. Under--we have already gone through pillars 1 and 2 and we now have to go to pillar 3, intervention, and we were not intervening…we could have done more. I don't think it would have been easy. I mean it would have been incredibly hard, but we could have done more

A shortfall in resources and funding were a major challenge for the AU during AMIS. The US provide resources such as base-camps, logistics and airlift support rather than direct monetary support to the AU.

I think one thing that the United States did a lot was we provided a lot of in-kind support and continued to do so, and you know in terms of airlift, construction of camps and so for, we did a lot of support in that way. I think one of the

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challenges then that remains a challenge today is that the African Union simply has very poor financial resources.

…so in getting financing for peace operations remains a significant challenge and the United States uh you know always provided strategic direction in kind support, but you know we did not provide funds that were fundable per se.

A reliable funding stream for the AU during AMIS was not available.  There is an effort by the AU to have a reliable funding of 25 percent of the cost of any peacekeeping mission in hand.  However, the reality was that the AU only has a current seven percent level of funding available and most of that seven percent came from the international donor source of the EU.

So, I think, as I mentioned, you know one of the current projects now is to make African Union peace operations have a more reliable funding stream…the African Union Peace and Security Council have pledged in a September Communique from last year, 2015, to fund to 25 percent of the cost of the AU peace operations by the year 2020. In January, it appointed Donald Kaberuka, the former head of the African Development Bank and by the way the Rwanda's finance minister when they were first sending troops to Darfur, as an AU high representative for the peace fund with the mandate to mobilize resources for AU peace operations.

I think that's a recognition by the AU that financing remains a serious challenge. And just to put in perspective of if the goal of the AU is to get to 25 percent in the year 2020 where they are at now? Well, they're at about 7 percent. And that 7 percent includes significant funding from the European Union, which in 2004 and even now remains the single largest donor to the African Union

Airlift for transporting AU peacekeepers in and out of AMIS was critical to the AU as the African countries did not have the airlift capability that the US and western nations had available to transport peacekeepers.

Airlift I think in the initial stages were: US, Australia, and Algeria were the major airlift countries I think in place at the time. The Nigerians also did some of their airlift in, but some of their C130's were not operational at the time, so that was the primary way of bringing troops in

And then along with the US, the UK, and the Australians we were able to coordinate with AMIS and most importantly with the larger umbrella of AU, the lift.

The US was one of several donor countries, or international partners, that were supporting AMIS. The African nations did not come to AMIS prepared with equipment and support organic to its force that the donor countries were able to provide.

The observer countries, in there were a couple, which was the coalition of the willing, which included uh the US, Australia, the UK, and I think those were the

three primary ones that were in place. There were some smaller Scandinavia

countries who gave some resources, which were usually non-lethal. Japan

probably gave some non-lethal resources as well, medical support to it. I don't

remember that the French were contributors in this particular case, but if they

were then I stand corrected. But UK--Australia might have initially provided

some type of support.


…when you go back to the Darfur mission, you know the biggest thing is--here

you have this African Union mission where you have African militaries, and

again you've heard the term 'the naked African,' you know the troops show up

and the donors pay. You know, mainly the United States provides everything

except for the weapons


So, you had 500 infantry guys show up to become the area security for the

peacekeeping mission, and yet they had no ground transportation. They had no

way of feeding themselves. They had no communications. They had no medical.

They had nothing to maintain any of this. So, the international community had

to fund all of this, so aviation assets were held at the force level, the major

general force commander controlled the aviation assets. They consisted of

primarily of six MI17 helicopters who were contracted I think--who, the

Canadians contracted them, they were both Russian or Ukrainian pilots…and

they kind of came with their own maintenance teams I guess.

The communications were contracted by the Brits. The Brits paid to have radios installed in all the vehicles. And the Brits paid for all the force level communications. Medical teams at force level and at sector level, there were six sectors, I think? At the sector level, there would be sort of an independent duty core man level medic…maybe nurse practitioner level. I think at the force level there was a PA or maybe a doctor…food service, um controlled at force level paid for I think by the Americans? Construction of the camps paid for by the Americans and it was contractors--you had these contractors living out on the sector bases providing these services for the Senegalese, or Rwandan, or the South African infantry battalion. We base there--or accompany them, we base there or whatever depending on the size of the post, but these things are real short comings because the logistics, the communications aren't integrated into the unit so it just doesn't work very well.

The AU had to depend on the donor countries outside of Africa and that made the AU vulnerable to the limitation of resource and financial support in a timely manner. Another challenge for the AU was the influence that the donor nations were able to exert.

You rely on donor support, so you know, when you relying on donors you are beholden to the donors, and not only that the money doesn't come very fast, so you wind up being very limited in what you can do.

We weren't at every single internal meeting, although I would say that probably the partners had a lot more access and were a much greater part of the decision making and agenda setting that would be the normal, but you know they had no other choice.

The US would have had a different method of executing AMIS. A major challenge for the AU was the lack of a staff that had planning experience and some could not operate a computer.

If this had been a US operation, we would have had dozens of planners with every conceivable expertise working 24/7 for weeks or months on end. They had a handful of guys, most of whom had little planning experience, couldn't operate a computer, and some of whom were not fluent in a common language. I think I remember an AMIS planning conference at the AU (late 2004?), but it was mostly lots of promises which went unfulfilled. Other western nations tried to help, the Brits and Germans. I think the EU sent a liaison officer (Brit?) for a while who tried to help as well.

The US provided its assistance to the AU as services and in-kind contributions, rather than straight US dollars. The lack of direct monetary contributions by the US was a disappointment to the AU but it did not cause a rift between the AU and the US. The EU was able to react much quicker when it came to monetary infusion and short suspense items.

You know I think there was a perception that the United States as a super power

would provide more financial aid to the African Union. There is always that

hope perhaps. And in that regard, we disappointed the African Union

Commission because again most of our assistance was assistance in-kind. But I

don't know it was a clash between the United States and the African Union.


The US could be slow in its providing in-kind support for certain items.  The

AU was often able to go with a shopping list to the EU and the EU would

provide the money to purchase these items where the US had its own

bureaucratic tail to content with that could slow the process down.


…mainly the United States provides everything except for the weapons.


Construction of the camps paid for by the Americans through direct contracts.


### *Future of African peacekeeping:*

There was a perceived difference between the US and the AU in how the

Government of Sudan's sovereignty was viewed.  There have been several initiatives

for the US to get more involved with supporting the African nations with peacekeeping

where lives ae are stake.  These initiatives did not exist during AMIS but the genocide

in Rwanda and Darfur were the catalyst for the US's view of today.

…looking back to where we were in 2004 with where we are in peacekeeping in 2016, you know, a key difference now is a recognition that states sovereignty is not paramount to the US as it was with the AU.

That there are times when because of the imperative of protecting civilians there needs to be greater action. You know, I think the promulgation of these Kagali Principles is today the whole right to protect movement…which didn't exist 10 years ago or perhaps just nascent then as really taken hold, so you know the culture in which we conduct peacekeeping is very different now.

And I think also there is a recognition that perhaps, I think, there is more openness now maybe doing things without side partners. You see in one of the debates with AMIS was trying to preserve the African nature of the mission and so while that is a nice goal it means that you're not going to have support from say Nepal or a western country for airlift and you know those things are absolutely essential.

…one of the things that the United States is doing now, and this goes back to two years ago when it had the US Africa Summit in Washington one of the outcomes of that was APREP, the African Peacekeeping Record Response Partnership, and it was identifying five or six African countries explicitly that would get targeted US assistance to deploy rapidly for a situation in which civilian's lives are at risk. And I think in another part of the US institutional

framework, that didn't exist then, was the Atrocity Prevention Board, and so at largely was a result of Rwanda and possibly Darfur, and now you have an Atrocity Prevention Board who proceedings are not public as far as I know, but it is an interagency effect at looking at the next Darfur and what is the next.

During AMIS, there was not as much support to the AU as there is today. Today there are 35 non-African nations accredited to the AU where the US was not accredited to the AU until early 2007, the tail end of AMIS. There are currently additional non-African countries that have been engaging with the AU such as China, Japan, Turkey and South Korea that did not exist at the current level during AMIS and are seen as competitors of the US for engagement in Africa.

I think as the African Union evolves--I there are more than 35 countries that are not part of the African Union's 53 members that I think are accredited to the African Union…another big difference I think over the last 10 years is the degree to which non-traditional partners have become more active in the African Union and Africa itself, so countries like Turkey, China, Japan, and South Korea.

You know every major power now has a huge Pan-African event. And so where as the United States has continued to have a US-Africa forum to promote trade between the United States and Africa.

Tokyo has TEKAD (Tokyo International conference on Agricultural and development) which is Africa focused…its being held for the first time this year in Africa. It used to be held in Tokyo every 5 years. The Japanese plan is to do it now every 3 years I believe.  China has a similar thing in Beijing and you have a number of other things such as the recent establishment of the Chinese logistic based in Djibouti highlights the degree to which these non-traditional partners are becoming more and more active in Africa and a competitor to the US's involvement.

The relationship that the US enjoys with the AU now was different at the start of AMIS.  Historically the perception was that the US was at a nascent level attempting to support the AU in the period of time of AMIS.  The US was becoming more engaged in Africa with the advent of PEPFAR and the planning for the establishment of the new COCOM, AFRICOM.

I guess one of the other things, that may be very obvious, is that it was the beginning of the United States of the formal relationship between African Union and the United States at that time, and so it is sort of taken for granted right now, but you know 2004 to 2007 was a time when the United States was actively trying to become more engaged with Africa.  And so, you know in defense, African, was stowed up as a separate command…on the health development side you had PEPFAR (President's Plan for AIDS Relief), launched by President Bush, which is now global, but obviously the President's emergency plan for

AIDS really focused great, in a large part, on African countries. I think

Condoleezza Rice, actually no, in Bush's autobiography he talks about the

genesis of this and how with Condoleezza Rice--the genesis of PEPFAR was

trying to do more for Africa.

I think it was useful looking at our involvement in the African Union that it was

part of the broader engagement in African and the establishment of the US

African Command, with the establishment of the presence of the emergency

plan for AIDS relief…the United States was doing a great deal on Africa to be

more engaged and I think it was well received.

*Summary of Key Sub-Question 3*

A shortfall in resources and funding were a major challenge for the AU during

AMIS.   Another challenge for the AU was the lack of a staff that had planning

experience and some could not operate a computer.  The African nations did not come

to AMIS prepared with equipment and support organic to its force that the donor

countries were able to provide.  The US was determined to be the top international

donor country to the AU during AMIS after initially little interest in supporting the AU.

The influence that the donor nations were able to exert were seen as a challenge for the

AU since it lacked its own funding stream and resources.

The US was not a major support contributor to the AU at the beginning of

AMIS.   There was the idea that the US Department of State and the US Department of

Defense, specifically CENTCOM, were not interested in supporting the AU at the

outset of AMIS due to the legacy of the former OAU.  Through the efforts and reporting

by the US embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the State Department began to view the

AU in different eyes.

There was a challenge on the US side throughout AMIS in not being able to

react quickly on some requests for equipment.   The support that did come from

Washington was assessed as slow in the beginning.  Conversely, the mechanism that the

US had put in place was difficult for the AU to configure their requests for US support.

There was the view that the US military was more helpful than other parts of the US

Government as a whole and that once the US military engaged with the AU the US

support mechanism sped up the support process.

The US determined early on in the Darfur crisis not to intervene directly.   There

was the view that the Africans did not want the western nations to intervene as well.  It

was the Government of Sudan that chose the AU's intervention as Sudan did not want

western intervention on its soil.   The Africans wanted to see African problems as being

solved by the Africans.  However, the AU was desperately in need of US support, as an

international donor country, for airlift, logistics, skilled advisers, and resources that the

AU did not possess.  The view was that the AU could not have executed AMIS on their

own without outside assistance.  There was, in many cases, a complete reliance on the

international partners, such as the US, to provide many of the logistical, training and

monetary resources for AMIS.  Most African countries supporting AMIS were

challenged with providing basic clothing and equipment with a few exceptions.

Inoperability of equipment was a concern for the US and the support it could offer.  The

US ACOTA program did provide support equipment for African peacekeepers that

were destined for AMIS.

Through the US Department of State's Agency for International Development (USAID), the US was perceived to have placed more money support and assets to Darfur than any other donor nation. The US provided financial support (in kind) for the deployments and the sustainability of AMIS. The US Department of State and the White House were involved with developing support mechanism for the AU with the bi-partisan support of the US Congress. There was an interagency cooperative effort under way with the US Congress to provide funding for the AU and AMIS. The US provided resources such as base-camps, logistics and airlift support rather than direct monetary support to the AU.

There was a demonstrated need to establish an international partners group to streamline support to the AU. At the start of AMIS, every international partner was working independently of the other partners and the AU was becoming overwhelmed attempting to answer the questions and requests from the international partners, one by one. In an effort to stream line the process between the AU and the international partners, the US looked at what type of international partners group could work most efficiently without interfering with any one partner. The international partners group sent representatives to the DITF. The four representatives of the partner's group, the US, UK, Canada and the EU, represented the whole with interaction and questions for the AU related to AMIS. Later, the UN and NATO began to participant in the DITF meeting. There was a challenge at the AU in planning for US and international partner support. The international partners, including the US, filled the planning gap themselves to assist the AU with AMIS.

A major challenge for US Support was the lack of knowledge of the structure of the AU and the manner in which Africans operated in order for the US and other international parties to provide any form of resource or assistance. The US personnel that were providing support to the AU had no difficulty with accessing the officials of the AU. In order to not overwhelm the AU, the US and other international partners set up a partners group to provide support to the AU. The US was able to demonstrate its support for the AU and AMIS by being present at AU open meetings as an observer country.

There was a lack of expertise at the AU to handle the paperwork and documentation it took to receive US support. This ca be viewed as a cross-cultural issue of African not being cognizant of the way that US as a western nation operated. The AU did not use the US system for request for support, rather the AU used telephonic or a simple letter for requesting US support that was contrary to the western culture way of conducting business. There was the belief that the US should have simplified the American system for requests rather than the complex system the AU faced in attempting to access US support. The AU may not have recognized what western and US support it actually required to run AMIS and did not know how to organize itself to request support. The US may have had a perception that the AU was able to act "above its weight" and therefore had an expectation of a more sophisticated method of requesting US support. There was a perception that it was sometimes easier to deal with the troop-contributing countries themselves rather than the AU headquarters.

The US was exerting pressure on the diplomatic front within the UN and Sudan

to resolve the issue in Darfur.  The US had a special envoy in Sudan to address the

north-south issue.  There were a number of issues in Sudan to include Darfur and the

peace mission of the AU and AMIS that was not on the agenda of the US Special Envoy

to Sudan.

The lack of a US mission to the AU during AMIS was seen as a huge challenge

and disadvantage for the US in providing support to the AU.  The US during most of

AMIS was handled by the local US Embassy staff and information from Washington.

There was some assistance the US military sent but it was challenged by short duration

work that lacked continuity and lack of expertise.

Airlift of TCC peacekeepers was seen as one of the more rapid responses that

the US possessed in supporting the AU and AMIS.  It was noted that most African

nations do not possess organic airlift capability. The US, as well as, NATO supplied

most of the airlift for AMIS.  US contributions through NATO was another avenue that

the US demonstrated support to the AU for executing AMIS.

Another vital area in which the US supported AU was through the establishment

of base camps in Darfur and the use of a contract companies to support the logistics of

AMIS.  A challenge was observed in the US contractors being able to access resources

in Sudan.  One of the challenges seen with US support was with the contractors

themselves that were acting on the behalf of the US.   The US was not always able to

fulfill its stated obligation since it was using contract work and depended on the

company hired to fulfill its obligation in a time agreed upon.

Training was another area that the US demonstrated support to the AU and

AMIS.  There was an effort by the US to expedite training when needed through the US

ACOTA program. Training was a challenge for the AU and those African countries supporting AMIS but not insurmountable since the US was attempting to provide training through its peacekeeping training initiative. The US ACOTA training program and the US IMET programs were seen as force multipliers for the troops that populated AMIS. Although the US acted swiftly in providing training support to the AU, there was a challenge observed that the US lacked the availability of multi-national training on a multi-national basis for the African troops that were assigned to AMIS. US training for the African troop contributing countries was based on a bi-lateral basis.

Organizational communications was also an area that the US provided assistance to the AU. A US initiative to support the AU in the area of communications was through the development of an operations center located at the AU headquarters for internal communication as well as communication with AMIS.

As the AU was in the process of transferring AMIS to UNAMID in early 2007, the US established a full-time US Representative to the AU (USAU) with Ambassadorial rank. The USAU was installed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in order to provide more direct US high level support to the AU.

The diplomatic engagement of the US support mechanism provided an avenue for the AU not to repeat the challenges it had experienced with AMIS. The US wanted the AU to learn the lessons from AMIS and apply them to AMISOM. A US, as well as an AU, initiative that the US desired was for the AU to develop a closer working relationship with the UN - a relationship that did not exist during the time of AMIS.

During AMIS, there was not as much support to the AU as there is today. Today there are 35 non-African nations accredited to the AU where the US was not

accredited to the AU until early 2007, the tail end of AMIS.  There are currently

additional non-African countries that have been engaging with the AU such as China,

Japan, Turkey and South Korea that didn't exist at the current level during AMIS and

are seen as competitors of the US for engagement in Africa.

## Key Sub-Question 4

Communications:  *What were the communications challenges in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan, to include cultural communication?"*

Key sub-question 4 addresses the challenges of communication focusing on

cross-cultural communication challenges exhibited by the AU during the time frame

through the lens of senior US officials who worked with the AU during AMIS.  This

study provides the perspective of US senior officials through an interview process

conducted by the researcher.  Cross-cultural communication was observed by the study

participants, and each had their own view of how the AU members working in Addis

Ababa, Ethiopia at the headquarters of the AU dealt with the challenges brought forth

with communicating.

### *Language communication:*

A challenge faced by the AU in the execution of AMIS in Darfur, Sudan was

related to the communication of language.  There are approximately 2,100 native

languages used throughout the continent of Africa (Childs, 2003).  The use of one

language for overall communications as well as the use of native languages when

applicable was brought forth in the interviews.

There were several accounts in the interviews related to the effectiveness of language. The use of English as the primary language of peacekeeping was emphasized in the interviews for internal communication and in the four official languages of the AU for external communication; English, French, Arabic and Portuguese:

…I can only assume that communication was as effective as one could be given that the main language used was English among the commanders and the staffs in AMIS.

I mean pretty standard levels of communication through communiques using English from AMIS to the AU and externally the AU would use communiques written in the four official languages of the AU. They turned in reports of accountability, of challenges they faced in the field to the AU.

The AU, as well as AMIS, used the method of communiques to communicate internally and externally. The communiques coming from AMIS were written in English as a common language for AU peacekeeping missions. However, the interviews demonstrated that the external communiques from the AU headquarters were always provided in the four official languages of the AU; Arabic, English, French and Portuguese.

There were a number of challenges brought forth by the participants that ran contrary to the effectiveness of the use of English as the primary language used in

executing AMIS.  However, the participants noted that the use of English may have caused some misunderstanding, but it did not have a negative impact on the accomplishment of the overall AMIS peacekeeping mission.  The use of translators at the AU assisted in any misunderstanding due to any language difference.

…there were occasional misunderstandings I guess between native Arabic speakers, native speakers of other African languages, of other languages, people for whom French or English was a second or third language something they learned for this job, for a job…but that is to be expected in any kind of international mission. I didn't see anything that sort of held the mission back because of you know, linguistic communication errors or problems.

Kagame (President of Rwanda) on this film--this video that we saw of him you know addressing the diplomats that are there, and he's doing this in English, and he addressing whoever else is around in French, he speaks some French for a while, and his French isn't that good because he grew up speaking English in Uganda. And then he just sort of addresses the troops in Ki-Swahili and he basically says to them, "You know we have a long experience with the United Nations in this country since 1994. This is ours first international peacekeeping mission." He told the Rwandan troops to lean forward and protect civilians and don't do anything to embarrass this country or yourself.

I don't have any particular insight into internal communication within the AU,

other than it was an understandable challenge.  Common languages versus

mother tongues, and levels of education were always a challenge among

contributing countries…

There weren't any real language issues. The missions were conducted in English

and there were a few Francophone countries represented but I don't remember

there really being any real issues. Some of the traffic was done in Arabic, but

there were plenty of translators around.

There was the occasional misunderstanding due to language, but the perception

was that the mission, such as AMIS, was not hampered by the diverse languages spoken

on the African continent.  Rwanda was mentioned as a population that spoke at least

three languages, and the President spoke in a mutual understood language of Ki-

Rwandan when addressing the troops since there was a mix and French and English, but

all troops spoke the native language of Ki-Rwandan.

…there were occasional misunderstandings I guess between native Arabic

speakers, native speakers of other African languages, of other languages, people

for whom French or English was a second or third language something they

learned for this job, for a job…but that is to be expected in any kind of

international mission. I didn't see anything that sort of held the mission back

because of you know, linguistic communication errors or problems

…there were political issues…one never knows what a national contingent has been told by their national military leadership command or their national command, right?

I had seen a video of President Paul Kagame addressing the Rwandan troops just as they are boarding the Illusionist to fly from Kegali up to Darfur. And there was a big ceremony out on the tarmac at the airport um, and in Rwanda--okay, let's remember that Paul Kagame is Major General Paul Kagame, right? When he was in Uganda as a young man in the refugee camps he joined the rebellion with Mosetami. He became the intelligence chief of Mosetami's rebel force and later the intelligence chief of the Ugandan army, plus he was trained in the United States. Then when Fredrick Gamel was killed in the early days of the RPF coming across the border in 1990 I guess that was Paul Kagame came back from the United States and took charge of the RPF July of 1994, Major General Paul Kagame becomes Vice President and Minister of Defense of Rwanda, so Kagame then as President is a trained military officer and he's addressing as the President of Rwanda this contingent of Rwandan soldiers. Now, it's interesting the Rwandan army, you know there's the native language Ki-Rwanda; there's Anglophones that grew up outside the country; there are Francophones that grew up inside the country. So, to avoid all of this the orders language for the Rwandan army is Ki-Swahili. So, everybody speaks three languages at least, right?

One participant had the perception that the use of different languages such as French and English was a challenge for communication in the AU.

The language between French and English was a problem in communication was a challenge in some areas.

### *Cultural impact on communication:*

The cultural aspect of staffing was an AU structural design that proved to be a challenge perceived by a participant. The AU did not have anyone available during the weekend as a part of the African culture.

…on the weekends, nobody's around, at night nobody's answering the phone because the offices are not staffed, and that's just not a part of their culture.

There were no issues observed with a cultural issue due to languages for those who came from Anglophone nations versus those who came from Francophone nations. The mix of Muslim cultures did not pose a challenge to the AU or AMIS. There did not appear to be any issues related to the language barrier. Or the lack of language adaptation related to cross-cultural communication.

I didn't see any difference in the cultural communication between the Francophone and Anglophone countries participating in the AU or AMIS. Not really, no. Even a lot of the nationals that were traditionally Anglophone there

were a lot of Muslims in there. In the Anglo nations not so much, the Guyana's, the South Africans, the Rwandans…but remember we had the Egyptians we had the Senegalese, we had Chadians, and then you know the Darfur rebels were represented on the ceasefire mission and on all the investigating teams. The Chadians were called mediators, so the Chadians mediators would come on. And you know, I never saw any--I don't remember seeing any issues with sort of culturally, no.

However, cultural variations did have an impact. The culture of the AU is a mix of 53 member nations, all possessing their own culture as well as the culture of the continent of Africa.

And again, that stems from the whole AU culture if you will. Culture in parentheses, this whole notion--here you have 54 countries, actually its 53 because Morocco is not a member…a lot of them are very rich, but no one really contributed.

There were some cross-cultural issues related to the African versus the western way of operating due to the experience of working the western model.  The west had certain cultural expectations that were not met by the Africans, such as a 24-Hour running operations center, the reporting from units in the field and the development of procedures that the African staff followed.

There was some real cultural differences and again western and European

expectations and experience were dramatically different from the experience of

the African commanders

…well culturally you know our expectations were very high. We wanted to see a

24-hour operation center, units calling in, SOPs, you know nine line forms--this

is what this type of report is for, this is the time you send it--all the things that

normal American and NATO military operations standards require, and they just

culturally that's not something these guys did.

### *African Culture:*

Africans were seen as having a shared common understanding of consensus on

how to conduct diplomacy and a shared commonality in cultural that was respected at

the AU and the individual nations.  The AU was cross-cultural in design where each

leadership and staff role had a different cultural background. There was a perception

that there was a shared message between the senior officials as they had the same

message.  The lower levels were not observed.

I would say highlighting the diplomacy component; that one I think for non-

Africans is all too often overlooked. The art of diplomacy under--of all the

African heads of states, so we know for the Sudanese they know that it was the

consensus because they are a consensus organization.

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…obviously, there were various individuals in these positions were from different member countries of the African Union…the Chairperson was from a different country than the deputy chairperson. There is a deputy chair person who I remember from one point was from Rwanda and his own experience I think background and dealing with the genocide there and he had been a refuge as a child, in Rwanda as well as in Uganda. Yeah, but he had been living in a refugee camp Uganda as a child is the point, that kind of colored his thinking to some extent, and you know conviction that we had to do something in Darfur and be serious. The commissioner for peace and security is from Algeria, and the director of the crisis management branch was from Mauritania. So yeah, all different--yeah, most of them were civilians and then there's a small military component as well.

I guess similarly at top of AU commissions and head of the AU seemed to have the same messages and so they seemed to be consulting each other with the same messages…I didn't see at the lower levels given as I engaged at the senior level.

The main forces in AMIS were Rwandan and Nigerian where the perception was one of cultural cooperation. There was the view that the Rwandan and the Nigerians we able to relate to the populations although there were West Africans operating in East Africa; from very diverse cultural backgrounds.

I will applaud the Rwandans who are a much smaller force, and but also very

experienced, but not to the same extent as the Nigerians, engaged very

cooperatively. And their expertise in their own cultural as well as historic

experience with genocide I think balanced out the differences between the two

forces.

Their ability to relate to population I think was a critical component. We tend to

as westerners look at Africa as one homogeneous society. Sometimes referring

to Africa the continent almost as if it were one nation state. But the complexity

of having West Africans in East Africa.

### *Culture of communication based on religion:*

Another cultural challenge that the members of AMIS were perceived as

overcoming was the fact that the Rwandans, although East Africans, were not Muslim.

Those who were Muslim from Nigeria had a major cultural difference from the

Muslims of Sudan.  The idea was that the Africans, regardless of nationality or religious

background, were couched under the flag of the AU and therefore brought a cultural

sensitivity that a non-African nation might not have brought.  The umbrella of Africans

entering Sudan gave the Sudanese a comfort level.

To have Rwandans who are East African, but not a Muslim population also

presents challenges. So, it would have been the same had we sent in a UN

peacekeeping force and the troops were from Honduras and El Salvador or

Canada the same challenges persist, and both organizations are so close in

structure. So, I think the fact that-- the cultural sensitivity of AU mission

brought more to the table than the culture sensitivity I think you would have had

from Latin American, but note there are cultural differences. So, the big

umbrella of being Africans gave the Sudanese some comfort.

…even though the Nigerians have a sizable Muslim population, there are major

cultural differences between the two.

## *Communication with the US:*

There was a belief that the AU level of communication was good with the US as

an external partner.  The communications between the AU and the US was seen as

adequate given the circumstances with the level of communications that the AU

possessed during AMIS from an organizational point of view.  The communications

between the AU and the US was at a level of expectation from a respondent point of

view.

There was ongoing communication between the US and the AU headquarters. I

think it was definitely an open level of communication with the Chairperson of

the AU through the Assistant Security of States and the US Embassy I would

say that communications were good.

How did the AU communicate externally with the US during AMIS?  The

communication with the US was generally good as can be expected.

### *Communication between AU and AMIS:*

Communications was a challenge of the AU headquarters as the organizational communication was not running efficiently. In addition, the communication between the AU headquarters and the commander of AMIS was lacking.

…I do remember them standing up the new peace and security counsel…the Alert Center, but again that was not functioning.

…one of the things to my knowledge and this is where the United States I think was trying to enhance is that from a military standpoint I don't think they had the communications infrastructure, example, either HF or FM, you know the physical communication capability, you know where the field commander could communicate directly…it was rudimentary at best. So, they just lacked general communication infrastructure. And I'm not sure how they actually communicated physically.

I do know that they transmitted written reports I think on a weekly and daily basis, but, that is not necessarily the most efficient. I mean that should be one communication mechanism, but a commander should be participating probably in daily calls with Djinnit (Commissioner of the Peace and Security Commission) and I don't know whether that happened or not.

…doesn't have the right kind of equipment or any kind of modern communication system.

The senior officials at the Darfur Integrated Task Force communicated with the international partners at the Task Force meetings. However, the senior official at the AU did not appear to be authoritative and seemed to pass on information from his chain of command rather being a decision maker who could communicated with the international partners.

So the Darfur Intergraded Taskforce was run by senior African AU personnel and was this basically (sighs) we had (sighs)—the US had one sometimes usually one civilian and one military sometimes a member from like the African Union meeting together with representatives of partner of countries: US, UK, Canada, and the European Commissioner were core members, and then every now and again we invited like some other AU member state to come and sit in on a rotating basis but all decisions were made at the top.

…the personality that was in charge of the Darfur Integrated Taskforce, while he was quite willing to talk to the partners didn't necessarily seem very authoritative; it was unclear where he was getting his information from. Sometimes that would not necessarily mess with information that would be gleaned from higher level meetings with in his chain of command. Sometimes

they didn't really even seem to kind of know what the priorities were, the higher
level people.

Not every participant noticed cultural challenges in communication. However,
women were not treated equal to men despite the AU policy that 50 percent of the
commissioner positions would be held by women. There was the perception that
women were treated differently than men due to a cultural difference for the Africans.

There were probably cultural challenges but I didn't see it…Cultural
communications… they probably did have cultural challenges…I did see that
woman had difficulty culturally with the African context along the AU was
supposed to have 50 percent woman at the commissioner level.

Cultural communication challenges were seen in how the US perceived African
ambassadors whose level of sophistication differed. The African ambassadors were
duel hatted as Ambassadors to Ethiopia and accredited to the AU, so the US was able to
leverage the stronger African ambassadors to find out what was occurring at the AU.
The strongest African ambassadors were listed as the ambassadors from Zambia,
Algeria and South Africa.

I saw cultural communication challenges and I saw most African ambassadors
were also Ambassadors to Ethiopia and "dual hatted" … so easy to learn about
the AU through the bi-lateral relationship. Some were weak and others more

sophisticated. There was some for example Zambia, Algeria and South Africa
that sent very seasoned ambassadors to Ethiopia and we had dual responsibility
with the AU. The US was able to engage the African ambassadors and the
African ambassadors were happy to tutor the US on their thoughts.

Participants saw the AU as a band of brothers, culturally, and from a cultural
perspective that may have been a controversial issue to the western view.

AU Headquarters—style I see – I comment member states and commission a
genuine homo-genesis identity of AU member states and the commensurate –
implicit were are all brothers and in this together. However, leads to disposition
of controversial issues that are not in step with western treatment/perspectives.

One observation was that perhaps there was a divide between the Arab states of
the AU and the non-Arab states. One participant posited that the Arab states saw
themselves more aligned with the Arab league vice the AU.

Well, I don't know to what extent one of the fissures in Africa is between states
that fundamentally see themselves as members of the Arab League and others
that do not. And so, I don't know to what extent Arab States, including Sudan,
were able to leverage that influence within the African Union I just don't know. I
just don't have enough insight on that.

There was the perception that that AU was undergoing a cultural shift from the former OAU to the nascent AU. This was mainly in the area of interference of the OAU to the AU's view of non-indifference.

I think one was that there was a cultural shift at the African Union, of course. You had a shift from the OAU's non-interference to the African Union's non-indifference, and so that was the cultural shift of the African Union

…one thing that has already been alluded to is that the cultural of the African Union of itself as an organization was changing globally from uh the principle of non-interference that countries were sovereign and that did not challenge that to a principle of non-indifference. And I think we have come a lot further on that now.

There was direct communication on a regular basis where the commander and the deputy commander of AMIS traveled back and forth between Darfur and the AU headquarters. The commanders debriefed the commissioner of the Peace and Security Commission and the President of the AU Commission.

Well, the commander and the deputy commander both made regular trips back to Addis to debrief with Ambassador Djinnit and President Konaré and to provide them with an overview of what was taking place.

There was perception that the President of the AU commission, Konaré, who was a Muslim and from a predominately Muslim country, was able to open a dialogue with the Sudanese.

…the fact that at the time President Konaré, a former president of Mali from a Muslim country, a predominately Muslim country, provided the stature of the gravitas, the comfort zone that the Sudanese needed to have or in the street vernacular the top cover the Sudanese needed to have--knowing that they weren't going to get away with anything, but knowing that they had a forum that they could go and have the conversation.

Some participants felt that AU member contingents for peacekeepers did not share a broad vision-that each contingent followed their own view on how to accomplish the mission. In addition, there was not a shared vision at the AU as to how to view the situation in Darfur. There was the perception that some in the AU felt they should give Sudan room to address its own issues, while others saw the AU as a new organization that had the right to intervene while lessening the impact of the western nations.

I don't think there was a broad shared vision. I think each contingent region had their own views on how things should be done.

I think they had lots of semi-shared red lines of things that they didn't want to

have happen…they didn't want (sigh)--Sudan is a member, right (laughs)? So

that's a problem when one of your own members is perpetrating genocide in

some country. Some of them were wanting to give the member a state a chance

to breathe and redeem itself. Others wanted to show that the organization was

very capable. Others wanted to make it look-- I got the sense that they had

things under control to try and minimize the western impact or footprint. So I

think they definitely had kind of competing interests in a sort of way. I mean of

course there were those who just said-- I think really truly felt that this genocide

was unacceptable

The communication from AMIS was handled by the AMIS force commander.
The force commander was seen as executing the strategic plan that was developed at the
AU headquarters.

I didn't see any frustration or any disconnect between the mission, but like any

commander on the ground you're going to view it from your vantage point and

it's not always the same as the strategic leadership that is back in the capital but

at the end of the day the force commander on the ground would provide the

information to the AU leadership and the AU leadership would package the

communication to the outside.

…and to communicate them, and at the end of the day the commander on the

ground executes and doesn't do the strategic planning.

### *AU method of communication:*

One participant saw the AU has having a more horizontal method of communication while another viewed the AU as having a centralized method of communication.

I saw more horizontal form of communication…

The AU had a centralized method of communication.

The AU was small in size and that fostered a good flow of information within the AU.  However, the communication often stayed in individual channels and not shared throughout the AU as the AU was just starting out as a new organization.

 As for organization communicating, the AU was small enough that there was good communication between each at the AU other but in stove pipes as the AU was just getting started.

 …they created mission as they went along…

Organization Communicating---small enough that there was good communication between each at the AU other but in stove pipes as the AU was just getting started…they created mission as they went along…

## US communication with the AU:

The US needed to find a way to communicate with the AU so that the Africans knew the US was serious. The US, however, had to be careful in how the US members approached the AU without seeming offensive.

It was important to figure out a way to communicate suggestions to the AU so that the ideas were communicating without being offensive to the Africans.

On communication, the AU need to know that the US was serious and we needed to communicate that to the AU.

Some respondents viewed the level of communication between the AU and the US as fine as it was and that the AU did all it could at the time of AMIS.

There was nothing wrong with it. There was no need to improve it because it was an excellent level of communication, without the dialogue between the foreign ministers and the ambassadors this would not have happened, and most certainly they had the ear of their presidents. So, sometimes there's not a need for important. You couldn't have done more than they did at the time.

Even with the change in US leadership, the communication level stayed constant, according to a participant, due to the level of mutual respect between the

African ambassadors and the US. The level of respect was what keep the communication seamless in time of leadership change.

> Although there was a change in US leadership at the Assistant Secretary level, I think the transition between those in play on all sides seamless because of the quality of the African ambassadors and their ability to understand Washington and communicate that back to the respective countries as well as their ability to provide that kind of dissemination of information by the African heads of states and their other foreign ministers on the ground within the AU made this possible and the African heads of states and President Bush that engagement, that seamless engagement, that respect, mutual respect was key to this moving forward.

The way the AU tended to communicate was seen as a communication issue. The lack of telephone connectivity and the use of Hotmail email accounts demonstrated to the participants that the AU did not possess modern equipment or use more modern methods. This meant that the AU could not communicate effectively.

> Yeah paper, literally running paper from one place to another. Telephones sometimes didn't work, just very unclear. I mean cell-phones you know, five cellphones at a time. The AU and AMIS didn't seem necessarily very secure or very you know, modern.

I mean how they did it was mostly as I recall a lot of cellphone calls and paper

like little, you know, literally things that somebody else was going to have to

make a copy of and get this somewhere

…like Hotmail addresses and yahoo addresses, open and things like that

Respondents expressed that the AU's external communication with the US

during AMIS was generally defined as good.  However, the communication was at

times inadequate because the AU lacked the personnel who could do the

communicating with the international partners.  Even if the AU had had enough

personnel, they would have lacked the technical expertise…since there was such a large

number of international partners, or donors, attempting to communicate with the AU at

one time, the capability of the AU to handle such communication was not effective.

The AU used one place for the international partners to communicate with the

AU.  It was called the Darfur integrated Task Force that was run by the Africans

with assistance from the international partners.  This allowed for the AU not

having to have multiple questions and for international partners, including the

US, to understand better what their needs are, and to also communicate you

know, what our capital's thinking was about various things.  In retrospect you

know, it was definitely better than what was there.   Each international partner

used the Darfur integrated Task Force if they had particular concerns, otherwise

we agreed that we would raise questions on their behalf.  Kind a meeting--it was

supposed to be a way for them to get all of our questions primarily.

Yeah, well I mean again they didn't have external missions for communications. So, I don't know if they could have improved that it would have been great if they had one (laughs). If they had one in Washington maybe they would have helped, right?

The Ambassador of course had access and met frequently with the peace security commissioner, so just general you know, meetings like that. That's basically how the communicating--the African Union as I mentioned didn't really have a mission in Washington, so there was no kind of on the ground communication there it was all pass via-via. You know, we had conference calls sometimes they joined the conference call. Sometimes the conference calls were just with partners

### *African cultural communication method:*

There was an African perceived cultural communication aspect exhibited between the various levels of rank among African militaries. The African military culture uses communication that is mostly directive in nature as opposed to the joking that can occur in the US military between officer and enlisted ranks.

…the communications between officers enlisted very directive, not a lot of play that I see in western armies where officers can joke with their troops, but yet that division is still there, that respect for the rank is still there.

### *AU communication with AMIS:*

The AU found itself passing the main information on AMIS through the key members of the African nations, such as the Presidents, Foreign Ministers and the African ambassadors. The mode of communications normally came from the senior members of each nation for that particular nation.

And the coalition again with the key leadership of the AU making African presidents, their foreign ministers and ambassadors aware of the situation with AMIS from the AU perspective. The ambassadors from both Nigeria and Rwanda were instrumental in their engagement in the AU as the AU communicated the issues of deployment to and from AMIS. So the tiers were primarily with the foreign ministers and the ambassadors as being the primary mediums of communication and engagement.

There was a cultural difference between the African view of communications and the western view of communications. The Africans tended to view no communication as good news as opposed to the western view that no communication may be a sign of something bad. The perception of a participant was that the AU and AMIS staffing for communications beyond the normal work day hours or on the

weekends was not a part of the African culture.

I ran into the Guyana chief of staff and he had deployed a unit a few days earlier and sorry I don't remember exactly where, but they were out on operations. And just in passing I asked him if he had heard from them and he said, "Na, no we have heard nothing from them, and no news is good news." And I sort of went off. I said, "No, no. No news means they're dead." Right, "they have to call you every 12 hours and say we're still alive, here's where we are, here's what we are doing. "And he said, "No, they don't have communications for that."

…there was no 24-hour operations center for the African Mission in Sudan, so at 5 or 6:00 whatever time, the sectors might call in, "Yes, we are alive and here's what's going on", with an update report, but that there is nobody monitoring that radio after that and you know, this is of course mind boggling to an American military officer. This shall never pass, right? This can't be, and I just couldn't get my head around it and he was like, "This is the way things are." this is the Guyana army and that's, you know, they are pretty well trained; they got plenty money. It's just not how they work, and so we were trying to you know, we were expecting them to operate using American, western, NATO standards, and they didn't. It wasn't, not even UN standards, they didn't...sort of at the operational level again nobody in Addis Ababa answered the phone after 5:00 if you get of Ambassador Kingibe, who was the political leader of the African mission, African Union mission in Sudan. If you could get a hold of him, it was usually

on a cellphone…again on the weekends nobody's around, at night nobody's answering the phone because the offices are not staffed, and that's just not a part of the culture.

### *AU strategic communication:*

The AU was perceived as lacking a strategic communications office or strategy during AMIS.   The Peace and Security Commission now has a twitter account that did not exist during AMIS.  One participant believed that trust, rapport and open communication is the key to successful operation that the AU could not have done better in communication during AMIS.

One of the things obviously back then in 2004 also was that the African Union simply didn't have a public communication strategy or office. And they haven't really--that's one of the areas where the African Union Commission remains weak. Yes, they have a twitter account and several officials have twitter accounts, the PSC has a twitter account, but in terms of sustained sort of press operation or outreach to civil society that is an area where the African Union is very weak.

Again, because there was the trust, the rapport, the open exchange of information, those are keys to being successful. And because that was successful you had AMIS, had that not been success you would not have had AMIS. So that's why I said I don't see where communications could have been better in

2004 to 2007.


### *Communication equipment in AMIS:*

Internal communication was an issue. Most troop-contributing countries did not come to Darfur with internal communication equipment. There was also a lack of personnel to run what equipment was available.


…and a lot of it is based on material equipment, right? I said earlier that these units would show up without internal communications equipment


…were no non-commissioned officers in the J6 (Communications) office. So that work wasn't going to be done. One of the westerns went in and plugged everything up. So, that sort of cultural thing was a real hold back, and these guys, I think they were Nigerians, maybe they were Anglophones from--they may have been Gambians, but I think they were Nigerians


There was a not a consensus in the area of improvement for the AU and AMIS communication from the participants in the study. There was the perception that the AU headquarter situation room was outdated and that the AU did not set priorities.


I mean they didn't really have what they had a so-called situation room, but it was very much outdated. It was unclear you know, what the priorities were for sending out--it tended to be news bulletins and you know, statements we

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condemn this and that or the other. I remember there being this huge need to have better commitment, which the various partners were keen to help out with.

The AU would have had a lot more direct access and didn't have to rely on messages that they had passed.  This is what my government thinks in a low level in a way. Or, of course, the ambassador was sent several times to communicate things at her level or at the deputy chief admission level.

You know (laughs), they--the personality that was in charge of the Darfur Integrated Taskforce, while he was quite willing to talk to the partners didn't necessarily seem very authoritative; it was unclear where he was getting his information from. Sometimes that would not necessarily mess with information that would be gleaned from higher level meetings with in his chain of command. Sometimes they didn't really even seem to kind of know what the priorities were, the higher-level people…and so sometimes it kind a helped us because maybe they disclose more than they should have (laughs) and made decisions that they shouldn't have, but that just what happened.

The alert center at the headquarters and the communication infrastructure of the AU were viewed as lacking.  Transmission of written messages was seen as inefficient and was one of the AU's only means of communication rather than an aspect of communication.  The perception of the participants was that the AU lacked modern communications equipment and did not have a budget to purchase or update the

equipment.

I mean I do remember them standing up the new peace and security counsel. You know the Alert Center, but again that was not functioning, you know it was rudimentary at best. So, they just lacked general communication infrastructure.

How did AU communicate internally/externally? AU lacked strategic communications "regard" HF/FM/UHF lacked reliable communication ...no lacked battle rhythm for receiving communications, managing strategic mission and within these two "start" strategic/BR-Battle Rhythm actual essential protocol to request when so all management practices could be more efficiency communicated from strategic/Battle rhythm reporting process. I didn't see it

The AU doesn't have the right kind of equipment or any kind of modern communication system. There is a limit to it seems to budget you know, that's another issue.

One method for the AU to communicate more effectually would have been to ask for western support. Another avenue that the AU did not use, but could have used, was to contract out the communications.

Improve communications by basically--and this would get back to--this is where they could ask for western or you know external support to provide

communications equipment and training or even contract it out for that matter, but I don't think they did that.

*__Non-governmental organization leverage:__*

The UN has a model of using NGO's for support in communications and reporting. The perception was that the AU did not leverage NGO's for support as the UN does.

You know the United Nations since, arguably since the 1940s or 50s, has had a very active and formal relationship with civil society groups. And so, at the UN secretary in New York you have NGOs (Non-governmental organizations) can be formally accredited to the United Nations through either the department of public information if they are more information focused or they can get what's called I think consultative status with the economic and social council if they have competence in certain particular areas. So for example, a human rights group, an international human rights group, might have consultative status with ECOSOC. What does that mean? It means they can present reports formally to the United Nations. They have representatives who are accredited who can be at the United Nations presenting briefings, attending other briefing, a lot of interaction there. To my knowledge, the AU then and the AU now does not the mechanism like that. And so, a lot of obviously with the projects like Enough Project or the International Crisis Group, you know NGOs and Civil Society can play a huge role in arguing and advocating for particular changes and not to say

that the NGOs were not active in Sudan 2004, but there wasn't really a

mechanism for the AU to engage with them.


*Summary of Key Sub-Question 4*

Participants viewed language as a challenge for the AU to operate as an

organization. There was a mix of colonial official languages of French, English and

Portuguese as well as Arabic and a number of native languages that were used by the

membership of the AU, although English was used as the main language of

communication. The use of English could and did cause some level of confusion for

effective communication with the AU. The AU provided communiques for the member

states that were drafted in the four official languages of the AU: English, French,

Portuguese and Arabic.

A participant, who had witnessed the Rwandan contingent, reported that a

common language was used at the national level in Rwanda. Ki-Swahili was used by

the national leadership of Rwanda in addressing the Rwandan troops to avoid confusion

in communication in a country that used French, English as well as Ki-Swahili as their

national languages.

The level of education of the member states of countries contributing manpower

was seen by a participant as the cause for communication challenges. Members of the

AU, who were chosen by their countries, did not all possess the same level of education

and this created a communication challenge for the AU.

Cultural differences were also a challenge that the AU faced. There were 53

member states, and each had its own unique culture as well an African cultural way of

communicating.  One participant did not see a difference in culture related to communication between Francophone and Anglophone countries or even between Muslim and Christian populations.  However, overall participants did see a cultural difference between the African and the western expectations of communication.   The lack of personnel at the AU after 5 p.m. and on weekends were examples of cultural differences between the western view and the African cultural norm raised by a participant.  Additionally, gender was not handled on an equal basis by the AU, as women appeared to have "difficulty culturally" within the organization.

There was a diverse view of how the AU communicated internally.  The Alert Center of the AU was seen as non-functional, due to the AU's lack of a communication infrastructure. Respondents reported this was due to not having the right kind of equipment and a modern system of communications.

The Africans shared the same message among the senior leadership of the AU, regardless of cultural background.  Although there were cultural differences between the more Muslim-aligned Nigerians and the more Christian-aligned Rwandans, they were able to work out those differences.  A participant pointed out the Nigerians and the Rwandans cooperated in Darfur although there was a "complexity of having West Africans in East Africa."   The describe a situation where the Africans saw themselves as "band of brothers" even in the face of the cultural shift with the transference of the mission from the former OAU to the present AU.  Furthermore, the Arab League was the premier organization seen by several member states.  There was a shift from the former OAU's "non-interference" policy to the AU's "non-indifference" policy that demonstrated the AU was meeting a new challenge. The fact that the African

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ambassadors to the AU were also the Ambassador to Ethiopia was seen as a challenge in communication for the AU.

An AU-led task force, called the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), was established to handle the issues of communication between the AU and AMIS. This was an avenue that the AU opened communication with the western partners, offering an avenue for the international partners to communicate with the AU on matters related to AMIS. However, a participant pointed out that the DITF members often "didn't know the priorities" of the AU leadership and the head of the DITF "didn't…seem very authoritative." The DITF did offer the US and the international partners an avenue to bring forth issues and to receive communications updates on AMIS. The international partners formed their own partners' group so that representatives of the group would communicate with the DITF regarding issues related to AMIS.

Since the President of the AU Commission, Konaré, was a Muslim from Mali, a participant saw this as a positive avenue for communication between the AU and the Government of Sudan during AMIS. However, it appeared to two participants that there was not a shared vision at the AU and that the AU "wanted to give a member state [Sudan] breathing room." Therefore, the AU had "semi-shared red-lines" that it did not want to implement on a member state as well as wanting to minimize western influence by having an African solution to an African issue.

There was no consensus among the participants as to the methods of communication within the AU. One participant saw communication at the AU as being horizontal in nature, while another it as centralized. There was the view that the AU created AMIS as they "went along" and that the AU was at a size that fostered good

communication but that the communication did not reach everyone in the organization. The communication was seen as staying in individual channels due to its "newness" as an organization. The AU passed information to its member states though the African presidents and foreign ministers as "primary mediums of communication" between the AU with its member states.

There was a difference in opinion between participants in regards to the AU's ability to communicate during AMIS. The AU, according to one participant, did not possess a "public communications strategy or office" and that hampered communication. However, there was also the view that the AU's communication could not have been better in "2004-2007" due to an open exchange of information during AMIS and that the AU "couldn't have done more than they did at the time."

There was open and on-going communication between the leadership of the AU and the US. Two participants offered that they saw the communication between the US and the AU leadership as "good" or "good as can be expected." One participant offered that the level of communication between the US and the AU was not hampered by the change of US leadership at the Assistant Secretary of State level due to the understanding that African ambassadors had of how the US operated and through their individual efforts of disseminating information to their respective countries. The US often used the US Ambassador to Ethiopia to communicate with the leadership of the AU and the US Ambassador would "often meet with the peace security commissioner" as a method of communication rather than using written messages. The AU was seen as sending out weekly communiques, but a participant observed that this method of communication was "not necessarily the most efficient."

The level of internal communication was seen as lacking due to units arriving in AMIS without internal communication equipment. A participant observed that the African military structure did not possess noncommissioned officers within their communications directorate. The lack of non-commissioned was seen as a cause for the lack of internal communication as well as the lack of communications equipment.

Another communications challenge observed by participants was the lack of a situation or operations center at the AU that could be used to monitor the situation in Darfur. The Alert center at the AU 'was not functioning" and was "rudimentary at best." There was no 24-hour operations center at the AU or in Darfur. In addition, a participant noted that the units in the field in Darfur did not report in to the headquarters. The AU tended to operate using personal Hotmail and Yahoo accounts and cellphones rather than professional communications equipment.

## Overview of Data Analysis

There were a number of challenges that the AU faced in regards to executing AMIS. The respondents observed challenges in the areas of organization, leadership, US support and communications.

### *Resources and equipment:*

The respondents reported that the AU lacked resources, and that caused challenges to the organization and leadership by not being able to sustain a steady flow of required resources to adequately address AMIS. Communications was a challenge through the organization due to a lack of modern communication equipment and a lack of an updated and operational alert center or situation room. Participants believed that

there were major funding issues, created primarily by the fact that many countries that did not contribute despite an ability to do so. Some respondents felt that resources were a key before any structural changes could be effective, creating a challenge in getting AU resources to Amis due to issues within Sudan.

Respondents observed that the AU "couldn't effectively spend" and receive resources due to a lack of personnel that understood the partners' processes for accessing donor resources to the AU. A respondent felt that the bureaucratic process was not understood by the senior personnel at the AU, and the donor nations viewed the "extremely centralized procedures for donor nations to access the Peace and Security Council members" led to donor nation's lack of desire to assist the AU.

### *Personnel and Staffing:*

A critical area that challenged the AU was in the lack of experienced staff and leadership and not having sufficient personnel to manage and understand the scope of the mission. The respondents reported that there was a challenge for the AU in staffing its organization with well-qualified individuals that understood the mission it was undertaking, without the needed expertise they needed. Along with the lack of an experienced staff, the AU was seen as lacking an organizational structure that would allow the AU to function and was challenged by a too few personnel. Currency of knowledge was an area that challenged the AU's leadership, organization and ability to communicate effectively.

Participants seemed to perceive that the AU's challenge in leadership was caused by a lack of skilled personnel, lack of structure, and untrained staff. This led to the AU's lack of institutional capacity. The AU required member States to provide

qualified personnel to the AU, but member states did not always send experienced

staff members to the Peace and Security Council, and the support staff often completed

tasks "ad hoc." Respondents noted that the AU was unable to engage in advance

planning due to a lack of qualitied leaders and staff. Participants pointed out that the

leadership that did exist did not have quality staffing and that both leaders and staff

lacked the necessary skill sets, especially in peacekeeping operations such as AMIS.

### *Leadership*:

Respondents saw the leadership challenge as one where the leadership "didn't

understand the scope of the mission and threat" but did "recognize shortfalls in

organization." Most respondents felt that Ambassador Djinnit, the Peace and Security

Commissioner, was impressive and "the quintessential ambassador," but they also

thought that he was "overwhelmed with…Darfur." Djinnit and President Konaré, as the

head of the AU Commission, were credited by respondents as being Muslim and

therefore more acceptable to Sudan and creating a vision. Konaré was viewed as being

idealistic with considerable vision. There was a counter view regarding Djinnit in that

he was seen as a "piece of work' and "not effective because he's about Djinnit." He was

not seen by some respondents as "trying to increase the effectiveness of the

organization," and both Djinnit and Konaré were seen as not creating a shared vision at

the AU. The senior leadership at the AU was seen as failing "to grasp the seriousness

of the threat" in regards to AMIS.

The leaders were seen as having to be soldiers and diplomats, and the dual skills

of leadership and diplomacy of those leaders was seen as essential for the success on the

ground.  The lack of training of the leadership going into Darfur was viewed a challenge

by the respondents.  They saw the leadership in AMIS as more or less autonomous from

the AU.  Each of the five regional economic communities of Africa were seen as having

their own views on how things should be done that impacted the leadership of the AU

and AMIS.

Respondents mentioned that a lack of personnel and staff was the greatest

challenge to leadership at the AU, leading to the limited organizational span of the

Peace and Security Commission.  The fact that the AU did not have the authority to hire

or fire its own personnel and staff but had to depend upon member states for staffing,

was seen as a challenge to the leadership of the AU.  Therefore, leadership at the AU

was seen as "task oriented" by a respondent.

### *Political Will:*

Although the respondents saw there were challenges with organization,

resources, structure, communication, and logistics, there were participants that noted the

AU had the political will to address AMIS.  The idea was further illuminated by

respondents who observed "there would have been no peacekeeping mission for the

AU" and "I want to applaud the AU" for undertaking AMIS.  Another positive view of

the AU was a respondent who offered that the AU "has demonstrated the political will

to commit troops" to AMIS.  There a counter argument in the data by a participant that

felt the launching of AMIS was "not well thought out."

### *Member States*:

The participants offered that the AU had a large membership base, leading to a difficult time attempting to address the needs of every member state. It was therefore reticent to engage in the internal affairs of their member states, such as Sudan. The fact that the Chairperson of the AU commission was Muslim and therefore accepted by Sudan was looked upon as favorable by a respondent. However, respondents observed that AMIS was a challenge for the AU because the Government of Sudan was opposed to intervention and having the AU conduct AMIS was a compromise to avoid western involvement. The AU was viewed as "coalition of the willing," and the challenges were not always negative. There was a shortage of resources at the AU because some member states were not paying their annual dues and those dues were being subsidized by Libya. Thus, those countries that did pay dues had undue influence in the organization.

Sudan, the host nation and a member state of the AU, was seen as a challenge for the AU in "getting cooperation…of the host nation," and it was Sudan that set the "ceiling amounts of AU…peacekeepers it was willing to take on its soil with AMIS." Respondents felt that the AU was challenged by Sudan in fielding AMIS peacekeepers troops and that it was a "horrendous undertaking" for the AU "to put troops om the ground" as well as "dealing with the Sudanese government" who "put impediments in the way" of the AU and AMIS.


### *Decision-Making:*

The summits run by the AU were the forums that the AU used for decision-making by the member states. Respondents viewed the partners as having "a much

greater part of the decision making and agenda setting" since the AU was suffering from a lack of structure, history, and skilled staff. The Heads of State of the member countries were mentioned as being able to "weld an enormous amount of influence" in decision making at the AU. Respondents felt that the AU's diplomatic effort with the African and non-African nations helped as it "expedited AMIS."

### *Structure*:

There was a challenge articulated by a respondent in regards to the structure of the AU. There was a lack of overarching structure, with the Peace and Security Commission having only one component, the Peace and Security Department. Respondents noted that there that the AU headquarter situation room was non-existent at the beginning of AMIS and did not have the ability to monitor the operation. The structure of the AU, according to a respondent, had to be flexible, and the UN viewed this flexibility as both a gift and a curse, with every member state having an opportunity to provide troops without giving up their sovereign authority, as would be the case if the AU had the right to demand participation.

The AU was not structured to deal with deploying a force into Darfur, according to respondents. Although the AU was challenged, however, not all the respondents saw the shortfalls as the fault of the AU since the AU was new.

### *History:*

The respondents viewed the AU as not being a developed organization. The AU was a nascent organization that faced challenges by not being prepared to handle its internal missions as well as a challenge to execute AMIS as a peacekeeping mission. The newness of the AU and the lack of an historical base of understanding of the

missions proposing to undertake caused a challenge for the AU to execute AMIS. Respondents described the AU history as possessing no "muscle memory," a lack of rules due to the fact the AU was so new.

*<u>Culture</u>:*

A cultural shift was observed by respondents that saw the AU as shifting from the non-interference policy of the OAU to the AU policy of "non-indifference." A respondent believed that the US made the mistake of viewing the AU as the same organization as the old OAU at the beginning of AMIS. There was the view that to be more effective at the start, the US should have engaged with high-level US officials visiting the AU at the outset of AMIS.

There was a cultural challenge due to the Africans lacking a strong non-commissioned officer culture possessing technical expertise to complete the lower level tasks. And, the African officers lacked "respect for the competence of the enlisted soldiers." An example of the lack of non-commissioned offers was noticed by a respondent in the J6 [communication directorate] of AMIS, stating that "the J6 did not have any non-commissioned offers."

Respondents saw the culture of consensus leadership as a challenge for the AU and AMIS and viewed it as a negative aspect of the leadership and decision-making in AMIS. There was a challenge observed that dealt with the culture of the African work day. One, a respondent noted that nobody was around on the weekends or answering phones at night. However, another respondent did not see "any difference in the cultural communication between Francophone and Anglophone" staff from different countries. There was the thought that the culture of the AU did not foster members to

pay dues even though many of the countries were rich. However, another respondent

noted that the AU consisted of a "band of brothers" in the mission together as opposed

to the cultural fissures caused by member states that identified as members of the Arab

League, while other member states did not see themselves as such.

Respondents did believe that there was a cultural divide between western and

European expectations as opposed to those of the African commanders. The western

countries had high expectations, but the Africans did not meet those. There was the

view that the US and the AU headquarters had "an open level of communication"

through the US Assistant Secretary of State, as well as the US Embassy in Addis

Ababa, Ethiopia and that, overall, communication was quite good. The fact that the

African ambassadors to the AU had dual responsibility as ambassadors to Ethiopia was

also seen as a cultural challenge for the AU.

There were respondents that believed there were cultural differences even within

the same country. For example, one noted that "even though the Nigerians have a

sizable Muslim population, there are major cultural differences." The Government of

Sudan, with a predominantly Muslim population, seemed to get some comfort from the

AU peacekeepers being African, even though they were not all Muslim. Gender

differences in how the Africans viewed woman in positions at the AU was also reported

by a respondent, who suggested that this created difficulty for women. Although

women were supposed to comprise half of the commissioners, this did not occur. "

***Logistics and resources:***

Overall, the subjects of this study felt that logistics created the most problems

for the operation, including its sustainability. The member militaries were challenged

and unable to work together. The AU's lack of a logistical base led to dependence on international partners for logistic support. Additionally, several felt that the AU was financially dependent on the international community. For example, the US provided the base camps in Darfur. Some respondents observed that the challenge of the logistical support that the US was supplying was further exacerbated by the contractors, who did not adhere to standards and timelines. This had a negative impact on the AMIS mission.

### *Training and procedures:*

A respondent felt that the lack of training was a challenge for the AU to execute a peacekeeping mission. The AU was seen as having a challenge in understanding the intricacies of dealing with international donor procedures, and there was not training in this endeavor. Participants pointed out the AU did not possess the basic procedures such as standard operating procedures for the AU staff to follow or learn, making "every minor task became a new discovery." The staff that the AU did possess was seen by a respondent as learning on the job, rather than being trained. Priorities were not set, and rules were created as they went along. There a lack of unified training, with little if any training prior to deployment.

### *US and partner support:*

The US, along with the international partners, were seen by respondents as key players in documentation and planning. The AU depended on them to run the peace support operations. AU resources depended on donor contributions, also presenting a challenge to the AU. One of the study participants suggested that this led to many

donors seeking to be heard by the AU, creating a capacity problem that had adverse effects on AMIS. There were simply too many donors wanting influence in exchange for their donations. It was noted that the US was the largest contributing, putting more funds for humanitarian aid into Darfur than all other players.

Respondents viewed establishing the DITF with the US and the international partners on AMIS issues as positive. One participant felt that the establishment of the DITF location outside of the AU headquarters, however, created challenges for the AU as well as the DITF.

There were respondents that noted that the US faced challenges addressing the needs of the AU in a timely manner, especially in supporting the AU with equipment because it was not possible to move quickly to meet those needs. Furthermore, US support between Washington and the AU was slow, and the US was slow in "coming to terms with…higher level diplomacy." An additional problem was the lack of US military interest in supporting the AU because it was focusing on other parts of the world but that "USAID and the State Department really wanted to sort this out" to find a way to support the AU. Additionally, respondents pointed out that the size of the US bureaucracy caused problems for the US in providing support to the AU and AMIS. Initially, the US was US did not provide any financial resources to the AU, but once the US military did become involved the military support was more helpful than other parts of the US Government. An area where the US was viewed as being to react quickly was in providing airlift capabilities, as the African countries did not have that ability. "The challenge of learning, according to one respondent was on "both sides [both US and AU]."

The AU was viewed as unsure of their needs since the concept of peacekeeping

was a new idea to them.  One respondent wanted the AU to have "US advisers rather

than expecting them [the AU] to be fully set up."  The AU was hampered by the

challenge of being unsure of what they should request and what the US could provide to

them. Articulating their requirements in detail was also problematic.  There were not

US personnel fully dedicated to working with the AU according to one respondent, and

the working arrangement was ad hoc. Furthermore, AU requests for support from the

US were not well-organized and seemed to be haphazard, "…generally passed simply

by voice or simple letter to State political officers from the Embassy [Addis Ababa,

Ethiopia].

The US was involved with attempting to assist the AU with setting up an

operations center for communication and IT, but the AU very little IT experience. A

respondent viewed diplomacy as the US "planting a seed and hope it works out," in an

effort to influence how the AU thought.  The US provided a large amount of in-kind

support rather than direct monetary support, as a respondent noted, "we built the camps

in Darfur."  Bilateral training and individual training was a US initiative through

ACOTA and IMET that seen as a "positive aspect for AMIS" by a respondent.


*__Communications__:*

There was a difference of opinion among the study respondents about the

organizational communication of the AU, with some seeing communication as

horizontal in nature and others viewing it as more centralized.  Some thought that the

small size of the AU resulted in good communication" throughout the organization,

although they noted that information often was limited to certain channels of communication. The US was seen as having to learn to communicate suggestions to the AU in a non-offensive manner, while still communicating that they were serious.

The participants also noted that the telephone system was not always operable and there was no real plan for crisis management at the AU. Part of the problem was that the operations center hand no audio-visual capability, making it unable to meets the goals of its mission. The lack of dedicated communications network between the AU and AMIS also created problems. Study participants felt that the communications problems were in part due to not having updated equipment and no communications infrastructure. Thus, the field commander was often unable to communicate directly with the AU leadership. Additionally, DITF was separate from AU headquarters, creating other communications issues.

A final important observation was that the multitude of languages used by AU members created problems at times. Some were Arabic speakers, while others used other African languages. Additionally, due to colonization histories, English was used by some, French by others. Furthermore, there was a wide range of level of education, causing still further communication difficulties. However, not every participant viewed language as a challenge for the AU leadership and organization. Some felt that there was an adequate capacity for translation. There was a concern by one respondent that saw political issues as a potential communication barrier. The senior level leadership of the AU commission and the AU leadership had similar messaging, therefore a respondent believed that "they seemed to be consulting each other with the same message."

# Chapter 5

## Discussion and Conclusions

The purpose of the study was to determine the challenges that the AU faced in executing AMIS from the perspective of senior US officials from the Department of Defense and the Department of State who were directly involved with supporting the AU. The focus of this study was determining the challenges that the AU faced with leadership, communications, organization and US support.

### Researcher

This research was possible in part because I was involved in AMIS and knew the key senior officials in the military and the State Department who served with the AU. I was a member of the US team in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 2004 to 2007 and deployed to Darfur to support AMIS in 2006. I was directly involved with the AU, the DITF and with the US team that administered support to the AU and AMIS. I chose not be a participant in the study in order to capture the participants' perceptions without my own opinions being involved with the study.

I determined that the US officials who participated in the US support mechanism were the best subjects for this study. The subjects had been located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia or had traveled and directly observed the AU during the execution of AMIS. The African officials who participated in AMIS were not recruited to be a part of this study as their location and availability was in question. This was a stand-alone case study of US officials.

This study was designed to answer the question that I had in regards to my own observation of the AU challenges during AMIS.  I designed the key questions to seek the perceptions of senior US officials on the challenges faced by the AU in leadership, communications, organization, and US support that stemmed from my experience and observation as a member of the US Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 2004 to 2007.  The participants did not have a working knowledge of the theories of leadership and communication, and the data from the interviews often did not fit with existing theories. The situation was also somewhat unique due to the wide range of cultures and nations involved in the AU, leading to the development of grounded theory. My ability to structure questions and elicit responses was based on my knowledge of the AU, AMIS and the potential participants.  I personally knew each of the participants and I had worked in some capacity with each, which provided me with access to the population.

This study confirmed my own recollections of the challenges the AU experienced in executing AMIS.  I found that the respondents' recollections were similar to mine but differed in perspective on the importance of the mandate that I viewed as not providing protection for the individual displaced persons (IDPs). However, the lack of mentioning the mandate or IDPs as challenges may have stemmed from the nature of the questions that I asked.

There was also a problem related to recall.  Ten years had passed for most of the participants of the study, and in some cases 11 years.  The distance of time can result in the benefit of reflection, but there may also be a deficit in not able to recall all the

minute facts surrounding the challenges.  The distance of time creates a potential threat to validity of the study.

There were a few ways that the general recollections of the respondents on the topics of leadership, organization, communications and US support differed from my own recollections of challenges faced by the AU.  I, along with the majority of respondents, felt that Djinnit was an exceptional African leader who demonstrated transformational leadership attributes. However, there was a minority assessment that Djinnit was a leader out for himself.   Additionally, I share the opinion of the respondents who believed that the AU should be lauded for its efforts to address the genocide in Darfur when the western nations were reluctant to execute a peacekeeping mission in Sudan.

I was not able to fully exploit the existing theories, as there were gaps in the data. Thus, I have recommended future research that focuses directly on the existing communications and leadership theories.  I found that the participants were not aware of the existing theories, and my intent was to elicit data that offered grounded theory on the challenges that the AU face during AMIS from a senior US official perspective.

## Analysis of Key Findings

The efforts of the AU to conduct AMIS was viewed as laudable in having the political will to conduct AMIS in spite of not having the resources, personnel, training, equipment, logistical base, or expertise.   The AU, despite challenges, possessed the political will to conduct AMIS and execute AMIS as an all-African venture, albeit with US and international support with logistics, equipment, movement and resources.

Conducting a peacekeeping mission, such as AMIS, was outside the scope of the AU to conduct effectively, but the AU took on that challenge.

The perception of the participants was that the AU decision-making process was vertical in that all decisions were made by the senior heads of state and passed down through the organization. The research data suggest that this did not provide the AU with the capability to engage its mid-level leaders to conduct a horizontal form of organizational communication, and leadership became more transactional in nature. The AU senior leadership was transformational in providing a shared vision and being charismatic but failed to produce any standards or procedures for the mid-level leaders and staff to follow or adhere to in conducting AMIS or the day-to-day operations at the AU headquarters.

The AU did not possess a mature organizational structure and lacked an operations center—alert center—that would have allowed the AU to monitor AMIS and to communicate with the US and other international partners, according to the participants. The lack of an alert center did not provide the AU with a method to monitor the activities of AMIS and the leadership of AMIS often acted on its own due to a lack of communication between the AU and AMIS. AMIS was left on its own with no rules of engagement or objectives developed as a guide for the AMIS leadership.

The respondents had the perception that the DITF was an asset in bridging the communication gap between the AU and the international partners and allowed the international partners an avenue to monitor the activities of AMIS and to determine its needs and progress. The DITF was a positive step for the AU, allowing it to access and

request international support.  However, the leadership of the DITF was often not aware of the AU priorities and therefore was not as effective as it could have been.

The AU was further challenged, according to the perceptions of the respondents, by not understanding how to access the bureaucratic US support mechanism or request support through the US cumbersome acquisition system.  This impeded the AU in accessing critical resources and support from the US, a major donor nation.   The US was culpable as well.  The US did not compensate for the shortcomings of the AU request system.  The US possessed a lengthy acquisition system that the AU was not able to navigate. Thus, critical resources were often delayed by the lack of understanding on both sides, the US and the AU, leaving the AU vulnerable in several areas of resources, logistics and equipment requirements to conduct AMIS.  The ability of the AU to access US support, though not always in the western method, and the open communication between the US and the AU allowed for the flow of in-kind logistical support and airlift that was needed for the execution of AMIS.  The US policy was also a challenge to the AU in accessing multi-national training.  The US policy allowed for bi-lateral training only, and that hampered the ability of the AU to receive unified training for the AMIS contingents.

The AU membership was multi-national, consisting of 53 nations and 53-plus different cultural backgrounds due to the inclusion of tribal areas that crossed international borders.  The respondents believed that the AU was challenged by multi-lingual usage and cultural differences that at times caused misunderstandings among leadership and staff within the organization.  The use of translators at meetings and conferences assisted in mitigating some of the ambiguities of language and culture, but

translators were not available in the daily operation of the AU, and this led to misunderstanding among the members of the AU organization. Cross-cultural adaptation policies and a higher level of organizational communication, using up-to-date communication equipment, would have been a benefit to the operation of the AU and AMIS.

The African work culture at the AU was different from that of the western nations in both the working environment and scope. The study participants had the perception that the difference in work culture often led to a task or mission not being completed. The leadership and members of the AU did not conduct official business in the evenings or on the weekends and were not reachable except by cell phone on a sporadic basis. The lack of access to the AU leadership and membership outside of normal working hours frustrated the US and the other western international partners. Exacerbating the cultural difference between the Africans and westerns was the absence of a strong and viable NCO corps in the African military. The lack of a viable NCO corps challenged the AU and AMIS in completing a number of simple low-level tasks critical to the AU and AMIS in accomplishing their missions.

The final challenge for the AU in conducting AMIS was perceived to be the challenge of working with the host nation of Sudan. The Government of Sudan had compromised their desire for sovereignty by allowing the AU to enter Sudan. This was done to ward off any UN or western intervention. However, Sudan placed a number of impediments to accessing Darfur, such as requiring entry visas and equipment entry that impeded the ability of the AU to conduct AMIS. The AU was culpable in allowing Sudan leverage in negotiations since Sudan was a member state of the AU, and several

members of the AU had a desire to see Sudan to address its own issues related to the genocide in Darfur.

The respondents offered that the challenges of resources, equipment, personnel, expertise, culture, training and structure were pervasive throughout the AU in the areas of organization, leadership, US support and communications. The challenges listed above were systemic and wide-spread throughout the AU and AMIS and crossed all four areas examined in this study.

## Key Sub-Questions

An analysis of the data is provided for each of the four key questions using grounded theory as a basis of comparison of the data in the responses of the participants. I used the existing theories of leadership and communications where I found applicability as an augment to grounded theory. The four research key questions are laid out below with analysis of the data.

## Challenges of Organization

For the first key sub-question, study respondents were asked, "What were the challenges for the African Union organizational structure in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan?" An examination of the interview data revealed that there were a number of challenges related to the organization of the AU. The AU was perceived by the respondents to be organizationally challenged by the structure, the number of personnel, the lack of experienced personnel, the non-availability of training, the lack of modern equipment, no organic resources, and a lack of guidance and operating procedures. The launching of a peacekeeping mission, AMIS, did not fit any

existing theories of organization.  Therefore, a grounded theory was developed to encompass the major challenges faced by the AU in organization.

Grounded Theory: "*The organization of the AU was challenged by the lack of a developed structure, no logistical base, a shortage of personnel, inadequate resources, no unified training, and a lack of preparedness to launch AMIS.*"

The responses of the interview participants revealed an organizational structure that was not adequate to conduct a complex peacekeeping mission.  They pointed out that the AU was a nascent organization that did not possess a mature organizational structure and was not fully staffed when the decision to launch AMIS was determined in early 2004.  The absence of an alert center or operations center at the AU headquarters did not allow for the monitoring of AMIS and did not provide the AU with updates on AMIS.  The establishment of the DITF was a positive step taken by the organization to filter support and requirements from the international partners.  However, there was a challenge of understanding the dynamics of the mission, as the AU did not produce any rules of engagement or guidelines for AMIS leaders to follow or adhere to while conducting the mission.

Furthermore, the AU was devoid of an organic logistical base.  The AU depended completely on the international partners for logistical support to include the development of base camps in Darfur and airlift assistance for troop movements to and from Darfur.

The AU headquarters was described as challenged by a thin staff and a lack of experienced personnel.  AMIS was hampered in that each member nation had to volunteer its forces to populate the contingents for AMIS.  Some of the nations, such as

Nigeria, were hesitant to allow their troops to be under the command of another nation. Nigeria, possessing a large military, ensured its leadership in the organization by contributing the most troops, thus ensuring that a Nigerian would be in command.

Resources were a major challenge for the AU in executing AMIS. The AU had very few organic resources and had to depend on donor nations to provide the bulk of resources needed to operate AMIS. Training, when conducted, was on a bi-lateral basis. Interviewees described a challenge in the preparedness of the AU staff and the AMIS contingents in that there was no unified training conducted or available. The staff at the AU headquarters did not receive any advance training for their positions and were learning the job as they were doing the jobs. In other words, due to limited organization, AU staff had to make decisions with no guidance or protocol to follow.

The study participants did believe that the political will to conduct AMIS and that the Africans had a desire to complete the mission within the AU. However, the AU was simply unprepared to handle the mission adequately. This meant that they needed the assistance of international donors for most resources outside of the actual troops conducting the mission.

## Challenges of Leadership

The second key sub-question asked the study respondents, "What were the leadership challenges for the African Union in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan?" Respondents reported a number of challenges related to leadership. Some of the responses suggested that existing theories of leadership could be applied to the data to augment grounded theory. Elements of Transformational and Transactional Leadership theories were apparent based on the personalities of the leaders and the

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effects of the African culture that included emotional Intelligence and charismatic leadership as described as the visionary leadership of the senior leadership of the AU, particularly Ambassador Djinnit and President Konaré.

Theories of Transformational and Transactional Leadership:

The study participants described the majority of leadership characteristics of the AU in ways consistent with transactional leadership with the exception of the transformational leadership style of the very senior leaders, Konaré and Djinnit. However, the AU, as a conglomerate of 53 individual nations, had a complicated and cumbersome decision-making process. Decisions made by AU leaders were contingent on approval of the heads of those nations.

Transformational leadership theory refers to visionary leadership and inspirational leadership with an understanding of charismatic and emotional aspects of leadership (Yukl, 2013). The leadership of the AU was seen as attempting to transform the creditability of the organization. Ambassador Djinnit and President Konaré demonstrated characteristics of transformational leadership through providing a shared vision for the AU. The interviewees indicated that Djinnit was a strong person. He was seen by most of them as having a charismatic personality (Yukl, 2013) that further demonstrated that he was viewed by senior US officials as a transformative figure. Djinnit was viewed as a quintessential diplomat and as an impressive individual. Respondents indicated that Djinnit demonstrated a positive self-regard and was creating a vision (Bennis & Naum, 1985). The efforts of Djinnit and the respect that he garnered worked to the benefit of the AU in engaging with senior US and international senior officials. The respondents suggested that Djinnit's leadership kept the challenges that

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the AU faced with AMIS from being insurmountable and allowed him to overcome

some of the barriers that occurred as suggested by Burns (2003). Additionally, some

respondents felt that Djinnit's diplomacy and the AU's gravitas were the driving forces

in being able to engage the leadership of Sudan.

Konaré was mentioned as the right person to start the organization due to his

gravitas, although Northouse (2013) points out that a leader does not need to possess

charisma to be a transformational leader. The interviews also suggested that Konaré, as

an African leader of the Muslim faith and a leader who had not been overthrown while

serving as president of an African country, can be tied to contingency theory of

leadership where the leadership style is matched to the organization (Fiedler, 1978). In

Konaré's case, his background assisted in identifying the AU as including the Muslim

countries (Yukl, 2013). However, Konaré was not enough of a leader to bring certain

concepts, such as a permanent all-African standby-force. Konaré demonstrated

characteristics of emotional intelligence as he was able to engage effectively with the

most senior levels of the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense.

Chairperson Konaré was also seen as idealistic and had a lot of vision as demonstrated

in the research on emotional intelligence of Goleman (1995) where a leader creates a

vision. He was not, however, viewed as realistic by the respondents, and that

diminished his ability to lead. Thus, he failed to create the vision of transformative

leadership (Kotter, 1990), to empower others to act (Kotter, 2012) or to diagnose the

issues (Kotter & Schlesinger, 2008). That in turn caused the failure of the AU to

establish an African standby-force.

The data demonstrated that the transformational efforts of Konaré and Djinnit were muted by the transactional nature of the organization. Overall, the African culture of having the African heads of state make the decisions for the AU entities was transactional for the AU leadership who deferred decisions to the heads of state. Decisions were primarily made at semi-annual meetings held at the AU. While the AU leadership participated in the decision-making process, African culture allowed heads of state to make final decisions autonomously (House, Hnages, Javidan & Gupta, 2004).

The AU was challenged in assessing the effectiveness of leadership while attempting to focus on AMIS, as the AU was working on designing a type of report card for the leadership while undertaking AMIS. AU leadership was viewed as failing to grasp the degree of threat. AU leaders also seemed challenged in understanding the scope of AMIS, although they did recognize problems and were motivated to remedy those (Kotter & Schlesinger, 2008).

In contrast to transformational leadership theories, transactional leadership theory holds that a leader finds themselves separated from their followers (Greenwald, 2008). There was some evidence of that, according to the interview subjects. Several described that the AU lacked a broad shared vision, further complicated by the decision-making bureaucracy of the AU that was difficult to overcome. The head of the Peace and Security Commission was not viewed as empowering those under him to carry out the work (Bass, 1990). Decisions were channeled up the chain of command to the Executive Council, resulting in lengthy delays. The respondents reported that the decision-making process for the leaders rested in the hands of the most senior leaders, similar to what was described by Makinda, Okumu and Mickler (2016). However, even

the senior leaders of the AU did not have the final decision-making responsibility. Their decisions were not finalized without the blessing of the African heads of state Only after that occurred could decision be implemented by the AU commission and staff. Bass (1998) referred to this as mutual self-interest in transactional leadership. Decisions were made at the top, as demonstrated by the Peace and Security Commission, which meant that the leadership of the AU was transactional at the intermediate level (Northouse, 2013). The transactional nature of the AU leadership at the head of state level was viewed by the interview subjects as a part of the leadership style exhibited in the African culture.

Grounded Theory: "*The AU was challenged in leadership due to decision making, cultural aspects, shortage of personnel, lack of resources, no unified training and a shortage of equipment.*" Grounded theory was used to supplement the existing theories of transformational and transactional leadership as well as existing theories of emotional intelligence. Grounded theory was used to illuminate the challenge the AU leadership faced with decision-making, inferior staffing, resource and equipment shortages, and lack of training as describe by the respondents.

The decision to launch AMIS was seen by the AU leadership as necessary since the western powers were reluctant to engage directly into Darfur. The AU had the political will but was ill prepared and was also challenged by insufficient personnel, a lack of resources, a shortage of equipment and a multi-cultural staff. The Government of Sudan did not want the interference of the western nations and allowed the AU to establish AMIS as a compromise.

The AU was described as severely challenged.  The leadership faced a shortage

of personnel and staff in both number and expertise.  Many of the staff were seen as

learning on the job as they did not possess the background and experience needed for

executing a peacekeeping mission such as AMIS.  The leaders in AMIS were not

provided rules of engagement causing them to act on their own as the mission

progressed.  The lack of interaction and communication between the leaders of AMIS

and the AU were the root of decision-making being ad hoc. Further, the lack of

established objectives of the mission were absent at both the AU and in Darfur.

Another problem was related to geographical divisions in Africa.  Decision-making was

~~also~~ challenged by the block-voting exhibited by the regions of Africa and impediments

set forth by the host nation of Sudan.

The AU and AMIS were populated by members from 53 nations and more than

53 cultures.  The multi-culture civilian and military forces had different training

regimens. They tended to operate as they did in their national communities and not as a

cohesive multi-national organization.  This lack of inter-operability was a challenge for

the leadership of the AU and the leadership of AMIS.

The AU was thinly staffed and lacked the adequate number of personnel to

accomplish the mission of the AU was well as AMIS.  The AU depended on the

member states to provide personnel for the AU and troops for AMIS.  Several of those

interviewed described an important cultural difference between the western nations and

the African nations. The Africans lacked a strong and viable non-commissioned officer

(NCO) corps.  They reported that as a result of a weak or non-existent NCO corps, a

number of simple tasks were not accomplished. This was because the leadership was

culturally constrained by officers not being able to accomplish lower level tasks.

Additionally, the leadership of the AU did not have the right to hire and fire staff

members. The net effect was that the AU was not able to take full advantage of the

leadership ability of either the AU or AMIS.

According to the interviewees, the AU leadership was challenged by a lack of

resources to accomplish its day-to-day operations, as well as AMIS. The organization

did not possess its own funding stream and depended on international partners to

provide the majority of the funding. There were a few AU member states, such as

Nigeria and Libya, that did provide resources disproportionate to the other members and

this gave them clout with the leadership and decision-making of the AU regarding

activities in Darfur.

Training was a challenge that the AU leadership faced in its organizational

staffing as well as the staff of AMIS. There was no form of unified training where the

leaders of a multi-national force could organize a culturally diverse force into a

cohesive unit. Individual training was another serious challenge for the AU. Personnel

often came to the AU without knowledge or training to accomplish their tasks.

Additionally, the lack of an operations center with basic equipment to monitor activities

in AMIS meant the AU leadership was often unaware of the activities unfolding in

Darfur.

## Challenges of US Support

The third key question was, "What were the challenges of US support to the

African Union during the African Union Mission in Sudan?" The interview data

suggested that the US support was slow in developing and that the US would not

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provide any support for the AU or AMIS until the US Embassy, located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, became involved with the AU. Washington (US Department of State) became aware that the AU was not continuing with the legacy of the former OAU non-interference policy through the efforts and engagement of the US Embassy. The US was not only slow to react but had a procurement system that was bureaucratic in nature. The deployment of African troops was seen by the Africans as a way to stem the violence in Darfur without US or western interference. However, the interviewed suggested that the AU required US and international partner support in order to provide a peacekeeping force in AMIS. The analysis of the data did not reveal a connection with an existing theory. Grounded theory was more appropriate to examine the challenge of US support.

Grounded Theory: "*The AU was challenged in receiving and requesting US support during the execution of AMIS.*"

An analysis of the data related to US support indicated that there was a challenge in the manner that the AU and the US operated in determining and filling requests for support. The US was reluctant to engage with the AU at the beginning of AMIS. The US view was that the AU was the OAU with a different name. However, the US Embassy located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia began to forge a relationship with the AU and began to communicate with members of the AU even when the official US policy was to maintain a distance from the AU. The US policy shifted toward assisting the AU and AMIS and instructed the US Embassy to engage with the AU but not to make any promises of support until vetted by the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense. The US military was deeply involved with the war efforts in

Afghanistan and Iraq and showed little interest in supporting the AU at the start of AMIS. However, the military did provide airlift for the movement of African troops and did so in an expeditious manner. The support from the US Department of State, however, was slow and was in-kind rather than direct monetary support.

The respondents noted that the US mechanism for requesting support was bureaucratic and cumbersome. The AU did not have the experience to develop procurement plans and procedures that would provide them with direct access to US support. The US Department of State procurement system not did allow for rapid response to requests from the AU, making it a challenge for the AU. The AU did not have a developed procedure for requesting US support and often did not understand how the US system operated or how to make requests. Cultural differences came into play, highlighting the differences between the bureaucratic nature of the US and the more personal interactions common in the AU. The AU was viewed as demonstrating a lack of sophistication in requesting US support by making requests verbally or by requesting support by a simple letter. Eventually, the establishment of the DITF assisted the AU in articulating its requests and allowed the US to coordinate with international donors to mitigate duplication.

According to study participants, the US provided a strong diplomatic effort with Sudan on the issue of Darfur and also provided in-kind support for the development of an operations center at the AU headquarters to enhance its efficiency. The US provided all the base camps in Darfur but was hampered by the US contractors on-site that did not always fulfill their obligations. The US provided training to most African nations on a bi-lateral basis but was prohibited from providing multi-national training by US

policy. Thus, the AU was not able to depend on the US to support any multi-national training, creating a challenge at the AU headquarters as well as with AMIS.

In summary, US support to AMIS was constricted by both AU policies and US policies. The AU, as a nascent organization, lacked sophistication and was unaware of how to interact with the US when requesting support. The US was hampered by its own bureaucracy and protocols.

## Challenges of Communications

The final question posed to the study participants was, "What were the challenges of US support to the African Union during the African Union Mission in Sudan?" In some places, their responses fit with theories of cross-cultural communication and organizational communication. Grounded theory was used to augmenting the existing theories.

Theory of Cross-Cultural Communication:

Respondents' answers to the question about communication demonstrated that language was an area that could be an issue with member integration into working in an international organization. Overcoming the barriers of intercultural communication is a vital aspect for international organizations to move forward into the future, and this was suggested in the data as both a challenge and not a challenge (Braun, 2001). The data demonstrated that the AU created barriers to communication by bringing together a diverse cultural group with different native and official languages of 53 individual states with numerous cultures (Makinda, Okumu & Micklar, 2016).

However, respondents also suggested that interpreters at the AU assisted in mitigating some of the cultural stress by offering each member of the AU a translation

in their own language.  Kim (2005) points out that stress adaptation can occur over time.

Experience was brought up as a challenge for communication and offered by Kim (1988) as an intercultural communication issue between individuals of different experience backgrounds.  The six steps of Bennett's *Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity* (1986, p.182) can be used to illustrate how the members of the AU were able to adapt and integrate into the culture of the organization through the availability of translators, as well as being able to address the AU membership in their native language at the summits and meetings of the AU.   During the execution of AMIS, the AU consisted of African members who possessed a shared memory (Drzewiecka, 2003) of the past as Africans who had been subjected to colonization. This collective memory could be used as a basis for shaping the present and future as members of the AU.

The use of different languages in communicating at the AU was not seen by the majority of study participants as an issue in adapting to a new culture, that of the AU (Kim, 1998).  Although Samovar and Porter (1991) discuss that non-verbal communication can be a barrier to communication, non-verbal communication at the AU or AMIS was not mentioned.

The data did support Kincaid's (1998) findings that the initial differences of different cultures at the AU diminished a shared vision as a group.   Kim (1998) illustrated what the data suggested, that communication among the AU membership was communication between the members from different cultural backgrounds.  Kim's (2001) *Structural Model: Factors Influencing Cross-Cultural Adaptation* (see figure 8)

was evident in the data where new members were expected to use the English language for all matters related to AMIS, thus transforming their individual cultural identity to that of AMIS membership that represented host communication competence related to the organization. *The Process Model: The Stress-Adaptation-Growth Dynamic* (Kim, 2001) (see figure 9) was also evident in the data. There was the suggestion that using a language, other than one's native language, could lead to misunderstanding and therefore increase the stress level of the individual. Adaptation into the culture of the AU organization was facilitated through learning English as a second or third language for their participation in the AU. The interview data suggested that the use of a common language versus the use of the member's native language was always a challenge. This adaptation took place at the AU, as English was used as a common language to facilitate adaptation. However, some of the respondents also indicated that there were occasional misunderstandings between native Arabic speakers, native speakers of other African languages, and speakers of other languages. This was seen as causing stress in individuals from different cultures that became adapted to the use of a common language, English, over time (Kim, 2001). The use of translators did mitigate some of the stress of adapting to the AU, and the use of the four official languages also reduced stress over time (Kincaid, 1998). An individual adapts to a new culture by "acculturating" to the new host patterns of communication (Kim, 1998, p. 72).

The data did suggest that there was a measure of shared vision at the AU that assisted communication among the members (Olufowote, 2006). The AU consisted of members who had differing cultural backgrounds. This can be understood through the

work of Gudykunst (1997), who offered that communication and culture influenced each other over time.

<u>Theory of Organizational Communication</u>:

The views of participants in the study were split on how the AU communicated as an organization. One respondent saw the method of organizational communication as horizontal, while another respondent felt that the organization communicated vertically. Overall, the data suggested that the method of organizational communication at the AU was vertical, or centralized, where members at the top were the decision-makers (Mintzberg, 1979), and communication flowed downward (Simpson, 1959). McPhee and. Poole (2001) demonstrated how centralization versus decentralization can determine the avenues of communication. AMIS is revealed as different from the AU through the method of communication between organizations. The data suggested that AMIS had a decentralized method of communication with the AU, acting on its own without the direction of the AU and having the availability of coordinating the details of the mission (Harris & Nelson, 2008) without getting direction from the AU. However, vertical communication was illustrated in the data due to the small staff of the AU as opposed to a horizontal method which is viewed as more informal (See figure 11).

<u>Grounded Theory</u>: "*The AU was challenged in communication related to the usage of multiple languages, the lack of modern communication techniques, the African work culture, and communication with the US and Sudan.*" Grounded theory was used to supplement the existing theories of cross-cultural communication and organizational communication to illuminate the challenge the AU faced with communication within

the organization and with AMIS. The challenges that existed within the AU and AMIS during the AMIS mission were examined through the lenses of grounded theory.

An analysis of the data demonstrated that the majority of the respondents saw the use of different languages and the cultural background of the members assigned to the AU as a challenge. The theory of cross-cultural communication was not a perfect fit for the data analysis as it related the adaptation of individuals into a different national culture but failed to address the cultural adaptively related to a multi-cultural organization.

A major challenge faced by the AU and AMIS was in the area of cross-cultural communication related to diverse language and cultural backgrounds in an organization consisting of 53 African nations. The actual numbers associated with cultures were in excess of 53, as the continent of Africa possesses 53 political lines that form nations as well as tribal areas that cross international boundaries. The participants in the study viewed the manner in which the AU communicated as an organization challenge, as well as how the AU communicated with the US and Sudan. The lack of an operations center or alert center hampered the communications between the AU and AMIS. The AU was viewed by study participants as communicating without standard operating methods or rules, resulting in a communications challenge.

The interviews also suggested that the AU did not possess modern communications, techniques or equipment. Members were forced to use their personal email accounts, such as Yahoo accounts, in order to communicate electronically. The majority of the internal communication was handled via personal contact and hand-

written documents.  Personal interaction was often a result of non-functional communications equipment such as the telephonic system within the AU.

The African work culture differed from the western work schedule.  The leaders and members of the AU were not available for contact after 5 p.m. or on weekends. The lack of availability of the AU leadership and staff was viewed as a challenge in communications with the international partners such as the US.  The members of the AU were seen as having to learn on the job rather than having a set of procedures to follow or learn from for their respective positions.

The AU communicated with the US through the senior leadership of both the AU and the US Department of State. The interviews suggested that the communication between the AU and the US was viewed as adequate given the lack of sophistication of the AU.

The participants in this study viewed the AU as more passive when it came to addressing issues with Sudan.  Sudan was a member of the AU, and there was the perception that the AU had a desire for Sudan to remain its sovereignty.  The consensus was that the AU desired to allow Sudan to solve its own issues regardless of AMIS.

## Concluding Summary

The AU was a new organization that required assistance in all areas to conduct AMIS.  As such, the respondents in the study overall saw the AU as ill-prepared to undertake a peacekeeping mission at such an early stage of organizational development. There was political will by the leadership of the AU to conduct AMIS, but the organization was challenged by a complete lack of resources, personnel, expertise, organizational structure, and more.  This created challenges for both the AU and the

international partners trying to support the AU. Overall, the decision-making process was transactional in nature, but elements of transformational leadership were exhibited by its key leaders. This allowed a shared vision to filter down to the mid-level leaders and enlighten the staff.  The lack of an operations center was a major challenge for the AU, as it made it virtually impossible for the AU to monitor what was occurring with AMIS or in Darfur and challenged the leadership, communications and organization of the AU.  US support was a challenge to the AU in both requesting and reeving needed support. This was particularly important as the US was considered the major international donor to the AU.  Eventually, some progress was made.  In particular, the establishment of the DITF assisted the AU, and the international partners provided a direct line of communication between the donors and the AU.  One major factor in AMIS was that the Government of Sudan allowed the AU to establish AMIS in an effort to placate the West by having a peacekeeping mission on Sudan soil.  However, Sudan would only allow African troops to participate in the mission.  Sudan continually laid out impediments to stymie and slow AMIS during the 2004-2007 time-frame, creating an additional challenge to the AU in conducting its mission to stem genocide and protect the IDPs.

### Recommendations for Policy and Programs

The results of this study of the recollections of senior US officials directly involved with supporting the AU during AMIS can be used by US and international partners in current and future peacekeeping missions that are executed by international organizations such as the AU, EU OAS, NATO and the UN.  The challenges faced by the AU during AMIS may be generalizable to future AU peacekeeping missions and

used as a model for determining a "lessons learned" study of AMIS for use by US and AU officials.

The challenges that the AU faced in accessing and receiving US support can be used by the US Department of Defense and the US Department of State in streamlining acquisition policy and programs in dealing with international organizations and less developed nations. Multi-national and unified training is an area of concern reported by those who participated in the study. This can be used to determine a more efficient method of training offered to international organizations by the US. The US military was observed by the respondents as reacting quickly and efficiently. The international community of non-governmental organizations and other civilian agencies could look at how the US military supported the AU as a guideline for their policies and programs of similar nature.

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**Recommendations for Future Research**

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This study focused on the perceptions of senior US officials who were directly involved with assisting and working with the AU, in part or throughout, the period of AMIS, 2004 to 2007. A future researcher may find it beneficial to design a similar study relating to the AU and AMIS that directly addresses the existing theories of communication and leadership.

Furthermore, I believe there could be an interest in the academic community as well as those involved in peacekeeping operations in a study that focused on the perceptions from the African perspective, using those senior African officials who were directly involved with supporting the AU during AMIS addressing the same topics. The

current data of this dissertation, highlighting the perceptions of senior US officials, could be correlated against the African perceptions of the challenges.

Another area of the AU and AMIS that future research could study would be the perceptions of senior non-African (and non-US) international officials who were directly involved with supporting or monitoring the AU.  It would be informative to study the challenges that were faced in the areas of organization, leadership, US support and communications from their perspective. The perceptions of international senior officials would include those senior officials from partnering countries such as Norway, Sweden, the European Union, Germany, France and NATO that contributed non-US personnel to support the AU during AMIS.

The *Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies* that was conducted by House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman and Gupta (2004) could be expanded to include an organization such as the AU rather than a focus on regional or country specific findings.  How the northern African members of the AU and the sub-Saharan members view leadership and communication may suggest that the cultures of the diverse membership within an organization may or may not differ.  Another aspect to study with the GLOBE model would be gender dynamics in the AU during AMIS.

### Limitation of Study

The fact that I was able to capture the perceptions of 66.7 percent of the senior US official population creates a limitation, as all potential participants were not available for the study.  To a degree the data collected from 8 respondents can be generalized to the population of 12 potential participants as they all worked together,

and I believe that the data is generalizable as it captures the majority of the target population.

Another limitation of the study is that I interviewed senior US officials and data collected may not be generalizable to non-US senior officials who were directly involved with the AU.

## Researcher's Conclusion

The AU was praised for conducting AMIS in the face of resistance from Sudan and the lack of a number of resource-related items. AMIS can be viewed as a success despite a number of short comings that existed at the AU. The data collected in this study can provide a road-map for future AU and US engagement with peacekeeping efforts on the continent of Africa as well as other locations.

I believe that there were a number of obstacles that the AU was able to mitigate through the efforts of the US and international partners. The AU was able to fulfill its stated objective of handing the genocide in Darfur through a mission created and executed by Africans. The AU, as well as any organization, must receive resources from a multitude of sources. The AU was a success in that it was able to reach out to the US and the international partners for support, although it was not always in the western method of handling communication and issues. The cultural differences between the African leadership and organizational style and the western view was exemplified in the data and can lead both sides to a better understanding of how to request and provide support in the future. The AU, despite being a new organization, was able to access resources and function as an organization to conduct AMIS. AMIS ran from 2004 to 2007 despite a number of challenges to its execution. The UN took

over the peacekeeping mission in Sudan in 2007 when AMIS was successfully turned

over to become UNAMID.

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## Appendix A

## List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACOTA: African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance

AFRICOM: Africa Command

AQIM:  al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

AMIS: African Union Mission in Sudan

APREP: African Peacekeeping Record Response Partnership

AU- African Union

CENTCOM: Central Command

CJTF-HOA: Combined Task Force-Horn of Africa

DBKO: Department for Peacekeeping Operations of the UN

ECOWAS: Economic Community of Western African States

EUCOM: European Command

DITF: Darfur Integrated Task Force

EU: European Union

FM: Frequency Modulation

HF: High Frequency

HIPPO: High-level Panel on Peace Operations of the UN

HMMWV: High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

IMET: International Military Education and Training

J6: Communications Staff

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PAE: Pacific Architects and Engineers

PEPFAR: President's Emergency Plan for AIDS relief

PSOD: Peace and Security Division

OAU: Organization of African Unity

OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF: Operation Iraqi Freedom

REC: Regional Economic Community

RPA: Rwandan Patriotic Army

RDF: Rwandan Defense Force

SADC: Southern African Development Community

TCC: Troop Contributing Country

UN: United Nations

UNAMID: UN-African Union Mission in Darfur

US: United States

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

# Appendix B

# Recruitment Letter

Study # 256

FROM: Joseph Q. Martinelli  TO: John/Jane Doe

Dear Doe

I am a doctoral student at the University of Oklahoma and I am conducting a research project for my dissertation entitled: "Effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Sudan: Case Study 2003-2007."

I am reaching out to you as a former member of the US team that worked closely with supporting the African  Union during the African Union Mission in Sudan to request that you participate in my study that will consist  of an in-person interview to be conducted at a time and place convenient for you, if you agree to participate.   I will conduct the interview using a recording device and/or notes.

Your participation is voluntarily and you may decline this offer to participate in my study. Please see the   attached disclosure document that informs you of the parameters of the study you right to accept or decline   to participate in the study.

Please be assured that your identification will not be disclosed and completely anonymous.

I would be honored to have you included in this study that is a part of my PH.D. study at the University of  Oklahoma. I am under the sponsorship of faculty member Dr. Susan Sharp who can be located at:  ssharp@ou.edu or 405-325-2829. I can be contacted at: josephmartinelli@hotmail.com or 202-870-9929.

Thank you so much for your

consideration.  Sincerely,

Joseph Q. Martinelli

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE:

Q: Describe the African Union organizational structure, 2003-2007.

Probe: What were the organizational challenges that the African Union faced during AMIS, 2003-2007, at the headquarters in Addis Abba?

Probe: How could the AU have improved its organizational structure at the AU headquarters to better execute AMIS, 2003-2007?

Q: Describe the AMIS organizational structure in Darfur, 2003-2007.

Probe: What were the organizational challenges of AMIS in Darfur, 2003-2007?

Probe: How could the AU have improved the organizational structure of AMIS in Darfur?

Q: What are the factors of AU or AMIS organizational structure that I did not ask, that you wouldadd?

LEADERSHIP:

Q: Describe the African Union style of Leadership, 2003-2007 (or, for example, 'Describe the African Union Leadership, 2003-2007').

Probe: What were the leadership challenges that the African Union leadership faced during AMIS, 2003-2007, at the headquarters in Addis Abba?

Probe: How could the AU have improved the leadership style at the AU headquarters to better execute AMIS, 2003-2007?

Q: Describe the leadership style of AMIS in Darfur, 2003-2007.

Probe: What were the leadership challenges of AMIS in Darfur, 2003-2007?

Probe: How could the AU have improved its leadership in Darfur to better execute AMIS,

2003-2007? Q: What are the factors of AU or AMIS leadership that I did not ask, that you

couldadd?

US SUPPORT:

Q: Describe how the AU requested US Support for AMIS, 2003-2007?

Probe: What were the challenges for the AU in seeking US support for AMIS, 2003-2007?

Probe: How could the AU have improved its request mechanism for US support for AMIS, 2003-2007?Q: Describe the US Support to AMIS, 2003-2007.

Probe: What were the challenges for the US in providing support to the AU for AMIS, 2003-

2007? Probe: How could the US have improved its support to the AU during AMIS, 2003-

2007?

Q: What are the factors and challenges of US Support and AU request for US Support that I did not ask, that you could add?

COMMUNICATION:

Q: How did the AU headquarters, in Addis Ababa, communicate internally during AMIS, 2003-2007?

Probe: What were the challenges for the AU in communicating internally within the AU during AMIS, 2003-2007?

Probe: How could the AU have improved its internal communication at the AU headquarters during AMIS, 2003- 2007?

Q: How did the AU communicate externally with the US during AMIS, 2003-2007?

Probe: How could the AU have improved its external communication between the AU headquarters and the US during AMIS, 2003-2007?

Q: What are the factors of AU or AMIS communication internally and externally that I did did not ask, that you could add?

**Consent Form**

**Signed Consent to Participate in Research**

Would you like to be involved in research at the University of Oklahoma?

I am Joseph Q. Martinelli from the Department of Advanced Studies and I invite you to participate in my research project entitled Effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Sudan: Case Study 2003-2007. This research is being conducted at your location, to be determined by you. You were selected as a possible participant because of your involvement with the African Union and the African Union Mission in Sudan, during the period 2003-2007.

Please read this document and contact me to ask any questions that you may have BEFORE agreeing to take part in my research.

What is the purpose of this research? The purpose of this research is to determine from the US perspective the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Sudan from your perspective.

How many participants will be in this research? About nine (9) people will take part in this research.

What will I be asked to do? If you agree to be in this research, you will be asked a series of questions related to your perception in the areas of African Union organization, leadership style, US support, and communication during the African Union Mission in Sudan during the period 2003-2007. Your response to these questions is all that will be asked of you.

How long will this take? Your participation will take approximately 30-45 minutes in total to respond to the questions asked under the four categories of organization, leadership US support and communication. It is anticipated that only one (1) meeting will be required to record your response.

What are the risks and/or benefits if I participate? "There are no risks and no benefits from being in this research.

What do I do if I am injured? If you are injured during your participation, report this to a researcher immediately. Emergency medical treatment is available. However, you or your insurance company will be expected to pay the usual charge from this treatment. The University of Oklahoma Norman Campus has set aside no funds to compensate you in the event of injury.

Will I be compensated for participating? You will not be reimbursed for your time and participation in this research.

Who will see my information? In research reports, there will be no information that will make it possible to identify you. Research records will be stored securely and only approved researchers and the OU Institution Review Board will have access to the records.

You have the right to access the research data that has been collected about you as a part of this research. However, you may not have access to this information until the entire research has completely finished and you consent to this temporary restriction.

Do I have to participate? No. If you do not participate, you will not be penalized or lose benefits or services unrelated to the research. If you decide to participate, you don't have to answer any question and can stop participating at any time.

Will my identity be anonymous or confidential? Your name will not be retained or linked with your responses <u>unless you specifically agree</u> to be identified. The data you provide will be destroyed unless you specifically agree for data retention or retention of contact information at the end of the research. Please check all of the options that you agree to:

I agree to being quoted directly.                                          ___ Yes ___

          No

I agree to have my name reported with quoted material.          ___Yes ___     No

I agree for the researcher to use my data in future studies.     ___Yes ___     No

Audio Recording of Research Activities to assist with accurate recording of your responses, your interview may be recorded on an audio recording device. You have the right to refuse to allow such recording without penalty.

I consent to audio recording.                                    ___     Yes     ___     No

Will I be contacted again? The researcher would like to contact you again to recruit you into this research or to gather additional information.

_____ I give my permission for the researcher to contact me in the future.

_____ I do not wish to be contacted by the researcher again.

Who do I contact with questions, concerns or complaints? If you have questions, concerns or complaints about the research or have experienced a research-related injury, contact me at 202-870-9929 or email: <u>josephmartinelli@hotmail.com</u> or the faculty adviser, Dr. Susan Sharp at 405-325-2829 or email: ssharp@ou.edu.

You can also contact the University of Oklahoma – Norman Campus Institutional Review Board (OU-NC IRB) at 405-325-8110 or <u>irb@ou.edu</u> if you have questions

about your rights as a research participant, concerns, or complaints about the research

and wish to talk to someone other than the researcher(s) or if you cannot reach the

researcher(s).

*You will be given a copy of this document for your records. By providing information to*

*the researcher(s), I am agreeing to participate in this* research.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Participant Signature | Print Name | Date |
| Signature of Researcher Obtaining Consent | Print Name | Date |
| Signature of Witness (if applicable) | Print Name | Date |