

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

ORGANIZED INTERESTS IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

PAUL D. JORGENSEN
Norman, Oklahoma
2011

ORGANIZED INTERESTS IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY

Dr. Glen S. Krutz, Chair

Dr. Ann-Marie Szymanski

Dr. Donald E. Maletz

Dr. Michael Givel

Dr. Zev Trachtenberg

© Copyright by PAUL D. JORGENSEN 2011
All Rights Reserved.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES	vi
LIST OF FIGURES	xvi
ABSTRACT	xvii
CHAPTER ONE: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, GROUP THEORY AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE	1
Introduction	1
The Role of Organized Interests in Elections: A Brief History	6
PAC Strategy and Representation: Geographic versus Financial Constituencies	10
Group Theory: Demand- versus Supply-Side Approaches	13
Campaign Finance: Does (PAC) Money Matter?	21
Conclusion	34
CHAPTER TWO: THE PAC SYSTEM	37
Introduction	37
Identifying the PAC System	42
Measuring PAC Donations	48
Geography and the PAC System	58
Policy Domains and the PAC System	61
Measuring the Political Environment	85
Geographic Environment	86
Legislative/Institutional Environment	89
Electoral Environment	106
Constituency Environment	120
Conclusion: The PAC System, 1990-2006	125
CHAPTER THREE: THE DEMAND-SIDE APPROACH	128
Introduction	128
Demand-Side and PAC Strategy: The Organizational Presence Model	131
Testing the Organizational Presence Model: Data, Variables, and Hypotheses	139
Findings	143
Conclusion	178
CHAPTER FOUR: THE SUPPLY-SIDE APPROACH	180
Introduction	181
Public Choice and Organized Interests: The Old Idea of <i>Politics without Romance</i>	184
Public Choice, Pluralism, and Policymaking: The Supply of Public Policy Model	201

Public Choice, Pluralism, and PAC Strategy: The Legislative Asset Model	207
Findings	219
Building a New Model of PAC Strategy	252
CHAPTER FIVE: A NEW APPROACH TO PAC STRATEGY MODELING	254
Introduction	254
Intellectual Roots of the Mediated Model	255
Mediated Model: Data, Variables, and Hypotheses	260
Findings	262
Conclusion	279
CHAPTER SIX: UNDERSTANDING POLITICS USING ORGANIZED INTERESTS	280
BIBLIOGRAPHY	287
APPENDIX A: CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS AND THOSE PACS OVER THE LIMITS	296
APPENDIX B: HOUSE STANDING COMMITTEE NAMES BY CONGRESSIONAL SESSIONS	300
APPENDIX C: INCUMBENTS NOT RETURNING FOR NEXT CONGRESSIONAL SESSION BY ELECTORAL CYCLE AND POLITICAL PARTY	301
APPENDIX D: CENSUS INDUSTRY CATEGORIES FOR 1980, 1990, AND 2000	315

LIST OF TABLES

2.1	Electoral Cycle Dates	44
2.2	Descriptive Statistics of Case Selection	47
2.3	1990 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals	51
2.4	1992 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals	51
2.5	1994 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals	52
2.6	1996 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals	52
2.7	1998 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals	53
2.8	2000 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals	53
2.9	2002 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals	54
2.10	2004 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals	54
2.11	2006 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals	55
2.12	PAC Donations to All Politicians versus Official Candidates in House of Representatives by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars	57
2.13	Individual Donations to PACs and to Candidates/Political Parties by Electoral Cycle	59
2.14	Individual Donations to PACs, Frequency and Amount, by State for 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	60
2.15	Number of Unique, Active PACs by Policy Sector and Electoral Cycle	63
2.16	1990-1994 Agribusiness PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	64
2.17	1996-2000 Agribusiness PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	64
2.18	2002-2006 Agribusiness PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	65
2.19	1990-1994 Communications/Electronics PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	65
2.20	1996-2000 Communications/Electronics PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	66
2.21	2002-2006 Communications/Electronics PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	66
2.22	1990-1994 Construction PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	67
2.23	1996-2000 Construction PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	67
2.24	2002-2006 Construction PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	68

2.25	1990-1994 Defense PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	68
2.26	1996-2000 Defense PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	69
2.27	2002-2006 Defense PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	69
2.28	1990-1994 Energy/Natural Resources PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	70
2.29	1996-2000 Energy/Natural Resources PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	70
2.30	2002-2006 Energy/Natural Resources PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	71
2.31	1990-1994 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	71
2.32	1996-2000 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	72
2.33	2002-2006 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	72
2.34	1990-1994 Health PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	73
2.35	1996-2000 Health PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	73
2.36	2002-2006 Health PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	74
2.37	1990-1994 Ideological/Single Issue PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	74
2.38	1996-2000 Ideological/Single Issue PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	75
2.39	2002-2006 Ideological/Single Issue PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	75
2.40	1990-1994 Labor PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	76
2.41	1996-2000 Labor PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	76
2.42	2002-2006 Labor PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	77
2.43	1990-1994 Lawyer/Lobbyists PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	77
2.44	1996-2000 Lawyer/Lobbyists PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	78
2.45	2002-2006 Lawyer/Lobbyists PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	78
2.46	1990-1994 Miscellaneous Business PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	79
2.47	1996-2000 Miscellaneous Business PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	79

2.48	2002-2006 Miscellaneous Business PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	80
2.49	1990-1994 Transportation PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	80
2.50	1996-2000 Transportation PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	81
2.51	2002-2006 Transportation PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars	81
2.52	Average PAC Donations to States, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	86
2.53	Standing Full Committee Names in the 109 th House of Representatives	92
2.54	PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbent Committee Members and Chairpersons, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollars	94
2.55	PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Leadership Positions, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollars	97
2.56	PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Chamber Seniority, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollars	99
2.57	Number of Official Candidates for the House of Representatives by Political Party and Electoral Cycle	101
2.58	Number of Official Candidates Receiving PAC Donations for the House of Representatives by Political Party and Electoral Cycle	101
2.59	PAC Donations to Official Democratic and Republican Candidates by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars	103
2.60	PAC Donations to Official Independent, Green, and Other Party Candidates by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars	103
2.61	PAC Donations to Official Libertarian, Natural Law, Socialist, and Reform Party Candidates by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars	104
2.62	PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Ideology, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollars	105
2.63	PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by District Partisanship, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollars	108
2.64	PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Electoral Margin of Victory, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollars	109
2.65	PAC Donations to General Election Winners by Political Party and Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars	111
2.66	PAC Donations to General Election Losers by Political Party and Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars	111
2.67	Number of Official Incumbents, Challengers, and Quality Challengers for the House of Representatives by Electoral Cycle	113
2.68	Number of Official Incumbents, Challengers, and Quality Challengers Receiving PAC Donations for the House of Representatives by Electoral Cycle	114
2.69	PAC Donations to Official Incumbents, Challengers and Quality Challengers by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars	115
2.70	Number of Official Incumbents, Challengers, and Quality Challengers for the House of Representatives by Political Party and Electoral Cycle	115

2.71	Number of Official Incumbents, Challengers, and Quality Challengers Receiving PAC Donations for the House of Representatives by Political Party and Electoral Cycle	116
2.72	PAC Donations to Incumbents by Party and Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars	116
2.73	PAC Donations to Democratic and Republican Challengers by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars	117
2.74	PAC Donations to Democratic and Republican Quality Challengers by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars	117
2.75	Total Number of General Election Incumbent Losers by Political Party and Election Cycle	118
2.76	PAC Donations to General Election Incumbent Losers by Political Party and Election Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars	118
2.77	PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Select Incumbent Variables and Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars	119
2.78	Election Year with Corresponding Census Data	121
2.79	Census Bureau Employment by Industry Categories	122
3.1	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Alabama, 1990	146
3.2	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Alabama PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	146
3.3	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Alaska, 1990	146
3.4	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Alaska PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	146
3.5	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Arizona, 1990	147
3.6	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Arizona PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	147
3.7	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Arkansas, 1990	147
3.8	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Arkansas PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	147
3.9	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in California, 1990	148
3.10	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by California PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	148
3.11	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Colorado, 1990	148
3.12	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Colorado PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	148
3.13	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Connecticut, 1990	149
3.14	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Connecticut PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	149

3.15	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Delaware, 1990	149
3.16	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Delaware PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	150
3.17	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Florida, 1990	150
3.18	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Florida PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	150
3.19	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Georgia, 1990	150
3.20	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Georgia PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	151
3.21	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Hawaii, 1990	151
3.22	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Hawaii PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	151
3.23	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Idaho, 1990	151
3.24	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Idaho PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	152
3.25	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Illinois, 1990	152
3.26	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Illinois PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	152
3.27	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Indiana, 1990	152
3.28	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Indiana PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	153
3.29	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Iowa, 1990	153
3.30	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Iowa PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	153
3.31	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Kansas, 1990	153
3.32	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Kansas PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	154
3.33	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Kentucky, 1990	154
3.34	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Kentucky PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	154
3.35	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Louisiana, 1990	154
3.36	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Louisiana PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	155
3.37	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Maine, 1990	155

3.38	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Maine PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	155
3.39	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Maryland, 1990	155
3.40	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Maryland PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	156
3.41	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Massachusetts, 1990	156
3.42	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Massachusetts PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	156
3.43	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Michigan, 1990	156
3.44	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Michigan PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	157
3.45	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Minnesota, 1990	157
3.46	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Minnesota PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	157
3.47	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Mississippi, 1990	157
3.48	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Mississippi PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	158
3.49	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Missouri, 1990	158
3.50	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Missouri PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	158
3.51	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Montana, 1990	158
3.52	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Montana PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	159
3.53	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Nebraska, 1990	159
3.54	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Nebraska PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	159
3.55	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Nevada, 1990	159
3.56	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Nevada PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	160
3.57	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in New Hampshire, 1990	160
3.58	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by New Hampshire PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	160
3.59	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in New Jersey, 1990	160
3.60	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by New Jersey PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	161

3.61	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in New Mexico, 1990	161
3.62	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by New Mexico PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	161
3.63	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in New York, 1990	161
3.64	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by New York PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	162
3.65	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in North Carolina, 1990	162
3.66	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by North Carolina PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	162
3.67	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in North Dakota, 1990	162
3.68	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by North Dakota PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	163
3.69	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Ohio, 1990	163
3.70	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Ohio PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	163
3.71	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Oklahoma, 1990	163
3.72	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Oklahoma PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	164
3.73	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Oregon, 1990	164
3.74	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Oregon PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	164
3.75	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Pennsylvania, 1990	164
3.76	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Pennsylvania PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	165
3.77	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Rhode Island, 1990	165
3.78	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Rhode Island PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	165
3.79	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in South Carolina, 1990	165
3.80	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by South Carolina PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	166
3.81	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in South Dakota, 1990	166
3.82	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by South Dakota PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	166
3.83	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Tennessee, 1990	166

3.84	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Tennessee PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	167
3.85	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Texas, 1990	167
3.86	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Texas PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	167
3.87	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Utah, 1990	167
3.88	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Utah PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	168
3.89	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Vermont, 1990	168
3.90	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Vermont PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	168
3.91	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Virginia, 1990	168
3.92	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Virginia PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	169
3.93	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Washington, 1990	169
3.94	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Washington PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	169
3.95	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in West Virginia, 1990	169
3.96	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by West Virginia PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	170
3.97	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Wisconsin, 1990	170
3.98	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Wisconsin PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	170
3.99	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Wyoming, 1990	170
3.100	Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Wyoming PAC to House of Representatives, 1990	171
3.101	California-Based PAC Strategy According to Organizational Presence Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycle	174
3.102	Michigan-Based PAC Strategy According to Organizational Presence Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycle	175
3.103	New York-Based PAC Strategy According to Organizational Presence Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycle	176
3.104	Texas-Based PAC Strategy According to Organizational Presence Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycle	177
4.1	Incidence of PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Policy Sector, 190-2006 Electoral Cycles	215
4.2	Agribusiness PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	220

4.3	Communications and Electronics PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	221
4.4	Construction PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	222
4.5	Defense PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	223
4.6	Energy and Natural Resource PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	224
4.7	Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	225
4.8	Health PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	226
4.9	Ideological and Single Issue PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	227
4.10	Labor PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	228
4.11	Lawyers and Lobbyists PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	229
4.12	Miscellaneous Business PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	230
4.13	Transportation PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	231
4.14	Heteroscedasticity of Legislative Asset Model by Policy Sector, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles (Derived from Appropriate Policy Sector Regression Tables, 4.2-4.13)	250
5.1	Agribusiness PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	263
5.2	Communications and Electronics PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	264
5.3	Construction PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	265
5.4	Defense PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	266
5.5	Energy and Natural Resource PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	267
5.6	Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	268
5.7	Health PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	269
5.8	Ideological and Single Issue PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	270
5.9	Labor PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	271
5.10	Lawyers and Lobbyists PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	272
5.11	Miscellaneous Business PAC Strategy According to Mediated	

	Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	273
5.12	Transportation PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles	274
5.13	Heteroscedasticity of Legislative Asset Model by Policy Sector, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles (Derived from Appropriate Policy Sector Regression Tables 5.1-5.12)	275

LIST OF FIGURES

2.1	PAC Spending in House of Representative Elections in 1989 Real Dollars	56
2.2	Total PAC Spending by Electoral Cycle and Policy Sector	82
2.3	Average PAC Spending by Electoral Cycle and Policy Sector	83
2.4	Mean PAC Donations to States by Size Ratio	88
2.5	The Geographic Distributional Aspects of the PAC System	89
4.1	Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Agribusiness PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006	238
4.2	Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Communications PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006	239
4.3	Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Construction PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006	240
4.4	Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Defense PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006	241
4.5	Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Energy and Natural Resources PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006	242
4.6	Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006	243
4.7	Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Health PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006	244
4.8	Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Ideological and Single Issue PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006	245
4.9	Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Labor PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006	246
4.10	Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Lawyer and Lobbyist PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006	247
4.11	Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Miscellaneous Business PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006	248
4.12	Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Transportation PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006	249

ABSTRACT

Why do political action committees (PACs) donate money to some candidates and not others? Answers to this PAC-strategy question take two different forms. First, scholars emphasize demand-side variables of the legislative market (e.g., geographic location of PAC donors), culminating in the organizational presence model of PAC strategy, which discounts legislative strategies and finds that PACs donate to ideologically friendly, electorally vulnerable candidates who campaign where PACs have an organizational presence. Second, public choice scholars emphasize supply-side variables of the legislative market (e.g., congressional member attributes), culminating in the legislative asset model of PAC strategy, finding that PACs donate to the lowest cost congressional members in the best position to provide legislation, or a legislative strategy. Using data from the Center for Responsive Politics, I test each model using every PAC donation to a congressional candidate from 1990-2006, organized by the geographic location of PAC donor-bases and the PAC's policy sector. I find both models deficient in explaining PAC strategy. Only a small portion of PACs make decisions bounded by the geography of individual donors, making most PACs the nationalizing force many feared in the early 1980s. While PACs exhibit a clear strategy that seeks legislative benefit, the statistical significance of the legislative asset model comes from its ability to explain small donations with more accuracy than large PAC donations. In an attempt to reconcile these two approaches, I re-specify the legislative asset model with a conditional hypothesis: PACs donate money according to legislator characteristics and legislative strategies, but predominantly within the geography of its donor-base. This conditional hypothesis forms the foundation of a new mediated model,

as the legislative strategy of PACs is mediated by the geographical distribution of its donor-base. This conditional hypothesis improves the explanatory power of PAC-strategy models marginally; however, the representational flaw in the PAC system still remains: PAC money creates financial constituencies that deviate from the geographic constituencies, exacerbating the differences between organized and unorganized interests in American political life.

CHAPTER ONE

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, GROUP THEORY, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE

*The point, for the 946,326th time is that people get elected to office by currying the favor of powerful interest groups. They don't get elected for their excellence as political philosophers.*¹

~Dean Baker, 21 December 2008~

Introduction

To understand which interest(s) politicians represent is to understand the structure, processes, and outcomes of a representative government. James Madison articulated as much when he crafted his foundational argument in *Federalist Paper #10*:

A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.

While much scholarly debate surrounding this and other passages, (especially Madison's mention of creditors and debtors) concerns the extent to which Madison viewed American politics through the lens of economic class conflict (e.g., Manley 1987), there is less discussion over the Madisonian reasons why individuals would be motivated for political action. Madison's *political participation principle* is as follows: the *principle task of modern legislation* is to regulate different economic interests (e.g., manufacturing, mercantile interests, real estate, finance), which *involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government*. Since

¹ This quote is from the 21 December 2008 blog posting by Dean Baker, economist and co-founder of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, found at: http://www.prospect.org/csnc/blogs/beat_the_press, or at <http://www.cepr.org>.

the primary task of legislation is to regulate the economy, it is inevitable that interested parties would be involved in the making and passing of that legislation. Of all the principles attributed to Madison, and *Federalist Paper #10* in particular (e.g., scope of conflict, pluralism, and what would become elements of Marxism), scholars miss this simple, yet foundational participation principle. All other political theories developed from Madisonian thought are secondary to his thought on why and which groups participate in lawmaking. *Politics* is the label scholars, journalists, activists, and commentators give to all behavior, speech, and thought flowing from Madison's participation principle.

The *spirit of party and faction* involves itself in contemporary government through a variety of activities, including funding policy research (e.g., think tanks), lobbying (e.g., information dissemination), and campaign contributions; in essence, the spirit of party and faction subsidizes its political representation in order to influence the substance of economic and social policy. Any robust understanding of political representation must understand how interested parties subsidize it to suit their particular interests, and understanding the subsidization of political representation begins with campaign finance because holding congressional office requires a privately financed election, making campaign contributions representative of a political relationship between organized interests and political decision-makers.² This relationship is a market of political influence.

² Thomas Ferguson (1995, 8) calls this method the *golden rule*: “to discover who rules, follow the gold (i.e., trace the origins and financing of the campaign).”

Individuals seeking congressional office demand money and will be able supply legislation; organized interests demand specific types of legislation and supply money. I examine one aspect of this market by asking: why do political action committees (PACs) form financial relationships with some congressional candidates and not others? I define the variation in PAC decision-making, to form financial relationships with some congressional candidates and not others, as *PAC strategy*. I am seeking answers to this PAC-strategy question rather than PAC-formation and PAC-influence questions because scholars have not clarified the debates concerning PAC strategy. While disagreements about why some groups form PACs (e.g., Gray and Lowery 1997) and the nature of PAC influence on election results and legislation (e.g., Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 127-146) certainly exist, and scholars developed different theories to reflect those disagreements, scholars have neglected theoretical debates about PAC strategy.³ PACs use a host of variables in making strategic decisions, and the collective outcome of all these decisions is called the PAC system of influence.

Typically, scholars describe PAC strategy using particular variables measuring: *organizational-maintenance* (PACs donating more money to congressional candidates in districts with PAC donors), *electoral* (PACs donating more money to congressional candidates who face a close election), *ideological* (PACs donating more money to ideologically friendly candidates), and *legislative* (PACs donating more money to incumbents occupying institutionally favorable positions) strategies. Many studies seek

³ Sabato (1984, 30-33) finds specific reasons why some companies do and do not form PACs: pressure from a chief executive officer, government regulation of the industry, the company may not want to give the appearance of corruption by forming a PAC, and the free-rider problem with some companies allows others do incur the costs of PAC formation and maintenance.

to find which strategies PACs use the most; however, scholars have found that PACs use multiple strategies (e.g., Grier and Munger 1986; Stratmann 1992), making the search for one dominant strategy futile. Instead, understanding the dynamic nature of PAC strategy and the PAC system is important because these strategies can help scholars understand larger issues in political science and American politics.

At stake in answering the PAC-strategy question is not a complete understanding of congressional campaign finance. Since 1990, congressional candidates receive at least one-third of their funding from the PAC system, making PACs an important piece of campaign financing, but certainly not representative of the entire system.⁴ Instead, what is at stake in answering this question is a fresh understanding of the PAC's role in political representation, group theory, and congressional campaign finance. PAC strategy creates empirical and normative dilemmas for political representation, the understanding of groups in American political life, and for campaign finance regulation. The remainder of this introductory chapter situates PAC strategy in relation to these empirical and normative dilemmas and outlines how I explain PAC strategy in congressional elections from 1990 through 2006. On the question of PAC strategy, scholars have allowed multiple, sometimes contradictory, perspectives to exist for decades without testing these perspectives against each other. The most empirically accurate answer to the PAC-strategy question is vital if political scientists, economists, journalists, and activists are to follow the money effectively.

⁴ Data concerning the source of congressional campaign funds comes from the Campaign Finance Institute (<http://www.cfinst.org/data/house.aspx>).

The remainder of this introduction occurs in five sections. First, I discuss the historical development of PACs via federal legislation, bureaucratic decisions, and Supreme Court cases, and the role PACs play in congressional elections. The development of PACs as a strategy of organized interests to influence politics benefits business over labor, and provides a foundation for understanding American elections through the eyes of political competition between business interests. Second, I introduce the political representation problem posed by PAC strategy. In congressional elections, PACs are positioned to create financial constituencies with policy preferences different and perhaps antithetical to the preferences of geographic constituencies. Third, I outline two different approaches to PAC strategy, the demand-side and supply-side approaches. While both approaches explain PAC strategy differently, both approaches agree that PACs do not create separate financial constituencies antithetical to geographic constituencies. Testing and synthesizing these two approaches represents this study's core project. Fourth, I address the debate over the influence of political money. If money distributed in congressional elections does not influence elections or legislation, then understanding PAC strategy is purely academic. I argue that literature in the business-power tradition places importance on the economic influence of politics, and much of the disagreement among scholars concerning this issue derives from conceptual differences about money's purpose in politics. In the fifth and final section, I outline the empirical research project and how this project contributes to the empirical and normative issues posed by PAC strategy.

The Role of Organized Interests in Elections: A Brief History

The role of organized interests in federal elections became more visible in the 1970s. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 with the ensuing 1974 and 1976 amendments, Supreme Court decisions, and bureaucratic rules established a framework for organizing and monitoring campaign finance. Separate segregated funds, or PACs, are central to this framework (Epstein 1979, 160). Concerned about a Supreme Court opinion adverse to the fundraising and spending ability of labor in *Pipefitters Local #562 v. United States*, it was the Hansen Amendment that established separate segregated funds in the FECA of 1971 (Epstein 1979, 164).⁵ If an organized interest wishes to contribute money to a candidate and/or political party, via a direct donation, then that organized interest must form a PAC. By recognizing the PAC in federal legislation, and establishing the Federal Election Commission, the federal government changed dramatically campaign finance regulations and politics. In the mid-1970s, federal campaign finance regulation went from “sporadic, fragmentary, ad hoc, unenforced and largely unenforceable legislative efforts” to “detailed statutory schemes, frequently administered by newly created regulatory bodies” with a “mandate to monitor and safeguard the sanctity of elections” (Epstein 1979, 159). The publicly and legally stated purpose was simple: to equate the amount of money with the strength of political ideas and to help prevent the appearance of corruption in American representative democracy.

⁵ At issue in *Pipefitters Local #562 v. United States* (1972) was labor’s creation of separate segregated funds to circumvent laws banning union donations to political candidates. The Supreme Court ruled that the 1971 Federal Election Act ban on union contributions (section 610) did not apply to separate segregated funds. The Hansen Amendment extended section 610 to explicitly legalize the separate segregated fund.

Before the FECA of 1971, the Tillman Act of 1907 established the regulation of corporate political action by banning the use of corporate funds for direct donations, and later expanded to include donations to primaries, party conventions, and all expenditures in general (Epstein 1979, 160). The regulation of labor before 1971 occurred on a different historical timeline, but the regulation had similar goals and purpose. The War Labor Disputes Act of 1943 (Smith-Connally Anti-Strike Act) banned labor union campaign contributions during times of war, and the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) of 1947 extended this ban to times of peace. With the Taft-Hartley Act, the federal government's campaign contribution regulation of corporations and unions became standardized (Epstein 1979, 161; Grier and Munger 1986, 350).

Efforts by corporations and unions to circumvent this regulation began in force from the early 1940s and lasted until the late 1960s. As a way to bypass the ban on the use of corporate and union treasuries in politics, unions established organizations similar to separate segregated funds. The earliest and largest of these groups belonged to the Congress of Industrial Organization (C.I.O.) and the American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.), and once these unions merged, they formed the Committee on Political Education (C.O.P.E.), which is the precursor to the modern-day PAC (Epstein 1979, 161). In response to increasing regulatory demands, and labor union presence, corporations began forming large PACs, starting with the Business-Industry PAC (BIPAC) formed by the National Association of Manufacturing (Epstein 1979, 163).

Beyond policy demands, union and corporate PACs had different functions:

While virtually from the outset of organized labor's electoral involvement, its fundamental political objective has been the mobilization of mass political

participation, business electoral activity has, until recently, focused on stimulating political activity among elites – namely, ranking corporate officers, directors, and shareholders. Until the overall reforms in campaign financing laws during the 1970s, monies from business-related sources could enter the electoral arena legally in virtually unlimited amounts in the form of individual campaign contributions (Epstein 1979, 162).

The irony of PAC development is that labor unions were thought to benefit from the PAC system because it was labor unions using separate segregated funds before 1971, and corporate donations usually came in the form of individual contributions. Of the corporate segregated funds in existence, all focused exclusively on raising and spending money, not mobilizing voters (Epstein 1979, 163). Labor also lobbied to prevent the banning of PAC giving for organizations with government contracts, which benefitted corporations, as most government contracts occur with corporations; “thus, business firms were the major beneficiaries of the AFL-CIO’s 1974 efforts,” as these efforts contributed to the growth of corporate PACs (Epstein 1979, 166-167).

Probably the most important decision made during the 1970s was a bureaucratic rule by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in the SUN-PAC and SUN-EPA cases. In April 1975, only three months after the beginning of the agency, the FEC ruled in favor of Sun Oil Company, allowing (1) corporate treasuries to be used to fund and staff the company’s PAC, (2) corporations to form multiple PACs with each PAC having its own contribution limit, and (3) allowing the company to use payroll deductions to fund the PAC. This last ruling expanded the source of funds for a corporate PAC greatly; not only could the corporate PAC solicit from shareholders, but also employees, who may or may not be a union member, which was the greatest contributing factor of corporate PAC growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Epstein 1979, 168).

In *Buckley v. Valeo* (1976), the Supreme Court upheld a majority of regulations in the 1971 FECA and 1974 amendments. The Supreme Court also indicated that unions and corporations could form as many PACs as possible through voluntary donations, with each PAC having a separate individual contribution limit of \$5,000 (Epstein 1979, 169). Also in 1976, Congress with President Ford's signature amended the FECA once again to reverse the FEC's SUN-PAC and SUN-EPA rulings that were beneficial to corporations. Corporations were limited in its solicitation efforts from employees to twice a year, forcing corporate PACs to raise funds from shareholders and executive positions, and forcing multiple PACs of the same corporation to abide by the same contribution limits, preventing the pooling of PAC contributions to the same candidate (Epstein 1979, 170; also see Sabato 1984, 52-53).⁶ The purpose of the decade-long legislative process was simple: to protect union members and shareholders from having their money used for political purposes against their will, and to prevent the perception of corruption (Epstein 1979, 188).

Despite these reform goals, the PAC structure has not provided a “politically meaningful role for those social groups (e.g., minorities, women, the economically disadvantaged) which do not possess the requisite financial or organizational resources to emulate” (Epstein 1979, 189). The concern for political representation has always been that money trumps concern for those whose interests are not represented monetarily; however, PACs created a concern among scholars that monetary interests

⁶ Sabato (1984, 53) recognizes the different fundraising situation of trade PACs: “Trade PACs have more flexibility in soliciting their noncorporate members – there is no limitation on frequency there – and trade PACs can of course freely solicit their own executive and administrative staffs. They have the same twice-yearly solicitation rights for their own nonexecutive employees as corporate PACs do.”

would become more organized and centralized, perhaps making geographic representation obsolete.

PAC Strategy and Representation: Geographic versus Financial Constituencies

With the increase of PAC contributions in the early 1980s, it did not take long for scholars to recognize the potential problems posed by PACs to political representation. The ability for individuals and PACs to contribute money across state and district lines to areas outside their voting jurisdiction creates the possibility that politicians will have two competing constituencies, one geographic and the other financial. PACs are in a unique position to *nationalize* and *centralize* campaigns that force the “detachment of congressmen from their electoral constituencies” (Eismeier and Pollock 1984, 122). If PAC strategy contributes to this detachment, then PACs will form monetary relationships with congressional candidates from districts and states that differ geographically from the districts and states where PAC headquarters and donors reside. This possible occurrence generates this question: to what extent is the financial constituency emanating from strategic PAC decisions, different from the geographic constituency of a congressional member? To determine the level of incongruence between geographic and financial constituencies, scholars define these interests objectively, using ideology, employment statistics, and donor residence.

As it turns out, the PAC system is famous for sending money across district and state lines. Grenzke (1988, 87) finds that the “proportion of within-district PAC money is a miniscule 2% and dropping,” and the “proportion of within-state money is larger, but still only about 14%.” The tension between geographic and financial constituencies derives from the transferable nature of money versus the stationary nature of votes and

constituents. In theory, and as the law allows, PAC money can cross-district lines using three different cues to select candidates: legislative, electoral, and ideological (Eismeier and Pollock 1985, 197; Grier and Munger 1986; Wright 1985, 403). It is more common for PAC scholars to call these cues *strategies*, and many scholars develop an extensive vocabulary to describe these three PAC strategies (see Eismeier and Pollock 1986, 292; and Gopoian 1984, 259-263 for examples of synonyms for these three PAC strategies). A legislative strategy connotes PAC contributions flowing to candidates that have occupied or will occupy important legislative decision-making positions in Congress. For example, politicians sitting on a committee of jurisdiction or occupying the chairpersonship of that committee would garner more PAC contributions because PACs want legislative favors. If a PAC pursues an electoral strategy, then PACs give more money to candidates in potentially close elections to gain leverage on that candidate's future voting behavior while in office. The competitiveness of the district, the experience of the challenger, and the closeness of poll numbers going into the election are all-important variables in an electoral strategy. An ideological strategy indicates that PACs contribute money to a candidate who is ideologically congruent with members of the PAC. There is nothing more stable in our understanding of PAC strategy than the presence of these three strategies; however, more fundamental goals govern PAC strategy.

The use of the term strategy connotes PAC decision-making to achieve a desired goal. If PACs have legislative, electoral, and ideological goals, then PACs will have legislative, electoral, and ideological strategies. With some notable exceptions (e.g., Grier and Munger 1986, 352-354; Stratmann 1992, 648), PAC scholars seek evidence

that PACs pursue one of these strategies over all others. Understanding these strategies as mutually exclusive still dominates recent research (e.g., Bonica 2010, 26-31). The research seeking to find which strategy dominates PAC decision-making is unnecessary because the question misses this important theoretical point: legislative, electoral, and ideological strategies are not strategies at all since two more fundamental goals govern PAC decision-making: organizational maintenance and/or marginal-cost selection. What the literature calls strategies (legislative, electoral, ideological) are variables correlated with other overarching strategies related to the two primary goals of PAC behavior. PAC strategy is goal oriented by definition and it would seem highly unlikely that individual PACs would be naïve enough to think their money could have deciding effects on elections or roll-call votes or the ideological distribution in Congress, especially with small PAC budgets. PACs have higher-order goals that correspond to the selection of candidates based on legislative, electoral, and/or ideological characteristics. In other words, what the literature calls PAC strategies are by-products of other more fundamental choices PACs have to make: choosing between an organizational-maintenance and a marginal-cost strategy. Both of these strategies discount the harmful division between geographic and financial constituencies.

The two different approaches to PAC contribution strategy reconcile geographic and financial constituencies differently. The first argues that PACs donate money to congressional districts and states where they have an organizational presence (i.e., donor base); hence, geographic and financial constituencies are not in conflict because the geographic constituency is the financial constituency. The second argues that PACs donate money to congressional districts where views are most favorable (i.e.,

constituency characteristics); hence, the ideas of the geographic and financial constituencies are not in conflict. While both approaches come to similar theoretical conclusions, each approach arrives at this conclusion differently.

Group Theory: Demand- versus Supply-Side Approaches

Starting in the 1970s, group theory withdrew from its central position in the political science subfield of American politics to the periphery (Baumgartner and Leech 1998); however, there was a corresponding rise in group theory concerns in economics, specifically within the field of public choice.⁷ Some of the early studies of PAC strategy published in the premiere political science journals used a demand-side approach to analyze PAC strategy, while those public choice scholars taking center stage in group theory development used a supply-side approach to PAC strategy. The demand-side approach to PAC strategy takes organizational maintenance to be the most important goal of PAC strategy. It is a demand-side approach because PAC strategy is governed by the characteristics of those demanding legislation. The supply-side approach to PAC strategy takes rent seeking, the purposive action of accruing the most legislative benefit with the least cost via a marginal-cost analysis of legislative favors, as the most important goal of PAC strategy. It is a supply-side approach because PAC strategy is governed by characteristics of those supplying legislation. In what follows, I explain briefly the demand- and supply-side approaches.

⁷ Baumgartner and Leech (1998, 45) blame the move of group theory from central to periphery in the study of American politics on scholarly disagreements concerning the causality of money and power, variable measurement, hypothesis testing, and many scholars having a normative bias. None of these methodological debates prevented public choice scholarship from thriving, which Baumgartner and Leech confine to a footnote. The result has been an unquestioned acceptance of public choice PAC models in the literature.

Where you stand depends on where you sit is a common phrase meaning the opinions and decisions a person forms and makes will always be in relation to their own interests. To the extent scholars can recognize PAC interests through its strategy, where individual PAC donors sit may determine where the PAC stands. The demand-side approach, using organizational analyses, asks this sub-question: how does the geographic distribution of PAC donors influence the choice of PAC strategy? In other words, do PACs pursue an organizational-maintenance or marginal-cost strategy, and does the geographic distribution of donors influence this decision?

All organizational analyses of PACs recognize the tension within a PAC between the committee that makes contribution decisions and the individual donors supplying the money that PAC decision-makers use to fund candidate campaigns. The PAC decision-making committee and the individual donors sit in different places and take different stands on who should receive the contributions. While the size of a PAC's budget, certainly an organizational variable, places mathematical constraint on PAC strategy, it is the internal dynamic between PAC decision-makers and PAC donors that provides the tension between organizational maintenance and a pure, rent-seeking, marginal-cost strategy. The organizational presence model emphasizes this tension in explaining PAC strategy.

The organizational presence model represents the most coherent explanation of how a PAC's organizational maintenance goals influence its contribution strategies. The essence of the organizational presence model is to show how the "factors that allow some PACs to become very rich are the very same factors that undercut their potential influence," which means the necessities of raising money take precedence over the

necessities of demanding legislation (Wright 1985, 400).⁸ The reason for this conundrum is that *local inputs* influence PAC decision-making and these local inputs prefer an electoral and ideological contribution strategy, discounting the legislative strategy preferred by national inputs. Local PAC inputs are those individuals working in local field offices, whose duty is to raise money for enlarging PAC budgets. PAC staffs listen to local inputs because of the internal, organizational maintenance goals of PACs. Listening to local donors and local PAC officials is vital to continuing the funding stream in future elections, and this organizational need results in an electoral and local strategy because local PAC donors are *political amateurs* and either do not know or are not interested in the legislative effectiveness of donations, or know more about electoral and ideological characteristics of politicians (Wright 1985, 405). According to Wright (1985), if local activists have influence on PAC decisions, then PACs should give to ideologically friendly candidates in close elections, located in districts and states where they have donors (Wright 1985, 406; see also Gopoian 1984, 271). Countering this strategy of organizational maintenance is the marginal-cost strategy identified by public choice scholars.

While the study and centrality of organized interests diminished among political science in the 1970s (Baumgartner and Leech 1998), it began to rise in the research program of public choice. The field of public choice derives from one postulate: the application of economic assumptions and pro-market philosophy to politics will provide

⁸ The five national PACs Wright (1985, 401-402) examines are the American Medical PAC, Dealers Election Action Committee, American Bankers Association, Realtors PAC, and the associated General Contractors PAC, for the 1978 and 1980 election cycles. To measure organizational presence, Wright (1985, 402) relies on interviews with PAC officials.

new insights on policymaking processes and outcomes. Public choice is simply the “economic study of nonmarket decision-making, or...the application of economics to political science” (Mueller 1976, 395).⁹ Central to public choice is the concept of *rent seeking*, the cost paid by an organized interest to accrue economic benefit from government, as all benefits from government have a price, and “in the political world that price can be paid in the form of campaign contributions” (Mitchell 1990, 90). While public choice argues rent-seeking behavior fails in creating economic efficiency, the rent-seeking system itself is in equilibrium. The *legislative asset* model is the most comprehensive application of public choice to PAC strategy modeling (Grier and Munger 1986).

Derived from Denzau and Munger’s (1986) *supply of public policy* model, the legislative asset model maintains the same assumptions, as its fundamental premise is that when PACs act rationally in their own self-interest (maximizing their separate, distinct preferences), the system of interacting politicians, organized interests, and unorganized interests is in equilibrium.¹⁰ PACs are seekers of the cheapest favors possible, as they supply money and demand legislation and regulation.

⁹ In their review of group theory, Baumgartner and Leech (1998, 66) only make brief reference to the public choice approach of the Chicago and Virginia Schools of economic thought. The public choice perspective developed by these schools dominates explanations of organized interest formation, strategy, and influence since the 1970s. For a review of how these schools of thought developed see Mitchell (1990), Mitchell and Munger (1991), and Mueller (1976, 1988).

¹⁰ Legislators, voters, and organized interests are all *constrained maximizers*, who seek the most efficient way of utilizing their discretionary activities. Legislators are constrained by the total effort they can dispense to voters and organized interests, voters are constrained by who appears on their voting ballot, and organized interests are constrained by their scarce resources (Denzau and Munger 1986, 92). The model is a supply-side model because it explains PAC contribution strategy through those that supply public policy (i.e., legislators). The legislator’s *promised level of effort* is the basis on which PACs strategize, and this effort derives from a legislator’s institutional capacity and constituent preferences, which make the legislator more or less likely to be productive in a particular policy domain. The cost of

Grier and Munger's (1986) legislative asset model conveniently subsumes all cues and PAC distinctions (rational, pragmatic, investor, ideological) under one postulate: all PACs will pursue their goals efficiently. Some PACs will pursue more legislative ends, which place primacy on the committee assignment, while other PACs place primacy on ideology so that ideological variables become more significant than others.¹¹ This application began a systematic inquiry into PAC spending combining legislative (i.e., pragmatic, investor-oriented PACs), electoral, and ideological cues (i.e., ideological PACs) into one model of PAC behavior, as evidence shows that PACs use different strategies for different legislators (Stratmann 1992, 648).¹²

If organized interests are rent seekers, and PACs are an extension of some organized interests, then the legislative process is the highest concern for PACs, as PACs will pursue a legislative strategy. Since much of the legislative process occurs in congressional committees, committee assignment should explain most of the variation in PAC donations, and is considered vital to the supply-side approach (Endersby and Munger 1992, 79; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 113). In sum, the legislative

each legislator (i.e., institutional capacity, constituency characteristics) is the *supply price* to the PAC, or the supply price for public policy.

¹¹ Some argue that the public choice approach, and by extension, the legislative asset model, do not think PACs are benign access seekers: "a considerable portion of recent discussion insists that PAC campaign contributions, in general, are merely investments in 'access' to (be able to 'tell the PAC's story) incumbent politicians that are invariant with respect to either regulatory philosophy or voting records. Nevertheless, doubts about these contentions, quite understandably, persist," and they are found in the public choice literature (Havrilesky 1990, 243-244). Many authors use a dichotomy between pragmatic, legislative, or investor oriented PACs versus electoral, ideological PACs (e.g., Rudolph 1999, 196-197; Sorauf 1988; Snyder 1990, 1992, 1993).

¹² The central dichotomy in the PAC-strategy literature has always been investment versus ideological, as investor PACs are "set up by organizations with relatively narrow economic interests – corporations, labor unions, trade associations, and farmers' cooperatives," but "ideological PAC contributions should be less persistent than investor PAC contributions...in particular, while there is persistence in both types, ideological PAC contributions exhibit considerably more year-to-year variation than investor PAC contributions" (e.g., Snyder 1992, 19). It is the unconnected PACs, as defined by the FEC, which are treated as ideological PACs (e.g., Sabato 1984; Snyder 1992, 21-22).

strategy expects incumbency, committee assignments, majority party status, leadership positions, and both chamber and committee seniority to explain the variation in the real dollar amount of PAC donations to congressional candidates. Ideology and electoral characteristics also contribute to making a low-cost contribution decision.

A PAC uses an ideological cue if that PAC accounts for a congressional members' voting ideology, political party (correlates with ideology), and by extension, constituency concerns. This strategy seeks to reduce constituent costs on the PAC by contributing to congressional members who can act on PAC needs without creating discontent among constituents. PACs donate to congressional members who are ideologically similar because it would cost too much to shift a member ideologically (Grier and Munger 1986, 355). If a PAC gives more money to one political party over another, then that PAC is using an ideological cue (Brunell 2005, 685). In sum, the ideological strategy predicts that ideology explains the variation in the real dollar amount of PAC donations to congressional candidates.

An electoral cue indicates that PACs donate to those friendly members who face electoral uncertainty during the current election, allowing PACs to acquire leverage over a winning candidate in the next congressional session. Electoral costs refer to a PAC's ability to rent low-cost members by supporting vulnerable representatives. Congressional members are more likely to act in the PAC's interest when the member needs money to win an election. If the candidate campaigns for a safe seat, then PACs must spend more money to acquire the congressional member's attention (Grier and Munger 1986, 353-355). Underlying these three cues is the notion that PACs donate only in districts with constituent preferences congruent with the PAC's goals. PACs

will not donate the required amount of money (it may be an amount beyond the limit anyways) necessary to shift a congressional member's policy preferences in a direction opposite of his/her constituency.¹³

The assumption that must occur for this model to be the most accurate explanation of PAC strategy, and for the rent-seeking system to be in equilibrium, is that PACs are placeless entities:

Our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his constituency...we do not model interest group decisions directly, assuming simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost supplier...policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium (Grier and Munger 1991, 24-25).

The legislative asset model, and all research that uses this model, views legislators and voters as bound geographically to a district, and it is PACs that can maneuver among districts donating money. Much of the PAC literature either implicitly (e.g., Grenzke 1989, 259; Rudolph 1999, 196-197) or explicitly (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999, 511; Endersby and Munger 1992, 79; Grier and Munger 1991, 1993; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 113; Havrilesky 1990, 243; Hersch and McDougall 2000, 331; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1163; Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 43-44; Snyder

¹³ There is a nuance to the supply-price thesis:

Political action committees would waste resources if they paid every legislator his or her supply price. Only a majority has to vote in their interests and thus be given contributions in their election campaigns. Some legislators may require no compensation since their constituency interests are similar to PAC interests; their supply price for voting in the PACs interest is zero. Under the assumption that these legislators are not sufficient to obtain a majority in Congress, votes have to be bought from legislators who require progressively higher price to change their platform. To minimize costs, the PAC will rank each legislator according to the compensation required to move from the vote-maximizing position to the position preferred by the PAC (Stratmann 1992, 650).

So, the median member of the House of Representatives should receive the most contributions. PACs do not give to the most favorable, nor to the most unfavorable, but to those on the fence.

1993, 219-220; Stratmann 1992, 649) adopts the legislative asset model and the assumption that PACs are not geographically bound. By law, this conceptualization of elections is true, money can (and does) cross district and state lines, but voters and legislators cannot; however, in reality, the model ignores demand-side constraints making PAC donations less portable (e.g., PACs have organizational maintenance goals and must respond to individual donor wishes). The assumption that PACs are placeless entities, responding to supply prices, unbound by organizational need and geography is not academic, its accuracy has real consequence for the public choice approach to politics.

The purpose of the legislative asset model is to show how the distribution of organized interests in American politics (i.e., the demand side) is inconsequential for public policy outputs because organized interests respond to supply-side forces, and these supply-side actors (i.e., legislators) must respond to unorganized interests, since voters hold legislators accountable at the voting booth; thus, PACs donate money to legislators who cannot deviate beyond the policy parameters set by unorganized interests. For this story to represent reality, PACs must be placeless organizations. The organizational presence model differs because it predicts PACs to contribute money where it has individual donors and an office, making PACs geographically bound.

This debate between organizational-maintenance and marginal-cost/rent-seeking PAC strategies, the focus of this research, is academic in its purest sense if money does not influence politics. While the focus of this research is PAC strategy, treating money as a dependent variable, I outline in the next section the debate on the effectiveness of money, treating money as an independent variable influencing political behavior.

Campaign Finance: Does (PAC) Money Matter?

The political representation and group theory debates brought to the forefront by PAC strategy are academic if money does not contribute to political outcomes, and knowledge of PAC strategy, the focus of this inquiry (PAC contributions as the dependent variable), cannot inform campaign finance debates unless the public deems this strategy as an important determinant of political outcomes. Generations after Louise Overacker's foundation work in this subject, *Money in Elections*, scholars still debate the influence of money in politics. The opposing sides on this debate could not be further apart, either scholars find evidence of moneyed interests forming public policy, or scholars find and argue that moneyed interests are redundant and irrational; very simply, money either matters a great deal, or money simply symbolizes wine brought to a dinner party, or what I call the elections-as-a-dinner-party hypothesis (i.e., money in politics is redundant and epiphenomenal to an existing relationship).

The gulf between these two positions is large; however, a careful articulation of each position and the differences of each will show the debate exists because of differences in the conceptualization of political money and methodology. To this end, I argue that scholars must properly conceive the utility of money in politics and understand the type of relationship money fosters between private interests and public servants. If scholars agree on the same conceptualization of money and on the parameters of adequate methodology, then these debates can be muted and scholars can make progress in answering the money question in politics.

The money question in politics is an old one:

Attempts to influence the voter are as old as the ballot box itself and have gone on in every age and type of civilization in which elections have been held.

When manipulation by force, intimidation, stuffing the ballot box, and falsifying returns becomes impossible or difficult the voter has been appealed to by money and the things only money can buy. The use of money in elections is no new problem, nor is it one which can be divorced entirely from the larger question of the manipulation of the electorate generally (Overacker 1932, 18-19).

In the United States, the issue of political money is noted in the Congressional Record during the early 1920s and House hearings on the Corrupt Practices Act in 1921 (was not law until 1925) (Overacker 1932, 1-2). Money must be spent to have elections and to operate a political apparatus; hence, questioning the potential influence of that money on decisions of the public interest is natural. The history of campaign-finance scholarship indicates data is hard to access, as many of the classic studies used biographies of public officials, the results of congressional investigations, reports of National Party Committees, and personal accounts and public testimony of public officials to cobble together a coherent portrait of monetary interests and the relationship between private interests and public officials (e.g., Overacker 1932, viii).

After this heroic effort, it took only until the second sentence of the preface for Louise Overacker (1932, vii) to state the core issue of the campaign-finance debate in the United States:

Many are beginning to wonder if present-day methods of raising and spending campaign funds do not clog the wheels of our elaborately constructed mechanism of popular control, and if democracies do not inevitably become plutocracies (Overacker 1932, vii).

The criteria Overacker uses to assess when money becomes an undue influence is simply stated: whether money prohibits popular control of government decision-making with majority rule, or more specifically, whether the “use of money prevents the voter who has something to express from expressing his wants as he feels them, or protecting his interests as he sees them, thereby preventing the majority from getting what it

wants” (Overacker 1932, 4). Scholars are still debating whether or not the use of money in politics crosses this line. Overacker sets the foundation for most of the political-money issues scholars debate today: the history of money in politics, why money is needed, how much money politicians spend, the effectiveness of money, and whether the amount and influence of money represents a danger to democratic practices. Despite her monumental achievement, there are those who deny the importance of money in politics (e.g., Milyo 2002) and even celebrate the deregulation of campaign finance to allow unlimited and undisclosed monetary donations (e.g., Smith 2001, 201-227).¹⁴ To establish the importance of political money, I begin with arguments discounting its significance, which I summarize as the elections-as-a-dinner-party argument.

Every argument against the significance of money on political behavior is mentioned in this carefully crafted parable:

When I was a boy, my family would occasionally receive tall baskets filled with fruits, nuts, and jams, most often around the holidays. These gifts from business acquaintances of my father were not meant to be inducements for him to break the law; rather, they were little niceties intended to maintain ongoing relationships. Today, when my wife and I are invited to dinner, we usually bring flowers or a bottle of wine as a gift. This is not some crass attempt on our part to ensure that sanitary conditions are maintained during meal preparation; it is only a symbol of our appreciation for the kindness of our hosts. Not for a moment do I believe that we would be ostracized should we go to dinner engagements empty-handed, nor would my father have punished nongivers. As such, these gift exchanges can be seen as epiphenomena: they symbolize underlying relationships, but they do not constitute relationships (Milyo 2002, 157).

¹⁴ Smith (2001) argues that money is important in politics, which is why it should be deregulated. This argument agrees with Overacker’s (1932) premise but turns her concern on its head.

The criticism of the study of political money (from this point forward, I call the political money perspective) embedded in this story collectively constitutes the elections-as-a-dinner-party perspective. There are four components to this perspective: (1) monetary relationships are only corrupt if there is a quid pro quo exchange of money for legislative favors (the father would never think about punishing dinner guests showing up empty-handed), (2) monetary exchanges are epiphenomenal to existing, friendly relationships making the study of political money methodologically flawed (friends bringing other friends gifts), (3) there are other more important aspects of politics than money (equating monetary exchanges during elections with relaxing, inconsequential, social events), and (4) political parties are autonomous agents and not beholden to investors (the father hosting the event invites the guests, and is indifferent to the guests bringing a gift). The elections-as-a-dinner-party argument falsely characterizes the political money perspective, and does not address the extant literature challenging its benign view of the relationships between organized interests and political parties. By bringing this misunderstanding to light, there are chances to reconcile these differing perspectives; however, the goal of this section is to establish the importance of political money by addressing the four criticisms offered by Milyo (2002).

First, the elections-as-a-dinner-party perspective argues that the political money perspective defines the purpose of monetary exchanges to be quid pro quo, and there is very little evidence to support this conceptualization of money in politics. To find evidence of quid pro quo, scholars must find evidence of an exchange of money for services (i.e., a smoking gun), where the political outcome would be different with a different quid pro quo exchange or without that exchange. Given there are laws against

this type of exchange in politics (i.e., bribery laws), the quid pro quo standard is impossible to meet, so it becomes questionable why the elections-as-a-dinner-party crowd wishes to characterize the study of political money in this way. For example, Milyo (2000, 75-76), the author of elections-as-a-dinner-party thesis, characterizes the study of political money in this fashion:

There is a dearth of systematic and consistent evidence to support the conventional wisdom that money plays a dominant and nefarious role in American politics. The familiar mantra of reform, which advocates that corporate PAC contributions are bribes, is therefore a simplistic and exaggerated view that plays on this public ignorance... literature on campaign finance has done a disservice to the public policy debate – and to the general advancement of knowledge – by too often taking as self-evident that PAC contributions are highly valuable to the recipient and donor alike.

This perspective characterizes the political money perspective as being narrowly focused on quid pro quo, when in fact quid pro quo is illegal and does not exist, which is a disservice to the public; however, those working in the political money perspective do not equate the monetary exchange with quid pro quo and one must wonder if Milyo uses this high, legal standard to purposely dismiss attempts to show money matters in politics.

The adverse effects of money reach well beyond quid pro quo exchanges. The political money perspective examines why only certain individuals/donors are invited to the party and the broad policy effect of this limited invitation list. It may have been a slip of the pen, but it is apt that those who were invited to Milyo's dinner party were only business acquaintances. The political money perspective would ask: why were only business acquaintances invited?

Investment theory, as developed by Thomas Ferguson, claims that scholars, journalists, and citizens can only purport to understand political decision-making once

they account for the financing of politicians, which is called the *Golden Rule of Political Analysis*, “to discover who rules, follow the gold (i.e., trace the origins and financing of the campaign)” (Ferguson 1995, 8). As long as campaign finance is properly understood, this analysis is distinct from the analysis usually offered by mainstream political commentators, who try to explain elections in strictly rhetorical and vague terms.¹⁵ The political party represents investor-bloc coalitions who coalesce during elections. Investment theory’s assumptions, findings, and implications are antithetical to rational-choice approaches (e.g., Downs 1957) because: (1) political parties maximize money, not votes; (2) political parties are organizations that represent business elite investments, not independent organizations detached from its financiers; (3) political party policy preferences represent those of its investors, not those of the median voter; and (4) not all policy preferences are discussed seriously by the two political parties because on issues that both of its major investors agree, there will be no conflict (Ferguson 1995, 21-36). In sum, major-investor blocs are the only groups of people who can pay the price to control government, which changes the definition of the political party from coalitions of voters to coalitions of investors, making it difficult (but not impossible) for voters to control political party policy positions, as the parties do not move to the center and do not set the agenda with all issues of societal importance; thus, “*the electorate is not too stupid or too tired to control the political*

¹⁵ For example, journalists claimed that the Democratic Party lost the majority in the House of Representatives in 2010 because President Obama was an elitist (Baker 2010) and lacked a clear, cogent political message (Bai 2010).

system. It is merely too poor” (Ferguson 1995, 384).¹⁶ Establishing the importance of money beyond the quid pro quo exchange does not address the second criticism of the political money perspective: it is fraught with methodological problems.

The second criticism of the political money perspective argues that monetary exchanges are epiphenomenal to existing, friendly relationships making the study of political money endogenous, meaning that it is not money that forms the relationship between organized interests and politicians, it is some other underlying tie that binds. The decision to contribute money is explained by the same forces that explain the behavior of congressional members (e.g., ideology, partisanship, constituency characteristics); hence, it is difficult to distinguish a unique money effect. In Milyo’s words, monetary exchanges “symbolize underlying relationships, but they do not constitute relationships” (Milyo 2002, 157).

In response, there are many studies that account for this methodological problem, and the contribution these studies make to the political money perspective is their creative research designs, and this creativity results in substantive knowledge about the effect of political money (Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov 2010; De Figueiredo and Edwards 2007; Eggers and Hainmueller 2010; Hall and Wayman 1990; Roberts 1990; Stratmann 1998, 2002; Tahoun 2010; Ziobrowski et al 2004). The first way to overcome the redundancy dilemma is to study the effect of money on congressional member behavior, not roll call votes. Since PACs distribute money to their friends in Congress, what does this money buy? According to Hall and Wayman

¹⁶ Voters can control the political parties via the electoral process if voters participate in efficacious *secondary organizations* that group small donations and resources, and that minimize information costs associated with politics (Ferguson 1995, 29).

(1990) this money buys mobilization; money subsidizes representation by making a congressional member more active on the PACs interests (e.g., actually attending committee meetings, asking more questions, offering more amendments, and brokering deals behind closed doors). There are many variables that influence roll call votes (e.g., party leadership pressure, constituent interests), but one of the practical decisions a congressional member must make is how to spend his/her time, and PAC money helps the congressional member make that crucial decision.

A second method to overcome the redundancy dilemma is to use special instances from congressional history. Stratmann (2002) finds two votes meant to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.¹⁷ The first in 1991 and the second in 1998, both acts failed to become law, but repeal efforts finally succeeded in 1999. In 1991 and in 1998, commercial banks resisted repeal of the 1933 act, while investment and insurance banks pressed for repeal. Finding the same group of House members who voted in 1991 and 1998, Stratmann (2002) is able to control for pre-existing preferences of those congressional members, and found that an increase in commercial banking money correlated with vote switching from 1991 to 1998, and the same was true for an increase in investment/insurance campaign donations. Hall and Wayman (1990) and Stratmann (2002) develop unique research designs to account for the redundancy issue in the

¹⁷ The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 alleviated the tight monetary policy resulting from the gold standard by allowing the Federal Reserve to accept amounts of paper (government bonds) as collateral for currency, at an acceptable paper-to-gold ratio. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 famously separated investment from commercial banking activity and insurance. This act was repealed in full when President Bill Clinton signed a large authorization bill in 2000; embedded in this authorization bill was the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (commonly referred to as Gramm-Leach-Bliley) that allows commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance companies to merge.

political money literature and find that money does influence the behavior of congressional members, even in roll call votes.

A third method to find the effects of money is to examine the benefits accrued to the businesses that give, which is to examine stock price fluctuations. Roberts (1990) finds that the seniority system in the Senate provides benefits to the businesses *tied* to those Senators with seniority. Businesses are tied to a Senator if that business is located within the same state and/or has helped to fund the Senator's campaign. In a legislative system that delegates agenda setting and legislative powers to more senior members, there will be built-in expectations when power is handed over from one Senator to the next, especially when there is an abrupt change of power, as in unexpected death. When Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA) died unexpectedly of a heart attack on September 1, 1983, and was replaced by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) as the ranking minority member on the Armed Services committee (Senator Nunn became chair of this committee from 1985 to 1995), what was the reaction of stock traders?

Assuming that stock traders are intelligent, vested observers of the political system, cognizant of the benefits senior Senators can bestow, abnormal stock price fluctuations would be an appropriate indication of benefits. Not surprisingly, controlling for many factors, the businesses in the state of Washington and those who funded Jackson's campaign (but not Nunn's) went down the next day, and those tied to Nunn went up (Lockheed Martin, the largest defense employer in the state of Georgia in the early to mid-1980s posted a one-day gain attributable only to the death of Jackson, of 2.5%). Roberts (1990) shows in this case study that the seniority system grants political investors expectations for future gain. Given these studies, if scholars want to

find unique ways to overcome methodological issues, the reward is to find money matters in politics; however, there are those that argue money is one of many resources that carry currency in legislative struggles.

The third criticism of the political money perspective is that there are other more important aspects of politics than money. The most recent incidence of this critique comes from Grossmann (2009), when he tries to interpret the failure of the Obama administration to alter the *politics of Washington* that appeal to organized interests at the cost of achieving the public good. According to this critique, Obama failed to alter the perceptions about politics because he focused too much attention on campaign finance and lobbying (e.g., limiting the revolving door and stressing small donations over large donations), because the bias in the political system is not monetary, but organizational, as the system “privileges those political interests that stimulate the most organization and institutionalized representation” (Grossmann 2009, 3). Grossman (2009, 4) argues that “advocacy groups that hire lobbyists and make PAC contributions are not more prominent in public debate or more involved in policymaking,” and it is the “age, internal staff, and public membership of these organizations [that] are much more predictive of their levels of prominence and involvement.” Grossmann (2009) misrepresents the political money perspective, as cash transfers are not simply the only influence of money; the organizational maturity and staff presence in Washington, D.C. is also indicative of moneyed interests.

Grossmann combines the old hat criticism of the political money perspective (i.e., focused too heavily on quid pro quo exchanges) with his criticism that the political money perspective ignores other variables (e.g., organizational capacity):

The relative influence of the interests groups that Obama invites to the table is unlikely to be driven solely by either the force of their arguments or the direct *quid pro quo* exchanges. Interest groups with better-established reputations, more experienced staff, better connections to other groups, and better research materials are likely to have advantages. In other words, resources spent on building organizational capacity provide at least as significant an advantage as direct money transfers (Grossmann 2009, 7).

What does it take to *build organizational capacity*? Money. Grossmann neglects serious scholarship that looks beyond the cash transfer toward the funding of organizations and think tanks that produce information (see Mayer 2009 for a journalistic account, and O'Connor 2009 for an academic account of moneyed interests forming think tanks and building organizational capacity). The political money perspective argues that moneyed interests filter through the political system because powerful, mature, organizations wish to protect their ability to make profit. Without developing some motivational reasoning for political participation, Grossmann is forced to conclude with this tautological vision of politics: “some public interests are better represented by organizations in Washington because some public groups are more politically engaged” (Grossman 2009, 8).

The fourth criticism of the political money perspective argues that political parties are autonomous agents and not beholden to investors. Grossmann (2009, 2-3) grants the competition between the two political parties much power:

Being heard does not guarantee that your views will be incorporated, however. America's two political parties each have relatively visible and stable interest group coalitions, including representatives of many public groups associated with their electoral coalitions as well as institutions that provide direct support to each party's legislative agenda. The consolidated Democratic leadership is likely to incorporate more views from interest groups and public constituencies that are members of their coalition. As a result, the nation may undergo significant changes in public policy without much change in political process.

The argument is that Americans can see significant policy change without a change in how public policy is made, mainly due to the strength of the political party coalitions, which has very little to do with monetary exchanges. This conception of the political party, as vote-maximizing agents, is tradition in political science. Even those on the elitist side of the pluralism/elitism debates viewed political parties as autonomous actors in the political process (e.g., Schattschneider 1975 [1960], chapter 3). This position should not be taken as truth, as the investment theory of political parties argues and shows with evidence from political party change in the 1920s and 1930s that political parties are a function of the interests that invest in them (Ferguson 1995, chapters 1 and 2).

The final criticism of the political money perspective, implied by Milyo's (2002) parable, but not fully developed in the story, is formulated in the form of a question: "why is there so little money in U.S. politics" (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003, 105)? At issue is the amount spent on elections does not come close to the amount spent by the federal government; hence, money in politics should be viewed as a consumption good (e.g., entertainment, feeling effective) and not as an investment because the gains from trade are too large and shares of the budget would have been diminished over time if money actually bought legislative favors (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003). Another reason why PACs account for only one-third of a congressional member's reelection fund is that they know they receive little in return, and the evidence that individuals contribute more to politics than organized groups gives credence to the consumption thesis (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003, 116). The authors' also argue "most donors give substantially less than the

current hard money limits” (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003, 125). There are four brief responses to this criticism of studying money as an investment. First, the dichotomy between individuals and groups is silly, as large donations from individual donors should be considered investment-oriented money (see Ferguson 2005, 30-31). Second, chapter two of this study shows that the average PAC contribution is increasing (after adjusting for inflation), indicating that PACs are encroaching upon the hard money limit. Third, money can be influential in a variety of venues, not only the direct donation (e.g., independent expenditures, lobbying). Fourth, the paradox that more money should be spent in politics to form equilibrium between the federal government budget and campaign spending is a strange comparison indeed. The federal government spends money on goods and services for over 300 million people. The cost to supply these public goods is much greater than supplying one public good: an election. There are 535 elections (primaries not included) for Congress and one presidential election, of which only a handful of states see high amounts of spending. Including lobbying and campaign finance, it is much less expensive to pay the costs of a political party and elections (both public goods) than it is to provide infrastructure, defense, and social services. There is not more money in elections because politicians do not need more money to be satisfied; politicians still know who their major investors are without having more money. Relative strength is important, not the percent spent as a percentage of gross domestic product or the budget.¹⁸

¹⁸ See Milyo (2002, 85) for other strange comparisons with campaign spending, such as philanthropy. While it is obvious that corporate campaign spending is less than the amount spent on philanthropy (spending limits and the need to find voluntary individual donations are two reasons), philanthropic

If quid pro quo exchanges do not readily exist (or if scholars define the only effect of money as quid pro quo), if money is epiphenomenal to friendships and working relationships, if there are more important aspects of politics than money, and if politicians are autonomous agents, then the study of political money becomes the study of political redundancy and scholars would be better served to study other aspects of political life (assuming money and these other aspects are mutually exclusive) and by implication, organized interests are benign organizations. The above evidence suggests the debate about the effectiveness of political money is still open, with ample evidence suggesting PAC coalitions are important to understand. In order to reconcile these positions, scholars must have a wider definition of political money (beyond cash transfers) and create research designs that overcome methodological problems. Based on the information above, the study of PAC strategy and the PAC system provides an important foundation to understand the interests engaged in congressional elections.

Conclusion

Few aspects of American politics are left untouched by money, as wealthy people influence agenda setting and public opinion (e.g., Mayer 2010), policy planning and formulation (e.g., O'Connor 2009), political campaigns and political party conflict (e.g., Ferguson 1995), lobbying (e.g., Hall and Wayman 1990), economic policy (e.g., Greider 1987), and they define the role of government in capitalism, with the most recent example being the cause and consequence of the 2008 Great Crisis (e.g., Ferguson and Johnson 2009a, 2009b; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Johnson and Kwak

spending can be viewed as political (e.g., Mayer 2009) and is an obvious source of decreasing the tax burden on those who give in high amounts.

2010). This perceived influence prompts some to ask if America is an oligarchy (Winters and Page 2009). The concern about money in politics flows from a tradition articulated eloquently by Louise Overacker in 1932, as she sketched a thought process that for many scholars is how they find themselves studying political money. Overacker's work derives from data and research partially collected by Victor J. West, a political scientist at Stanford who died before publication, leaving Overacker to expand and finish his project. She writes:

For years before his death in February, 1927, he had been collecting material for what was at first a study of corrupt practices act. Later, with somewhat changed emphasis and scope, the central theme became 'Money in Elections'...from a study of the brief outlines found among his notes, it is evident that in the course of the years the study had become less and less a consideration of laws and their operation, and more and more a statement of the underlying problem in terms of a theory of parties and the electoral process (Overacker 1932, x).

Scholars conduct research on campaign finance, lobbying, and political money in general because they are seeking the origins of political decision-making and believe we must move beyond the written law to the representation of moneyed interests. This study is a beginning. Seeking to understand a part of congressional elections via the strategic actions of the primary organization disseminating money: the political action committee.

I begin this empirical exploration in Chapter Two by analyzing the PAC system from 1990-2006. Chapter Two is an update of previous work in the 1980s that examined the PAC system by accounting for the candidates favored by PACs (see especially Sabato 1984). Chapter Two is a macro-examination of the PAC system, deciphering the importance of incumbency, ideology, election vulnerability, committee assignment, seniority, and constituency characteristics for PACs. This chapter

establishes the importance of variables used to test two theories of PAC strategy, in addition to supporting and critiquing some of Sabato's findings in the mid-1980s.

Chapter Three and Chapter Four test the demand-side and supply-side approach to PAC strategy respectively. My findings indicate that both approaches lack in explanatory power, leaving room for a new model of PAC strategy that takes both organizational-maintenance and marginal-cost strategies seriously. Chapter Five tests this new model, the *mediated model*, on a twelve policy domains establishing how scholars can derive more complete analyses of PAC strategy. The concluding chapter, Chapter Six relates the mediated model to representation concerns, arguing that the financial-versus-geographic-constituencies debate is just one concern in congressional elections. Instead, scholars must re-acquaint themselves with a distinction made long ago between organized and unorganized interests (Schattschneider 1975 [1960]), as PACs embody a system of already organized interests, and PAC strategy does not undermine our privately-financed system of elections any more than what would exist by having a system of only individual donations; however, PACs certainly do not mediate the geographic/financial conflict.

CHAPTER TWO THE PAC SYSTEM

Introduction

From the 1972 electoral cycle, the first with legally sanctioned PACs, through the 1982 electoral cycle, known as the *PAC Decade*, the number of PACs increased from 113 to 3,479 and the amount of PAC donations increased from \$19.1 million to \$190.2 million, a 350 percent increase after adjusting for inflation (Sabato 1984, 10-14). During this time, PACs became responsible for a larger portion of campaign finance. Much of the growth in PAC population and donation activity occurred after the FEC's SUNPAC decision to allow unlimited spending from corporate/union treasuries to maintain a PAC, which means these treasuries can pay for the PAC's overhead costs. PAC growth, in the number of organizations and budgets, was disproportionate during the decade that followed.

Corporate sector PAC growth was the largest during the mid-1970s, as this sector tripled in number from 1975 to 1976 and grew by 1,600 percent from 1975 to 1983. During the PAC Decade, trade/membership/health PACs expanded over 100 percent, and nonconnected PACs increased from 110 in 1977 to 821 in 1983, compared to the paltry growth of labor PACs from 201 in 1974 to 378 in 1983 (Sabato 1984, 11). Not only was growth in the number of PACs unevenly distributed, but also the proportion of PACs contributing to total spending was small.

The inability for PACs to maintain spending in consecutive electoral cycles characterizes the PAC system, as only 61 percent of the PACs registered donated money in the 1982 congressional elections. Of those PACs that donate money to candidates, by the early 1980s, 25 percent reported budgets of less than \$1,000, while

less than 40 reported a budget of over \$1 million. Most PAC treasurers find themselves with modest budgets, between \$10,000 and \$100,000 in the early 1980s (Sabato 1984, 11). While this skewed distribution of spending to a handful of PACs during this decade lends credence to the fact that “most PACs operate on modest budgets, with small staffs, outside Washington, and without access to unpublished data,” overall spending by PACs increased and the role of these organizations as a staple in campaign finance became solidified (Sabato 1984, 11).

The most common form of PAC giving during this decade, and throughout the 1980s, was the direct donation. In fact, PACs spent little on independent expenditures, money spent independently of the candidate’s campaign (e.g., television advertisements, literature dissemination in the district/state) (Sabato 1984, 96).

Regarding the direct donation, corporations outpaced labor during the PAC Decade. Corporate and trade PACs consisted of 59 percent of all direct donations in 1982, up from 38 percent in 1974, and nonconnected PACs increased from 11 to 17 percent of all direct donations during this same time; however, “by 1982 business-related PACs were outspending labor in direct contributions to congressional campaigns by nearly three to one,” as labor’s proportion of direct donations was 24 percent by 1980 and 1982 (Sabato 1984, 14). Characteristics of the money market’s supply-side are only half the story emerging from the PAC Decade. During this time of PAC growth in campaign finance comes long-standing patterns about which candidates PACs support, or the demand-side of the money market. Of those needing money (e.g., congressional candidates), whom does the PAC system decide to support?

Studies from the PAC Decade find that PACs donate money to candidates sympathetic to the PAC's cause, and PACs look toward a host of variables to determine the candidate's level of sympathy. In his extensive survey of PAC officials, Sabato (1984, 79) finds that PAC boards (and by extension local field offices giving advice to the board) seek answers to a whole litany of questions:

In whose districts do we have plants or local divisions?
Which congressmen are on the House or Senate committees affecting us?
Which congressmen have been particularly accessible to us and have attempted to understand our problems?
Which congressmen have voted 'right' on our issues and concerns?
What is the political situation in the districts we want to target?
Who especially needs help?
For non-incumbents, where do they stand on our issues and how close to us have they been in the past? What are their electoral chances? What political consultants have they hired, what do their poll results say, and how much have they raised so far and from what groups? Which House or Senate committee assignments will they seek if elected?

To the extent that a candidate's answers or situation is satisfactory to the PAC, a donation will likely follow, given a certain level of PAC resources. While some idiosyncratic decisions occur in the PAC system, based on loyalty to likely losers, personal affinity, or grudges (Sabato 1984, 80), much of PAC strategy is predictable and consistent. Studies of the PAC Decade find that PACs find sympathetic politicians among incumbents, Democrats or Republicans (as opposed to both or third parties), liberal or conservative ideologies (as opposed to both), those sitting on committees of jurisdiction, freshmen running for reelection, sure winners, and the various combinations of each to determine donation strategy (Sabato 1984, 73-89). Studies of the PAC Decade also began the classic distinction embedded in the PAC community between *pragmatic* and *ideological PACs* (i.e., non-connected) (Sabato 1984, 73-78). At some level, all PACs are pragmatic and rational, but some PACs have goals that

allow them to pursue a strictly ideological strategy (e.g., pro-life PACs), while some have specific legislative goals requiring a close examination of committee assignments, voting behavior, and constituency characteristics. While PAC money could be evenly distributed among some of these variables, studies of the PAC Decade indicate that a PAC system bias occurs because the PAC system as a whole donates more money to incumbents, more to committees with broad and important policy jurisdictions (e.g., Ways and Means Committee), freshman, close elections, but also sure winners (e.g., incumbents), with the minimal likelihood of bet-hedging and donating the maximum contribution (Sabato 1984, 86-89).¹⁹

This chapter replicates and updates some of macro-analysis of the PAC system found when the PAC phenomena sparked political, journalistic, and scholarly interest after the PAC Decade. This replication and update occurs within the theoretical framework established in the first chapter, and with new data dating back to the 1990 electoral cycle. The two approaches to PAC spending behavior, organizational presence and public choice, use similar PAC populations, but accentuate different political environmental factors (demand- versus supply-side) to explain how PACs behave in congressional elections and reach different conclusions about this behavior. Using comprehensive data released by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), I stay true to the PAC populations used historically by each approach, but expand and refine the identification of the PAC system to include every active PAC formed by an

¹⁹ Bet-hedging, albeit infrequent, can occur when a single PAC gives to both the Democratic and Republican candidate in the same general election, when a single PAC gives to an incumbent, and when that incumbent is likely to lose, the PAC will give to the challenger; and when a single PAC gives to a losing primary contestant and then gives to the other party for the general (Sabato 1984, 89).

organized interest, which could donate money potentially to every active candidate in the House of Representatives from the 1990 through the 2006 elections, and I organize these PAC donations by geography and policy domains.²⁰ Using CRP data to explain PAC strategy systematically is valuable because it reaches beyond the obtuse FEC categorization of corporate, labor, trade, and unconnected PACs that dominated the PAC literature during the past four decades.

Characteristics of the political environment help explain variations in these direct donations within and across election cycles. The political environment consists of demand-side factors (i.e., organizational), and supply-side factors (i.e., legislative, electoral, and constituent factors). The description of how I identify the PAC system, how I measure PAC donations and the political environment, and how these demand- and supply-side factors correlate with total PAC-system spending all help in explaining the generic nature of PAC behavior in American congressional elections. I find, similar to findings in the 1970s and 1980s, PACs donate more money to incumbents, those in leadership positions, to freshman and the most senior members of the chamber, to the two major parties over third parties, to marginal districts and close elections, to winners over losers, and give less to the most liberal congressional members; however, I find some PAC donation patterns that are contrary to previous studies and patterns that previous studies could not find due to timeframe limitations: (1) PACs give a sizeable

²⁰ I would like to thank the Center for Responsive Politics for making their data available to the public. Their bulk data can be found at <http://www.opensecrets.org>, after creating a free account. I am using the bulk PAC data, accessed at <http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/index.php>. In no way does the Center for Responsive Politics endorse or share in the views or conclusions of this research. The author compiled and is responsible for all tables, figures, calculations, and findings generated from bulk data provided by the Center for Responsive Politics.

amount of money to districts with an open seat, when comparing the means to incumbent and open seat districts, (2) PACs give to incumbents to a fault, giving the most money to incumbent losers in elections that change the majority party, and (3) there are few statistical differences in PAC donations across committee assignments. The purpose of this chapter is to understand the structure of the PAC system while defining the data and variable operationalization for the ensuing analysis of PAC-strategy models.

Identifying the PAC System

Since most PAC literature seeks to move beyond formal, mathematical deductive theory (e.g., Bental and Ben-Zion 1975; Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Edelman 1992), into empirical projects (Poole and Romer 1985, 64), attention to case selection is of primary importance to study of PAC donations. Case selection in PAC research occurs along two dimensions of the money market: (1) demand-side, the selection of politicians receiving PAC money and the timeframe of these donations, and (2) supply-side, the selection of PACs giving the money.

PAC-strategy models developed from analysis of PAC donations in elections for the House of Representatives (e.g., Wright 1985, 1989; Grier and Munger 1986); hence, I limit the demand-side of the political money market by analyzing only PAC contributions to *official* candidates for the House of Representatives, eliminating elections for the Senate and Presidency and elections for non-voting delegates in the House of Representatives (American Samoa, Washington, D.C., Guam, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands). Official candidates are those politicians seeking to hold office in the next legislative session. I use the general and primary election ballots, and CRP's

designation to determine the official status of a candidate's PAC. I include all PAC donations made to candidates with multiple PACs for the same congressional office; however, if candidates with multiple PACs maintain a PAC for a Senate or Presidential campaign (e.g., Bernie Sanders, Ron Paul), then I eliminate those donations, only keeping the House of Representatives PAC for the analysis.

The time period for my sample is the 1990 election cycle through the 2006 election cycle, using the FEC's definition of an election cycle as starting the day after the general election and ending on election-day two years later.²¹ Table 2.1 reports the dates for these nine electoral cycles (primary and general elections), resulting in 3,915 congressional district observations.²²

²¹ Using the FEC dates for election cycles is the most accurate representation of the legal environment facing PAC donation decisions; however, it poses practical problems when using CRP data and the FEC's own data because each electoral cycle dataset produced by these organizations contains transactions that occurred in previous electoral cycles (e.g., corrections to transactions in previous electoral cycles). To fix this problem, I aggregated all electoral-cycle datasets (1990-2006) and re-divided the transactions based on dates of those transactions. Transactions occurring before 11/9/1988 or after 11/7/2006 are not included in the analysis. Most of the knowledge concerning PAC strategy occurs using election cycles from the mid-1970s through the 1980s (e.g., Endersby and Munger 1992, 80; Grenzke 1988, 84; Grier and Munger 1991, 25; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 113; Havrilesky 1990, 244; Munger 1989, 182; Poole and Romer 1985, 65; Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987, 299; Romer and Snyder 1994, 748; Snyder 1990, 1207; Snyder 1992, 21), with only a few studies using 1990s electoral cycles (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999, 515; Brunell 2005, 685; Florence 1999, 61; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1170; 2005, 42; Ruldoph 1999, 198; Shin 2004, 137).

²² For analysis of PAC donations throughout this study, *n* sizes will change depending on the unit of analysis (candidate or district), and the type of district election (e.g., incumbent, quality challenger, open seat). In general, there are two types of elections that I will not investigate in detail: (1) new open seats created after reapportionment (*n*=45) and (2) districts with two-incumbents in the general election (*n*=11). Including these districts in systematic analysis of the PAC System is difficult because many independent variables require using values found in the previous legislative session (e.g., committee assignment) and in these instances, that information does not exist, or exists for multiple incumbents in the same election. Discounting these districts in the usually analysis results in 3,859 congressional districts. Some scholars use a trend variable will be the control variable for electoral-cycle changes in real PAC dollars (i.e., 1990=1, 1992=2, 1994=3, 1996=4, 1998=5, 2000=6, 2002=7, 2004=8, 2006=9) (e.g., Rudolph 1999, 199), but I will use the standard yearly dichotomous variables for pooled-cross-sectional data analysis.

Table 2.1 Electoral Cycle Dates

Start Date	End Date	Electoral Cycle
11/9/1988	11/6/1990	1990
11/7/1990	11/3/1992	1992
11/4/1992	11/8/1994	1994
11/9/1994	11/5/1996	1996
11/6/1996	11/3/1998	1998
11/4/1998	11/7/2000	2000
11/8/2000	11/5/2002	2002
11/6/2002	11/2/2004	2004
11/3/2004	11/7/2006	2006

The second dimension important to case selection is the identification of which PACs to include in the analysis. To narrow the selection of PACs, scholars conduct research on *single PACs* (e.g., Gutermuth 1999, 357; Shin 2004, 137; Wilkerson and Carrell 1999, 337);²³ *multiple PACs* (Grenzke 1988, 88; 1989, 246; Welch 1979, 201; Welch 1980, 107);²⁴ *single-industry* or *single-policy domain* PAC studies (Hersch and McDougall 2000, 330; Havrilesky 1990, 244; Stratmann 1992, 648; Stratmann 1998, 94; Van Doren, et al 1999, 400-401);²⁵ *multiple-industry* or *multiple-policy domain* PAC studies (Florence 1999, 62; Jorgensen 2010, 18-19; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1164; Taylor 2003, 295);²⁶ *large budget PACs*, including PACs who spend over \$5,000 (Snyder 1992, 21), \$50,000 (Brunell 2005, 684), over \$100,000 (Romer and Snyder

²³ The PACs used in these studies include: American Medical Association, National Abortion and Reproduction Rights Action League.

²⁴ The PACs used in these studies include: American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations Committee on Political Education, United Auto Workers, National Education Association, American Federation of Government Employees, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Communication Workers of America, National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, Association of General Contractors, Life Underwriter Political Action Committee, Machinist's Non-Partisan Political League, United Steel Workers of America, Marine Engineer's Beneficial Association, Business Industry PAC, Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, National Committee for an Effective Congress, NCPAC.

²⁵ The PACs used in these studies include: automobile manufacturing, banks, and agriculture.

²⁶ The PACs used in these studies include: railroads and airlines; aerospace, airlines, automobiles and oil; fruit, nuts, and wine; commercial banks, securities firms, investment banks, and insurance companies; tobacco and alcohol.

1994, 751), or the top 500 PACs in spending (Poole and Romer 1985, 78); *PACs with an interest group rating system* (e.g., labor, business, ideological) (Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987, 299); *total PAC-system money* with little delineation of policy domain or FEC headings (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999, 515; Silberman and Yochum 1980, 82); or, PAC studies using all or a few *FEC categories* (e.g., labor, corporations with and without stock, cooperatives, trade associations, membership organizations) (Brunell 2005, 684; Endersby and Munger 1992, 84; Grier and Munger 1986, 354; Grier and Munger 1991, 31; Grier and Munger 1993, 619; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 116; Kau and Rubin 1982, 111; Keim and Zardkoohi 1988, 27; Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 4; Magee 2002, 381; Munger 1989, 185; Romer and Snyder 1994, 751; Rudolph 1999, 198; Snyder 1990, 1207; Snyder 1992, 21; Snyder 1993, 229; Stratmann 1996, 616).²⁷

The studies listed above indicate three general trends in PAC case selection, as scholars choose to analyze a few PACs, a few industries, or use aggregated FEC headings to develop models of PAC behavior, but little PAC research organizes all PACs by policy domain and geographic location, the two most basic and important methods of organizing PACs according to PAC-strategy modeling. I use CRP data to obtain all active PACs in elections for the House of Representatives, and then use CRP bulk data to organize these PACs by geographic location and policy domain.

²⁷ The studies that use all FEC categories include (Grier and Munger 1991, 31; Grier and Munger 1993, 619; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 116; Romer and Snyder 1994, 751; Snyder 1990, 1207; Snyder 1992, 21; Snyder 1993, 229) (Romer and Snyder 1994, 751), studies that use corporations and labor unions include (Brunell 2005, 684; Grier and Munger 1986, 354; Keim and Zardkoohi 1988, 27; Magee 2002, 381; Rudolph 1999, 198; Stratmann 1996, 616), studies that use corporations include (Kau and Rubin 1982, 111; Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 4; Munger 1989, 185), and studies that use labor unions include (Endersby and Munger 1992, 84).

CRP uses FEC data, but adds value to this government data before the organization releases it to the public. CRP standardizes PAC names and the parent organization of the PAC, converts contribution amounts to an easily readable integer format, identifies which PACs were active during an electoral cycle, and provides the ability to organize PACs by geography and policy domain. I use CRP data to define the *PAC system* in elections for the House of Representatives.

To define the PAC system, I exclude PAC donations from candidate PACs, leadership PACs, political party PACs, other party officials, former political party members, non-federal candidate PACs, joint PACs, and other miscellaneous candidate PACs, because I expect these PACs to have strictly partisan donation patterns and scholars have not used these PACs in the development of PAC-strategy models; thus, the decision to eliminate these PACs from consideration results from an effort to stay true to the population PAC-strategy models are meant to explain.²⁸ In the language of the FEC, I am using *unauthorized* separate segregated funds and independent PACs (PACs not authorized by candidates or political parties), which are either *Non-Qualified Non-Party* or *Qualified Non-Party* (i.e., multi-candidate committee) PACs. In sum, I define the PAC system as those PACs representing an organized interest in House of

²⁸ I eliminate these committees from the analysis, including CRP codes in parentheses: candidate committees (Z1000), Republican candidate committees (Z1100), Democratic candidate committees (Z1200), third-party committees (Z1300), unknown party committees (Z1400), third-party leadership committees (J1300), leadership committees (J2000), Democratic leadership committees (J2100), Republican leadership committees (J2200), party committees (Z5000), Republican party committees (Z5100), Democratic party committees (Z5200), third-party party committees (Z5300), Democratic officials, candidates and former member committees (J2300), Republican officials, candidates and former member committees (J2400), non-federal candidate committees (J2500), Republican joint candidate committee (Z4100), Democratic joint candidate committee (Z4200), third-party joint candidate committee (Z4300), candidate contributions to his/her own campaign (Z9000), transfer between national party committees (Z9100), transfer from intermediary type 24I or 24T (Z9500), non-contribution or miscellaneous (Z9600), un-itemized or small contribution (Z9700), internal transfer non-contribution (Z9999).

Representative elections that are not coordinated or associated with a candidate or political party. Table 2.2 reports the number of PACs and the total amount of real dollar expenditures of the PAC system, and that of excluded PACs.

Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics of Case Selection

Election Cycle	#PACs Selected (Donations/Real 1989 Dollars)	#PACs Eliminated (Donations/Real 1989 Dollars)
1990	2,910 (139,188/\$106,339,999)	551 (10,632/\$11,969,626)
1992	3,059 (167,233/\$129,316,265)	591 (12,750/\$21,477,722)
1994	2,947 (159,181/\$115,825,336)	624 (16,346/\$23,811,547)
1996	2,975 (177,301/\$128,913,689)	724 (16,801/\$22,942,608)
1998	2,898 (162,862/\$126,047,676)	820 (17,019/\$23,897,974)
2000	2,878 (169,549/\$142,484,653)	867 (19,650/\$24,631,337)
2002	2,858 (159,410/\$141,844,009)	907 (21,137/\$28,806,641)
2004	2,934 (153,317/\$145,407,526)	954 (21,739/\$78,911,535)
2006	3,055 (170,966/\$177,441,872)	1,028 (32,397/\$137,865,782)

From the 1990 through the 2006 electoral cycles, the PAC system was stable in terms of the number of active PACs from 1990 through 2006; however, the frequency of transactions was volatile and the real dollar amount of PAC expenditures increased.

From 1990 through 2000, the real dollar amount of PAC donations was cyclical, meaning the amount of donations increased in presidential election years and decreased in mid-term elections, but starting in 2002, this decrease was slight and PAC donations increased from the 2004 to the 2006 mid-term election. A trend illuminated by Table 2.2, but is not a focus of this study, is the rise in PACs associated with candidates and political parties. Captured under the heading of *PACs Eliminated*, these PACs are more

prevalent and spend more money now than in the early 1990s, which reflects the rise in use of leadership PACs. The donation patterns of these PACs should be the focus of future empirical studies and model development. The numbers in Table 2.2 reflect PAC donations of all transaction types to all candidates, past and present, and regardless of their intent to hold office, in an election cycle. Parsing the PAC donation by transaction type to official candidates for the House of Representatives shows these aggregate spending trends hold, and are driven by the direct donation to candidates, not a PAC's independent expenditures in the district (e.g., television advertisements, literature dissemination).

Measuring PAC Donations

Measuring PAC donations across time requires standardizing donation amounts and defining which PAC transactions qualify as a donation. Using the case selection of PACs and candidates mentioned above, I measure the donations from PACs to candidates as 1989 real dollars. To obtain the real dollar amount, I adjust the PAC contribution for inflation using the annual-average Consumer Price Index (CPI). For example, candidates for the 1990 election received PAC contributions in 1988 (sparingly), 1989, and 1990; hence, donations in 1989 are the baseline and donations in 1990 are adjusted for inflation. The few 1988 donations will increase due to inflation in 1989.²⁹

²⁹ The Bureau of Labor Statistics (<ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiiai.txt>) reports the annual average CPI, and for the 1989 baseline the CPI is 124. I adjust nominal PAC campaign contributions with this equation, using the 1990 CPI (130.7) adjustment as an example: $(124/130.7) * \text{PAC Contribution Nominal Amount}$.

PACs donate money for/against candidates via nine different transaction types and the FEC regulates each of these transactions: 24A (independent expenditure against a candidate), 24C (coordinated expenditure), 24E (independent expenditure for candidate), 24F (communication cost for candidate), 24H (honorarium), 24K (direct contributions), 24N (communication cost against candidate), 24R (election recount disbursement), and 24Z (in-kind contributions). PACs engage in direct donations when they donate money to a candidate's campaign staff to use at their own discretion. Independent expenditures are expenses of the PAC uncoordinated with the campaign, such as the production and airing of television advertisements that advocate on behalf of a candidate and/or issue, similar to communication costs, which can be for or against a candidate. In-kind contributions occur when a PAC uses its budget and staff to provide a service for a candidate's campaign (e.g., polls, staff sharing), which benefits the PAC because it has discretion over the use of funds and provides personal interaction between the PAC's and candidate's campaign staff, potentially making this type of campaign financing more lucrative:

Those PACs that do use in-kind giving are generally pleased with the results. They believe that a donation of money is often invisible and quickly absorbed by the campaign organization, while in-kind expenditures are usually prominent and draw attention to the PAC, making its gift a memorable one for the candidate and his staff. The candidate frequently benefits substantially since the PAC can often provide services at a lower cost than an individual campaign can secure... The personal relationships thus established become very useful if the campaign is victorious and, as usually happens, campaign staffers become office staffers. PACs are then in a better position to influence the officeholder's legislative aims" (Sabato 1984, 94).

The federal government limits the amount of money a PAC can give via direct donations, transaction type 24K, in an election cycle under both FECA (1971 – 2002) and BCRA (2004 – present) campaign finance regimes. This limit is equal to \$5,000

per candidate per election (primary, general) under both FECA and BCRA; thus, the maximum total amount a PAC can give to a candidate is \$10,000. The campaign donation data reported by the FEC, and by definition CRP, includes 24K transactions over \$5,000 and total 24K amounts over \$10,000 between individual PACs and individual candidates. This phenomenon can occur for only one of two reasons: (1) the FEC committed an error or (2) the PAC or candidate committed a crime. I keep these transactions in the dataset, and conduct outlier analysis when appropriate. Appendix A reports spending limits under FECA and BCRA.³⁰ Tables 2.3 through 2.11 show PAC donations by transaction type in 1989 real dollars for each electoral cycle. These totals subtract instances of refunds and corrections filed at a later date; thus, transaction type frequencies and 1989 real-dollar totals represent net transactions and net dollars. In all the analysis and reporting, net real dollars means that if a candidate received and returned the same amount of money to a PAC in the same year, then the net donation will be zero, and treated as if no transaction ever occurred; however, if the candidate waited until the next calendar year to return the same amount, this situation results in a small positive donation to the candidate due to inflation adjustments.³¹

³⁰ This Internet conversation from a CRP employee indicates errors in transaction dates probably result from human error, found at http://groups.google.com/group/opensecrets-open-data/browse_thread/thread/36af96af54497f3a.

³¹ I can change this calculation easily so that only one inflation adjustment is made per electoral cycle, eliminating the small positive amounts for donations refunded a year later, making that refund zero; however, this chapter conducts analysis with yearly inflation adjustments (two per cycle).

Table 2.3 1990 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals^a

Transaction Type	Frequency ^b	Real Dollar Total ^c
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	559	264,046
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	16	26,060
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	1,304	1,234,727
Communication Cost For (24F)	1,272	818,771
Honorarium (24H)	43	53,293
Direct Contribution (24K)	133,549	102,956,715
Communication Cost Against (24N)	26	35,508
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	3	4,449
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	2,416	946,430
Total PAC to Candidate/District	139,188	106,339,999

a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC System at any point in the election cycle

b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 2,695)

c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds (\$2,242,585), and are rounded to the nearest dollar

Table 2.4 1992 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals^a

Transaction Type	Frequency ^b	Real Dollar Total ^c
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	1696	828,642
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	90	40,691
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	3925	3,420,536
Communication Cost For (24F)	1513	2,143,920
Honorarium (24H)	3	4,744
Direct Contribution (24K)	153,987	120,946,365
Communication Cost Against (24N)	18	29,238
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	24	154,590
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	5977	1,747,539
Total PAC to Candidate/District	167,233	129,316,265

a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC System at any point in the election cycle

b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 3,833)

c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds (\$3,176,756), and are rounded to the nearest dollar

Table 2.5 1994 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals^a

Transaction Type	Frequency ^b	Real Dollar Total ^c
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	766	525,855
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	24	2,561
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	2,702	1,296,590
Communication Cost For (24F)	1,397	1,684,523
Honorarium (24H)	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	150,209	110,693,814
Communication Cost Against (24N)	2	593
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	38	59,904
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	4,043	1,561,494
Total PAC to Candidate/District	159,181	115,825,336

a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC System at any point in the election cycle

b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 3,746)

c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds (\$3,128,008), and are rounded to the nearest dollar

Table 2.6 1996 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals^a

Transaction Type	Frequency ^b	Real Dollar Total ^c
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	1,111	1,540,481
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	2	766
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	4,265	2,348,106
Communication Cost For (24F)	3,055	1,988,142
Honorarium (24H)	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	163,437	120,643,572
Communication Cost Against (24N)	116	394,717
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	49	84,731
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	5,266	1,913,176
Total PAC to Candidate/District	177,301	128,913,689

a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC System at any point in the election cycle

b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 4,221)

c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds (\$3,310,612), and are rounded to the nearest dollar

Table 2.7 1998 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals^a

Transaction Type	Frequency ^b	Real Dollar Total ^c
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	532	721,548
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	1	1,141
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	2,270	4,773,682
Communication Cost For (24F)	2,360	2,249,852
Honorarium (24H)	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	152,511	116,404,487
Communication Cost Against (24N)	1	198
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	52	73,612
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	5,135	1,823,156
Total PAC to Candidate/District	162,862	126,047,676

a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC System at any point in the election cycle

b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 4,332)

c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds (\$3,361,701), and are rounded to the nearest dollar

Table 2.8 2000 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals^a

Transaction Type	Frequency ^b	Real Dollar Total ^c
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	329	1,329,038
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	1	720
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	2,503	5,069,310
Communication Cost For (24F)	3,236	2,519,147
Honorarium (24H)	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	158,052	131,724,401
Communication Cost Against (24N)	341	109,368
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	4	5,413
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	5,083	1,727,256
Total PAC to Candidate/District	169,549	142,484,653

a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC System at any point in the election cycle

b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 4,098)

c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds (\$3,532,125), and are rounded to the nearest dollar

Table 2.9 2002 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals^a

Transaction Type	Frequency ^b	Real Dollar Total ^c
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	494	596,906
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	18	285
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	2,578	3,687,622
Communication Cost For (24F)	3,063	3,297,261
Honorarium (24H)	4	2,423
Direct Contribution (24K)	148,662	132,817,063
Communication Cost Against (24N)	32	39,658
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	13	30,951
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	4,546	1,371,838
Total PAC to Candidate/District	159,410	141,844,009

a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC System at any point in the election cycle

b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 5,095)

c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds (\$4,749,173) and are rounded to the nearest dollar

Table 2.10 2004 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals^a

Transaction Type	Frequency ^b	Real Dollar Total ^c
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	139	397,472
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	1,858	4,148,755
Communication Cost For (24F)	1,919	1,424,219
Honorarium (24H)	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	145,532	138,074,632
Communication Cost Against (24N)	30	22,085
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	1	656
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	3,838	1,339,706
Total PAC to Candidate/District	153,317	145,407,526

a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC System at any point in the election cycle

b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 4,694)

c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds (\$4,538,613), and are rounded to the nearest dollar

Table 2.11 2006 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar Totals^a

Transaction Type	Frequency ^b	Real Dollar Total ^c
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	999	7,986,580
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	7	6,723
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	3,878	7,757,503
Communication Cost For (24F)	3,176	3,988,833
Honorarium (24H)	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	159,026	156,246,186
Communication Cost Against (24N)	62	174,461
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	3,818	1,281,586
Total PAC to Candidate/District	170,996	177,441,872


a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC System at any point in the election cycle

b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 4,741).

c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds (\$4,795,176), and are rounded to the nearest dollar

Tables 2.3 through 2.11 display expected and unexpected trends in PAC donations from 1990 through 2006. Expectedly, the direct donation (24K) drives total PAC donations to House of Representative PACs. Unexpectedly, the ebb and flow of donation totals in mid-term and presidential election years stops after the 2000 election cycle, and there is a growth of PAC independent expenditures (for and/or against a candidate) in House of Representative elections during the 2006 electoral cycle. Figure 2.1 displays this information graphically, showing the importance of the direct donation in explaining the variation in PAC donations across congressional districts.

Figure 2.1: PAC Spending in House of Representative Elections in 1989 Real Dollars



Despite the rise in independent expenditures in 2006, the above information provides the rationale for limiting the dependent variable in this study to PAC transaction types 24K and 24Z, since the direct donation is the most important reason for PAC formation and in-kind donations double as hard money in federal elections. These findings are compatible with the early research on PAC spending behavior, noting:

Despite the attention that independent expenditures have drawn, relatively few PACs engage in them. Only 4 percent of all the multicandidate PACs reported making any independent outlays in 1981 or 1982...but another 6 percent of the PAC community has also indicated a desire to expand into the independent arena in the near future, and that proportion might well grow if Congress should pass major limitations on PAC giving (Sabato 1984, 96).

The growth in PAC independent expenditures should be a focus of study in future research, even and especially after the Supreme Court's decision in *Citizens United v. FEC* (2010).

The dollar amounts listed above include politicians with House of Representative PACs that may not be official candidates competing for a seat in the

ensuing legislative session, while the remainder of the analysis uses only PAC-system donations to official candidates. Using only official candidates for office reduces the total amount of PAC donations, because a small portion of PAC donations is to unofficial candidates (e.g., debt repayment). Table 2.12 reports this differential in total amounts in each electoral cycle.

Table 2.12: PAC Donations to All Politicians versus Official Candidates for the House of Representatives by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Electoral Cycle	PAC Donations To All	PAC Donations to Official Candidates	Differential
1990	103,903,145	100,407,419	3,495,726
1992	122,693,904	108,362,990	14,330,914
1994	112,255,309	108,408,725	3,846,584
1996	122,556,747	118,781,211	3,775,536
1998	118,227,643	114,956,870	3,270,773
2000	133,451,657	132,368,792	1,082,865
2002	134,188,901	132,436,004	1,752,897
2004	139,414,337	135,411,417	4,002,920
2006	157,527,772	156,014,402	1,513,370

a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar, direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only.

While the real dollar amount increases, especially after the 2000 electoral cycle,

scholars note the remarkable stability to the PAC system:

Long-term considerations are in fact important for a large group of PACs...the first supporting fact is that there is a remarkable degree of persistence in PAC contributions over time. The PACs that give to a representative in one year are very likely to give to that representative in subsequent years as well (Snyder 1992, 18).

This stability is true for the electoral cycles 1990-2006, as only 16 district observations out of 3,915 experienced zero or negative real PAC dollars (more total refunds than total PAC donations).

In sum, I measure PAC donations as active PACs, not associated with candidates or political parties, donating to official candidates for the House of

Representatives (1990-2006) via direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z).³²

Depending on the model in question (organizational presence, public choice), I organize these PAC donations by geographical origin or by their legislative and policy concerns.

Geography and the PAC System

To understand the geography of the PAC system, one must determine where the individuals who donate money to PACs reside. Individual donations to PACs do not constitute a majority of individual donations, as most individuals who donate money to politics either donate to individual candidates and/or political parties. For the 1990 through 2006 electoral cycles, only 16.9% of all individual donations was given to a PAC, the remainder were donations to candidates and/or parties.³³ Table 2.13 displays the number of individual donations to PACs and to candidates and political parties for each electoral cycle, indicating a rise in individual donations (measured as transactions not unique individuals) from 1990 to 2006.

³² There are various ways to construct the dependent variable of PAC donations: total PAC dollars (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999, 515), incidence of PAC donations (e.g., Endersby and Munger 1992, 88), PAC money to incumbents, with challenger donations treated as negative (e.g., Grenzke 1989, 248; Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987, 299; Rudolph 1999, 199-200), proportion of PAC money received in real dollars (e.g., Grier and Munger 1991, 30; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1174; Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 49; Snyder 1992, 39), total PAC dollars to incumbents (e.g., Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 115-116), and change in PAC donations across election cycles (e.g., Romer and Snyder 1994, 751). There are different statistical methods of analyzing this dependent variable: Tobit (e.g., Florence 1999, 62; Grier and Munger 1991, 32; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 117; Gutermuth 1999, 357; Hersch and McDougall 2000, 335), chi-square test, to find differences in PAC donations by certain variables, such as committee assignments and political party identification (e.g., Endersby and Munger 1992, 84; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1170; Munger 1989, 181; Snyder 1992, 23); ordinary least squares regression (e.g., Grenzke 1989, 260); and, probit (e.g., Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987, 300).

³³ I compiled these figures from the bulk data issued by the Center for Responsive Politics, and do not include refund transactions.

Table 2.13 Individual Donations to PACs and to Candidates/Political Parties by Electoral Cycle^a

Electoral Cycle	PACs	Candidates/Parties
1990	111,151	394,907
1992	125,981	720,597
1994	137,556	692,416
1996	164,868	1,033,092
1998	184,026	812,077
2000	229,247	1,426,368
2002	251,220	1,159,066
2004	389,204	2,073,168
2006	387,331	1,456,972

a. The figures in this table reflect transactions between individuals and PACs and candidates/parties, and do not reflect transactions considered refunds (giving money back to the individual). The figures for candidates/parties reflect the transactions between a candidate and his/her own PAC (a candidate giving to him/herself).

Of those individual contributions to PACs, the geographical dispersion of those individual donations has definite geographical biases. The individual contribution data produced by the FEC and organized by CRP has deficiencies with respect to the coding of each individual's address. Of the 1,980,584 individual donations to PACs from the 1990 through 2006 electoral cycles, 59,096 (3%) had missing state values, 1,308 originated from U.S. Territories, and 3,901 had incorrect state initials making it impossible to determine where the individual lived. The amount of dollars flowing into the PAC system will not reflect the amount of dollars flowing out of the PAC system for two reasons. First, the individual-level data is limited, with respect to the number of coding errors and the law states only individual contributions over \$200 must be made public. Second, PACs do not have to spend the same amount raised; thus, PACs maintain and spend reserves across different election cycles; however, the data can indicate broadly whether or not a redistribution of PAC wealth is taking place in the United States. Table 2.14 shows where individual PAC donations originate by state, displaying the number of transactions between individuals and PACs per state, the mean

amount of real 1989 dollars raised in each state, and each state's ranking with regards to mean real dollars raised. There are disparities among the states, as some states raise much more per individual transaction to a PAC than others, which raises the likelihood that the PAC system redistributes money from one state to another (see table 2.52 and figure 2.5 for further discussion of this potential phenomenon).

Table 2.14 Individual Donations to PACs, Frequency and Amount, by State for 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

State	Rank	Frequency	Mean 1989 Real Dollars
Alabama	40	25,757	\$558.62
Alaska	47	4,640	\$522.48
Arizona	30	25,732	\$591.94
Arkansas	14	11,045	\$683.74
California	1	235,629	\$907.94
Colorado	6	26,118	\$779.37
Connecticut	9	46,331	\$720.07
Delaware	44	5,971	\$537.01
District of Columbia		54,138	\$1,806.71
Florida	13	84,895	\$684.66
Georgia	29	57,566	\$592.80
Hawaii	50	8,100	\$446.20
Idaho	45	5,776	\$535.67
Illinois	15	102,499	\$677.69
Indiana	36	24,697	\$569.16
Iowa	42	17,217	\$542.94
Kansas	23	17,944	\$630.19
Kentucky	37	17,465	\$562.73
Louisiana	35	22,212	\$569.81
Maine	39	7,019	\$559.34
Maryland	25	51,053	\$621.42
Massachusetts	18	54,029	\$662.92
Michigan	10	52,478	\$712.84
Minnesota	33	45,353	\$585.95
Mississippi	17	9,620	\$666.10
Missouri	20	34,262	\$643.27
Montana	48	5,078	\$511.19
Nebraska	31	11,080	\$591.20
Nevada	7	11,749	\$764.41
New Hampshire	32	8,110	\$587.60
New Jersey	21	72,125	\$636.90
New Mexico	34	8,858	\$576.42
New York	3	159,401	\$848.83

North Carolina	41	35,232	\$547.13
North Dakota	49	7,666	\$482.44
Ohio	12	72,516	\$685
Oklahoma	5	15,784	\$792.76
Oregon	28	16,252	\$609.38
Pennsylvania	11	88,782	\$694.10
Rhode Island	26	6,073	\$615.19
South Carolina	24	13,280	\$621.44
South Dakota	46	4,700	\$534.31
Tennessee	22	30,040	\$634.23
Texas	2	146,393	\$886.93
Utah	4	7,566	\$826.30
Vermont	16	3,754	\$672.01
Virginia	27	68,550	\$612.08
Washington	8	40,030	\$723.35
West Virginia	43	6,055	\$541.77
Wisconsin	38	26,038	\$560.52
Wyoming	19	3,532	\$650.23

a. I round total 1989 real dollar amounts to the nearest dollar.

Policy Domains and the PAC System

According to the public choice approach to PAC strategy, and most mainstream political discourse, PACs are seekers of favorable public policy; thus, PACs are an extension of political activity conducted in policy domains. Studies of PAC decision-making find that PACs:

Share information about candidates, and some charge, coordinate contributions for maximum effect. Whether or not the PACs ‘run in packs’ in selecting candidates, they certainly share information freely with one another and use regular, organized meetings as well as informal consultations to do so” (Sabato 1984, 44).

In addition, large-budget PACs and industry leaders are central in their PAC networks and act as guides to other PACs with less resources, leading to similar donation strategies among like-minded PACs (e.g., Business Industry Political Action Committee, Chamber of Commerce, Committee on Political Education) (Sabato 1984, 45-47). This coordination, staff sharing, and information sharing allows PACs with

similar policy agendas, economic needs, and ideological predispositions to coordinate contributions, and in essence, act as policy domains while providing campaign finance.

Those who study PAC donation strategy (e.g., the public choice approach, investment theory) often assume PAC act together in policy domains, but this assumption is tested only tangentially due to data and time constraints. The FEC categorization of corporations, labor, and trade/membership/health PACs is not adequate to analyze PAC behavior by policy domain, and relates obtusely to congressional committee jurisdictions, and neglects other more refined methods for classifying PACs that can further inform our knowledge of campaign finance, lobbying, and representation (see, for example, Snyder's (1992, 38-39) plea for improving PAC classification). The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) has improved PAC classification beyond the FEC categories by classifying PACs by policy domains.

While a select few studies incorporate the two-digit Standard Industrial Codes (SIC) to classify corporate and business PACs into policy domains (e.g., Munger 1989, 185; Taylor 2003, 295), others are utilizing recent data compiled by CRP that classifies all PACs by policy domains using SIC and the more recent North American Industry Category System (NAICS) produced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); however, these studies limit the selection of policy domains to pro- and anti-gun, hawk/dove foreign policy PACs (Magee 2002, 381), and agriculture (Van Doren et al 1999, 400-401). Using SIC and NAICS codes, CRP organizes PACs hierarchically into *policy sectors*, *industries*, and *categories*, with a policy sector being an aggregation of policy industries, and policy industries are an aggregation of smaller policy categories. CRP organizes PACs into policy sectors, industries, and categories in two ways. First,

it organizes PACs by their name and industry concerns (e.g., the goods/services its parent company produces). Second, it organizes PACs by their contribution; if Boeing donates money to a member on the Defense committee it is considered a defense policy contribution, but if Boeing donates money to the Transportation and Infrastructure committee it is considered an aviation contribution. I choose to organize PACs into policy domains by the former method, because using the latter would be tautological to describing how PACs choose to donate money (i.e., if a contribution to the Defense committee is considered a defense contribution, then committee assignment and PAC donations will always be statistically significant). Table 2.15 displays the number of active PACs in congressional elections (House of Representatives only) by policy sector per electoral cycle.

Table 2.15 Number of Unique, Active PACs by Policy Sector and Electoral Cycle

Policy	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006
Agribusiness	256	272	280	285	271	272	263	273	270
Comm./Elect.	132	126	119	109	124	152	163	168	191
Construction	111	113	108	119	115	111	108	110	111
Defense	57	59	66	62	62	52	54	49	52
Energy/Nat. Resources	324	326	321	329	324	300	271	242	244
F.I.R.E.	664	624	563	533	508	461	452	443	440
Health	179	202	207	211	202	211	235	271	307
Ideology/Single-Issue	284	347	297	348	333	342	340	360	397
Labor	234	278	266	268	248	279	245	249	247
Lawyers/Lobbyists	127	129	136	139	152	145	156	172	180
Misc. Bus.	351	357	357	365	362	356	359	374	374
Other	12	9	9	11	13	15	16	25	20
Transportation	149	155	152	155	161	154	147	147	157
Unknown	30	62	66	41	23	28	49	51	65
Total	2910	3059	2947	2975	2898	2878	2858	2934	3055

Besides the notable phenomena of different amounts of active PACs by policy sector (Defense with under 70, while Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, or F.I.R.E. has well

over 400 active PACs), the PAC system is relatively stable in total number and per policy sector. Only three policy sectors experienced swings in the total number of active PACs over 100. The F.I.R.E. sector saw a decrease in the number of active PACs of 224, while the health and ideological policy sectors saw an increase of 128 and 113 respectively. When combining this trend with Tables 2.16 through 2.51 and Figures 2.2 and 2.3, these policy sectors, while shrinking in the number of total active PACs, actually donated more money in House of Representative elections, meaning these industries did not shrink as much as they were consolidated.

Table 2.16 1990-1994 Agribusiness PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1990	1992	1994
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	830	3,768	218
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	0	0
Honorarium (24H)	9,596	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	8,273,402	9,735,806	9,132,716
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	442	442
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	21,473	52,163	64,362
Total Amount	8,305,301	9,792,179	9,197,738

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.17 1996-2000 Agribusiness PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1996	1998	2000
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	3,885	5,936	9,399
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	1,862	3,944
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	9,655,277	8,407,049	8,711,396
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	407	386	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	66,140	48,965	77,527
Total Amount	9,725,709	8,464,198	8,802,266

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.18 2002-2006 Agribusiness PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	2002	2004	2006
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	8,091	4,389	2,687
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	2,016	3,576
Honorarium (24H)	689	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	7,916,911	8,217,302	9,348,424
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	45,810	52,064	53,870
Total Amount	7,971,501	8,275,771	9,408,557

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.19 1990-1994 Communications/Electronics PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1990	1992	1994
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	0	337	0
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	0	0
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	5,659,347	6,452,105	5,285,360
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	442	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	10,088	18,649	12,421
Total Amount	5,669,435	6,471,533	5,297,781

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.20 1996-2000 Communications/Electronics PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1996	1998	2000
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	0	0	0
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	0	191,031
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	6,334,018	6,064,960	7,506,098
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	4,590	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	45,326	83,374	104,809
Total Amount	6,383,934	6,148,334	7,801,938

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.21 2002-2006 Communications/Electronics PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	2002	2004	2006
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	0	0	0
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	0	0
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	7,985,742	8,535,455	9,573,060
Communication Cost Against (24N)	345	0	1,250
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	96,895	46,561	43,851
Total Amount	8,082,982	8,582,016	9,618,161

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.22 1990-1994 Construction PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1990	1992	1994
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	0	0	0
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	2,089	5,430
Honorarium (24H)	1,000	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	3,233,987	3,051,686	3,086,474
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0	429
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	19,032	15,623	7,606
Total Amount	3,254,019	3,069,398	3,099,939

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.23 1996-2000 Construction PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1996	1998	2000
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	108,014
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	0	34,963	36,005
Communication Cost For (24F)	1,745	0	28,030
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	3,857,934	4,703,804	4,947,915
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	6,651	16,706	25,871
Total Amount	3,866,330	4,755,473	5,145,835

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.24 2002-2006 Construction PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	2002	2004	2006
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	8,853	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	109,418	2,401	5,471
Communication Cost For (24F)	30,719	127	0
Honorarium (24H)	345	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	4,775,959	6,134,928	7,150,466
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	1,587
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	25,966	30,465	13,818
Total Amount	4,951,260	6,167,921	7,171,342

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.25 1990-1994 Defense PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1990	1992	1994
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	0	0	0
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	0	0
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	3,775,009	3,827,371	3,580,631
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	3,768	13,758	4,756
Total Amount	3,778,777	3,841,129	3,585,387

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.26 1996-2000 Defense PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1996	1998	2000
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	0	0	0
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	0	0
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	4,117,312	3,294,942	3,529,759
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	7,979	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	9,458	13,003	3,764
Total Amount	4,134,749	3,307,945	3,533,523

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.27 2002-2006 Defense PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	2002	2004	2006
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	0	0	0
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	0	0
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	3,961,461	4,694,777	4,941,097
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	9,518	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	2,740	8,100	41,882
Total Amount	3,964,201	4,712,395	4,982,979

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.28 1990-1994 Energy/Natural Resources PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1990	1992	1994
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	875	19,087	6,500
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	0	0
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	7,001,964	8,244,865	6,971,282
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	10,514	21,003	12,738
Total Amount	7,013,353	8,284,955	6,990,520

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.29 1996-2000 Energy/Natural Resources PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1996	1998	2000
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	0	761	720
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	0	0
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	7,512,930	7,644,790	8,705,970
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	418	1,159	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	34,958	45,613	78,959
Total Amount	7,548,306	7,692,323	8,785,649

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.30 2002-2006 Energy/Natural Resources PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	2002	2004	2006
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	5,129	10,903	62,721
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	0	0
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	9,025,126	9,224,714	10,193,863
Communication Cost Against (24N)	4,825	2,971	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	689	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	53,066	75,764	31,233
Total Amount	9,088,835	9,314,352	10,287,817

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.31 1990-1994 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1990	1992	1994
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	468,830	852,996	0
Communication Cost For (24F)	210,438	348,032	269,043
Honorarium (24H)	9,487	1,897	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	17,413,820	19,164,145	17,026,232
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	3,500	73,951	2,462
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	93,558	97,540	74,028
Total Amount	18,199,633	20,538,561	17,371,765

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.32 1996-2000 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1996	1998	2000
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	720
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	0	1,826	0
Communication Cost For (24F)	239,806	201,487	209,506
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	18,596,387	18,864,122	21,187,756
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	2,092	773	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	101,127	188,176	145,949
Total Amount	18,939,412	19,256,344	21,543,931

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.33 2002-2006 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	2002	2004	2006
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	773,031	1,276,441	1,485,572
Communication Cost For (24F)	589,865	415,416	1,182,900
Honorarium (24H)	689	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	21,863,927	23,932,531	27,746,255
Communication Cost Against (24N)	1,400	1,348	625
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	120,940	86,444	96,449
Total Amount	23,349,852	25,634,380	30,511,801

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.34 1990-1994 Health PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1990	1992	1994
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	21,827	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	3	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	5,164	728,314	26,828
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	0	0
Honorarium (24H)	8,545	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	7,507,753	9,638,872	10,298,180
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0	1,326
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	42,677	382,936	185,317
Total Amount	7,564,139	10,771,952	10,511,651

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.35 1996-2000 Health PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1996	1998	2000
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	350,692	1,394,457	948,577
Communication Cost For (24F)	37,883	12,864	24,222
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	10,095,435	10,043,691	11,936,944
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	7,553	4,612	372
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	264,543	187,740	149,697
Total Amount	10,756,086	11,643,364	13,059,812

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.36 2002-2006 Health PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	2002	2004	2006
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	9,238
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	655,015	885,474	829,055
Communication Cost For (24F)	87,890	190,712	114,807
Honorarium (24H)	700	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	13,328,745	15,203,219	18,280,031
Communication Cost Against (24N)	15,853	0	615
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	112,120	120,357	51,342
Total Amount	14,200,323	16,399,762	19,285,088

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.37 1990-1994 Ideological/Single Issue PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1990	1992	1994
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	250,736	756,576	337,324
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	26,060	40,689	2,561
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	671,945	1,737,470	1,169,040
Communication Cost For (24F)	229,337	1,066,650	778,933
Honorarium (24H)	10,972	949	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	6,102,727	9,103,210	6,376,019
Communication Cost Against (24N)	22,924	24,651	324
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	5,613	4,291
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	646,139	1,026,596	849,454
Total Amount	7,960,840	13,762,404	9,517,946

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.38 1996-2000 Ideological/Single Issue PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1996	1998	2000
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	1,115,427	708,396	1,035,135
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	766	1,141	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	1,688,297	2,235,745	2,388,052
Communication Cost For (24F)	272,552	309,559	535,079
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	6,449,408	6,684,923	7,658,950
Communication Cost Against (24N)	1,962	0	109,285
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	9,323	10,976	1,440
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	972,761	977,247	887,475
Total Amount	10,510,496	10,927,987	12,615,416

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.39 2002-2006 Ideological/Single Issue PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	2002	2004	2006
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	558,403	367,454	4,620,568
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	5,514
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	1,511,960	1,950,574	3,454,444
Communication Cost For (24F)	142,689	161,054	162,185
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	6,800,394	6,705,206	7,066,867
Communication Cost Against (24N)	1,446	6,278	33,431
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	7,921	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	714,771	710,894	710,763
Total Amount	9,737,584	9,901,460	16,053,772

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.40 1990-1994 Labor PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1990	1992	1994
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	33,371	28,470	10,866
Communication Cost For (24F)	344,868	670,387	556,291
Honorarium (24H)	3,449	1,897	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	28,185,608	31,165,482	29,059,464
Communication Cost Against (24N)	3,797	202	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	949	71,932	43,017
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	55,348	45,116	32,602
Total Amount	28,627,390	31,983,486	29,702,240

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.41 1996-2000 Labor PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1996	1998	2000
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	368,494	2,463	154,544
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	245,038	1,071,367	1,673,302
Communication Cost For (24F)	1,227,265	1,564,236	1,366,242
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	32,268,535	29,591,346	32,772,082
Communication Cost Against (24N)	392,528	198	83
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	33,725	53,165	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	25,416	38,103	58,560
Total Amount	34,561,001	32,320,878	36,024,813

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.42 2002-2006 Labor PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	2002	2004	2006
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	9,306	29,586	3,354,158
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	285	0	1,209
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	571,487	10,355	1,732,340
Communication Cost For (24F)	2,318,732	582,255	2,447,508
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	32,008,405	29,524,320	31,724,304
Communication Cost Against (24N)	13,717	656	132,474
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	22,341	656	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	26,782	7,639	59,270
Total Amount	34,971,055	30,155,467	39,451,263

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.43 1990-1994 Lawyers/Lobbyists PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1990	1992	1994
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	0	0	29
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	0	0
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	2,884,820	3,947,924	3,514,078
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0	4,505
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	16,206	24,988	16,406
Total Amount	2,901,026	3,972,912	3,535,018

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.44 1996-2000 Lawyers/Lobbyists PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1996	1998	2000
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	6,443	0	0
Communication Cost For (24F)	47,905	14,938	11,935
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	3,799,174	3,956,263	4,531,713
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	4,184	773	3,600
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	42,420	47,532	55,271
Total Amount	3,900,126	4,019,506	4,602,519

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.45 2002-2006 Lawyers/Lobbyists PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	2002	2004	2006
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	37,092	345	0
Communication Cost For (24F)	29,316	3,145	19,700
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	4,863,311	4,913,930	6,034,688
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	123
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	49,969	77,726	93,669
Total Amount	4,979,688	4,995,146	6,148,180

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.46 1990-1994 Miscellaneous Business PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1990	1992	1994
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	1,638	32,401
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	40	9,160	8,513
Communication Cost For (24F)	32,049	47,601	74,826
Honorarium (24H)	4,397	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	6,519,118	7,790,160	7,700,764
Communication Cost Against (24N)	8,787	4,385	269
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0	2,574
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	20,672	26,653	36,448
Total Amount	6,585,063	7,879,597	7,855,795

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.47 1996-2000 Miscellaneous Business PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1996	1998	2000
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	13,045
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	38,137	1,869	0
Communication Cost For (24F)	160,986	140,950	149,160
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	9,155,654	8,925,469	10,958,106
Communication Cost Against (24N)	228	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	2,812	1,769	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	281,835	117,282	57,820
Total Amount	9,639,652	9,187,339	11,120,311

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.48 2002-2006 Miscellaneous Business PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	2002	2004	2006
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	125	369	123,016
Communication Cost For (24F)	98,052	67,068	54,949
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	11,155,378	11,572,548	13,880,858
Communication Cost Against (24N)	1,729	1,313	4,356
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	49,638	67,822	41,593
Total Amount	11,304,922	11,709,117	14,104,772

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.49 1990-1994 Transportation PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1990	1992	1994
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	57,147
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	0	5,055	43,694
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	0	0
Honorarium (24H)	4,846	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	6,206,654	8,529,874	8,434,952
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	2,210	858
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	6,698	22,002	257,733
Total Amount	6,218,198	8,559,141	8,794,384

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.50 1996-2000 Transportation PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	1996	1998	2000
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	3,253	12,482	371
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	3,957	0
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	8,526,087	7,884,918	8,822,385
Communication Cost Against (24N)	0	0	0
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	11,645	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	55,053	57,480	81,101
Total Amount	8,596,038	7,958,837	8,903,857

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 2.51 2002-2006 Transportation PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Transaction Type	2002	2004	2006
Independent Expenditures Against (24A)	0	0	0
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)	0	0	0
Independent Expenditures For (24E)	0	674	0
Communication Cost For (24F)	0	0	0
Honorarium (24H)	0	0	0
Direct Contribution (24K)	8,593,833	8,869,677	9,550,700
Communication Cost Against (24N)	345	0	308
Election Recount Disbursement (24R)	0	0	0
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)	72,571	54,829	30,456
Total Amount	8,666,749	8,925,180	9,581,464

a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Figure 2.2





Figure 2.3



Tables 2.16 through 2.51 indicate that every policy sector increased its PAC spending from 1990 through 2006, even after adjusting for inflation, and the majority of that spending is direct donations. While ideological PACs utilize independent expenditures the most of any policy sector, independent expenditures are still a small portion of its PAC donations, until 2006. In 1990, the ideological sector spent 11.6% of their total donations on independent expenditures (for and against), but in 2006, this percentage increased to 50.3%. Policy sectors, according to Figure 2.2 fall into four groups (I list each policy sector in descending order based on their 2006 spending levels). Labor PACs clearly spend more than any other sector, with F.I.R.E. in a second grouping, and the third group of total spenders consists of health, ideological, miscellaneous business, energy, communications/electronics, and transportation, with agribusiness, construction, lawyers/lobbyists, and defense in the fourth group. Figure 2.3 shows how total spending may mislead the amount of spending per PAC per policy sector. In terms of average amount per PAC, defense becomes the second most giving industry, while labor and F.I.R.E. still in the top three policy sectors. In addition, the dominance of labor is misleading, as most PACs in most other policy sectors represent a corporation, and corporate spending still dominates the PAC world.

The purpose of the previous two sections was to introduce descriptive data about the PAC system, which states give the most/least to the PAC system, and which policy domains dominate the PAC system. The importance of the geographic dispersion of PAC donors and a PAC's policy domain on PAC strategy is the focus on chapters three and four respectively. In the remaining portion of this chapter, I report the measurement of independent variables important to explaining PAC strategy, and in the

process, show how the entire PAC system supports certain candidates and electoral situations over others.

Measuring the Political Environment

PACs make donation decisions within a political environment that includes both demand- and supply-side concerns. Demand-side concerns include responsiveness to individual donor wishes to meet the PAC's goal of organizational maintenance. Often responding to individual donor needs requires PAC officials to donate money to politicians residing in the same state as the individual donor (e.g., if the individual donor resides in California, then the PAC taking the individual donor's money will donate more money to California politicians). For the demand-side approach, PACs act as local election, or re-election, constituencies, and the most important variable in the political environment facing PACs is the geographic dispersion of its donor-base (i.e., organizational presence). The supply-side approach differs in its explanation of the political environment, emphasizing congressional member characteristics and legislative needs over organizational maintenance needs.

Supply-side concerns include matching the PAC's ideological and legislative needs with those of congressional members to meet the goal of efficient lobbying and legislative achievement. Legislative/institutional organization, electoral conditions, and constituency characteristics all characterize the political environment facing PACs and donation decisions in the supply-side approach. PACs are placeless entities moving money around the United States in response to the legislative, electoral, and constituency characteristics facing the congressional member. The PAC system in its entirety finds resources to support incumbents, quality challengers, those candidates in

close elections, those in leadership positions and those sitting on important policy committees.

Geographic Environment

Examining PAC donations in net 1989 real dollars by states, across all electoral cycles (1990-2006) shows that the PAC system gravitates to certain states over others.

Table 2.52 Average PAC Donations to States, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a


State	Mean PAC Donations	Rank	#CDs	State Size Ratio ^b
Alabama	\$275,493	32	63	.14285714
Alaska	\$462,430	2	9	1
Arizona	\$261,102	38	59	.15254237
Arkansas	\$266,202	35	36	.25
California	\$254,712	41	464	.019396552
Colorado	\$246,148	42	57	.15789474
Connecticut	\$405,225	3	51	.17647059
Delaware	\$206,132	47	9	1
Florida	\$241,522	43	209	.043062201
Georgia	\$317,339	15	104	.086538462
Hawaii	\$227,181	45	18	.5
Idaho	\$327,967	12	18	.5
Illinois	\$289,209	25	179	.05027933
Indiana	\$271,557	34	87	.10344828
Iowa	\$329,067	11	46	.19565217
Kansas	\$299,618	20	37	.24324324
Kentucky	\$348,144	8	55	.16363636
Louisiana	\$327,549	13	64	.140625
Maine	\$284,251	27	18	.5
Maryland	\$293,097	23	72	.125
Massachusetts	\$181,033	50	91	.098901099
Michigan	\$376,034	19	143	.062937063
Minnesota	\$315,521	17	72	.125
Mississippi	\$259,084	39	42	.21428571
Missouri	\$304,018	6	81	.11111111
Montana	\$380,355	5	10	.9
Nebraska	\$277,519	30	27	.33333333
Nevada	\$384,295	4	21	.42857143
New Hampshire	\$308,847	18	18	.5
New Jersey	\$273,056	33	118	.076271186
New Mexico	\$337,216	10	27	.33333333
New York	\$264,394	37	276	.032608696
North Carolina	\$265,142	36	110	.081818182

North Dakota	\$572,593	1	9	1
Ohio	\$278,882	29	170	.052941176
Oklahoma	\$258,527	40	51	.17647059
Oregon	\$283,583	28	45	.2
Pennsylvania	\$276,253	31	185	.048648649
Rhode Island	\$298,825	21	18	.5
South Carolina	\$198,806	48	54	.16666667
South Dakota	\$354,228	7	9	1
Tennessee	\$226,996	46	81	.11111111
Texas	\$315,708	16	273	.032967033
Utah	\$288,149	26	27	.33333333
Vermont	\$185,318	49	9	1
Virginia	\$296,468	22	98	.091836735
Washington	\$345,435	9	80	.1125
West Virginia	\$241,215	44	28	.32142857
Wisconsin	\$292,057	24	78	.11538462
Wyoming	\$322,436	14	9	1

a. Mean dollar amounts are net dollars of direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z), accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar.

b. The state size ratio derives from Snyder (1992, 36), which is the minimum number of potential congressional district observations divided by the total number of district observations in a state. For this research, the minimum number of congressional district observations is 9 (one congressional district for nine electoral cycles). Smaller ratios represent larger states, and higher ratios represent smaller states.


Figure 2.4



Scholars have found that investment-oriented PACs (i.e., rent-seekers) donate disproportionately more money to congressional members from small states because it is more likely that these members become Senators, as PACs wish to establish long-term relationships with legislative dividends (Snyder 1992, 20). Table 2.52 and Figure 2.4 indicate this relationship to be slight, as outliers such as North Dakota pull the fit line in an upward sloping fashion. When comparing table 2.14 (the mean individual transaction originating from a state), with table 2.52 (the mean amount the PAC system spends in each district) across all election cycles (1990-2006), no geographic relationship exists. Some states raise a lot of money per individual donation and receive a lot of money per district from the PAC system, while other states have a negative

relationship (small amounts of money per individual donation and large amounts per district).

Figure 2.5



Legislative/Institutional Environment

Legislators designed the U.S. House of Representatives to divide policymaking labor through the committee system and distribute agenda-setting powers unevenly, giving the majority party, certain committee positions, and party leadership more agenda-setting control than other members of the chamber. In addition, political party affiliation and ideological disposition of legislators give PACs an indication of the type of legislation the congressional member will support or write in future congressional sessions; thus, the variables important to measuring the legislative/institutional

environment are: *committee assignment, committee chair, chamber and committee seniority, leadership, majority party status, political party affiliation, and ideology*.³⁴

This list of legislative/institutional independent variables is meant to measure and find the effect of this division of labor, uneven agenda-setting control, and ideological predispositions in the House of Representatives. I operationalize all of these legislative/institutional variables using values *before* the general election date; thus, for elections with incumbents, the values of these variables are those of the incumbent in the election, but for open seat elections, the values of these variables are those of the previous incumbent who is not in the general election.

I measure committee assignments and committee chair with a series of ordinal variables created for every full committee in the House of Representatives from the 101st through the 109th congressional sessions, meant to measure the influence of committee assignments and chairpersonships for the 1990 election cycle (for the 102nd Congress) through the 2006 election cycle (for the 110th Congress) (e.g., I use the final committee roster of the 101st House of Representatives, 1989-1991, to create the ordinal variable for the 1990 election). Changes in committee assignments do influence the distribution of PAC money across congressional districts (Romer and Snyder 1994, 755-765); therefore, using the most up-to-date committee roster before the general election is crucial to understanding the total amount of PAC dollars to a congressional district. The ordinal variables range from zero to two, with a zero indicating that the previous congressional member did not sit on the full committee, a one indicating that

³⁴ Another legislative variable is legislative reputation, measured as the frequency of PAC donations and statistical methods to mediate the endogeneity problem with PAC money as the dependent variable (e.g., Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 46).

the previous member did sit on the full committee, and a two indicating that the previous congressional member was the chair of the full committee.³⁵ In Appendix B, I provide a table illustrating how full committee names in the House of Representatives changed during this time period, which full committees disbanded and which were created during this time period. Unless I state otherwise, I will use the 109th congressional committee names in reference to PAC strategy. Table 2.53 Displays the 109th full committees in House of Representatives.

³⁵ Committee assignments are vital to explaining PAC donation strategies, and is now commonplace to include committee chairpersonships and sometimes subcommittee assignments and rank on the committee (e.g. Endersby and Munger 1992, 79; Florence 1999, 71; Grenzke 1989, 249, including rank on committee and subcommittee; Grier and Munger 1991, 25; Grier and Munger 1993, 618; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 116; Gutermuth 1999, 357; Keim and Zardkoohi 1988, 27, with chairs of committees and subcommittees; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1164; Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 50; Munger 1989, 181; Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987, 299; Romer and Snyder 1994, 749; Rudolph 1999, 199; Shin 2004, 138; Stratmann 1992, 651). Some aggregate committee assignments into groupings based on policy (Banking and Finance Committee, Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, Government Operations), prestige (Appropriations, Budget, Rules, Ways and Means), constituent (Agriculture, Armed Services, Interior, Merchant Marines, Public Works, Science Space and Technology, Small Business, Veterans' Affairs), and unrequested committees (District of Columbia, House Administration, Post Office, Standards of Official Conduct, Select Intelligence) (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999, 517; also see Romer and Snyder 1994, 749-752). Some find that committee assignments do not matter (Gopoian 1984; Wright 1985). Others view the legislative strategy as secondary to PAC concerns, which would include committee assignments (Welch 1980; Eismeier and Pollock 1984; Poole and Romer 1985, 105-106; Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987). Some find that committee chairpersonships and ranking minority committee members do not influence the distribution of PAC donations (e.g., Poole and Romer 1985, 105-106).

Table 2.53 Standing Full Committee Names in the 109th House of Representatives

Agriculture
Appropriations
Armed Services
Budget
Education and the Workforce
Energy and Commerce
Financial Services
Government Reform
Homeland Security
House Administration
International Relations
Judiciary
Resources
Rules
Science
Small Business
Standards of Official Conduct
Transportation and Infrastructure
Veterans' Affairs
Ways and Means
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Table 2.54 displays donations from the PAC system to each full committee in the House of Representatives from the 101st through the 109th Congress, and the statistical significance of the mean difference in PAC donations of those who sit on the committee, the chair of the committee, and those that do not sit on each full committee. According to Table 2.54, it is not so much that a congressional member needs to sit on a high priority committee to receive PAC money as much as it is that a congressional member does not want to sit on a poor committee. There is not much statistical difference between many of the committees; the statistical difference in PAC-donation means is more likely when comparing the less important policy committees to the others with more notoriety. In general, committee chairs receive more PAC donations than other congressional members, with some notable exceptions of Financial Services, International Relations, and Veterans' Affairs; however, it is rare that this mean

difference rises to a statistically significant level. The exceptions to this finding are the Energy and Commerce, Resource, and the Transportation and Infrastructure committees. For rank-and-file committee members, it makes little difference which committee assignment one receives for receiving PAC donations. Energy and Commerce and Ways and Means are the notable exceptions, otherwise, congressional members only want to avoid a small group of committees.

Table 2.54 PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbent Committee Members and Chairpersons, 1990 – 2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Committee Assignment ^b	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Levene (sig.)	Welch (sig.)
Agriculture	369	293,719	164,627	1.311	1.769
Chair	7	289,276	136,837	(.270)	(.202)
Otherwise	3116	276,176	185,593		
Appropriations	485	261,179	176,688	1.746	2.613
Chair	9	315,239	184,618	(.175)	(.097)
Otherwise	2998	280,675	184,420		
Armed Services	451	242,897*	159,484	6.254	11.664
Chair	8	291,700	106,537	(.002)	(.001)
Otherwise	3033	283,248	186,374		
Budget	316	255,031	170,710	1.629	4.104
Chair	7	414,031	229,600	(.196)	(.037)
Otherwise	3169	280,052	184,362		
Education/Work.	346	230,834*	146,320	8.461	17.937
Chair	6	293,179	213,236	(.000)	(.000)
Otherwise	3140	283,231	186,356		
Energy/Com.	392	343,044*	180,064	1.264	46.531
Chair	8	770,766***	229,802	(.283)	(.000)
Otherwise	3092	268,542	180,369		
Financial Ser.	476	293,438	184,374	2.876	2.169
Chair	8	214,990	299,164	(.057)	(.143)
Otherwise	3008	275,790	184,374		
Gov. Ref.	345	231,493*	144,427	7.585	18.021
Chair	8	286,597	149,567	(.001)	(.000)
Otherwise	3139	283,152	186,649		
Homeland Security ^c	77	321,282	179,357	.709	.368
Chair	2	376,067	92,164	(.492)	(.723)
Otherwise	1103	315,459	206,898		
House Admin.	100	312,730	202,371	2.910	3.578
Chair	9	411,687	193,937	(.055)	(.047)
Otherwise	3383	276,676	182,266		
International Rel.	361	217,246*	137,998	15.598	46.011
Chair	7	178,248	51,578	(.000)	(.000)

Otherwise	3124	285,307	186,859		
Judiciary	288	215,043*	133,968	12.918	35.255
Chair	9	348,946	76,766	(.000)	(.000)
Otherwise	3195	283,536	186,421		
Resources	352	259,856	167,338	1.877	3.280
Chair	8	434,911**	285,096	(.153)	(.060)
Otherwise	3132	279,701	184,659		
Rules	100	285,272	198,298	1.162	1.887
Chair	8	371,941	136,803	(.313)	(.181)
Otherwise	3384	277,621	183,073		
Science	390	259,204	157,262	2.891	3.173
Chair	7	317,307	134,110	(.056)	(.069)
Otherwise	3095	280,342	186,477		
Small Business	294	244,744*	163,971	2.374	6.394
Chair	7	296,460	80,428	(.093)	(.009)
Otherwise	3191	281,085	185,027		
Stand./Official Cond.	87	212,099*	116,322	8.057	19.310
Chair	9	142,728	115,145	(.000)	(.000)
Otherwise	3396	280,104	184,571		
Transport./Infra.	539	279,748	168,417	1.129	9.144
Chair	8	460,344***	118,682	(.323)	(.002)
Otherwise	2945	277,251	186,005		
Vet. Affairs	248	268,051	156,449	3.742	9.501
Chair	9	149,128	89,558	(.024)	(.001)
Otherwise	3235	279,182	185,427		
Ways/Means	294	362,301*	217,378	19.599	24.880
Chair	7	469,955*	385,552	(.000)	(.000)
Otherwise	3191	269,873	177,220		

Intelligence	147	253,787	186,942	.901	10.696
Chair	9	128,889*	101,437	(.406)	(.001)
Otherwise	3336	279,528	183,261		
District of Columbia ^d	24	259,804	150,221	.267	.344
Chair	3	177,412	170,789	(.766)	(.725)
Otherwise	1100	241,301	153,638		
Merchant Marines ^d	114	271,741	146,365	.152	2.441
Chair	3	208,125	137,843	(.859)	(.177)
Otherwise	1010	238,214	154,106		
Post Office ^d	57	234,970	130,695	2.138	.215
Chair	3	248,491	20,151	(.118)	(.812)
Otherwise	1067	241,855	154,906		

a. Dollar amounts are rounded to nearest dollar, only including districts where the incumbent was in the general election, not including districts with two incumbents in the general election, or any open seats. The means are calculated from districts that do include negative values, and are figured from net real dollars per district.

b. Committee assignment means are calculated without donations to committee chair. The means for the committee chair are figured separately.

c. Committee assignments to the Homeland Security committee only occurred starting before the 2002 election.

d. These committees were eliminated after the 1994 general election.

*Difference in mean between sitting on the committee (or being committee chair) and not sitting on the committee is statistically significant at the .05-level, using the Bonferroni post hoc test.

**Difference in mean between being a committee chair and sitting on the committee is statistically significant at the .05-level, using the Bonferroni post hoc test.

***Difference in mean between being a committee chair and the two other means (sitting on the committee, and not sitting on the committee) are statistically significant at the .05-level, using the Bonferroni post hoc test.

These findings are congruent with studies of the PAC Decade indicating that the House Energy and Commerce and Ways and Means Committees are *high-priced* committees; however, the Appropriations Committee does not rise to the level of statistical significance (Sabato 1984, 79).

In addition to dividing policymaking labor across different full committees and giving committee chairs more agenda-setting power within the committee, legislators gave more agenda-setting powers to the majority party, party leadership, and those congressional members with chamber and committee seniority. The majority party

changed in the House of Representatives to the Republican Party in 1994, and changed back to the Democratic Party after the 2006 election (I address the importance of the majority party when discussing the effect of party affiliation on PAC strategy). I define party leadership as the Speaker of the House, the majority and minority party leaders, and the majority and minority whips. If the previous congressional member representing the district was a member of their party's leadership, then that district scores a one, if otherwise, then that district's election scores a zero. Table 2.55 reports the differential in PAC donations to congressional districts with a representative occupying a leadership position over those representatives not in leadership. Congressional districts with members occupying a leadership position receive almost three times, on average, the amount of PAC donations as districts with members not in leadership.³⁶

Table 2.55 PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Leadership Positions, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Position	N-Size	Mean	Standard Deviation
Leadership	45	\$751,395	\$271,942
Otherwise	3,814	\$275,707	\$172,845

a. Dollar amounts rounded to nearest dollar, and include direction donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only. The sample size does not include 11 races with two incumbents in the general election, and 45 new open seats created after reapportionment and redistricting.

The seniority system in Congress allows more senior members of committees, and the entire chamber, to accrue more agenda-setting power. I measure chamber seniority and committee seniority in the House of Representatives similarly, the numerical value of each variable includes the current term the representative is serving,

³⁶ Typically, leadership positions receive more money from the PAC system (e.g., Florence 1999, 59; Grenzke 1989, 245; Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 51; Shin 2004, 138)

with one caveat: the value of chamber seniority is the number of cumulative terms and the value of committee seniority is the number of consecutive terms.³⁷ I use the chamber and committee seniority values as they occur before each general election. For example, in 1998, Robert Wexler ran for reelection in Florida's nineteenth congressional district, leading to the 106th Congress; hence, he was the previous congressional member representing that district. I use his committee seniority from the 105th Congress (the last updated committee roster before the 1998 electoral cycle), measured to include the current 105th term, as the committee seniority value in the 1998 election. The 105th Congress was the first term that Representative Wexler sat on the International Relations committee; thus, for the 1998 election, his committee seniority on the International Relations committee was valued at one. Table 2.56 reports PAC donations to congressional districts by chamber seniority for the 1990-2006 electoral cycles. I group chamber seniority into five categories. These five categories are: (1) those districts where representatives served only one term prior to the general election (i.e., freshmen), (2) those serving two terms, (3) those serving three or four terms, (4) those serving five, six, or seven terms, and (5) those congressional districts where the incumbent campaigning for reelection has served eight or more terms in the House of Representatives prior to the general election.³⁸

³⁷ I would like to thank Charles Stewart and Jonathan Woon for making this data available on their website, http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html.

³⁸ Chamber seniority, including a separate variable for freshmen, is common in the literature (e.g., Endersby and Munger 1992, 88, but not significant; Grenzke 1989, 245; Grier and Munger 1993, 618; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 116; Gutermuth 1996, 357; Kiem and Zardkoohi 1988, 27; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1173; Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 50, with age; Rudolph 1999, 199; Shin 2004, 138, with age; Snyder 1992, 20), chamber seniority is significant (e.g., Poole and Romer 1985, 105-106; Stratmann 1992, 651), seniority is not a significant predictor (e.g., Evans 1983, 1986; Poole, Romer, and

Table 2.56 PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Chamber Seniority, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Chamber Seniority Groupings ^b	N-Size	Total PAC Money (Mean) ^c	Standard Deviation
1: 1 Session	538	\$176,358,736 (\$327,804) ^d	\$182,062
2: 2 Sessions	487	\$126,092,196 (\$258,916) ^e	\$160,500
3: 3 & 4 Sessions	785	\$195,068,489 (\$248,495) ^f	\$151,569
4: 5, 6, & 7 Sessions	853	\$225,411,664 (\$264,258) ^g	\$173,492
5: 8+ Sessions	829	\$248,040,722 (\$299,205) ^h	\$221,924
Total	3,492	\$970,971,807 (\$278,056)	\$181,601

a. Dollar amounts rounded to nearest dollar, and include direction donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only. The sample size does not include 11 races with two incumbents in the general election, and 45 new open seats created after reapportionment and redistricting, or any other open seats.

b. I base Chamber Seniority groupings on the number of legislative sessions served, including the current session before the general election.

c. The Levene Statistic for testing the homogeneity of variances is 24.007 and is statistically significant (sig.=.000). The variances in the seven ideological groups are not similar. As a result, the Welch statistic is 21.658 and is statistically significant (sig.=.000). There are statistically significant differences between the means of the seven ideological groupings. I use the Bonferroni post hoc difference of means test for to test each individual mean against each other.

d. The mean of the first group is statistically different from all other means at the .05-level.

e. The mean of the second group is statistically different from 1 and 5 at the .05-level.

f. The mean of the third group is statistically different from 1 and 5 at the .05-level.

g. The mean of the fourth group is statistically different from 1 and 5 at the .05-level.

h. The mean of the fifth group is statistically different from all other means at the .05-level.

The results indicate the PAC system donates differently to three tiers of seniority. The mean PAC donation to districts with a freshman incumbent in the general election is higher than those serving two through seven terms, but the mean donation increases again in districts with a senior incumbent serving more than eight terms. The difference between these groups is significant at the .05-level.³⁹ The PAC system donates the most

Rosenthal 1987, 302; Grier and Munger 1986; Nelson 1982). Committee seniority, while less common, is a significant predictor of PAC donations (e.g., Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 50).

³⁹ Another way to account for the influence of seniority on PAC donations is to account for age and chance of death: “we estimate a first-stage probit regression in which the dependent variable equals one

money to freshmen incumbents, and senior incumbents are the next priority, confirming findings from the PAC Decade dating back to the 1970s that PACs donate at higher rates to freshmen because “they often need the money most of all and gratefully remember those who help pay off their large first-election debts, and second, unlike veterans, they have not taken a position on many issues and are considered persuadable by the PACs” (Sabato 1984, 79). Regardless of seniority status, PAC donations gravitate at high rates to the two major parties.

Political party affiliation and ideology also give PACs an indication of how a representative legislates and votes.⁴⁰ I account for political party affiliation differently depending on the task, as I either organize the cases according to PAC spending by political party (i.e., the dependent variable is PAC donations to Democrats), or I control for political party with a dichotomous variable (Democrats equal to 1, Republicans equal to 0). Tables 2.57 and 2.58 display the number of official candidates for the House of Representatives for each electoral cycle and the number of Democratic and Republican candidates receiving PAC donations for each electoral cycle.

in the last electoral cycle in which a legislator is running for reelection is in the House and zero in other periods. The independent variables are the legislator characteristics listed earlier plus the legislator’s age as an instrument. The probability of retirement or death should be an increase function of the legislator’s age, but age should have no impact on the frequency of repeat givers or the level of PAC contributions, independent of its effect on the probability of termination” (Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 53). Those who control for age find that younger congressional members receive more PAC donations than older members, and the rate of decline in PAC donations is faster for older congressional members (Snyder 1992, 19-20).

⁴⁰ Political party identification is a primary control variable (e.g., Brunell 2005; Endersby and Munger 1992, 88; Florence 1999, 59; Grier and Munger 1993, 618; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 116; Kiem and Zardkoohi 1988, 27; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1173; Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 52; Rudolph 1999, 199), but some find that political party identification is not important to explaining variation in total PAC donations (Poole and Romer 1985, 105-106).

Table 2.57 Number of Official Candidates for the House of Representatives by Political Party and Electoral Cycle

Electoral Cycle	Dem.	Rep.	Indep.	Lib.	Ref.	Green	Nat.	Law	Soc.	Other	Write In
1990	451	428	35	48	0	0	0	5	79	10	
1992	536	467	113	120	1	11	29	11	166	0	
1994	746	810	61	78	0	7	30	3	100	0	
1996	774	801	105	152	25	5	147	12	109	0	
1998	574	628	78	151	27	10	61	11	80	0	
2000	655	721	110	256	31	37	93	4	157	3	
2002	728	807	56	225	11	58	7	3	91	40	
2004	671	731	50	151	4	44	1	7	121	24	
2006	853	705	74	124	6	40	1	4	116	14	

Table 2.58 Number of Official Candidates Receiving PAC Donations for the House of Representatives by Political Party and Electoral Cycle^a

Electoral Cycle	Democrats Number (Percent of Total)	Republicans Number (Percent of Total)
1990	394 (87.3%)	308 (71.9%)
1992	449 (83.7%)	415 (88.8%)
1994	490 (65.7%)	491 (60.6%)
1996	515 (66.5%)	515 (64.2%)
1998	392 (68.3%)	419 (66.7%)
2000	428 (65.3%)	424 (64.7%)
2002	455 (62.5%)	449 (55.6%)
2004	409 (60.9%)	426 (58.2%)
2006	520 (60.9%)	382 (54.1%)

a. PAC donations refer to direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only.

While most of the official candidates identify with the Democratic or Republican Parties, there is a high frequency of Independents and Libertarians during some electoral cycles; however, third party candidates receive an inconsequential amount of PAC donations. The percentage of Democratic and Republican candidates receiving PAC donations has decreased from 1990 to 2006, but this decline results from an increase in the number of candidates instead of a decline in the distribution of PAC donations.

Tables 2.59 through 2.61 show those Democrats and Republicans receiving PAC donations, receive almost all of the PAC donations from 1990 through 2006. Third

party candidates for the House of Representatives receive little help for their campaign financing from PACs (an interesting question is why they receive PAC money at all). The amount of PAC donations to independent candidates during this timeframe is almost all due to Bernie Sanders of Vermont. The trend in PAC donations to Democrats and Republicans in Table 2.59 is telling, as the PAC system gives disproportionately more money to Democrats when they were in the majority, especially the year they lost control of the House of Representatives. Once Democrats lost their majority party status, the PAC system quickly, but reactionary, evened donations to both parties. A similar trend emerged in 2004 and 2006 when the PAC system donated disproportionately more money to the Republican Party, the mean difference in 2006, like that between 1990-1994, is statistically significant at the .01-level. Table 2.59 indicates a growing comfort of the PAC system with Republican majorities after four decades of Democratic rule of the House of Representatives, but this table also shows the PAC system works hard to hold onto the status quo once it is comfortable with the majority party. In both 1994 and 2006, the mean difference in PAC donations between the majority and minority party was at its widest margin, which hints at the PAC system's incumbency bias.

Table 2.59 PAC Donations to Official Democratic and Republican Candidates by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Electoral Cycle	Democrats ^b Total (Mean)	Republicans ^b Total (Mean)
1990*	66,574,363 (168,970)	33,765,751 (109,629)
1992*	72,848,258 (162,246)	35,208,049 (84,839)
1994*	72,994,910 (148,969)	35,207,422 (71,706)
1996	59,274,169 (115,095)	58,998,972 (114,561)
1998	57,410,652 (146,456)	57,361,413 (136,901)
2000	68,316,339 (159,618)	63,336,454 (149,378)
2002	66,617,369 (146,412)	65,751,433 (146,440)
2004	61,709,260 (150,878)	73,594,943 (172,758)
2006*	71,097,593 (136,726)	84,911,273 (222,281)

a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only

b. The mean value was created using the number of candidates receiving PAC funds; negative net values were treated as zero, and candidates giving refunds in a different year had positive PAC donations due to the adjustments for inflation.

* Statistically significant differences between the Democratic and Republican means at $p < .01$.

Table 2.60 PAC Donations to Official Independent, Green, and Other Party Candidates by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Electoral Cycle	Independent	Green	Other	Write-In
1990	61,431	0	8,064	0
1992	204,568	0	120,891	0
1994	133,575	0	98,627	0
1996	469,792	0	48,304	0
1998	113,147	0	68,947	0
2000	277,180	62,648	384,252	0
2002	67,618	1,395	4,624	0
2004	88,513	1,641	23,150	0
2006	1,891	0	41,105	0

a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only.

Table 2.61 PAC Donations to Official Libertarian, Natural Law, Socialist, and Reform Party Candidates by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Electoral Cycle	Libertarian ^b	Natural Law ^c	Socialist ^d	Reform ^e
1990	0	0	0	0
1992	0	0	0	0
1994	1,268	0	0	0
1996	395	1,581	0	3,161
1998	9,073	0	0	399
2000	6,056	720	0	720
2002	1,861	0	0	1,866
2004	0	0	0	0
2006	6,766	0	0	0

a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only.

To measure ideology, I use Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal's first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores (measuring roll call votes about government's role in the economy, negative values are liberal ideologies) the value of which is the ideological score of the previous congressional member representing that district.⁴¹ For presentation purposes, I group these ideology scores into seven relatively equal groups, across the 1990-2006 electoral cycles to determine the ideological strategies of the entire PAC system in the House of Representatives.⁴²

⁴¹ I would like to thank Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal for making this data available on their website, <http://www.voteview.com>.

⁴² There are many ways to PAC scholars measure ideology: as the partisan or ideological nature of the district (e.g., Grier and Munger 1991, 33), a sample of roll call votes important to the PAC's policy agenda (e.g., Grenzke 1989, 245; Grier and Munger 1991,33; Shin 2004, 138), interest group vote score cards, including Americans for Democratic Action (e.g., Gutermuth 1999, 357; Havrilesky 1990, 244; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1173), AFL-CIO (e.g., Endersby and Munger 1992, 88), U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 116; Rudolph 1999, 199), various labor, business, and ideological organizations (e.g., Poole and Romer 1985, 105-106; Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987, 298), and DW-NOMINATE, which has been squared to capture the nonlinear effects of more extreme ideological positions on the distribution of PAC donations (Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 51).

Table 2.62 PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Ideology, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Ideology Groupings ^b	N-Size	Total PAC Money (Mean) ^c	Standard Deviation
1: -1.00 - -.482	553	\$118,883,545 (\$214,979) ^d	\$138,201
2: -.481 - -.359	553	\$157,151,020 (\$284,179) ^e	\$171,278
3: -.358 - -.208	551	\$177,445,862 (\$322,043) ^f	\$169,705
4: -.207 - .242	548	\$146,215,833 (\$266,817) ^g	\$170,957
5: .243 - .405	557	\$167,913,529 (\$301,461) ^h	\$192,066
6: .406 - .522	547	\$161,859,976 (\$283,437) ⁱ	\$204,891
7: .523 - 1.30	550	\$155,890,195 (\$283,436) ^j	\$197,652
Total	3,859	\$1,085,359,959 (\$281,254)	\$181,601

a. Dollar amounts rounded to nearest dollar, and include direction donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only. The sample size does not include 11 races with two incumbents in the general election, and 45 new open seats created after reapportionment and redistricting.

b. I base Ideology groupings on first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores, negative values indicate more liberal representatives

c. The Levene Statistic for testing the homogeneity of variances is 13.033 and is statistically significant (sig=.000). The variances in the seven ideological groups are not similar. As a result, the Welch statistic is 27.739 and is statistically significant (sig=.000). There are statistically significant differences between the means of the seven ideological groupings. I use the Bonferroni post hoc difference of means test for to test each individual mean against each other.

d. The mean of the first group is statistically different from all other means at the .05-level.

e. The mean of the second group is statistically different from 1 and 3 at the .05-level.

f. The mean of the third group is statistically different from 1, 2, and 7 at the .05-level.

g. The mean of the fourth group is statistically different from 1, 3, and 5 at the .05-level.

h. The mean of the fifth group is statistically different from 1 and 4 at the .05-level.

i. The mean of the sixth group is statistically different from 1 at the .05-level.

j. The mean of the seventh group is statistically different from 1 and 3 at the .05-level.

The larger means show the PAC system's majority party bias, as the Republicans were in the majority from 1995-2007. The results also indicate a general propensity of the PAC system to support Democrats and Republicans across the ideological spectrum.

The lowest mean PAC donations, and statistically different from the rest at the .05-level, were the most liberal members of the House of Representatives.

Collectively, committee assignment, committee chairpersonship, majority-party status, party-leadership status, chamber and committee seniority, political party identification, and ideology are meant to measure the important aspects of institutional design in Congress, accounting for the division of labor, uneven ability to affect the legislative agenda, and the ideologies of those congressional members making public policy. The PAC system also responds to the electoral environment in each congressional district, by donating more money to incumbents and those Democrats and Republicans in need.

Electoral Environment

These independent variables measuring the electoral environment facing candidates indicate the willingness of PACs to donate money to competitive races and incumbents, but also challengers more likely to win. The list of independent variables measuring the electoral environment includes: *district partisanship*, *margin of victory*, *incumbency*, *quality challengers*, and the interaction of incumbency and quality challengers with political party affiliation.⁴³

To measure district partisanship, I use the Democratic Presidential Two-Party Normal Vote (Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2006). To obtain this variable, I subtract the percentage of two-party vote received by the Democratic presidential candidate in the nation from the percentage of the two-party vote received by the Democratic presidential candidate in the congressional district. This simple subtraction

⁴³ I would like to thank Gary Jacobson for supplying (1) the Democratic presidential two-party vote percentage in each congressional district, which is also updated after redistricting and reapportionment, and (2) data on the presence of quality challengers. This data is a valuable contribution to the PAC-behavior literature.

normalizes the presidential vote, and its value “is comparable across districts and elections and independent of the results of congressional elections themselves” (Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2006, 78). I use the most current Democratic Presidential Two-Party Normal Vote to explain the variation in PAC dollars in a given congressional election. In mid-term elections, I use the previous normal vote, and for presidential election years, I use the current normal vote. For example, I use the 2000 democratic presidential normal vote to explain PAC donations in the 2002 mid-term election, and I use the 2004 democratic presidential normal vote to explain PAC donations in the 2004 congressional elections (Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2006, 78). The values of this variable range from -1 to 1 and negative values represent Republican districts. The Democratic Presidential Two-Party Normal Vote (normal vote) measures two aspects of PAC strategy. First, it measures any PAC system bias to partisan constituencies, and second, it measures PAC system bias to marginal or safe districts.

Table 2.63 groups the normal vote into seven relatively equal categories in order to measure PAC donations to congressional district-by-district partisanship. The results indicate the PAC system donates more money to conservative constituencies than liberal.

Table 2.63 PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by District Partisanship, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollars^a

District Partisanship Groupings ^b	N-Size	Total PAC Money (Mean) ^c	Standard Deviation
1: -1.00 - -.125	560	\$150,635,764 (\$268,992) ^d	\$201,985
2: -.124 - -.074	558	\$146,224,847 (\$262,052) ^e	\$161,270
3: -.073 - -.035	560	\$171,466,709 (\$306,191) ^f	\$193,799
4: -.034 - .007	559	\$189,878,977 (\$339,676) ^g	\$182,831
5: .008 - .060	560	\$194,121,082 (\$346,645) ^h	\$224,109
6: .061 - .142	559	\$145,360,905 (\$260,037) ⁱ	\$152,444
7: .143 - 1.00	559	\$109,440,487 (\$195,779) ^j	\$111,397
Total	3,915	\$1,107,128,770 (\$282,792)	\$185,151

a. Dollar amounts rounded to nearest dollar, and include direction donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only.

b. I base District Partisanship groupings by the democratic presidential normal vote, negative values indicate more conservative districts because the Democratic presidential candidate received a larger percentage of votes nationally than in the particular district.

c. The Levene Statistic for testing the homogeneity of variances is 34.110 and is statistically significant (sig=.000). The variances in the seven ideological groups are not similar. As a result, the Welch statistic is 67.902 and is statistically significant (sig=.000). There are statistically significant differences between the means of the seven ideological groupings. I use the Bonferroni pos hoc difference of means test for to test each individual mean against each other.

d. The mean of the first group is statistically different from 3, 4, 5, and 7 at the .05-level.

e. The mean of the second group is statistically different from 3, 4, 5, and 7 at the .05-level.

f. The mean of the third group is statistically different from all other means at the .05-level.

g. The mean of the fourth group is statistically different from 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 at the .05-level.

h. The mean of the fifth group is statistically different from 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 at the .05-level.

i. The mean of the sixth group is statistically different from 3, 4, 5, and 7 at the .05-level.

j. The mean of the seventh group is statistically different from all other means at the .05-level.

The mean PAC donation to the most conservative districts (groups one and two) is higher, and statistically significant at the .05-level, than the most liberal districts (group seven). In terms of PAC donations to marginal congressional districts, the PAC system donates more money to the more marginal districts. Districts in groups four and five, the most marginal, receive more PAC money, at statistically significant levels ($p < .05$), than any other districts, confirming previous interpretations of the PAC system that find

PACs donate at higher rates to close elections (Sabato 1984), to the extent that the normal vote measures close congressional elections.

In addition to district partisanship, the current election's margin of victory gives an indication of the electoral environment facing PACs and candidates.⁴⁴ I construct the margin of victory by subtracting the second-place candidate's vote total from that of the winner, and divide that difference by the total vote between the winner and second-place candidate; specifically, this variable is the percent difference between the first- and second-place candidates. While election margins could be a function of candidate spending, the ability of an individual PAC, or even a policy domain to affect this margin is negligible. Of primary concern is the correlation between PAC donations and close elections.

Table 2.64 PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Electoral Margin of Victory, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Electoral Victory Margin ^b	N-Size	PAC Spending	
		Total	Mean ^c
1: 0 - .0771944	391	172,172,674	440,339 ^d
2: .0771945 - .1520392	392	160,096,063	408,408 ^e
3: .1520393 - .2158535	391	130,609,155	334,039 ^f
4: .218536 - .2769802	392	112,321,392	286,534 ^g
5: .2769803 - .3323993	392	97,790,356	249,465 ^h
6: .3323994 - .3876466	391	95,142,188	243,330 ⁱ
7: .3876467 - .4561869	392	90,554,070	231,005 ^j
8: .4561870 - .5627199	391	89,460,272	228,798 ^k

⁴⁴ Scholars measure electoral vulnerability in several ways: electoral margin in district in previous election (e.g., Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1173; Snyder 1990, 1214), electoral margin in current election (e.g., Grier and Munger 1993, 618; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 116), both electoral margin in previous and current election (e.g., Endersby and Munger 1992, 88; Grenzke 1989, 251), electoral margin with interactive term for PAC friend or foe (e.g., Grenzke 1989, 251), percentage of vote won in previous election (Kroszner and Stratmann 2005), dummy variables for election margins under 25% (e.g., Poole and Romer 1985, 105-106; Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987, 300) and under 60% of the vote (e.g., Shin 2004, 138). Some electoral variables use percent of challenger spending (out of the total spending for entire district/state) as a measure of closeness of the election (e.g., Gutermuth 1999, 364). Some find that expectations of a close election increase PAC donations to the challenger (e.g., Poole and Romer 1985, 105-106).

9: .5627200 - .8396323	392	80,979,205	206,580 ^l
10: .8396324 – 1	391	78,003,395	199,497 ^m

- a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only
- b. I base election margin groupings by the percentage difference in votes between first and second place, (first place votes – second place votes)/(first place votes + second place votes).
- c. The Levene Statistic for testing the homogeneity of variances is 25.582 and is statistically significant (sig.=.000). The variances of the ten electoral margin groups are not similar. As a result, the Welch statistic is 78.129 and is statistically significant (sig.=.000). There are statistically significant differences between the means of the ten electoral margin groupings. I use the Bonferroni pos hoc difference of means test for to test each individual mean against each other.
- d. The mean of the first group is statistically different from 3 – 10 at the .05-level.
- e. The mean of the second group is statistically different from 3 – 10 at the .05-level.
- f. The mean of the third group is statistically different from all other means at the .05-level.
- g. The mean of the fourth group is statistically different from 1 – 3 and 6 – 10 at the .05-level.
- h. The mean of the fifth group is statistically different from 1 – 3, and 9 and 10 at the .05-level.
- i. The mean of the sixth group is statistically different from 1 – 4, and 10 at the .05-level.
- j. The mean of the seventh group is statistically different from 1 – 4 at the .05-level.
- k. The mean of the eighth group is statistically different from 1 – 4 at the .05-level.
- l. The mean of the ninth group is statistically different from 1 – 5 at the .05-level.
- m. The mean of the tenth group is statistically different from 1 – 6 at the .05-level.

Table 2.64 reports total PAC donations to all general elections for the House of Representatives by competitiveness of the election. According to Table 2.64, the more competitive elections receive more PAC donations. If the percent of votes the winner receives over the second-place candidate moves below fifteen percent, the average amount of PAC donations in that district climbs above \$400,000 1989 real dollars. The least competitive elections accrue under \$200,000 1989 real dollars on average; although PAC dollars flow to districts with close general election results, PACs still prefer donating to winners.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ There are two ways of hypothesizing about PAC donations in close elections: “security of the seat has two offsetting effects. On the one hand, PACs may be more willing to develop relationships with and make higher contributions to more secure legislators. On the other hand, an extra dollar of contributions may be less valuable to incumbents who have little worry about fending off challengers in the next election, so they may expend less effort in working for special interests and developing reputations. Conversely, legislators in less secure seats may have a higher demand for contributions and may expend more effort to raise funds” (Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 51).

Table 2.65 PAC Donations to General Election Winners by Political Party and Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Electoral Cycle	Winners	Democratic Winners Total (Mean)	Republican Winners
1990	88,214,278 (202,791)	60,409,630 (226,253) n=267	27,801,707 (166,477) n=167
1992	85,179,396 (195,815)	57,542,405 (223,033) n=258	27,628,506 (156,980) n=176
1994	81,357,633 (187,029)	49,506,089 (242,667) n=204	31,849,054 (138,474) n=230
1996	95,350,037 (219,195)	45,963,302 (222,045) n=207	49,355,913 (218,389) n=226
1998	99,522,701 (228,788)	49,805,037 (236,043) n=211	49,714,157 (222,933) n=223
2000	112,987,854 (259,742)	56,863,413 (268,224) n=212	56,124,441 (253,957) n=221
2002	113,218,937 (260,273)	53,441,263 (260,689) n=205	59,777,674 (261,038) n=229
2004	121,421,464 (279,130)	52,961,018 (262,183) n=202	68,457,492 (295,075) n=232
2006	130,523,531 (300,054)	63,587,644 (272,908) n=233	66,935,882 (331,366) n=202

a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only.

Table 2.66 PAC Donations to General Election Losers by Political Party and Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Electoral Cycle	Democratic Loser	Republican Loser
1990	5,429,730 (41,134) n=132	5,311,938 (24,255) n=219
1992	11,913,028 (73,086) n=163	6,241,729 (26,116) n=239
1994	21,497,354 (110,243) n=195	2,430,423 (12,928) n=188
1996	11,962,568 (55,640) n=215	8,428,193 (42,141) n=200
1998	6,633,004 (39,482) n=168	6,922,347 (40,014) n=173
2000	10,176,753 (53,281) n=191	5,612,684 (31,009) n=181
2002	9,950,752 (53,788) n=185	3,298,116 (19,515) n=169
2004	7,645,904 (38,817) n=197	3,774,002 (21,689) n=174
2006	6,102,869 (31,786)	14,121,804 (75,518)

a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only.

Tables 2.65 and 2.66 report total PAC donations by winners (Democrat, Republican) and losers (Democrat, Republican). Comparing across tables, it is clear that the PAC system gives more to the 3,915 winners from 1990-2006 than losers. Again, this spending hints at an incumbent, majority-party strategy. Table 2.66 reports the amount of PAC money flowing to Democratic and Republican losers, and these amounts increase during electoral cycles that changed the majority party. In 1994, the PAC system gave more money to Democratic losers than any other year, and in 2006, the PAC system gave more money to Republican losers than any other year. It is conceivable that the phenomena of PACs giving to winners correlates with an incumbent donation strategy. In theory, PACs achieve success with incumbent donation strategies along two dimensions. First, the parent organization achieves access during the legislative session by reminding the incumbent of who helped to fund his/her campaign. Second, PACs can claim success with their donor-base by publicizing a high win-to-loss ratio (Sabato 1984, 78).

There are two methods that I use to account for the presence of incumbents, quality challengers, and the interactive effects of those variables with political party affiliation.⁴⁶ First, I organize the cases according to PAC spending by incumbents (i.e., the dependent variable is PAC donations to incumbents), which I also organize by

⁴⁶ Other ways to measure the presence of quality challengers include: challenger expenditures when only examining PAC donations to incumbents since “challenger expenditures are highly correlated with proxies for challenger quality but more straightforward to measure” (Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 52). It is possible to run a fixed effects model to control for unobserved candidate phenomena (Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 52). Some measure challenger policy opinions with congressional quarterly questionnaires and Project Vote Smart records (e.g., Magee 2002, 397).

Democratic and Republican incumbents. Second, I control for incumbents in the races with a dichotomous variable (incumbent races equal to 1, otherwise equal to 0), which I also create dichotomous variables for Democratic and Republican incumbent races. These two ways for measuring incumbent donation strategies also apply to quality challengers found in the general election. I measure the presence of quality challengers with a dichotomous variable, one each for Democratic and Republican quality challengers. Those challengers that have held public, elected office in the past receive a one, and zero for otherwise. This variable captures an element of challenger demand for PAC donations, usually not accounted for in quantitative studies. Candidates often solicit PAC donations and challengers must engage in elaborate processes to convince PACs that they are worthy of money:

PAC-hungry challengers are also urged to send ‘PAC kits,’ a kind of investment portfolio, to the appropriate officials. The kits usually contain a profile of the candidate and district, past voting results, a sketch of candidate’s orientation, budget, issue, stands, endorsements, and perhaps derogatory information about the opponent. While some candidates send out a ‘Dear PAC’ form letter, the wiser ones personalize the kit’s cover letter, perhaps including specific comments on each group’s legislative agenda. The cover letters also frequently emulate the emotional appeals of direct mail; the candidates passionately explain why their election is essential to the PAC’s goals as well as to the survival of Western civilization...they follow up with frequent ‘newsnotes,’ telephone calls from the staff, and personal visits from the candidate. Repeated solicitation is often the key to a PAC contribution for a challenger (Sabato 1984, 113).

Table 2.67 Number of Official Incumbents, Challengers, and Quality Challengers for the House of Representatives by Electoral Cycle

Electoral Cycle	Total Candidates	Incumbents ^a	Challengers	Quality Challengers
1990	1,056	407	649	81
1992	1,454	367	1,086	180
1994	1,835	388	1,447	115
1996	2,130	386	1,744	131
1998	1,620	402	1,218	114
2000	2,067	412	1,655	116
2002	2,025	418	1,607	103

2004	1,804	406	1,398	96
2006	1,937	423	1,514	99

a. The number of incumbents includes eight instances of independent incumbents and Bernie Sanders of Vermont represents 7 of those instances.

Table 2.68 Number of Official Incumbents, Challengers, and Quality Challengers Receiving PAC Donations for the House of Representatives by Electoral Cycle

Electoral Cycle	Incumbents Number (% of Total)	Challengers Number (% of Total)	Quality Challengers Number (% of Total)
1990	399 (98.0%)	306 (47.1%)	70 (86.4%)
1992	361 (98.1%)	508 (46.8%)	176 (97.8%)
1994	380 (97.9%)	610 (42.2%)	112 (97.4%)
1996	374 (96.9%)	667 (38.2%)	128 (97.7%)
1998	398 (99.0%)	428 (35.1%)	107 (93.9%)
2000	409 (99.3%)	489 (29.5%)	109 (93.9%)
2002	415 (99.3%)	501 (31.2%)	94 (91.3%)
2004	405 (99.8%)	437 (31.3%)	84 (87.5%)
2006	420 (99.3%)	503 (33.2%)	86 (86.9%)

Tables 2.67 and 2.68 display the number of incumbents, challengers, and quality challengers for the House of Representatives between 1990 and 2006, and the percent of those candidates receiving PAC donations during those same electoral cycles. These tables indicate two trends in PAC donations: (1) PACs donate to almost one hundred percent of incumbents campaigning for office and (2) PAC donations to challengers are actually directed toward quality challengers instead of the run-of-the-mill challenger. Table 2.69 reports the dollar amounts PACs donate to incumbents, challengers, and quality challengers, who are a subset of the challenger total. Not surprisingly, PACs donate more money to incumbents, and most PAC donations to challengers are to quality challengers, which could capture candidate demand and the professionalization of a challengers campaign. Tables 2.70 through 2.74 repeat this analysis by political party identification.

Table 2.69 PAC Donations to Official Incumbents, Challengers and Quality Challengers by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Electoral Cycle	Incumbents ^b		Challengers ^c		Quality Challengers ^d	
	Total (Mean)		Total (Mean)		Total (Mean)	
1990	85,232,355 (213,615)		15,177,253 (49,599)		8,306,238 (118,661)	
1992	83,918,442 (232,461)		24,446,465 (48,123)		15,313,810 (87,010)	
1994	86,176,209 (226,780)		22,245,307 (36,468)		11,573,732 (103,337)	
1996	89,869,211 (240,292)		28,924,692 (43,365)		14,903,927 (116,437)	
1998	94,418,819 (237,233)		20,543,567 (47,999)		11,645,523 (108,837)	
2000	107,373,024 (262,526)		25,000,334 (51,125)		15,398,276 (141,269)	
2002	108,850,235 (262,290)		23,587,034 (47,080)		12,408,566 (132,006)	
2004	118,246,199 (291,966)		17,168,153 (39,286)		9,592,421 (114,195)	
2006	135,807,165 (323,350)		20,399,808 (40,556)		11,174,869 (129,940)	

a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only.

b. Amounts include PAC spending on incumbents that were official candidates during the electoral cycle, but were not official candidates for the general election (e.g., lost primary, died, appointed to bureaucracy), which includes PAC money to incumbents in open seats. Negative values and zeros are not included in totals. Means determined from the sample size of those receiving PAC donations, not the universal set.

Table 2.70 Number of Official Incumbents, Challengers, and Quality Challengers for the House of Representatives by Political Party and Electoral Cycle^a

Electoral Cycle	Incumbents		Challengers		Quality Challengers	
	D	R	D	R	D	R
1990	248	159	203	269	34	47
1992	226	140	309	327	89	91
1994	229	158	517	653	55	60
1996	169	216	605	585	79	52
1998	189	212	385	416	63	51
2000	205	205	450	516	58	58
2002	204	213	524	694	49	54
2004	193	212	478	519	48	48
2006	195	228	658	477	54	45

Table 2.71 Number of Official Incumbents, Challengers, and Quality Challengers Receiving PAC Donations for the House of Representatives by Political Party and Electoral Cycle^a

Electoral Cycle	Incumbents		Challengers		Quality Challengers	
	D	R	D	R	D	R
Number (% of Total)						
1990	243 (97.9)	156 (98.1)	152 (74.8)	153 (56.8)	31 (91.2)	39 (83.0)
1992	225 (99.1)	135 (96.4)	223 (72.1)	279 (85.3)	87 (97.8)	89 (97.8)
1994	223 (97.3)	156 (98.7)	267 (51.6)	336 (51.4)	53 (96.4)	59 (98.3)
1996	167 (98.8)	206 (95.3)	348 (57.5)	311 (53.1)	78 (98.7)	50 (96.2)
1998	189 (100)	208 (98.1)	202 (52.4)	212 (50.9)	62 (98.4)	45 (88.2)
2000	204 (99.5)	203 (99.0)	237 (52.6)	229 (44.3)	55 (94.8)	54 (93.1)
2002	203 (99.5)	211 (99.0)	251 (47.9)	238 (34.2)	47 (95.9)	47 (87.0)
2004	193 (99.4)	211 (99.5)	215 (44.9)	216 (41.6)	42 (87.5)	42 (87.5)
2006	195 (99.4)	225 (99.1)	325 (49.3)	170 (35.6)	52 (96.3)	34 (75.6)

Table 2.72 PAC Donations to Incumbents by Party and Electoral Cycle In 1989 Real Dollars^a

Electoral Cycle	Democratic Incumbents ^b	Republican Incumbents ^b
	Total (Mean)	Total (Mean)
1990	57,269,506 (235,677)	27,962,849 (179,249)
1992	57,014,675 (253,399)	26,769,367 (198,292)
1994	60,393,085 (270,821)	25,652,876 (164,442)
1996	39,487,422 (236,452)	50,208,478 (243,730)
1998	45,888,599 (242,797)	48,425,538 (232,815)
2000	54,699,675 (268,136)	52,396,349 (258,110)
2002	53,342,483 (262,771)	55,445,861(262,777)
2004	52,698,244 (273,048)	65,466,353 (310,267)
2006	56,843,351 (293,007)	78,963,814 (350,950)

a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only.

b. Amounts include PAC spending on incumbents that were official candidates during the electoral cycle, but were not official candidates for the general election (e.g., lost primary, died, appointed to bureaucracy). Net negative sums of money are treated as zero, no instance of receiving PAC money; thus, total values are larger than reported in other tables.

Table 2.73 PAC Donations to Democratic and Republican Challengers by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Electoral Cycle	Democratic Challengers ^b Total (Mean)	Republican Challengers ^c Total (Mean)
1990	9,304,857 (61,216)	5,802,901 (37,927)
1992	15,816,879 (70,928)	8,438,527 (30,246)
1994	12,588,279 (47,147)	9,553,807 (28,434)
1996	19,785,067 (56,854)	8,789,703 (28,263)
1998	11,521,545 (57,037)	8,935,139 (42,147)
2000	13,615,200 (57,448)	10,930,557 (47,732)
2002	13,266,615 (52,855)	10,303,395 (43,292)
2004	9,011,016 (41,912)	8,125,600 (37,619)
2006	14,227,161 (43,776)	5,932,587 (34,898)

a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only.

Table 2.74 PAC Donations to Democratic and Republican Quality Challengers by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Electoral Cycle	Democratic Quality Challengers ^b Total (Mean)	Republican Quality Challengers ^c Total (Mean)
1990	4,496,670 (145,054)	3,809,569 (97,681)
1992	10,132,473 (116,465)	5,181,337 (58,217)
1994	6,764,636 (127,635)	4,809,096 (81,510)
1996	10,321,303 (132,324)	4,582,625 (91,653)
1998	6,941,450 (111,959)	4,704,073 (104,535)
2000	8,060,009 (146,546)	7,338,268 (135,894)
2002	6,714,563 (142,863)	5,694,002 (121,149)
2004	5,062,007 (120,524)	4,530,415 (107,867)
2006	7,007,763 (134,765)	4,167,106 (122,562)

a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only.

Tables 2.75 and 2.76 best exemplify the PAC system’s incumbent and majority party bias. In elections that changed the majority party, 1994 and 2006, it was “déjà vu all over again” for the PAC system. PACs donated to all 34 Democratic incumbent losers

in 1994, the highest by far in this 16-year period, and in 2006, PACs donated to all 22 Republican incumbent losers, also the highest in this time period.⁴⁷

Table 2.75 Total Number of General Election Incumbent Losers by Political Party and Election Cycle

Electoral Cycle	Democratic Total (#Receiving PAC Money)	Republican Total (#Receiving PAC Money)
1990	6 (6)	9 (9)
1992	13 (13)	6 (6)
1994	34 (34)	0 (0)
1996	3 (3)	18 (17)
1998	1 (1)	5 (5)
2000	2 (2)	4 (4)
2002	2 (2)	2 (2)
2004	3 (3)	2 (2)
2006	0 (0)	22 (22)

Table 2.76 PAC Donations to General Election Incumbent Losers by Political Party and Election Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Electoral Cycle	Dem. Incumbent Losers (PAC Money to Winners)	Rep. Incumbent Losers (PAC Money to Winners)
1990	\$1,772,640 (\$323,539)	\$2,400,077 (\$1,486,401)
1992	\$4,274,595 (\$825,332)	\$1,611,546 (\$596,437)
1994	\$12,967,453 (\$2,292,344)	0 (0)
1996	\$994,943 (\$247,435)	\$4,534,444 (\$3,606,272)
1998	\$368,214 (\$212,038)	\$2,064,159 (\$965,521)
2000	\$693,052 (\$147,372)	\$1,853,519 (\$1,292,599)
2002	\$1,262,387 (\$367,106)	\$1,006,958 (\$264,019)
2004	\$1,349,759 (\$348,143)	\$1,291,374 (\$399,550)
2006	0 (0)	\$11,488,887 (3,281,050)

⁴⁷ Appendix D reports the status of each incumbent going into the next congressional session, from 1990-2006.

a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only. Incumbents receiving money means that they receive a net positive value of 1989 real dollars from the entire PAC system. These numbers do not reflect the 11 races with two incumbents in the same general election.

b. For 1990, PAC money to Bernie Sanders (I) VT is considered PAC money to Democratic winner over a Republican incumbent.

Table 2.77 examines PAC donations to incumbents and open seats by district, not per candidate, reaching similar conclusions; however, unexpectedly, PACs donate more money to open seats on average than to districts with incumbents in the general election.

Table 2.77 PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Select Incumbent Variables and Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollars^a

Electoral Cycle	Incumbent Races	Two Incumbent Races	Incumbent w/ No Challenger	Open Seats
1990	91,594,018 (226,158) n=405	----	13,776,146 (164,002) n=84	8,811,100 (293,703) n=30
1992	86,137,207 (254,092) n=339	2,946,736 (589,347) n=5	5,045,274 (194,049) n=26	19,270,670 (211,766) n=91
1994	94,467,517 (246,651) n=383	----	8,816,465 (169,547) n=52	13,940,291 (268,083) n=52
1996	104,448,875 (273,426) n=382	----	3,636,644 (191,402) n=19	14,330,296 (270,383) n=53
1998	103,864,685 (259,014) n=401	----	17,209,530 (183,080) n=94	11,092,186 (326,241) n=34
2000	117,017,439 (292,544) n=400	----	11,772,513 (192,992) n=61	15,350,646 (438,590) n=35
2002	109,201,594 (285,868) n=382	4,418,649 (1,104,662) n=4	18,862,440 (232,870) n=81	18,812,952 (383,938) n=49
2004	121,960,107 (306,432) n=398	2,561,836 (1,280,918) n=2	16,643,940 (260,062) n=64	10,889,474 (311,128) n=35
2006	142,280,366 (353,931) n=402	----	15,622,163 (269,348) n=58	13,732,129 (416,125) n=33
1990-2006 ^b	(278,056)	(902,475)		(306,383)

n=3492

n=11

n=412

a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only.

b. For total PAC spending from 1990 through 2006, using the Bonferroni post hoc method, the difference in means between incumbent, two-incumbent, and open seat districts is all statistically significant at the .05 level. The Levene statistics is 13.346 (.000) and the Welch statistic is 17.643 (.000)

These electoral independent variables help measure the partisan competitiveness of a district and election, along with the type of attachments PACs form with candidates (e.g., incumbents, quality challengers, Democrats, Republicans). The third group of independent variables measures the characteristics of the constituency facing each candidate.

Constituency Environment

In addition to district partisanship, defined as an electoral variable, I measure constituency characteristics with industry employment data within each congressional district, provided by the United States Census Bureau in the 1980, 1990, and 2000 census, which the bureau updates for changes in congressional district boundaries caused by redistricting and reapportionment.⁴⁸ The Census Bureau obtains industry employment data within congressional districts from its long-questionnaire, which is a one-in-six sample of the United States population with the figures weighted to determine the industry employment statistics in each congressional district. These numbers are then adjusted for new district boundaries created after redistricting and

⁴⁸ I use industry employment by congressional districts located in these specific census datasets: 1980 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 3D (congressional district lines used for the 98th Congress); 1980 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 3H (congressional district lines used for the 99th Congress); 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 3D (congressional district lines used for the 103rd Congress, and updated for the 104th and 105th Congress district lines); 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 3D (congressional district lines used for the 106th Congress, and updated for the 108th, 109th, and 110th Congress district lines). I obtained this data from the United States Census Bureau website, <http://www.census.gov>, and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) website, <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu>.

reapportionment. Table 2.78 displays which census data, with corresponding district boundaries, I used for each election cycle. Overall, I used the most recent census figures possible, with the appropriate redistricting and reapportionment adjustments. The industry employment numbers only changed as a result of a new census or redistricting and reapportionment, and for those latter cases, industry employment numbers only changed for those districts, not the entire 435 districts in the House of Representatives.

Table 2.78 Election Year with Corresponding Census Data

Election Year (Ensuing Congressional Session)	Census Data by District Lines
1990 (102 nd)	1980: 98 th with 99 th Redistricting ^a
1992 (103 rd)	1990: 103 rd District Lines
1994 (104 th)	1990: 103 rd with 104 th Redistricting ^b
1996 (105 th)	1990: 103 rd with 105 th Redistricting ^c
1998 (106 th)	2000: 106 th District Lines
2000 (107 th)	2000: 106 th District Lines
2002 (108 th)	2000: 108 th District Lines
2004 (109 th)	2000: 108 th with 109 th Redistricting ^d
2006 (110 th)	2000: 108 th with 110 th Redistricting ^e

a. California (all districts), Hawaii (all districts), Louisiana (districts 1, 2, 3), Maine (all districts), Mississippi (all districts), Montana (all districts), New Jersey (all districts), New York (districts 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, 34), Texas (all districts), and Washington (all districts) redrew congressional district lines for the 1984 election leading to the 99th Congress

b. Maine (all districts) and Minnesota (all districts) redrew congressional district lines for the 1994 election

c. Florida (districts 2-6), Georgia (all districts), Kentucky (districts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6), Louisiana (all districts), and Texas (districts 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 18, 22, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30) redrew congressional district lines for the 1996 elections

d. Maine (all districts), and Pennsylvania (all districts), Texas (all districts) redrew congressional district lines for the 2004 election

e. Georgia (all districts) and Texas (districts 15, 21, 23, 25, 28) redrew congressional district lines for the 2006 election

The United States Census Bureau reports a variety of industry activity within congressional district boundaries.⁴⁹ The census collects this data from household

⁴⁹ There are other measurements for constituency characteristics, some are specific to the nature of the study: districts' rural area (Stratmann 1992, 655), percent labor union membership in district (Endersby and Munger 1992, 88), number of banks in the district (Havrilesky 1990, 245), share of total employment

responses and matches these self-responses to the SIC for the 1980 and 1990 census and the SIC replacement NAICS for the 2000 census. The census instructs the respondents to report the job/industry in which they are employed for the week that they respond to the survey. If the respondent works more than one job, then the respondent is instructed to report the industry in which he/she works the longest amount of hours. The unemployed report their most recent working experience. The census codes these responses for their industry codes using computer software, and for those responses not coded electronically, census staffers code the responses manually using the American Business Index (ABI), which links the business name with the SIC/NAICS. Table 2.79 reports the 15-industry employment categories used in the 2000 census. Throughout this study I will use the 2000 census categorization to describe constituency characteristics; however, it is important to note that the comparability between 1980, 1990, and 2000 census is limited.

Table 2.79 Census Bureau Employment by Industry Categories

Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing (Durable and Non-Durable Goods)
Transportation and Warehousing
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Rental and Leasing
Information and Utilities
Health Care and Social Assistance
Educational Services
Professional, Scientific, Management, Administrative, and Waste Mgmt
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodation, and Food Services

in district using the U.S. Census Bureau's County Business Patterns (Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1170; Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 52-53), constituency opinion (Shin 2004, 138). The effect of constituency characteristics may not be linear because those with the most favorable constituency characteristics may not require that much in PAC donations (Stratmann 1992, 656).

Other Services (Business Repair and Personal Services)
Public Administration

Source: U.S. Census on Housing and Population, Summary Tape File 3D 2000

There are three reasons for guarding against comparing categories from 1980 through 2000. First, from 1980 to 2000 the census has altered the individual categories that aggregate into these larger classifications in Table 2.79. The alterations result from the disappearance of some individual categories and the development of others; in other words, as a result of changes in American economic production. Second, the census shifts the classification of individual categories that changes how each of these industries are aggregated. Third, the change from the SIC to the NAICS involved the alteration of specific industry categories that changes how industries are aggregated from the individual categories. The comparability of 1980, 1990, and 2000 industry employment numbers is not a focus of this study; instead, I use these categories to explain the distribution of PAC campaign contributions for the appropriate electoral cycle (e.g., I am not using the 2000 census industry employment numbers to explain the 1990 election). Important for this study is the linking of constituency characteristics, as defined by this census data, with the appropriate PAC industry. This linkage must occur for each election cycle, so comparability across time is not as imperative as comparability across PAC/constituent industry. Appendix D reports how these industry categories change in the census from 1980 to 2000, and reports the individual categories that aggregate to the larger industry categories reported in Table 2.79.

The most important problem I had to overcome was how the census reports its industry employment data. There are slight differences in how the census reports industry employment data pre-105th Congress, compared with the 105th Congress

numbers and the ensuing congressional sessions. For the industry employment data for the 98th, 99th, and 103rd congressional sessions, which I use as an independent variable for the 1990 electoral cycle, the census reports employment in mining with employment in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. In addition, this industry employment data reports personal services with arts and entertainment, while in the latter reports, personal services are grouped with business and repair services. For the 103rd congressional session (the 1992 electoral cycle), I re-categorized the industry employment data to match those categories for the 105th congressional district lines. I was able to conduct this calculation by keeping the ratio of mining to agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (and arts and entertainment to personal, business, and repair services) the same as was reported for the 105th Congress. The 105th Congress industry employment data has the same source as the 103rd Congress data (the 1990 census), the only adjustments that must occur are with those districts whose state legislatures redrew their boundaries, because for those districts not redrawn, I can use the 105th data and categorization for the 103rd Congress.

For example, in Florida's second congressional district, the 105th Congress census industry employment data reports 10,356 workers in agriculture, forestry, and fishing and 591 workers in mining. For the 103rd and 104th congressional district lines, which I must use since Florida redrew the second congressional district boundaries for the 105th Congress and the industry employment numbers changed (i.e., employment numbers are different for the 103rd/104th Congress and the 105th Congress); however, for the 103rd Congress and 104th Congress, the census only reports agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and mining employment together, which is 10,740 workers. To determine the

amount of mining workers out of 10,740, I use the same ratio as reported in the 105th Congress and then multiply that ratio by the 103rd and 104th Congress industry employment totals: $591/(10,356 + 591) * 10,740 = 580$. As a result, I determine that the drop in industry workers from the 105th Congress (10,947) to the 103rd and 104th Congress (10,740) resulted in a drop in mining employment from 591 to 590 workers. The only assumption I make is that the ratio of mining workers to agriculture, forestry, and fisheries workers stays constant from 1992 to 1996. I made the same calculations to determine the changes in arts and entertainment employment and business, repair, and personal services employment during this time period. The purpose was only to match the 103rd Congress categories with those of the 105th Congress categories, which derived from the same 1990 census data. I only had to perform these calculations on those redistricted districts from 1992 to 1996.

Conclusion: The PAC System, 1990-2006

The PAC system, regardless of whether it is thought of as local re-election constituencies or as extensions of policy and lobbying domains, has not changed all that much from when it first began in the early 1970s. Donations from the PAC system are biased towards the Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means committee, and shy away from lesser important committees in the House of Representatives. The PAC system also donates more money to incumbents, leadership, the two-party system, freshmen running for reelection, and very senior members of the chamber. These legislative variables are vital to understanding the nature of PAC strategy. Electorally, the PAC system favors districts with incumbents, close races, but also favoring winners above all. This exploration was able to analyze some aspects of PAC giving that studies

of the PAC Decade were not. First, this strategy of donating to winners does not necessarily mean that PACs can predict the future, as they took it on the chin in 1994 and 2006. Second, while PACs give more money to incumbents, what they do give to challengers, they give to quality challengers. The one major change in PAC behavior from the PAC Decade is that PACs donate a lot of money to open seat elections.

In sum, there appears to be plenty of PAC money to go around, but analyzing total PAC-system donations masks much of what is interesting about PAC strategy. Even though PAC donation decisions can succumb to idiosyncratic processes, there are consistent patterns, and an underlying rationality, to PAC strategy. The two approaches to PAC strategy (organizational presence, public choice) simply disagree about which underlying logic and rationality best explains all PAC donation decisions. It is common knowledge that PACs use multiple metrics to determine the distribution of resources, as indicated by the findings in this chapter, and what we need is a model to explain and predict all elements of PAC strategy. Much research tries to parse specific hypotheses about specific donation strategies, finding different PACs act differently, finding support for all of them. A small group of scholars approached PAC behavior to build theory, designing comprehensive models meant to address the core elements of PAC-decision-making applying to all PACs.

At stake in understanding PAC strategy is our ability to comprehend the current state of American political representation. The central guiding this research is: why do PACs establish relationships with some candidates and not others? There are two sub-questions whose answers are crucial to answering the main question: how do PAC

donors influence PAC strategy, and how do legislative characteristics influence PAC strategy? The first is a demand-side question and the second a supply-side question.

Chapter Three investigates and re-tests the demand-side hypothesis that PACs use electoral and ideological cues to satisfy donors and Chapter Four investigates and re-tests the supply-side hypothesis that PACs use legislative cues to discern which congressional member is worthy of PAC money. The results in both chapters indicate that neither approach explains the variation in PAC contributions across congressional elections very well. Chapter Five posits a new approach to PAC-strategy modeling that accounts for both the geographic distribution of individual donors to PACs and rent-seeking strategies.

CHAPTER THREE

THE DEMAND-SIDE APPROACH

Introduction

Organized interests demand legislation and politicians supply legislation. In this market for legislation, organized interests act strategically to attain favorable policy. There are two sets of variables explaining variation in this strategy: demand- and supply-side. Scholars using the demand-side approach argue organizational-level variables best explain the variation in organized-interest strategy. Scholars using the supply-side approach argue politician characteristics and legislature-level variables best explain organized-interest strategy. This chapter tests and evaluates the demand-side approach, and the next chapter tests and evaluates the supply-side approach to explaining organized interest strategy.

In an attempt to understand why PACs form relationships with some candidates and not others, each chapter asks a sub-question unique to its own approach. To assess the accuracy of the demand-side approach, I ask, how does the geographic dispersion of individual PAC donors affect PAC strategy? To assess the accuracy of the supply-side approach, I ask, how do candidate-level characteristics affect PAC strategy? Asking and answering the demand-side question implies that PAC strategy may cater more toward organizational maintenance goals rather than legislative goals for its parent organization. The need to keep PAC donors happy, which in turn gives PAC donors implicit power in the PAC contribution decision process, affects PAC strategy by

curbing the amount of pure legislative-oriented contributions (Eismeier and Pollock 1985, 211; 1986, 290; Wright 1985, 1989).⁵⁰

The use of organizational variables to explain PAC strategy questions the single-minded, legislative-seeking PAC that nationalizes and centralizes congressional elections:

PACs, are not, as it turns out influence-maximizing actors guided by questionable ethics and armed with limitless dollars and perfect information. They are political organizations whose behavior turns on a variety of decision rules and whose spending strategies are shaped by the internal structures they have and the financial resources they control (Eismeier and Pollock 1984, 124-125).⁵¹

The size of the legislative-intent contributions are small and the “typical PAC is a modest operation and, we suspect, a locally oriented one” (Eismeier and Pollock 1984, 138). A careful examination of PAC organizational variables dispels those thinking PACs have perfect information, unlimited resources, and are unresponsive to its members.

Scholars working within the demand-side approach find that the PAC organizational structure, along with budget size, play an important role in determining which candidates receive PAC contributions (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and Bartels 2005; Eismeier and Pollock 1984; Gopoian 1984; Sabato 1984; Wilcox 1989;

⁵⁰ Eismeier and Pollock (1985, 194) refer to organizational-maintenance goals as *internal* and legislative goals as *external*. For external goals there is a difference between *content* (e.g., material versus purposive goals) and *scope* (e.g., narrow versus broad).

⁵¹ Wilcox (1989, 165-171) finds that organizational variables explain much of the PAC variation in contribution strategy in any given election cycle; however, changes in organizational variables across election cycles do not explain changes in contribution strategy (switching between Republican and Democratic incumbents and challengers) as well as electoral expectations (presidential approval, economic conditions). Wilcox (1989, 158-159) first reports the proportion of PAC contributions to incumbents, political parties, and margin of victory, and then uses multivariate regression analysis for a more conservative statistical test, using independent variables of a Washington, D.C. office, PAC age, and total contributions.

Wright 1985, 1989). The most robust theoretical treatment of the demand-side approach to PAC strategy is the *organizational presence* model, which explains the link between PAC organizational variables and PAC strategy with this contradiction: organizational characteristics that allow the PAC to solicit individual donations and maintain fundraising are the same characteristics that inhibit a legislative PAC strategy (Wright 1985, 400). Local PAC officials, typically working in field offices, must make decisions with the goal of future fundraising in mind, and those local PAC donors wish for the PAC to donate more money to local, electorally vulnerable, ideologically friendly politicians, which can undermine a pure legislative strategy preferred by national, lobbying-oriented PAC officials. PAC contribution decisions are not isolated from the wishes and expectations of PAC donors because PACs concern themselves with organizational maintenance, making a “surprising amount of PAC activity...meant for internal consumption and organizational survival” (Eismeier and Pollock 1985, 194). The importance of these organizational variables lies in its relation to PAC strategy, since “despite their relative autonomy, PAC staffs are constrained in their strategic choices by organizational goals, contributor expectations, and in some cases by the committee’s decision-making structure” (Eismeier and Pollock 1985, 197).

This chapter is the first macro-level test of the organizational presence model’s expectations. Using the geographic dispersion of PAC donors as the primary variable of interest, I test the organizational presence model’s expectations using PAC contribution data during the 1990-2006 electoral cycles of the House of Representatives. While the organizational presence model’s explanatory power is low, the geographic nature of PAC contributions is evident, and as a byproduct, this chapter

helps to standardize a way of measuring “organizational presence” in future macro-level studies.

Demand-Side and PAC Strategy: The Organizational Presence Model

Where you stand depends on where you sit is a common phrase meaning the opinions and decisions a person forms and makes will always be in relation to their own position, material or otherwise. All organizational analyses recognize the tension within a PAC between the committee that makes contribution decisions and the individual donors supplying the money to PAC decision-makers use to fund candidate campaigns. The PAC decision-making committee and the individual donors sit in different places and take different stands on who should receive the contributions. While the size of a PAC’s budget, certainly an organizational variable, places mathematical constraints on PAC strategy, it is the internal dynamic between PAC decision makers and PAC donors that provides the tension between organizational maintenance and legislative goals. The organizational presence model emphasizes this tension in explaining PAC strategy.

Studies of the internal workings of PAC communication show that PAC officials communicate with members formally, with newsletters, annual reports, and meetings to inform donors about candidates who received contributions, and the win/loss record of the PAC. This communication is conducted with a keen eye toward organizational maintenance and solidifying future donations (Sabato 1984, 67; Sorauf 1984, 602-603). Donor voice within the PAC is rarely formalized, but the goal of future fundraising influences the PAC decision makers:

Most PACs do, however, actively solicit recommendations from their donors about the allocation of PAC monies. PAC administrators and allocation

committees, by their own accounts, heed those suggestions...in short, observers and PAC people agree that very few PACs will support a candidate if local contributors do not, and many feel compelled to offer at least token financial support, regardless of the better judgment of its leadership, to a candidate with important local backing...beyond these reports from the PACs, there is a good deal of indirect evidence pointing to a substantial donor voice. The decentralization and dispersion of PAC contributions suggest a sensitivity to the local wishes and initiatives of the many constituencies of most PACs (Sorauf 1984, 602-603).⁵²

Regarding the relationship between PAC decision makers and PAC donors, there is evidence that donors do not have a high level of input, and individual PAC donors give money precisely because they do not want to directly engage the political process; however, PAC decision-makers may feel obligated to make strategic decisions to please donors, and Eismeier and Pollock's (1985, 196) survey finds this portrayal to be accurate, as PAC decision-makers report that giving to a winning candidate is one of the best ways to show donors that their money has influence. Electability ranks high, along with legislative success, candidate financial need, and contributing to a candidate within the same geographic region (e.g., state) (Eismeier and Pollock 1985, 198; 1986, 297).⁵³ Of all PAC decision-makers studied, nearly half thought the geographic congruence between donors and candidates was important to PAC strategy (Eismeier

⁵² Sorauf (1984, 603) does not expect the geographic distribution of donors to influence the decisions of non-connected (e.g., ideological) PACs:

As for the PACs without parent organizations, a concept of 'voice' whether formal or informal, hardly applies. Donors to most of them are scattered across the country. They have no contact either with each other or with the leadership or staff of the PAC. They are bound together, not by a common profession, occupation, or workplace, but by computer-based mailing lists...in the independent PACs, therefore, donors rarely can affect, even indirectly, the allocative or strategic decisions of the PAC.

⁵³ Eismeier and Pollock (1985, 202) find that trade association PACs are the most likely to use a pure legislative strategy and "in most of these committees, donor participation and influence are negligible." A possible reason is that trade association PACs have geographically diverse donor bases. Despite this finding, "PACs with more modest budgets may put the long-term organizational health and power engendered by donor participation ahead of whatever short-term benefits might be achieved by leaving investment tactics entirely up to the professionals" (Eismeier and Pollock 1985, 204).

and Pollock 1985, 198). The ability for PAC officials to sell the importance of their efforts to donors and potential donors is important for organizational maintenance and *product differentiation* (Eismeier and Pollock 1985, 199).⁵⁴ The influence of donors and those located in the Washington, D.C. office or PAC officials in general is always in flux, “yet as with the large trade PACs, local affiliates of labor PACs often take the view that because they raised the money, it ought to be spent in their states. As a result, Washington staffers walk a line between internal harmony and external effectiveness” (Eismeier and Pollock 1985, 206). These findings indicate that whether or not a PAC has a Washington, D.C. office, there will be a tension between PAC decision makers and PAC donors, which for those PAC decision makers, is a tension between internal and external goals. The influence of PAC donors can hamper legislative strategies.

The organizational presence model represents the most coherent explanation of how the organization of PACs influences PAC contribution strategies. The essence of the organizational presence model is to show how the “factors that allow some PACs to become very rich are the very same factors that undercut their potential influence,” which means the necessities of raising money take precedence over the necessities of demanding legislation (Wright 1985, 400).⁵⁵ The reason for this conundrum is that

⁵⁴ Inter-organizational relations are an important variable in PAC contribution strategy. Those PACs with parents may not have to compete for donors, but they do compete against each other for influence in Congress. Also, there is a PAC network, with a few *bellwether* PACs that share information with other PACs about to whom to donate, “as with other political organizations, we would expect that patterns of competition and cooperation among PACs will depend on the relative complementarity (sic) of their policy objectives and relative independence of their organizational bases” (Eismeier and Pollock 1985, 199).

⁵⁵ The five national PACs Wright (1985, 401-402) examines are the American Medical PAC, Dealers Election Action Committee, American Bankers Association, Realtors PAC, and the associated General Contractors PAC, for the 1978 and 1980 election cycles. To measure organizational presence, Wright (1985, 402) relies on interviews with PAC officials.

local inputs influence PAC decision-making and these local inputs prefer an electoral and ideological contribution strategy, discounting the legislative strategy preferred by national inputs. Local PAC inputs are those individuals working in local field offices, whose duty is to raise money for enlarging PAC budgets. Traditionally, scholars capture this tension between the local and the national with proxy variables, isolating the effect of PAC geography (e.g., Washington, D.C. headquarters, location of PAC interests, geographic dispersion of PAC donors). A tension can occur between those that work in the field offices and those PAC-affiliated lobbyists or staffers working in Washington, D.C., but the local input is well respected and these individuals control much of the contribution decisions (Sorauf 1984, 595; Wright 1985, 403-404).

The Washington, D.C. office does not dictate all contribution decisions, rather it creates a tension between the national and local PAC officials (lobbying concerns versus local knowledge) and “this conflict – rather than purely rational calculation – appears to affect, and occasionally even determine, a PACs choice of candidate recipients” (Sabato 1984, 44). This conflict between the national and the local is not unique to the D.C. office, as corporate and union PACs conflict between the national PAC staff and local corporate plants and union chapters (Sabato 1984, 80). This tension between local and national inputs should be most distinctive when a PAC locates its headquarters in Washington, D.C. If a PAC has its headquarter location in Washington, D.C., then the PAC is expected to communicate with lobbyists more frequently than those PACs without an office in Washington, D.C., which in turn, should lead to different PAC contribution strategies. Scholars expect those PACs without a D.C. office to donate to more challengers and have more ideological contribution patterns,

while those PACs with a Washington, D.C. headquarter location will communicate with lobbyists and are more likely to contribute at higher rates to incumbents, be less partisan in contribution patterns (Eismeier and Pollock 1984, 125, 137; Sabato 1984, 44; Sorauf 1984, 595; Wilcox 1989, 162-165), and contribute less money to lost causes (Wilcox 1989, 164-165). This influence is implicit because PAC decision makers realize that donors will become disgruntled with decisions and stop giving money in the next election cycle (Sabato 1984, 31, 594-595).

PAC staffs listen to local inputs because of the internal, organizational maintenance goals of PACs. Listening to local donors and local PAC officials is vital to continuing the funding stream in future elections, and this organizational need results in an electoral and local strategy because local PAC donors are *political amateurs* and either do not know or are not interested in the legislative effectiveness of donations, or local PAC activists know more about electoral and ideological characteristics of politicians (Wright 1985, 405). In sum, “campaign contributions will be used to elect ideologically sympathetic candidates in close races rather than alter the policy positions of not-so-sympathetic candidates in safe races” (Wright 1985, 406). The organizational presence model is a culmination of two deductive and empirically validated studies (Wright 1985, 1989).

According to Wright (1985), if local activists have influence on PAC decisions, then PACs should give to where they have donors, to the ideologically friendly politician, in a close election. If lobbyists or PAC officials in Washington, D.C. have most of the influence, then institutional/policy variables should explain most of the variation in PAC contributions; PAC contributions will flow to congressional members

on committees of jurisdiction and leadership positions (Wright 1985, 406).⁵⁶ When determining the influence of local inputs in PAC contribution strategies, two characteristics are important: the size of the contribution and where/why the contribution occurs. As electoral need increases and candidate ideology becomes closer to that of the PAC, the amount of the PAC contribution increases, implying the influence of local PAC officials in contribution decisions (Wright 1985, 407-408). Another approach to this same issue is to understand whether or not PACs acquire access for their parent organization after the election when (and if) PACs contribute to districts where they have little or no organizational presence.

The goal is to understand if PACs pursue a strategy that allows them to attain access they normally would not have if politicians make decisions on the basis of geographic constituency concerns exclusively.⁵⁷ PAC officials have choices between following an *expanding* or *maintaining strategy* with respect to its lobbyists' concerns. An expanding strategy occurs when "organizations make 'outside' contributions – contributions selectively targeted to representatives from districts where they have little or no organizational base – and then follow these contributions with organized lobbying efforts" (Wright 1989, 715). The other PAC strategy is a maintaining strategy, which occurs when PACs contribute money to politicians who represent a geographic area

⁵⁶ To test these hypotheses, Wright (1985, 406) uses an interaction term of ideology and electoral competition, with close elections being a dichotomous variable for those candidates who received less than 60% of the two-party vote in the previous election.

⁵⁷ Wright (1989, 715) uses PAC contributions from 30 organizations during the 1984 election cycle for the House of Representatives and interviews from lobbyists as his data to make his theoretical claims. Interviews are common to measure decision-making within a PAC, as some scholars used "structured, questionnaire-based interviews with officials of 58 political action committees headquartered in Washington... we supplemented these data with open-ended interviews with 12 additional committees" (Eismeier and Pollock 1985, 193).

where the PAC has “moderate or strong organizational base,” and the PAC’s parent organization follows these contributions with direct lobbying techniques, with the purpose of maintaining visibility within their home state or congressional district (Wright 1989, 716). Wright’s (1989) findings indicate that an expansionary strategy is used rarely and most of the variation in PAC contributions can be explained with a maintenance strategy:

Of the 333 total contributions made by all groups in the sample...only 113, or 34%, were outside contributions. Even if lobbying followed all 113 contributions – which seems unlikely – contributions are still far more often used to maintain influence than to expand it...in the vast majority of instances, a group’s contributions only supplemented, or reinforced, whatever pressures the group was able to exert through its organizational presence in the representative’s district (Wright 1989, 723-724).

The organizational presence model makes one central prediction about PAC strategy: PACs contribute money to electorally vulnerable, ideologically friendly politicians, located in states where PAC donors reside (see also Gopoian 1984, 271). While Wright (1984, 1989) stresses the geographic distribution of PAC organization, scholars operationalize this variable differently.

The home district is meant to measure where a PAC has donors; however, scholars measure home districts differently, even within the same research design. In a study of defense PACs, oil PACs, auto manufacturing PACs, and labor PACs, Gopoian (1984) operationalized each home state variable differently. For defense firms the home district variable was measured using the headquarter location of the PAC’s parent company. For auto manufacturers, the home state variable was those representatives from Michigan. For oil firms, the home state variable was those representatives from

Louisiana, Texas, and Oklahoma, and for labor unions, the home state variable was the amount of blue-collar workers in the area (Gopoian 1984, 266). The findings indicate:

On the average, home state representatives were four times as likely as all others to receive contributions from the Michigan-based auto industry PACs and twice as likely as all other incumbents to receive contributions from defense PACs. On the other hand, only modest support materialized for the home district hypothesis with the oil PACs and the home district indicator appears totally unrelated to labor PAC contributions (Gopoian 1984, 267).

It is entirely plausible that auto PACs and defense PACs strategize to contribute to home district representatives; however, it is also plausible that those two measures of home district were more accurate than oil and labor PACs. Defense is the only home state variable that is actually a home state variable, with auto manufacturers coming close (due to the concentration of the auto industry in the late 1970s in Michigan). For oil and labor, the operationalization of home districts is closer to constituency characteristics, which indicate little about where the PAC donation originated; leading to this ambiguous conclusion: “these findings indicate that the home district connection may be an important consideration for some PACs, but not necessarily for all economic interest PACs” (Gopoian 1984, 267).⁵⁸ Recent research determines the geographic distribution of PAC donors to be the most appropriate operationalization of a PAC’s home state.

In their study of PAC contribution timing of corporate and labor PACs, Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and Bartels (2005) find the geography and resources of PACs

⁵⁸ Gopoian (1984, 267-270) finds small support for committee assignment, strong support for PACs contributing to electorally vulnerable incumbents, ambiguous support for partisanship, and strong support for the key vote variable.

(demand-side variables) have the most explanatory power in determining the distribution and timing of PAC contributions during an election cycle:

Candidates are more likely to receive money earlier in the campaign from large and small corporate PACs and large labor PACs based in their home state...in general, the larger the share of a PAC's fund-raising in a state, the more likely PACs are to make contributions in that state...substantial evidence suggests that PACs contribute where they have members (Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and Bartels 2005, 566).

This measurement of a PAC's home state is more useful in explaining corporate PAC giving than from labor PACs because labor PACs rely on employee check-off donations, not large individual donations, but the percent of union membership is an important prediction of labor PAC strategy (Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and Bartels 2005, 566). The home state variable, which has been *neglected* in the literature, plays an important role in early money decisions, and in fact, is the *primary determinant* of early money decisions, having more explanatory power than a Washington, D.C. office (Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and Bartels 2005, 572-575).

The findings of the organizational presence model are clear: despite the idiosyncratic nature of most PAC decision-making committees (Sabato 1984, 37), more often than not, PACs rely on local inputs to make strategic contribution decisions, and this reliance occurs because local inputs are responsible for fundraising year-after-year, and this reliance results in PACs using electoral and ideological cues.

Testing the Organizational Presence Model: Data, Variables, and Hypotheses

According to the organizational presence model, PACs will contribute money to candidates campaigning in districts and states where PACs have an organizational presence, to electorally vulnerable and ideologically friendly candidates. I test this assertion using donations from the PAC system to congressional elections from 1990-

2006. The dependent variable is the percentage of the PAC's total allocations to a particular candidate, measured as net real dollars. The independent variables for this test derive directly from the organizational presence model.

The organizational presence model is a model with three base variables and two interactive terms: organizational presence (home state), ideology, and electoral vulnerability. To measure organizational presence, I use the percentage of a PACs individual donor contributions coming from the same state (Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and Bartels 2005, 557). Based on the percentage of incoming PAC donations coming from a state, I organize each PAC into a state category: dominant, strong, moderate, majority, weak, and none.⁵⁹ These categories capture the amount of

⁵⁹ Grenzke (1988) is actually studying the redistributive effects of PACs: "an index was estimated for each PAC that reflects the proportion of the PAC's receipts that comes from individuals within a member's district...that index is multiplied by the PAC's contribution to the member to determine the proportion of the PAC's contribution that could be considered within-district. The within-district contributions of all the PAC's contributing to a particular incumbent are added together to determine the incumbent's summary proportion of within-district PAC contributions" (Grenzke 1988, 87). Grenzke's logic is the following: find the location of the individual donor to the PAC, and regardless of PAC location, track the amount of PAC money contributed to the incumbent of the original individual donor's location. Grenzke then calculates a within-district index "dividing the amount of money reported coming into the PAC from within a House member's district by the sum of the PACs receipts for which the geographic source is reported," and this calculation gives us the percent of PAC budget coming from within a certain zip code, which were grouped by district (Grenzke 1988, 97). Each PAC has a within district index percentage for each legislator, "the amount of within-district money coming from a single PAC to a legislator is estimated as the product of the PAC's within-district index for that legislator and the PAC's total contribution to the legislator. These products are then summed for all PACs contributing to the legislator" (Grenzke 1988, 97). Here is the flaw in this approach: "assume that \$1,000 is collected from each of districts A, B, and C. The PAC contributes \$1,000 each to incumbents running in districts A, D, and E, but nothing to candidates in districts B or C. The within-district index for the candidate in district A for this PAC is 33.3% (\$1,000/\$3,000), and \$333 of the \$1,000 contributed to the candidate in district A is considered within-district money" (Grenzke 1988, 97). A second approach would "divide the amount of reported money coming into the PAC from within a House member's district by the PAC's contribution to the House member (instead of by the PAC's total receipt)," then the incumbent from district A would have 100 percent within-district donations from the PAC (Grenzke 1988, 98). Grenzke settles on using the first approach because she cannot know how the dollars were spent by the PAC, "if I assume that all of A's money from the PAC was within-district, then I must also assume that none of the money from districts B or C went to the candidate from district A. I must also assume that the money from districts B and C went only to candidates from districts that didn't contribute to the PAC such as D and E. Finally, I must assume that no money from district A went to any other candidate" (Grenzke

incoming contributions to the PAC come from a particular state. A PAC is a dominant state PAC if it receives 90% or more of its money from one state, is a strong state PAC if it receives 70-89% of its money from one state, is a majority state PAC if it receives 50-69% of its money from one state, is a moderate state PAC if it receives 30-49% of its money from one state, is a weak state PAC if it receives 1-29% of its money from one state, and a PAC is not affiliated with a state if it receives no money from that state. PACs can be in multiple categories at once. For example, a PAC can be a strong state PAC in one state and a weak state PAC in another state; however, that PAC's strategy should differ in the strong state versus its strategy with respect to the weak state. I then match each organizational presence category with the spending of those PACs; in other words, I ask, do strong state PACs contribute money to candidates in that same state?

To determine an answer to this question, I first present two descriptive tables for each state. For each category (dominant, strong, majority, moderate, weak, none), the tables display the mean spent in the state and the total spent in the state, with comparisons to the mean spent overall and the total spent overall. Second, I conduct an independent sample t-test on the mean spent in the state for two categories; the first category groups dominant, strong, and majority state PACs together, with the second category being the rest of PACs loosely tied or not tied to the state (defined as a lack of individual donors to the PAC from that state). This t-test will show if the difference of means (mean spent by the PAC in that state across the two different groups) is statistically significant. Since it is reasonable to conclude that the distribution of PAC

1988, 98). Studying the amount of money flowing in and out of districts is preposterous when the bulk of PACs are multicandidate committees.

contributions in each category (those PACs with 50% or more individual contributions coming from one state, and those with less than 50%) is abnormal (most PAC distributions are), I present the Mann-Whitney nonparametric test statistic to determine if the difference of medians of two skewed distributions is statistically significant. The purpose of these tables is to determine if PACs contribute money disproportionately to candidates where the PACs have an organizational presence (as defined by the geographic distribution of PAC donors). I conducted this analysis for every state in every election cycle, from 1990 through 2006, which produces 100 tables for each election cycle. For the sake of space, I present the results for the 1990 election cycle only; however, the 1990 results are indicative of trends within the PAC system.

After this descriptive and statistical analysis, I proceed to test other aspects of PAC strategy, as hypothesized by the organizational presence model. Very simply, PACs pursue an electoral and ideological strategy within states and districts where they have an organizational presence. Specifically, PACs within their organizational boundaries will give to ideologically friendly candidates who are facing a close election. This local spending occurs because PACs need to satisfy their goal of organizational maintenance (e.g., keeping donors happy), in order to accrue future fundraising. I expect the model to have high explanatory power for those PACs with over fifty percent of fundraising from one state.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Another important organizational variable is budget size, which I do not study here. Regarding budget size, as PAC budgets increase (measured as amount of expenditures), PACs tend to give more to challengers and open seats and close elections (Eismeier and Pollock 1984, 125; Wilcox 1989, 165). The rationale for this hypothesis is those larger budgets PACs have more money to provide *venture capital* for candidates that may otherwise have little PAC money to use (Wilcox 1989, 171). This finding leads Eismeier and Pollock (1984, 138) to argue, “if there is continued growth not only in the number of PACs

To measure electoral vulnerability, I use the percentage of the Democratic presidential two-party vote within the congressional district. This variable is a structural measure of partisan competition, exogenous from the performance of House candidates. To measure ideology, I use first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores. I also include controls for incumbent status, and for strong state PACs, I provide a dummy variable indicating if the candidate is in the PACs home state.

Findings

The first hypothesis of the organizational presence model is that PAC money flows to districts and states where the PAC has individual donors. The empirical validity of this hypothesis is at issue in the Grenzke (1988) – Wright (1985, 1989) debate. Grenzke (1988) argues that an overwhelming amount of PAC dollars received by congressional candidates comes from outside their districts, implying that PACs create a financial constituency distinct from the geographic. Wright (1985, 1989) argues that PACs donate money to congressional candidates that represent geographic areas where PACs have an organizational presence; implying the distinction between the financial and geographic constituency is slight. According to Wright (1985, 1989), what appears to be outside money, when looking at the PAC's headquarter-location, usually overlaps with the congressional candidate's constituency. The findings presented in this chapter represent the first, national, long-term test of the hypothesis that underlies this unresolved debate.

but also in the budgets of existing PACs, the dollar volume of challenger contributions may increase substantially in the years ahead.”

Tables 3.1 through 3.100 presented below report my test of this first organizational presence hypothesis for the 1990 electoral cycle only. After examining the findings from 1992-2006, the findings from 1990 are representative of the entire sample, and for the sake of space, clarity, and brevity, I present the 1990 results only. These tables (two per-state) represent a simple, yet enlightening, analysis of the PAC system. The first table for each state (the odd-numbered tables) is the amount of money PACs contributed to congressional candidates in that state (reporting the mean, number of PACs, standard deviation, and total amount of PAC money). In this first table, I divide the PAC system by organizational presence into six categories (dominant, strong, majority, moderate, weak, and none). These categories represent the strength of ties each PAC has to the state in question (i.e., percent of individual donors from the state in question). For example, Table 3.1 is the amount of PAC money donated to House races in Alabama in the 1990 electoral cycle (in real 1990 dollars). I divide the PAC system into Dominant Alabama PACs, Strong Alabama PACs, Majority Alabama PACs, Moderate Alabama PACs, Weak Alabama PACs, and None (PACs with no individual donors from Alabama). Below each odd-numbered table is my statistical test of the difference of PAC donation means to the state. To conduct this independent samples t-test, I construct two categories: (1) those PACs with a majority of individual donors from the state in question (dominant, strong, majority) and (2) those PACs without a majority of individual donors from the state in question (moderate, weak, none). I will determine if the difference of means is statistically significant between these two groups. Assuming the distribution of PAC dollars to each state violates normality assumptions (PAC contributions typically have non-normal distributions), I present the

Mann-Whitney test-statistic to determine if the median dollar amounts for the two groups is statistically significant. The Mann-Whitney statistic is usually significant in this analysis because many states have few PACs, and few PACs are rooted only in one state. With very small sample sizes (less than 5), the Mann-Whitney statistic is not reliable. The second table for each state (the even-numbered tables) displays information about the same PAC groupings for contributions to the entire population of congressional candidates, not only within the same state as in the odd-numbered tables. Comparing the totals across tables is instructive, and my summary analysis appears after Tables 3.1-3.100.

Table 3.1: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Alabama, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from AL	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	10091.8824	17	1.08596E4	171562.00
Strong 70-89%	7050.0000	3	4960.09072	21150.00
Majority 50-69%	11250.0000	1	.	11250.00
Moderate 30-49%	1100.0000	3	529.15026	3300.00
Weak 1-29%	3711.3046	151	8372.36639	560407.00
None	466.7417	2896	2705.17303	1351684.00
Total	690.1182	3071	3466.70716	2119353.00

*Difference of means for Alabama PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 9712.4762 and 627.9970 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-Whitney of 4441.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.2: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Alabama PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

PAC77 Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from AL	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	20947.7647	17	2.37091E4	356112.00
Strong 70-89%	22616.6667	3	1.00437E4	67850.00
Majority 50-69%	24500.0000	1	.	24500.00
Moderate 30-49%	26525.0000	3	1.57568E4	79575.00
Weak 1-29%	2.0503E5	151	4.00910E5	3.10E7
None	27075.6488	2896	1.05173E5	7.84E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.3: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Alaska, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from AK	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	200.0000	2	282.84271	400.00
Strong 70-89%	.0000	1	.	.00
Majority 50-69%	1000.0000	1	.	1000.00
Weak 1-29%	906.3830	47	1414.73676	42600.00
None	79.3632	3020	522.83227	239677.00
Total	92.3728	3071	556.25315	283677.00

*Difference of means for Alaska PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 350 and 92.0368 respectively, is statistically insignificant (same for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-Whitney of 3522 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .001, but the Mann-Whitney is always statistically significant when the number of cases is below five.

Table 3.4: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Alaska PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from AK	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	200.0000	2	282.84271	400.00
Strong 70-89%	.0000	1	.	.00
Majority 50-69%	24500.0000	1	.	24500.00
Weak 1-29%	3.3968E5	47	4.47735E5	1.60E7
None	31095.5371	3020	1.24850E5	9.39E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.5: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Arizona, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from AZ	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	2328.5294	17	2581.38636	39585.00
Majority 50-69%	3716.6667	3	5704.01905	11150.00
Moderate 30-49%	6437.5000	4	4849.97852	25750.00
Weak 1-29%	1258.6250	160	3417.01736	201380.00
None	165.2982	2887	924.84240	477216.00
Total	245.8746	3071	1277.88811	755081.00

*Difference of means for Arizona PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2536.7500 and 230.8574 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .01$), with a Mann-Whitney of 7663.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.6: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Arizona PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from AZ	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	6056.7059	17	9209.48255	102964.00
Majority 50-69%	10200.0000	3	1.49158E4	30600.00
Moderate 30-49%	26781.2500	4	3.22040E4	107125.00
Weak 1-29%	1.8436E5	160	3.95874E5	2.95E7
None	27765.5837	2887	1.05354E5	8.02E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.7: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Arkansas, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from AR	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	4458.3333	12	6506.04032	53500.00
Weak 1-29%	3032.1809	94	5021.89301	285025.00
None	300.9744	2965	1412.61687	892389.00
Total	400.8186	3071	1768.67625	1230914.00

*Difference of means for Arkansas PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4458.3333 and 384.9016 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .1$), with a Mann-Whitney of 3905.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.8: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to Arkansas House of Representatives, 1990

PAC78 Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from AR	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	11424.0833	12	1.80484E4	137089.00
Weak 1-29%	2.3929E5	94	4.49248E5	2.25E7
None	29432.7862	2965	1.13076E5	8.73E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.9: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in California

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from CA	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	9068.8611	144	1.56468E4	1305916.00
Strong 70-89%	18355.5385	26	3.23370E4	477244.00
Majority 50-69%	9373.2400	25	1.11279E4	234331.00
Moderate 30-49%	9653.5152	33	1.37459E4	318566.00
Weak 1-29%	9650.5302	430	2.57320E4	4149728.00
None	1697.8442	2413	9186.10973	4096898.00
Total	3446.0055	3071	1.39119E4	1.06E7

*Difference of means for California PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 10346.1077 and 2978.1613 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.001), with a Mann-Whitney of 117828 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.10: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by California PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from CA	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	16492.8681	144	3.23174E4	2374973.00
Strong 70-89%	91819.6154	26	2.60347E5	2387310.00
Majority 50-69%	44087.4800	25	5.05836E4	1102187.00
Moderate 30-49%	75481.0303	33	1.18798E5	2490874.00
Weak 1-29%	1.0650E5	430	2.71422E5	4.58E7
None	23103.3630	2413	9.97565E4	5.57E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.11: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Colorado, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from CO	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	5674.3636	11	7070.15194	62418.00
Strong 70-89%	900.0000	3	360.55513	2700.00
Majority 50-69%	3375.0000	2	1590.99026	6750.00
Moderate 30-49%	498.3333	6	666.64583	2990.00
Weak 1-29%	2502.1495	194	5342.71152	485417.00
None	288.5716	2855	1711.21429	823872.00
Total	450.7154	3071	2252.80009	1384147.00

*Difference of means for Colorado PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4491.75 and 429.5512 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.05), with a Mann-Whitney of 4195.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.12: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Colorado PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from CO	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	32262.0909	11	6.52485E4	354883.00
Strong 70-89%	19166.6667	3	9207.65080	57500.00
Majority 50-69%	24000.0000	2	2.72236E4	48000.00
Moderate 30-49%	4915.0000	6	4237.13937	29490.00
Weak 1-29%	1.6718E5	194	3.70072E5	3.24E7
None	26961.4932	2855	1.03609E5	7.70E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.13: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Connecticut, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from CT	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	2175.4500	20	2202.10984	43509.00
Strong 70-89%	6187.5000	8	7095.71047	49500.00
Majority 50-69%	3877.0833	12	5428.53842	46525.00
Moderate 30-49%	1154.1667	12	1969.36288	13850.00
Weak 1-29%	2558.9406	286	5375.78976	731857.00
None	393.4819	2733	2153.80282	1075386.00
Total	638.4328	3071	2758.61267	1960627.00

*Difference of means for Connecticut PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 3488.3500 and 600.8225 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .001$), with a Mann-Whitney of 17871.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.14: Total 1990, Net Real Dollars Donated by Connecticut PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from CT	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	17263.9000	20	4.08476E4	345278.00
Strong 70-89%	52703.1250	8	6.32393E4	421625.00
Majority 50-69%	84763.9167	12	8.65193E4	1017167.00
Moderate 30-49%	74957.6667	12	1.39675E5	899492.00
Weak 1-29%	1.3701E5	286	3.26659E5	3.92E7
None	24891.8353	2733	9.86958E4	6.80E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.15: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Delaware, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from DE	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	380.0000	2	91.92388	760.00
Strong 70-89%	812.5000	2	972.27182	1625.00
Majority 50-69%	1083.3333	3	1876.38837	3250.00
Moderate 30-49%	1000.0000	1	.	1000.00
Weak 1-29%	597.1429	70	1782.17087	41800.00
None	54.2944	2993	440.00789	162503.00
Total	68.6871	3071	520.53761	210938.00

*Difference of means for Delaware PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 805 and 67.0049 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (insignificant for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-Whitney of 3658 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.16: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Delaware PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from DE	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	380.0000	2	91.92388	760.00
Strong 70-89%	8362.5000	2	1.16496E4	16725.00
Majority 50-69%	39508.3333	3	4.75101E4	118525.00
Moderate 30-49%	6800.0000	1	.	6800.00
Weak 1-29%	1.9849E5	70	4.47209E5	1.39E7
None	32028.3291	2993	1.22620E5	9.59E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.17: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Florida, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from FL	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	7218.4186	43	1.19051E4	310392.00
Strong 70-89%	11271.4286	7	1.21373E4	78900.00
Majority 50-69%	4355.9091	11	6554.05097	47915.00
Moderate 30-49%	3744.4444	9	4572.43401	33700.00
Weak 1-29%	5973.9490	353	1.67373E4	2108804.00
None	915.2863	2648	5193.40243	2423678.00
Total	1629.2377	3071	7816.39030	5003389.00

*Difference of means for Florida PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 7167.3279 and 1517.0040 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .001$), with a Mann-Whitney of 34103.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.18: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Florida PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from FL	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	20110.2791	43	5.06401E4	864742.00
Strong 70-89%	36771.4286	7	4.26417E4	257400.00
Majority 50-69%	20833.1818	11	2.54231E4	229165.00
Moderate 30-49%	44879.8889	9	6.76337E4	403919.00
Weak 1-29%	1.2559E5	353	2.95271E5	4.43E7
None	24097.6862	2648	1.00279E5	6.38E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.19: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Georgia, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from GA	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	6835.4167	24	8185.17322	164050.00
Strong 70-89%	7700.0000	11	8491.58407	84700.00
Majority 50-69%	6487.5000	4	1.29750E4	25950.00
Moderate 30-49%	1703.5714	7	3701.98226	11925.00
Weak 1-29%	4504.3281	256	1.32578E4	1153108.00
None	529.9895	2769	2500.88573	1467541.00
Total	946.6864	3071	4780.68303	2907274.00

*Difference of means for Georgia PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 7043.5897 and 868.2632 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .001$), with a Mann-Whitney of 19339.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.20: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Georgia PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from GA	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	16072.9167	24	2.23998E4	385750.00
Strong 70-89%	36641.3636	11	4.43796E4	403055.00
Majority 50-69%	71112.5000	4	1.27372E5	284450.00
Moderate 30-49%	98658.4286	7	1.77425E5	690609.00
Weak 1-29%	1.5439E5	256	3.49437E5	3.95E7
None	24778.5150	2769	9.56176E4	6.86E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.21: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Hawaii

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from HI	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	5181.5000	10	7985.64895	51815.00
Moderate 30-49%	333.3333	3	577.35027	1000.00
Weak 1-29%	955.0789	76	2493.20045	72586.00
None	118.9115	2982	1217.51314	354594.00
Total	156.2993	3071	1370.33918	479995.00

*Difference of means for Hawaii PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 5181.5 and 139.8824 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .1$), with a Mann-Whitney of 3494.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.22: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Hawaii PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from HI	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	10714.0000	10	1.78451E4	107140.00
Moderate 30-49%	3.6767E5	3	5.33470E5	1103009.00
Weak 1-29%	2.6936E5	76	4.79618E5	2.05E7
None	29583.1050	2982	1.13303E5	8.82E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.23: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Idaho, 1990

PAC91 Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from ID	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	1500.0000	1	.	1500.00
Strong 70-89%	3966.6667	3	1674.31578	11900.00
Majority 50-69%	8000.0000	1	.	8000.00
Moderate 30-49%	500.0000	1	.	500.00
Weak 1-29%	2266.2923	65	3784.01281	147309.00
None	170.6437	3000	1079.07909	511931.00
Total	221.7975	3071	1250.13468	681140.00

*Difference of means for Idaho PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4280 and 215.1794 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .001$), with a Mann-Whitney of 257.500 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.24: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Idaho PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from ID	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	1500.0000	1	.	1500.00
Strong 70-89%	84927.3333	3	1.27577E5	254782.00
Majority 50-69%	40000.0000	1	.	40000.00
Moderate 30-49%	2250.0000	1	.	2250.00
Weak 1-29%	2.5412E5	65	3.53530E5	1.65E7
None	31027.2693	3000	1.28453E5	9.31E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.25: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Illinois, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from IL	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	5210.3151	73	9339.39239	380353.00
Strong 70-89%	6133.5500	20	5722.17758	122671.00
Majority 50-69%	3361.8182	11	5012.78754	36980.00
Moderate 30-49%	8213.4615	26	2.00053E4	213550.00
Weak 1-29%	5589.7778	351	1.32303E4	1962012.00
None	915.9131	2590	4721.33056	2372215.00
Total	1656.7180	3071	6883.34847	5087781.00

*Difference of means for Illinois PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 5192.3462 and 1532.7863 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .001$), with a Mann-Whitney of 60805 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.26: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Illinois PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from IL	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	25185.7260	73	5.21057E4	1838558.00
Strong 70-89%	39193.2000	20	7.36373E4	783864.00
Majority 50-69%	14386.8182	11	2.15056E4	158255.00
Moderate 30-49%	1.2583E5	26	3.98701E5	3271636.00
Weak 1-29%	1.2062E5	351	2.91854E5	4.23E7
None	23748.3954	2590	9.52234E4	6.15E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.27: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Indiana, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from IN	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	4655.7500	16	6059.60744	74492.00
Strong 70-89%	1700.0000	3	1630.18404	5100.00
Majority 50-69%	1500.0000	2	2121.32034	3000.00
Moderate 30-49%	1412.5000	4	2003.48654	5650.00
Weak 1-29%	5159.8392	199	1.49262E4	1026808.00
None	793.0734	2847	4333.14379	2257880.00
Total	1098.3165	3071	5760.54613	3372930.00

*Difference of means for Indiana PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 3932.9524 and 1078.7993 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .05$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .05$), with a Mann-Whitney of 11024.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.28: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Indiana PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from IN	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	17741.5000	16	3.48743E4	283864.00
Strong 70-89%	17995.3333	3	1.92586E4	53986.00
Majority 50-69%	17975.0000	2	2.50669E4	35950.00
Moderate 30-49%	27087.5000	4	2.71277E4	108350.00
Weak 1-29%	1.6691E5	199	3.81678E5	3.32E7
None	26765.5578	2847	9.94803E4	7.62E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.29: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Iowa, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from IA	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	2622.2222	9	3104.44350	23600.00
Strong 70-89%	3200.0000	3	3647.94463	9600.00
Majority 50-69%	1525.0000	2	601.04076	3050.00
Moderate 30-49%	6500.0000	2	3535.53391	13000.00
Weak 1-29%	2806.9231	143	5089.10443	401390.00
None	314.7840	2912	1710.57184	916651.00
Total	445.2266	3071	2081.42090	1367291.00

*Difference of means for Iowa PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2589.2857 and 435.4076 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .05$), with a Mann-Whitney of 4356 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.30: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Iowa PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from IA	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	11622.2222	9	1.72677E4	104600.00
Strong 70-89%	7700.0000	3	5210.80608	23100.00
Majority 50-69%	5150.0000	2	3606.24458	10300.00
Moderate 30-49%	52525.0000	2	2.65519E4	105050.00
Weak 1-29%	1.9036E5	143	4.02685E5	2.72E7
None	28308.4224	2912	1.08188E5	8.24E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.31: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Kansas, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from KS	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	1608.3333	9	1825.94154	14475.00
Strong 70-89%	3525.0000	4	2794.48862	14100.00
Majority 50-69%	600.0000	4	516.39778	2400.00
Moderate 30-49%	483.3333	3	225.46249	1450.00
Weak 1-29%	2129.1189	143	3733.44635	304464.00
None	275.0395	2908	1351.76163	799815.00
Total	370.1413	3071	1600.56311	1136704.00

*Difference of means for Kansas PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 1822.0588 and 362.0593 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .01$), with a Mann-Whitney of 8764 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.32: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Kansas PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from KS	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	2758.3333	9	2193.52741	24825.00
Strong 70-89%	42168.7500	4	6.26145E4	168675.00
Majority 50-69%	10318.7500	4	8301.59059	41275.00
Moderate 30-49%	13900.0000	3	2.13063E4	41700.00
Weak 1-29%	1.9338E5	143	4.06001E5	2.77E7
None	28187.1431	2908	1.07410E5	8.20E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.33: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Kentucky, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from KY	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	1298.0833	12	2061.60099	15577.00
Strong 70-89%	2766.6667	3	1553.49069	8300.00
Majority 50-69%	987.5000	4	1367.70794	3950.00
Moderate 30-49%	2472.1667	6	2613.51644	14833.00
Weak 1-29%	2200.6486	148	3988.37220	325696.00
None	254.8482	2898	1382.10122	738550.00
Total	360.4383	3071	1669.15807	1106906.00

*Difference of means for Kentucky PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 1464.5789 and 353.5645 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .01$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .05$), with a Mann-Whitney of 15936.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.34: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Kentucky PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from KY	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	3114.7500	12	5295.12999	37377.00
Strong 70-89%	24150.0000	3	2.03124E4	72450.00
Majority 50-69%	6325.0000	4	3893.26341	25300.00
Moderate 30-49%	39459.6667	6	3.65554E4	236758.00
Weak 1-29%	1.9836E5	148	4.17113E5	2.94E7
None	27663.4310	2898	1.03424E5	8.02E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.35: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Louisiana, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from LA	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	4354.5455	11	5521.88621	47900.00
Strong 70-89%	1925.0000	4	2368.01605	7700.00
Majority 50-69%	2690.0000	5	4518.62811	13450.00
Moderate 30-49%	1200.0000	3	1866.14576	3600.00
Weak 1-29%	3119.8966	145	6801.66114	452385.00
None	366.1230	2903	1503.35763	1062855.00
Total	517.0596	3071	2201.15099	1587890.00

*Difference of means for Louisiana PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 3452.5 and 497.8171 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .05$), with a Mann-Whitney of 13518.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.36 Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Louisiana PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from LA	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	20758.1818	11	4.01777E4	228340.00
Strong 70-89%	11375.0000	4	1.09412E4	45500.00
Majority 50-69%	20245.0000	5	3.02038E4	101225.00
Moderate 30-49%	41956.6667	3	3.80765E4	125870.00
Weak 1-29%	2.0800E5	145	4.58917E5	3.02E7
None	27294.8147	2903	9.43349E4	7.92E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.37: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Maine, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from ME	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	3083.3333	3	2240.72161	9250.00
Moderate 30-49%	2000.0000	1	.	2000.00
Weak 1-29%	1969.6197	71	3233.07038	139843.00
None	173.7707	2996	1127.46582	520617.00
Total	218.7268	3071	1250.46190	671710.00

*Difference of means for Maine PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 3083.3333 and 215.9257 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (insignificant for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-Whitney of 300.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.38: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Maine PAC to House of Representatives

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from ME	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	19700.0000	3	1.70789E4	59100.00
Moderate 30-49%	35467.0000	1	.	35467.00
Weak 1-29%	2.6199E5	71	4.79510E5	1.86E7
None	30441.4973	2996	1.16826E5	9.12E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.39: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Maryland

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from MD	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	6812.0588	17	1.08489E4	115805.00
Strong 70-89%	9700.0000	3	9153.68778	29100.00
Majority 50-69%	1770.6667	6	1466.56151	10624.00
Moderate 30-49%	4160.2500	20	6331.07592	83205.00
Weak 1-29%	3060.8537	294	6382.30100	899891.00
None	526.7836	2731	2617.67271	1438646.00
Total	839.2286	3071	3436.25516	2577271.00

*Difference of means for Maryland PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 5981.8846 and 795.3176 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .01$), with a Mann-Whitney of 14153.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.40: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Maryland PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from MD	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	58034.0588	17	1.89038E5	986579.00
Strong 70-89%	39875.0000	3	3.71684E4	119625.00
Majority 50-69%	18189.0000	6	1.70095E4	109134.00
Moderate 30-49%	1.4033E5	20	2.83919E5	2806672.00
Weak 1-29%	1.2994E5	294	3.05683E5	3.82E7
None	24779.7397	2731	1.01344E5	6.77E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.41: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Massachusetts, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from MA	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	3358.3333	6	4269.82630	20150.00
Strong 70-89%	2987.5000	4	4039.87933	11950.00
Majority 50-69%	13600.0000	2	6222.53967	27200.00
Moderate 30-49%	3110.0000	7	5883.85078	21770.00
Weak 1-29%	2485.2778	252	6278.41674	626290.00
None	351.4175	2800	2417.34120	983969.00
Total	550.7421	3071	3028.01616	1691329.00

*Difference of means for Massachusetts PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4941.6667 and 533.5172 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .05$), with a Mann-Whitney of 6367 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.42: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Massachusetts PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from MA	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	8533.3333	6	1.06557E4	51200.00
Strong 70-89%	10525.0000	4	1.19608E4	42100.00
Majority 50-69%	3.4200E5	2	2.65666E5	684008.00
Moderate 30-49%	14546.8571	7	1.86279E4	101828.00
Weak 1-29%	1.4726E5	252	3.42024E5	3.71E7
None	25682.4268	2800	9.93742E4	7.19E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.43: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Michigan, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from MI	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	8026.6774	31	7830.29390	248827.00
Strong 70-89%	5717.2222	9	7595.47938	51455.00
Majority 50-69%	2266.6667	3	3100.53759	6800.00
Moderate 30-49%	4505.0000	4	3929.89822	18020.00
Weak 1-29%	5483.9203	251	1.20470E4	1376464.00
None	1043.7093	2773	5477.67930	2894206.00
Total	1496.5067	3071	6454.61850	4595772.00

*Difference of means for Michigan PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 7141.4419 and 1416.3441 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .001$), with a Mann-Whitney of 15034.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.44: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Michigan PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from MI	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	23791.1935	31	3.85518E4	737527.00
Strong 70-89%	26509.7778	9	4.74374E4	238588.00
Majority 50-69%	35348.3333	3	5.27759E4	106045.00
Moderate 30-49%	10580.0000	4	8945.31162	42320.00
Weak 1-29%	1.4315E5	251	3.25539E5	3.59E7
None	26268.5831	2773	1.05711E5	7.28E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.45: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Minnesota, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from MN	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	4543.7500	20	5675.84999	90875.00
Strong 70-89%	3900.0000	6	1645.29633	23400.00
Majority 50-69%	4014.2857	7	8513.45574	28100.00
Moderate 30-49%	3652.0000	4	3307.87434	14608.00
Weak 1-29%	3506.7406	212	7269.62516	743429.00
None	458.6322	2822	2446.00690	1294260.00
Total	714.6441	3071	3199.37666	2194672.00

*Difference of means for Minnesota PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4314.3939 and 675.5421 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .001$), with a Mann-Whitney of 16666 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.46: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Minnesota PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from MN	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	15897.0000	20	3.03177E4	317940.00
Strong 70-89%	12716.6667	6	1.26126E4	76300.00
Majority 50-69%	51388.7143	7	1.03813E5	359721.00
Moderate 30-49%	35220.7500	4	3.32901E4	140883.00
Weak 1-29%	1.6547E5	212	3.56017E5	3.51E7
None	26195.7279	2822	1.03164E5	7.39E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.47: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Mississippi, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from MS	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	2506.2500	8	1926.77330	20050.00
Majority 50-69%	.0000	2	.00000	.00
Moderate 30-49%	1400.0000	2	141.42136	2800.00
Weak 1-29%	3510.3673	98	6853.02910	344016.00
None	312.4556	2961	1618.65184	925181.00
Total	420.7252	3071	2084.85231	1292047.00

*Difference of means for Mississippi PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2005 and 415.5495 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .05$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .05$), with a Mann-Whitney of 6340 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.48: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Mississippi PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from MS	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	8493.7500	8	1.57101E4	67950.00
Majority 50-69%	829.0000	2	500.63160	1658.00
Moderate 30-49%	49847.5000	2	6.55453E4	99695.00
Weak 1-29%	2.1832E5	98	4.58417E5	2.14E7
None	29832.2486	2961	1.11685E5	8.83E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.49: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Missouri, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from MO	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	5334.3810	21	5064.87419	112022.00
Strong 70-89%	10560.7143	7	1.30571E4	73925.00
Majority 50-69%	5716.6667	6	4382.19884	34300.00
Moderate 30-49%	3953.3333	15	5866.35281	59300.00
Weak 1-29%	5077.6038	212	1.44964E4	1076452.00
None	606.4765	2810	2786.44797	1704199.00
Total	996.4826	3071	4893.75126	3060198.00

*Difference of means for Missouri PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 6477.8529 and 935.1172 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .001$), with a Mann-Whitney of 10233 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.50: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Missouri PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from MO	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	19586.2857	21	5.28696E4	411312.00
Strong 70-89%	2.0599E5	7	5.02858E5	1441950.00
Majority 50-69%	53775.0000	6	5.65407E4	322650.00
Moderate 30-49%	78179.2000	15	1.75656E5	1172688.00
Weak 1-29%	1.7413E5	212	3.98329E5	3.69E7
None	24780.6609	2810	8.55458E4	6.96E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.51: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Montana, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from MT	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	900.0000	2	141.42136	1800.00
Majority 50-69%	.0000	1	.	.00
Weak 1-29%	1518.2540	63	2854.71175	95650.00
None	112.3983	3005	705.70418	337757.00
Total	141.7151	3071	831.86883	435207.00

*Difference of means for Montana PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 600 and 141.2669 respectively, is not statistically significant (same for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-Whitney of 1891 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.52: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Montana PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from MT	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	2900.0000	2	777.81746	5800.00
Majority 50-69%	250.0000	1	.	250.00
Weak 1-29%	2.8737E5	63	4.26512E5	1.81E7
None	30545.1181	3005	1.22853E5	9.18E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.53: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Nebraska, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from NE	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	3978.0000	6	3594.35418	23868.00
Strong 70-89%	2616.6667	3	1758.07660	7850.00
Majority 50-69%	.0000	2	.00000	.00
Moderate 30-49%	10550.0000	2	3606.24458	21100.00
Weak 1-29%	4393.7429	105	1.27871E4	461343.00
None	330.5713	2953	1753.93774	976177.00
Total	485.2940	3071	3027.27143	1490338.00

*Difference of means for Nebraska PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2883.4545 and 476.6732 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .01$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .05$), with a Mann-Whitney of 4928.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.54: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Nebraska PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from NE	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	7603.0000	6	9082.39132	45618.00
Strong 70-89%	10016.6667	3	1.23179E4	30050.00
Majority 50-69%	5275.0000	2	7459.97654	10550.00
Moderate 30-49%	1.5171E5	2	1.61656E5	303416.00
Weak 1-29%	2.1089E5	105	4.09191E5	2.21E7
None	29585.1118	2953	1.16234E5	8.74E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.55: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Nevada, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from NV	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	2288.8889	9	2738.81564	20600.00
Strong 70-89%	4000.0000	2	5656.85425	8000.00
Majority 50-69%	1650.0000	2	1626.34560	3300.00
Moderate 30-49%	500.0000	3	259.80762	1500.00
Weak 1-29%	1386.1111	90	3376.91292	124750.00
None	79.9619	2965	466.69013	237087.00
Total	128.6998	3071	803.41631	395237.00

*Difference of means for Nevada PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2453.8462 and 118.8152 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .05$), with a Mann-Whitney of 5688.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.56: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Nevada PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from NV	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	7348.2222	9	6675.27553	66134.00
Strong 70-89%	6775.0000	2	3217.33585	13550.00
Majority 50-69%	8725.0000	2	7389.26586	17450.00
Moderate 30-49%	69390.0000	3	6.03003E4	208170.00
Weak 1-29%	2.5811E5	90	4.70261E5	2.32E7
None	29127.3642	2965	1.10830E5	8.64E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.57: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in New Hampshire, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from NH	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	3125.0000	2	1944.54365	6250.00
Moderate 30-49%	13200.0000	1	.	13200.00
Weak 1-29%	1987.3776	98	3623.42017	194763.00
None	180.2657	2970	1276.70011	535389.00
Total	244.0905	3071	1467.45943	749602.00

*Difference of means for New Hampshire PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 3125 and 242.2131 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .01$) (insignificant for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-Whitney of 134 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.58: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by New Hampshire PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from NH	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	3125.0000	2	1944.54365	6250.00
Moderate 30-49%	51250.0000	1	.	51250.00
Weak 1-29%	2.1703E5	98	4.17464E5	2.13E7
None	29822.1886	2970	1.16736E5	8.86E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.59: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in New Jersey, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from NJ	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	4909.4375	32	6306.84153	157102.00
Strong 70-89%	5792.5000	6	4700.74861	34755.00
Majority 50-69%	6991.3333	15	1.02938E4	104870.00
Moderate 30-49%	2296.4286	14	3359.79992	32150.00
Weak 1-29%	4041.9054	349	1.03661E4	1410625.00
None	613.5183	2655	3711.29827	1628891.00
Total	1096.8391	3071	5159.04047	3368393.00

*Difference of means for New Jersey PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 5598.6226 and 1017.7820 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .001$), with a Mann-Whitney of 23565 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.60: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by New Jersey PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from NJ	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	9810.0625	32	1.25538E4	313922.00
Strong 70-89%	28351.0000	6	2.82869E4	170106.00
Majority 50-69%	1.0335E5	15	2.89779E5	1550289.00
Moderate 30-49%	40191.0000	14	3.90281E4	562674.00
Weak 1-29%	1.2705E5	349	3.13383E5	4.43E7
None	23714.2689	2655	9.08926E4	6.30E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.61: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in New Mexico, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from NM	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	3016.6667	6	1704.60162	18100.00
Strong 70-89%	.0000	1	.	.00
Majority 50-69%	1400.0000	1	.	1400.00
Moderate 30-49%	2361.0000	2	3338.95822	4722.00
Weak 1-29%	2006.1798	89	3169.24873	178550.00
None	179.2773	2972	768.49828	532812.00
Total	239.5259	3071	990.08870	735584.00

*Difference of means for New Mexico PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2437.5 and 233.7852 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .001$), with a Mann-Whitney of 2432.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.62: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by New Mexico PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from NM	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	3616.6667	6	2220.06006	21700.00
Strong 70-89%	4950.0000	1	.	4950.00
Majority 50-69%	1400.0000	1	.	1400.00
Moderate 30-49%	49385.0000	2	3.98596E4	98770.00
Weak 1-29%	2.8809E5	89	5.18926E5	2.56E7
None	28307.8893	2972	1.02398E5	8.41E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.63: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in New York, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from NY	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	5229.7407	54	9601.93372	282406.00
Strong 70-89%	3665.3846	13	6314.61218	47650.00
Majority 50-69%	8320.0370	27	1.60956E4	224641.00
Moderate 30-49%	6665.9070	43	1.48071E4	286634.00
Weak 1-29%	8384.9158	380	2.14652E4	3186268.00
None	1252.3312	2554	7382.80711	3198454.00
Total	2352.9967	3071	1.07418E4	7226053.00

*Difference of means for New York PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 5901.0319 and 2240.9661 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .05$), with a Mann-Whitney of 61132.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.64: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by New York PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from NY	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	30364.5185	54	5.58962E4	1639684.00
Strong 70-89%	19573.8462	13	3.17505E4	254460.00
Majority 50-69%	52176.2963	27	9.10847E4	1408760.00
Moderate 30-49%	52985.5116	43	1.20063E5	2278377.00
Weak 1-29%	1.2286E5	380	3.02535E5	4.67E7
None	22564.7937	2554	9.20903E4	5.76E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.65: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in North Carolina, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from NC	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	3504.0000	15	5553.01308	52560.00
Strong 70-89%	5583.3333	6	7662.35386	33500.00
Majority 50-69%	23900.8000	5	2.83279E4	119504.00
Moderate 30-49%	4027.2727	11	5383.64949	44300.00
Weak 1-29%	4824.8792	207	1.07037E4	998750.00
None	589.5550	2827	2679.28830	1666672.00
Total	949.2953	3071	4215.40064	2915286.00

*Difference of means for North Carolina PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 7906.3077 and 889.8923 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .05$), with a Mann-Whitney of 16049 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.66: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by North Carolina PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from NC	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	8068.4000	15	1.42502E4	121026.00
Strong 70-89%	18076.5000	6	2.54634E4	108459.00
Majority 50-69%	1.6349E5	5	2.44404E5	817454.00
Moderate 30-49%	19281.8182	11	2.21005E4	212100.00
Weak 1-29%	1.5831E5	207	3.47721E5	3.28E7
None	26837.4694	2827	1.06581E5	7.59E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.67: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in North Dakota, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from ND	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	1500.0000	1	.	1500.00
Moderate 30-49%	2000.0000	2	2121.32034	4000.00
Weak 1-29%	1318.6047	43	1535.49369	56700.00
None	125.6221	3025	578.35560	380007.00
Total	143.9945	3071	621.05181	442207.00

*Difference of means for North Dakota PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 1500 and 143.5528 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .05$) (insignificant for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-Whitney of 89 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .002

Table 3.68: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by North Dakota PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from ND	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	1500.0000	1	.	1500.00
Moderate 30-49%	1.5565E5	2	1.82465E5	311305.00
Weak 1-29%	3.6217E5	43	6.36353E5	1.56E7
None	31078.3511	3025	1.13524E5	9.40E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.69: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Ohio, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from OH	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	5084.8235	34	7870.73233	172884.00
Strong 70-89%	6338.8889	9	3175.10116	57050.00
Majority 50-69%	6067.0000	10	6733.63044	60670.00
Moderate 30-49%	3275.0000	12	4017.82958	39300.00
Weak 1-29%	5102.6308	279	1.25408E4	1423634.00
None	826.8159	2727	4572.68270	2254727.00
Total	1305.1986	3071	5960.39359	4008265.00

*Difference of means for Ohio PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 5483.0943 and 1231.8294 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .001$), with a Mann-Whitney of 28360 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.70: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Ohio PAC to House of Representatives

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from OH	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	48746.7941	34	2.26753E5	1657391.00
Strong 70-89%	22250.0000	9	9847.91380	200250.00
Majority 50-69%	26126.1000	10	3.56547E4	261261.00
Moderate 30-49%	32021.8333	12	3.52133E4	384262.00
Weak 1-29%	1.3936E5	279	3.15777E5	3.89E7
None	25124.3469	2727	1.01233E5	6.85E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.71: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Oklahoma, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from OK	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	3535.2143	14	7404.94995	49493.00
Strong 70-89%	4725.0000	2	6682.15908	9450.00
Majority 50-69%	2500.0000	1	.	2500.00
Moderate 30-49%	2690.0000	5	2674.97664	13450.00
Weak 1-29%	2982.7734	128	6491.99057	381795.00
None	292.3369	2921	1347.67946	853916.00
Total	426.7678	3071	2020.51584	1310604.00

*Difference of means for Oklahoma PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 3614.2941 and 409.0246 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .1$), with a Mann-Whitney of 8276.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.72: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Oklahoma PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from OK	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	17749.3571	14	4.20848E4	248491.00
Strong 70-89%	4900.0000	2	6434.67171	9800.00
Majority 50-69%	12950.0000	1	.	12950.00
Moderate 30-49%	20670.6000	5	2.06702E4	103353.00
Weak 1-29%	2.0247E5	128	4.22000E5	2.59E7
None	28623.0366	2921	1.08438E5	8.36E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.73: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Oregon, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from OR	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	5091.2308	13	6020.78643	66186.00
Strong 70-89%	1841.6667	3	818.66253	5525.00
Majority 50-69%	4337.5000	2	6134.15133	8675.00
Moderate 30-49%	2916.6667	3	4836.92395	8750.00
Weak 1-29%	3985.6014	138	6817.45609	550013.00
None	382.4481	2912	1862.27341	1113689.00
Total	570.7711	3071	2488.51546	1752838.00

*Difference of means for Oregon PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4465.8889 and 547.8061 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .01$), with a Mann-Whitney of 5368 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.74: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Oregon PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from OR	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	9700.2308	13	1.44894E4	126103.00
Strong 70-89%	2550.0000	3	823.10388	7650.00
Majority 50-69%	10087.5000	2	1.42659E4	20175.00
Moderate 30-49%	27168.3333	3	2.54443E4	81505.00
Weak 1-29%	2.2933E5	138	4.41174E5	3.16E7
None	26790.7376	2912	9.91260E4	7.80E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.75: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Pennsylvania, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from PA	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	4478.8065	62	6063.52451	277686.00
Strong 70-89%	5434.4118	17	8334.20885	92385.00
Majority 50-69%	2792.3077	13	3847.01433	36300.00
Moderate 30-49%	4577.9412	17	6319.80940	77825.00
Weak 1-29%	5700.6893	338	1.47921E4	1926833.00
None	1013.4962	2624	4563.69374	2659414.00
Total	1651.0723	3071	6754.16786	5070443.00

*Difference of means for Pennsylvania PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4417.0761 and 1565.6502 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .001$), with a Mann-Whitney of 58933 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.76: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Pennsylvania PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from PA	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	10132.7258	62	1.51336E4	628229.00
Strong 70-89%	55437.3529	17	1.69034E5	942435.00
Majority 50-69%	22700.3846	13	3.38663E4	295105.00
Moderate 30-49%	31135.6471	17	4.69534E4	529306.00
Weak 1-29%	1.3035E5	338	3.17711E5	4.41E7
None	24178.2961	2624	9.30852E4	6.34E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.77: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Rhode Island, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from RI	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	4165.0000	2	4051.72186	8330.00
Strong 70-89%	500.0000	1	.	500.00
Majority 50-69%	1948.5000	4	2425.38155	7794.00
Moderate 30-49%	7275.0000	2	388.90873	14550.00
Weak 1-29%	2534.5287	87	4868.68327	220504.00
None	187.0013	2975	1233.80064	556329.00
Total	263.1088	3071	1532.09693	808007.00

*Difference of means for Rhode Island PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2374.8571 and 258.2843 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .1$), with a Mann-Whitney of 2383 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.78: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Rhode Island PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from RI	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	4165.0000	2	4051.72186	8330.00
Strong 70-89%	500.0000	1	.	500.00
Majority 50-69%	34342.5000	4	5.52047E4	137370.00
Moderate 30-49%	1.2889E5	2	1.37225E5	257785.00
Weak 1-29%	2.3352E5	87	4.43395E5	2.03E7
None	29975.8235	2975	1.16311E5	8.92E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.79: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in South Carolina

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from SC	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	2711.1111	9	3452.42467	24400.00
Strong 70-89%	3850.0000	1	.	3850.00
Moderate 30-49%	7700.0000	1	.	7700.00
Weak 1-29%	3014.7398	123	6117.59813	370813.00
None	296.8594	2937	1610.96930	871876.00
Total	416.3592	3071	2078.69577	1278639.00

*Difference of means for South Carolina PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2825 and 408.4904 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .05$), with a Mann-Whitney of 2137.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.80: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by South Carolina PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from SC	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	3877.7778	9	4932.17188	34900.00
Strong 70-89%	6850.0000	1	.	6850.00
Moderate 30-49%	98900.0000	1	.	98900.00
Weak 1-29%	2.2230E5	123	4.38945E5	2.73E7
None	28060.7303	2937	1.05562E5	8.24E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.81: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in South Dakota, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from SD	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	400.0000	3	529.15026	1200.00
Weak 1-29%	1000.8197	61	2203.39684	61050.00
None	65.6615	3007	548.23248	197444.00
Total	84.5633	3071	637.56491	259694.00

*Difference of means for South Dakota PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 400 and 84.2549 respectively, is statistically insignificant (same for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-Whitney of 1792.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.82: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by South Dakota PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from SD	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	566.6667	3	814.45278	1700.00
Weak 1-29%	2.7394E5	61	5.51495E5	1.67E7
None	30989.7024	3007	1.13772E5	9.32E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.83: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Tennessee, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from TN	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	8708.8235	17	2.12939E4	148050.00
Strong 70-89%	2400.0000	5	2770.37904	12000.00
Majority 50-69%	2762.5000	4	3776.10359	11050.00
Moderate 30-49%	1116.6667	6	1331.79077	6700.00
Weak 1-29%	3325.3695	203	7472.01737	675050.00
None	446.1079	2836	2102.87793	1265162.00
Total	689.6815	3071	3320.86153	2118012.00

*Difference of means for Tennessee PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 6580.7692 and 639.3800 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .1$), with a Mann-Whitney of 15054.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.84: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Tennessee PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from TN	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	31154.7059	17	1.02777E5	529630.00
Strong 70-89%	4990.0000	5	3783.25257	24950.00
Majority 50-69%	25725.0000	4	2.14038E4	102900.00
Moderate 30-49%	19485.0000	6	3.70937E4	116910.00
Weak 1-29%	1.5301E5	203	3.71025E5	3.11E7
None	27525.8843	2836	1.02382E5	7.81E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.85: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Texas, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from TX	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	7372.4000	95	1.00419E4	700378.00
Strong 70-89%	8117.8571	21	1.49761E4	170475.00
Majority 50-69%	5282.5000	20	7718.77879	105650.00
Moderate 30-49%	7403.4000	25	1.36563E4	185085.00
Weak 1-29%	8213.8773	383	2.07587E4	3145915.00
None	1293.2723	2527	5672.19343	3268099.00
Total	2466.8193	3071	9640.28263	7575602.00

*Difference of means for Texas PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 7180.1691 and 2248.4153 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .001$), with a Mann-Whitney of 79972 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.86: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Texas PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from TX	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	12700.2737	95	1.79071E4	1206526.00
Strong 70-89%	46338.2381	21	1.41578E5	973103.00
Majority 50-69%	55142.3500	20	1.65195E5	1102847.00
Moderate 30-49%	45610.1200	25	5.20127E4	1140253.00
Weak 1-29%	1.2423E5	383	2.99770E5	4.76E7
None	22910.0313	2527	9.30508E4	5.79E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.87: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Utah, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from UT	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	3781.1429	7	6374.09778	26468.00
Strong 70-89%	1750.0000	2	353.55339	3500.00
Moderate 30-49%	.0000	2	.00000	.00
Weak 1-29%	2142.8125	80	4252.04712	171425.00
None	267.3916	2980	1655.10589	796827.00
Total	325.0472	3071	1822.31409	998220.00

*Difference of means for Utah PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 3329.7778 and 316.2155 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (insignificant for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-Whitney of 2784.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.88: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Utah PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from UT	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	8145.4286	7	1.23298E4	57018.00
Strong 70-89%	10800.0000	2	1.12430E4	21600.00
Moderate 30-49%	5800.0000	2	2404.16306	11600.00
Weak 1-29%	2.1927E5	80	4.40404E5	1.75E7
None	30961.8131	2980	1.19578E5	9.23E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.89: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Vermont, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from VT	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	550.0000	1	.	550.00
Majority 50-69%	.0000	1	.	.00
Weak 1-29%	1701.5088	57	2612.42521	96986.00
None	102.2291	3012	718.53175	307914.00
Total	132.0254	3071	823.11927	405450.00

*Difference of means for Vermont PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 275 and 131.9322 respectively, is statistically insignificant (same for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-Whitney of 1791 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .029

Table 3.90: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Vermont PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from VT	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	550.0000	1	.	550.00
Majority 50-69%	5000.0000	1	.	5000.00
Weak 1-29%	3.4289E5	57	5.37635E5	1.95E7
None	29996.0647	3012	1.13846E5	9.03E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.91: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Virginia, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from VA	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	4578.5500	20	8115.94772	91571.00
Strong 70-89%	5336.3636	11	5368.01131	58700.00
Majority 50-69%	3369.2308	13	8542.57813	43800.00
Moderate 30-49%	2238.2500	24	4052.14817	53718.00
Weak 1-29%	3364.8792	331	7646.34705	1113775.00
None	475.3372	2672	2324.48837	1270101.00
Total	856.9407	3071	3592.23093	2631665.00

*Difference of means for Virginia PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4410.7045 and 805.2838 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .05$), with a Mann-Whitney of 27386.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.92: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Virginia PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from VA	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	17451.7500	20	3.63780E4	349035.00
Strong 70-89%	28649.0000	11	2.84678E4	315139.00
Majority 50-69%	1.2032E5	13	3.69061E5	1564134.00
Moderate 30-49%	24590.2083	24	2.82272E4	590165.00
Weak 1-29%	1.4002E5	331	3.24224E5	4.63E7
None	22729.0801	2672	8.68779E4	6.07E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.93: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Washington, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from WA	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	3587.2800	25	4696.37080	89682.00
Strong 70-89%	7075.0000	4	6036.07212	28300.00
Majority 50-69%	6859.0000	5	1.02940E4	34295.00
Moderate 30-49%	4750.0000	5	7403.54645	23750.00
Weak 1-29%	4480.2727	220	8376.46247	985660.00
None	547.9011	2812	2435.17494	1540698.00
Total	879.9691	3071	3474.87530	2702385.00

*Difference of means for Washington PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4478.7353 and 839.6799 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (same for equal variances not assumed, $p < .001$), with a Mann-Whitney of 16494.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.94: Total Net Real Dollars Donated by Washington PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from WA	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	5714.0800	25	7495.29869	142852.00
Strong 70-89%	97747.5000	4	1.81099E5	390990.00
Majority 50-69%	11164.0000	5	9103.26755	55820.00
Moderate 30-49%	2.5044E5	5	3.24353E5	1252185.00
Weak 1-29%	1.7680E5	220	3.80297E5	3.89E7
None	24595.0832	2812	9.14317E4	6.92E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.95: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in West Virginia, 1990

PAC129 Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from WV	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Strong 70-89%	5366.6667	3	6689.98007	16100.00
Majority 50-69%	8100.0000	1	.	8100.00
Moderate 30-49%	500.0000	1	.	500.00
Weak 1-29%	2037.0000	78	3823.30415	158886.00
None	236.2373	2988	1471.82206	705877.00
Total	289.6330	3071	1621.39009	889463.00

*Difference of means for West Virginia PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 6050 and 282.1203 respectively, is statistically significant ($p < .001$) (insignificant for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-Whitney of 442.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.96: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by West Virginia PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from WV	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Strong 70-89%	75721.6667	3	1.25389E5	227165.00
Majority 50-69%	75285.0000	1	.	75285.00
Moderate 30-49%	1500.0000	1	.	1500.00
Weak 1-29%	2.2716E5	78	3.55029E5	1.77E7
None	30748.2587	2988	1.26785E5	9.19E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.97: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Wisconsin, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from WI	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	3023.0000	10	3781.21982	30230.00
Majority 50-69%	1000.0000	1	.	1000.00
Moderate 30-49%	2461.1111	9	3941.66667	22150.00
Weak 1-29%	4026.7711	201	9227.78466	809381.00
None	530.8923	2850	2916.68841	1513043.00
Total	773.6255	3071	3781.12024	2375804.00

*Difference of means for Wisconsin PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2839.0909 and 766.2007 respectively, is statistically insignificant (same for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-Whitney of 3716.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.98: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Wisconsin PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from WI	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	4043.0000	10	4204.43430	40430.00
Majority 50-69%	1750.0000	1	.	1750.00
Moderate 30-49%	26709.1111	9	3.84031E4	240382.00
Weak 1-29%	1.6255E5	201	3.61123E5	3.27E7
None	26997.3772	2850	1.04539E5	7.69E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

Table 3.99: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Wyoming, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from WY	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	633.3333	3	125.83057	1900.00
Moderate 30-49%	1100.0000	1	.	1100.00
Weak 1-29%	1838.6000	40	2704.63959	73544.00
None	177.3987	3027	1031.74822	536986.00
Total	199.7818	3071	1085.41256	613530.00

*Difference of means for Wyoming PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 633.3333 and 199.3579 respectively, is statistically insignificant (and statistically significant for equal variances not assumed, $p < .001$), with a Mann-Whitney of 601.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000

Table 3.100: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Wyoming PAC to House of Representatives, 1990

Categorical Variable of Percent Individual Contributions to PAC from WY	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Sum
Dominant 90+%	1233.3333	3	1061.05294	3700.00
Moderate 30-49%	7500.0000	1	.	7500.00
Weak 1-29%	3.4857E5	40	6.23868E5	1.39E7
None	31696.1123	3027	1.17170E5	9.59E7
Total	35785.8180	3071	1.40603E5	1.10E8

The descriptive analysis is instructive because it adds some nuance to the Grenzke (1988) – Wright (1985, 1989) debate. In support of Grenzke (1988), the number of PACs that receive over 50% of incoming donations from one state is substantial, but a majority of PACs have a national constituency (in 1990, 1,632 PACs out of 3071 had less than fifty percent of fundraising from one state), and this money is redistributed to candidates out of the state. The large number of PACs corresponding to the financial, real estate, and insurance industries, and trade associations contributes to the nationality of the PAC system. As a result, there are large amounts of PAC money flowing into states where the PAC has weak or no organizational presence in that state. This result is true especially for sparsely populated states. Also in support of Grenzke (1988), the amount of money donated by PACs rooted in one state is minimal by comparison, and in fact, of these small budgets, only part of the budget is spent within that same state (compare the dominant, strong, and majority group sums in even-numbered tables to the same category in odd-numbered tables for the same state).

In support of Wright (1985, 1989), the mean donation (and the median as measured by the Mann-Whitney statistic) by state-based PACs to congressional

candidates in that same state are higher than PACs not rooted in that state.⁶¹ This data supports Wright's (1985, 1989) claims because the structure of individual donors helps to determine where the PAC will spend money. PACs rooted disproportionately in one state will raise less money and contribute more of that money to in-state congressional candidates. PACs not tied to one particular state will raise more money and donate less of that money to any one particular state. While the distribution of individual donors does affect where a PAC will contribute money (and especially the amount raised), these types of PACs do not dominate the PAC system. These findings support both Grenzke (1988) and Wright (1985, 1989). My findings would better support Wright's (1985, 1989) claims if more PACs were rooted disproportionately in one state; however, most PACs are weakly tied to one state, making most PAC money outside-the-state money. These findings also add nuance to Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and Bartel's (2005) finding that an overwhelming amount of early PAC contributions are giving within the same state of the individual contributors to the PAC. While this *early* money finding may be true, *total* money is contributed across state lines, and even early money could be national money given the number of weakly tied PACs in the PAC system.

With some evidence that PACs contribute a majority of money to congressional candidates that represent constituencies where individual PAC donors reside, I select four large states with a sizable amount of state-based PACs (California, Michigan, New York, and Texas) to test the second hypothesis of the organizational presence model:

⁶¹ This result must be interpreted with caution because there are many congressional candidates within each state that do not receive PAC contributions from a majority of PACs. Future analysis should take the zeros out of the analysis, and only examine PACs that contributed to candidates in that state (e.g., what is the statistical significance of the difference of means for state-based PACs versus non-state-based PACs that contributed money to that state's congressional candidates).

PACs that strategize to obtain organizational maintenance goals will contribute to ideologically friendly and electorally vulnerable candidates. The four states I chose have a sufficient number of dominant, strong, majority, moderate, and weak state-based PACs to conduct this analysis. To extend the organizational presence hypothesis, I hypothesize that the dominant, strong, and majority state-based PACs will exhibit a stronger relationship with congressional candidates of that same state. I aggregate dominant, strong, and majority state-based PACs into one PAC grouping called *state-based PACs*. The dependent variable for this analysis is the percent of each state-based PAC budget given to the congressional candidate. The key independent variable of interest is the home state dichotomous variable, coded for each congressional candidate. This variable should be positive, large, and statistically significant for state-based PACs, along with the interactive terms measuring the organizational-maintenance strategy. State-based PACs should donate more money to those candidates within its home state who are electorally vulnerable and ideologically friendly. Tables 3.101 – 3.104 present my multiple-regression findings.

Table 3.101 California-Based PAC Strategy According to the Organizational Presence Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Constant	.001 (3.35E-5)**
California Candidate	2.637E-5 (6.249E-5)
Incumbency	.001 (2.31E-5)**
Ideology	3.473E-5 (3.54E-5)
District Partisanship	1.59E-4 (1.25E-4)
Electoral Margin	-.001 (4.53E-5)**
California Candidate * Ideology	-3.67E-4 (1.12E-4)**
California Candidate * District Partisanship	-.001 (4.45E-4)**
California Candidate * Electoral Margin	-2.87E-4 (1.76E-4)
1992	1.11E-4 (4.90E-5)*
1994	-7.211E-5 (4.29E-5)
1996	-8.074E-5 (3.98E-5)*
1998	4.14E-5 (4.21E-5)
2000	2.26E-5 (4.17E-5)
2002	2.83E-5 (4.31E-5)
2004	7.81E-5 (4.35E-5)
2006	.1.77E-5 (4.42E-5)
R ²	.291
Adj. R ²	.290
F	288.357
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.029
N	11,277

a. The dependent variable is the percent of the state-based PAC total allocation to a candidate and I measure this percentage with net 1990 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections). The model is heteroscedastic, with a statistically significant correlation between the residuals and predicted values, .070 (.006)**

* p<.05, ** p<.01

Table 3.102 Michigan-Based PAC Strategy According to Organizational Presence Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Constant	.001 (4.55E-5)**
Michigan Candidate	4.48E-5 (1.58E-4)
Incumbency	.001 (3.17E-4)**
Ideology	4.048E-5 (4.68E-5)
District Partisanship	5.957E-5 (1.66E-4)
Electoral Margin	-.001 (6.08E-5)**
Michigan Candidate * Ideology	-4.15E-4 (2.26E-4)
Michigan Candidate * District Partisanship	.003 (.001)**
Michigan Candidate * Electoral Margin	.001 (4.34E-4)**
1992	1.08E-4 (6.73E-5)
1994	-7.12E-5 (5.9E-5)
1996	-7.12E-5 (5.47E-5)*
1998	2.03E-5 (5.78E-5)
2000	-8.65E-6 (5.73E-5)
2002	-5.5E-7 (5.91E-5)
2004	5.09E-5 (5.97E-5)
2006	2.74E-6 (6.07E-5)
R ²	.177
Adj. R ²	.175
F	150.878
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/7.729
N	11,277

a. The dependent variable is the percent of the state-based PAC total allocation to a candidate and I measure this percentage with net 1990 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections). The model is heteroscedastic, with a statistically significant correlation between the residuals and predicted values, .057 (.005)**

* p<.05, ** p<.01

Table 3.103 New York-Based PAC Strategy According to Organizational Presence Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Constant	.001 (3.32E-5)**
New York Candidate	-4.88E-5 (8.09E-5)
Incumbency	.001 (2.30E-5)**
Ideology	4.714E-5 (3.42E-5)
District Partisanship	-1.77E-4 (1.25E-4)
Electoral Margin	-.001 (4.48E-5)**
New York Candidate * Ideology	1.82E-4 (1.55E-4)
New York Candidate * District Partisanship	.002 (.001)**
New York Candidate * Electoral Margin	-6.89E-5 (2.31E-4)
1992	1.42E-4 (4.88E-5)**
1994	-4.43E-5 (4.28E-5)
1996	-4.43E-5 (3.97E-5)
1998	8.40E-5 (4.19E-5)*
2000	7.91E-5 (4.16E-5)
2002	6.56E-5 (4.29E-5)
2004	1.19E-4 (4.33E-5)**
2006	6.65E-5 (4.40E-5)
R ²	.287
Adj. R ²	.286
F	282.763
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.133
N	11,277

a. The dependent variable is the percent of the state-based PAC total allocation to a candidate and I measure this percentage with net 1990 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections). The model is heteroscedastic, with a statistically significant correlation between the residuals and predicted values, .068 (.006)**

* p<.05, ** p<.01

Table 3.104 Texas-Based PAC Strategy According to Organizational Presence Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Constant	.001 (3.27E-5)**
Texas Candidate	2.541E-5 (7.4E-5)
Incumbency	.001 (2.27E-5)**
Ideology	1.85E-5 (3.42E-5)
District Partisanship	1.4E-4 (1.23E-4)
Electoral Margin	-.001 (4.52E-5)**
Texas Candidate * Ideology	-4.36E-4 (1.32E-4)**
Texas Candidate * District Partisanship	-.002 (4.7E-4)**
Texas Candidate * Electoral Margin	9.03E-5 (1.53E-4)
1992	1.4E-4 (4.82E-5)**
1994	-4.34E-5 (4.22E-5)
1996	-4.24E-5 (3.92E-5)
1998	8.16E-5 (4.14E-5)
2000	5.23E-5 (4.11E-5)
2002	6.64E-5 (4.24E-5)
2004	1.23E-4 (4.28E-5)**
2006	5.38E-5 (4.35E-5)
R ²	.296
Adj. R ²	.295
F	295.342
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.049
N	11,277

a. The dependent variable is the percent of the state-based PAC total allocation to a candidate and I measure this percentage with net 1990 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections). The model is heteroscedastic, with a statistically significant correlation between the residuals and predicted values, .072 (.006)**

* p<.05, ** p<.01

Tables 3.101 – 3.104 show clearly the lack of evidence supporting the organizational presence model's expectations for PAC strategy. The home state candidate does not receive a larger percentage of state-based PAC money and the overall fit of the model is low, which means that additional variables are needed to explain the variation in state-based PAC strategy. The common theme from 1990 through 2006 is that state-based PACs give disproportionately more money to incumbents, electorally vulnerable candidates, and ideologically friendly candidates

within the same state; however, the robustness of the organizational presence model is tenuous at best.

Conclusion

The organizational presence model places organizational maintenance as the primary goal of a PAC, which leads PAC decision-makers to use ideological, electorally vulnerable, and geographical proximity as cues for strategic donation decisions. While not the dominant explanation for PAC strategy, this model still receives favor among scholars in political science (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and Bartels 2005, Wright 1989); however, in this first macro-study of the organizational presence model, I find that the model does not explain the majority of PAC decisions. In essence, the model requires the scholar to organize PACs by geographic location, and the model argues that PACs should be thought of as geographic entities that operate as local electoral fundraising organizations. My findings do not support this hypothesis. The overwhelming amount of PAC money in congressional elections is raised and spent nationally. The majority of PACs and the majority of PAC spending is not isolated in one particular state. Of those PACs that do raise money from one or two states, a slight majority of that spending occurs within the same state; however, the strategic expectations of the organizational presence model do not explain much of the variation in PAC strategy.

I isolate PACs that receive a majority of their funding from one state and examine the strategy of these PACs, finding that home-state candidates do not receive any additional amount of money from these PACs. From 1990 through 2006, state-based PACs from California, Michigan, New York, and Texas did not donate a

disproportionately high amount of money to candidates from California, Michigan, New York, or Texas. While ideology and electoral vulnerability are significant predictors of PAC decisions, the overall fit of the organizational presence model is low. Much of the variation in PAC strategy, even among the population of PACs the organizational presence model should explain the best, goes unexplained. These results question both the focus on organizational maintenance and the mutual exclusivity of organizational maintenance as a strategy separate from legislative concerns. Organizational maintenance, according to my findings, does not lead more PAC money being distributed to local candidates, and it is shortsighted to argue that PAC donors are political amateurs with myopic focus on local candidates. My findings do not overturn or even address the need for PACs to maintain future funding streams by claiming success; however, scholars should interpret success broadly to mean electoral and legislative success. Even political amateurs want their money to be useful beyond the electoral arena. The implications of my findings are that organizational presence should be a control variable in models of PAC strategy, but building PAC-strategy theory off of PAC-geography is futile.

CHAPTER FOUR THE SUPPLY-SIDE APPROACH

The fight between proponents and opponents of CFR [campaign finance reform] is difficult to resolve because both sides have valid points. Government ought not to serve particular interests at the expense of others. Nor should people who have sworn to uphold the Constitution silence political speech...the existence of this dilemma stems from reluctance on the part of many to address the underlying causes of the difficulties in question...from an economic perspective, if both proponents and opponents of CFR were serious about curtailing the abuse of the political process, they would make serious proposals for reducing the size and scope of the state. Instead, one side's solution legitimizes graft, while the other side's solution penalizes political speech. The solution lies neither in silencing political discourse nor in permitting corruption, but in the alteration or abolition of the governmental authorities that allow for the offensive practices in question...government is too large. This being the case, both sides should redirect their efforts to the advocacy of privatization and deregulation.

~D.W. MacKenzie and Christopher Westley, 2002~⁶²

As long as the government has the power to pick winners and losers in business, market-actors will have an incentive to invest, by whatever means necessary, in political influence...lobbying and campaign finance reform are true red herrings. As long as government has the power to interfere dramatically in the market, market actors will devote resources to influencing what government does. The only real solution is to respect constitutional limits on government activity and allow consumers to return to their natural role as the 'bosses' in a truly free market.

~Arthur Foulkes, 2004~⁶³

Campaign finance reform efforts are entirely superfluous – what is needed is the abolition of the redistributive state, period.

~Tibor R. Machan, 1999~⁶⁴

⁶² MacKenzie, D.W. and Christopher Westley. 2002. "The Debate on Campaign Finance." *The Free Market* 20 (9): 1-2. Published online at <http://mises.org>.

⁶³ Arthur Foulkes is a journalist, and his quote originated in an essay he wrote for the Ludwig Von Mises Institute on 19 April 2004, found at <http://blog.mises.org/1859/money-in-politics-a-red-herring/>.

⁶⁴ Machan, Tibor. 1999. "Corruption and Campaign Finance." *Mises Daily* 16 October. Accessed at <http://mises.org>.

Introduction

While the study and centrality of organized interests diminished among political science in the 1970s, it began to rise in the research program of public choice. Scholars from the Chicago and Virginia schools of economics such as George Stigler, Sam Peltzman, Richard Posner, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Ann Krueger, Robert Tollison, Robert McCormick, William Shughart, Gary Becker, Dennis Mueller, and others helped create the field of public choice from one postulate: the application of economic assumptions and pro-market philosophy to politics will provide new insights on policymaking processes and outcomes. Public choice is simply the “economic study of nonmarket decision-making, or...the application of economics to political science” (Mueller 1976, 395).⁶⁵ In this application, the public choice research agenda seeks to explain all organized interest behavior with supply-side variables in hopes of minimizing government’s role in economic affairs. While elitism, pluralism, and public choice all understand organized interests to be the central component of policymaking processes (Mitchell and Munger 1991, 536), the single contribution of public choice to group theory is explaining this behavior from the supply-side, meaning the organization of legislative institutions explains organized interests’ level of activity, strategy, and influence.

⁶⁵ In their review of group theory, Baumgartner and Leech (1998, 66) only make brief reference to the public choice approach of the Chicago and Virginia Schools of economic thought. The public choice perspective developed by these schools dominates explanations of organized interest formation, strategy, and influence since the 1970s. For a review of how these schools of thought developed see Mitchell (1990), Mitchell and Munger (1991), and Mueller (1976, 1988). These reviews were helpful in organizing this chapter.

Public choice scholars tell a simple and expected story about the policymaking process: since government has the power to tax, spend, and draft enforceable regulation in a majority-rule system, organized interests (i.e., producers) engage in a costly process of securing particular benefits to the economic detriment of unorganized interests (i.e., consumers). The best way to minimize this costly behavior is to replace majority rule with a system of unanimous (or two-thirds) consent voting procedures via a constitutional amendment. Embedded in this story is a dichotomy between empirical and normative research, which scholars use to legitimize the public choice project.⁶⁶

Scholars engaged in the *empirical* element of public choice investigate policymaking processes and its outcomes, while the *normative* element of public choice recommends policy solutions to the problems found during the empirical project (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 281-289, 291-299). This distinction occurs throughout the development and application of public choice. Empirically, public choice scholarship proceeds from the assumptions that individuals are the most important

⁶⁶ There are three broad criticisms of public choice: (1) the distinction between empirical and normative is ambiguous, (2) the assumptions are not empirically accurate, and (3) public choice undermines public morality. I will elaborate on the first criticism now, and the second and third criticisms appear in notes throughout the chapter. The first criticism has two prongs. First, the distinction between empirical and normative is ambiguous because public choice is tautological. Its conclusions are built into the assumptions; for example, “freedom, economic justice, and efficiency are achieved in free, unregulated markets because freedom, economic justice, and efficiency have strict market definitions” (De Gregori 1974, 223). Second, the distinction between empirical and normative is ambiguous because public choice is ideological. The individualistic and the anti-historicism nature of public choice make the project an arbitrary denial of class and more holistic conceptions of the state (e.g., general will). Due to this anti-historicism, public choice scholarship neglects the “coercion that was used to bring ‘free’ markets into existence,” and fosters an anti-interventionist attitude when it comes to the actions of government and administration, ignoring historical privilege and power that brought about particular economic relationships, selecting only a few cases to support their cause (De Gregori 1974, 221-223; also see Orchard and Stretton 1997, 410-411). On this point, “the assumptions of this theory lead to one public policy conclusion: do virtually nothing. More fundamental is the hidden assumption that honoring tastes expressed in the marketplace is freedom; honoring those expressed in the voting booth is repression” (De Gregori 1974, 219). Public choice represents an extreme defense of negative liberty.

decision-making unit and are rational, self-interested, utility-maximizing agents. From these assumptions, public choice argues that politics concerns the distribution of material goods, and government is described best as the arbiter of wealth transfers. Central to this process is organized-interest behavior, strategizing to extract as many private benefits as possible from government, resulting in economically inefficient and suboptimal policies. Normatively, public choice scholars propose constitutional amendments and policy solutions limiting majority rule to curb this harmful group behavior found during the empirical investigations.

Starting in the mid-1970s, public choice scholars turned their attention to PACs, and campaign contributions, since organized interest behavior in elections represented the epitome of efforts to seek particular benefits from government. PACs became integral to public choice arguments concerning the nature of politics and role of government. Applying the assumptions of public choice, and treating the PAC/legislator relationship as a market exchange of money and legislation, leads scholars to examine several hypotheses about PAC strategy. The empirical validity of these hypotheses would lend support to public choice expectations about the policymaking process and efforts for reform. At its core, the public choice project reasserts a pluralistic (or, hyperpluralistic) and anti-Marxist, conception of the American republic, and places PACs at the forefront of this discussion. The purpose of this chapter is to trace the intellectual tradition of the most dominant explanation of PAC strategy to date, to show how this tradition influences the modeling of PAC strategy, and then to re-test the public choice model of PAC strategy. This replication exposes substantial deficiencies in the public choice approach to PAC strategy and

questions the utility of only using supply-side variables to model organized interest behavior in elections.

Public Choice and Organized Interests: The Old Idea of *Politics without Romance*

Public choice, developed most fully by the Chicago (e.g., Peltzman 1976; Posner 1971, 1974; Stigler and Friedland 1962) and Virginia (e.g, Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Shughart, Tollison and Goff 1986; McCormick and Tollison 1981) schools of economics, emerged from a critical response to both Keynesian and Marxist economics. Keynesianism or welfare economics more generally, views markets as prone to disequilibrium and failure, and believes government spending can return markets to an equilibrium point. Public choice views Keynesian economics as idealizing politics and government capabilities; thus, James Buchanan writes:

in a very real sense, public choice became a set of theories of governmental failures, as an offset to the theories of market failures that had previously emerged from theoretical welfare economics...public choice may be summarized by the three-word description ‘politics without romance’ (Buchanan 2008, 8).⁶⁷

Simply stated, public choice is a response to those who argue government *can* act in the *public interest* (Buchanan 2003, 8; Buchanan 2005, 1; Mitchell and Munger 1991, 520;

⁶⁷ Without actually addressing the Keynesian critique of laissez-faire capitalism, James Buchanan essentially designs a research program around this principle: if Keynesians show that markets cannot always serve the public good, then public choice will show that government cannot either. Buchanan simply romanticizes the economic and debases the political. This ideology occurs through out the public choice literature, especially concerning the origins of governmental regulation. Kau and Rubin (1982, 2) note that regulation does not occur from market failures, instead the “purpose of much regulation seemed to be the creation of wealth for one or another set of special interests in the economy,” as there is “little relation between market failure and regulation.” The entire public choice approach should be read as an attempt to eliminate most governmental programs. In their discussion of automobile safety laws, Kau and Rubin (1982, 16-17) write, “even if the laws worked as designed, little theoretical basis exists for them since many of the reforms they mandate create no external benefits...automobile manufacturers, for example, seem to have been major losers. In sum, automobile safety laws do not seem to serve any purpose at all, and yet, they have imposed substantial cost on the economy.”

Orchard and Stretton 1997, 410).⁶⁸ The study of economics suffered from a gap in the literature about governmental decision-making and public choice scholars sought to fill this gap by debunking the assumption that government can solve economic problems (Buchanan 2005, 1; Orchard and Stretton 1997, 410). *Politics without romance* refers to the role individual political behavior plays in collective, government decision-making; more specifically, the term indicates the public choice belief that rational, collective decision-making rarely can achieve public interest goals because individuals do not alter their self-interested motivations when transitioning from the economic to the political realm (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 19; Kau and Rubin 1982, 11-12).⁶⁹ As a result, most regulations and public policies are manifestations of private interests seeking private economic gain over an unorganized population of taxpayers and consumers. To reach this conclusion of politics without romance, public choice scholars begin with the assumptions of *economic man*.

The *homo economicus* principle means that individuals act similarly in the economic and political realms, insinuating that it is different supply-side forces pushing markets toward equilibrium and governments toward failure (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 289). Adopting *homo economicus* as the primary source of individual behavior

⁶⁸ While it is difficult to find a public choice scholar who provides a citation of who they believe to be a *public interest* theorist of governmental action, from various quotes and placement of terms, one can discern that public interest theorists include, Keynesians, Marxists, and Civic Republicans (Buchanan 2003, 10).

⁶⁹ On this point, Kelman (1987) criticizes public choice scholarship for debasing political life, which results in a de-legitimization of political decision-making that undermines authority. Public choice scholars respond by asking why keep the myth alive (Brennan and Buchanan 1988, 187-188)? Interestingly, working within the public choice tradition, Parker (1996, 153-154) finds that rent seeking undermines the *intrinsic* public interest motivations of congressional members, and fosters *adverse selection* of politicians who are only motivated by rent-seeking benefits; hence, rent seeking undermines the legitimacy of Congress.

assumes: (1) individuals are the most appropriate unit of analysis for all forms of decision-making (i.e., methodological individualism), (2) rationality, self-interest, and utility maximization characterize all individual-level decision-making, and (3) James Madison identified correctly the most important aspects of human nature (Buchanan 2003, 1; Mitchell 1990, 85; Mueller 1976, 395).⁷⁰

The first assumption of methodological individualism means the individual, not groups, people, community, or class makes decisions and is the most important decision-making unit; thus, the study of collective decision-making is the study of how individuals act collectively when faced with varying constraints and incentive structures (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 30-31). While some public choice scholars cloak the importance of methodological individualism in its unit of analysis, which shifts away from ambiguous and non-verifiable larger units, the individual as the unit of analysis is the least important aspect of methodological individualism. The significance of methodological individualism is its reactionary nature; positing the importance of the individual is a reaction to *organic* conceptions of societal organization (e.g., Keynes's social welfare functions, Rousseau's general will, Marx's proletariat and bourgeoisie). Public choice is opposed to the Marxist conception of the State, and dismisses it as

⁷⁰ Critics argue that neither methodological individualism nor rationality are appropriate assumptions of political behavior. First, proponents of class- and/or community-based decision-making argue that individuals behave within a structure and system that influences their behavior (De Gregori 1974, 209-210). Second, scholars criticize the rationality assumption for being empirically inaccurate (e.g., Green and Shapiro 1996; Wittman 1996; McQuaig 2001; Opp 1999). Some argue that public choice takes a *narrow* view of rationality, which means preferences are egoistic, constraints must be tangible and explain the majority of decisions, and decisions are characterized by full information. It is possible that organized interests have a *wide* conception of rationality, which means that non-egoistic preferences are relevant, all constraints are important including subjective constraints, and full information is not assumed to characterize decision-making, and the relationship between preferences and constraints explains choices (Opp 1999, 174). Another critique of self-interested rationality is evidence of altruistic behavior (De Gregori 1974, 209).

irrelevant because Marx redefines economics as class warfare instead of gains from trade and exchange (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 11-15, 311-303). Very simply, public choice argues that individuals have economic motivations in politics, but this motivation is not rooted in class, as indicated by their vehement denial of Beard's thesis on U.S. constitutional development (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 24-25). Class motivations are not accurate because "different individuals have different utility functions," and the "individual must act contrary to his own economic interest to further the interest of the social class" (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 25). It is not differences in class, but differences in taste (i.e., utility functions) that separate individuals (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 25); thus, it is not the individual, but the detached, separated nature of individuals/groups that is the most important aspect of methodological individualism. Contrary to those organic conceptions of societal organization, methodological individualism posits that interests vary among individuals making these interests separated from each other.

The variability and separateness of individual interests is vital to a proper understanding of methodological individualism because it moves analyses away from the simplistic and meaningless unit of analysis issue, and allows methodological individualism to infiltrate group theory discussions. The variability of individual interests means that economists cannot derive proper social welfare functions because there are too many conceptions of public interest for a universal principle to benefit all interests; however, it is the separateness of interests that represents the force of public choice and what it means to be an *economic individualist* (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 69). According to Buchanan and Tullock (1962, 270-271), "social welfare or the

‘public interest’ does not exist, for the individual, as something apart from and independent of special group interests.” If the primary concern of methodological individualism is the source of interests, then the unit of analysis is irrelevant for public choice studies (as long as it is not class), as indicated by the public choice founders’ support for the founder of modern pluralism:

Although developed independently, our conception of democratic process has much in common with that accepted by the school of political science which follows Arthur Bentley in trying to explain collective decision-making in terms of the interplay of group interest. Throughout our analysis the word ‘group’ could be substituted for the word ‘individual’ without significantly affecting the results (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 9).

This passage is important for two reasons. First, Buchanan and Tullock agree with Bentley’s conceptualization of group interest, which at its core is anti-Marxist.⁷¹

Bentley argued that group interests are rooted rarely in mass, classed-based coalitions, and if this were to occur, a tyrannical government would ensue (Bentley 1908, 467).

Second, Buchanan and Tullock are willing to have public choice extend to the study of organized interests (a unit of analysis shift away from individuals), which indicates what is truly economic about their approach is not individualism per se, but the exchange relation resulting from separated interests.

The application of economics to political science means that scholars should view politics as an *exchange* or *trade* relationship instead of one’s *will* opposing another (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 308-309), which is the *most controversial* aspect of public choice:

⁷¹ Please see Manley (1987, 116) for a discussion of Bentley’s denial of class-based group interests and how Bentley and modern pluralism differs from the Madisonian conception of pluralism.

Our theory is ‘economic’ only in that it assumes that separate individuals are separate individuals and, as such, are likely to have different aims and purposes for the results of collective action...when individual interests are assumed to be identical, the main body of economic theory vanishes. If all men were equal in interest and in endowment, natural or artificial, there would be no organized economic activity to explain. Each man would be a Crusoe. Economic theory thus explains why men co-operate through trade: they do so because they are different (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 3-4).⁷²

The authors continue:

The economic approach, which assumes man to be a utility maximizer in both his market and his political activity, does not require that one individual increase his own utility at the expense of other individuals. This approach incorporates political activity as a particular form of exchange; and, as in the market relation, mutual gains to all parties are ideally expected to result from the collective relation” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 22).

From these core assumptions, and viewing political decision-making as a market of exchange, public choice scholars derive a definition of government and politics focused on the distribution of material wealth. The assumptions of methodological individualism, rationality, and the self-interested aspect of human nature are all directly related to the solutions offered by public choice to the problem of organized interest behavior: the unanimity decision-rule.

The Chicago and Virginia schools of economic thought disagree slightly on the role government now plays in American representative democracy. The Chicago school viewed government as a *cartel manager* that engages in “price fixing, restriction of entry, subsidies, suppression of substitute goods and promotion of complementary goods” (Mitchell 1990, 90). The Virginia school viewed government as the arbiter of wealth transfers, since politics concerns who receives what in terms of material goods

⁷² Public choice scholarship cannot maintain the separated individual when they advocate for constitutional change, or even when they discuss the empirical validity of organized (i.e., producers) versus unorganized (i.e., consumers) interests.

(Hersch and McDougall 2000, 331; Mitchell 1990, 94; Mitchell and Munger 1991, 524; Orchard and Stretton 1997, 410). Regardless of these subtle differences in definition, both schools of thought emphasize the role organized interests play in causing cartels or wealth transfers via government decision-making. Cartels and/or wealth transfers result from the relationship between reelection-minded legislators and *rent-seeking* organized interests. Organized interests are an “institutional manifestation of the active promotion of economic interest” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 269). The sole purpose for the existence and strategy of organized interests is to seek particular benefit from government (i.e., rent seeking); thus, the Chicago and Virginia schools found that regulation and public policy rarely occur in the name of public interest (Mitchell 1990, 89-90).

The Virginia school developed the rent-seeking concept most fully (e.g., Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974), and it is defined as the costs paid on behalf of those organized groups (e.g., lobbying, campaign contributions, advertising) to acquire rents or benefits from government. Rents refer to the economic gain accrued by an organized group at the cost of another group, typically unorganized taxpayers, because “concentrated pressure overcomes diffuse resistance” (Orchard and Stretton 1997, 412). In more technical terms, “rent is the part of the payment to an owner of resources over and above that which those resources could command in any alternative use. Rent is receipt in excess of opportunity cost” (Buchanan 1980, 3; also see Buchanan 2005, 49-50). The concept of economic rent refers to the ability of a firm through innovation to accrue a profit that is more than it would be in a competitive market; however, in the private market, the existence of rent is dissipated when other

firms enter as a result of seeing the profit accrued by the original firm (Buchanan 1980, 3-7; Tullock 1988, 52-53).⁷³ This profit-seeking behavior returns the new market to equilibrium; however, this same behavior in politics, called rent seeking, results in rents that are more permanent and gives incentives to firms to engage in lobbying rather than spending resources on innovation (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 21; Tullock 1988, 57). This incentive results in a system that seeks to protect existing rents and/or create cartels, as it is a “fairly obvious characteristic of our political process that protecting what you have is somewhat easier than acquiring a new income source or wealth” (Tullock 1988, 58; also see Buchanan 1980, 8).

The difference between profit seeking and rent seeking is the different institutional settings in which the same behavior takes place (Buchanan 1980, 4). In government, or collective decision-making, the result is social waste because the costs that government levies on unorganized individuals, the loss in innovation, and the money, time, and effort it takes to pursue advantages (e.g., lobbying), which organized interests could use to increase economic growth in accordance with public interest. In addition, politicians and bureaucrats spend time seeking out these benefits from organized interests (Buchanan 1980, 8; Mitchell 1990, 95; Mueller 1988, 231; Tullock 1988, 61). The existence of rents means that Pareto efficient policies are available, but government fails to enact these policies.

The public choice emphasis on rent-seeking behavior by organized interests reasserts a notion well known to political science: the distribution of organized interests

⁷³ Buchanan (1980, 7) acknowledges the “freedom of entry” or a lack of substantial barriers to entry is an essential prerequisite for the dissipation of economic rents.

helps determine the character of legislation (Crawford 1939; Schattschneider 1935, 1960; Schriftgiesser 1951).⁷⁴ Students of organized interests have always known that lobbyists seek something from government, and many times, government gives it to them. What is unique about the public choice scholarship on rent seeking is its ability to explain the demand for rents with variables pertaining to the supply of rents.

Analyzing and explaining organized interest behavior from the supply-side starts with a foundational assumption: organized interests engage in rent-seeking behavior because of government's ability to tax, spend, and draft enforceable regulation (Mitchell and Munger 1991, 525; Mitchell 1990, 95). Rent-seeking behavior results not from organized interests alone, but from the institutional design in which the organized interests operate. Explaining rent seeking from an institutional viewpoint fills a gap left by the works of Truman (1951) and Olson (1965, 1982) because these works treat "rent-seeking as a pure demand phenomenon leaving out the powerful role of the supplier, i.e. government, in aiding the pursuits of rent-seekers" (Mitchell 1990, 88; also see Mitchell and Munger 1991, 518). Olson too narrowly focused on organized interest formation and the structure of inputs into the policymaking process, neglecting institutional design.

⁷⁴ James Buchanan (2003, 6) believes the rent-seeking approach, developed in the 1960s and 1970s represents a *profound* change in the way scholars view organized interest behavior:

if an opportunity that promises to yield value arises, persons will invest time and resources in efforts to capture such value for themselves...the extension of this motivational postulate to the share of value allocated through politics or collective action seems elementary now, but until Tullock explicitly made the connection, no attention had been paid to the profound implications.

These implications are the welfare costs associated with the pursuit of governmental policy advantage. There is nothing profound about rent seeking, it only provides a generalizable language with which to categorize the findings of political science with regards to lobbying (see especially Crawford 1939; Schattschneider 1935; Schriftgiesser 1951).

The second assumption of the supply-side approach is that logrolling characterizes the lawmaking process, resulting in distributional and re-distributional policy coalitions (Orchard and Stretton 1997, 412). Majority voting on legislation in Congress (neglecting the complexity of the lawmaking process including the filibuster power in the Senate, the conference committee, and presidential veto) exacerbates government spending and by extension, rent seeking:

The twentieth century experienced a manifold increase in the size of government, at all levels, but concentrated in the United States at the federal level. The political decision structure accelerated this growth. Congress found itself able to advance popular spending programs separately from the imposition of taxes needed to finance them. Further, the spending process itself was effectively decentralized through the delegation of authority to committees, members of which were necessarily responsive to interest groups (Buchanan 2005, 1).⁷⁵

The extent of rent-seeking behavior is endogenous to the decision-making rule in legislative institutions, since building a coalition requires the distribution of money to legislators, and in return, the distribution of rents (Buchanan 2003, 4). Organized interests, all acting to pursue private benefits, creates rent-induced policies, such as quotas, monopolies, license requirements, subsidies, price fixing, and tariffs; resulting in this paradox: “the better a polity performs its task of representing the economic interests of constituent groups, the worse it may be at managing its economy” (Mitchell 1990, 88; also see Buchanan 1980, 9-10; Mueller 1988, 235-243). The exposure of rent seeking is supposed to show that public policy is a series of government failures, and when juxtaposed against a market of voluntary exchange, convinces public choice

⁷⁵ Legislators are presented with a dilemma, as they cannot let the rents get too large to incorporate everyone, as the market would fail, but must sustain barriers to entry in order to attain power and money (Mitchell 1990, 97; Mitchell and Munger 1991, 526).

scholars to engage in the normative project to alter the decision-making process of government.⁷⁶

The empirical validity of rent-seeking behavior, coupled with a normative belief in unregulated market efficiency and mutual benefit, fosters the public choice argument that the outcomes of public and private decision-making differ substantially. Public choice scholars argue that individuals in the private market act rationally to exchange goods and services for a Pareto efficient price; however, in the public market of government decision-making, acting rationally does not lead to a preferable equilibrium point, as the “invisible hand of competitive markets surely does not operate in the polity as in the private economy” (Mitchell 1990, 88; also see Mitchell and Munger 1991, 516). In sum, public choice wants to show how individuals operating on behalf of the same underlying motivation (i.e., utility maximization) in both the private market and public sphere arrive at mutual benefit via voluntary exchange in the private market, and private benefit via rent seeking and coercion in the public sphere (Buchanan and

⁷⁶ Another example of the ambiguity between the empirical/normative distinction in public choice is its incessant belief in market-based solutions. Public choice scholars consider rents a social cost, not because an established capitalistic class is using the levers of government to benefit monetarily, or that government itself was established by an upper class and is not exogenous to the foundation of rent seeking, but because rents are distorting their neoclassical view of the marketplace. In describing the organized interest influence in regulation, Mitchell (1990, 90) argues, “these practices have been widely recognized and documented by political scientists and fill the pages of their skeptical – sometimes Marxist-inspired – American government texts and countless research monographs. Still many, prefer to believe in the welfare possibilities of vigorous governmental regulation of business. Market competition is not thought to be robust.” Mitchell does not provide a citation, but one can assume that those who believe in governmental regulation are Keynesians, and those who are skeptical-Marxists are those who believe government policy furthers class-based interests. Public choice wants to refute both Keynes and Marx by arguing that government cannot help economic disequilibrium because of rent-seeking behavior, and government is not the tool of the capitalist class because of majority rule voting. On the incessant belief that markets always tend toward equilibrium and are a system of voluntary exchange with mutual benefit, some public choice scholars either wish to ignore Marx’s arguments, do not understand them, or have not read Marx’s arguments about the development of capitalism. For example, “since Adam Smith, we have known that the profit-seeking activity of the butcher and baker ensures results beneficial to all members of the community...but let us be honest. How much more do we know about market process than Adam Smith knew that is of practical relevance” (Buchanan 1980, 4).

Tullock 1962, 99). Since public choice engages in an institutional analysis of rent-seeking behavior, all of their constitutional and policy changes affect legislative institutions; public choice scholarship defines the solution into the problem.

The notion that American lawmakers can design institutions and rules to curb the effects of organized interests is older than the U.S. Constitution itself. James Madison in *Federalist Paper #10* recognized that it is human nature to form groups to serve interests, and liberty allows group formation and influence of government. The downside of liberty is that these factions will influence government and the resulting public policy will levy costs on the losing minority. Recognizing that curtailing liberty is not an option, Madison outlines two methods for controlling these adverse effects of factions, a demand- and a supply-side approach. The demand-side approach is to locate government in a well-populated society, which will have diverse organized interests. A society with heterogeneous organized interests will make the consistent application of costs on a consistent minority unlikely; pluralists recognize and advocate for this solution. The supply-side solution offered by Madison is to develop a republic, not a democracy. The scheme of representation offered by a republic provides distance between the majority of people and legislative power, helping ensure minority rights. Public choice scholars emphasize the supply-side Madisonian principle that the design of legislative institutions affects the influence of organized interests. Emanating from this thought is the argument that Madison did not go far enough in curbing the effects of factions, as the scheme of representation and majority rule still foster rent-seeking behavior, which “allow us to reach the conclusion that the constitutional rules that were

‘optimal’ in 1900 are probably not ‘optimal’ in 1960” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 275).

Public choice theory adopts many Madisonian assumptions and goals by assuming humans are selfish and acquisitive, preferring to preserve the economic status quo with minority rule, wanting to control factions that pursue government influence for private gain, by preserving the wealth distribution created in the market. Public choice parts ways with Madison on two occasions: (1) public choice only focuses on Madison’s supply-side solutions, neglecting demand-side controls of factions, and (2) public choice argues that Madison did not move far enough in his institutional design to ensure the goals of preserving wealth accrued in the private market. The sub-category of public choice adopting this line of argument is called *constitutional economics*.⁷⁷

Constitutional economics is the study and understanding of the relation between constitutional decision-making rules and the growth of government influence in the economy, which rent seeking facilitates. Unlike early public choice founders, Duncan Black and Kenneth Arrow, who were concerned with the stability of voting preferences

⁷⁷ Once again, the public choice normative agenda is a source of criticism for being an ideological diatribe. Kau and Rubin (1982, 2) begin their book by stating, “it should be noted that we have a normative bias: we believe that much of the new regulation is inefficient and that the world would be a better place if it had not been passed.” There is little doubt that a policy goal of public choice is to abolish the regulatory state, as Buchanan (2005, 3) writes, “the ‘regulatory state’ has not worked. Abandonment of its constitutional legitimacy offers a starting point for constructive dialogue.” The questions not answered by public choice are, has not worked for whom, and by which metric? One critic writes, “much of the writing and teaching in this vein has a consistent non-interventionist, anti-administration, and ‘conservative’ bent to it” (De Gregori 1974, 211). Of course, the public choice is non-interventionist once they achieve a constitutional amendment or policy changes that make it nearly impossible for government to spend money or act as a system of organization to counter the corporation. To my knowledge no public choice scholarship has occurred on the hypothesis that rent-seeking behavior occurs for de-regulatory purposes, distributing wealth upwards (e.g., Enron); however, some rent-seeking is seen as beneficial. Mueller (1988, 241) argues, “rent seeking can sometimes improve welfare, for example, when it succeeds in eliminating a trade barrier.” Buchanan (2003, 11) states that Keynesianism failed because of policy performance issues. Can we say the same for the push toward deregulation?

in collective decisions, James Buchanan concerns himself with preventing this instability from influencing public policy, protecting minority rule (Buchanan 2003, 3). A well-ordered and just society will abolish majority rule (presumably in elections and legislative voting) in favor of unanimity or at least a 2/3 voting procedure. A change of this magnitude requires a constitutional amendment.

This approach derives from the social contract tradition. The ultimate goal of this social contract is to establish a political system that allows for extensive exchanges in the market, which are deemed to benefit both buyers and sellers, and producers and consumers (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 308-309). Buchanan and Tullock (1962), however, replace the original intention of social contract theory, which is the argument for the origins of government, with their version, which is the “perfecting of existing institutions of government” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 304). This conceptual shift essentially excludes historical conceptions of the state. Their notion of the social contract, and the decisions emanating from individuals in this position is related to their assumptions about the individual. The unanimity rule is an obvious choice because it allows Buchanan and Tullock not to make “interpersonal comparisons among separate individuals” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 14).

The social contract concerns reducing costs, not accruing benefits, which is a normative, a priori judgment: “we propose to consider collective action as a means of reducing the external costs that are imposed on the individual by purely private or voluntary action,” but here is the value judgment:

instead of using as our bench mark the situation in which no collective action is undertaken at all, we shall use that situation in which no external costs are imposed on the individual because of the action of others (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 42).

The costs levied by government onto the individual are related to the decision-rule in place and the difference between private and collective organizing. Since the emphasis is on cost, the question becomes, what are the “costs of organizing decisions collectively” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 42)? The costs levied on the individual are related to the costs of organizing. Public choice starts from a position where collective action already exists, instead of a society where no collective action occurs. Instead of comparing the costs and benefits of collective action itself, public choice only examines the costs of collective action and the benefit of not having collective action, or raising the costs of decision-making.

There are two types of costs: (1) *external costs*, which are costs levied on the individual out of his/her control, and (2) *decision-making costs*, which are the costs levied on the individual (or group) for engaging in collective action (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 63). In the private market, both external and decision-making costs are zero in the long-run, since rents dissipate (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 43-45). But, in the political arena, external costs and decision-making costs (together called *social interdependence*) have a different relationship. The goal is to reduce social interdependence, which results from collective action. Given this goal, the purpose is to increase decision-making costs so that external costs are reduced (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 46). Most areas of the economy will be collectivized if there are low decision-making costs, causing high external costs, but if decision-making costs are high, the economy will be privatized, keeping external costs low (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 46). The unanimity rule is most rational because it reduces external costs by increasing decision-making costs (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 77). The unanimity

rule increases the size of the decision-making coalition, which organized interests could not, or would not bother spending the costs (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 79-80).⁷⁸

Public choice scholars focus on the costs of collective action, and not benefits, because the assumption in this social contract is that your economic position will always be better than the majority; therefore, you will always vote for high decision-making costs so that the majority does not burden you with taxes for services, as “only the unanimity rule will insure that all external effects will be eliminated by collectivization” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 84).⁷⁹ In terms of economic decision-making, the individual in the social contract is a risk-taker. Coming full circle, this social contract is antithetical to one offered by welfare economics:

⁷⁸ A follow-up research question would ask, would this not increase the likelihood of class-based action by having to broaden the coalition?

⁷⁹ It takes Buchanan and Tullock until page 84 to mention the foundational assumption of the public choice approach. They use a common-pool resource, oil drilling, to exemplify why an individual would want to minimize the influence of collective decision making (i.e., government):

Let us begin by considering a single activity that is organized by private decision-making but which does impose some external costs on the individual. The individual experiences some reduction in his utility as a result of private behavior of other individuals. Let us further assume that these external costs are present because of spillover effects and that no effort is being made to eliminate these through voluntarily organized institutional changes. Take the common oil pool as a familiar example. We assume an initial distribution of property rights such that there are many separate owners of drilling rights to the large common pool and that there has been no joint arrangement worked out voluntarily. Recognizing the spillover costs imposed on him by the action of others, the single owner will support some collectivization of decision-making if the costs of the later are disregarded. He may recognize that *any* centralization of decision-making will reduce external costs that he expects to incur, but he will also recognize that only if the consent of all members of the group is required will he be free of all expectations of external costs. *Take the circumstances of the single owner whose productive equipment is somewhat more modern than that of most of his fellow drillers* [emphasis added]. Suppose that a proposal is made to set over all limits on drilling by collective action and to allow the actual quotas to be set by a simple majority voting rule. The owner in question may rationally support the collectivization of decision-making in the first place because this will reduce the expected external costs, but he will vote against the particular quota that the majority of his fellows choose because his own interests would be better served by different limits on production...he will be unable to determine with any degree of accuracy what his role will be in any particular decision in the future...the essence of the collective-choice process under majority voting rules is the fact that the minority of voters are forced to accede to actions which they cannot prevent and for which they cannot claim compensation for damages resulting. Note that this is precisely the definition previously given for externality (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 85).

it is especially surprising that the discussion about externality in the literature of welfare economics has been centered on the external costs expected to result from *private* action of individuals or firms. To our knowledge little or nothing has been said about the *external* costs imposed on the individual by *collective action* (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 85).

Ironically, or hypocritically, for this constitutional change to occur, consumers must recognize their common interest as consumers to get out of their prisoners' dilemma.

The ultimate goal, stemming from a pro-market ideology, is to turn politics into an exchange process resembling the idealized view of the market (Buchanan 2005, 71-76).

The logic of a strict voting rule is that organized interests will not have enough resources to operate in a logrolling environment that must achieve unanimity or a super-majority. This voting procedure, in conjunction with the checks and balances in place, should allow market processes to thrive unfettered from future government influence. This line of thought makes public choice scholars proponents of low marginal tax rates, line-item vetoes, sunset laws, and balanced-budget amendments (Buchanan 2005, 1; Mitchell 1990, 101).

These amendments and policies seek to restore government intervention around one central principle: the government must “provide *general* benefits to all individuals and groups and which are financed from *general* tax revenues” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 273). Policies violating this principle come in two discriminatory forms: (1) policies that target a particular group or population for selective benefit and impose costs generally on society, and (2) policies that benefit society generally and impose costs selectively (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 277). More specifically, policies that “are clearly ruled out, at least in principle, are all programs that target persons who qualify in accordance with identification by ethnicity, occupation, industry, or activity”

(Buchanan 2005, 2-3). In essence, public choice is defending liberty in the name of equality, or allowing private individuals and corporations to do as they wish in the market place, while arguing that all must be taxed and benefit equally by government policy. The purpose of the general principle, and the policies following this principle is to control organized interest behavior through supply-side means, which is *the* unique contribution of public choice.

All public choice inquiries into organized interest behavior take supply-side constraints as the most important indicator of rent seeking, the central notion behind *politics without romance*. The public choice project is one that moves from assumptions to behavior to outcomes, showing that politics rarely involves the public interest and most likely involves an exchange of favors between organized interests and legislators. These favors, and resulting policies, distribute costs disproportionately to unorganized interests (i.e., consumers, sometimes referred to as voters). Analyzing the dichotomy between organized and unorganized interests, via a supply-side approach, is fundamental to PAC-strategy models. For public choice, PAC strategy is synonymous with rent-seeking strategy, and PAC strategy modeling is rent-seeking modeling. Public choice models of PAC strategy take the most important elements of methodological individualism (e.g., group interest is rooted in particular self-interest of members, behavior based on economic exchange) and utility maximization to formulate models of rent seeking.

Public Choice, Pluralism, and Policymaking: The Supply of Public Policy Model

While public choice argues the rent-seeking behavior of organized interests fails in creating economic efficiency, public choice PAC-strategy modelers believe the

system of rent seeking is in equilibrium. The modeling of PAC behavior with public choice is an attempt to diagram the rent-seeking system; all benefits from government have a price, and “in the political world that price can be paid in the form of campaign contributions” (Mitchell 1990, 90). Scholars applying the framework of public choice to the rent-seeking system find that when PACs act rationally in their own self-interest (maximizing their separate, distinct preferences), the system of interacting politicians, organized interests, and unorganized interests is in equilibrium. What better way to blame the supply-side of legislative development (i.e., Congress) than to argue there is nothing wrong with the demand-side of legislative development (i.e., distribution of organized interests)? All PACs have their own separate economic interest, and rationally seek to maximize this interest, which public choice argues can be seen when studying how legislative institutional design brings to light this PAC behavior.

Denzau and Munger’s (1986) *supply of public policy* model is the culmination of early efforts to explain public policymaking from the incentives and constraints of legislator (Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Bental and Ben-Zion 1975; Kau and Rubin 1982; Silberman and Yochum 1980). Through this model’s synthesis of pluralists’ and institutionalists’ fundamental claims about policymaking, the model posits that public policy originates from those organized interests (i.e., interest groups) who actively pursue a policy stance and the discretion of those who must decide on which policy to pursue (i.e. legislators). Policymaking is a product of relationships between three central agents: legislators, unorganized interests (e.g., voters), and organized interests

(e.g., PACs, interest groups).⁸⁰ Legislators are motivated, first and foremost, by reelection, and unorganized and organized interests are motivated by the substance of public policy (Denzau and Munger 1986, 91-92). This model adds to the work of previous supply-side models (Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Bental and Ben-Zion 1975) by adding the sophistication of the electorate as something that varies in their deductive models, and viewing the legislator as someone who is constrained in their ability to serve both voters and organized interests; there must be some trade-off, as it is not physically possible to serve both (Mitchell and Munger 1991, 538).

These three agents have certain freedoms and constraints en route to achieving their goals. Legislators have the most control over how they decide to spend their time, usually between constituency service (e.g., casework) and giving specific favors to interest groups (e.g., specific items in legislation, testimony at hearings) (Denzau and Munger 1986, 91). Both unorganized and organized interests want to maximize their policy preferences, but each entity does so in different ways. Unorganized interests have discretion over their vote choice, and legislators affect this choice through casework, roll call votes, and campaign activities (Denzau and Munger 1986, 92).

Organized interests, or interest groups in elections, have discretion over which legislator they give money to during the election cycle. In sum, legislators legislate, voters vote,

⁸⁰ Throughout public choice, there is a concern for the dichotomy between organized and unorganized interests. For the early developers of the supply side approach (Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Bental and Ben-Zion 1975), the central dilemma of political action was that there is “conflict between serving one’s geographic constituency for votes and serving interest groups in exchange for the money needed to campaign and win those votes” (Mitchell and Munger 1991, 537). Kau and Rubin (1982, 3) state the issue as one of explaining the variation in roll call voting, “we identify three agents who are important in the roll call voting model: representatives who actually vote for the bills; constituents, who vote for or against representatives based on the stands of the representatives on issues of interest to constituents; and contributors to political campaigns, who give to representatives based on the way the representatives will vote on issues of interest to the contributors.”

organized interests give money, and it is the discretion and constraints over this activity that makes the supply of public policy model interesting.⁸¹

Legislators, voters, and organized interests are all *constrained maximizers*, who seek the most efficient way of utilizing their discretionary activities. Legislators are constrained by the total effort they can dispense to voters and organized interests, voters are constrained by who appears on their voting ballot, and organized interests are constrained by their scarce resources (Denzau and Munger 1986, 92). It is the assumptions about goals, discretion, and constraints that foster certain hypotheses about public policymaking and the role of PAC decision-making in this system. These goals, discretionary acts, and constraints play into the decision calculus of the legislators, voters, and organized interests.

The voter decision calculus in the supply of public policy model is straightforward, as the voter makes choices based on the legislator's time spent conducting constituency service, his/her decisions while in Congress, and their campaign activities; however, it is the organized interest decision calculus (e.g., which campaign to support, whom to lobby) that is the model's focal point. The model is a supply-side model because it explains PAC contribution strategy through those that supply public policy (i.e., legislators). The legislator's *promised level of effort* is the basis on which PACs strategize, and this effort derives from a legislator's institutional capacity and constituent preferences, which make the legislator more or less likely to be

⁸¹ The supply of public policy model assumes that voters do not contribute money during a campaign and that interest groups do not vote. While this assumption is incorrect and scholars should use empirical data to determine if this incorrect assumption influences the model's findings, I maintain this assumption for the same reason as Denzau and Munger (1986, 93): simplicity. One can relax this assumption by looking at individual contributors.

productive in a particular policy domain. Institutional capacity refers to a legislator's ability to influence certain policy domains over others, including committee assignments, committee chair positions, and seniority. A legislator's constituency preferences bind the legislator from making public policy that would diminish his/her chances for reelection (Denzau and Munger 1986, 93-99). What governs the supply price of public policy, and the organized interest's decision to support a legislator, is the legislator's comparative advantage at supplying public policy. Due to the organization of Congress via the committee and seniority system, and geographic representation in districts and states, each legislator has something different to offer organized interests; hence, "the more adept the legislator is at producing policy services for a group, the lower the minimum price he will require for doing so" (Denzau and Munger 1986, 97). The legislator's comparative advantage, while a source of effort on public policy labor, also reflects the *cost* to the PAC when making strategic decisions about electoral spending and support.

The cost of each legislator (i.e., institutional capacity, constituency characteristics) is the *supply price* to the PAC, or the supply price for public policy. Since organized interests are constrained maximizers, and have the assumed ability to shop between the 535 members of Congress who themselves are organized to achieve a division of labor, PACs seek the lowest supply price for public policy favors. In sum, what constrains PAC strategy is the supply price (e.g. legislator characteristics) of public policy. If correct, then this model's conclusions have ramifications for representation and public policy.

The primary conclusion emanating from the supply of public policy model is that our democratic system represents unorganized interests because the supply price facing organized interests embed the interests of the unorganized. Unorganized voters make decisions “based not on whether the legislator accepts money, but on what he does in order to elicit the contributions in the first place,” thus, “in deciding which interest groups to serve, the legislator must consider the response of the large, unorganized group” (Denzau and Munger 1986, 95).⁸² Organized interests are not passive elements in the election cycle, merely supplying services and money to those legislators seeking monetary help, rather, they seek benefits actively from government, exploiting the institutional design of Congress to achieve these benefits cheaply. The assumption is that “each interest group desires to achieve a set of goals, and makes its campaign resource contributions in the way it believes best accomplishes these goals” (Denzau and Munger 1986, 97). This assumption of the *supply of public policy model*, and the public choice approach in general, underlies a majority of PAC research.

Ironically, it is PACs pursuing and maximizing their self-interest that reconciles the differences between organized and unorganized interests in elections. Throughout the discussion of the constraints faced by voters, interest groups, and legislators, Denzau and Munger (1986) assume that there is an antagonism between unorganized interests and organized interests, and it is the organized interest’s decision on whom to

⁸² This model presumably works even if voters are “rationally ignorant” since the “legislator must consider not only the reaction of voters given their present knowledge, but also the expected reaction if voters were to find out...thus, another consideration enters the interest group’s choice of which legislators to contribute to – the preferences of a legislators geographic constituency” (Denzau and Munger 1986, 100).

support monetarily that reconciles this tension. The beauty, elegance, and seductiveness of this approach is that voters and organized interests begin as antagonistic and become congruent once organized interests become seekers of legislation. The representation of unorganized interests via the behavior of organized interests is central to this model:

Although the unorganized group appears nowhere as an explicit agent in the bargaining over the policy outcome between the legislator and interest groups...the preferences and expected voting reaction of the unorganized group are implicitly embodied in the schedule of supply prices...The conclusion is that unorganized, noncontributing voters may be effectively represented even in a situation in which interest groups are well organized and active. The representation of such voters, deriving from the institutional requirement of periodic reelection for legislators, tends to reduce the influence of organized but nonvoting economic interests in the political process. Thus, unorganized groups can shape and constrain decisions to a greater extent than predicted by simple demand-oriented group theories of collective action (Denzau and Munger 1986, 98-103).

The fundamental purpose of the supply of public policy model is to show how unorganized interests can influence the behavior of congressional members through the behavior of organized interests, which is the core element of modern pluralism. The public approach to PAC strategy maintains the essential element of pluralism: the political behavior of organized interests helps represent the interests of unorganized interests.

Public Choice, Pluralism, and PAC Strategy: The Legislative Asset Model

Using the arguments from the *supply of public policy model*, Grier and Munger's (1986) *legislative asset model* analyzes PAC strategy more specifically. The purpose of the legislative asset model is twofold: (1) to show that the supply-side approach can explain most of the variation in PAC donations (and in turn, showing the rationality, self-interest motivations of PACs), and (2) to show the rent-seeking system is in equilibrium, balancing the representational interests of voters and organized

interests. The legislative asset model conveniently subsumes all strategies and PAC distinctions (rational, pragmatic, investor, ideological) under one postulate: all PACs will pursue their goals efficiently. Some PACs will pursue more legislative ends, which place primacy on the committee assignment, while other PACs place primacy on ideology so that ideological variables become more significant than others.⁸³ This application began a systematic inquiry into PAC spending combining legislative (i.e., pragmatic, investor-oriented PACs), electoral, and ideological strategies (i.e., ideological PACs) into one model of PAC behavior, as evidence shows that PACs use different strategies for different legislators (Stratmann 1992, 648).⁸⁴ Much of the PAC literature either implicitly (e.g., Grenzke 1989, 259; Rudolph 1999, 196-197) or explicitly (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999, 511; Endersby and Munger 1992, 79; Grier and Munger 1991, 1993; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 113; Havrilesky 1990, 243; Hersch and McDougall 2000, 331; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1163; Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 43-44; Snyder 1993, 219-220; Stratmann 1992, 649) adopts the legislative asset model, deriving from the supply-side model of public policy

⁸³ Some argue that the public choice approach, and by extension, the legislative asset model, do not think PACs are benign access seekers: “a considerable portion of recent discussion insists that PAC campaign contributions, in general, are merely investments in ‘access’ to (be able to ‘tell the PAC’s story’) incumbent politicians that are invariant with respect to either regulatory philosophy or voting records. Nevertheless, doubts about these contentions, quite understandably, persist,” and they are found in the public choice literature (Havrilesky 1990, 243-244). Many authors use a dichotomy between pragmatic, legislative, or investor oriented PACs versus electoral, ideological PACs (e.g., Rudolph 1999, 196-197; Sorauf 1988; Snyder 1990, 1992, 1993).

⁸⁴ The central dichotomy in the PAC-strategy literature has always been investment versus ideological, as investor PACs are “set up by organizations with relatively narrow economic interests – corporations, labor unions, trade associations, and farmers’ cooperatives,” but “ideological PAC contributions should be less persistent than investor PAC contributions...in particular, while there is persistence in both types, ideological PAC contributions exhibit considerably more year-to-year variation than investor PAC contributions” (e.g., Snyder 1992, 19). It is the unconnected PACs, as defined by the FEC, which are treated as ideological PACs (e.g., Sabato 1984; Snyder 1992, 21-22).

and the general public choice approach to political behavior. PACs are seekers of the cheapest favors possible, as they supply money and demand legislation and regulation.

The fundamental premise of the legislative asset model is that “PACs contribute disproportionately to legislators who have a comparative advantage in producing the services desired” (Grier and Munger 1986, 349). The simple premise of the public choice approach to PAC strategy is that PACs supply money and demand legislation, and strategize to satisfy this demand with minimizing cost. PACs shop around for the lowest cost legislator, and are able to do this shopping because legislator profiles are diverse:

each is elected from a distinct geographic district with voters whose preferences may vary widely across districts. Each legislator also has different endowments of ability and experience and a different position in the legislative committee system. Thus, the cost of providing services to interest groups will vary across legislators and interest groups can be expected to employ the legislator or group of legislators that are the least-cost suppliers of the desired policy (Grier and Munger 1986, 352).

This legislator-profile diversity and PACs’ ability to shop for legislators form the foundation of the comparative advantage thesis: PACs purchase legislative benefits from the lowest-cost providers, who are low cost because they are in a better position to supply the benefits, relative to other congressional members (Grier and Munger 1986, 354). The three sources of legislator differentiation are legislative, ideological, and electoral, which PACs use to establish the supply price (Grier and Munger 1986, 352-354).

A legislative strategy emphasizes the member’s committee assignment, incumbency, majority party status, leadership position, and seniority, both in the chamber and in committee. This strategy seeks to reduce institutional costs since the

House of Representatives allows some members to be more influential than others through committee assignments and leadership positions. PACs seek those members in the best institutional position to supply legislation corresponding to PAC and organized interest concerns (Grier and Munger 1986, 354). As the legislative asset model developed, the congressional committee took primacy in explaining PAC strategy.⁸⁵ Since the public choice approach views PACs as rent-seeking agents, the congressional committee system must be the most important variable in explaining how PACs achieve their goals, as rent seekers pursue legislative/regulatory items. This rent-seeking pursuit is not thought to come at the cost of voter wishes since “committees whose jurisdictions are most relevant to the policy interest of a group may still not receive contributions unless separate account is taken of the preferences of the voters those committee members represent” (Grier and Munger 1991, 26-27). If organized interests are rent seekers, and PACs are an extension of some organized interests, then the legislative process is the highest concern for PACs. Since much of the legislative process occurs in congressional committees, committee assignment should explain most of the variation in PAC donations. The congressional committee is vital to the public choice approach to PAC strategy:

We focus first on committee assignment because our theory predicts this variable is the most important institutional determinant of the allocation of PAC funds (Endersby and Munger 1992, 79).

⁸⁵ Box-Steffensmeier and Grant (1999, 512-517) do not find committee assignment to be a significant explanatory variable in PAC strategy; they organize committees into constituency, policy, prestige, and unrequested and examine total PAC dollars across those committee assignment classifications. In chapter two I use total PAC dollars in the district to search for committee assignment bias, and find little significant difference, except there are a few committees that receive much less PAC money. The authors add another variable to the legislative strategy, legislative success or *hit rate*, but this new variable adds very little explanatory power to public choice PAC-strategy models (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999, 516-518).

Interest groups maximize profits (or analogous to the model of Peltzman 1976) regulatory returns from campaign contributions...the prediction is that, *ceteris paribus*, the pattern of contributions should largely conform to the pattern of legislative jurisdictions (Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 113).

The committee system also allows congressional members to develop reputations and a long-term relationship with PACs (Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1163-1166). As a result, the expectation is that PACs embedded in certain policy domains will donate more than the average to members on certain committees, as PACs in certain domains donate more to certain committee members than they do to all other members not on the committee, and scholars have confirmed this hypothesis (e.g., Endersby and Munger 1992, 82; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1171-1172).⁸⁶ In sum, the legislative strategy expects incumbency, committee assignments, majority party status, leadership positions, and both chamber and committee seniority to explain the variation in the real dollar amount of PAC donations to congressional candidates.

An ideological strategy indicates that PACs account for a congressional members' voting ideology, political party (correlates with ideology), and by extension, constituency concerns. This strategy seeks to reduce constituent costs on the PAC by contributing to congressional members who can act on PAC needs without creating discontent among constituents. PACs donate to congressional members who are

⁸⁶ Eismeier and Pollock (1984, 137; 1986, 293, 303) also measure the influence of governmental regulation on industry PAC contribution patterns. The authors find those industries subject to traditional economic regulation contributed more to incumbents while those industries subject to new social regulation contributed more to Republican challengers in the early 1980s. The influence of regulation on PAC contribution strategy should not only be manifest in partisan giving, but also a broader legislative strategy. Their findings indicate "support for the thesis that at least part of the observed variation in corporate PAC spending may be understood in terms of the complex web of government-business relations that has been spun in this century" (Eismeier and Pollock 1986, 303). Another interesting research design is using Eismeier and Pollock's application of electoral expectations (I could interact presidential approval with political party in the regression) (Eismeier and Pollock 1986, 305).

ideologically similar because it would cost too much to shift a member ideologically (Grier and Munger 1986, 355). This strategy is also indicated by PACs giving more money to the one political party over another (Brunell 2005, 685). In sum, the ideological strategy predicts that ideology, as measured with roll call votes, and district partisanship, as measured with the Democratic presidential normal vote, explains the variation in the real dollar amount of PAC donations to congressional candidates.

An electoral strategy indicates that PACs donate to those friendly members who face electoral uncertainty during the current election, allowing PACs to acquire leverage over a winning candidate in the next congressional session. Electoral costs refer to a PAC's ability to rent low-cost members by supporting vulnerable representatives. Congressional members are more likely to act in the PAC's interest when the member needs money to win an election. If the candidate campaigns for a safe seat, then PACs must spend more money to acquire the congressional member's attention (Grier and Munger 1986, 353-355).

Underlying these three strategies is the notion that PACs donate only in districts with constituent preferences congruent with the PAC's goals. PACs will not donate the required amount of money (it may be an amount beyond the limit anyways) necessary to shift a congressional member's policy preferences in a direction opposite of his/her constituency. Even in cases of industry rivalry (e.g., General Motors, Ford), the PACs within an industry illustrate similar donation patterns to congressional districts with high industry employment, regardless of the company, which could mean that PAC strategy concerns collective, industry benefits rather than particular benefits to one company within an industry (Hersch and McDougall 2000, 336-339). In sum, the

important variables for the legislative asset model conform to legislative, ideological, and electoral strategies, with no variables concerning the organizational or maintenance needs of PACs and how those needs affect PAC strategy.

The assumption that must occur for this model to be the most accurate explanation of PAC strategy is that PACs are placeless entities:

Our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his constituency...we do not model interest group decisions directly, assuming simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost supplier...policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium (Grier and Munger 1991, 24-25).

The legislative asset model, and all research that uses this model, views legislators and voters as bound geographically to a district, and it is PACs that can maneuver among districts donating money. By law, this conceptualization of elections is true, money can cross district and state lines, but voters and legislators cannot; however, in reality, the model ignores demand-side constraints making PAC donations less portable (e.g., PACs have organizational maintenance goals and must respond to individual donor wishes). The assumption that PACs are placeless entities, responding to supply prices, unbound by organizational need and geography is not academic, its accuracy has real consequence for the public choice approach to politics.

The purpose of the legislative asset model is to show how the distribution of organized interests through out American politics (i.e., the demand side) is inconsequential for public policy outputs because organized interests respond to supply-side forces, and these supply-side actors (i.e., legislators) must respond to unorganized interests, since voters hold legislators accountable at the voting booth; thus, PACs

donate money to legislators who cannot deviate beyond the policy parameters set by unorganized interests. For this story to represent reality, PACs must be placeless organizations. If PACs do not act according to the legislative asset model, then the pluralistic conception of representation is less appealing.

I test the legislative asset model on the net 1989 real dollar PAC donation patterns of twelve policy sectors during the 1990 through 2006 electoral cycles (direct and in-kind donations): agribusiness, communications/electronics, construction, defense, energy and natural resources, finance, insurance, and real estate, health, ideological and single issues, labor, lawyers and lobbyists, miscellaneous business, and transportation. Organizing PACs by policy sector is the most appropriate method to test the legislative asset model, as opposed to geographical organization, because the legislative asset model views PACs as rent seekers, and PACs representing similar public policy domains should have similar strategies to obtain public policy goals. The dependent variable is the percentage of total policy sector donations to a congressional district during the electoral cycle, measured with direct and in-kind donations. For example, if a policy sector donated \$9 million in direct and in-kind donations, and \$25,000 of that total was donated to a single congressional district, then the value of the dependent variable for that observation is .0028. In this example, the policy sector donated .28% of its total donations to that congressional district.

At the policy-sector level the PAC system is highly stable and diffuse, with the twelve policy sectors exhibiting repeat giving across most congressional districts. Table 4.1 displays the proportion of congressional districts receiving PAC donations from each policy sector during the 1990-2006 electoral cycles. At the policy-sector level, it

makes little sense to use a dichotomous dependent variable for the incidence of PAC donations; instead, it is more important to focus on the amount of the policy sector donations to each district, in the form of a percent of the entire policy sector donations (direct, in-kind) to the district.

Table 4.1 Incidence of PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Policy Sector, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Policy Sector	Congressional Districts Receiving Donations	Percent of Total (Total N=3,915)
Agribusiness	3,782	96.6%
Communications/Electronics	3,791	96.8%
Construction	3,659	93.4%
Defense	3,399	86.8%
Energy and Natural Resources	3,778	96.5%
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate	3,857	98.5%
Health	3,843	98.1%
Ideological and Single Issue	3,840	98.1%
Labor	3,814	97.4%
Lawyers and Lobbyists	3,735	95.3%
Miscellaneous Business	3,840	98.1%
Transportation	3,775	96.4%

a. PAC donations refers to direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only, measured as net 1989 real dollar donations.

Using OLS multivariate regression, I regress a series of independent variables on this dependent variable, and the value of each coefficient is a percent. There is a total of 24 models. I test the legislative asset model on each of the 12 policy sectors listed in table 4.1, and for each policy sector there is an incumbent and open seat model. The incumbent model uses the dependent variable for congressional districts with an incumbent in the general election, and the open seat model uses the dependent variable for congressional districts without an incumbent in the general election. The independent variables represent the three strategies of the legislative asset model.

For the legislative strategy, I use the full committee assignments of jurisdiction and of the *high-priced* policy committees (e.g., Appropriations, Energy and Commerce,

House Administration, Rules, and Ways and Means Committees). I measure both jurisdiction and policy full committee assignments with a categorical variable capturing those that sit on the committee (value of 1), the committee chair (value of 2), and those that do not sit on the committee (value of 0). The House Administration committee is usually not included in most research designs but those congressional members sitting on this committee receive more money than those that do not (see Chapter Two), probably for one particular reason. The House Administration Committee's jurisdiction includes drafting regulations for contested elections, corrupt behavior, and campaign contributions. I measure the committee assignment variable using the assignment from the second term of the previous legislative session. For the incumbent model, it is the committee assignment of the incumbent entering the general election, and for the open seat model, it is the committee assignment of the previous congressional member. The other two variables that represent the legislative strategy are leadership and chamber seniority. I measure leadership position with a dichotomous variable. Those districts with a congressional member occupying the Speaker of the House, the majority/minority party leader, and majority/minority party whip are considered leadership positions (value of 1), and all other positions are not considered leadership (value of 0). I measure leadership position using the positioning of the second term of the previous legislative session. For the incumbent model, it is the leadership positioning of the incumbent entering the general election, and for the open seat model, it is the leadership positioning of the previous congressional member. I measure chamber seniority with the total legislative sessions of service of the previous congressional member before the general election. For the incumbent model, it is the

total sessions of the incumbent entering the general election, and for the open seat model, it is the total sessions of the previous congressional member.⁸⁷ I expect high-priced committees, committees of jurisdiction, leadership positioning, and chamber seniority to all increase the percentage of net real dollar donations of a policy sector to a congressional district, for both the incumbent and open seat model. The only policy sector I do not expect to have a legislative strategy is the ideological and single issue PACs.

The ideological strategy consists of two variables, capturing the ideology of the congressional member and of the district. I measure the ideology of the congressional member using the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE scores, with negative values indicating the congressional member is a liberal and positive values indicating the congressional member is a conservative. I measure the ideological scores for the previous congressional member. For the incumbent model, it is the ideological score of the incumbent entering the general election, and for the open seat model, it is the ideological score of the previous congressional member. I measure district partisanship using the Democratic presidential normal vote (two-party percentage of vote for the Democratic presidential candidate in district minus the two-party percentage of vote for the Democratic presidential candidate in nation), with negative values indicating conservative districts and positive values indicating liberal districts. I measure this variable using the current election when the electoral cycle is a presidential election year and the previous election when it is a midterm election (e.g., 1992 normal vote for

⁸⁷ I do not use majority party or political party affiliation because ideology correlates with those variables, and I do not use committee seniority because its performance is similar to the categorical variable.

the 1992 electoral cycle, and 1992 normal vote for the 1994 electoral cycle). I expect the ideological strategy to influence the percentage of net real dollar policy sector donations to a congressional district, but the direction of such influence will depend on the policy sector. For example, I expect labor PACs to donate heavily to liberal and Democratic districts, and miscellaneous business PACs to donate heavily to conservative and Republican districts.

The electoral strategy includes five independent variables: electoral margin, Democratic quality challenger, Republican quality challenger, freshman status, and constituency characteristics. I measure electoral margin of victory using the results from the current electoral cycle, and as a percent difference between the winner and the second-place finisher [$(\# \text{ votes for winner} - \# \text{ votes for second-place}) / (\# \text{ votes for winner} + \# \text{ votes for second-place})$]. I measure quality challenger with a dichotomous variable for each the Democratic and Republican Party. Those challengers who have held elected office previously are quality challengers (value of 1). I measure the freshman status of the incumbent with a dichotomous variable. I consider a freshman as those incumbents entering their second election with one legislative session of experience (value of 1). The final variable of the electoral strategy is constituency characteristics. I measure constituency characteristics using percent employment in a policy sector, which derives from the U.S. Census Bureau, measured every 10 years and updated for congressional redistricting. I also include dichotomous control variables for electoral cycles 1992 through 2006, with 1990 as the baseline.

I expect the electoral strategy to influence the percentage of net real dollar policy sector donations to a congressional district. The electoral margin of victory

should have a negative correlation with PAC donations, as the margin of victory increases, the percent of PAC donations to the congressional district should decrease. The presence of a quality challenger should increase the percentage of PAC donations to a congressional district, but the partisanship of such increase is ambiguous. For example, an increase in total PAC donations to a congressional district as a result of the presence of a Democratic quality challenger may not actually go to that Democrat. If a policy sector donates to conservative districts, then the total PAC donations may increase as a result of the Democratic quality challenger because the policy sector donates more to the conservative incumbent. I expect the presence of a freshman incumbent to increase PAC donations, and the level of employment in the district should increase the net real dollar percentage as well. PACs within a policy sector should place more emphasis on elections in districts with higher employment in that sector. While the overall performance of the legislative asset model is important to the entire public choice theoretical perspective of PAC strategy, committee assignments and constituency characteristics are the most important variables to the model. The statistical significance of committee assignments gives credence to the rent-seeking approach, and the statistical significance of constituency characteristics gives credence to the pluralistic perspective on political representation.

Findings

Tables 4.2-4.13 display the incumbent and open seat models for each of the twelve policy sectors, all with predictable results corresponding to previous findings. Across all policy sectors, the legislative asset model explains PAC donations to congressional districts with incumbents in the general election better than open seats,

and while elements of all strategies are statistically significant, the legislative strategy and constituency characteristics influence a greater percentage of PAC donations to congressional districts than other strategies; however, the overall fit of the legislative asset model to the PAC system is questionable.

Table 4.2 Agribusiness PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Incumbent Model	Open Seat Model
Constant	.075 (.015)***	.138 (.048)**
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>		
Agriculture Committee	.401 (.012)***	.059 (.034)
Appropriations Committee	.113 (.01)***	.021 (.03)
Energy and Commerce Committee	.086 (.011)***	.007 (.029)
House Administration Committee	.045 (.018)*	-.01 (.062)
Rules Committee	.063 (.018)***	-.042 (.054)
Ways and Means Committee	.131 (.012)***	.053 (.03)
Leadership Position	.418 (.031)***	.109 (.132)
Chamber Seniority	-.001 (.001)	.000181 (.002)
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>		
Ideology	.019 (.013)	-.014 (.032)
District Partisanship	-.203 (.042)***	-.119 (.112)
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>		
Electoral Margin	-.104 (.014)***	-.169 (.052)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.06 (.014)***	.023 (.021)
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.022 (.014)	.013 (.021)
Freshman	.02 (.011)	N/A
Percent Employed in Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting	2.597 (.153)**	2.671 (.402)***
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>		
1992	.036 (.015)*	-.044 (.041)
1994	.028 (.015)	-.047 (.043)
1996	.026 (.015)	-.026 (.043)
1998	.063 (.015)***	.033 (.048)
2000	.059 (.015)***	.087 (.048)
2002	.063 (.015)***	.078 (.049)
2004	.053 (.015)***	.034 (.047)
2006	.062 (.015)***	.003 (.048)
R ²	.470	.282
Adj. R ²	.466	.236
F	133.5	6.135
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.048	.000/.129
N	3,492	367

a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) multiplied by 100. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses. I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats (n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11).

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls, and these committee

assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables ($p < .05$): Agriculture Committee, Appropriations Committee, House Administration, and Ways and Means Committee.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 4.3 Communications and Electronics PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Incumbent Model	Open Seat Model
Constant	.097 (.016)***	.172 (.041)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>		
Appropriations Committee	.025 (.01)**	.035 (.021)
Energy and Commerce Committee	.418 (.01)***	.051 (.021)*
Homeland Security Committee	.059 (.022)**	.003 (.051)
House Administration Committee	.058 (.017)***	-.041 (.046)
Rules Committee	.114 (.017)***	.013 (.04)
Science Committee	.02 (.01)*	.015 (.024)
Ways and Means Committee	.071 (.012)***	.031 (.022)
Leadership Position	.671 (.03)***	.237 (.1)*
Chamber Seniority	.009 (.001)***	.0000364 (.002)
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>		
Ideology	.043 (.012)***	.002 (.024)
District Partisanship	-.04 (.039)	-.168 (.081)*
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>		
Electoral Margin	-.092 (.013)***	-.092 (.039)*
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.035 (.013)**	.001 (.015)
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.036 (.013)**	.003 (.016)
Freshman	.062 (.01)***	N/A
Percent Employed in Information and Utilities	1.611 (.312)***	1.006 (.857)
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>		
1992	.008 (.014)	-.067 (.03)*
1994	.002 (.014)	-.051 (.031)
1996	-.009 (.014)	-.032 (.031)
1998	-.021 (.014)	-.046 (.035)
2000	-.027 (.014)*	.002 (.034)
2002	-.038 (.014)**	.003 (.035)
2004	-.039 (.014)**	-.09 (.035)**
2006	-.044 (.014)**	-.058 (.035)
R ²	.430	.151
Adj. R ²	.426	.094
F	109.173	2.656
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.029	.000/.193
N	3,492	367

a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) multiplied by 100. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses. I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats ($n=45$) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election ($n=11$).

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables ($p < .05$): Energy and Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Judiciary Committee, Rules Committee, and Homeland Security Committee.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 4.4 Construction PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Incumbent Model	Open Seat Model
Constant	.172 (.017)***	.354 (.055)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>		
Appropriations Committee	.074 (.009)***	.072 (.026)**
Banking and Financial Services Committee	.049 (.009)***	.016 (.026)
Energy and Commerce Committee	.055 (.01)***	.007 (.026)
House Administration Committee	-.004 (.015)	.009 (.054)
Rules Committee	.076 (.016)***	-.022 (.047)
Transportation and Infrastructure	.183 (.009)***	.038 (.025)
Ways and Means Committee	.065 (.011)***	.049 (.027)
Leadership Position	.375 (.028)***	.291 (.115)*
Chamber Seniority	.005 (.001)***	.001 (.002)
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>		
Ideology	.112 (.011)***	.036 (.028)
District Partisanship	-.117 (.038)**	-.225 (.101)*
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>		
Electoral Margin	-.149 (.012)***	-.264 (.045)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.076 (.012)***	.017 (.018)
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.046 (.012)***	.027 (.018)
Freshman	.074 (.009)***	N/A
Percent Employed in Construction	.412 (.204)*	-.732 (.637)
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>		
1992	-.012 (.013)	-.135 (.035)***
1994	-.024 (.013)	-.076 (.037)*
1996	-.043 (.013)***	-.055 (.037)
1998	-.033 (.013)**	-.006 (.04)
2000	-.036 (.013)**	.081 (.04)*
2002	-.034 (.013)**	.005 (.041)
2004	-.036 (.013)**	-.066 (.041)
2006	-.042 (.013)***	-.069 (.04)
R ²	.322	.331
Adj. R ²	.318	.286
F	68.710	7.37
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.046	.000/.344
N	3,492	367

a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) multiplied by 100. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses. I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats (n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11).

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Appropriations Committee, Banking and Financial Services Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Rules Committee, Ways and Means Committee, and Homeland Security Committee.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 4.5 Defense PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Incumbent Model	Open Seat Model
Constant	-.017 (.023)	.088 (.036)*
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>		
Appropriations Committee	.401 (.016)***	.047 (.023)*
Armed Services Committee	.445 (.016)***	.138 (.023)***
Energy and Commerce Committee	.019 (.017)	.007 (.022)
Foreign Affairs Committee	-.01 (.017)	-.029 (.023)
Homeland Security Committee	.047 (.035)	.059 (.052)
House Administration Committee	.056 (.027)*	-.014 (.047)
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence	.198 (.023)***	.025 (.045)
Rules Committee	.042 (.028)	.025 (.041)
Science Committee	.11 (.017)***	.03 (.025)
Ways and Means Committee	.024 (.02)	.02 (.023)
Leadership Position	.2 (.048)***	.038 (.103)
Chamber Seniority	.017 (.002)***	.001 (.002)
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>		
Ideology	.032 (.02)	.001 (.024)
District Partisanship	-.363 (.066)***	-.087 (.086)
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>		
Electoral Margin	-.076 (.021)***	-.112 (.039)**
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.013 (.021)	-.001 (.016)
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.039 (.021)	-.001 (.016)
Freshman	.035 (.016)*	N/A
Percent Employed in Professional, Scientific, and Management	1.151 (.204)***	.665 (.332)*
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>		
1992	-.016 (.023)	-.066 (.031)*
1994	-.019 (.023)	-.08 (.033)*
1996	-.008 (.023)	-.067 (.032)*
1998	-.039 (.024)	-.103 (.038)**
2000	-.056 (.024)*	.011 (.039)
2002	-.064 (.024)**	-.008 (.037)
2004	-.079 (.024)***	-.072 (.038)
2006	-.085 (.024)***	-.067 (.038)
R ²	.356	.237
Adj. R ²	.350	.179
F	70.770	4.062
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.036	.000/.119
N	3,492	367

a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) multiplied by 100. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses. I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats (n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11).

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Appropriations Committee, Armed Services Committee, House Administration Committee, Science Committee, and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 4.6 Energy and Natural Resource PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Incumbent Model	Open Seat Model
Constant	.058 (.015)***	.13 (.044)**
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>		
Agriculture Committee	-.003 (.011)	-.031 (.025)
Appropriations Committee	.087 (.01)***	.067 (.025)**
Energy and Commerce Committee	.333 (.011)***	.025 (.024)
House Administration Committee	.032 (.017)	.053 (.052)
Resources Committee	.077 (.011)***	.063 (.03)*
Rules Committee	.046 (.018)**	-.025 (.045)
Science Committee	.035 (.011)***	-.008 (.028)
Ways and Means Committee	.135 (.012)***	.053 (.025)*
Leadership Position	.482 (.03)***	.079 (.11)
Chamber Seniority	.004 (.001)***	-.003 (.002)
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>		
Ideology	.042 (.013)***	-.03 (.027)
District Partisanship	-.304 (.04)***	-.38 (.094)***
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>		
Electoral Margin	-.091 (.014)***	-.105 (.044)*
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.086 (.013)***	.03 (.018)
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.023 (.013)	.029 (.018)
Freshman	.08 (.01)***	N/A
Percent Employed in Mining	2.421 (.194)***	2.274 (.522)***
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>		
1992	.072 (.016)***	.022 (.04)
1994	.066 (.016)***	.066 (.041)
1996	.056 (.016)***	.076 (.041)
1998	.077 (.016)***	.068 (.046)
2000	.074 (.016)***	.13 (.044)**
2002	.064 (.016)***	.102 (.045)*
2004	.07 (.016)***	.027 (.044)
2006	.064 (.016)***	.084 (.044)
R ²	.387	.273
Adj. R ²	.383	.223
F	87.534	5.365
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.046	.000/.226
N	3,492	367

a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) multiplied by 100. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses. I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats (n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11).

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Agriculture Committee, Appropriations, Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, Resources Committee, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Science Committee, Ways and Means Committee, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 4.7 Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Incumbent Model	Open Seat Model
Constant	.116 (.014)***	.165 (.034)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>		
Appropriations Committee	.014 (.009)	.027 (.019)
Banking and Financial Services	.304 (.009)***	.109 (.02)***
Energy and Commerce Committee	.154 (.009)***	.011 (.019)
House Administration Committee	.093 (.015)***	.079 (.041)
Rules Committee	.167 (.016)***	.032 (.036)
Ways and Means Committee	.299 (.011)***	.067 (.02)***
Leadership Position	.555 (.027)***	.149 (.088)
Chamber Seniority	.001 (.001)	-.000085 (.002)
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>		
Ideology	.021 (.011)	-.013 (.021)
District Partisanship	-.184 (.037)***	-.23 (.075)**
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>		
Electoral Margin	-.11 (.012)***	-.115 (.035)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.038 (.012)***	.022 (.014)
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.05 (.012)**	-.000259 (.014)
Freshman	.035 (.009)***	N/A
Percent Employed in Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Rental and Leasing	1.0 (.136)***	.345 (.314)
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>		
1992	-.023 (.013)	-.013 (.027)
1994	-.017 (.013)	-.048 (.028)
1996	-.025 (.013)*	-.036 (.028)
1998	-.026 (.012)*	.017 (.031)
2000	-.024 (.012)	.03 (.031)
2002	-.042 (.013)***	.054 (.031)
2004	-.038 (.012)**	-.007 (.03)
2006	-.038 (.012)**	.023 (.031)
R ²	.441	.234
Adj. R ²	.437	.185
F	118.737	4.782
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.018	.000/.344
N	3,492	367

a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) multiplied by 100. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses. I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats (n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11).

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Banking and Financial Services Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Rules Committee, and Ways and Means Committee.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 4.8 Health PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Incumbent Model	Open Seat Model
Constant	.206 (.018)***	.348 (.055)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>		
Appropriations Committee	.059 (.01)***	.029 (.025)
Budget Committee	-.011 (.011)	.01 (.025)
Education and Labor Committee	.018 (.011)	-.005 (.026)
Energy and Commerce Committee	.319 (.01)***	.001 (.024)
House Administration Committee	.096 (.017)***	-.042 (.053)
Rules Committee	.083 (.017)**	-.008 (.046)
Ways and Means Committee	.367 (.012)***	.066 (.026)
Leadership Position	.555 (.01)***	.131 (.113)
Chamber Seniority	.0000451 (.001)	-.002 (.002)
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>		
Ideology	.001 (.012)	.002 (.028)
District Partisanship	-.045 (.04)	-.128 (.098)
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>		
Electoral Margin	-.148 (.013)***	-.08 (.045)
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.044 (.013)***	.011 (.018)
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.052 (.013)***	.003 (.018)
Freshman	.08 (.01)***	N/A
Percent Employed in Health Care and Social Assistance	-.240 (.182)	-.347 (.536)
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>		
1992	-.018 (.014)	-.07 (.035)*
1994	-.024 (.014)	-.026 (.037)
1996	-.02 (.014)	-.085 (.036)*
1998	.002 (.015)	-.069 (.044)
2000	-.003 (.015)	-.011 (.043)
2002	-.009 (.015)	-.065 (.045)
2004	-.007 (.015)	-.056 (.044)
2006	-.006 (.015)	-.06 (.045)
R ²	.397	.096
Adj. R ²	.393	.036
F	95.305	1.59 (.043)
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.080	.000/.233
N	3,492	367

a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) multiplied by 100. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses. I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats (n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11).

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Energy and Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Ways and Means Committee, and District of Columbia Committee.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 4.9 Ideological and Single Issue PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, Electoral Cycles 1990-2006^a

Independent Variables	Incumbent Model	Open Seat Model
Constant	.319 (.014)***	.791 (.074)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>		
Appropriations Committee	.015 (.011)	.066 (.049)
Energy and Commerce Committee	-.002 (.012)	-.065 (.047)
House Administration Committee	.007 (.019)	-.038 (.104)
Judiciary Committee	-.007 (.013)	.054 (.061)
Rules Committee	.000249 (.019)	-.056 (.09)
Ways and Means Committee	-.016 (.013)	.025 (.05)
Leadership Position	.252 (.033)***	-.023 (.221)
Chamber Seniority	-.003 (.001)*	-.007 (.004)
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>		
Ideology	-.062 (.014)***	.000105 (.054)
District Partisanship	.041 (.044)	.688 (.185)***
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>		
Electoral Margin	-.332 (.015)***	-.814 (.087)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.144 (.015)***	.015 (.035)
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.164 (.015)***	.052 (.035)
Freshman	.156 (.012)***	N/A
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>		
1992	-.058 (.016)***	-.291 (.067)***
1994	-.052 (.015)***	-.205 (.07)**
1996	-.038 (.016)*	-.306 (.07)***
1998	-.012 (.015)	-.08 (.077)
2000	-.018 (.015)	.08 (.075)
2002	-.011 (.015)	.065 (.078)
2004	-.005 (.015)	-.045 (.076)
2006	-.012 (.015)	-.058 (.077)
R ²	.311	.343
Adj. R ²	.307	.303
F	71.204	8.58
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.027	.000/.049
N	3,492	367

a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) multiplied by 100. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses. I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats (n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11).

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Science Committee and Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 4.10 Labor PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Incumbent Model	Open Seat Model
Constant	.271 (.021)***	.455 (.087)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>		
Appropriations Committee	.009 (.008)	.042 (.027)
Education and Labor Committee	.009 (.008)	-.017 (.027)
Energy and Commerce Committee	.002 (.008)	-.029 (.026)
House Administration Committee	.029 (.013)*	.09 (.056)
Rules Committee	.039 (.013)**	-.077 (.049)
Transportation and Infrastructure	.047 (.007)***	.022 (.026)
Ways and Means Committee	.001 (.009)	.021 (.027)
Leadership Position	.234 (.023)***	.105 (.119)
Chamber Seniority	-.003 (.001)***	-.002 (.002)
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>		
Ideology	-.251 (.009)***	-.081 (.029)**
District Partisanship	.006 (.033)	.569 (.106)***
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>		
Electoral Margin	-.247 (.01)***	-.511 (.048)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.099 (.01)***	.053 (.019)**
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.085 (.01)***	.003 (.019)
Freshman	.084 (.008)***	N/A
Percent Employed in Construction	.142 (.173)	-.314 (.688)
Percent Employed in Manufacturing	-.038 (.041)	.094 (.144)
Percent Employed in Mining	.029 (.147)	-.537 (.581)
Percent in Transportation and Warehousing	.427 (.197)*	.793 (.783)
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>		
1992	-.037 (.012)**	-.163 (.045)***
1994	-.034 (.012)**	-.103 (.046)**
1996	-.009 (.012)	-.122 (.045)**
1998	.011 (.013)	-.047 (.052)
2000	.006 (.013)	.053 (.052)
2002	.017 (.013)	.005 (.052)
2004	.023 (.013)	-.024 (.051)
2006	.013 (.013)	-.013 (.052)
R ²	.477	.419
Adj. R ²	.473	.375
F	116.903	9.443
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.014	.000/.093
N	3,492	367

a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations to the congressional district, in net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) multiplied by 100. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses. I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats (n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11).

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Post Office and Civil Service Committee.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 4.11 Lawyers and Lobbyists PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Incumbent Model	Open Seat Model
Constant	.144 (.012)***	.295 (.042)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>		
Appropriations Committee	.045 (.009)***	.032 (.026)
Energy and Commerce Committee	.114 (.009)***	.013 (.025)
House Administration Committee	.081 (.015)***	.009 (.055)
Judiciary Committee	.074 (.01)***	-.019 (.117)
Rules Committee	.078 (.015)***	-.021 (.048)
Ways and Means Committee	.139 (.011)***	.094 (.026)***
Leadership Position	.431 (.027)***	.191 (.117)
Chamber Seniority	.01 (.001)***	.000411 (.002)
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>		
Ideology	-.129 (.011)***	-.072 (.029)*
District Partisanship	-.109 (.036)**	.189 (.099)
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>		
Electoral Margin	-.136 (.012)***	-.219 (.046)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.037 (.011)***	.001 (.018)
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.065 (.012)***	-.022 (.019)
Freshman	.098 (.009)***	N/A
Percent Employed in Professional, Scientific, and Management	.308 (.113)**	.715 (.387)
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>		
1992	-.021 (.013)	-.121 (.037)***
1994	-.026 (.013)*	-.042 (.038)
1996	.001 (.013)	-.091 (.038)*
1998	.005 (.013)	-.107 (.045)*
2000	-.002 (.013)	-.017 (.045)
2002	-.005 (.013)	-.033 (.044)
2004	-.004 (.013)	-.094 (.044)*
2006	-.009 (.013)	-.07 (.045)
R ²	.282	.174
Adj. R ²	.277	.121
F	59.176	3.3
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.055	.000/.111
N	3,492	367

a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) multiplied by 100. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses. I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats (n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11).

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Energy and Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Judiciary Committee, and Ways and Means Committee.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 4.12 Miscellaneous Business PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Incumbent Model	Open Seat Model
Constant	.309 (.041)***	.304 (.136)*
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>		
Appropriations Committee	.037 (.009)***	.062 (.026)*
Energy and Commerce Committee	.109 (.009)***	-.003 (.026)
House Administration Committee	.065 (.015)***	-.094 (.055)
Rules Committee	.066 (.015)***	.046 (.048)
Small Business Committee	.033 (.01)***	.023 (.031)
Transportation and Infrastructure	.048 (.008)***	.011 (.025)
Ways and Means Committee	.242 (.01)***	.078 (.027)**
Leadership Position	.634 (.026)***	.169 (.117)
Chamber Seniority	.003 (.001)***	-.003 (.002)
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>		
Ideology	.109 (.011)***	-.024 (.029)
District Partisanship	-.061 (.036)	-.217 (.1)*
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>		
Electoral Margin	-.170 (.012)***	-.3 (.047)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.091 (.011)***	.037 (.018)*
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.045 (.011)***	.051 (.019)**
Freshman	.079 (.009)***	N/A
Percent Employed in Manufacturing	-.016 (.045)	.141 (.14)
Percent Employed in Retail	-.356 (.214)	.044 (.623)
Percent Employed in Wholesale	-.784 (.31)*	-.113 (.943)
Trade		
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>		
1992	-.009 (.013)	-.122 (.036)***
1994	-.023 (.012)	-.055 (.038)
1996	-.042 (.012)***	-.038 (.038)
1998	-.047 (.016)**	.021 (.054)
2000	-.048 (.016)**	.067 (.053)
2002	-.047 (.016)**	-.038 (.53)
2004	-.046 (.016)**	-.071 (.053)
2006	-.051 (.016)***	-.046 (.053)
R ²	.387	.323
Adj. R ²	.382	.274
F	84.119	6.517
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.048	.000/.053
N	3,492	367

a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) multiplied by 100. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses. I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats (n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11).

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Agriculture Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Small Business Committee, and Ways and Means Committee.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 4.13 Transportation PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Incumbent Model	Open Seat Model
Constant	.079 (.014)***	.192 (.038)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>		
Appropriations Committee	.098 (.009)***	.05 (.02)*
Energy and Commerce Committee	.096 (.009)***	-.009 (.02)
House Administration Committee	.027 (.014)	-.006 (.042)
Rules Committee	.082 (.015)**	-.017 (.037)
Transportation and Infrastructure	.241 (.008)***	.036 (.02)
Ways and Means Committee	.138 (.01)***	.05 (.02)*
Leadership Position	.491 (.026)***	.294 (.09)***
Chamber Seniority	.007 (.001)***	-.002 (.002)
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>		
Ideology	.076 (.011)***	.005 (.022)
District Partisanship	-.229 (.034)***	-.275 (.076)***
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>		
Electoral Margin	-.110 (.012)***	-.124 (.036)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.047 (.011)***	.003 (.014)
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.017 (.011)	.007 (.014)
Freshman	.043 (.009)***	N/A
Percent Employed in Transportation and Warehousing	2.029 (.221)***	.362 (.575)
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>		
1992	-.003 (.012)	-.047 (.027)
1994	-.016 (.012)	-.014 (.029)
1996	-.024 (.012)*	-.016 (.028)
1998	-.021 (.012)	.024 (.031)
2000	-.026 (.012)*	.089 (.031)**
2002	-.027 (.012)*	.045 (.031)
2004	-.033 (.012)**	.004 (.031)
2006	-.036 (.012)**	.012 (.031)
R ²	.382	.270
Adj. R ²	.378	.224
F	93.228	5.796
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.034	.000/.424
N	3,492	367

a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) multiplied by 100. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses. I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats (n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11).

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Appropriations Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Rules Committee, Ways and Means Committee, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

The legislative strategy is significant for all policy domains except ideological PACs. Across all policy sectors, except ideological PACs, PACs donate a higher percentage of their total net real dollar donations to districts with incumbents on policy committees and committees of jurisdictions important to the PACs. Not only are these committee assignments statistically significant and high levels ($p < .001$), but the coefficients are relatively large, explaining larger shifts in the percent donated to the district than many other variables. For example, for incumbents sitting on the Agriculture committee, on average, those districts receive .401 percent more agriculture PAC donations than those who do not sit on the committee, and for financial, insurance, and real estate PACs, those incumbents sitting on the Banking and Financial Services Committee have an increase of .304 percent of those PACs donation budget. The other two variables of the legislative strategy are donations to those in leadership positions and donations on the basis of chamber seniority. Those districts with congressional members in a leadership position (Speaker of the House, majority/minority party leader, majority/minority party whip) all receive more PAC donations than those not occupying leadership positions. This variable is statistically significant, positive, and explains large shifts in the percent of total policy sector donations to a district, even for ideological PACs. Chamber seniority is not a significant explanatory variable for many policy sectors, and when it is significant, it does not explain large shifts in percent donations.

For open seats, only in isolated cases does the committee assignment of the previous congressional member explain variation in policy sector PAC donations. Defense PACs donate more net real dollars to open seats where the previous member

sat on the Armed Services Committee; energy and natural resource PACs to districts where the previous member sat on the Appropriations, Resources, or Ways and Means committee; finance, insurance, and real estate PACs to districts where the previous member sat on the Banking and Financial Services Committee or the Ways and Means Committee; lawyer and lobbyist PACs to districts where the previous member sat on the Ways and Means Committee; miscellaneous business PACs to districts where the previous member sat on the Appropriations or the Ways and Means Committees; and transportation PACs to open seat districts where the previous member sat on the Appropriations or the Ways and Means Committees.

These findings lend support for the legislative strategy, and the notion that PACs behave as policy-seeking actors in elections. Policy sectors, as represented by PACs, do exist in congressional elections, as PACs have ties to certain committees of jurisdiction depending on the policy interests of the PACs. With some nuance, the ideological and electoral strategies are as equally robust and as stable as the legislative strategy.

Both the congressional member ideological variable and the district partisanship variable are statistically significant predictors of PAC donations, but the influence of these variables is policy sector dependent. For construction, energy and natural resources, lawyers/lobbyists, and transportation policy sector PACs, both the individual and district ideological measures are statistically significant (health PACs do not have an ideological strategy, as both variables were statistically insignificant), and consistent, meaning the construction, energy and natural resources, and transportation policy sectors donated more money to conservative candidates and conservative districts. The exception was lawyer/lobbyists PACs, who donated more money to districts with liberal

incumbents and to more conservative districts. The remaining policy sectors donate according to an ideological strategy, but only one of the variables are statistically significant. Agribusiness, defense, and finance, insurance, and real estate donate more money to conservative districts, while communications/electronics and miscellaneous business PACs donate more to districts with conservative congressional members. Ideological and labor PACs donate more money to liberal congressional members. For open seats there is a slightly more uniform trend. Agribusiness, defense, and health PACs do not use an ideological strategy (as measured by these two variables) in open seat elections; neither the ideological leanings of the previous congressional member nor the voters' partisanship explain the distribution of PAC dollars in open seat elections for these policy sectors. Communications/electronics, construction, energy and natural resources, finance, insurance, and real estate, miscellaneous business, and transportation PACs donate to open seats on the basis of district partisanship alone, and give more money to open seats with more conservative voters. Ideological PACs give more money to liberal congressional districts in open seat elections, as do labor PACs, but labor PACs also donate more money to open seat elections in districts where the previous congressional member was an ideological liberal. Several variables representing the electoral strategy are also statistically significant in both incumbent and open seat elections.

For every policy sector, the election margin variable is statistically significant and negative, meaning that PAC donations for all policy sectors, as a percentage of its total, decrease as election margins between the winner and the second-place loser increase. All policy sector PAC donations increase as the election margin of victory

decreases. This trend is also true for open seat elections, with the exception of the health policy sector, which does not use electoral margin as a strategy for open seat elections. All policy sectors donate more to districts with a freshman incumbent running for reelection, with the exception of agribusiness. The presence of a quality challenger is another indication that more PAC money will flow into a congressional district. Communications/electronics, construction, finance, insurance, and real estate, health, ideological, labor, lawyers/lobbyists, and miscellaneous business donated a larger percentage of money to congressional districts with a Democratic quality challenger or a Republican quality challenger. Agribusiness, energy and natural resources, and transportation PACs only donated more money to congressional districts with a Democratic quality challenger; however, when coupled with a conservative ideological strategy, these policy sectors are not thought to give to the Democratic quality challenger, but to the Republican incumbent. It is this incumbent and conservative strategy that is increasing PAC money in the district with a Democratic quality challenger. Defense PACs did not increase donations to congressional districts with a quality challenger of either political party.

The last independent variable of interest is percent policy sector employment in the district. This variable is one of the strongest predictors of the amount of net real dollar policy sector PAC donations in a district. All policy sector PACs increase donations when the same policy sector's employment in that district increases. The only exception to this rule is the health sector, which could be a result of a lack of variation in health sector employment, as the amount of health care sector workers in each congressional district is high. Variation in labor and miscellaneous business PAC

donations explained by constituent employment, while still statistically significant, donate less on the basis of constituent employment; however, this finding could be an artifact of faulty variable operationalization. I expect a percent labor union membership variable to be a highly significant and positive predictor of labor PAC donations.

These PAC-strategy models seem to predict each policy sector fairly well, as the legislative, ideological, and electoral strategies intertwine to produce the predictions of the public choice approach: PACs pursue congressional members and select the politicians in best position to distribute rents back to the PAC. The two keystones of the model, the congressional committee and constituency characteristics, perform well, which gives credence to the notion that the rent-seeking system exists and is in equilibrium, as PACs seek those districts that support the industry; however, the model is a house of cards, once the model reaches beyond its limited foundation, it becomes very unstable.

This reproduction of the legislative asset model stays true to previous research, and its findings are identical to the findings that provided the justification for the entire legislative asset approach (e.g., Grier and Munger 1986, 356-357; Grier and Munger 1991, 34-39).⁸⁸ There is something curious about my reproduction of the legislative asset model, and the findings of the previous decades of legislative asset research. Most variables in the model reach statistical significance, and for those that reach this significance the level is high ($p < .000$), yet the goodness-of-fit measures are relatively low (Adj. R^2 between .277 and .473). Goodness-of-fit measures are not the sole

⁸⁸ These initial works used Tobit to determine the importance of committee assignments and constituency characteristics, producing a pseudo- R^2 and asymptotic T-ratios, but the same findings result: very high statistical significance for most variables and relatively low goodness of fit measures.

measure of a model's worth to knowledge development, and it is important to know that variables within the legislative asset model do explain some variation of PAC strategy with very high levels of statistical significance, but this situation should have sent alarms off decades ago. A residual analysis of each of the models in tables 4.2-4.13 shows substantial heteroscedasticity in the legislative asset models, calling into question the theoretical basis of the supply-side approach to PAC strategy and the public choice conceptualization of representation in the United States.

One reason why a model can have high levels of statistical significance for most of the variables and relatively low goodness of fit measures is the model's inability to explain all observations with equal success (e.g., a model's success could be the result of high levels of explanatory power for small PAC donations, but the model could fail to explain large PAC donations). To determine if the legislative asset model suffers from this problem, I plot the absolute value standardized residuals (y-axis) against the standardized predicted values (x-axis) for each model appearing in tables 4.2-4.13 (I conduct the same analysis for open seat elections with similar results, but I only report residual analysis for incumbent election models). Figures 4.1-4.12 display these residual plots, which should show a *cloud* of data points with no correlation between the absolute value standardized residuals and standardized predicted values; however, in all figures, there is a positive correlation between the predicted values and the variance of the residuals.

Figure 4.1 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Agribusiness PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006




Figure 4.2 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Communications /Electronics PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006




Figure 4.3 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Construction PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006




Figure 4.4 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Defense PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006




Figure 4.5 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Energy and Natural Resources PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006




Figure 4.6 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006




Figure 4.7 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Health PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006




Figure 4.8 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Ideological and Single Issue PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006




Figure 4.9 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Labor PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006




Figure 4.10 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Lawyer and Lobbyist PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006




Figure 4.11 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Miscellaneous Business PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006





Figure 4.12 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Transportation PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 1990-2006



These figures help visualize the potential problem for the legislative asset model. As the predicted values increase for all policy sector models, the variance of the residuals increases, meaning that as the predicted values of PAC donations increase, the model's explanatory power decreases. The significance of the legislative asset model's variables is a result of predicting small PAC donations with great accuracy; however, the model does an inadequate job explaining large donations. In other words, the variables in the legislative asset model are a necessary but not sufficient condition for receiving high net real dollar amounts of PAC donations; thus, PAC strategy may not be what the legislative asset model predicts. Table 4.14 displays a series of bivariate regressions,

using the standardized residuals to re-predict the standardized predicted values. For every policy sector incumbent model, the standardized residuals are statistically significant and positive predictors of the standardized predicted values, indicating the heteroscedasticity seen in figures 4.2-4.13.

Table 4.14 Heteroscedasticity of Legislative Asset Model by Policy Sector, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles (Derived from Appropriate Policy Sector Regression Tables 4.2-4.13)

Policy Sector Residuals	Incumbent Model	Open Seat Model
Agribusiness	.541 (.02)***	.491 (.068)***
Communications and Electronics	.550 (.021)***	.286 (.072)***
Construction	.498 (.023)***	.242 (.084)**
Defense	.683 (.018)***	.642 (.061)***
Energy and Natural Resources	.621 (.02)***	.524 (.074)***
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	.602 (.02)***	.404 (.074)***
Health	.628 (.019)***	.115 (.077)
Ideological and Single Issue	.562 (.021)***	.528 (.083)***
Labor	.414 (.025)***	.150 (.084)
Lawyer and Lobbyists	.461 (.023)***	.230 (.077)**
Miscellaneous Business	.563 (.022)***	.307 (.083)***
Transportation	.534 (.022)***	.362 (.076)***

a. The dependent variable in this bivariate regression is the appropriate predicted values from Tables 4.2-4.13. The independent variable is the residuals from those regressions.

b. ** p<.01, *** p<.001

The presence of heteroscedasticity indicates that the legislative asset model is underspecified. An independent variable not included in the model would improve the model's predictability either by itself or as an interaction term within the legislative asset model.⁸⁹ Most PAC scholars mediate this problem using robust standard errors, because, in this case, the presence of heteroscedasticity causes the standard errors for

⁸⁹ Another reason for heteroscedasticity is the presence of a non-normally distributed independent variable.

each variable to be too high; however, using robust standard errors does not solve the theoretical problem with the supply-side approach. The best way to explain this theoretical problem is with an example:

In terms of legislative characteristics, from 2000 to 2004, Maurice Hinchey (D-NY) and Sam Farr (D-CA) are strikingly similar. As incumbents during this time, both represented congressional districts near metropolitan areas yet have sufficient agricultural production to make them appealing to fruit, nut, and wine industry PACs. Hinchey represented the twenty-second district northwest of New York City, along the Pennsylvania border, consisting of over 8 percent of the state's wineries and fruit and nut farms combined. Farr represented the seventeenth district, south of San Francisco, along the Pacific Ocean, home to nearly 3 percent of California's wineries and fruit and nut farms combined. In addition, both members sat on an important committee of jurisdiction (Agriculture Subcommittee on Appropriations) with similar ideological voting records on the economy (both place on the liberal side of the left-right spectrum). Hinchey won reelection by an average of a 30 percent vote margin and Farr with an average of 41 percent. Despite these similarities, California fruit, nut, and wine PACs contributed \$58,785 net dollars to Farr and only \$1,500 net dollars to Hinchey during the same period (Jorgensen 2010, 16).

The legislative asset model does well in predicting the California fruit, nut, and wine donations to Representative Hinchey, but does poor in predicting the same industry's PAC donations to Representative Farr, and this disparity is the reason why error variance increases when the predicted values increase for the legislative asset model. The model predicts similar PAC donations to each candidate, which likely causes the error to be the greatest for the case of Representative Farr. In this example, the committee assignment is important, but a variable(s) not captured in the legislative asset model is influencing the dollar disparity between Representatives Farr and Hinchey. In addition, the dollar disparity in this case calls into question the value of constituency characteristics as a method of explaining PAC strategy. It is possible that PAC strategy has little to do with representing unorganized interests, as the public choice approach

and modern pluralism would expect. Existing studies and theoretical approaches of PAC strategy have yet to model accurately the high-dollar donations.

Building a New Model of PAC Strategy

The public choice solution to the ills of American campaign finance is to abolish government, or to make decision rules too stringent thereby rendering government incapable of responding to societal problems. Stripping the supply of political authority, legitimacy, and ability is the philosophical goal of public choice, and this goal influences empirical study of political phenomena by public choice scholars. The strict adherence to supply-side variables in public choice scholarship is an implicit endorsement of this philosophy. The purpose of this chapter was not to argue against public choice on philosophical grounds, but to put its empirical assertions to a statistical test. If the approach fails on empirical grounds, then some of its philosophical assertions come into question.

Interestingly, or perhaps purposely, while public choice scholars claim to explain all organized interest behavior from supply-side variables (i.e., governmental actors and institutional design cause organized interest behavior and strategy), their strongest assertions concern characteristics of the demand-side for legislation (i.e., the organized interest community). They claim that while rent-seeking behavior harms unorganized consumers by wasting resources on lobbying and preserving economic rent with those resources, which could be used to create wealth for the entire economy, the system of rent-seekers is in equilibrium, so those that are not organized into a rent-seeking interest but sympathize with the cause are in fact benefiting from the organized rent-seeking behavior. This position seems precarious intellectually, but it is consistent

with the public choice argument that society can only benefit from policy change if it comes in the form of controlling supply-side forces. In essence, what the legislative asset model argues is that although rent seeking is a negative value in society, representation of demand-side for legislation is in equilibrium, so no demand-side policy change is required. Public choice is pluralism in a poorly designed disguise. To move PAC studies beyond this ideological approach into a more empirical and factual understanding of this political reality (which does not undermine the fact that rent seeking is the primary purpose of the PAC), I design a model taking demand-side variables *and* legislative goals seriously.

CHAPTER FIVE A NEW APPROACH TO PAC STRATEGY MODELING

Introduction

The PAC literature is bifurcated between those that use demand-side variables and those that use supply-side variables to explain PAC strategy. Both approaches lack explanatory power. Demand-sided approaches argue that PAC decision-makers place primacy on the goal of organizational maintenance and are encumbered by the need to maintain funding streams when making decisions about which candidates should receive PAC money. PAC decision-makers respond to political amateurs, and know PAC strategy could be improved by using legislative cues, but PAC decision-makers must follow the wishes of the individual donors to the PAC. I find little evidence supporting the empirical validity of this approach to PAC strategy. The amount of PACs that could be encumbered by geography is small and using geography, ideology, and electoral vulnerability to explain PAC strategy tells only a small part of the story.

The supply-side approach argues PAC decision-makers strive to attain rent-seeking goals and will use legislative, electoral, and ideological cues to find the lowest cost legislator in order to maximize rent-seeking benefits. This marginal-cost approach explains more of the variation of PAC strategy from 1990 through 2006, but small donations drive the statistical significance of the model. As the predicted dollar amounts increase, the error variance of the supply-side model increases, which means that the model is underspecified and those missing variables could help explain the larger donations by PACs. The purpose of the third approach to explaining PAC strategy is to use geography to explain larger PAC donations and to provide a more robust explanation of PAC strategy.

The lobbying literature provides the origins of this third approach, and argues that PACs pursue legislative benefits (assuming rent-seeking goals) but will do so within the bounds of its organizational presence; in other words, PACs will use legislative asset cues in states where individual donors reside. This hypothesis derives from scholars that find lobbyists decide which congressional member to lobby by the amount of interest group membership within that congressional member's district. I call this new approach to PAC strategy the *mediated model* because a pure rent-seeking strategy is mediated by the geographic characteristics of the PAC.

Intellectual Roots of the Mediated Model

The intellectual roots of the mediated model occur in an answer to this question: why do lobbyists pursue access to some congressional members and not others? Interest groups that have PACs and that employ lobbyists are the same groups that dominate the PAC system (Tripathi, Ansolabehere, and Snyder 2002, 133), and the lobbyists employed by interest groups with PACs make contact with more members of Congress than those groups without a PAC (Hojnacki and Kimball 2001, 169). This fact raises a similar concern addressed in Chapter One: interest groups with PACs can create financial constituencies that differ substantively from geographic constituencies. If it is PAC money that buys lobbyist access, then the financial constituency is determining how congressional members spend their time and effort (Hojnacki and Kimball 2001, 162; also see Hall and Wayman 1990 on this point); however, scholars find that lobbyists decide whom to lobby in Congress via a similar decision-making process as PAC decision-makers when they try to decide which congressional candidate should receive a percentage of the PAC's budget.

Hojnacki and Kimball (2001, 163) reiterate this message and relate their findings back to Wright's (1985, 1989) research:

The results of our analysis demonstrate that PAC-affiliated organizations contacted more committee members – particularly undecided legislators – than did non-affiliated groups. We also offer evidence that this advantage derives primarily from the organizational presence of PAC-affiliated groups in a relatively diverse array of congressional districts. Once we control for district ties, we see that contributions play, at best, a very small role in providing PAC affiliates with a means of accessing members of Congress.

The reason why interest groups that maintain a PAC and pay a lobbying firm enjoy more lobbying contacts with congressional members, according to these authors, is that groups with PACs have a greater *organizational presence* around the country and are known to the politician. Lobbyists capitalize on this diverse organizational presence when making decisions on whom to lobby. It is this organizational presence and not the money that allows groups increased access to congressional members.

When comparing interest groups with individual supporters in a district and a PAC in that district, against interest groups that only give money to a candidate without that organizational presence, the lobbyists for that interest group are much more likely to make contact with the congressional member from districts with organizational ties (Hojnacki and Kimball 2001, 173). As a result, the money itself does not open the door as much as the presence of an organization in the district/state.⁹⁰

The lobbyist's decision is complicated somewhat by the issue position of the congressional member. When organizations employ a lobbyist to contact a

⁹⁰ Hojnacki and Kimball use a survey to determine the level of organizational presence in a district/state. The question wording is as follows: "for each of the following members of Congress, can you please tell us whether your group's organizational presence or base of support – in terms of members, supporters, and their level of activism – in each legislator's state or district is strong, medium, or weak to none" (Hojnacki and Kimball 2001, 168).

congressional member, and that organization has a base of support and has given a campaign contribution, the predicted probability of a lobbyist contact is equal for allies and uncertain congressional members, but increases sharply for opponents; hence, campaign donations that are given to issue opponents will increase the probability that a lobbyist will contact that foe in Congress; “thus, PAC-affiliated organizations may use contributions to try to broaden their access to legislators whose issue positions are opposed to their own when they have no district-based means of establishing contact with a member” (Hojnacki and Kimball 2001, 175).

Hojnacki and Kimball (2001, 164-165) recognize the importance of their findings on the PAC-strategy literature, but they fail to notice the full implications when they argue:

Given that groups with a sizable and easy to identify contingent of potential contributors are more likely to maintain PACs, and that contributions tend to flow to legislators who represent the districts of group supporters, we believe it is reasonable to expect that any advantage PAC affiliates enjoy in contacting legislators is derived from their distribution of organized support in legislative districts, not campaign donations per se. Specifically, we hypothesize that groups with a PAC will have an organizational presence in relatively more districts than will non-PAC groups, providing the PAC affiliates with a ‘natural’ means of establishing contact with a greater array of legislators...In this way, the same organizational attributes that make groups more likely to form and maintain a PAC also make PAC-affiliated groups more effective lobbying organizations on Capitol Hill.

If lobbyists choose to pursue contact with congressional members from areas where there are interest group supporters, and interest groups with PACs have more supporters in more geographic areas, then it is reasonable that Hojnacki and Kimball (2001) rely on Wright’s (1985, 1989) theory of PAC-strategy to buttress their findings. In their argument cited above, Hojnacki and Kimball assume that *contributions tend to flow to legislators who represent the districts of group supporters* making both PAC and

lobbyist strategy congruent with geographic constituency. My findings in Chapter 3 question this assumption, but more on that issue later in this chapter. The important point now is that Hojnacki and Kimball's findings actually negate Wright's organizational presence model's expectations. When they argue *that the same organizational attributes that make groups more likely to form and maintain a PAC also make PAC-affiliated groups more effective lobbying organizations*, they are negating Wright's paradox of PAC organizing. Wright's paradox is that PACs are organized in such a fashion as to negate their legislative effectiveness, and this paradox occurs because PACs respond to individual donors who are political amateurs, caring only about ideologically friendly, electorally vulnerable, local candidates. In short, PACs can follow a contribution strategy that satisfies both political amateurs and lobbyists.

If lobbyists mainly contact congressional members who represent interest group and PAC members in their geographic constituency (i.e., it is the organization, not the money), then this apparent reality raises a burdensome question for PAC strategy: why do PACs give to congressional members outside of the PACs geographic donor base? Hojnacki and Kimball (2001, 177-178) actually dodge the question they pose:

Ultimately, though, this study raises the question of why PAC affiliates give money to congressional campaigns. If votes are not purchased and contributions do not facilitate opportunities for direct contact with legislators, why do groups spend money in this way? We believe that the answer suggested by our analysis is akin to the rationale for giving offered by Wright (1985, 1989). Money may be given to legislators who have the support of the members and patrons of the PAC-affiliated organization in their districts. Indeed, organization representatives have an incentive to satisfy these contributors (and potential contributors), especially if they give financial support to the organization as well as to the organization's PAC. Organizations also may contribute to legislators' electoral campaigns in order to keep more of their friends in Congress.

By arguing that PACs are still rational, and give according to an organizational maintenance strategy, not a purely legislative strategy (but since lobbyists contact members based on organizational presence, there is no paradox), the authors do not acknowledge the amount of PAC money that does cross state lines.

The questions for this chapter are as follows: (1) do PACs, as organized by policy sectors, contribute more money to congressional candidates running for office in the same state as PAC funders, and (2) if PACs do follow the expectations of the organizational presence model, then does this strategy negate rent-seeking strategies? Bringing forth a large dataset, which is relatively uncommon in the PAC literature, my answer to the first question is no, state-based PACs do not give more money to candidates in that home state. The number of PACs that may be geographically bound (over 90% of fundraising money from one state) is small enough that the issue is inconsequential. Acknowledging the findings in Chapter 3, I seek to answer the first question one more time with a different, more efficient variable that allows me to combine the geography and the policy sector of the PAC into one model.

Answering the second question is the focal point of this chapter. I predict that the geographic distribution of PAC donors does not negate the rent-seeking strategy of PACs. Committee assignments, incumbency, and political party should be important to PACs in addition to the geographic location of the congressional member. At worst for the rent-seeking model, the geographic distribution of PAC donors mediates legislative assets. If PACs follow this rent-seeking strategy more often, then studies of lobbying decisions need to be revisited with better data.

Mediated Model: Data, Variables, and Hypotheses

The data, variables, and hypotheses of the mediated model are similar to those of the legislative asset model; however, the mediated model provides one additional variable to the legislative asset model: the percent of money to policy-sector PACs from the candidates' state. This variable is meant to capture the important aspects of the organizational-maintenance strategy outlined by Wright (1985, 1989) and corroborated by Hojnacki and Kimball (2001). I measure this variable for each candidate and each policy sector from 1990 through 2006 by adding all individual donations of over \$200 to each policy sector PAC and then deriving the percentage of those donations coming from each state. This variable is continuous, and measures the same aspects of PAC strategy that the state classifications measured in Chapter Three, but this new variable is more efficient because it allows me to combine the geography of individual donors to the PAC system with policy sector classifications in one regression equation for all states.

If PACs pursue Wright's (1985, 1989) organizational-maintenance strategy, then two results should occur: (1) as the percentage of money to a policy sector increases in a candidate's state, the amount of PAC donations to that candidate should increase, and (2) when this variable is significant, the amount of variation explained by this variable should be more than the legislative assets of the particular candidate and/or district. Given the findings in Chapter Three, I do not expect geography of individual donors to play the significant role assigned to it in the political science literature. An interesting test of the organizational presence model against the legislative asset model is to compare the results of the PAC donor variable with the constituency characteristics

variable in Chapter 4 (measured using Census Bureau statistics). If and when the individual PAC donor variable is significant, it will not diminish the significance of committee assignments, and the two strategies of organizational maintenance and rent seeking can co-exist (the central prediction of the mediated model).

I measure the committee assignment of the committees of jurisdiction using the assignment status at the end of the legislative session of the previous congressional member (a zero indicates no assignment, a one indicates an assignment on that committee, and a two indicates a committee chair). For incumbents running for reelection, it is their committee assignment going into the election, and for challengers it is the committee assignment of their incumbent opponent. To finish testing the legislative strategy, I include a dichotomous variable for those candidates holding a leadership position (Speaker of the House, majority/minority leader, majority/minority whip), and I include chamber seniority (the number of congressional sessions served). I measure both the leadership and seniority variable using the values of the previous congressional member. For open seats, it is the assignment of the incumbent who is not campaigning for office. Since the open seat model performed poorly in Chapter Four, I simply combine the open seat model with the incumbent model and add two dichotomous incumbent variables to measure the political party affiliation of the incumbent. I also include a dichotomous variable indicating if the incumbent is a freshman, and campaigning as the first time as an incumbent.

I measure ideology using first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores, and I measure district partisanship using the Democratic presidential two-party normal vote. This district partisanship measure subtracts the national Democratic presidential two-

party from the same measure at the congressional district level. Negative values indicate a conservative district, while negative values for DW-NOMINATE indicate a liberal candidate. The ideology measure uses values of the previous congressional candidate, similar to how I measure committee assignments. The measurement of quality challenger by political party also gives a good indication of the ideological and partisan leanings of a policy sector. A quality challenger is a candidate who has held any publicly elected office before campaigning for the House of Representatives. To measure electoral margin, I measure the percent gap between first and second place $[(\text{\#first-place votes} - \text{\#second-place votes}) / \text{Total \# of votes}]$, and I use the election results of that cycle (not the previous election). With legislative, ideological, and electoral controls, I expect PAC donor geography to coexist with the significance of other legislative assets; however, for many policy sectors, I do not expect PAC donor geography to be significant, as many PACs redistribute money across state lines, questioning Wright's (1985, 1989) conceptualization of organizational maintenance strategy.

Findings

Tables 5.1 through 5.12 show the results of the mediated model's central variable in each policy sector, with table 5.13 measuring the heteroscedasticity of the mediated model. For the most part, the results do not support the geographic nature of PACs posited by the organizational presence model. Agribusiness, defense, energy and natural resources, and lawyers/lobbyists give a significant portion of their spending budget back to candidates in states where individual donors live, but all the other policy sectors do not exhibit strategies of the organizational presence model. Agribusiness,

defense, and energy and natural resources are all industries that are rooted in geographic locations and would require distributive benefits from Congress (e.g., defense PACs would lobby Congress to maintain military installations). The primary support for the mediated model has come from state-based PACs in the agribusiness industry (Jorgensen 2010).

Table 5.1 Agribusiness PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Constant	-.033 (.004)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>	
Agriculture Committee	.082 (.003)***
Appropriations Committee	.028 (.003)***
Energy and Commerce Committee	.018 (.003)***
House Administration Committee	.012 (.005)*
Rules Committee	.01 (.005)*
Ways and Means Committee	.029 (.004)***
Leadership Position	.109 (.009)***
Chamber Seniority	-.001 (.00039)**
Incumbent (Democrat)	.116 (.003)***
Incumbent (Republican)	.164 (.003)***
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>	
Ideology	-.014 (.003)***
District Partisanship	-.075 (.011)***
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>	
Electoral Margin	-.025 (.004)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.043 (.008)***
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.118 (.008)***
Freshman	.002 (.003)
Percent Employed in Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting	.563 (.041)***
Percent Contributions to AG PAC From Candidate's State	.176 (.03)***
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>	
1992	.009 (.005)*
1994	.006 (.004)
1996	.005 (.004)
1998	.017 (.004)***
2000	.018 (.004)***
2002	.015 (.004)***
2004	.013 (.004)**
2006	.021 (.004)***
R ²	.372
Adj. R ²	.370
F	256.07
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.043
N	11,277

a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses.

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls, and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables ($p < .05$): Agriculture Committee, Appropriations Committee, House Administration, and Ways and Means Committee.
 * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5.2 Communications and Electronics PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Constant	-.033 (.004)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>	
Appropriations Committee	.006 (.003)*
Energy and Commerce Committee	.093 (.003)***
Homeland Security Committee	.009 (.006)
House Administration Committee	.008 (.005)
Rules Committee	.025 (.005)***
Science Committee	.007 (.003)*
Ways and Means Committee	.016 (.003)***
Leadership Position	.183 (.009)***
Chamber Seniority	.002 (.00033)***
Incumbent (Democrat)	.130 (.003)***
Incumbent (Republican)	.160 (.003)***
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>	
Ideology	-.001 (.003)
District Partisanship	-.021 (.011)*
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>	
Electoral Margin	-.017 (.004)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.031 (.008)***
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.070 (.007)***
Freshman	.011 (.003)***
Percent Employed in Information and Utilities	.414 (.089)***
Percent Contributions to CE PAC From Candidate's State	.018 (.013)
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>	
1992	.008 (.004)
1994	.002 (.004)
1996	-.009 (.003)
1998	-.021 (.004)
2000	-.027 (.004)
2002	-.038 (.004)
2004	-.039 (.004)
2006	-.044 (.004)
R ²	.402
Adj. R ²	.401
F	280.581
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.041
N	11,277

a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses.

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee

assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables ($p < .05$): Energy and Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Judiciary Committee, Rules Committee, and Homeland Security Committee.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5.3 Construction PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Constant	-.009 (.005)*
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>	
Appropriations Committee	.019 (.003)***
Banking and Financial Services Committee	.012 (.002)***
Energy and Commerce Committee	.012 (.003)***
House Administration Committee	-.003 (.005)
Rules Committee	.014 (.005)**
Transportation and Infrastructure Ways and Means Committee	.041 (.002)***
Leadership Position	.015 (.003)***
Chamber Seniority	.101 (.008)***
Incumbent (Democrat)	.001 (.00029)***
Incumbent (Republican)	.078 (.003)***
.189 (.003)***	
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>	
Ideology	-.015 (.003)***
District Partisanship	-.038 (.01)***
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>	
Electoral Margin	-.043 (.004)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.027 (.007)***
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.171 (.007)***
Freshman	.011 (.002)***
Percent Employed in Construction	.127 (.058)*
Percent Contributions to CN PAC From Candidate's State	.029 (.026)
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>	
1992	.001 (.004)
1994	-.002 (.013)
1996	-.002 (.013)
1998	.003 (.013)
2000	.004 (.013)
2002	.002 (.004)
2004	.004 (.004)
2006	.009 (.004)*
R ²	.41
Adj. R ²	.409
F	289.657
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.037
N	11,277

a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses.

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables ($p < .05$): Appropriations Committee, Banking and Financial Services Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee,

Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Rules Committee, Ways and Means Committee, and Homeland Security Committee.
 * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 5.4 Defense PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Constant	-.062 (.006)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>	
Appropriations Committee	.100 (.004)***
Armed Services Committee	.100 (.004)***
Energy and Commerce Committee	.004 (.004)
Foreign Affairs Committee	-.006 (.005)
Homeland Security Committee	.015 (.009)
House Administration Committee	.013 (.008)
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence	.056 (.007)***
Rules Committee	.006 (.008)
Science Committee	.023 (.004)***
Ways and Means Committee	.002 (.005)
Leadership Position	.07 (.013)***
Chamber Seniority	.003 (.00038)**
Incumbent (Democrat)	.137 (.004)***
Incumbent (Republican)	.182 (.004)***
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>	
Ideology	-.011 (.005)*
District Partisanship	-.097 (.017)***
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>	
Electoral Margin	-.018 (.006)**
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.019 (.012)
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.035 (.011)**
Freshman	.008 (.004)
Percent Employed in Professional, Scientific, and Management	.118 (.054)*
Percent Contributions to DF PAC From Candidate's State	.177 (.034)***
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>	
1992	.009 (.006)
1994	.006 (.006)
1996	.006 (.005)
1998	.006 (.006)
2000	.005 (.006)
2002	.001 (.006)
2004	.009 (.006)
2006	.006 (.006)
R ²	.298
Adj. R ²	.297
F	159.439
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.03
N	3,492

a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses.

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee

assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables ($p < .05$): Appropriations Committee, Armed Services Committee, House Administration Committee, Science Committee, and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5.5 Energy and Natural Resource PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Constant	-.037 (.004)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>	
Agriculture Committee	.001 (.003)
Appropriations Committee	.021 (.003)***
Energy and Commerce Committee	.071 (.003)***
House Administration Committee	.004 (.005)
Resources Committee	.02 (.003)***
Rules Committee	.006 (.005)
Science Committee	.007 (.003)**
Ways and Means Committee	.03 (.003)***
Leadership Position	.121 (.008)***
Chamber Seniority	.000 (.000)
Incumbent (Democrat)	.1 (.003)***
Incumbent (Republican)	.169 (.003)***
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>	
Ideology	-.013 (.003)***
District Partisanship	-.075 (.01)***
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>	
Electoral Margin	-.022 (.004)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.036 (.007)***
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.119 (.007)***
Freshman	.013 (.002)***
Percent Employed in Mining	.522 (.048)***
Percent Contributions to ER PAC From Candidate's State	.136 (.014)***
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>	
1992	.01 (.004)*
1994	.018 (.004)***
1996	.015 (.004)***
1998	.016 (.004)***
2000	.019 (.004)***
2002	.018 (.004)***
2004	.021 (.004)***
2006	.025 (.004)***
R ²	.400
Adj. R ²	.399
F	268.133
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.044
N	11,277

a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses.

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables ($p < .05$): Agriculture Committee, Appropriations, Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, Resources Committee,

Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Science Committee, Ways and Means Committee, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 5.6 Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Constant	-.021 (.004)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>	
Appropriations Committee	.004 (.003)
Banking and Financial Services	.065 (.003)***
Energy and Commerce Committee	.032 (.003)***
House Administration Committee	.023 (.005)***
Rules Committee	.037 (.005)***
Ways and Means Committee	.07 (.003)***
Leadership Position	.149 (.008)***
Chamber Seniority	.000 (.000)
Incumbent (Democrat)	.124 (.003)***
Incumbent (Republican)	.164 (.003)***
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>	
Ideology	-.01 (.003)**
District Partisanship	-.042 (.011)***
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>	
Electoral Margin	-.034 (.004)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.044 (.008)***
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.101 (.007)***
Freshman	.005 (.003)*
Percent Employed in Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Rental and Leasing	.214 (.044)***
Percent Contributions to FIRE PAC From Candidate's State	.013 (.018)
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>	
1992	.005 (.004)
1994	-.002 (.004)
1996	.001 (.003)
1998	-.001 (.004)
2000	-.001 (.004)
2002	.003 (.004)
2004	.001 (.004)
2006	.002 (.004)
R ²	.397
Adj. R ²	.396
F	285.203
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.037
N	11,277

a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses.

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Banking and Financial Services Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Rules Committee, and Ways and Means Committee.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 5.7 Health PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Constant	.005 (.006)
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>	
Appropriations Committee	.012 (.003)***
Budget Committee	.003 (.004)
Education and Labor Committee	.006 (.003)
Energy and Commerce Committee	.067 (.003)***
House Administration Committee	.017 (.006)**
Rules Committee	.016 (.006)**
Ways and Means Committee	.087 (.004)***
Leadership Position	.150 (.01)***
Chamber Seniority	-.001 (.000)
Incumbent (Democrat)	.122 (.003)***
Incumbent (Republican)	.152 (.003)***
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>	
Ideology	-.012 (.004)**
District Partisanship	-.011 (.013)
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>	
Electoral Margin	-.043 (.005)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.075 (.009)***
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.108 (.009)***
Freshman	.012 (.003)***
Percent Employed in Health Care and Social Assistance	-.086 (.064)
Percent Contributions to HH PAC From Candidate's State	9.72E-5 (.047)
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>	
1992	.009 (.005)
1994	.001 (.005)
1996	.003 (.004)
1998	.009 (.005)
2000	.007 (.005)
2002	.006 (.005)
2004	.003 (.005)
2006	.008 (.005)
R ²	.287
Adj. R ²	.285
F	167.567
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.070
N	11,277

a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses.

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Energy and Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Ways and Means Committee, and District of Columbia Committee.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 5.8 Ideological and Single Issue PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, Electoral Cycles 1990-2006^a

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Constant	.055 (.003)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>	
Appropriations Committee	.000 (.003)
Energy and Commerce Committee	.001 (.003)
House Administration Committee	.003 (.005)
Judiciary Committee	-.001 (.003)
Rules Committee	-.005 (.005)
Ways and Means Committee	.001 (.003)
Leadership Position	.032 (.008)***
Chamber Seniority	-.001 (.000)***
Incumbent (Democrat)	.06 (.003)***
Incumbent (Republican)	.064 (.003)***
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>	
Ideology	-.004 (.003)
District Partisanship	.019 (.01)
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>	
Electoral Margin	-.112 (.004)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.151 (.007)***
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.161 (.007)***
Freshman	.028 (.003)***
Percent Contributions to ISI PAC From Candidate's State	-.025 (.026)
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>	
1992	-.001 (.004)
1994	-.01 (.004)**
1996	-.006 (.003)
1998	.012 (.004)***
2000	.002 (.004)
2002	.005 (.004)
2004	-.005 (.004)
2006	.017 (.004)***
R ²	.204
Adj. R ²	.202
F	115.439
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.020
N	11,277

a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses.

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables ($p < .05$): Science Committee and Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5.9 Labor PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Constant	.044 (.007)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>	
Appropriations Committee	.004 (.003)
Education and Labor Committee	.003 (.003)
Energy and Commerce Committee	-.002 (.003)
House Administration Committee	.016 (.005)***
Rules Committee	.01 (.005)*
Transportation and Infrastructure	.009 (.002)***
Ways and Means Committee	.001 (.003)
Leadership Position	.069 (.008)***
Chamber Seniority	-.001 (.000)**
Incumbent (Democrat)	.191 (.003)***
Incumbent (Republican)	.011 (.003)***
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>	
Ideology	.016 (.003)***
District Partisanship	.025 (.011)**
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>	
Electoral Margin	-.078 (.004)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.257 (.007)***
Quality Challenger (Republican)	-.017 (.007)**
Freshman	.011 (.002)***
Percent Employed in Construction	-.159 (.059)**
Percent Employed in Manufacturing	-.001 (.014)
Percent Employed in Mining	.076 (.047)
Percent in Transportation and Warehousing	.085 (.069)
Percent Contributions to LB PAC From Candidate's State	-.046 (.027)
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>	
1992	.003 (.004)
1994	-.003 (.012)
1996	.001 (.003)
1998	.016 (.004)***
2000	.009 (.004)*
2002	.008 (.004)*
2004	-.009 (.004)*
2006	.01 (.004)*
R ²	.429
Adj. R ²	.427
F	281.31
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.017
N	11,277

a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses.

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables ($p < .05$): Post Office and Civil Service Committee.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5.10 Lawyers and Lobbyists PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Constant	-.015 (.003)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>	
Appropriations Committee	.011 (.002)***
Energy and Commerce Committee	.024 (.002)***
House Administration Committee	.018 (.004)***
Judiciary Committee	.014 (.003)***
Rules Committee	.017 (.004)***
Ways and Means Committee	.032 (.003)***
Leadership Position	.122 (.007)***
Chamber Seniority	.002 (.000)***
Incumbent (Democrat)	.162 (.002)***
Incumbent (Republican)	.082 (.002)***
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>	
Ideology	.000 (.003)
District Partisanship	-.024 (.009)**
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>	
Electoral Margin	-.03 (.003)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.123 (.006)***
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.019 (.006)**
Freshman	.015 (.002)***
Percent Employed in Professional, Scientific, and Management	.041 (.028)
Percent Contributions to LL PAC From Candidate's State	.134 (.021)***
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>	
1992	-.001 (.003)
1994	.004 (.003)
1996	.004 (.003)
1998	.005 (.003)
2000	.007 (.003)*
2002	.008 (.003)*
2004	.005 (.003)
2006	.005 (.003)
R ²	.438
Adj. R ²	.437
F	337.112
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.047
N	11,277

a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses.

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables ($p < .05$): Energy and Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Judiciary Committee, and Ways and Means Committee.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5.11 Miscellaneous Business PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Constant	.022 (.01)*
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>	
Appropriations Committee	.009 (.002)***
Energy and Commerce Committee	.022 (.002)***
House Administration Committee	.011 (.004)***
Rules Committee	.014 (.004)***
Small Business Committee	.008 (.003)**
Transportation and Infrastructure	.008 (.002)***
Ways and Means Committee	.056 (.003)***
Leadership Position	.164 (.007)***
Chamber Seniority	.000 (.000)
Incumbent (Democrat)	.081 (.002)***
Incumbent (Republican)	.169 (.002)***
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>	
Ideology	-.009 (.003)**
District Partisanship	-.011 (.036)
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>	
Electoral Margin	-.046 (.003)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.023 (.006)***
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.18 (.006)***
Freshman	.012 (.002)***
Percent Employed in Manufacturing	.011 (.012)
Percent Employed in Retail	-.049 (.05)
Percent Employed in Wholesale	-.232 (.084)**
Trade	
Percent Contributions to MB PAC	-.042 (.029)
From Candidate's State	
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>	
1992	.001 (.004)
1994	.000 (.003)
1996	-.001 (.003)
1998	-.001 (.004)**
2000	.000 (.004)*
2002	.000 (.004)**
2004	.000 (.004)**
2006	.005 (.004)**
R ²	.437
Adj. R ²	.435
F	300.511
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.037
N	11,277

a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses.

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables ($p < .05$): Agriculture Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Small Business Committee, and Ways and Means Committee.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5.12 Transportation PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles^a

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Constant	-.035 (.004)***
<u>Legislative Strategy^b</u>	
Appropriations Committee	.024 (.002)***
Energy and Commerce Committee	.021 (.003)***
House Administration Committee	.004 (.004)
Rules Committee	.016 (.004)***
Transportation and Infrastructure	.052 (.002)***
Ways and Means Committee	.033 (.003)***
Leadership Position	.141 (.007)***
Chamber Seniority	.001 (.000)***
Incumbent (Democrat)	.108 (.002)***
Incumbent (Republican)	.184 (.002)***
<u>Ideological Strategy</u>	
Ideology	-.009 (.003)***
District Partisanship	-.064 (.009)***
<u>Electoral Strategy</u>	
Electoral Margin	-.025 (.003)***
Quality Challenger (Democrat)	.024 (.007)***
Quality Challenger (Republican)	.115 (.006)***
Freshman	.006 (.002)*
Percent Employed in Transportation and Warehousing	.458 (.064)***
Percent Contributions to TP PAC	.003 (.02)
From Candidate's State	
<u>Electoral Cycle Controls</u>	
1992	.008 (.004)
1994	.003 (.003)
1996	.003 (.003)
1998	.004 (.003)
2000	-.002 (.003)*
2002	.004 (.003)*
2004	.006 (.003)**
2006	.008 (.003)**
R ²	.469
Adj. R ²	.468
F	382.83
Cook's D Min/Max	.000/.037
N	11,277

a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), with standard errors in parentheses.

b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on information about committee jurisdiction. I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables ($p < .05$): Appropriations Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Rules Committee, Ways and Means Committee, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5.13 Heteroscedasticity of Legislative Asset Model by Policy Sector, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles (Derived from Appropriate Policy Sector Regression Tables 5.1-5.12)

Policy Sector Residuals	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
Agribusiness	.240 (.005)***
Communications and Electronics	.235 (.004)***
Construction	.244 (.006)***
Defense	.254 (.005)***
Energy and Natural Resources	.260 (.005)***
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	.213 (.005)***
Health	.155 (.005)***
Ideological and Single Issue	.138 (.007)***
Labor	.247 (.007)***
Lawyer and Lobbyists	.231 (.005)***
Miscellaneous Business	.269 (.006)***
Transportation	.257 (.005)***

a. The dependent variable in this bivariate regression is the appropriate predicted values from Tables 4.2-4.13. The independent variable is the residuals from those regressions.

b. *** p<.001

With the exception of the geographic location of individual PAC donors, the remainder of the model shows remarkable consistency across all policy sectors.

Important for this chapter, the addition of the mediated model variable did not diminish the explanatory power of various legislative assets, especially committee assignment and leadership position. Those congressional members that sit on committees important to the policy sector and those select few leaders of the House of Representatives receive more policy sector PAC money.

Another remarkably consistent cue that all PACs use is margin of victory. Coefficients across all policy sectors are negative and statistically significant, meaning that as candidates face close elections, the percent of the PAC's budget going to those candidates increases. The negative coefficient indicates that as the margin of victory increases, the percentage of the PAC's budget going to those candidates decreases. The

coefficients are largest for ideological and single-issue PACs and labor PACs, which is consistent with expectations; however, the consistency of this electoral cue does not negate the rent seeking purpose of PAC strategy. Coefficient size for committee assignments is equal to or larger than that of margin of victory. The percent of the policy sector PAC budgets spent on existing incumbents shows PACs follow a legislative strategy in addition to giving in close elections.

The incumbency variable shows an interesting pattern when compared to donations to quality challengers. Across every policy sector, incumbency is one of the most important variables and explains more about PAC strategy than most other variables. Even at this broad level of policy sector, there are partisan patterns across the twelve policy domains. The only two policy sectors giving more money to Democrats than Republicans are labor and lawyers/lobbyists. Again, this finding is not surprising. Even though policy sectors will give a lot of money to both parties (labor even gives some money to Republicans, as the coefficient is statistically significant and positive), PACs will give more to one party over another. Even across sixteen years, which saw a change in the majority party, some policy sectors pursue one party over another. Agribusiness, miscellaneous business, construction, and transportation/warehousing all pursued Republican incumbents with more money than Democratic incumbents; however, only examining the incumbent variable to determine partisan PAC giving does not capture the extent to which these policy sectors choose one party over another.

The differences in being a Democrat and Republican become vivid when examining the coefficients for quality challengers. In selecting which quality challengers to support, PACs are also selecting which political party to support, and the

difference between the Democratic and Republican coefficients across all policy sectors are informative. All policy sectors support incumbents, and the difference in being a Democratic or Republican incumbent does not matter to the PAC as much as it is does when the quality challenger is a Democrat or Republican. The differences between the coefficients across political party affiliation are larger for the quality challenger variable than the incumbent variable. The only two sectors supporting Democratic quality challengers are labor and lawyers/lobbyists, with all other sectors supporting, heavily, Republican quality challengers. PACs will give to incumbents of both parties with the differences between the two parties being minimal; however, PACs show partisan donation patterns when examining contributions to challengers. The PAC system overall, from 1990 through 2006, dealt with Democratic and Republican incumbents, but when selecting which quality challengers to support, most policy sectors gave a lot more money to Republicans.

The coefficients in tables 5.1-5.12 are small because this analysis occurs at the candidate level; thus, the coefficient represents the percent of the entire policy-sector spending going to a candidate. A unit shift in the independent variable will increase the percent of the policy-sector spending going to that candidate. While the coefficients are small, this small shift can result in large sums of money, especially for candidates in need. The largest coefficients are typically an important committee assignment, being in a leadership position, and having a constituency that is employed in the PAC's policy domain. When the percent of money raised by the PAC from the candidate's state is significant, the coefficient is usually large. For example, using the coefficient generated from agribusiness spending from 1990-2006, in 2006, if there was a one percent

increase in the amount of money going to agribusiness PACs from a candidate's state, then that candidate would expect \$22,837 (1990 real dollars) more money from agribusiness PACs. The coefficients for constituency characteristics (employment in policy domain, individual donors to PACs) are not always statistically significant predictors of which candidates a policy sector will support, but when these coefficients are significant, they are large. When PACs contribute to a candidate using employment and individual donors, these PACs will give a lot of money to those local candidates. I view this strategy as leverage, following the money with personal pressure or using jobs to cast leverage over the candidate. Given the statistical significance of the geographic variable and the legislative variables, the organizational maintenance and rent seeking strategies are not mutually exclusive and the organizational maintenance strategy does not prevent legislative rent seeking. Wright's (1985) paradox of PAC organizing is not necessarily true, as PACs have developed into the nationalizing, money distributing force that scholars worried about in the 1980s.

Since the geographic location of individual donors to PACs did not explain any additional variance in many policy sectors, the heteroscedasticity of PAC modeling still exists, as seen in table 5.13. The positive value and statistical significance of the coefficients in table 5.13 indicate that the mediated model is still underspecified and only explains the variance in small donations. As the predicted values of PAC donations increase, the variance of error increases. The search for variables that improve our understanding of PAC strategy continues.

Conclusion

It is clear that PACs, as organized into policy sectors do not follow the predictions of the organizational presence model, and of those policy sectors that do distribute a percentage of its budget to home state candidates, this geographic distribution does not diminish the percent of the budget going to congressional members with important legislative assets. The difference between my study and older studies trumpeting the value of organizational presence is a function of data. Those studies that find value of having activists on the ground over an exchange of cash use survey questions of PAC decision-makers and lobbyists to determine subjectively the amount of organizational presence in a district/state. While there is merit in this approach, since activists could be a larger group of people than individual donors, I measure organizational presence objectively, using the behavior of individual donors who gave the PAC over \$200 in a single contribution. The value of this approach is that I can use the entire population of PACs in the FEC database and identify an important class of individuals in the PAC system: the donors.

Using the geographic location of individual donors as a measure of organizational presence, I find that PACs act in accordance to rent-seeking models developed by public choice economists and political scientists (agribusiness, defense, energy and natural resources, and lawyers/lobbyists act in favor of the mediated model). I find that PACs are relatively placeless entities; however, I am not arguing that demand-side forces are inconsequential. *Who* gives to the American political system is important, and all models of PAC strategy are under-specified. The search for the missing variables goes on, and this issue is the focus of the last chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

UNDERSTANDING POLITICS USING ORGANIZED INTERESTS

Why do PACs form relationships with some congressional candidates and not others? I sought to answer this question using one of the largest datasets in the PAC literature to date, and using this data in one of the first tests of both the organizational presence and legislative asset model. Case studies using only a selection of PACs have been useful to build theory, but the evidence of this study shows the limitation of using only a small selection of PACs to make theoretical claims, since most PACs are not encumbered by geographic constraints as once thought by most political scientists. Combining both demand-side and supply-side variables when necessary (e.g., agribusiness, defense, energy and natural resources, lawyers/lobbyists), I determined that PACs form relationships with congressional members who are most likely to help them legislatively and who have PAC donors in close geographic proximity. Almost uniformly, PACs give to those congressional members who occupy institutional positions of interest to the PAC, challengers from a political party more apt to act favorably in the PAC's interest, and those congressional members in electoral need. PAC strategy tends to resemble expectations of the rent-seeking approach more than expectations of organizational maintenance; however, my findings raise more questions than answers, and in this concluding chapter I offer ways to study PACs that can strengthen the overall group theory approach to politics, which is on the rise again in political science.

My findings do not undermine organizational maintenance as a PAC strategy; rather, my findings call into question the political amateurishness of PAC donors. To maintain future fundraising, it is reasonable to assume that PAC staffers must show

contributors that money is effective in politics (regardless of the true effectiveness of money) and keep donors happy. PAC staffers can accomplish the goal of future fundraising by showing legislative effectiveness in addition to electoral success, and individual donors may not be amateurs at all, calling for money to be distributed out of state. If the geographic location of individual donors represents an accurate measurement of organizational presence (as opposed to a survey with a limited sample size and subjective assessment), then organizational presence is not a prominent reason why PACs form relationships with some candidates over others, and should be no more than a control variable in future models.

PACs are the nationalizing force that scholars feared in the 1980s (e.g., Grenzke 1988), and money clearly crosses state lines at high rates, creating financial constituencies that are different from geographical constituencies; however, this dilemma may not be the most accurate way of thinking about PACs (PACs do give to candidates with constituency characteristics that mirror the PACs concerns). PACs pose a more important problem for political representation by reinforcing the political representation of occupation. The organizational-presence model solution to the dilemma of financial constituencies taking precedence over geographic constituencies when making policy was to argue that money flows into districts where individual donors reside. This solution is not empirically accurate. Money does cross state lines into states where PACs have no organizational presence, but the employment characteristics of the state are important in determining where PAC money flows. The significance of employment characteristics does not mean that organized interests represent unorganized interests via PAC strategy. Instead, this strategy reinforces the

existing level of occupational organization, which reflects poorly on most Americans' ability to become a member of the financial constituency. The lack of secondary organizations outside of the corporation in the financial constituency is disturbing, and the failure to vote on the Employee Free Choice Act since 2008 is a prime example.

Future research on PAC strategy should change in two ways: (1) become substantively relevant to policy discussions, and (2) re-theorize the demand-side aspects of the legislative market. In changing the literature in these two ways, PAC-strategy scholarship can strengthen the group theory approach to political science, which scholars have reinvigorated recently with the current economic downturn (e.g., Hacker and Pierson 2010; Johnson and Kwak 2010). The case of the Employee Free Choice Act is an example of how PAC-strategy literature can become substantively relevant to political discussions. Upon passage and implementation, this act would have made it easier for employees to unionize by not informing employers of public elections to form union. This act would have made it easier for employees in the service sector to organize, especially among younger workers; hence, strengthening one of the major secondary organizations concerned with the economics of the middle class (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 56-61, 127-132). PAC-strategy modeling can become relevant in a discussion of this magnitude by examining how political candidates marginalized the labor movement in their quest for campaign financing. When no labor party exists, as in the United States, labor must enter into a coalition with certain businesses to attain influence, typically through the Democratic Party. It is well documented that the Democratic Party relies more on corporations for financing starting in the early 1980s (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 170-182).

The supply-side model cannot account for the failure of the Employee Free Choice Act because it does not account for shifts in the demand-side of the Democratic Party. The coalition within the Democratic Party changed, with businesses hostile to more unionization filling the reelection treasuries of more Democrats. PAC-strategy modeling must account for the coalitions within each party to become more relevant to discussions of the policy process. To become more relevant to policy discussions, PAC-strategy modeling must have a more robust treatment of the demand-side of the legislative market.

Given PAC-strategy models are not robust, and small donations drive the significance of these models, scholars must derive new ways to think about PACs. No longer should we think of PACs as local, reelection constituencies, and no longer should we neglect the demand-side of the legislative market. The geographic location of individual donors is not the best way to capture the essence of demand-side PAC strategy; instead, scholars should re-categorize PACs to resemble crucial aspects of our economic structure (e.g., class and trade issues), and account for more substantive supply-side variables (e.g., election forecasts, likelihood of new legislation in the next congressional session) to determine why PACs form relationships with some candidates and not others. Accomplishing this task would also connect the PAC literature with the political party literature. The primary theory PAC scholars should use to advance the literature is *investment theory*.

Investment theory of political parties begins with a simply stated premise: if scholars, journalists, and academics wish to know who rules politically, then follow the money (if properly understood). The origins of this political theory lie in Popkin and

his colleagues' (1976) research concerning personal vote choice, finding voters' party affiliation and vote choice is cognitive rather than affective, meaning voters sought cues (or short-cuts) to minimize information costs associated with knowledge of candidate policy positions. The implication of this research is that voters try to control public policy via the electoral process, but this control is costly; hence those who are most able to control policy are those who can pay the cost it takes to control political parties. Investment theory extends this rationale by asking and answering the next logical question: who does have the capacity to pay the costs necessary to control government policy? According to investment theory, major blocs of investors, who invest economic resources into the political party, control the parameters of that party's policy options (Ferguson 1995, 27).

The political party represents investor-bloc coalitions who coalesce during elections. Investment theory's assumptions, findings, and implications are antithetical to rational-choice approaches (e.g., Downs 1957) because: (1) political parties maximize money, not votes; (2) political parties are organizations that represent business elite investments, not independent organizations detached from its financiers; (3) political party policy preferences represent those of its investors, not those of the median voter; and (4) not all policy preferences are discussed seriously by the two political parties because on issues that both of its major investors agree, there will be no conflict (Ferguson 1995, 21-36). Beyond establishing the reasons for investigating investors instead of voters to understand political party behavior, investment theory offers hypotheses concerning coalition change and coalition stability. Coalitions between investors and political parties change when: (1) there are "cumulative long-run

changes in industrial structures,” which (2) combine with “a variety of short-run factors, notably steep economic downturns” (Ferguson 1995, 23). When industrial structures and short-run economic conditions are stable, the dominant investor bloc must defend its position by “making positive appeals to some (which need not be the same from election to election) or by minimizing voter turnout or both” (Ferguson 1995, 23). In sum, major-investor blocs are the only groups of people who can pay the price to control government, which changes the definition of the political party from coalitions of voters to coalitions of investors, making it difficult (but not impossible) for voters to control political party policy positions, as the parties do not move to the center and do not set the agenda with all issues of societal importance; thus, “*the electorate is not too stupid or too tired to control the political system. It is merely too poor*” (Ferguson 1995, 384).

No longer can scholars afford to use models of PAC strategy that reinforce the pluralist vision of political representation, discounting the differences between financial and geographic constituencies and neglecting the differences between organized occupations/interests and unorganized or less organized interests. Scholars need new ways to categorize PACs and individual donors that reflect the true nature of American economy (e.g., manufacturing versus financial interests, businesses that need to suppress wages for profit and those that do not rely on low wages for profit), and to contribute to the increased awareness of group theory (e.g., Hacker and Pierson 2010, 116-136).

An increase focus on demand-side forces can account for a wide array of forms of influence in the American system today. PACs, and individual campaign donations,

are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to campaign finance, and the lack of FEC willingness to confront these new forms make it appear to be a captured agency. These new forms of influence can include front groups as allowed in the form of all donations (exacerbated by the majority opinion in *Citizens United v. FEC* 2010) and consulting fees paid by think tanks to politicians, just to name a few (Ferguson 2011, 25). The need to expand beyond the PAC system, treating PACs as part of the larger system of influence can bring relevancy back to the PAC literature.

While an increase in attention to group theory, and to the power relationships embedded in the quest for legislative success, will inevitably bring a repeat of the old methodological discussions, as seen between Robert Dahl, Nelson Polsby, Peter Bachrach, and Morton Baratz, but this new emphasis on group theory will focus more heavily on the connections between the political party and interest groups, and how economic structure affects interest group influence (e.g., Hacker and Pierson 2010; Ferguson 1995). The PAC-strategy literature can offer data-driven evidence in this resurgence; however, a re-focus on demand-side influences is necessary as the lack of explanatory power of PAC models shows the shallow vision of demand-side factors in the literature.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abramowitz, Alan I., Brad Alexander, and Matthew Gunning. 2006. "Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections." *Journal of Politics* 68 (1): 75-88.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen, John M. de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder. 2003. "Why is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17 (1): 105-130.
- Bai, Matt. 2010. "Choice, Referendum and the Midterm Elections." *New York Times*, 22 July.
- Baker, Peter. 2010. "Elitism: The Charge That Obama Can't Shake." *New York Times*, October 30.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth Leech. 1998. *Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ben-Zion, Uri, and Zeev Eytan. 1974. "On Money, Votes, and Policy in a Democratic Society." *Public Choice* 17 (1): 1-10.
- Bental, Benjamin, and Uri Ben-Zion. 1975. "Political Contribution and Policy – Some Extensions." *Public Choice* 24 (1): 1-12.
- Bentley, Arthur F. 1908. *The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bonica, Adam. 2010. "Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace." Working Paper.
- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., J. Tobin Grant. 1999. "All in a Day's Work: The Financial Rewards of Legislative Effectiveness." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24 (4): 511-523.
- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Peter M. Radcliffe, and Brandon L. Bartels. 2005. "The Incidence and Timing of PAC Contributions to Incumbent U.S. House Members, 1993-94." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30 (4): 549-579.
- Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan. 1988. "Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the 'Nobel' Lie." *Virginia Law Review* 74 (2): 179-189.
- Buchanan, James M. 1980. "Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking." In James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock (eds.) *Toward a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, p. 3-15.

- Buchanan, James M. 2003. "Public Choice: The Origins and Development of a Research Program." Center for the Study of Public Choice at George Mason University.
- Buchanan, James M. 2005. "Afraid to Be Free: Dependency as Desideratum." *Public Choice* 124 (1/2): 19-31.
- Buchanan, James M. 2008. "Cato Unbound." *Cato Institute*.
- Buchanan, James, M. and Gordon Tullock. 1962. *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Brunell, Thomas L. 2005. "The Relationship between Political Parties and Interest Groups: Explaining Patterns of PAC Contributions to Candidates for Congress." *Political Research Quarterly* 58 (4): 681-688.
- Cooper, Michael J., Huseyin Gulen, and Alexei Ovtchinnikov. 2010. "Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns." *Journal of Finance* 45 (2): 687-724.
- Crawford, Kenneth Gale. 1939. *The Pressure Boys: The Inside Story of Lobbying in America*. New York: J. Messner.
- De Figueiredo, Rui J.P., and Geoff Edwards. 2007. "Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications." *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy* 16 (3): 547-576.
- DeGregori, Thomas R. 1974. "Caveat Emptor: A Critique of the Emerging Paradigm of Public Choice." *Administration and Society* 6 (2): 205-228.
- Denzau, Arthur T., and Michael C. Munger. 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented." *American Political Science Review* 80 (1): 89-106.
- Downs, Anthony. 1997 [1957]. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Edelman, Susan A. 1992. "Two Politicians, a PAC, and How They Interact: Two Extensive Form Games." *Economics and Politics* 4 (3): 289-306.
- Eggers, Andrew, and Jens Hainmueller. 2010. "Political Investing: The Common Stock Investments of Members of Congress, 2004-2008." Working Paper.

- Eismeier, Theodore J., and Philip H. Pollock. 1984. "Political Action Committees: Varieties of Organization and Strategy." In Michael J. Malbin (ed.) *Money and Politics in the United States: Financing Elections in the 1980s*. Chatham: Chatham House, p. 122-141.
- Eismeier, Theodore J., and Philip H. Pollock. 1985. "An Organizational Analysis of Political Action Committees." *Political Behavior* 7 (2): 192-216.
- Eismeier, Theodore J., and Philip H. Pollock. 1986. "Politics and Markets: Corporate Money in American National Elections." *British Journal of Political Science* 16 (3): 287-309.
- Endersby, James W., and Michael C. Munger. 1992. "The Impact of Legislator Attributes on Union PAC Campaign Contributions." *Journal of Labor Research* 13 (1): 79-97.
- Epstein, Edwin M. 1979. "The Emergence of Political Action Committees." In Edwin Epstein (ed.) *Political Finance*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, p. 159-198.
- Ferguson, Thomas. 1995. *Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ferguson, Thomas. 2005. "Holy Owned Subsidiary: Globalization, Religion, and Politics in the 2004 Election." UTIP Working Paper #32.
- Ferguson, Thomas. 2011. "Legislators Never Bowl Alone: Big Money, Mass Media, and the Polarization of Congress." Conference Paper for the Institute for New Economic Thinking at Bretton Woods, April.
- Ferguson, Thomas, and Robert Johnson. 2009a. "Too Big to Bail: The 'Paulson Put,' Presidential Politics, and the Global Financial Meltdown, Part I: From Shadow Financial System to Shadow Bailout." *International Journal of Political Economy* 38 (1): 3-34.
- Ferguson, Thomas, and Robert Johnson. 2009b. "Too Big to Bail: The 'Paulson Put,' Presidential Politics, and the Global Financial Meltdown, Part II: Fatal Reversal – Single Payer and Back." *International Journal of Political Economy* 38 (2): 5-45.
- Florence, Robert. 1999. "An Analysis of PAC Contributions and Legislator Quality." *Atlantic Economic Journal* 27 (1): 59-73.
- Gopoian, J. David. 1984. "What Makes PACs Tick? An Analysis of the Allocation Patterns of Economic Interest Groups." *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (2): 259-281.

- Gray, Virginia, and David Lowery. 1997. "Reconceptualizing PAC Formation: It's Not a Collective Action Problem, and It May Be an Arms Race." *American Politics Research* 25 (3): 319-346.
- Green, David P., and Ian Shapiro. 1996. *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Grenzke, Janet. 1988. "Comparing Contributions to U.S. House Members from Outside Their Districts." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 13 (1): 83-103.
- Grenzke, Janet. 1989. "Candidate Attributes and PAC Contributions." *Western Political Quarterly* 42 (2): 245-264.
- Greider, William. 1989. *Secrets of the Temple: How the Federal Reserve Runs the Country*. New York: Simon and Shuster.
- Grier, Kevin B., and Michael C. Munger. 1986. "The Impact of Legislator Attributes on Interest-Group Campaign Contributions." *Journal of Labor Research* 7 (4): 349-361.
- Grier, Kevin B., and Michael C. Munger. 1991. "Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions." *Economic Inquiry* 29 (1): 24-43.
- Grier, Kevin B., and Michael C. Munger. 1993. "Comparing Interest Group PAC Contributions to House and Senate Incumbents, 1980-1986." *Journal of Politics* 55 (3): 615-643.
- Grier, Kevin B., Michael C. Munger, and Gary M. Torrent. 1990. "Allocation Patterns of PAC Monies: The U.S. Senate." *Public Choice* 67 (2): 111-128.
- Grossmann, Matt. 2009. "Who Gets What Now? Interests Groups under Obama." *The Forum* 7 (1): Article 5.
- Gutermuth, Karen. 1999. "The American Medical Political Action Committee: Which Senators Get the Money and Why?" *Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law* 24 (2): 357-382.
- Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson. 2010. *Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer – and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class*. New York: Simon and Shuster.
- Hall, Richard L., and Frank W. Wayman. 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees." *American Political Science Review* 84 (3): 797-820.

- Havrilesky, Thomas. 1990. "The Causes and Consequences of Big Bank PAC Contributions." *Journal of Financial Services Research* 4 (3): 243-249.
- Hersch, Philip L., and Gerald S. McDougall. 2000. "Determinants of Automobile PAC Contributions to House Incumbents: Own Versus Rival Effects." *Public Choice* 104 (3): 329-343.
- Johnson, Simon, and James Kwak. 2010. *13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Jorgensen, Paul D. 2010. "Campaigning on Fruit, Nuts, and Wine." *Political Research Quarterly* 63 (1): 16-28.
- Kau, James B., and Paul Rubin. 1982. *Congressmen, Constituents, and Contributors: Determinants of Roll Call Voting in the House of Representatives*. New York: M. Nijhoff.
- Kelman, Steven. 1987. "Public Choice and Public Spirit." *Public Interest* 87: 93-94.
- Keim, Gerald, and Asghar Zardkoohi. 1988. "Looking for Leverage in PAC Markets: Corporate and Labor Contributions Considered." *Public Choice* 58: 21-34.
- Kroszner, Randall S., and Thomas Stratmann. 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees." *American Economic Review* 88 (5): 1163-1187.
- Kroszner, Randall S., and Thomas Stratmann. 2005. "Corporate Campaign Contributions, Repeat Giving, and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation." *Journal of Law and Economics* 48 (1): 41-71.
- Krueger, Anne O. 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society." *American Economic Review* 64 (3): 291-303.
- Magee, Christopher. 2002. "Do Political Action Committees Give Money to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motives?" *Public Choice* 112 (3): 373-399.
- Manley, John F. 1987. "Class and Pluralism in America: The Constitution Reconsidered." In John F. Manley and Kenneth M. Dolbeare (eds.) *The Case Against the Constitution: From the Antifederalists to the Present*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, p. 101-119.
- Mayer, Jane. 2010. "Covert Operations." *New Yorker* 86 (25): 44-55.
- McCormick, Robert E., and Robert D. Tollison. 1981. *Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy: An Inquiry into the Interest-Group Theory of Government*. New York: M. Nijhoff.

- McQuaig, Linda. 2001. *All You Can Eat: Greed, Lust, and the New Capitalism*. New York: Viking.
- Milyo, Jeffrey. 2002. "Bribes and Fruit Baskets: What Does the Link between PAC Contributions and Lobbying Mean." *Business and Politics* 4 (2): 157-159.
- Milyo, Jeffrey, David Primo, and Timothy Groseclose. 2000. "Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective." *Business and Politics* 2 (1): 75-88.
- Mitchell, William C. 1990. "Interest Groups: Economic Perspectives and Contributions." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 2 (1): 85-108.
- Mitchell, William C. and Michael C. Munger. 1991. "Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey." *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (2): 512-546.
- Mueller, Dennis C. 1976. "Public Choice: A Survey." *Journal of Economic Literature* 14 (2): 395-433.
- Mueller, Dennis C. 1989. *Public Choice II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Munger, Michael C. 1989. "A Simple Test of the Thesis that Committee Jurisdictions Shape Corporate PAC Contributions." *Public Choice* 62 (2): 181-186.
- O'Connor, Alice. 2008. "The Privatized City." *Journal of Urban History* 34 (2): 333-353.
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Olson, Mancur. 1982. *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1999. "Contending Conceptions of the Theory of Rational Action." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 11 (2): 171-202.
- Orchard, Lionel, and Hugh Stretton. 1997. "Critical Survey: Public Choice." *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 21: 409-430.
- Overacker, Louise. 1932. *Money in Elections*. New York: Macmillan Company.
- Parker, Glenn R. 1996. *Congress and the Rent-Seeking Society*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Peltzman, Sam. 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation." *Journal of Law and Economics* 19: 211-248.

- Poole, Keith T., and Thomas Romer. 1985. "Patterns of Political Action Committee Contributions to the 1980 Campaigns for the United States House of Representatives." *Public Choice* 47 (1): 63-111.
- Poole, Keith T., Thomas Romer, and Howard Rosenthal. 1987. "The Revealed Preferences of Political Action Committees." *American Economic Review* 77 (2): 298-302.
- Popkin, Samuel, John Gorman, Charles Phillips, and Jeffrey Smith. 1976. "Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward an Investment Theory of Voting." *American Political Science Review* 70 (3): 779-805.
- Posner, Richard. 1971. "Taxation by Regulation." *Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science* 2: 22-50.
- Posner, Richard. 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation." *Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science* 5: 335-358.
- Roberts, Brian E. 1990. "A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits." *American Journal of Political Science* 34 (1): 31-58.
- Romer, Thomas, and James M. Snyder. 1994. "An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions." *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (3): 745-769.
- Rudolph, Thomas J. 1999. "Corporate and Labor PAC Contributions in House Elections: Measuring the Effects of Majority Party Status." *Journal of Politics* 61 (1): 195-206.
- Sabato, Larry. 1984. *PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees*. New York: Norton.
- Schattschneider, E.E. 1935. *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff: A Study of Free Private Enterprise in Pressure Politics*. New York: Prentice-Hall.
- Schattschneider, E.E. 1975 [1960]. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Schriftgiesser, Karl. 1951. *The Lobbyists: The Art and Business of Influencing Lawmakers*. New York: Little, Brown.
- Shin, Youseop. 2004. "Constituency Opinion and PAC Contributions: A Case of the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League." *Public Choice* 118 (1): 133-149.

- Shughart, William F., Robert D. Tollison, and Brian L. Goff. 1986. "Bureaucratic Structure and Congressional Control." *Southern Economic Journal* 52 (4): 962-972.
- Silberman, Jonathan, and Gilbert Yochum. 1980. "The Market for Special Interest Campaign Funds: An Exploratory Approach." *Public Choice* 35 (1): 75-83.
- Smith, Bradley A. 2001. *Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Snyder, James M. 1990. "Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986." *Journal of Political Economy* 98 (6): 1195-1227.
- Snyder, James M. 1992. "Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often." *Journal of Law and Economics* 35 (1): 15-43.
- Snyder, James M. 1993. "The Market for Campaign Contributions: Evidence for the Senate, 1980-1986." *Economics and Politics* 5 (3): 219-240.
- Sorauf, Frank J. 1984. "Who's in Charge? Accountability in Political Action Committees." *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (4): 591-614.
- Stratmann, Thomas. 1992. "Are Contributors Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees." *Journal of Political Economy* 100 (3): 647-664.
- Stratmann, Thomas. 1996. "How Reelection Constituencies Matter: Evidence from Political Action Committees' Contributions and Congressional Voting." *Journal of Law and Economics* 39 (2): 603-635.
- Stratmann, Thomas. 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?" *Journal of Law and Economics* 5: 1-16.
- Stratmann, Thomas. 2002. "Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation." *Journal of Law and Economics* 45 (2): 345-373.
- Tahoun, Ahmed. 2010. "The Role of Stock Ownership by U.S. Members of Congress on the Market for Political Favors." Working Paper.
- Taylor, Andrew J. 2003. "Conditional Party Government and Campaign Contributions: Insights from the Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverage Industries." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (2): 293-304.
- Tripathi, Mickey, Stephen Ansolabehere, and James M. Snyder. 2002. "Are PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked? New Evidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Act." *Business and Politics* 4 (2): Article 2.

- Truman, David B. 1951. *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion*. New York: Knopf.
- Tullock, Gordon. 1988. "Rents and Rent-Seeking." In Charles K. Rowley, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Congleton (eds.) *The Political Economy of Rent Seeking*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 51-62.
- Van Doren, Terry D., Dana L. Hoag, and Thomas G. Field. 1999. "Political and Economic Factors Affecting Agricultural PAC Contribution Strategies." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 81 (2): 397-407.
- Welch, W.P. 1979. "Patterns of Contributions: Economic Interest and Ideological Groups." In Edwin Epstein (ed.) *Political Finance*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, p. 199-220.
- Welch, W.P. 1980. "The Allocation of Political Monies: Economic Interest Groups." *Public Choice* 35 (1): 97-120.
- Wilcox, Clyde. 1989. "Organizational Variables and Contribution Behavior of Large PACs: A Longitudinal Analysis." *Political Behavior* 11 (2): 157-173.
- Wilkerson, John D., and David Carrell. 1999. "Money, Politics, and Medicine: The American Medical PAC's Strategy of Giving in U.S. House Races." *Journal of Health, Politics, Policy and Law* 24 (2): 335-355.
- Winters, Jeffrey A., and Benjamin I. Page. 2009. "Oligarchy in the United States?" *Perspectives on Politics* 7 (4): 731-751.
- Wittman, D. A. 1996. *The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are Efficient*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Wright, John R. 1985. "PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 79 (2): 400-414.
- Wright, John R. 1989. "PAC Contributions, Lobbying, and Representation." *Journal of Politics* 51 (3): 713-729.
- Ziobrowski, Alan J., Ping Cheng, James W. Boyd, and Brigitte Ziobrowski. 2004. "Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the U.S. Senate" *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis* 39 (4): 661-676.

APPENDIX A
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS AND THOSE PACS OVER THE
LIMITS

Individual to a Candidate's PAC

Pre-BCRA: \$1,000, per candidate, per election

2004 Election Cycle: \$2,000 (Subject to aggregate limit, but can rise when candidate is campaigning against a wealthy opponent financing his/her own campaign)

2006 Election Cycle: \$2,100

2008 Election Cycle: \$2,300

2010 Election Cycle: \$2,400

Individual to Political Party PAC

Pre-BCRA: \$20,000 per political party PAC, per year

2004 Election Cycle: \$25,000 per political party PAC, per year, subject to aggregation limit

2006 Election Cycle: \$26,700

2008 Election Cycle: \$28,500

2010 Election Cycle: \$30,400

Individual to a State/Local Party PAC

Pre-BCRA: \$5,000 per state/local party PAC, per year

2004 Election Cycle: \$10,000 per state/local party PAC, per year (Levin Funds)

2006 Election Cycle: \$10,000

2008 Election Cycle: \$10,000

2010 Election Cycle: \$10,000

Individual to Any Other PAC

Pre-BCRA: \$5,000 per PAC, per year

2004 Election Cycle: \$5,000 to per PAC, per year, subject to aggregation limit

2006 Election Cycle: \$5,000

2008 Election Cycle: \$5,000

2010 Election Cycle: \$5,000

Individual Aggregation Limits

Pre-BCRA: \$25,000 per year

2004 Election Cycle: \$95,000 per election cycle: \$37,500 to candidates, \$57,500 to national political party PACs and other PACs (only \$37,500 allowed to go to other PACs per election cycle)

2006 Election Cycle: \$101,400 per election cycle: \$40,000 to candidates, \$61,400 to national political party PACs and other PACs (only \$40,000 allowed to go to other PACs per election cycle)

2008 Election Cycle: \$108,200 per election cycle: \$42,700 to

candidates, \$65,500 to national political party PACs and other PACs (only \$40,000 allowed to go to other PACs per election cycle)

2010 Election Cycle: \$115,500 per election cycle: \$45,600 to candidates, \$69,900 to national political party PACs and other PACs (only \$45,600 allowed to go to other PACs per election cycle)

Multi-Candidate PAC to a Candidate's PAC

Pre-BCRA: \$5,000 per PAC, per year
2004 Election Cycle: \$5,000 to per PAC, per year
2006 Election Cycle: \$5,000
2008 Election Cycle: \$5,000
2010 Election Cycle: \$5,000

Multi-Candidate PAC to a Political Party PAC

Pre-BCRA: \$15,000 per PAC, per year
2004 Election Cycle: \$15,000 to per PAC, per year
2006 Election Cycle: \$15,000
2008 Election Cycle: \$15,000
2010 Election Cycle: \$15,000

Multi-Candidate PAC to a State/Local Party PAC

Pre-BCRA: \$5,000 per state/local party PAC, per year
2004 Election Cycle: \$5,000 per state/local party PAC, per year
2006 Election Cycle: \$5,000
2008 Election Cycle: \$5,000
2010 Election Cycle: \$5,000

Multi-Candidate PAC to Any Other PAC

Pre-BCRA: \$5,000 per PAC, per year
2004 Election Cycle: \$5,000 to per PAC, per year
2006 Election Cycle: \$5,000
2008 Election Cycle: \$5,000
2010 Election Cycle: \$5,000

Multi-Candidate PAC Aggregation Limits

Pre-BCRA: No Limit
2004 Election Cycle: No Limit
2006 Election Cycle: No Limit
2008 Election Cycle: No Limit
2010 Election Cycle: No Limit

Other PACs to a Candidate's PAC

Pre-BCRA: \$1,000 per PAC, per year
2004 Election Cycle: \$2,000 to per PAC, per year

2006 Election Cycle: \$2,100
2008 Election Cycle: \$2,300
2010 Election Cycle: \$2,400

Other PACs to a Political Party PAC

Pre-BCRA: \$20,000 per PAC, per year
2004 Election Cycle: \$25,000 to per PAC, per year
2006 Election Cycle: \$25,000
2008 Election Cycle: \$25,000
2010 Election Cycle: \$30,400

Other PACs to a State/Local Party PAC

Pre-BCRA: \$5,000 per state/local party PAC, per year
2004 Election Cycle: \$10,000 per state/local party PAC, per year (Levin Funds)
2006 Election Cycle: \$10,000
2008 Election Cycle: \$10,000
2010 Election Cycle: \$10,000

Other PACs to Any Other PAC

Pre-BCRA: \$5,000 per PAC, per year
2004 Election Cycle: \$5,000 per PAC, per year
2006 Election Cycle: \$5,000
2008 Election Cycle: \$5,000
2010 Election Cycle: \$5,000

Other PACs Aggregation Limits

Pre-BCRA: No Limit
2004 Election Cycle: No Limit
2006 Election Cycle: No Limit
2008 Election Cycle: No Limit
2010 Election Cycle: No Limit

Potential Errors in FEC/CRP Data, Multi-Candidate PACs to Candidates

*Includes all active candidate PACs, same as analysis

All donation files (PAC to Candidate) were merged together to create one large file, then the most noticeable date errors and those with dates prior to 11/9/1988 or after 11/7/2006, were removed (n = 513+ 6782; out of 2126273 +(513+6782)), including donations by all PACs, to all candidates (House, Senate, President). For all offices, there were 93 missing cases in the CRP data that was missing the CRP candidate ID and FEC candidate ID numbers. I deleted those items, meaning the above numbers should subtract 93 from total. For just House transactions, there were 1,671,472 total transactions; the number of transactions eliminated for being outside the election cycles for only House transactions is 379 + 4740; for a grand net total of 1,666,353 transactions, including refunds/corrections. The total amount of donation transactions (positive amounts) was 1,627,478 (97.7%) and the total amount of refunds/corrections

(negative amounts) was 38,875 (2.3%). The amount of leadership, party, candidate, joint committee transactions to candidates was 169,891, leaving 1,496,462 donations/refunds in the PAC System.

APPENDIX B
HOUSE STANDING COMMITTEE NAMES BY CONGRESSIONAL SESSIONS

Reproduced from the Standing Committee rosters of the 101st and 102nd congressional sessions and from Charles Stewart and Jonathan Woon's data found at http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html

Agriculture (101st – 110th)
Appropriations (101st – 110th)
Armed Services (101st – 103rd, 109th – 110th)
 National Security (104th – 108th)
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (101st – 103rd)
 Banking and Financial Services (104th – 106th)
 Financial Services (106th – 110th)
Budget (101st – 110th)
District of Columbia (101st – 103rd)
Education and Labor (101st – 103rd, 110th)
 Economic and Educational Opportunities (104th)
 Education and the Workforce (105th – 109th)
Energy and Commerce (101st – 103rd, 107th – 110th)
 Commerce (104th – 106th)
Foreign Affairs (101st – 103rd, 110th)
 International Relations (104th – 109th)
Government Operations (101st – 103rd)
 Government Reform and Oversight (104th – 109th)
 Oversight and Government Reform (110th)
Homeland Security (Permanent Select 107th – 108th; Standing 109th – 110th)
House Administration (101st – 103rd, 109th – 110th)
 House Oversight (104th – 108th)
Judiciary (101st – 110th)
Merchant Marine and Fisheries (101st – 103rd)
Natural Resources (103rd, 110th)
 Resources (104th – 109th)
 Interior and Insular Affairs (101st – 102nd)
Post Office and Civil Service (101st – 103rd)
Public Works and Transportation (101st – 103rd)
 Transportation and Infrastructure (104th – 110th)
Rules (101st – 110th)
Science, Space, and Technology (101st – 103rd)
 Science (104th – 109th)
 Science and Technology (110th)
Small Business (101st – 110th)
Standards of Official Conduct (101st – 110th)
Veterans Affairs (101st – 110th)
Ways and Means (101st – 110th)
Intelligence (Permanent Select)

APPENDIX C
INCUMBENTS NOT RETURNING FOR NEXT CONGRESSIONAL SESSION
BY ELECTORAL CYCLE AND POLITICAL PARTY

Underline denotes incumbent lost in general election

Italics denotes an resulting open seat election

Bold denotes incumbent PAC not active in election cycle

Plain font (no bold) denotes an active incumbent PAC that did not make it to the general election (other reasons for this occurrence are death, losing in primary, retirement, appointment to bureaucratic position, and campaigning for another office)

Elected in 1988, but did not serve after 1990 election

Ron Flipppo (D) AL-5
Tommy Robinson (R) AR-2
Douglas Bosco (D) CA-1
No Shumway (R) CA-14
Charles Pashayan (R) CA-17
Augustus Hawkins (D) CA-29
Jim Bates (D) CA-44
Hank Brown (R) CO-4
Bruce Morrison (D) CT-3
John Rowland (R) CT-5
Bill Grant (R) FL-2
Bill Nelson (D) FL-11
Patricia Saiki (R) HI-1
Dani Akaka (D) HI-2
Larry Craig (R) ID-1
Lyn Martin (R) IL-16
John Hiler (R) IN-3
Thom Tauke (R) IA-2
Robert Whittaker (R) KS-5
Cori Boggs (D) LA-2
Joseph Brennan (D) ME-1
Roy Dyson (D) MD-1
Bill Schuette (R) MI-10
George Crockett (D) MI-13
William Frenzel (R) MN-3
Arlan Strangeland (R) MN-7
Jack Buechner (R) MO-2
Virginia Smith (R) NE-3
Robert C. Smith (R) NH-1
Chuck Douglas (R) NH-2

James Florio (D) NJ-1
James Courter (R) NJ-12
James McClure Clark (D) NC-11
Mic DeWine (R) OH-7
Donald E. Lukens (R) OH-8, Location in Dataset is R_3, Unique Case ID 1417
Wes Watkins (D) OK-3
Denny Smith (R) OR-5
Doug Walgren (D) PA-18
Claudine Schneider (R) RI-2
Marvin Leath (D) TX-11
Howard Nelson (R) UT-3
Peter Smith (R) VT
Stan Parris (R) VA-8
Robert Kastenmeier (D) WI-2

Elected in 1990, but did not serve after 1992 election (1992 District Numbers)

William Dickinson (R) AL-2
Ben Erdreich (D) AL-6
Claude Harris (D) AL-7
John Rhodes (R) AZ-1
Bill Alexander (D) AR-1, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1560
John Hammerschmidt (R) AR-3
Beryl Anthony (D) AR-4, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1563
Frank Riggs (R) CA-1
Barbara Boxer (D) CA-6
Tom Campbell (R) CA-14
Robert Lagomarsino (R) CA-22, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 1585
Edward Roybal (D) CA-25
Mel Levine (D) CA-36
Mervyn Dymally (D) CA-37
Glenn Anderson (D) CA-38
William Dannemeyer (R) CA-39
Bill Lowery (R) CA-50
Ben Nighthorse Campbell (D) CO-3
Thomas Carper (D) DE
Charles Bennett (D) FL-4
William Lehman (D) FL-17
Thomas Lindsey (D) GA-1
Charles Hatcher (D) GA-2, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1653
Richard Ray (D) GA-3
Ben Jones (D) GA-10, Location in Dataset is D_5, Unique Case ID 1661 (Switched from GA-4)
Ed Jenkins (D) GA-9
Doug Barnard (D) GA-10
Richard Stallings (D) ID-2

Charles Hayes (D) IL-1, Location in Dataset is D_6, Unique Case ID 1667
Gus Savage (D) IL-2, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1668
John Cox (D) IL-16
Terry Bruce (D) IL-19, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1685
Jim Jontz (D) IN-5
David Nagle (D) IA-2
Carroll Hubbard (D) KY-1, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1706
Larry Hopkins (R) KY-6
Clyde Holloway (R) LA-6, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 1717
Jerry Huckaby (D) LA-5
Thomas C. McMillen (D) MD-1
Beverly Byron (D) MD-6, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1726
Joseph Early (D) MA-3
Chester Atkins (D) MA-5, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1733
Nicholas Mavroules (D) MA-6
Robert Davis (R) MI-11
Carl Pursell (R) MI-2
Howard Wolpe (D) MI-7
Guy Vander Jagt (R) MI-2, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 1740
Vin Weber (R) MN-2
Gerry Sikorski (D) MN-6
Joan Kelly Horn (D) MO-2
Thomas E. Coleman (R) MO-6
Ron Marlenee (R) MT-1
Matthew Rinaldo (R) NJ-7
Robert Roe (D) NJ-8
Frank Guarini (D) NJ-13
Thomas Downey (D) NY-2
Robert Mrazek (D) NY-3
Norman Lent (R) NY-4
Ted Weiss (D) NY-8, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1808
Stephen Solarz (D) NY-12, Location in Dataset is D_4, Unique Case ID 1812
Bill Green (R) NY-14
David O'Brien Martin (R) NY-24
Matthew McHugh (D) NY-26
Henry Nowak (D) NY-30
Walter Jones (D) NC-1, Location in Dataset is D_5, Unique Case ID 1832
Byron Dorgan (D) ND
Charles Luken (D) OH-1, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1845
Bob McEwen (R) OH-6
Mary Rose Oaker (D) OH-10 (Moved from OH-20)
Donald Pease (D) OH-13
Chalmers Wylie (R) OH-15
Edward Feighan (D) OH-19
Mickey Edwards (R) OK-5, Location in Dataset is R_4, Unique Case ID 1868
Les AuCoin (D) OR-1

Joe Kolter (D) PA-4, Location in Dataset is D_3, Unique Case ID 1878
Gus Yatron (D) PA-6
Peter Kostmayer (D) PA-8
Lawrence Coughlin (R) PA-13
Don Ritter (R) PA-15
Elizabeth Patterson (D) SC-4
Robin Tallon (D) SC-6
Albert Bustamante (D) TX-23
Wayne Owens (D) UT-2
Jim Olin (D) VA-6
John Miller (R) WA-1
Sid Morrison (R) WA-4
Rod Chandler (R) WA-8
Harley Staggers (D) WV-1, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1968
Jim Moody (D) WI-5

Elected in 1992, but did not serve after 1994 election

Sam Coppersmith (D) AZ-1
Kyl, Jon (R) AZ-4
Karen English (D) AZ-6
Dan Hamburg (D) CA-1
Don Edwards (D) CA-16
Leon Panetta (D) CA-17
Richard Lehman (D) CA-19
Michael Huffington (R) CA-22
Alfred McCandless (R) CA-44
Lynn Schenk (D) CA-49
Earl Hutto (D) FL-1
Jim Bacchus (D) FL-15
Tom Lewis (R) FL-16
George Darden (D) GA-7
Don Johnson (D) GA-10
Larry LaRocco (D) ID-1
Dan Rostenkowski (D) IL-5
George Sangmeister (D) IL-11
Robert Michel (R) IL-18
Philip Sharp (D) IN-2
Jill Long (D) IN-4
Frank McClosky (D) IN-8
Neal Smith (D) IA-4
Fred Grandy (R) IA-5
Jim Slattery (D) KS-2
Dan Glickman (D) KS-4
Thomas Barlow (D) KY-1
William Natcher (D) KY-2, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 2142

Romano Mazzoli (D) KY-3
Thomas Andrews (D) ME-1
Olympia Snowe (R) ME-2
Helen Delich Bentley (R) MD-2
Bob Carr (D) MI-8
William Ford (D) MI-13
Timothy Penny (D) MN-1
Rod Grams (R) MN-6
Jamie Whitten (D) MS-1
Mike Espy (D) MS-2
Alan Wheat (D) MO-5
Peter Hoagland (D) NE-2
James Bilbray (D) NV-1
Dick Swett (D) NH-2
William Hughes (D) NJ-2
Herb Klein (D) NJ-8
Dean Gallo (R) NJ-11, Location in Dataset is R_3, Unique Case ID 2230
George Hochbrueckner (D) NY-1
David Levy (R) NY-4
Hamilton Fish (R) NY-19
Tim Valentine (D) NC-2
Martin Lancaster (D) NC-3
David Price (D) NC-4
Stephen Neal (D) NC-5
J. Alex McMillan (R) NC-9
David Mann (D) OH-1
Willis Gradison (R) OH-2
Ted Strickland (D) OH-6
Douglas Applegate (D) OH-18
Eric Fingerhut (D) OH-19
James Inhofe (R) OK-1
Mike Synar (D) OK-2, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 2300
Dave McCurdy (D) OK-4
Glen English (D) OK-6
Robert Smith (R) OR-2
Michael Kopetski (D) OR-5
Lucien Blackwell (D) PA-2, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 2311
Majorie Margolies-Mezvinsky (D) PA-13
Rick Santorum (R) PA-18
Austin Murphy (D) PA-20
Thomas Ridge (R) PA-21
Ronald Machtley (R) RI-1
Arthur Ravenel (R) SC-1
Butler Derrick (D) SC-3
Marilyn Lloyd (D) TN-3
Jim Cooper (D) TN-4

Don Sunquist (R) TN-7
Jack Brooks (D) TX-9
J.J. Pickle (D) TX-10
Bill Sarpalius (D) TX-13
Craig Washington (D) TX-18, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 2366
Michael Andrews (D) TX-25
Karen Shepherd (D) UT-2
Leslie Byrne (D) VA-11
Maria Cantwell (D) WA-1
Al Swift (D) WA-2
Jolene Unsoeld (D) WA-3
Jay Inslee (D) WA-4
Thomas Foley (D) WA-5
Mike Kreidler (D) WA-9
Les Aspin (D) WI-1
Peter Barca (D) WI-1
Craig Thomas (R) WY-1

Elected in 1994, but did not serve after 1996 election

Glen Browder (D) AL-3
Tom Bevill (D) AL-4
Blanche Lambert Lincoln (D) AR-1
Ray Thornton (D) AR-2
Y. Tim Hutchinson (R) AR-3
Richard Baker (R) CA-10
Norman Mineta (D) CA-15
Andrea Seastrand (R) CA-22
Anthony Beilenson (D) CA-24
Carlos Moorhead (R) CA-27
Walter Tucker (D) CA-37
Robert Dornan (R) CA46
Patricia Schroeder (D) CO-1
Wayne Allard (R) CO-4
Gary Franks (R) CT-5
Douglas Peterson (D) FL-2
Sam Gibbons (D) FL-11
Harry Johnston (D) FL-19
Mel Reynolds (D) IL-2
Michael Patrick Flanagan (R) IL-5
Cardiss Collins (D) IL-7
Richard Durbin (D) IL-20
John Myers (R) IN-7, Location in Dataset is R_11, Unique Case ID 2563
Andrew Jacobs (D) IN-10
Jim Lightfoot (R) IA-3
Pat Roberts (R) KS-1

Sam Brownback (R) KS-2
Jan Meyers (R) KS-3
Mike Ward (D) KY-3
Cleo Fields (D) LA-4
James Hayes (D) LA-7
James Longley (R) ME-1
Kweisi Mfume (D) MD-7
Peter Blute (R) MA-3
Peter Torkildsen (R) MA-6
Gerry Studds (D) MA-10
Dick Chrysler (R) MI-8
Barbara Rose-Collins (D) MI-15, Location in Dataset is D_7, Unique Case ID 2623
G.V. Montgomery (D) MS-3
Mel Hancock (R) MO-7
Bill Emerson (R) MO-8
Harold Volkmer (D) MO-9
Pat Williams (D) MT
Barbara Vucanovich (R) NV-2
William Zeliff (R) NH-1
William Martini (R) NJ-8
Robert Torricelli (D) NJ-9
Dick Zimmer (R) NJ-12
Dan Frisa (R) NY-4
David Funderburk (R) NC-2
Fred Heineman (R) NC-4
Charlie Rose (D) NC-7
Frank Cremeans (R) OH-6
Martin Hoke (R) OH-10
Bill Brewster (D) OK-3
Wes Cooley (R) OR-2, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 2741
Ron Wyden (D) OR-3
Jim Bunn (R) OR-5
William Clinger (R) PA-5
Robert Walker (R) PA-16
Jack Reed (D) RI-2
Tim Johnson (D) SD
James Quillen (R) TN-1
Ford, Harold E. (D) TN-9
Jim Chapman (D) TX-1
Charles Wilson (D) TX-2
John Bryant (D) TX-5
Jack Fields (R) TX-8
Steve Stockman (R) TX-9
Pete Geren (D) TX-12
Greg Laughlin (R) (Switched political parties during this cycle and ran as a Republican in 1996 against Ron Paul) TX-14, Location in Dataset is R_3, Unique Case ID 2797

E. de la Garza (D) (TX-15)
Ronald Coleman (D) TX-16
Bill Orton (D) UT-3
Enid Greene Waldholtz (R) UT-2
Lewis Payne (D) VA-5
Randy Tate (R) WA-9
Steve Gunderson (R) WI-3
Toby Roth (R) WI-8

Elected in 1996, but did not serve after 1998 election

Frank Riggs (R) CA-1
Vic Fazio (D) CA-3
Ronald Dellums (D) CA-9
Walter Capps (D) CA-22
Esteban Edward Torres (D) CA-34
Jane Harman (D) CA-36
Jay Kim (R) CA-41, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 2909
Sonny Bono (R) CA-44
David Skaggs (D) CO-2
Dan Schaefer (R) CO-6
Barbara Kennelly (D) CT-1
Newt Gingrich (R) GA-6
Michael Crapo (R) ID-2
Sidney Yates (D) IL-9
Harris Fawell (R) IL-13
Glenn Poshard (D) IL-19
Vince Snowbarger (R) KS-3
Jim Bunning (R) KY-4
Scotty Baesler (D) KY-6
Joseph Kennedy (D) MA-8
Mike Parker (R) MS-4
Jon Christensen (R) NE-2
John Ensign (R) NV-1
Mike Pappas (R) NJ-12
Steven Schiff (R) NM-1
Bill Richardson (D) NM-3
Bill Redmond (R) NM-3
Floyd Flake (D) NY-6
Thomas Manton (D) NY-7
Charles Schumer (D) NY-9
Susan Molinari (R) NY-13
Gerald Solomon (R) NY-22
Bill Paxon (R) NY-27
W.G. Hefner (D) NC-8
Louis Stokes (D) OH-11

Elizabeth Furse (D) OR-1
Robert Smith (R) OR-2
Thomas Foglietta (D) PA-1
Joseph McDade (R) PA-10
Jon Fox (R) PA-13
Paul McHale (D) PA-15
Bob Inglis (R) SC-4
Henry Gonzalez (D) TX-20
Frank Tejeda (D) TX-28
Rick White (R) WA-1
Linda Smith (R) WA-3
Mark Neumann (R) WI-1
Scott Klug (R) WI-2
Jay Johnson (D) WI-8

Elected in 1998, but did not serve after 2000 election

Matt Salmon (R) AZ-1
Jay Dickey (R) AR-4
Tom Campbell (R) CA-15
James Rogan (R) CA-27
Matthew Martinez (R, switched after losing Democratic Primary) CA-31, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 3334
Julian Dixon (D) CA-32 (died on 7 December 2000, won the 2000 general election)
Steven Kuykendall (R) CA-36
George Brown (D) CA-42
Ron Packard (R) CA-48, Location in Dataset is R_9, Unique Case ID 3351
Brian Bilbray (R) CA-49
Sam Gejdenson (D) CT-2
Tillie Fowler (R) FL-4, Location in Dataset is R_3, Unique Case ID 3372
Bill McCollum (R) FL-8
Charles Canady (R) FL-12
Helen Chenoweth (R) ID-1
John Edward Porter (R) IL-10
Thomas Ewing (R) IL-15
David McIntosh (R) IN-2
Edward Pease (R) IN-7, Location in Dataset is R_7, Unique Case ID 3433
Debbie Stabenow (D) MI-8
David Minge (D) MN-2
Bruce Vento (D) MN-4, Location in Dataset is D_9, Unique Case ID 3498
James Talent (R) MO-2
Pat Danner (D) MO-6, Location in Dataset is D_5, Unique Case ID 3513
Rick Hill (R) MT
Bill Barrett (R) NE-3, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 3520
Bob Franks (R) NJ-7
Michael Forbes (D) NY-1, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 3541

Rick Lazio (R) NY-2
John Kasich (R) OH-12
Tom Coburn (R) OK-2
Ron Klink (D) PA-4
William Goodling (R) PA-19
Robert Weygand (D) RI-2
Marshall Sanford (R) SC-1
Bill Archer (R) TX-7
Merrill Cook (R) UT-2, Location in Dataset is R_5, Unique Case ID 3685
Herbert Bateman (R) VA-1, Location in Dataset is R_9, Unique Case ID 3688
Owen Pickett (D) VA-2, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 3689
Thomas Bliley (R) VA-7, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 3694
Jack Metcalf (R) WA-2
Robert Wise (D) WV-2

Elected in 2000, but did not serve after 2002 election

Sonny Callahan (R) AL-1, Location in Dataset is R_8, Unique Case ID 3721
Bob Riley (R) AL-3, Location in Dataset is R_4, Unique Case ID 3723
Earl Hilliard (D) AL-7, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 3727
Asa Hutchinson (R) AR-3
Bob Stump (R) AZ-3, Location in Dataset is R_8, Unique Case ID 3730
Gary Condit (D) CA-18, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 3758
Stephen Horn (R) CA-38
Bob Schaffer (R) CO-4, Location in Dataset is R_4, Unique Case ID 3797
James Maloney (D) CT-5
Karen Thurman (D) FL-5
Dan Miller (R) FL-13
Carrie Meek (D) FL-17, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 3823
Cynthia McKinney (D) GA-4, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 3835
Bob Barr (R) GA-7 (Lost in primary to incumbent John Linder (R) from GA-11),
Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 3838
Saxby Chambliss (R) GA-8
Patsy Mink (D) HI-2 (died in September of election year, name still on the ballot,
special election to elect Ed Case)
Rod Blagojevich (D) IL-15
David Phelps (D) IL-9
Tim Roemer (D) IN-3
Brian Kerns (R) IN-7 (Lost in primary to incumbent Stephen Buyer (R) in IN-4),
Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 3871
Greg Ganske (R) IA-4 (became IA-5 in 2002)
John Cooksey (R) LA-5
John Baldacci (D) ME-2
Robert Ehrlich (R) MD-2, Location in Dataset is R_3, Unique Case ID 3902
Constance Morella (R) MD-8
John Moakley (D) MA-9

James Barcia (D) MI-5 (Lost in primary to incumbent Dale Kildee (D)), Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 3923

David Bonior (D) MI-10, Location in Dataset is D_3, Unique Case ID 3928

Lynn Rivers (D) MI-13 (Lost in primary of MI-15), Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 3933

Bill Luther (D) MN-6

Ronnie Shows (D) MS-4

John Sununu (R) NH-1

Marge Roukema (R) NJ-5, Location in Dataset is R_10, Unique Case ID 3968

Joe Skeen (R) NM-2, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 3978

Felix Grucci (R) NY-1

Benjamin Gilman (R) NY-20

John LaFalce (D) NY-29, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 4008

Eva Clayton (D) NC-1, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 4009

Tony Hall (D) OH-3, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 4025

Tom Sawyer (D) OH-14 (Lost in primary in OH-17), Location in Dataset is D_7, Unique Case ID 4039

James Trafficant (D) OH-17

Steve Largent (R) OK-1

Wes Watkins (R) OK-3, Location in Dataset is R_3, Unique Case ID 4043

J.C. Watts (R) OK-4, Location in Dataset is R_8, Unique Case ID 4044

Robert Borski (D) PA-3 (became PA-13), Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 4063

Bud Shuster (R) PA-9

William Coyne (D) PA-14, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 4064

George Gekas (R) PA-17

Frank Mascara (D) PA-20 (Lost in primary, became PA-12), Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 4062

Floyd Spence (R) SC-2, Location in Dataset is R_6, Unique Case ID 4073

Lindsey Graham (R) SC-3

John Thune (R) SD

Van Hilleary (R) TN-4

Bob Clement (D) TN-5

Ed Bryant (R) TN-7

Ken Bentsen (D) TX-25

Richard Armey (R) TX-26, Location in Dataset is R_7, Unique Case ID 4113

James Hansen (R) UT-1, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4120

Thomas Barrett (D) WI-5

Elected in 2002, but did not serve after 2004 election

Doug Ose (R) CA-3

Calvin Dooley (D) CA-20

Scott McInnis (R) CO-3

Porter Goss (R) FL-14

Peter Deutsch (D) FL-20

Denise Majette (D) GA-4
Johnny Isakson (R) GA-6
Mac Collins (R) GA-8
Max Burns (R) GA-12
Phillip Crane (R) IL-8
Barron Hill (D) IN-9
Ken Lucas (D) KY-4
Ernie Fletcher (R) KY-6
David Vitter (R) LA-1
W.J. Tauzin (R) LA-3
Christopher John (D) LA-7
Nick Smith (R) MI-7
Richard Gephardt (D) MO-3
Karen McCarthy (D) MO-5
Dough Bereuter (R) NE-1
Jack Quinn (R) NY-27
Amo Houghton (R) NY-29
Frank Ballance (D) NC-1
Richard Burr (R) NC-5
Cass Ballenger (R) NC-10
Brad Carson (D) OK-2
James Greenwood (R) PA-8, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4493
Joseph Hoeffel (D) PA-13
Patrick Toomey (R) PA-15
Jim DeMint (R) SC-4
William Janklow (R) SD
Max Sandlin (D) TX-1
Nick Lampson (D) TX-2
Lloyd Doggett TX-10 (moved to TX-25)
Chet Edwards TX-11 (moved to TX-17)
Martin Frost TX-24 (moved to TX-32)
Charles Stenholm (D) TX-19
Martin Frost (D) TX-32
Chris Bell (D) TX-9, Location in Dataset is D_3, Unique Case ID 4531
Ciro Rodriguez (D) TX-28, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 4550
Edward Schrock (R) VA-2, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4560
George Nethercutt (R) WA-5
Jennifer Dunn (R) WA-8
Gerald Kleczka (D) WI-4

Elected in 2004, but did not serve after 2006 election

J.D. Hayworth (R) AZ-5
Jim Kolbe (R) AZ-8, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4606
Robert Matsui (D) CA-5
Richard Pombo (R) CA-11

William Thomas (R) CA-22, Location in Dataset is R_4, Unique Case ID 4632
Randy Cunningham (R) CA-50, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4660
Joel Hefley (R) CO-5, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4668
Bob Beauprez (R) CO-7
Rob Simmons (R) CT-2
Nancy Johnson (R) CT-5
Michael Bilirakis (R) FL-9
Jim Davis (D) FL-11
Katherine Harris (R) FL-13
Mark Foley (R) FL-16, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4692
E. Clay Shaw (R) FL-22
Cynthia McKinney (D) GA-4, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 4705
Ed Case (D) HI-2
C.L. Otter (R) ID-1
Henry Hyde (R) IL-6, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4724
Lane Evans (D) IL-17, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 4735
Chris Chocola (R) IN-2
John Hostettler (R) IN-8
Mike Sodrel (R) IN-9
Jim Nussle (R) IA-1, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4747
James Leach (R) IA-2
Jim Ryun (R) KS-2
Anne Northup (R) KY-3
Benjamin Cardin (D) MD-3
Joe Schwarz (R) MI-7, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4795
Gil Gutknecht (R) MN-1
Martin Olav Sabo (D) MN-5, Location in Dataset is D_13, Unique Case ID 4808
Mark Kennedy (R) MN-6
Tom Osborne (R) NE-3, Location in Dataset is R-2, Unique Case ID 4828
Jim Gibbons (R) NV-2, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4830
Jeb Bradley (R) NH-1
Charles Bass (R) NH-2
Robert Menendez (D) NJ-13
Major Owens (D) NY-11
Sue Kelly (R) NY-19
John Sweeney (R) NY-20
Sherwood Boehlert (R) NY-24, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4873
Charles Taylor (R) NC-11
Rob Portman (R) OH-2, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4894
Michael Oxley (R) OH-4, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4896
Ted Strickland (D) OH-6, Location in Dataset is D_4, Unique Case ID 4898
Sherrod Brown (D) OH-13
Bob Ney (R) OH-18, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4910
Ernest Istook (R) OK-5
Melissa Hart (R) PA-4
Curt Weldon (R) PA-7

Michael Fitzpatrick (R) PA-8

Don Sherwood (R) PA-10

William Jenkins (R) TN-1, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4949

Harold Ford E. Jr. (D) TN-9

Tom DeLay (R) TX-22, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4979

Henry Bonilla (R) TX-23

Bernie Sanders (I) VT

Mark Green (R) WI-8, Location in Dataset is R_3, Unique Case ID 5024

APPENDIX D
CENSUS INDUSTRY CATEGORIES FOR 1980, 1990, AND 2000

Industry Employment Categorization for the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census

Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Mining (1980)

 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (1990)

 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting (2000)

 Mining (1990, 2000)

Construction (1980, 1990, 2000)

Manufacturing (Durable and Non-Durable Goods) (1980, 1990, 2000)

Transportation (1980, 1990)

 Transportation and Warehousing (2000)

Wholesale Trade (1980, 1990, 2000)

Retail Trade (1980, 1990, 2000)

Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (1980, 1990)

 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Rental and Leasing (2000)

Communication and Public Utilities (1980, 1990)

 Information and Utilities (2000)

Health Services (1980, 1990)

 Health Care and Social Assistance (2000)

Educational Services (1980, 1990, 2000)

Other Professional Related Services (1980, 1990)

 Professional, Scientific, Management, Administrative, and Waste Mgmt (2000)

Personal, Entertainment, and Recreation Services (1980)

 Entertainment and Recreation Services (1990)

 Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodation, and Food Services (2000)

Business and Repair Services (1980)

 Business, Repair, and Personal Services (1990)

 Other Services (2000)

Public Administration (1980, 1990, 2000)

**1980/1990 Census Industry Categories
(1980 Census) and (1972 Standard Industrial Classification Codes)**

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (10-31)

Agricultural Production, Crops (10) (01)
Agricultural Production, Livestock (11) (02)
Agricultural Services, Except Horticultural (20) (07, not 078)
Horticultural Services (21) (78)
Forestry (30) (08)
Fishing, Hunting, and Trapping (31) (09)

Mining (40-50)

Metal Mining (40) (10)
Coal Mining (41) (11, 12)
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction (42) (13)
Non-Metallic Mining and Quarrying, Except Fuel (50) (14)

Construction (60) (15, 16, 17)

Manufacturing, Non-Durable Goods (100-222)

Food and Kindred Products (100-122)
 Meat Products (100) (201)
 Dairy Products (101) (202)
 Canned and Preserved Fruits and Vegetables (102) (203)
 Grain Mill Products (110) (204)
 Bakery Products (111) (205)
 Sugar and Confectionery Products (112) (206)
 Beverage Industries (120) (208)
 Miscellaneous Food Preparations and Kindred Products (121) (207, 209)
 Not Specified Food Industries (122)
 Tobacco Manufacturers (130) (21)
Textile Mill Products (132-150)
 Knitting Mills (132) (225)
 Dyeing/Finishing Textiles, Except Wool, Knit Goods (140) (226)
 Floor Coverings, Except Hard Surfaces (141) (227)
 Yarn, Thread, and Fabric Mills (142) (228, 221-224)
 Miscellaneous Textile Mill Products (150) (239)
Apparel and Other Finished Textile Products (151-152)
 Apparel and Accessories, Except Knit (151) (231-238)
Paper and Allied Products (160-162)
 Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Mills (160) (261-263, 266)
 Miscellaneous Paper and Pulp Products (161) (264)
 Paperboard Containers and Boxes (162) (265)
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries (171-172)
 Newspaper Publishing and Printing (171) (271)
 Printing, Pub., Allied Ind., Except Newspapers (172) (272-279)

- Chemicals and Allied Products (180-192)
 - Plastics, Synthetics, and Resins (180) (282)
 - Drugs (181) (283)
 - Soaps and Cosmetics (182) (284)
 - Paints, Varnishes, and Related Products (190) (285)
 - Agricultural Chemicals (191) (287)
 - Industrial and Misc. Chemicals (192) (281, 286, 289)
- Petroleum and Coal Products
 - Petroleum Refining (200) (291)
 - Misc. Petroleum and Coal Products (201) (295, 299)
- Rubber and Misc. Plastic Products (210-212)
 - Tires and Inner Tubes (210) (301)
 - Other Rubber Products, Plastics Footwear/Belting (211) (302, 304, 306)
 - Misc. Plastics Products (212) (307)
- Leather and Leather Products (220-222)
 - Leather Tanning and Finishing (220) (311)
 - Footwear, Except Rubber and Plastic (221) (313, 314)
 - Leather Products, Except Footwear (222) (315-317, 319)

Manufacturing, Durable Goods (230-391)

- Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture (230-241)
 - Logging (230) (241)
 - Sawmills, Planing Mills, and Millwork (231) (242, 243)
 - Wood Buildings and Mobile Homes (232) (245)
 - Misc. Wood Products (241) (244, 249)
- Furniture and Fixtures (242) (25)
- Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products (250-262)
 - Glass and Glass Products (250) (321-323)
 - Cement, Concrete, Gypsum, and Plaster Products (251) (324, 327)
 - Structural Clay Products (252) (325)
 - Pottery and Related Products (261) (326)
 - Misc. Non-Metallic Mineral and Stone Products (262) (328, 329)
- Metal Industries
 - Blast Furnaces, Steelworks, Rolling and Finishing Mills (270) (331)
 - Iron and Steel Foundries (271) (332)
 - Primary Aluminum Industries (272) (3334, part 334, 3353-3355, 3361)
 - Other Primary Metal Industries (280) (3331-3333, 3330, part 334, 3351, 3356, 3357, 3362, 3369, 339)
 - Cutlery, Handtools, and Other Hardware (281) (342)
 - Fabricated Structural Metal Products (282) (344)
 - Screw Machine Products (290) (345)
 - Metal Forgings and Stampings (291) (346)
 - Ordnance (292) (348)
 - Misc. Fabricated Metal Products (300) (341, 343, 347, 349)
 - Not Specified Metal Industries (301)
- Machinery, Except Electrical (310-332)

- Engines and Turbines (310) (351)
- Farm Machinery and Equipment (311) (352)
- Construction and Material Handling Machines (312) (353)
- Metalworking Machinery (320) (354)
- Office and Accounting Machines (321) (357, Except 3573)
- Electronic Computing Equipment (322) (3573)
- Machinery, Except Electrical (331) (355, 356, 358, 359)
- Not Specified Machinery (332)
- Electrical Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies (340-350)
 - Household Appliances (340) (363)
 - Radio, T.V., and Communication Equipment (341) (365, 366)
 - Electrical Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies (342) (361, 362, 364, 367, 369)
 - Not Specified Electrical Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies (350)
- Transportation Equipment (351-370)
 - Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment (351) (371)
 - Aircraft and Parts (352) (372)
 - Ship and Boat Building and Repairing (360) (373)
 - Railroad Locomotives and Equipment (361) (374)
 - Guided Missiles, Space Vehicles, and Parts (362) (376)
 - Cycles and Miscellaneous Transportation Equipment (370) (375, 379)
- Professional and Photographic Equipment, and Watches (371-382)
 - Scientific and Controlling Instruments (371) (381, 382)
 - Optical and Health Services Supplies (372) (383, 384, 385)
 - Photographic Equipment and Supplies (380) (386)
 - Watches, Clocks, and Clockwork Operated Devices (381) (387)
 - Not Specified Professional Equipment (382)
- Toys, Amusement, and Sporting Goods (390) (394)
- Misc. Manufacturing Industries (391) (39, Except 394)
- Not Specified Manufacturing Industries (392)

Transportation (400-432)

- Railroads (400) (40)
- Bus Service and Urban Transit (401) (41, Except 412)
- Taxicab Service (402) (412)
- Trucking Service (410) (421, 423)
- Warehousing and Storage (411) (422)
- U.S. Postal Service (412) (43)
- Water Transportation (420) (44)
- Air Transportation (421) (45)
- Pipe Lines, Except Natural Gas (422) (46)
- Services Incidental to Transportation (432) (47)

Communication and Other Public Utilities (440-472)

- Radio and Television Broadcasting (440) (483)
- Telephone (Wire and Radio) (441) (481)
- Telegraph and Misc. Communication Services (442) (482, 489)

Utilities and Sanitary Services (460-472)
 Electric Light and Power (460) (491)
 Gas and Steam Supply Systems (461) (492, 496)
 Electric and Gas, and Other Combinations (462) (493)
 Water Supply and Irrigation (470) (494, 497)
 Sanitary Services (471) (495)
 Not Specified Utilities (472)

Wholesale Trade (500-571)

Durable Goods (500-532)
 Motor Vehicles and Equipment (500) (501)
 Furniture and Home Furnishings (501) (502)
 Lumber and Construction Materials (502) (503)
 Sporting Goods, Toys, and Hobby Goods (510) (504)
 Metals and Minerals, Except Petroleum (511) (505)
 Electrical Goods (512) (506)
 Hardware, Plumbing, and Heating Supplies (521) (507)
 Not Specified Electrical/Hardware Products (522)
 Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies (530) (508)
 Scrap and Waste Materials (531) (5093)
 Misc. Wholesale, Durable Goods (532) (5094, 5099)
Non-Durable Goods (540-571)
 Paper and Paper Products (540) (511)
 Drugs, Chemicals, and Allied Products (541) (512, 516)
 Apparel, Fabrics, and Notions (542) (513)
 Groceries and Related Products (550) (514)
 Farm Products – Raw Materials (551) (515)
 Petroleum Products (552) (517)
 Alcoholic Beverages (560) (518)
 Farm Supplies (561) (5191)
 Misc. Wholesale, Non-Durable Goods (562) (5194, 5198, 5199)
 Not Specified Wholesale Trade (571)

Retail Trade (580-691)

Lumber and Building Material Retailing (580) (521, 523)
Hardware Stores (581) (525)
Retail Nurseries and Garden Stores (582) (526)
Mobile Home Dealers (590) (527)
Department Stores (591) (531)
Variety Stores (592) (533)
Misc. General Merchandise Stores (600) (539)
Grocery Stores (601) (541)
Dairy Products Stores (602) (545)
Retail Bakeries (610) (546)
Food Stores (611) (542, 543, 544, 549)
Motor Vehicle Dealers (612) (551, 552)

Auto and Home Supply Stores (620) (553)
Gasoline Service Stations (621) (554)
Misc. Vehicle Dealers (622) (555, 556, 557, 559)
Apparel and Accessory Stores, Except Shoe (630) (56, Except 566)
Shoe Stores (631) (566)
Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores (632) (571)
Household Appliances, T.V., Radio Stores (640) (572, 573)
Eating and Drinking Places (641) (58)
Drug Stores (642) (591)
Liquor Stores (650) (592)
Sporting Goods, Bicycles, and Hobby Stores (651) (5941, 5945, 5946)
Book and Stationary Stores (652) (5942, 5943)
Jewelry Stores (660) (5944)
Sewing, Needlework, and Piece Goods Stores (661) (5949)
Mail Order Houses (662) (5961)
Vending Machine Operators (670) (5962)
Direct Selling Establishments (671) (5963)
Fuel and Ice Dealers (672) (598)
Retail Florists (681) (5992)
Misc. Retail Stores (682) (593, 5947, 5948, 5993, 5994, 5999)
Not Specified Retail Trade (691)

Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (700-712)

Banking (700) (60)
Savings and Loan Associations (701) (612)
Credit Agencies (702) (61, Except 612)
Security, Commodity Brokerage, and Investment Companies (710) (62, 67)
Insurance (711) (63, 64)
Real Estate, Including Estate-Insurance-Law Offices (712) (65, 66)

Business and Repair Services (721-760)

Advertising (721) (731)
Services to Dwellings and Other Buildings (722) (734)
Commercial, Research, Development, and Testing Labs (730) (7391, 7397)
Personnel Supply Services (731) (736)
Business Management and Consulting Services (732) (7392)
Computer and Data Processing Services (740) (737)
Detective and Protective Services (741) (7393)
Business Services (742) (732, 733, 735, 7394, 7395, 7396, 7399)
Automotive Services, Except Repair (750) (751, 752, 754)
Automotive Repair Shops (751) (753)
Electrical Repair Shops (752) (762, 7694)
Misc. Repair Services (760) (763, 764, 7692, 7699)

Personal Services (761-791)

Private Households (761) (88)

Hotels and Motels (762) (701)
Lodging Places, Except Hotels and Motels (770) (702, 703, 704)
Laundry, Cleaning, and Garment Services (771) (721)
Beauty Shops (772) (723)
Barber Shops (780) (724)
Funeral Service and Crematories (781) (726)
Shoe Repair Shops (782) (725)
Dressmaking Shops (790) (part 729)
Misc. Personal Services (791) (722, part 729)

Entertainment and Recreation Services (800-802)

Theaters and Motion Pictures (800) (78, 792)
Bowling Alleys, Billiard and Pool Parlors (801) (793)
Misc. Entertainment and Recreation Services (802) (791, 794, 799)

Professional and Related Services (812-892)

Health Services (840) (807, 808, 809)
 Offices of Physicians (812) (801, 803)
 Offices of Dentists (820) (802)
 Offices of Chiropractors (821) (8041)
 Offices of Optometrists (822) (8042)
 Offices of Health Practitioners (830) (8049)
 Hospitals (831) (806)
 Nursing and Personal Care Facilities (832) (805)
Legal Services (841) (81)
Educational Services (860) (829)
 Elementary and Secondary Schools (842) (821)
 Colleges and Universities (850) (822)
 Business, Trade, and Vocational Schools (851) (824)
 Libraries (852) (823)
Job Training and Vocational Rehabilitation Services (861) (833)
Child Day Care Services (862) (835)
Residential Care Facilities, Without Nursing (870) (836)
Social Services (871) (832, 839)
Museums, Art Galleries, and Zoos (872) (84)
Religious Organizations (880) (866)
Membership Organizations (881) (861-865, 869)
Engineering, Architectural, and Surveying Services (882) (891)
Accounting, Auditing, and Bookkeeping Services (890) (893)
Non-Commercial Educational and Scientific Research (891) (892)
Misc. Professional and Related Services (892) (899)

Public Administration (900-932)

Executive and Legislative Offices (900) (911-913)
General Government (901) (919)
Justice, Public Order, and Safety (910) (92)

Public Finance, Taxation, and Monetary Policy (921) (93)
Administration of Human Resources Programs (922) (94)
Administration of Environmental Quality and Housing Programs (930) (95)
Administration of Economic Programs (931) (96)
National Security and International Affairs (932) (97)

**2000 Census Industry Categories
(2000 Census) and (2000 North American Industrial Classification System)**

Agriculture, forestry, Fishing, and Hunting (001-036) (11)

Crop Production (017) (111)
Animal Production (018) (112)
Forestry, Except Logging (019) (1131, 1132)
Logging (027) (1133)
Fishing, Hunting, and Trapping (028) (114)
Support Activities for Agriculture and Forestry (029) (115)

Mining (037-056) (21)

Oil and Gas Extraction (037) (211)
Coal Mining (038) (2121)
Metal Ore Mining (039) (2122)
Non-Metallic Mineral Mining and Quarrying (047) (2123)
Not Specified Type of Mining (048) (part 21)
Support Activities for Mining (049) (213)

Construction (077-106) (23)

Manufacturing (107-406)

Animal Food, Grain, and Oilseed Milling (107) (3111, 3112)
Sugar and Confectionery Products (108) (3113)
Fruit and Vegetable Preserving and Specialty Food Manufacturing (109) (3114)
Dairy Product Manufacturing (117) (3115)
Animal Slaughtering and Processing (118) (3116)
Retail Bakeries (119) (311811)
Bakeries, Except Retail (127) (3118, Except 311811)
Seafood and Other Misc. Foods (128) (3117, 3119)
Not Specified Food Industries (129) (part 311)
Beverage Manufacturing (137) (3121)
Tobacco Manufacturing (139) (3122)
Fiber, Yarn, and Thread Mills (147) (3131)
Fabric Mills, Except Knitting (148) (3132, Except 31324)
Textile and Fabric Finishing and Coating Mills (149) (3133)
Carpets and Rugs Manufacturing (157) (31411)
Textile Product Mills Except Carpets and Rugs (159) (314, Except 31411)
Knitting Mills (167) (31324, 3151)

Cut and Sew Apparel Manufacturing (168) (3152)
Apparel Accessories and Other Apparel Manufacturing (169) (3159)
Footwear Manufacturing (177) (3162)
Leather Tanning and Products, Except Footwear Manufacturing (179) (3161, 3169)
Sawmills and Wood Preservation (377) (3211)
Veneer, Plywood, and Engineered Wood Products (378) (3212)
Prefabricated Wood Buildings and Mobile Homes (379) (321991, 321992)
Misc. Wood Products (387) (3219, Except 321991, 321992)
Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Mills (187) (3221)
Paperboard Containers and Boxes (188) (32221)
Misc. Paper and Pulp Products (189) (32222, 32223, 32229)
Printing and Related Support Activities (199) (323)
Petroleum Refining (207) (32411)
Misc. Petroleum and Coal Products (209) (32412, 32419)
Resin, Synthetic Rubber and Fibers, and Filaments Manufacturing (217) (3252)
Agricultural Chemical Manufacturing (218) (3253)
Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing (219) (3254)
Paint, Coating, and Adhesives Manufacturing (227) (3255)
Soap, Cleaning Compound, and Cosmetic Manufacturing (228) (3256)
Industrial and Misc. Chemicals (229) (3251, 3259)
Plastics Product Manufacturing (237) (3261)
Tire Manufacturing (238) (32621)
Rubber Products, Except Tires, Manufacturing (239) (32622, 32629)
Pottery, Ceramics, and Related Products Manufacturing (247) (32711)
Structural Clay Product Manufacturing (248) (32712)
Glass and Glass Product Manufacturing (249) (3272)
Cement, Concrete, Lime, and Gypsum Product Manufacturing (257) (3273, 3274)
Misc. Non-Metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing (259) (3279)
Iron and Steel Mills and Steel Product Manufacturing (267) (3311, 3312)
Aluminum Production and Processing (268) (3313)
Nonferrous Metal, Except Aluminum, Production and Processing (269) (3314)
Foundries (277) (3315)
Metal Forgings and Stampings (278) (3321)
Cutlery and Hand Tool Manufacturing (279) (3322)
Structural Metals and Tank and Shipping Container Manufacturing (287) (3323, 3324)
Machine Shops, Turned Product, Screw, Nut, and Bolt Manufacturing (288) (3327)
Coating, Engraving, Heat Treating and Allied Activities (289) (3328)
Ordnance (297) (332992-332995)
Misc. Fabricated Metal Products Manufacturing (298) (3325, 3326, 3329, Except 332992-332995)
Not Specified Metal Industries (299) (part 331, part 332)
Agricultural Implement Manufacturing (307) (33311)
Construction Mining and Oil Field Machinery Manufacturing (308) (33312, 33313)
Commercial and Service Industry Machinery Manufacturing (309) (3333)
Metalworking Machinery Manufacturing (317) (3335)
Engines, Turbines, and Power Transmission Equipment Manufacturing (318) (3336)

Machinery Manufacturing (319) (3332, 3334, 3339)
Not Specified Machinery Manufacturing (329) (part 333)
Computer and Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing (336) (3341)
Communications, Audio, and Video Equipment Manufacturing (337) (3342, 3343)
Navigational, Measuring, Electromedical, and Control Instruments Manufacturing (338) (3345)
Electronic Component and Product Manufacturing (339) (3344, 3346)
Household Appliance Manufacturing (347) (3352)
Electrical Lighting, Equipment, and Supplies Manufacturing (349) (3351, 3353, 3359)
Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment Manufacturing (357) (3361, 3362, 3363)
Aircraft and Parts Manufacturing (358) (336411-336413)
Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing (359) (336414-336419)
Railroad Rolling Stock Manufacturing (367) (3365)
Ship and Boat Building (368) (3366)
Other Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (369) (3369)
Furniture and Related Products Manufacturing (389) (337)
Medical Equipment and Supplies Manufacturing (396) (3391)
Toys, Amusement, and Sporting Goods Manufacturing (397) (33992, 33993)
Misc. Manufacturing (398) (3399, Except 33992, 33993)
Not Specified Manufacturing Industries (399) (Part 3133)

Wholesale Trade

Motor Vehicles, Parts and Supplies (407) (4211)
Furniture and Home Furnishings (408) (4212)
Lumber and Other Construction Materials (409) (4213)
Professional and Commercial Equipment and Supplies (417) (4214)
Metals and Minerals, Except Petroleum (418) (4215)
Electrical Goods (419) (4216)
Hardware, Plumbing and Heating Equipment, and Supplies (426) (4217)
Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies (427) (4218)
Recyclable Material (428) (42193)
Misc. Durable Goods (429) (4219, Except 42193)
Paper and Paper Product Wholesalers (437) (4221)
Drugs, Sundries, and Chemical and Allied Product Wholesalers (438) (4222, 4226)
Apparel, Fabrics, and Notions Wholesalers (439) (4223)
Groceries and Related Product Wholesalers (447) (4224)
Farm Product Raw Material Wholesalers (448) (4225)
Petroleum and Petroleum Product Wholesalers (449) (4227)
Alcoholic Beverage Wholesalers (456) (4228)
Farm Supplies Wholesalers (457) (42291)
Misc. Non-Durable Goods Wholesalers (458) (4229, Except 42291)
Not Specified Wholesale Trade (459) (Part 42)

Retail Trade

Automobile Dealers (467) (4411)
Other Motor Vehicle Dealers (468) (4412)

Auto Parts, Accessories, and Tire Stores (469) (4413)
Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores (477) (442)
Household Appliance Stores (478) (44311)
Radio, TV, and Computer Stores (479) (443112, 44312)
Building Material and Supplies Dealers (487) (4441, Except 44413)
Hardware Stores (448) (44413)
Lawn and Garden Equipment and Supplies Stores (489) (4442)
Grocery Stores (497) (4451)
Specialty Food Stores (498) (4452)
Beer, Wine, and Liquor Stores (499) (4453)
Pharmacies and Drug Stores (507) (44611)
Health and Personal Care, Except Drug Stores (508) (446, Except 44611)
Gasoline Stations (509) (447)
Clothing and Accessories, Except Shoe Stores (517) (448, Except 44821, 4483)
Shoe Stores (518) (44821)
Jewelry, Luggage, and Leather Goods Stores (519) (4483)
Sporting Goods, Camera, and Hobby and Toy Stores (527) (44313, 45111, 45112)
Sewing, Needlework and Piece Goods Stores (528) (45113)
Music Stores (529) (45114, 45122)
Book Stores and News Dealers (537) (45121)
Department Stores (538) (45211)
Misc. General Merchandise Stores (539) (4529)
Retail Florists (547) (4531)
Office Supplies and Stationary Stores (548) (45321)
Used Merchandise Stores (549) (4533)
Gift, Novelty, and Souvenir Shops (557) (45322)
Misc. Retail Stores (558) (4539)
Electronic Shopping and Mail-Order Houses (559) (4541)
Vending Machine Operators (567) (4542)
Fuel Dealers (568) (45431)
Other Direct Selling Establishments (569) (45439)
Not Specified Retail Trade (579) (Part 4445)

Transportation and Warehousing

Air Transportation (607) (481)
Rail Transportation (608) (482)
Water Transportation (609) (483)
Truck Transportation (617) (484)
Bus Service and Urban Transit (618) (4851, 4852, 4854-4859)
Taxi and Limousine Service (619) (4853)
Pipeline Transportation (627) (486)
Scenic and Sightseeing Transportation (628) (487)
Services Incidental to Transportation (629) (488)
Postal Service (637) (491)
Couriers and Messengers (638) (492)
Warehousing and Storage (639) (493)

Information and Utilities (57-76, 647-686) (22, 51)

Utilities

- Electric Power Generation Transmission and Distribution (57) (2211)
- Natural Gas Distribution (58) (2212)
- Electric and Gas and Other Combinations (59) (Part 2211, 2212)
- Water, Steam, Air-Conditioning, and Irrigation Systems (67) (22131, 22133)
- Sewage Treatment Facilities (68) (22132)
- Not Specified Utilities (69) (Part 22)

Information

- Newspaper Publishing (647) (51111)
- Publishing Except for Newspaper and Software (648) (5111, Except 51111)
- Software Publishing (649) (5112)
- Motion Pictures and Video Industries (657) (5121)
- Sound Recording Industries (659) (5122)
- Radio and Television Broadcasting and Cable (667) (5131, 5132)
- Wired Telecommunications Carriers (668) (51331)
- Other Telecommunication Services (669) (5133, Except 51331)
- Libraries and Archives (677) (51412)
- Other Information Services (678) (5141, Except 51412)
- Data Processing Services (679) (5142)

Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Rental and Leasing (687-726) (52, 53)

Finance and Insurance

- Banking and Related Activities (687) (521, 52211, 52219)
- Savings Institutions, Including Credit Unions (688) (52212, 52213)
- Non-Depository Credit and Related Activities (689) (5222, 5223)
- Securities, Commodities, Funds, Trusts, and Other Financial Investments (697) (523, 525)
- Insurance Carriers and Related Activities (699) (524)

Real Estate and Rental and Leasing

- Real Estate (707) (531)
- Automotive Equipment Rental and Leasing (708) (5321)
- Video Tape and Disk Rental (717) (53223)
- Other Consumer Goods Rental (718) (53221, 53222, 53229, 5323)
- Commercial, Industrial, and Other Intangible Assets Rental and Leasing (719) (5324, 533)

Professional, Scientific, Management, Administrative, and Waste Management Services (727-785) (54-56)

Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services

- Legal Services (727) (5411)
- Accounting, Tax Preparation, Bookkeeping and Payroll Services (728) (5412)
- Architectural, Engineering, and Related Services (729) (5413)
- Specialized Design Services (737) (5414)
- Computer Systems Design and Related Services (738) (5415)

- Management, Scientific and Technical Consulting Services (739) (5416)
- Scientific Research and Development Services (746) (5417)
- Advertising and Related Services (747) (5418)
- Veterinary Services (748) (54194)
- Other Professional, Scientific, Technical Services (749) (5419, Except 54194)
- Management of Companies and Enterprises
 - Management of Companies and Enterprises (757) (55)
- Administrative and Support and Waste Management Services
 - Employment Services (758) (5613)
 - Business Support Services (759) (5614)
 - Travel Arrangement and Reservation Services (767) (5615)
 - Investigation and Security Services (768) (5616)
 - Services to Buildings and Dwellings (769) (5617, Except 56173)
 - Landscaping Services (777) (56173)
 - Other Administrative and Other Support Services (778) (5611, 5612, 5619)
 - Waste Management and Remediation Services (779) (562)

Health Care and Social Assistance (797-855) (62)

- Offices of Physicians (797) (6211)
- Offices of Dentists (798) (6212)
- Offices of Chiropractors (799) (62131)
- Offices of Optometrists (807) (62132)
- Offices of Other Health Practitioners (808) (6213, Except 62131, 62132)
- Outpatient Care Centers (809) (6214)
- Home Health Care Services (817) (6216)
- Other Health Care Services (818) (6215, 6219)
- Hospitals (819) (622)
- Nursing Care Facilities (827) (6231)
- Residential Care Facilities, Without Nursing (829) (6232, 6233, 6239)
- Individual and Family Services (837) (6241)
- Community Food and Housing, and Emergency Services (838) (6242)
- Vocational Rehabilitation Services (839) (6243)
- Child Day Care Services (847) (6244)

Educational Services (786-796) (61)

- Elementary and Secondary Schools (786) (6111)
- Colleges and Universities, Including Junior Colleges (787) (6112, 6113)
- Business, Technical, and Trade Schools and Training (788) (6114, 6115)
- Other Schools, Instruction, and Educational Services (789) (6116, 6117)

Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodation, Food Services (856-865) (71)

- Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
 - Independent Artists, Performing Arts, Spectator Sports, and Related Industries (856) (711)
 - Museums, Art Galleries, Historical Sites, and Similar Institutions (857) (712)
 - Bowling Centers (858) (71395)

Other Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries (859) (713, Except 71395)

Accommodation and Food Services

Traveler Accommodation (866) (7211)

Recreational Vehicle Parks and Camps, and Rooming and Boarding Houses (867) (7212, 7213)

Restaurants and Other Food Services (868) (722, Except 7224)

Drinking Places, Alcoholic Beverages (869) (7224)

Other Services (Not Public Administration) (877-936) (81)

Automotive Repair and Maintenance (877) (8111, Except 811192)

Car Washes (878) (811192)

Electronic and Precision Equipment Repair and Maintenance (879) (8112)

Commercial and Industrial Machinery and Equipment Repair and Maintenance (887) (8113)

Personal and Household Goods Repair and Maintenance (888) (8114, Except 81143)

Footwear and Leather Goods Repair (889) (81143)

Barber Shops (897) (812111)

Beauty Salons (898) (812112)

Nail Salons and Other Personal Care Services (899) (812113, 81219)

Dry Cleaning and Laundry Services (907) (8123)

Funeral Homes, Cemeteries and Crematories (908) (8122)

Other Personal Services (909) (8129)

Religious Organizations (916) (8131)

Civic, Social, Advocacy Organizations, and Grantmaking and Giving Services (917) (8132, 8133, 8134)

Labor Unions (918) (81393)

Business, Professional, Political, and Similar Organizations (919) (8139, Except 81393)

Public Administration

Executive Offices and Legislative Bodies (937) (92111, 92112, 92114, Part 92115)

Public Finance Activities (938) (92113)

Other General Government and Support (939) (92119)

Justice, Public Order, and Safety Activities (947) (922, Part 92115)

Administration of Human Resource Programs (948) (923)

Administration of Environmental Quality and Housing Programs (949) (924, 925)

Administration of Economic Programs and Space Research (957) (926, 927)

National Security and International Affairs (959) (928, Except 928110)