Kickham, KennethEngland, Jessica2020-04-172020-04-172009(AlmaMMSId)9973315385202196https://hdl.handle.net/11244/323889Supporters of term limits argued that they would decrease interest group influence. Using data from 24 states from 1998 to 2008, this paper finds that this assumption is not the case. This analysis finds that states with term limits have higher numbers of lobbyists and campaign contributions than those states without term limits. This suggests that interest groups have become more entrenched in term limited states and have become more influence in the inexperience legislatures.All rights reserved by the author, who has granted UCO Chambers Library the non-exclusive right to share this material in its online repositories. Contact UCO Chambers Library's Digital Initiatives Working Group at diwg@uco.edu for the permission policy on the use, reproduction or distribution of this material.Term limits (Public office)LobbyistsAcademic theses(OCoLC)ocn430824902;(OCoLC)430824902