Daniel Sutter2016-01-142016-03-302016-01-142016-03-302003-07-01Sutter, D. (2003). Durable Constitutional Rules and Rent Seeking. Public Finance Review, 31(4), 413-428. doi: 10.1177/1091142103031004004http://hdl.handle.net/11244/25354Many constitutional political economists argue that the length of time constitutions remain in effect distinguishes constitutional politics from legislative politics. The author explores the role of constitutional durability in a repeated rent-seeking game. A general interest (e.g., consumers) in the game can lobby for a constitutional prohibition that prevents the rent-seeking contest from occurring. A durable constitution can reduce expected rent-seeking expenditures if constitutional politics occurs less frequently than legislative politics, stable rights to receive rents do not exist, and the general interest has a longer time horizon than rent seekers. Under these conditions, general interest lobbying for a constitutional prohibition denies transfers to future rent seekers unable to participate in politics today.en-USRent seekingconstitutional political economyrent dissipationDurable Constitutional Rules and Rent SeekingResearch Article10.1177/1091142103031004004false